Second Murder: - He not made with it (coeur). He is a dangerous thing. He makes a man a coward; a man cannot stand but it seizes him; he cannot run but it checks him; it is a rushing strange spirit that mutinies in a man's bosom; it falls on face of obstacles; it makes me once resolve a fiend had found. -

King Richard III, i, i.
When our common ancestor
dying, after the scene of his
first consciences, heard the
voice of the Lord in the cave
of Horeb, he was listening
to the voice of conscience when
Cain heard his brother's (Heb.
Heb. 11:7) crying to him from the
ground; then, so it tells us,
when Moses heard the sound
free, "sounding trumpet, the voice of the Lord," he
heard and obeyed. Conscience
which spoke, Conscience warned
Balaam in the nurse's way
not to meddle with the will of
the Lord, conscience held
Souls for faith in prison
Though his friends had pro-
vided a way I escape, con-
science sent. Mourn bitter
At Worns. Though thou
had been a mighty devil in
the city on the lake, I to
houses. As this question moment
in history, every religious
reform, all acts of personal
bravery and heroism have been
accomplished at the bidding
of that sovereign power which
men have called conscience. So
much can be freely said with-
out fear of contradiction. When
however it becomes a question
I am the one defining this
something which all feel
acknowledged to be pointed in the conscious life. More, each thinker acts with singleness along his own road. Theory confirms what his neighbor has gone assenting. Would we attempt to follow these various by ways? I thought he was soon blunted without in endless mergo of contradication and confusion, and whether the result could repay the labor and time is quite an open question. The life main facts which thinkers have followed in dealing with this interesting subject may, however. In virtue with care and perfect analysis these points on the theological and the scientific
...those who follow the former
worse group are in the theological
school, those who follow
the latter, in the scientific
school.

The writers of the theological
school, among whom are included
eminent philosophers such as
Hume and Hume, speak of
conscience as the voice of moral
sentiments, or a divine genius or
morning star in man, which
represent in us an "inscrutable
moral and guide." Or as Hume
put it, "It is in the revelation
of this opinion to the national
and self-consciousness." In many
respects this view is beautiful
and satisfactory. It defines
for us the exact way in which
The divine power reveals itself to the human heart. And in doing this it not only assures us of the immortality of the soul, but helps us in our another great philosophical difficulty. It gives me a rational basis for belief in a personal God, who is not dependent upon our creative imagination. If the ethical moral question of the human soul is acknowledged to be the voice of God, we cease to be moral beings if we feel the necessity of some higher power to reward right and punish wrong and who, therefore, presides over the universe of a God and we become endowed with the immortality of his works.
also explains the immorality
of the mere sense and furnishes
a conclusive argument for the
infallibility I have assumed. It is immediately
evident how such a theory as
this exerts and dignifies man
and removes him by an infinite
interval from the lower
depth. But when it comes
to many things unexplained. How
are we to account for the
difference between the
Christian
mind in its
sense of duty, versus her infor
ment into the body, and the
Christian mind who willingly
makes any sacrifice for the
comfort of others and will for
her own
spring? Of conscience
is the voice of God speaking to the human soul, how comes it to have such various meanings? A conscience is inexplicable while we are to accord the more judgments. P. Bowley enough as they were made with Bishop Butler's? Why can't we inspire every duty which conscience has declared to be right for ourselves upon our fellow men without losing sight of our human limitations and pleading with both moderation and modesty? There is evidently something insufficient in the theological view. Scientists have felt this insufficiency, and have tried to remedy it by running
Conscience from a directly opposite position. In them existence is no more mysterious, no more inexplicable, no more divine than our perception of light and color. They are both faculties. We would not evolve, and W.D.'s rule.

The development of this faculty of conscience. Mr. Hartshorne hence attempted to force for us from the first principles themes which came ages since to some microscopic organisms lying, already, in a vast ocean, to the delicate and elaborate conscience of civilized man. Instead some would deny, derived conscience some other dignity, or independent mental faculty.
Mr. John Foster, for example, considers it simply a bundle of habits. Mr. James Hyslop in his excellent book "The Elements of Ethics" thinks it nothing more than the "mind occupied with mental phenomena. It is not," he says, "a unique and simple power. There is nothing in conscience to make it differ from the mental faculties and activities as such. The minds, of course, are extreme and must not be taken in the full scientific view which Dr. Reid expressed very well when he called conscience an original power of the mind by which we have a conception of right and wrong in human
conduct. In other words, conscience has become for science simply a faculty among faculties, a sense not differing essentially from man's aesthetic sense. It can be analyzed, can be educated, is fallible, and can be trusted as supreme only within certain limits.

If there is conception one can only possible one, and if a choice between them were necessary, one would not shun long doubting which to choose for, though the scientific conception of conscience is comparatively low and un-beautiful, yet it does attempt to explain when theology assume and latter for greater
To vitiate it gives a conscience suitable for the purposes of practical politics. Then grows what conscience is infallible and what is its need of moral education? But given an infallible conscience, a conscience that is educated and there is some hope of progress toward ideal perfection. Some justification of optimistic thought concerning human nature. But conscience also learns some thing unexplained. Of conscience is nothing more than the faculty similar in nature to the scientific and artistic capacities. How are we to account for its unbounded supremacy? Whence comes it that this
foolly alone always seems
impractical. While the Atheist
would, why is it universally present
in the human conscience?

As this question the outer
sciences are incomplete and un-
satisfactory.

The whole difficulty has
apparently lain in the fact that
Istology has persistently viewed
man as a spiritual side alone, while science has just
a persistently blinded itself
to all but his animal side.
Each has been partial in its
view, and therefore incorrect.

Man is neither a simple
ember driven by desire, nor is
be simply an animal organism, but a wonderful creation of the life. He is the line of contact where the two blend and become the living organism about which I was speaking. This basic truth must necessarily be imperfect, viewed in his composite nature; many difficulties in the way of explaining moral conscience disappear. Even when the night of vice has been reached, I think it is no easy matter to say just what this strange visitor is. Human thought is always somewhat involved in mist when turned inward upon itself and its phenomena.
itself in the loss analysis
and like Oedipus refuses
to be seized and examined.
If, however, we were success
in forming some conception,
towards infinities which make
due allowance for the two
elements in mind's nature,
we shall feel satisfied, temperately
at least.

Here is in every
human being's feeling
oughtness more or less important,
a feeling that certain things
are right, that certain other
things are wrong, a feeling
that the right must be done
at all costs and that the
wrong must be avoided
whether the apparent loss.
His feeling is absolutely independent of moral standards. It is essentially like sense. Duty leads him to murder his enemy and in the good Samaritan who helped the wounded man by the way-side. But it is by no means equally cultivated in each individual. It seems to be on an understandable foot—and if so it is under significant—since every man is born into this world with a certain native capacity for fulfilling the moral imperative, and this capacity, though capable of slight modification, gives the dominant tone to
each individual's moral nature. This inherent feeling of rightness survives in individuality and can be modified only within narrow limits. If you prefer, this presumption of the existence of God bestows on man 'the primary gift in human conscience.' This is what the theologians refer to when they speak of an infallible conscience. This is what he meant when he said, 'Conscience never deceives, and can never deceive. It can be the ultimate opinion which is without appeal.' To attempt to rise above one's conscience is to attempt to go over one's self.
separate our's elf from one self" and again "and always in conformity with your convictions I truly always obey your conscience" and is what your must have meant when he called on erring conscience a chimera. 

Then was it you mean do what you feel you ought not to do your actions will be - not necessarily right - but moral. That is if you lose our conscience the matter upon which our moral judgment is engaged and consider the broken only, then will remain the will to do one duty which necessarily impossible and being unresolvable.
It should here complete
away from the individual and
can never be violated or appealed
from without the direct con-
sequences. In his, those con-
science in emotional, it is
concerned with the feeling
not with the intellect and reason,
and in their found object and
motions where the remaining
form and the intellectual faculties
are but slightly developed. It does
not judge facts and principles,
but feels satisfied with them.
In a serious fire according as they
agree or disagree with its sense
of satisfaction. And its action
at first retrospective merely,
as the ancient Esu as seems
to belong thoughts, giving a now
Conscience, gratitude, feelings, self-appraisal, conscience, and humanity. This is perspective as well, showing itself in a feeling of rightness or wrongness antecedent to a solution. Conscience in this aspect, in the ever-present mind, uninfluenced by our passions and interests, looks upon our actions with approving or disapproving eyes. It insists upon obedience to the laws of duty in necessity, which the idea of right implies, and an anxiety I see of the irrational and unregulated impulses. It inspires a sense of unconditional obligation which allows no liberty to the will in the presence of the passion. Wherein it exists, it excludes...
all other alternatives of legitimate choice. A man was in isolated living whose actions concerned himself alone; if he chose cut loose the bond of relationship which binds him round, obedience to the moral law of his nature would be the one thing needful, and his morality would become his virtue. But no man either binds himself. His thoughts, his feelings, his actions intimately concern his fellow-men. So, when the duty which he instinctively feels to perform becomes a complicated affair not to be clearly discovered without
most careful thought and attention. Here is a voice continually speaking to his heart which urges him to pursue the right long irrespectively of the other considerations. Does it mean the many possible choices which is the right one? Or is it the difficulty which the cogitation demands? That conscience does to dictate. From experience, from contemplation of the actions of exemplary men in terms of the ideal standard of right and wrong, the standards which must depend to a large extent upon culture and education. By this standard each particular is tested. If it harmonizes
with the idea it is permissible
imperatively necessary according
to its nature. If it does not
harmness. The categorical imperative
cannot oppose it without
violence to itself. This comparison
in particular with the idea
is usually a difficult matter.
Not only must the act be
considered in its own intrinsic
nature, but all its consequences
must be foreseen, ideally at
least, and the means
accomplishing it must be
unimpeachable or the act
itself. In this process Phaeth-
ontic for error are almost
infinite in number. In forer,
judgments, fineness of vision,
uncious voices I promise
interest as continually exciting
a powerful influence on the
more strong and sound judgments
I ever in disregard of and since
we have the opposite perceptions
as shown even then, most views.
If we have been perfect clear
above just men to be un-
deniably just, and whose know-
ledge has been comprehensive,
there has never been an absolutely
ineffable conscience. But the
measure of ineffability has
undoubtedly been largely dependent
upon the degree of perfection
in which these three qualities
were present. In this form
we find a sufficient explana-
tion of why it has in reality
been the ages been owned.
The relig ions fanatic... Here w
have a more abnormally
get the with the power
feeling the impulse

shy, a man. I intense feeling
she cannot speak in impress
himself and his ways on his
opposition neighbors. But
his view of things is distorted,
his judgments are discussed and
based his very intently con
sumed only to know him more
deeper into the quagmire of
error. He has they is his
emotional conscience, certainly,
but he has on the same time
committed what Rollo called
the unpardonable sin, in
depiring his cognitive
faculty's light. Then one
can not fully influence his.
conscience for good or ill? In so far as it is just this belief upon which we must build our hope for a universal advancement in virtue, a higher science, fuller knowledge, more minute analysis of motives, greater reliability, a quicker mind and broader vision are alone required, conscience becomes a thing capable of education and the way to a broader diffusion of high moral standard becomes clear. Any view of conscience which denies the power of discoverers our best hopes, makes our on efforts in the education of ourselves and other and leads
be utter despair.

To sum up briefly what we have been trying to say: conscience is a composite affair formed of two elements, an emotional and an intellectual. (1) The emotional element feels wrongness or rightness in the presence of the more choices, it is minimally present in varying intensity, in misgivings, unprofitable and may be concerned — and I see no reason why we should shrink from this admission — the voice of God in the human heart. (2) The intellectual or cognitive element is fallible, capable, and manipulative, and is the part of conscience, which
can be more easily influenced for good or ill. In brief, these facts, though perfectly aware of the impossibility of defining subjective phenomena accurately, we may venture to call conscience the feeling and perception of rightness or wrongness in moral choices.