The Agent in the Deed: Towards an Expressivist Theory of Action
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2015
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Haverford College. Department of Philosophy
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Thesis
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eng
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Abstract
My aim in this paper will be to examine the relation between an agent’s intentions and her actions. I will look at two different ways of approaching the relation: the causal framework and the expressivist framework, and I will attempt to put forth my own critiques of each. The causal theorists I refer to in my paper approach the question from an analytic standpoint, discussing the mechanisms of the act and attempting to understand human action by breaking it down into its simplest and most basic form. I will claim that in doing so, they lose sight of the big picture and the importance of understanding action phenomenologically. The expressivist theorists oppose the causalists from the beginning by assuming an essential difference between human action and mere events, thus seeking to characterize that difference rather than explain it. Expressivists provide what I consider to be a more phenomenologically accurate view of action, producing the beginnings of an artful perspective on human action. I will attempt to defend and enrich the expressivist understanding of human action, while also illuminating the places where the theory still needs to be filled out.