Towards a Theory of Fascism: The Rise of the Nazis

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Introduction

Fascism has been characterized in numerous fashions, typically as a list of elements which some, though not all, historically labeled fascists share. In this B.A. Thesis, I construct a theory of fascism that, I contend, is capable of universal application, in both historical and contemporary examples. Due to the restrictions of time, this Thesis will only concern a single empirical case: the rise of Nazi Germany (though the theory is equally, if not more relevant, to the contemporary United States). If we wish to prevent an outcome, we must be capable of identifying its cause. A predictive theory is necessary to change the world, and changing the world should be our aspiration. To these ends, this Thesis is split into two sections: theory and analysis. The theory section will outline how combining the characterization of fascism with a theory of internal disorder (e.g., revolutions) provides a framework for analyzing the rise, revolution, and institutionalization of fascism. The theory is then applied to Nazi Germany.
Theory

This section will explain the theory used, both for sociologists and for those unfamiliar with sociology. While I would like to avoid using academic terminology entirely, it is helpful as shorthand and, in some places, necessary to reference specific concepts. This section, and those that follow it, will provide the reader with the necessary definitions to navigate this Thesis.

Sociological Foundations: Preliminary Definitions

Concepts are not ‘right’ or ‘wrong,’ but instead ‘useful’ or ‘not useful’ in the context of a specific analysis. For example, if my goal is to identify what sociology book to have my French class read, language as a differentiating concept is useful (when comparing the work of Durkheim, who was French, and Weber, who was German). Alternatively, if my goal is to construct a foundation for my theory, language as a differentiating concept would be useless (where the theories of Durkheim and Weber may converge, despite the language difference). Whether or not a concept is useful depends both on the goal and on the theory.

If a theory is to have predictive utility, it must be capable of being applied across disparate cases. For this reason, “abstract” concepts, concepts that do not have a one-to-one correspondence to their empirical manifestation or

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1 Although academic terminology has utility, I am wary of academia’s tendency to use it to obfuscate their argument (when they are incapable of making a coherent argument) or gate-keep information and modes of thinking.
measurement, are necessary in both analysis and theory construction. If we are to meaningfully investigate revolutions, we must have a concept of revolutions that abstracts from specific details of different historical cases. For this reason, it is neither practical nor desirable to provide a comprehensive historical analysis of the events under investigation. Instead, it is sufficient to identify the variables of our theory within the historical case.

When it comes to theoretical concepts and the theories we construct, there are three dimensions which must be addressed: (1) functional, (2) structural, and (3) developmental. “Propositions using functionalist concepts are ‘societal universals,’ meant to be valid for all societies” (Gould 1987:4). The point of functionally defined concepts is to identify and treat disparate things as the same, so that universal conclusions can be drawn. The way this is accomplished is by defining a concept according to its function, which it to say, defined in terms of the outcome they have for the society (or system) as a whole. The functional elements of the theory (the theory of internal disorder and the interchange) will be explored later.

Structural concepts or schemas are concerned with interactional elements, such that “propositions using structural concepts are meant to be valid only for the type of society to which they refer” (1987:4). For example, a structural analysis of a capitalist economy is only applicable to societies whose economic structure is capitalist. For our purposes, a ‘social structure’ may be defined as “the group of social interactions that are organized as sanctioned social patterns and which are
stable in form for the period of analysis” (1987:5). The nature of a social structure is better understood through the four components of social action and their patterned interrelationships. The four components are: values (V), norms (N), goals (or collectivities) (G), and role-facilities (F). Each will be covered in the next section.

Lastly, developmental frameworks or schemas are concerned with the (progressive or regressive) development of ‘types’ or ‘stages’ of various phenomena that occur over time and space. There are two developmental frameworks that will be engaged: the stages of societal development and the stages of revolution (which will be covered when the theory of internal disorder is explored). Some of the stages of societal development will be explained as they become relevant, but the larger schema will be ignored to save space.

The Four Components of Social Action

Within social systems, values have the highest degree of generality among the four components. “Values state in general terms the desirable end states which act as a guide to human endeavor; they are so general in their reference that they do not specify kinds of norms, kinds of organization, or kinds of facilities which are required to realize these ends” (Smelser 1962:25). They define, in other words, what is desirable (not necessarily what is desired) and constitute obligations. Values, which are also called social values, constitute the difference between what
is morally *right* and *wrong*. Values also constitute notions of ‘good society.’ Ideally, social values are internalized by all individuals within society.

Norms can exist at different levels of generality (like values), though they are always “more specific than general values, for they specify certain regulatory principles,” (Smelser 1962:27) such as rules, regulations, procedures, and role-expectations that role-incumbents are expected to follow. They constitute both formal and informal expectations. A distinction must be made between norms at the social level (social norms) and norms at the cultural level (cultural norms). Social norms may be conceptualized as the specification of social values (specific moral rules as opposed to general values). Cultural norms may be conceptualized as the specification of a cultural logic, one that determines *sense* from *nonsense* (meaning). To demonstrate the difference (using Durkheim’s terms), if an actor breaks a social norm (e.g., theft), their action will be perceived as morally *wrong*, and one might label them a *delinquent*. Alternatively, breaking a cultural norm (e.g., stand on one’s head and cluck like a chicken) will appear *nonsensical*, such that one might consider the actor *deranged* (Durkheim [1912] 1995:17 and fn. 20). A further complexity of this will be explored in the next section.

Goals (or collectivities) concerns both the mobilization of the motivational mechanisms (which motivate actors to attain common goals by rewarding

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2 It is possible, depending on the society and structure examined, that there is not a significant difference between social norms and social values. In general, whether social norms or social values are mentioned, they distinguish moral right from wrong.
conformity and punishing deviance), and “concerns the definition of socially defined goals” (Gould 1987:6). In other words, this component involves the mobilization of positive and negative sanctions to incentivize actors to adopt a socially defined goal.

Lastly, role-facilities, which Smelser calls situational facilities, concerns the environmental or situational elements that the actor “utilizes as means [to achieve socially defined goals]; these include knowledge of the environment, predictability of consequences of action, and tools and skills” (Smelser 1962:24-25). As Gould recognizes, this can include roles/role-relationships insofar as they are used as “instrumentalities in the pursuit of some social goal” (1987:6-7).

Each of the four components can be summarized generically. Facilities (role-facilities) concern the resources (includes role-relationships) available to enable conformity to socially defined goals and norms. Goals concern the mobilization of motivational mechanisms (positive and negative sanctions) to incentivize conformity. Norms constitute role-expectations that role-incumbents are expected to follow (i.e., rules and regulations). Finally, values constitute norms as obligations (insofar as the norms are consistent with values), define what is desirable in general terms (which informs collective decision making, and therefore, goals), and informs the selection of facilities (in terms of moral right versus wrong) (Smelser 1962:23-28; Gould 1987:5-7).
Social and Cultural Norms

Culture, or a cultural logic, constitutes the framework through which the world becomes meaningful, or in other words, the taken for granted lifeworld. Basil Bernstein’s definition of a cultural role may be useful here: “a constellation of shared learned meanings, through which an individual is able to enter into persistent, consistent and recognized forms of interaction with others. A [cultural] role is thus a complex coding activity controlling the creation and organization of specific meanings and the conditions for their transmission” (qtd. in Gould 2014:28-29). When cultural norms are fully functional, an actor will not be aware that these norms mediate their contact with pure phenomena, such that these norms are tacit. Essentially, cultural norms constitute meaning and distinguish between what is sensical and what isn’t.

Since the level of culture is higher in generality than the social level, culture regulates the social system. Therefore, all social norms and values must, themselves, be consistent with cultural norms (to be meaningful). In situations where they are not consistent, conforming to social norms or values will appear nonsensical to the individual actor. In this way, cultural “regulation [can] also account for and rationalize violations of moral obligations in situations where conformity makes little sense” (Gould 2014:29). The impact of both social and cultural norms will be important in this thesis (especially when they differ in different groups under examination).
Legitimation and Justification

In his 1993 paper, “Legitimation and Justification: The Logic of Moral and Contractual Solidarity in Weber and Durkheim,” Gould argues that Durkheim’s theory of solidarity and Weber’s theory of legitimation converge, and that they both make a critical mistake: the conflation of structure/form and function. To save space, I will not summarize the reasons behind the argument, and will instead define the terms Gould concludes with.

Legitimation is a process through which norms and activities are subsumed under a set of common values. In other words, values legitimate norms and activities, thereby constituting them as moral obligations for actors who have internalized those values. Legitimation is akin to Durkheim’s Mechanical Solidarity, which similarly described the solidarity of a community being maintained through the homogeneity of internalized values, or his conscience collective (as in a shared conscience, hence, shared values constituting a shared morality). Whether a rule or norm is considered consistent with shared values (and therefore legitimate) is defined culturally (in terms of cultural norms) and is often contested politically (Gould 1993).

Justification\(^3\) is a process through which norms and activities are subsumed under a set of legitimate procedures (consistent with shared values). In other

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\(^3\) Weber’s terminology for this was rational-legal legitimation. However, since Weber mistook this for a version of legitimation, and not a different function entirely, Gould has used the term justification to avoid confusion.
words, through the due process of a legitimate procedure, various outcomes (other norms, activities, or otherwise), are justified. Justification is akin to Durkheim’s Organic Solidarity, which similarly described the solidarity of a community being maintained through due process and legal contract relationships. Both legitimation and justification can exist within a given societal situation (the content of each (type of value and procedure) depends on the developmental stage⁴ and society at hand) (Gould 1933).

The reader may, correctly, assert that justification involves two separate types of norms: (1) the legitimate procedures (since procedures are norms) and (2) the norms they justify. Norms can exist at different levels of generality, as is the case here. Different authors use different terminology to distinguish between them, but I prefer Piaget’s language: “there are two kinds of [norms], those that are constitutive and render possible the exercise of cooperation, and those that are constituted and are the result of this very exercise” (Piaget [1932] 1997:98). Constitutive norms are the legitimate procedures capable of justifying, and constituted norms are the norms they justify (Gould 1993:211-212).

**Defining Fascism**

As mentioned previously, to study a phenomenon, there must be an abstract concept or category which enables us to identify its presence, regardless of

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⁴ This refers to the model of societal development, generalized from the work of Jean Piaget. Some of the relevant stages will be addressed later.
specific historical details. I characterize fascist movements as patrimonial and fundamentalist forms of “disorder” occurring within the state and supported by a significant portion of the societal community/civil society. Each aspect will be covered.

**Patrimonialism**

A Patrimonial state is one in which political authority is centered in the person or group at the top of the institutional hierarchy (i.e., an absolute monarch via prerogative/personalistic powers) and is legitimated by traditional-hierarchical values.

Traditional-hierarchical values are, as their name suggests, a type of values which are traditional and hierarchical in nature. According to traditional-hierarchical values, things are ‘good’ because either “that is how it has always been” (according to tradition) or “that is what your superior has told you.” Ultimately, these values reinforce hierarchies (i.e., gender, sex, race, religion, etc.) and are particularistic, or exclusionary, in nature.\(^5\)

\(^5\) There can be cases of some forms of religiosity containing, within their religious commitments, forms of universalism that, despite this, are used to reinforce particularistic and traditional-hierarchical structures and societies. By associating traditional-hierarchical values with particularism, I do not mean to imply there cannot be other universalistic tendencies. However, if these universalistic tendencies are present, there must be some other tendency stopping them from becoming dominant. If universalistic tendencies become dominant, it would undermine the particularistic, traditional-hierarchical nature of the values.
Generically, patrimonialism, or a patrimonial state, refers to a specific stage in the developmental model of societies. Within the developmental theory, generalized from Jean Piaget’s theories concerning the development of children, there are two stages of concern to this thesis: the Patrimonial stage (stage 4), and the Rational-Egalitarian stage (stage 5).

In the Patrimonial stage, traditional-hierarchical values legitimate certain innovations occurring within the society (such as a rational bureaucracy, civil society, or a distinct societal community), though the extent to which these innovations can truly be legitimized by traditional-hierarchical values is questionable. These innovations both consolidate the previous stage (the Traditional stage, where the society is legitimated by traditional-hierarchical values without innovations) and anticipate the next stage.

In the Rational-Egalitarian stage, the innovations from the previous stage are institutionalized such that values are transformed to non-problematically legitimate the innovations. As its name suggests, society is legitimated by rational-egalitarian values, values which are universalistic and prize treating all actors as though they were the same (unlike traditional-hierarchical values, discrimination and unequal treatment is considered morally wrong). This will typically entail a democratic society of one form or another.

Throughout this thesis, I will refer to modernity and incipient modernity. Typically, modernity refers to the Rational-Egalitarian stage, or stage 5, where incipient modernity refers to a transitional phase in-between stages 4 and 5, where
various structures have been transformed but have yet to be fully institutionalized. Whether in incipient or fully actualized modernity, Fascist movements are patrimonial insofar as they seek to redefine the extant polity into a patrimonial one (such that certain innovations from modernity are kept to better facilitate societal functioning).

**Fundamentalism**

Fundamentalism involves a charismatic re-evocation/rearticulation of subterranean, traditional-hierarchical values within the context of incipient or fully actualized modernity. The re-evocation/rearticulation of these values is not ‘traditional,’ and is instead a reinvention of the ‘tradition’ akin to revivalist movements. Although these values are redefined, those internalizing them will treat this redefinition as a “discovery” of the “true” values from the glorified past. Insofar as the traditional understanding of these values is still present, the re-evocation will be contrary and hostile to them.⁶ These values run counter to the dominant shared values (which, in modernity, will be rational-egalitarian values), and will manifest as subterranean values. Subterranean values are:

Values…which are in conflict or in competition with other deeply held values but which are still recognized and accepted by

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⁶ Depending on the strength of the traditional evocation of these values, this hostility may be covert. However, if the fundamentalist values (re-evocation) are to become dominant, they must overcome the actual tradition.
many…They may also exist within a single individual and give rise to profound feelings of ambivalence in many areas of life. In this sense, subterranean values are akin to private as opposed to public morality. (Matza and Sykes 1961:716)

The degree to which these values are subterranean depends partially on whether this re-evocation is occurring in incipient or fully actualized modernity. In incipient modernity, the dominance of rational-egalitarian values may be in question (such that those values are implemented in institutions, but not properly internalized by most actors in the society). In fully actualized modernity, rational-egalitarian values will be (ideally) internalized by most actors in society.

By ‘charismatic re-evocation,’ I mean the rearticulated values are evoked by a charismatic figure. The notion of a charismatic figure (one holding charismatic authority) can be split into three variants (each of which function differently). The first notion of charisma is what I call “inherent” charisma. Someone who is “inherently charismatic” may be akin to a smooth talker, someone who is charismatic in the colloquial sense (this notion is not relevant to this analysis).

The second notion is what I call “social” charisma. One who is socially charismatic is charismatic by being an embodiment of the social values they evoke. For example, Martin Luther King Jr. was charismatic by embodying egalitarian values, values shared in society (even if some groups were not included
within them). A socially charismatic figure will activate values (subterranean or otherwise) within segments of the population that internalize them.

The third notion is “cultural” charisma. Someone who is culturally charismatic uses cultural norms (which constitute meaning) to redefine or rearticulate values. For instance, if one can demonstrate that values should be changed because they will make more sense, they are embodying and using cultural norms to critique social values, such as a religious figure saying, “it is written, but I say unto you” (Gould 1987:107-108; Weber [1947] 1964:358-361).

Disorder from within

Forms of ‘disorder’ (or disorderly movements) involve motivated violations of institutionalized norms in the furtherance of an attack on one or more of the four components of social action (values, norms, goals/collectivities, role-facilities) of an institution7 (Gould 1987:65). While there are many different types of internal disorder (some of which will be explored later), our primary focus will be on revolutions: movements that violate institutionalized norms of authority (in the polity) motivated and “guided by a belief (an ideology) in an attempt to redefine and restructure one or another of the components of social action in that polity” (Gould 1987:91-92). Not all actions that support the revolution need be

7 “Institutional structures are legitimized normative patterns defining regularized expectations for actors in situations where the requisite facilities for performance are provided and where conforming performance is, in the idealized case, rewarded and disorder negatively sanctioned” (Gould 1987:382).
violations of institutionalized norms (e.g., a legitimate election of revolutionary actors). Similarly, other forms of disorder may benefit the revolution by providing a necessary variable for its generation or success.

As part of the definition of fascism, these forms of disorder (revolutions mainly) will occur (at least partially) from within the state. Typically, these actions are supported by revolutionary actors within the societal community/civil society in the form of militias and popular support.

The Theory of Fascist Revolutions

The general theory of fascist revolutions combines the definition of fascism, provided above, with Gould’s Theory of Internal Disorder as applied to revolutions. This section will first outline the theory, before applying it specifically to fascism. For revolutions, there are three steps to account for: (1) the genesis of revolutionary movements, (2) the success or failure of various revolutionary stages, and (3) whether the newly constructed polity can be institutionalized. Before continuing, a couple of things should be covered.

This theory, especially the parts concerning institutionalization and the genesis of revolutionary movements, is functional. Therefore, the contention is that the theory is universally applicable to any society (though if the societies are in different developmental stages, that must be kept in mind). The reader might, correctly, critique some of the variables and concepts in the theory for being imperfectly defined. This is, unfortunately, a necessary evil when constructing
theories. One should not prematurely narrow a concept, as doing so might interfere with identifying the variables in initial applications of the theory, thereby stopping the theory’s development. However, if concepts are left too open, one could (reasonably) conclude the theory isn’t being tested at all, especially if one can simply redefine various concepts to fit the historical situation under examination. This process is what Mark Gould calls “cheating:”

On occasion it is justifiable to modify concepts rather than to treat a negative case as falsifying the proposition. The sole restraint on the modification of definitions (“cheating”) in an attempt to save one’s propositions is the necessity to be consistent in such modifications… [Therefore, applications of the theory, past, present, or future, must consistently use the same modified concept. If a modified concept works in one case and not another, it is invalid] …If this contradiction occurs we will be forced to modify the propositional structure of the theory. (Gould 1987:65).

Lastly, Gould’s Theory of Internal Disorder is a value-added model (at least the part of the theory specifying the generating conditions of disorderly movements). A value-added model consists of an ordered list of the necessary and sufficient conditions, “independent yet interdependent variables,” for the generation of the studied phenomenon (Gould 1987:69). A vital aspect of value-added models is that:
Every stage in the value-added process...is a necessary condition for the appropriate and effective addition of value in the next stage. The sufficient condition for the... [generated outcome], moreover, is the combination of *every* necessary condition, according to a definite pattern... As the value-added process develops, it allows for progressively fewer outcomes other than the one we wish to explain. (Smelser 1962:14).

Another important quality of value-added models is that “the variables are not necessarily ordered in time,” such that the second variable may manifest prior to the first, but it “will only add value, or become relevant to the predicted outcome, when the first variable is present.” In other words, the variables are “ordered in terms of their effect on the final outcome” (Gould 1987:69).

The rest of the theory will be explored in the following order: (1) the interchange, (2) the generating conditions of internal disorder (revolutions), (3) the success and development of revolutionary stages, (4) institutionalizing the new polity, and (5) characterizing fascism within the theory.

**The (Revised) Interchange**

This subsection will, as simply as possible, explain the functional framework within which the rest of the theory is constructed. Both the original interchange (devised by Talcott Parsons) and Gould’s revised version of it identify four, abstract, functions: latency (L), integration (I), goal-attainment (G), and
adaptation (A). The interchange is made up of four functionally defined subsystems (one for each function) and their continuous exchanges (hence, interchange). These four functions will be clarified in the next section (though the reader may choose to skip that section, as abstract concepts are counter intuitive).

At the level of the societal system, certain generic cognates for the different subsystems can be used: the economy (A), the polity (G), the societal community (I), and the evaluative/fiduciary (L). When applying the interchange to a specific historical case, one can identify institutional structures which, primarily, serve the function of one of these subsystems. For instance, property-contract institutions (e.g., business firms) are categorized in the economy (A), authority institutions in the polity (G), stratification-legal institutions (e.g., civil and criminal courts) in the societal community (I), and “religious”-kinship institutions in the evaluative/fiduciary (L) (Gould 1987:13).

It is important to note that there is no one-to-one correspondence between these institutional structures and the functional subsystems (Gould 2014:25). It is possible a single institutional structure serves multiple functions (thereby

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8 “Functionally defined” means to define something in terms of its consequences for the system. For example, if a structure has adaptive consequences for the system, it will be classified as a part of the adaptive subsystem.

9 “the terms economy, polity, …societal community [and evaluative/fiduciary] are used as cognates for [the four functional subsystems] …They do not refer to economic or political organizations. For example, governmental organizations may have adaptive consequences for the society, and they will then be categorized within the economy, not the polity. It is essential to refrain from reifying these functionally defined categories” (Gould 1987:370).
operating as more than one functional subsystem). For example, in a society with little structural differentiation, a religious organization might simultaneously serve the integrative (societal community) and latency (evaluative/fiduciary) functions. It does so by being both “religious” and stratification-legal structures, such that it both maintains commitment to values and offers differentiated expectations according to roles.

It is also possible that more than one institution can serve the same function, such that they would both be categorized within the same subsystem. “For example, in complex societies, we usually categorize both legal and scientific organizations in the integrative subsystem (I),” the societal community, since both have integrative consequences for society (Gould 2014:25). The following section, which explains the functions in more detail, is only included for those who want to understand the abstract concepts better. Those uninterested should skip to page 24.

*The Four Functions*

Each of the functions serves to answer, or address, a problem faced. To begin with, there is the problem of maintaining the general pattern of society. Without a function of maintenance, involving a mechanism to evaluate what is and is not consistent with some standard, patterned relationships10 could not be reproduced. This evaluation of society in terms of a standard of what is a “good”

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10 See pages 5-9 for social structures, understood as the interrelationships between the components of social action.
society, or the desirable society, is the function of latency (L). Therefore, latency (or latent pattern-maintenance) “concerns the maintenance of social values for all system units and the transmission of these values to all new system members.” Put simply, it is akin (in function) to legitimation or mechanical solidarity as previously explained (Gould 1987:10).

Next, there is the problem of coordinating and integrating differences. Without this, system members would only have a conception of a desirable society. If there is any structural differentiation within the system, a general definition of a desirable society would be insufficient. The differences in structural position (on top of individual differences), necessitate a process or standard through which differential expectations (more concrete guides to potential action) according to roles can be acquired. This function, concerning “the coordination and harmonization of the actions of differentiated units,” is called integration (I). Put simply, it is akin (in function) to justification or organic solidarity as previously explained (Gould 1987:10).

The third problem is the attainment of collective goals, which arises when collectivities, or goals, are differentiated within the system. In the general case, “goals involve directional changes to meet discrepancies between the ‘needs’ of the system units… [interacting] with some environment.” Without collective goals, individual units would each act according to their own goal, making collective action (or collectively oriented action) nigh unachievable. Therefore,
this function, “concerning the attainment of collective goals,” is called goal-attainment (G) (Gould 1987:11).

Lastly, “the appearance of multiple goals within the system immediately makes apparent another functional problem, the allocation of means or facilities in the… [fulfilment] of social goals.” Put simply, if goals are coordinated to facilitate collectively oriented action, this will require (if system units are to fulfill their social goals) certain means or facilities. This function is called adaptation (A), and it concerns “the allocation of instrumentalities” (Gould 1987:11). The next section will discuss the cybernetic hierarchy of control.

The Cybernetic Hierarchy of Control

The four subsystems, and their functions, can be understood as being ordered within a cybernetic hierarchy. “A cybernetic system is made up of at least two parts, one said to be high in information, the other high in ‘energy.’ In this system the first controls the second, while the second conditions the first” (Gould 1987:13). For example, the relationship between a car’s gas pedal and the car’s engine is a cybernetic system. The gas pedal controls the engine, increasing the engine’s output when pressed. The engine conditions the gas pedal, as it can only provide acceleration within limits. The car will only function “within a certain

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11 “The word control is used in its specific cybernetic meaning,” as a reference to the high in information component ‘leading’ or ‘driving’ the high in energy component, “not as a synonym for effective determinant” (Gould 1987:14).
range—specified by the system’s ‘energy’ potential” (1987:13). Similarly, the four subsystems are ordered (from high in information to high in energy): the fiduciary (L), the societal community (I), the polity (G), and the economy (A) (1987:13).

The figure below should clarify this.

\[\text{Figure 1. The four subsystems ordered in a cybernetic hierarchy.}\]

The way both control and conditions are transmitted between the subsystems is explained through the generalized media, which the next section will address.

\textit{The Generalized Symbolic Media}

In Luhmann’s terms, the generalized “media… solve the problem of double contingency through transmission of reduced complexity. They employ their selection pattern as a motive to accept the reduction, so that people join with others in a narrow world of common understandings, complementary expectations,
and determinable issues” (qtd. in Gould 1987:14). In other words, they facilitate communication as a symbolic medium with limits on what is an acceptable communication or message. They are “analogous in certain respects to language.”

The media, generically, allow one unit (ego) to impact another (alter) through the transmission of ‘pressure.’ Each medium has a code which “defines the limits… of acceptable pressure of ego on alter” (1987:15). The code is sourced within an institutional structure. Therefore, so long as there are distinct institutional structures for each of the four subsystems, each subsystem has its own symbolic medium. For example, the economy’s (A) symbolic medium is money.

Money “is symbolic in that, though measuring and thus ‘standing for’ economic value or utility, it does not itself possess utility in the primary consumption sense—it has no ‘value in use’ but only ‘in exchange’” (Parsons 1963:236). This property, of containing no intrinsic use value but only value in exchange, is held by all the symbolic media. The other symbolic media are as follows: the polity (G), power; the societal community (I), influence; the fiduciary (L), value-commitments.12

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12 The presence of differentiated institutional structures categorized within the same subsystem can lead to more than one form of a given symbolic medium. For example, we previously highlighted that both scientific and stratification-legal institutions are within the societal community. Therefore, different codes for symbolic media can be based in the different institutional structures, such that, in a complex society, we might treat influence-reputation (based in the scientific community) and influence-respect (based in the stratification-legal system) as distinct symbolic media. Another example can be found in a sufficiently differentiated fiduciary. If the family-kin and “religious” (can be religious or secular, just concerned with shared values) institutional structures are distinct, we
With the media in mind, a simplified version of the interchange can be described. Each subsystem (or the institutions classified within them) can be thought of as a factory. Each subsystem takes in certain factors of production, which “are combined in a value-added process to generate products” (Gould 1987:19). Both factors of production and products are exchanged with the factors and products of the other subsystems. The media facilitate this interchange, allowing each of the subsystems to have the necessary resources from the other subsystems. The economy provides the other subsystems adaptive resources as means for action (money). The polity provides goal-attainment resources for aligning collective goals (power). The societal community provides integrative resources for justification (influence). Lastly, the fiduciary provides evaluative resources for legitimation (value-commitments). The simplified diagram below shows this interchange.

might treat value-commitments-“religion” (based in “religious” structures) and value-commitments-love (based in family-kin structures) as distinct symbolic media (Gould 2014:26).
Figure 2. A simplified version of Gould’s revised interchange. Red arrows (thinner) indicate an exchange of factors of production. Blue arrows (thicker) indicate an exchange of products.

The stability of the interchange (and society) requires each of the subsystems to receive the right balance of inputs from the other subsystems (in exchange for their outputs). Since the media facilitate this interchange, their functionality is required for the system to remain stable. If one or more of the media are dysfunctional, it will disrupt the exchanges, such that the subsystems lack the necessary resources to function. This can result in forms of disorder. The next subsection will briefly cover how the media can become dysfunctional.
Inflation and Deflation of the Symbolic Media

Each of the media have two main components: (1) the symbolic and (2) the security base/real. Their relative scope determines whether the medium is fully functional (symbolic and real scopes are equivalent), inflated (symbolic scope exceeds real scope), or deflated (real scope exceeds symbolic scope) (Gould 1987:54; and 2014:46). When a medium is inflated, ego will have the ‘right’ to pressure alter but will lack the capacity to do so. Therefore, the “medium will be devalued and thus its holder will have a diminished capacity to ‘pressure’ alter” (2014:46). For example, when money is inflated, its symbolic scope (the scope of adaptive resources it claims to represent) exceeds its real scope (the scope of adaptive resources it has the capacity to mobilize). In other words, $100 may have the ‘right’ to pressure alter into providing ego with a certain quantity of consumable goods but will lack the capacity to do so (since it is devalued, and therefore, represents less “real” consumables).

When a medium is deflated, the opposite is true: ego will have the capacity to pressure alter, but will lack the ‘right’ to do so. Therefore, the medium “is more valuable, but within a limited scope of discretion.” More “individuals [would] demand… to hold [the medium], but… [it] is in danger of losing its symbolic

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13 This is an oversimplification of the actual causes of inflation and deflation. Those interested in understanding the more technical version can read chapter 2 of Gould’s 1987 Revolution in the Development of Capitalism. Although I may make passing reference to this more technical version (for those familiar with the theory), it is impractical to give a full account here.
nature,” (1987:59) such that “appeals will be made to the security base” (2014:46) to ensure ego pressures alter. For example, when money is severely deflated, one might expect barter to occur amongst those without access to money, which is more valuable (can mobilize more consumable goods), but within a limited purview.

As this B.A. Thesis is primarily concerned with revolutions (movements of disorder attacking the polity), only power, as a generalized symbolic medium, will be immediately relevant to this analysis. In Parsons’ terms:

Power…[as a] generalized symbolic medium… [is defined as the]
generalized capacity to activate collective obligations of member units in the interest of the implementation of goal-oriented decisions binding on the collectivity of reference. Power in this sense may be a measure of effectiveness, both for the collectivity as a whole and for its decision-making organs. (1968:139)

The symbolic component is authorized powers of office, such that the symbolic scope is the scope of authorized powers. The real component is the capacity to implement binding decisions (Gould 1987:54). The security base, which actors holding power fall back to as the ultimate deterrent, is the threat or use of institutional violence, or in other words, force (Parsons 1963:240).

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14 Another, slightly more concise definition of Power: the “generalized capacity to secure the performance of binding obligations” (Parsons 1963:237).
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When power is inflated (when authorized powers of office exceed the capacity to implement binding decisions), “policy decisions are called into question… [as] their bindingness is dubious; and further… the capacity of politically categorized collectivities to maintain effective organizational control and, in the extreme, wield effective force… is also called into question…[In other words], the ability of the government to enforce its decrees is doubtful when power is inflated” (Gould 1987:56).

When power is deflated, power holders will be increasingly reliant on “coercive sanctions, culminating in the threat and use of physical force” (qtd. in Gould 1987:58). Further, “political decisions are not accepted as binding, [since they exceed authorized powers, such that] …units within the deflated political sectors will adopt an expedient orientation toward the authority structure, no longer automatically accepting its decisions” (Gould 1987:103). For example, a King may exceed his authorized powers, and therefore lack the ‘right’ to give certain decrees, but has the capacity to implement those decrees through the threat or use of force.

Power inflation and deflation can occur simultaneously, within different parts of the polity. Often, the situation is more complex than a simple deflation or inflation for a given group in each structure. For instance, severe power deflation occurring within the structures of the polity which are responsible for implementing force might cause individuals in those roles to view the polity’s decrees as illegitimate. If this occurs, they might be unwilling to enforce the
decrees. In such a situation, severe power deflation can induce acute power inflation.

Generating Conditions of Internal Disorder (Revolutions)

Within Gould’s theory, outlined in chapter 3 of *Revolution in the Development of Capitalism*, disorderly movements are classified in terms of three variables: (1) which medium is deflated (which subsystem/institution is attacked: fiduciary, societal community, polity, or economy), (2) the location of strain (which social component is attacked: values, norms, goals, or role-facilities), and (3) the nature of the orienting belief (does the movement attempt to redefine the attacked social component). Each will be briefly covered, after which the generating conditions will be explored.

As outlined in the previous section, the generalized symbolic media facilitate the interchange, allowing adaptive, goal-attainment, integrative, and evaluative resources to be exchanged. When one of the media becomes deflated, ego will have the capacity to pressure alter, but will not have the right to do so. This will result in the adoption of an expedient or calculating orientation towards the institutionalized norms of the institution that acts as that medium’s base. For instance, power is based in institutionalized structures of authority within the polity. If power becomes deflated, individuals will view institutionalized norms of authority in a calculating manner, where they will violate them when it is in their interest to do so. Without this, a disorderly movement could not occur, since
disorderly movements involve, by definition, violations of institutionalized norms. Therefore, the deflated medium determines which institutional structures will be under attack (by creating the conditions where some actors will violate those institutionalized norms). For our purposes, we are primarily concerned with attacks on the polity, which is why we have only focused on power inflation and deflation.

Strain is defined “as an impairment of the relations among and consequently inadequate functioning of the components of social action” (Smelser 1962:47). Strain typically entails either an ambiguity or a contradiction in one of the social components (values, norms, mobilization mechanisms (goals), or role-facilities). Therefore, the four strains are: strain at the level of values (SV), strain at the level of norms (SN), strain at the level of goals (SG), and strain at the level of role-facilities (SF) (Gould 1987:73). The location of strain determines which social component will be attacked. For example, if SV is present (in addition to the other necessary and sufficient conditions), the disorderly movement will attack the values of the institutionalized structure.

Unlike medium deflation and strain, which are both independent variables delimiting the type of movement that may be generated, the third variable is part of the definition of the movement: “is the disorder solely negative or does it demand a positive redefinition within the extant system” (Gould 1987:66)? The variable determining this is the Orienting belief (OB), which itself, is a part of another variable to be discussed, the legitimizing belief (LB) (Gould 2014:50).
If power is deflated, the corresponding disorderly movement will attack the polity. If strain at the level of goals, SG, is present, the disorderly movement will attempt to attack the mobilization mechanisms (goals/collections) of the polity. If the orienting belief includes the intent to redefine the goals/collections under attack, the disorderly movement is classified as a revolution at the level of goals, RevoG. If the orienting belief lacks any attempt to redefine the goals, the movement is classified as a riot at the level of goals, RiotG. In other words, a revolution is a form of disorder (motivated violations of institutionalized norms) attacking and attempting to redefine one of the social components of the institutional structure of authority (the polity). A riot, meanwhile, is a form of disorder attacking one of the social components of the institutional structure of authority (the polity) without any attempt to redefine it. As I am primarily concerned with revolutions and riots, I will not characterize the other types of disorderly movements which attack the other subsystems.

The necessary and sufficient conditions for the generation of disorderly (revolutionary) movements are: (1) strain, S, (2) an open illegitimate opportunity structure, Og, (3) both components of a neutralizing belief, NBg, (4) a precipitating factor, Pg, and if the movement is to become regularized, (5) both components of the legitimizing belief, LBg. Each will be covered in order.15

15 The subscript “g” following the abbreviations for the opportunity structure (O), neutralizing belief (NB), precipitating factor (P), and legitimizing belief (LB) indicates that these variables are relevant to the generation of a disorderly movement attacking the goal-attainment subsystem, the polity. If this discussion
Strain, S:

Each of the strains, when combined with the other necessary and sufficient conditions, will generate different types of movements. This subsection will both define the different strains and explain the types of revolutions they generate.

When there is a contradiction or “ambiguity as to the adequacy of means for a given goal” (Smelser 1962:51), SF becomes manifest (Gould 1987:74). In other words, SF involves the lack of the necessary resources to conform to socially defined goals or norms. SF is a necessary but insufficient condition for the generation of a “facilitatory rebellion (a revolution at the level of facilities, RevoF)” (Gould 1987:95). RevoF “involves an attempt to work within the context of the collectivity structures extant within the system in redefining the actual content of the roles involved. Thus, it involves a ‘misuse’ of existing collectivities in the political misappropriation of adaptive resources…to exert control over some set of political questions” (1987:95). However, RevoF, on its own, will not seek to redefine any other social components (the political values, norms, and collectivities remain intact). An example of the RevoF would be the King’s revolution: the executive (in this case, the king) tries to assert control over legislative questions, by misappropriating the powers of other roles (the

were addressing disorderly movements directed to the other subsystems, these same variables would instead have the following subscripts: economy, adaptive, subscript “e;” societal community, integrative, subscript “i;” fiduciary, latency (latent pattern-maintenance), subscript “l.”
legislature) and redefining the executive to include them (such that the king can pass laws) (Gould 1987:95).

SG involves either a contradiction or ambiguity in goals (or motivational mechanisms). Gould articulates one example of this, relative deprivation: “when an actor is measuring herself against a reference group (or in the limiting case, a reference individual) that serves as a ‘comparison group,’ she…feels relatively deprived when…she views them as gleaning greater rewards [or lesser punishments] … for like performances. When this deprivation is socially structured…SG is manifest” (1987:75). However, there are other ways SG could manifest. For example, if the reward for conformity or punishment for deviance is ambiguous, SG will also be manifest. SG is a necessary but insufficient condition for the generation of a rebellion “(revolution at the level of goals, RevoG), [which] includ[es] most coup d’états” (Gould 1987:96). This concerns the takeover of various roles within the government, for instance, the executive. On its own, RevoG will not seek to redefine the other social components (political values, norms, and facilities remain intact).

SN is best explained through the concept of role ambiguity, which “includes not only situations in which the actor feels herself confronted with incompatible expectations…but also situations in which the expectations to which she is expected to conform are not specified or detailed.” SN, therefore, “implies a confusion with regard to expectations; a confusion created either by a proliferation… or a dearth of norms” (Gould 1987:76-77). SN is a necessary but
insufficient condition for the generation of a “‘normative revolution,’ or RevoN (a revolution at the level of norms)” (1987:97). RevoN concerns the redefinition of “the political regime, which is constituted by the norms of the authority structure, the codes within the political system definitive of justifiable rights and duties of offices…[It] often involves the redefinition of the political constitution of the society” (1987:97). On its own, a RevoN will only attempt to redefine the political norms (values, collectivities, and facilities remain intact).

Lastly, SV involves the contradiction between institutionalized (dominant) values and those the actor internalizes. SV “can be conceptualized as an ideological alienation in which actors are ambivalent toward or consciously reject what they believe are the dominant institutionalized values of their society” (Gould 1987:77). SV is a necessary but insufficient condition for the generation of a “‘total revolution,’ RevoV (revolutions at the level of values)” (1987:98). A RevoV concerns the redefinition of “the fundamental values that legitimize the political structure…evaluations definitive of the ‘good polity’ (cf. Smelser 1962:25) …[and] may involve components of the society’s ‘civil religion’ (Bellah 1967) or definitions of the national community” (1987:97-98). Strictly defined and, on its own, a RevoV will only attempt to redefine the political values (norms, collectivities, and facilities remain intact).

As strictly defined, each type of revolution will only seek to redefine a single component of social action. This, however, is not the full picture. If the political values of the society are redefined, it will likely mean the extant political
norms, collectivities, and facilities are illegitimate in terms of the new values. This complexity will be covered later during the developmental stages of revolutions.

An Open and Illegitimate Opportunity Structure, $O_g$:

In general, “the opportunity structure can be conceptualized as the availability of the necessary facilities to perform the revolutionary actions” (Gould 1987:99). The adjectives “open” and “illegitimate” refer, in turn, to the opportunity structure’s availability of access (hence, open), and at least partially contradicting dominant norms (considered illegitimate by the state). As the opportunity structure ($O_g$) delimits what revolutionary actions are possible to commit, there are two things to consider: (1) the origin of the opportunity structure and (2) what the opportunity structure must be capable of.

First, it is rare, though not completely unheard of, for revolutionary opportunity structures to be created for the revolution. More often, a revolutionary opportunity structure will arise from already extant structures, which are then commandeered for revolutionary purposes.16 Second, the opportunity structure must allow for both the performance of revolutionary acts as well as the continuation of the revolutionary organization (which includes socialization of

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16 This basic insight is taken from Resource Mobilization Theory, which states social movements require the capacity to mobilize certain resources to facilitate collective action. While revolutionaries could create a new structure capable of mobilizing the requisite resources, it is far simpler to commandeer an already existing structure.
new groups, etc.). This process of socialization has more to do with later variables, but nonetheless requires resources which can be found within the opportunity structure. The opportunity structure can also change over time, as revolutionaries gain or lose control of various role positions and organizations (which may include role positions within the government).

_The Neutralizing Belief, NB_S:_

The neutralizing belief renders actors in a state of drift, wherein they, given the right “opportunity and favorable set of sanctions, will take part in riotous and/or revolutionary actions” (Gould 1987:105). There are two components of the neutralizing belief: (1) a deflation of the relevant medium (in this case, power) and (2) a non-negative orientation to specific riotous or revolutionary acts.

The impact of a deflation of power has already been explained, but to briefly summarize, actors experiencing a deflation of power will view institutionalized norms of authority neutrally, such that violating those norms carries no moral weight (they feel no moral obligation to conform to those norms). Once again, power can be deflated in one sector of the polity and inflated in another, such that different groups will experience vastly different circumstances.

A non-negative orientation implies the actor(s) must not be hostile to the possibility of committing certain revolutionary or riotous acts (such that, for them, it is either positive or neutral). Even with a deflation of power, certain actors may
view some actions as beyond the pale, not because it would violate institutionalized norms, but because it would violate their own internalized values.

Actors in a state of drift will form a “subculture of revolution” or a ‘subculture of riot,’ wherein certain riotous/revolutionary acts are viewed as acceptable, but not obligatory or binding. To regularize such acts, a legitimizing belief (LB_g) is required to form the smaller “revolutionary subculture” (core revolutionary group) within the broader “subculture of revolution” (though this will be explored more later) (Gould 1987:102-105).

Precipitating Factor, P_g:

If strain (S), an open illegitimate opportunity structure (O_g), and a neutralizing belief (NB_g) are present, a precipitating factor (P_g) is the spark that lights the explosion, the straw that breaks the camel’s back, and that which “provides the immediate impetus to engage in riotous or revolutionary actions…by affecting some prior condition,…accentuating strain,…opening [an]…opportunity structure, making [power deflation]…manifest, or providing the ideological connection between…[action and alleviating] strain, identifying a target,…[or] removing the coercive force used to stifle disorderly acts” (1987:105-106). Put

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17 More generally, a ‘subculture of disorder’ refers to a group of individuals who view disorderly actions as acceptable, or in other words, do not perceive violations of institutionalized norms as problematic. The precise name (replacing the word disorder) depends on the type of movement (e.g., revolution, riot, deviance, etc.).
simply, it causes an outbreak in action by either accentuating the generating conditions or removing obstacles to such actions.

*Legitimizing Belief, $LB_g$:*

Once the preceding conditions are present, and some riotous or revolutionary acts are underway, a legitimizing belief, $LB_g$, is required to regularize that action such that it is viewed as both desirable and obligatory. There are two parts of the legitimizing belief: (1) the orienting belief (OB) and the legitimizing values (LV) (Gould 2014:41-42, 48-50; 1987:100-103, 106-109). The orienting belief provides an ideological connection between potential revolutionary (or riotous) action and the alleviation of the extant strain. Specifically, it determines whether the sought-after disorderly goals include a positive redefinition of one or more components of the attacked institution.

The legitimizing values are the shared set of social values that legitimate the violations of institutionalized norms. Although these values, and the orienting belief, can be present prior to riotous or revolutionary action, they will only serve to regularize disorderly action *after* it has been committed. It is also possible that legitimizing values develop from post hoc justifications of disorderly acts. “The group requires that each individual perform an irrevocable action” (qtd. in Gould

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18 Gould originally defines the legitimizing belief without explicitly splitting it into these two parts (though it is implicitly within his 1987 characterization). His 2014 paper, “Toward a theory of ‘Islamist movements,’” made this distinction explicit.
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1987:106). In other words, “once an actor undertakes actions in violation of the institutionalized authority code, she must legitimize her actions or retreat into conformity, while perhaps justifying [and rationalizing] sporadic violations” (Gould 1987:106).

Those who internalize the legitimizing values and adopt the orienting belief form the ‘disorderly subculture,’¹⁹ for whom disorderly acts are not just acceptable but are desirable and obligatory. “This subculture will be revolutionary as against riotous when… [the orienting belief] demands the restructuring of some component of the political system,” determined by strain (Gould 1987:106-107).

Generally, it is the job of the revolutionary subculture to exacerbate the variables outlined above in different populations, thereby inducing members first into the subculture of revolution, where a NBₙ is manifest, and then into the revolutionary subculture, where the LBₙ is manifest (internalize legitimizing values and adopt the orienting belief) (Gould 1987:100-101).

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¹⁹ Akin to the subculture of disorder footnote previously (see fn. 14), ‘disorderly’ can be replaced with the more specific term (e.g., revolutionary, riotous, deviant, etc.). A subculture of disorder views disorderly actions as acceptable but not obligatory (neutral and calculating), whereas a disorderly subculture views certain disorderly actions as desirable and obligatory.
The Success and Development of Revolutionary Stages

Having covered the generating conditions of revolutionary movements, this section will briefly outline both the necessary and sufficient conditions for a revolution to succeed, and the developmental stages of revolutions.

*Success and Social Control, $X_g$:*

To succeed at a given revolutionary stage, the revolutionaries must successfully redefine the attacked social components. Therefore, the conditions of success for the following revolution types are: RevoF, redefine facilities; RevoG, redefine collectivities; RevoN, redefine norms; RevoV, redefine values. Those not supporting the revolution (counterrevolutionaries, the prior government, etc.) will try and stop this from occurring.

Mechanisms of social control, $X_g$, refer to the mechanisms the polity can utilize to try and combat the revolution. Smelser identifies two types of social control, $X_g$. The first is concerned with ameliorating the generating conditions of revolutionary movements ($S, O_g, NB_g, P_g,$ and $LB_g$), thereby preventing the formation of a revolution in the first place. Since governments lack this theory (to use as a guiding principle), they will frequently only attempt to ameliorate the more obvious variables (such as the $O_g$), while ignoring others (such as strain, $S$). In the case that this fails, such that a revolution has been generated, the second mechanism is the use of power or, in its deflated state, force (violence and coercive sanctions) (Smelser 1962:17). Force will be used to try and counter
revolutionary action, and its potential for success depends on the situation, how much force is controlled by those opposing the revolution, and their ability to avoid an inflationary spiral.

Again, power inflation is a situation in which policy decisions may be legitimate but cannot be implemented. In cases of acute inflation, this will go so far as role-incumbents being unwilling to execute decisions dictated to them. If the social control mechanisms controlled by those opposing the revolution experience an acute inflation of power, they will be unable to implement the force, and therefore, will be incapable of combatting revolutionaries. It is for this reason that Gould identifies an acute inflation of power (in the political sectors holding social control mechanisms) as one potential avenue for a successful revolution. If neither the revolutionaries nor the government experience an inflation of power, it may become a contest of force against force, a situation akin to a civil war, where “the system with greater strength will triumph” (Gould 1987:110). A third option, which is relevant to this Thesis, is if the revolution occurs partially from within the polity itself. In the ideal case, if revolutionaries can assert control over social control mechanisms prior to the commission of revolutionary actions, there will be no method to stop them.

*Developmental Stages of Revolutions*

The basic developmental order of revolutionary stages progresses from least to most radical, with each successive stage potentially having a smaller group
supporting it: RevoF, RevoG, RevoN, RevoV. The reason for this is that the higher one goes in the cybernetic hierarchy (from role-facilities to values), the more components of social action will require redefinition (Gould 1987:108).

Although a RevoV, strictly defined, only redefines values, it is likely that the previous norms, goals, and facilities will be illegitimate in terms of these new values. Not all revolutions will begin with a RevoF. Furthermore, it is possible that a revolution can stop at any given stage. For instance, a simple coup may only consist of a RevoG, and not attempt to redefine the other components. Regardless, when considering this general order (from least to most radical transformations), there are two modes that Gould and Smelser have implicitly suggested in their work regarding the developmental nature of revolutions: (1) the ‘bottom-up’ and (2) the ‘top-down’ developmental approach.

The first suggests that sometimes (not always), the impacts of a prior revolutionary stage can generate the conditions for the next revolutionary stage in either the first revolutionary group or a group of counter revolutionaries. The basic order of this approach is as follows: once a certain revolutionary stage has occurred, it has the potential to generate the conditions of the next stage, such that the rough order would be SF→RevoF→SG+→RevoG→SN+→RevoV.\(^20\) Within this ‘bottom-up’ approach, it is possible for the starting position to not be a RevoF,

\(^20\) The “+” recognizes that the prior revolution may generate more conditions than just strain, though if this development occurs and the higher order strain was not already present, it must \textit{at least} generate that next level strain.
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and instead occur higher up. For instance, if revolutionary activities begin with a coup (RevoG), it might continue forward from there.

There is also the possibility that although a RevoF took place prior to a RevoG, SF (and the other generating conditions of RevoF) were generated out of SG. This is the ‘top-down’ approach. It entails a higher order strain generating lower order strains (e.g., SV generating SN, SG, and/or SF). As Smelser put it, “ambiguity at a higher level is a sufficient but not necessary condition for ambiguity at all lower levels; ambiguity at a lower level is neither necessary nor sufficient for ambiguity at higher levels” (1962:54).

Institutionalizing the New Political Structure

Within the interchange, each of the four subsystems (economy, polity, societal community, and fiduciary) require certain inputs from the other three subsystems to function. For the restructured polity to function within the system, and therefore become institutionalized, it must mobilize the six inputs from the other three subsystems (which provide adaptive, integrative, and evaluative resources). If the new state is unable to mobilize the inputs from one or more of the subsystems due to their structure, they will have to restructure those subsystems and maintain control through force in the meantime. When applying this theory, one should analyze the revolution’s capacity to mobilize these inputs in terms of their control over key role-positions as well as the structures of the other subsystems. It is always possible, or even probable, that prolonged attempts
to restructure the other subsystems may give rise to the conditions for a counter-revolution.

Characterizing Fascism within the Theory

Fascist movements are patrimonial (seeking to establish a patrimonial state) and fundamentalist (charismatic re-evocation of traditional-hierarchical values in the context of incipient or fully actualized modernity) forms of political disorder (e.g., revolutions) that occur at least partially within the state while supported by a popular movement. This section will characterize fascist movements within the theory in the following order: (1) Revolution type, (2) Popular support within the societal community (I), (3) institutionalization.

*The Fascist Revolution: RevoV$_{f}$*

As previously stated, a fascist movement will seek to create a patrimonial state (legitimated by traditional-hierarchical values) out of the currently existing state (some form of modernity, legitimated by rational-egalitarian values). Therefore, in its most basic form, a fascist revolution *must* entail a revolution at the level of values, RevoV.

Since fascist movements are fundamentalist, the values internalized in the actor (which contradict the dominant values) must be a rearticulation or re-

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21 See pages 12-18 for the characterization of fascist movements.
evocation of traditional-hierarchical values, such that they are redefined (not the same as tradition) and used to legitimate non-traditional actions. Therefore, a fascist revolution is a revolution at the level of values, \( \text{RevoV} \), where the revolutionary values are fundamentalist, \( \text{RevoV}_f \). This does not mean a fascist revolution will only involve a revolution at the level of values. As previously explored in the developmental stages of revolution, top-down generation can occur such that the higher order strain (SV), generates lower order strains (SN, SG, and/or SF). If the necessary and sufficient variables are present, a fascist revolution could entail all or some of the other revolutionary stages (RevoF, RevoG, and/or RevoN). For example, one form of strain which appears common, if not universal, amongst fascist movements, is strain at the level of goals, SG. This often entails relative deprivation occurring when the fascist sees a “lesser” group being treated equally (e.g., a racist slave owner would experience relative deprivation when the slave is treated as though they were equal to the slave owner).

A brief word of warning is in order. If a fascist revolution never successfully generates the \( \text{RevoV}_f \) stage (due to failing earlier revolutionary stages or otherwise), it can still be understood as a revolutionary fascist movement, so long as the generated revolutionary stages were generated at least in part ‘top-down’ from the fundamentalist strain at the level of values, \( \text{SV}_f \).

It is also important to differentiate between non-disorderly movements with fascist aims and ‘proper’ fascist revolutionary movements. It is possible that a
non-disorderly movement has fascist aims (insofar as they wish to reconstruct the polity into a patrimonial state legitimated by fundamentalist values). However, unless that movement becomes disorderly, it is not an actual fascist movement (since I characterize fascist movements as being forms of disorder). The main insight informing the distinction, is the fact that intent or desire to reconstruct the polity and a willingness to violate norms to do so are different and generated by different variables (Gould 2014:30).

*Popular support within the Societal Community (I)*

Since fascists in the polity are supported by a popular movement within the societal community, their support needs to be accounted for. There are, generically, two types of support to explain: (1) the voter support which provided revolutionaries with the political roles needed to commit a revolution within the state and (2) actual revolutionary support within the societal community. This section will be primarily concerned with the first, before briefly addressing the second.

In his 2021 Haverford B.A. Thesis, “The King’s Revolution: A Prolegomenon on De-Democratization at the Dawn of the 21st Century,” Jonah Benjamini used a simplified version of the theory of internal disorder to analyze revolutions which occur from within the state. In his analysis, he emphasized the necessity of identifying the relationship between a group of supporters in the
societal community and the revolutionaries within the polity who represent them (especially for the initial provision of political support).

While this insight is useful, its simplified and varied form makes his version of the theory’s application distinct from the version Gould uses in his 1987 book, *Revolution in the Development of Capitalism*. To have a unified theory that can explain revolutions that take place both within and without the government, I will be translating Benjamini’s insights into the logic of the interchange, such that the theory can be consistently applied across cases. To do so, we must consider the double boundary between the polity (G) and the societal community (I).

Interest demands (factor input to the polity) are exchanged with policy decisions (factor input to the societal community). An analogy can be made between the exchange of a worker’s commitment to work for their employer and a received wage. In both cases, there is a certain imbalance. Not all interest demands will be met or addressed in policy decisions, or put differently, the policy decisions will not necessarily be distributed equally in the societal community (often, policy decisions are distributed such that although they impinge on and affect the whole of the societal community, they are *in the interest* of some subset of the larger community).

Political support (product input to the polity) is exchanged with Leadership responsibility (product input to the societal community). The exchange of products serves to evaluate the last cycle of factor exchanges, and subsystem functionality. For example, a group in the societal community, whose interest demands are
unmet by their politician’s policy decisions, may provide a different politician with political support, if a ‘better’ alternative is available. This is not an exchange of interest demands for political support. Instead, the efficacy of the exchange of factors (interest demands and policy decisions) is evaluated through the exchange of products (political support and leadership responsibility). Within the interchange, unmet interest demands generate SG for the societal community (since strains are located at the factor outputs in the interchange). However, since the interchange model is an aggregate model, this does not mean any unmet interest demands necessarily generate SG.

Within a society split in terms of defining what is desirable, due to either differential interest demands or values, the policy decisions provided to the societal community from the polity will be distributed unequally. The nature of this distribution will determine which groups feel unserved by the policy decisions, and if they feel entitled to being served by those policy decisions, this will manifest relative deprivation (a comparable group is served when your group isn’t), a form of SG. However, this is not unusual within normal societal functioning, as not all groups receive policy decisions implementing their

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22 This is only true in aggregate, and it is always possible that the transmission of strains is far more complicated, especially when differentiating structures. Nonetheless, SF is found at the factor outputs from the adaptive subsystem, the economy. SG is found at the factor outputs from the goal-attainment subsystem, the polity. SN is found at the factor outputs from the integrative subsystem, the societal community. Lastly, SV is found at the factor outputs from the latency subsystem, the evaluative/fiduciary (Gould 1987: 74-75, 77-78).
particular interest demands. So long as the society is otherwise stable, such that the maligned group feels they still could have their interest demands met in the future (via future elections or otherwise), or so long as the group does not feel entitled to having their interest demands met over others, the relative deprivation will not be ‘strong enough’ to constitute significant strain at the level of goals.\footnote{When referring to the strength of phenomenon which are the manifestation of strain or any of the other necessary and sufficient conditions toward a specific outcome, I am recognizing that there is a threshold, qualitative or quantitative, beyond which an otherwise ‘unproblematic’ imbalance becomes capable of generating disorder. Although the theory used here, and the more complex version from chapter 3 of \textit{Revolution in the Development of Capitalism}, does not specify where this threshold is for different historical situations, it is nonetheless important to keep this in mind when utilizing the theory. A more developed version of the theory would include a process for identifying this threshold in different situations, but that will have to await a future iteration of the theory.}

For example, if Germans, in the 1920s, ‘deserve’ X from policy decisions, and non-Germans get X instead (when non-Germans are viewed as lesser due to the dominant internalized values being particularistic) this will generate strain at the level of goals. On the other hand, if the dominant values are rational-egalitarian, a group constituting 5\% of the population would not feel \textit{entitled} to have their interest demands met over those of a group five times larger, and therefore no SG. Of course, as said above, if this group feels they won’t \textit{ever} have the opportunity to have their interest demands met, the severity increases.

If the revolutionary actor does not hold government positions prior to becoming revolutionary, and the government positions are necessary to facilitate a revolution from within the government, they will have to diverge political support
from other actors/parties. In this scenario, two distinct groups can shift political support to the revolutionary: (1) those knowingly supporting the disorderly (revolutionary) actions and (2) those who mistakenly believe the revolutionary is not disorderly (such that they are “just another party/politician”). The first implies knowledge and approval of potential violations of institutionalized norms, while the second does not.

The necessary and sufficient conditions for a group to knowingly switch their political support to a revolutionary actor are: (1) SG (from unmet interest demands the group feels *entitled* to), (2) the opportunity to support an alternative who is ‘better’ (via calculation or shared values), (3) both components of a neutralizing belief, NB\(_g\), and if support is to be regularized, (4) both components of a legitimizing belief, LB\(_g\). On the other hand, only the first two variables are necessary for a group to shift their political support to a covert revolutionary actor (whose revolutionary intentions are unknown to the group supporting them). Each will be briefly explained.

For both groups, as explained previously, unmet interest demands (when the group is *entitled* to have them met) will generate, for them, SG. Contained within these interest demands may be the amelioration of other experienced strains. In this way, this first variable can be understood to include *any* strain, so long as the group feels their representative is *obligated* and *capable* of ameliorating it. This will result in that group adopting a calculating orientation toward their extant representative *within* the institutionalized authority structure. It
is vital to not conflate this with a calculating orientation toward institutionalized norms of authority. Calculation within the structure implies they will view their support of the current representative in a neutral manner, such that they will switch their support to a better alternative if given the chance. Calculation toward the institutionalized norms of authority implies they will view institutionalized norms neutrally, such that violating those norms is considered acceptable. This difference must be kept in mind.

The second variable is the opportunity to support an alternative who is ‘better’ in some way. The evaluation of ‘better’ could be in terms of calculation (what benefits will the group accrue for supporting the alternative) or shared values, usually through a charismatic figure. It is important to keep in mind that comparing possibilities almost always concern choosing between the lesser of two evils or greater of two goods (such that an alternative need not be ‘perfect,’ but ‘better’). If these are the only variables generated for a group in the societal community, the revolutionary can only secure their support through hiding their revolutionary intentions.

The third variable is both components of a neutralizing belief, NBg: (1) a deflation of power and (2) a non-negative orientation to the actions the revolutionary representative might commit. This variable implies the group adopts a calculating orientation toward the institutionalized norms of authority, such that the representative violating norms is acceptable. When these three variables are
present, a group will knowingly support a revolutionary actor, as they don’t care if norms are violated.

The last variable is both components of the legitimizing belief, LB\textsubscript{g}: (1) an orienting belief and (2) legitimizing values. While the orienting belief is less relevant, so long as the revolutionary’s actions do not contradict the group’s orienting belief, the legitimizing values are essential. A group in the societal community (who internalize values legitimating violations of norms) will view their representative’s violation of norms as desirable and obligatory, not just acceptable.\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{24} These variables, obviously, closely resemble the generating conditions for internal disorder (S, O, NB, P, LB). While it is almost identical in application, there are three necessary caveats to make. First, the specification of SG (instead of any strain) is to explain groups switching their political support to a new (in this case revolutionary) actor. If the revolutionary actor is already present within the polity, any strain will fulfill this role (insofar the groups supporting the revolution, knowingly or otherwise, think the revolutionary representative is addressing their interest demands by ameliorating the strain). Just as SG generated from unmet interest demands can be an opportunity for a new representative, it can be harmful to an already present representative, so revolutionaries must avoid becoming the subject of SG themselves. Second, the precipitating factor, P, is not included because the act of providing political support (through institutionalized voting mechanisms) does not violate institutionalized norms. This is related to the third and last caveat: the strength of the neutralizing and legitimizing beliefs. Within the theory, the neutralizing belief makes violating norms an acceptable option for the actor, while the legitimizing belief makes it desirable and obligatory. Although voting is not a violation of institutionalized norms, voting for someone who you know will violate norms is an action which authorizes, or approves of, those violations. It is possible someone would find it easier to support violations of institutionalized norms than violate those norms themselves. Insofar as that is true or there is a discrepancy between a willingness to support violations and commit violations themselves, the NB\textsubscript{g} and LB\textsubscript{g} responsible for voting support will be weaker in strength than their counterparts for committing violations.
The major difference between this version and Benjamini’s, other than it being couched within the logic of the interchange, is the recognition that a group’s calculating orientation/disillusionment to a representative and to the institutionalized norms are not the same. After all, within a stable democracy, representatives are replaced, but that process of switching to an alternative does not threaten the polity nor does it necessarily support revolutionary actors. Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish between them. Further, the distinction is not black or white. For example, I may have a calculating orientation toward a specific informal norm, but not to the larger set of norms (the difference between voting for a political outsider and a revolutionary).

When examining voter support one must analyze how the size and strength of these two groups (unwitting and known support of disorderly actors) changes over time. Insofar as popular support of fascist actors does not authorize violations of institutionalized norms (lacks a neutralizing belief), revolutionary actions taken might cause support to decrease. It is possible that trust accrued over time will allow the representative to introduce a neutralizing belief or legitimizing belief for revolutionary action (acting to induce members first into the subculture of revolution, and then into a revolutionary subculture). It is also possible that upon revealing her true intentions, the group supporting her will switch to an alternative. If a revolution occurring within the government requires political support for longer durations, it is necessary to maintain this relationship. If a revolution can
take place in a short enough period of time, the relationship need not be maintained.

Having covered voting support, revolutionary and riotous support can be briefly addressed. The main form this takes, in fascist movements, are militias, whose job it is to create a situation of violence or lawlessness to enable the revolutionaries to ‘take control.’ This is, by no means, the universal use of militias, but is a fairly common example. It is possible there are numerous other revolutionary or riotous actions taken, which contribute to the overall revolution. Either way, these instances can be analyzed through the theory of internal disorder ($S, O_g, NB_g, P_g,$ and $LB_g$). Their role can be analyzed through their consequences for the revolution. Generally, one would expect that fewer groups support progressively more radical stages of revolution ($\text{RevoF}, \text{RevoG}, \text{RevoN}, \text{RevoV}$). As is the case with voting, not all of the popular support will be violations of institutionalized norms. Nonetheless, the analyst should endeavor to include those events specifically relevant to the generation of variables for revolutionary stages and their success.

**Institutionalizing the Fascist State**

To save space, I will keep my general thoughts on this brief. As previously explained, institutionalizing the polity requires mobilizing the inputs from the other subsystems. Having redefined political values, it will almost certainly be necessary to redefine the values within the evaluative subsystem, in addition to the
in institutional structure responsible for transmitting them (religious institutions, primary schools, etc.). As the fascists are already supported by a popular movement, how they redefine the societal community is somewhat variable. However, since the state is patrimonial, certain innovations from the previous society will be retained (whether these exist primarily in the economy, the societal community, or both, depends on the previous structures). As the economy provides adaptive resources to the polity, Fascists will have to be careful to ensure economic institutions are aligned with them, without interfering with economic productivity too much. For these reasons, certain bureaucratic institutions in the societal community, which help facilitate the economy’s functioning, may be kept in place, as a matter of expedience. Whether or not fascism, in the long term, is stable, depends on their ability to balance these different inputs, which can be answered more concretely through a structural analysis of the redefined institutions.
Nazi Germany

This section will, using the theory previously outlined, explain the fascist status of the Nazis and their revolution which transformed the Weimar Republic into the Third Reich. Giving a full historical account (one that historians familiar with the situation would find acceptable) would take far longer than the time available to me. Additionally, although some historical context is necessary, it would be counterproductive to get stuck on emphasizing details which, while historically important, are irrelevant to the variables under investigation. Therefore, out of both practical and theoretical necessity, the following characterization will necessarily be abridged, focusing only on those variables which, I contend, generate revolutionary movements. I will begin by characterizing the Nazis as fascist, continue by explaining the three revolutionary stages (RevoG, RevoN, and RevoV), before concluding with an analysis of how the Nazis institutionalized the Third Reich.

The Nazis are Fascist

As explained on pages 12-18, fascist movements are patrimonial and fundamentalist forms of disorder occurring within the government and supported by a popular movement in the societal community/civil society. Each of these factors will be covered in order.
Patrimonialism

As previously defined, there are two ways to think of patrimonialism. In one sense, a patrimonial state is one in which political authority is centered in the person or group at the top of the institutional hierarchy (i.e., an absolute monarch via prerogative/personalistic powers) and is legitimated by traditional-hierarchical values. The other aspect is relevant to the developmental model of societies, the fact that patrimonial states have innovations which they attempt to legitimate through traditional-hierarchical values, despite this legitimation being questionable.

Evidence of the first kind can be found within the structure of the Nazi party during the Weimar Republic and Hitler’s own statements on the leader’s role. The structure of the Nazi party (NSDAP), going as far back as the early 1920’s, facilitated Hitler’s nigh direct control. The NSDAP’s highest authority structure was the Central High Command, which could dictate orders to the various civilian and military organizations. Yet despite the party being ruled “in theory…by committee,” Hitler maintained personalistic control through his direct control over party finances (Gordon 1972:59-60). Furthermore, the authority of various “state (Landfruppen), area (Gaugruppen), and municipal (Ortsgruppen)” party officials was constituted by their informal relationship with, and therefore proximity to, Hitler, such that the “chain of command was…indistinct” (Gordon 1972:60). The following excerpt from Mein Kampf, which Hitler wrote in prison
following the failed Beer Hall Putsch, summarizes his view on the role of the
‘leader:’

…In big things and in small, the movement advocates the principle
of the unconditional authority of the leader, coupled with the greatest
responsibility… It is one of the supreme tasks of the movement to
make this dominant principle not only for its own ranks, but for the
entire state as well. He who would be a leader shall have the highest,
unlimited authority; he also shall bear the final and heaviest
responsibility. He who is not capable of that, or it too cowardly to
bear the consequences of his actions, is not fit to be a leader. Only
the hero is called… (qtd. in Remak [1969] 1990:31)

Evidence of the second aspect, using the re-evocation of traditional-
hierarchical values to legitimate innovations in a problematic manner, can be
found in the innovations which remained within the Third Reich. For example, the
Nazis maintained significant portions of the formal legal system (from the Weimar
Republic), to enable the functioning of the economy (despite the Nazis, explicitly
stating multiple times that these formal procedures are not consistent with Nazi
values). This will be covered in more detail during the institutionalization section.

Fundamentalism

Fundamentalism involves a charismatic re-evocation/rearticulation of
subterranean, traditional-hierarchical values within the context of incipient or fully
actualized modernity. This section will, as concretely as possible, explain the (1) Nazis’ reinvention of tradition, (2) Hitler’s charisma, and (3) the (questionably) subterranean nature of values in incipient modernity.

Re-evocation of traditional-hierarchical values

Briefly, the German Empire, prior to the Weimar Republic’s establishment, had been a patrimonial state, one which went through several time periods which made it more democratic, and less monarch led. The vital thing to understand, however, is that the articulation of traditional-hierarchical values during these phases supported the right of powerful landowners to rule (from the right of the King to rule the empire, to the right of landed nobles to have a say in governance). Essential to these values were notions of a hierarchy among Germanic people, even if the state itself were to be constituted of the German people. This form of particularistic nationalism, where being ‘German’ is a matter of language, culture, and race, was not new.

There are several ideological strands which the Nazis, Hitler in particular, interwove into a new articulation of values: (1) Social Darwinism, (2) race as an essential category within the Darwinian struggle (and therefore, the notion of a superior race), and (3) the Pan-Germanic perspective. Each will be covered independently, before showing how Hitler combined them. Social Darwinism applies Darwin’s theory of natural selection to “social and historical phenomena… [such that] all sorts of groups–nations, races, cultures–were subject to…the same
perpetual struggle for existence, the same survival of the stronger, [and most importantly] the same elimination of the less fit” (Remak [1969] 1990:2).

Several writers began to associate this view of history with the vague (and un-Darwinian) notion of the superior race as being “the Germanic, Nordic, Teutonic, or Aryan” (Remak [1969] 1990:4). This would further be reinforced by connecting the ‘fit’ of race with the ‘fit’ of culture. In 1899, H.S. Chamberlain published *The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*. It reinterpreted history such “that of the three major strains of mankind, two, the Greeks and Romans, had been Aryan and culture-creating, whereas the third had been Semitic and culture-destroying” (Remak [1969] 1990:5). Still, this strain of antisemitism, which had been present throughout Europe, was focused more on the role of religion (such that converting to Christianity was a means of escaping prosecution).

The last ideological strand is that of Pan-Germanism. It was focused on the establishment of a Greater German or Teutonic Empire, one which would contain all German speakers and no others. It was both antisemitic and anti-catholic. There was a longing for how things used to be, partially in response to industrialization. Pan-German groups “were aggressively Teutonic and expansionist…antimodern in temper, vaguely anticapitalist as well as definitely anti-Marxist. They were nostalgic for an earlier age in which life, they felt, had been simpler, more honest, and less hectic” (Remak [1969] 1990:10-12).

Hitler took the notion of social Darwinism to the extreme, especially its quasi-scientific and ‘objective’ appearance, such that history is amoral (just a
mechanism of the weak dying to the strong). By combining this with the notion of
the Nordic, Aryan, Germanic, Teutonic superior race, the only ‘moral’ ends were
the fight and survival of the superior race (that which is ‘culture-creating’). By
focusing on race as the essential category (not just one among many), antisemitism
was no longer a rejection of religion, but of the ‘Jewish race.’ This fixation on race
as the ultimate category in natural selection also transformed certain notions of the
Pan-Germanic state. Instead of a Pan-Germanic empire or state being the center of
an ‘Aryan’ society, the opposite was true. The desirable state (for the Nazis) was
one based strictly on the superior race, where its only purpose is the survival of the
Aryan race.

In such a society, notions of a hierarchy among Germanic people (such as
the traditional version of the values in the pre-Weimar German Empire), was
incoherent. A Nazi state might contain a political hierarchy, such as the
‘‘Führerprinzip,’ or the utter authority of the leader…but it was largely a means to
an end, which was to control a state whose task it would be to sponsor a better
being subservient to a King, the ruler would be subservient (in principle) to the
racial community, not in terms of voting, but in terms of ends.

The reinvented tradition, the past appealed to, was the largely symbolic
legends of the ancient Nordic and Aryan race, not an actual historical account.
Hitler was explicit about this: “never has a state been founded on a peaceful
economy; it has been founded, always and solely, by the instinct for preserving the
species” (qtd. in Remak [1969] 1990:32). The nostalgia for a simpler time was not
just a matter of romanticism, it was, for Hitler, the superior race’s instinct of
survival, calling to the legends of the Nordic people. The combination of these
factors was, as will be demonstrated, quite effective. Ultimately, a particularistic
nationalism centered on the German “völk,” referring to the German people and
race, was not new. The way Hitler connected this nationalism with a state whose
sole purpose was to strengthen the race, and therefore the racial community, was
new and contrary to the original traditional values. This re-evocation was still
traditional-hierarchical due to being particularistic and maintaining a hierarchy of
race.

_Charismatic re-evocation of values_

Hitler was a socially charismatic figure by embodying his revocation of the
traditional-hierarchical values. This is not a historically understudied phenomena,
quite the opposite. There have been myriad historians focusing on Hitler’s
charismatic nature. Instead of simply restating that, the following first-hand
account of a Nazi speaking of Hitler should be a sufficient example (italics are
mine):

…We old National Socialists did not join the storm troopers from
any rational considerations, or after much contemplation. It was our
feelings that led us to Hitler. What we felt, what our hearts
compelled us to think, was this—Hitler, you’re our man. You talk like
a human being who’s been at the front, who’s been through the same mess we were, and not in some soft berth, but *like us* as an unknown soldier. You are pleading, with all your being, with all your burning heart, *for us, the Germans*. *You want what is best for Germany* not because it will benefit you personally; no, it is because you can do no other, *because this is the way you must act* out of your most profound convictions *as a man of decency and honor*. He who once looked into Hitler’s eyes, he who once heard him, will never get away from him again… (qtd. in Remak [1969] 1990:26)

In other words, Hitler was charismatic by embodying the ‘völkish’ spirit, by appearing to his followers as a man who *can only* seek out the goal of the ‘Volksgemeinschaft’ (or national community), and ultimately by appealing to the *re-evocation* of traditional-hierarchical values.

*Subterranean values*

The extent to which traditional-hierarchical values was subterranean, in the Weimar Republic, is questionable. The Weimar Republic was an example of incipient modernity, where rational-egalitarian values were being implemented (within institutionalized structures) but were not yet institutionalized. The 1918 November Revolution, which was predominantly carried out by various socialist movements, deposed the Kaiser and, through a democratically elected national assembly, created the Weimar Republic and its Constitution. While the Weimar
Republic implemented rational-egalitarian values (as it protected numerous rights, created universal suffrage, etc.), most of the population internalized the traditional-hierarchical values from before the revolution. However, since the Kaiser had been notoriously unpopular, pro-monarchist and restorationist factions proved unable to gain sufficient support to carry out a successful revolution (Fritzsche 1998:89-114; Goltz 2009:43-64).

Without an alternative, the Weimar Republic was viewed, at first, as a mixed bag. On the one hand, it provided the population an opportunity to influence outcomes in a way which was, until this point, unavailable to many. On the other hand, it carried with it a certain amount of danger, with most groups feeling anxiety over the possibility of losing their desirable way of life.

There was, for many, a process of rationalizing the Republic’s illegitimacy (as it implemented rational-egalitarian, not traditional-hierarchical, values). The preamble to the Weimar Constitution reads: “The German people, united in their racial elements (Stämmen) and impelled by the will to renew and strengthen their Reich in freedom and justice, to serve the ends of peace at home and abroad and further social progress, have established this Constitution” (Constitution of the German Reich: 1). The German word used, Stämmen, could be translated as tribe, nation, or race, making the definition of what it means to be a part of the German people inherently ambiguous. Therefore, one might be able to rationalize the egalitarian structures as serving the particularistic German people (as a race exclusionary of others). While this interpretation would be contradictory (since
Weimar protected many who were not considered Germanic or Aryan, it allowed groups to cautiously support the Weimar Republic, so long as it could provide groups with their desirable ways of life.

It is worth noting that, overall, Weimar’s acceptance was purely situational, with the lack of a feasible alternative forcing many to rationalize the illegitimate republic. This rationalization, however, was quite fragile. The traditional-hierarchical values were *just barely* covered with this thin, fragile, rationalization, such that calling these values ‘subterranean’ is probably an overstatement. The only requirement to successfully appeal to these barely subterranean values, was a positive outlook, one promising national renewal, instead of a return to the Kaiser.

**Disorder from within**

The rest of this B.A. thesis will be concerned with exploring the process through which Hitler and the Nazis took power *from within* the state (including their support in the societal community), such that having an entire section dedicated to explaining it is unnecessary. It is sufficient to understand that following Hitler’s failed coup attempt in 1923, the Beer Hall Putsch, he changed his orientation towards future revolutionary action. The Beer Hall Putsch had been defeated using social control ($X_g$) mechanisms of the second kind (force), such that Hitler realized the *only* successful path to transforming Germany would be a revolution *from within* the government itself. To be in a political position to do so, Hitler would have to acquire a larger bed of support within civil society who
would be willing to vote for revolutionary actors, if not participate in the revolution outright (Fritzsche 1998:185-6).

**Preliminary Grounds for Revolution**

In order to successfully restructure the polity from within, revolutionaries must: (1) use their knowledge of the state tofacilitate the revolution and (2) have enough voting support in the societal community to provide them with the roles needed to carry out the revolution. This section will briefly cover the political structure of the Weimar Republic (to expose the weaknesses the Nazis targeted) and the origins of voter support in the societal community, using the theory previously outlined.

**Weimar’s Political Structure and Weaknesses**

The Weimar Republic\(^{25}\) was split between the Reich (akin to a federal government) and the individual states (called lands or Länder). The Reich had three structures: the Reichstag (lower house of parliament), the Reichsrat (higher house of parliament), and the Reich Government (more accurately, the Reich administration). Above these three structures, the popularly elected Reich President, serving a 7 year term, was analogous to the position of the Kaiser prior

\(^{25}\) This entire section is a summary of the relevant innerworkings of the Weimar Government, as outlined in the *Constitution of the German Reich*, the Weimar Constitution.
to the November revolution. For our purposes, and the Nazis, only the Reich President, the Chancellor and ministers in the Reich Government (administration), and Reichstag need to be addressed. The Reich President had a wide range of powers, from the ability to dissolve the Reichstag, appoint the chancellor and ministers within the Reich Government (administration), as well as utilize emergency powers specified in Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution (which can be repealed by the Reichstag through a majority vote). It should be noted that after President Hindenburg dissolved the Reichstag in 1930 for trying to repeal his emergency decree, this legislative ‘check’ became effectively inoperative.

The Reichstag was the main legislative institution, through which laws were passed by simple majority, except for amending the Constitution, which required a 2/3 majority. The Reichstag could remove the Chancellor or ministers within the Reich Government through a vote of no confidence. For this reason, forming the Reich Government required a majority coalition (though this was bypassed when President Hindenburg used emergency decrees to instill minority governments, also called Presidential cabinets).

Lastly, the Reich Government controlled all administration (including powers of police), could block Presidential decrees by withholding a counter-signature, and, if the President was removed from office or stopped functioning, the Chancellor could replace her until the election.

From the point of view of the Nazis, controlling either the Reich Government or Reich President would let them carry out a revolution from within
the polity. In the Reich Government, if Nazis could become Chancellor (who was responsible for carrying out laws and decrees and could, therefore, use powers given to them through the President’s emergency decrees) and the Minister of Interior (controls the police), they could effectively bypass the Reichstag and would control social control mechanisms ($X_e$), so long as the President did not use her control over the army to thwart them. If a Nazi could become President, emergency decrees (via Article 48) in addition to control over the military and the ability to appoint the Chancellor and ministers, she would be able to use the military and police to carry out a revolution. Without characterizing specific plans of action, controlling these roles would mean others would have no way to stop the revolution from occurring (since revolutionaries would control social control mechanisms). Unless sever power inflation occurred (such that the police, military, or both didn’t follow Nazi orders), the revolution would be an almost guaranteed success.

With this in mind, the amount of popular support required to facilitate such revolutionary actions can be determined. Since the President is popularly elected every seven years, the Nazis would have to gain the majority of political support in such an election. The only other method of becoming President would be the Chancellor replacing President, after her removal or incapacitation. To control the vital parts of the Reich Government (Minister of Interior and Chancellor), the Nazis would either need to be appointed via emergency decree as a minority government or have a majority coalition. Since who is appointed to what role falls
into political negotiations, all the Nazis had to do was ensure that, without them, no majority coalition could be formed. Therefore, the Nazis would need to become the largest political party in the Reichstag.

Elections 1928-1932: Becoming the Reichstag’s Largest Party

The necessary and sufficient conditions for a group to knowingly switch their political support to a revolutionary actor are: (1) \(SG\) (from unmet interest demands the group feels \textit{entitled} to),\(^{26}\) (2) the opportunity to support an alternative who is ‘better’ (via calculation or shared values), (3) both components of a neutralizing belief, \(NB_g\), and if support is to be regularized, (4) both components of a legitimizing belief, \(LB_g\). Only the first two variables are necessary for groups to support covert revolutionary actors (whose disorderly intent is hidden). The Nazis (NSDAP) were not subtle when expressing their hatred of parliamentary democracy and the Weimar Republic. Therefore, it is fair to conclude that voters would \textit{either} have supported them knowing they were likely to violate institutionalized norms or they mistakenly thought the Nazis would ‘mellow’ when they achieved power. While both groups existed, it is highly unlikely (given

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\(^{26}\) As previously said in the theory section, the “unmet interest demands” can include the failure of extant authorities to ameliorate other strains. For this reason, this first variable can really be understood as any strain, which groups in the societal community blame the polity for not ameliorating. Furthermore, once the group has begun voting for the disorderly actor, so long as they believe the disorderly actor is working to ameliorate that strain (and the other variables are present), voter support will continue.
the contentious nature of politics at the time) that the second group was significant in size.

There are six elections to focus on when evaluating the size and strength of Nazi voter support in the societal community: the 1928 Reichstag election (a baseline), the 1930 Reichstag election, the 1932 Presidential election (two rounds), the two 1932 Reichstag elections. The table below shows the votes the NSDAP received in each of these elections as well as percent changes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elections</th>
<th>1928</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1932 President (round 1)</th>
<th>1932 President (round 2)</th>
<th>1932 July</th>
<th>1932 November</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>votes</td>
<td>810,127</td>
<td>6,406,379</td>
<td>11,339,446</td>
<td>13,418,547</td>
<td>13,779,017</td>
<td>11,737,395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
<td>30.1%</td>
<td>36.8%</td>
<td>37.3%</td>
<td>33.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote change</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>+5,596,252</td>
<td>+4,933,067</td>
<td>+2,079,101</td>
<td>+360,470</td>
<td>-2,041,622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% change</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>+15.7%</td>
<td>+11.8%</td>
<td>+6.7%</td>
<td>+0.5%</td>
<td>-4.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3: NSDAP Election results. Source: www.gonschior.de/weimar/Deutschland

Without sufficient data, it is difficult to ascertain the precise makeup of the political support, so the theory will be applied in general terms, and will not be concerned with specifying precise numbers of different groups. The following social and economic groups within the societal community will be examined in terms of the variables states above: agriculture (farm workers), artisans (handwerk), white-collar middle-class workers (small retailers, businesses, etc.), big business (industry), and big labor (trade unions).
**Strain at the level of goal (from unmet, entitled to, interest demands)**

From 1930 through 1932, Chancellor Brüning (who lacked a Reichstag majority coalition, and therefore relied on President Hindenburg’s emergency powers) passed deflationary economic policies (in response to the Great Depression) which were so unpopular both in the German public and in the parties of the Reichstag, that Brüning was nicknamed the ‘Hunger Chancellor.’ From 1928 to 1930, unemployment increased by roughly 1,708,000, and by July 31, 1932, increased again by roughly 2,316,000 (Remak [1969] 1990:44). The economic crisis impacted the different groups under examination in different ways. For most of the left leaning working class, who could be found within the trade unions, the Great Depression was devastating as unemployment sharply rose. To those who lost their jobs within the trade unions, the “Social Democrats…seemed more intent on protecting the benefits of (still) employed workers than on offering radical solutions to the general crisis. Despite its revolutionary pedigree, the party looked increasingly like a big special interest group” (Fritzsche 1998:202). The unemployed were currently experiencing severe strain at the level of facilities, SF, insofar as unemployment meant a lack of steady income and the ability to support oneself. Yet the SPD’s focus on maintaining benefits for the still employed, at the perceived cost of not ameliorating the unemployed workers’ SF, generated relative deprivation, and therefore SG, for those unemployed (the group of comparison is the still employed, who arguably
needed less assistance than those fully unemployed). Thus, many workers, especially those unemployed, adopted a calculating orientation toward the SPD.

For agriculture, the situation was similarly devastating: “in the countryside chronically low agricultural prices since the mid-1920s ruined the livelihoods of farmers” (Fritzsche 1998:156). Therefore, just like the unemployed in big labor, farmers were experiencing acute SF, and expected the government to ameliorate it. While farmers typically supported nationalist parties (due to their heavy identification with the volk), the DNVP’s lack of substantial financial plans (combined with the fact that the DNVP had cooperated with the liberal parties previously), was sufficient to give farmers the impression that the DNVP (and other established parties) was more concerned with political theater than addressing the economic situation which threatened to destroy the farmers’ desirable way of life. Relative deprivation, and SG, was generated from the belief that the extant parties were more concerned with protecting big business interests than the farmers. Thus, many farmers adopted a calculating orientation toward the DNVP and other established parties.

For artisans and various craftsmen, the situation was slightly more complicated. Artisans existed within various corporate guilds, which structured both their work, their status within the occupation, and the manner of education (master-apprentice relationships). Artisans tended to vote as a block with their corporate estates, usually on occupational lines (not party platforms). Therefore, most political activity was “corporate political barter, a process akin to
establishing an electoral contract between occupational estate and political party” (Domurad 2019:276).

However, the corporate estates had fundamental disagreements with both the Social Democrats on the left, and the liberal economic parties in the center and on the right. Social Democrats and the Socialist trade unions understood master-apprentice relationships as being exploitative, unpaid labor, which should be abolished. These relationships, meanwhile, were understood by the corporate estates to be a system of education, one integral to their corporate way of life. The liberal economic parties understood unlicensed craftsmen as capitalist entrepreneurs, whose right to economic competition ought to be protected. These unlicensed craftsmen, meanwhile, were understood as ‘black labor’ by the corporate estates, a fundamental threat both to the dominance of the corporate estates themselves but also to the reputation of the craft. Both issues came to a head in the economic crisis (Domurad 2019:184-194). 27

As economic conditions worsened, and the artisans who had “briefly flirted with an accommodation to market capitalism and liberal pluralism” returned to the corporate estates in droves, the guilds tried to protect themselves by limiting the number of accepted apprentices and fighting ‘black labor’ even harder than before (Domurad 2019:194-195). These conflicts worsened, until the corporate estates,

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27 Both disagreements are, fundamentally, due to a difference of cultural norms. Artisans in the corporate estates have a different ‘understanding’ of ‘black labor’ and master-apprentice relationships than the other groups.
and the artisans within them, felt relative deprivation (SG) when compared with multiple groups. While the corporate estates were just trying to ensure the survival of their desirable way of life, various parties were siding with the left (Social Democrats, Trade unions, and Marxists) and big business on the issues of apprentice relationships and ‘black labor.’ In other words, big business and big labor were being treated better (through meeting interest demands) than the artisans, even when, from the artisanal point of view, corporate values were essential to the volk’s existence. Thus, with the fear of losing their desirable way of life from multiple sides, they adopted a calculating orientation toward the extant parties, one even more severe than they had previously (during the phases of cautious political barter).

A similar situation was occurring for white-collar middle-class workers (e.g., small business, shops, clerks, small retailers, etc.). Although they lacked the structure of corporate estates, the economic crisis threatened to squeeze them out of the economy without proper support. As the economic situations worsened, and unemployment grew, many feared a socialist or communist revolution would take place. Therefore, as the economic situation worsened without proper government response, more and more of the middle class felt as though they were under threat from both big business (who could weather the economic crisis better than they could) and a left revolution, either of which were capable of destroying their desirable way of life (Fritzsche 1998:159). This perceived threat to their desirable way of life was sufficient to generate relative deprivation (insofar as either side
could make future governments, on top of the current parties, incapable of addressing their interest demands). Thus, most of the middle class adopted a calculating orientation toward the extant parties.

Lastly, big business (industrialists) perceived the economic crisis, primarily, as the grounds for a potential socialist revolution. Thus, the worse the crisis became, the more threatened their way of life was from the left (and therefore, relative deprivation became manifest, where the group compared to is the one which threatens to negate any hope of having your interest demands met in the future). Thus, the industrialists also adopted a calculating orientation toward extant parties.

*Opportunity to support a ‘better’ alternative*

As this analysis is concerned with the Nazi’s success, each group will be examined in terms of whether they, for the elections from 1928 to 1932, found the Nazis to be a ‘better’ alternative. Again, without exact numbers, there is little way to give a precise breakdown. Instead, this argument is concerned with trends.

Beginning with big labor (socialist leaning trade unions), the left was largely “immune to the Nazis” (Fritzsche 1998:206). Hitler had, in an effort to appeal more to artisans and big business, been downplaying the ‘socialist’ parts of the Nazi platform. Doing so, of course, made the Nazis worse than the KPD (communists), which most of the disgruntled left viewed as offering actual solutions to their problems. This is not to suggest there was no working-class
support of the Nazis. On the contrary, “many one-time Social Democrats…found the Nazi invocation of the Volksgemeinschaft attractive” (Fritzsche 1998:201). That said, the majority of left-aligned workers (especially workers located in socialist trade unions), found the KPD more attractive than the Nazis. Since I am analyzing Nazi support, not all support, this group can be dropped from the value-added analysis. Big labor groups experienced strain which resulted in a calculating orientation toward extant parties (the first variable), but lacked the second variable (‘better’ alternative) to support the Nazis in significant numbers.

For most big business groups, although the Nazis’ “assertive nationalism and [their]… implacable hostility toward Marxism [was attractive] … the fear that the National Socialists might eventually live up to their name by turning out to be socialists of some kind” was sufficient to make them a ‘worse’ alternative to the moderate and conservative parties (in calculation) (Turner 1969:61). Despite Hitler’s repeated attempts to “allay this fear,” from 1926 through 1932, the fears were repeatedly reignited “by the radical noised emanating from the Left Wing of the Nazi party” (1969:61).

For farmers, especially during the economic crisis, the Nazis appeared to be the better alternative in both respects. First, Hitler’s charismatic re-evocations of traditional-hierarchical values (including the image of a national renewal) was very attractive to farmers, who would often refer to themselves as the landvolk (reference to the German volk). Although the DNVP also appealed to the volk, there was a substantial difference: the Nazis offered a positive direction of the
future, a vision of a national renewal and a new state based on the national community (Volksgemeinschaft). What made this so powerful was the promise of a future which didn’t advocate simply restoring the Kaiser. By definition, it was new, and involved reinventing the tradition. Second, in comparison to the DNVP, the Nazi platform had a larger (though still muted) emphasis on economic solutions (the potential to address their interest demands). Thus, through both calculation and shared values, many farmers found the NSDAP to be the ‘better’ alternative. Generally, when unemployment increased, agrarian populations “tended to vote increasingly for the NSDAP and less for the DNVP” (Frey and Weck 1983:413).

For white-collar middle-class workers, just like farmers, the Nazis appeared to be the better alternative through both shared values and calculation. Through calculation, the Nazis managed to present themselves as a solution to both comparative groups threatening their desirable way of life: (1) big business, market capitalism, and endless competition; (2) the communists. The Nazis addressed the first through their economic proposals, especially the “Common Interest Before the Self-Interest” program (Remak [1969] 1990:27-30). The Nazis’ decisive anti-marxist stance, insofar that Hitler associated Marxism with Jews, and therefore, the betrayers who had sought out to destroy Germany from within (this conspiracy theory will be briefly discussed later) made the Nazis appear to be the perfect protectors from a left uprising (Fritzsche 1998:159). Additionally, Hitler’s re-evocation of the volk, and his plans to create a national community
(Volksgemeinschaft) as the basis of the new society resonated deeply with the middle class, which was weary from the division of interest by occupation (Fritzsche 1998:184).

Unlike farmers and the rest of the white-collar middle-class, artisans were embedded within a corporate structure which could isolate them from becoming complete Nazi advocates. While Hitler’s re-evocation of values resonated with individual artisans, their orientation was collective (for the betterment of the corporate estates). For this reason, most of the support from artisans to the Nazis was through calculation, not due to shared values (Domurad 2019:303-305).

“When it came to the Nazis, artisans treated them as they did any other political party–as equals on a barter basis” (2019:304-305). The Nazis were the ‘better’ alternative by addressing both groups which had generated relative deprivation. However, even beyond being against liberal economic principles and Marxist communists, the Nazis managed to tie the survival of the corporate estates to themselves:

The Nazis took seriously artisan concerns about the continued deterioration of their status rank in society, about the future viability of their occupational estate and translated these worries into a political language comprehensible to the average master…Moreover, the NSDAP, with its pledge of a corporate state and Volksgemeinschaft born out of the womb of occupational estates, offered in artisans’ eyes the only realistic… solution to their
problems—one that seemed capable of [winning and electing a greater number of craftsmen]. (Domurad 2019:303)

_Neutralizing Belief_

Of the groups remaining (farmers, artisans, and white-collar middle-class), the neutralizing belief (both components) were shared. To start with, very few groups treated the Weimar Republic as valid and legitimate, instead, many rationalized it as the ‘only feasible option’ (few found restoring the Kaiser to be attractive) and through the particularistic preamble (Weimar is meant to serve the racial volk). However, this rationalization was quite fragile, since there were numerous examples of non-Germans being treated equally. Therefore, whether Weimar was treated (rationalized) as legitimate was determined by the extent to which it could let various groups achieve their desirable ends. Insofar as the liberal pluralistic form of government was incapable of doing that, legitimacy was almost instantly withdrawn.

When Hindenburg initially used emergency powers to appoint, and keep in office, Brüning, it didn’t generate a deflation of power within the societal community solely because rationalizing Hindenburg’s actions and rationalizing egalitarian structures were similar tasks. The German public did not internalize rational-egalitarian values, so violations of those values was, for most Germans, irrelevant. So long as Hindenburg and Chancellor Brüning were capable of meeting interest demands, most Germans wouldn’t care one way or another (party
politics versus presidential decrees). However, Chancellor Brüning did fail to meet interest demands. Thus, his legitimacy (or rationalized legitimacy) was broken and questioned, which resulted in the public’s opinion that “anything but Brüning and this mock democracy” would be preferable (Fritzsche 1998:157).

Throughout 1930-1932, a deflation of power was eminently present for most within the societal community. The second aspect of the neutralizing belief, the non-negative orientation to potential violations of institutionalized norms, overlaps with the discussions of why these groups found the Nazis attractive. So long as the violation of norms didn’t run counter to the interests of these groups (farmers, artisans, and white-collar middle-class workers), such violations would be neutral.

*Legitimizing Belief*

For those who internalized the values which Hitler evoked, the legitimizing values would be present (values which defined the desirable, or ‘good,’ society as the Volksgemeinschaft, or national community). As stated previously, of the three groups, only the farmers and white-collar middle-class were largely swayed by the shared values. The majority of artisans (who were within their corporate structure) had legitimizing values of their own. Namely, “their demands no longer involved just reforms in existing policies, but the systemic reconstruction of the Republic’s liberal social and economic order itself…The liberal period, [they]…concluded, had come to an end” (Domurad 2019:203-204). Thus, while corporate values were
compatible with the legitimizing values Hitler evoked (insofar as Hitler’s Volksgemeinschaft was based on a corporate economy), this compatibility did not constitute shared values. Therefore, artisans thought they would benefit from Hitler’s take over, but they did not inherently him.

Hitler never directly advocated that groups should rise against the state directly. While there were plenty of calls to riot, strike, march, etc., Hitler was focused on achieving the Volksgemeinschaft through a revolution internal to the government. Therefore, he was always careful to explain what Weimar should be replaced with, but not how he was planning to do so. The Nazis were not subtle about their aims, but they were, slightly, more reserved when it came to explaining their precise revolutionary plans. Thus, the orienting belief was kept vague, at least until the revolution commenced.

**RevoG: The Nazi’s Rebellion**

The Nazi Revolution began with an attempt to redefine the collectivities of the polity (e.g., Reichstag’s makeup, various bureaucratic positions in the administration, etc.). The RevoG can be split into three rough phases. In the first phase, the Nazis in the government began replacing certain people with Nazis and created certain variables for Nazi supporters in the societal community, in addition to expanding their opportunity structure. In the second phase, they focused, primarily, on redefining the Reichstag’s makeup to enable future action and expand their opportunity structure. In the third phase, they focused on creating the
opportunity structure to enable the RevoN. The following pages will provide some historical context before the revolution, and the generating variables, are explored.

As previously mentioned, Hitler planned the Nazi revolution to occur within the state. His first hope was winning the Presidential election, through which he could have made several legal moves to provide the necessary opportunity structure to start the revolution. Unfortunately, for him, he lost to Hindenburg. By this point in time, “a ‘reversal of voter coalitions’ [occurred]… between 1925 and 1932–Hindenburg’s one-time supporters now made up the core of the Nazis’ following,” such that although Hindenburg defeated Hitler, the Presidential election served, yet again, as publicity for Hitler and the Nazi party (Goltz 2009:144-166). The group which supported Hindenburg had been the pro-democracy parties, seeing him as the last barrier to the Nazis, meanwhile, a significant portion of the right-wing voting base had abandoned Hindenburg for Hitler.

In May, on the advice of several close to him, Hindenburg dismissed Brüning from the position of Chancellor (Goltz 2009:167-192). Franz von Papen, another Centre politician, was chosen to replace Brüning as Chancellor. Since he had basically no support in the Reichstag, Hindenburg once again dissolved the Reichstag. This resulted in the July 1932 Reichstag elections, which saw the Nazis emerge has the largest party, with 37.3% of the vote. Throughout the Summer and Fall, Papen failed to form a majority coalition which would support his Government. The main problem is that Hitler, and the NSDAP broadly, refused to
participate in any cabinet which did not have Hitler as chancellor (which was necessary for the Nazi’s future revolutionary plans). Hoping to avoid a vote of no confidence in Papen, Hindenburg dissolved the Reichstag again, with the next election set for November 1932 (Goltz 2009:167-192).

Although the NSDAP’s electoral numbers decreased to 33.1%, they were still the largest party, and a decisive obstacle to any cabinet which was not headed by Hitler as Chancellor. In December, to counter this, Hindenburg replaced Papen with General Kurt von Schleicher, an old friend he hoped would be able to split the NSDAP vote. When this once again failed to materialize, “Hindenburg and his advisers… increasingly believed that appointing Hitler was the only choice other than declaring a state of emergency” (Goltz 2009:167-192). Finally, following several backroom negotiations, a deal was reached between Hindenburg, Papen, “Hugenburg, the leader of the Nationalist Party,” and Hitler which resolved the deadlock, and Hitler became Chancellor on January 30, 1933 (Jarman [1956] 1968:117).²⁸

Only three posts would be given to Nazis: Hitler would lead the new coalition government (Nazi-Nationalist coalition) as Chancellor; Göring would be the Minister without Portfolio and the Minister of Interior for Prussia; Frick would be the Minister of the Interior. Papen would be both the Vice-Chancellor and the Reich Commissioner for Prussia, which “appeared to give him sufficient power to

²⁸ The pages from the Jarman are the pages of a reprint of Jarman in Fascism Anthology.
hold Hitler in check.” Hindenburg chose to make “the diplomat von Neurath…Foreign Minister, and General von Blomberg Minister of Defense” (Jarman [1956] 1968:118). The rest of the positions were filled by “Hugenberg, Seldte (leader of the Nationalist private army, the Stahlhelm, comparable to the S.A.), and others” from the Nationalists’ Party ([1956] 1968:118).

On its own, the new coalition controlled 247 of the 583 seats in the Reichstag (42.4%). To secure a parliamentary majority, Papen had expected Hitler to negotiate with the Catholic Centre Party, but Hitler made sure to dash this possibility. Lacking a majority coalition, Papen convinced Hindenburg to dissolve the Reichstag, unknowingly giving Hitler and the Nazis everything they wanted. As Jarman puts it, “It was [Hitler’s] aim to fight an election with the State machinery on his side; it had long been his aim not to revolt against the State, but to take over all the machinery of the state, and use it to make the Nazi revolution” ([1956] 1968:118). And that is exactly what happened.

The general plan was to achieve a large enough majority in the election to not only let Hitler operate without the Nationalists’ assistance, but to also enable him to pass what would later be called the Enabling Act, which would vest his cabinet with the ability to pass legislation without the Reichstag’s approval or oversight, including amendments to the Constitution. Since such a bill would be an alteration to the Constitution itself, the Nazis would need a two thirds majority to pass it. Ideally, they hoped to achieve that much electoral success on their own.
Since this revolution involved redefining various collectivities within the German Polity (primarily the makeup of the Reichstag, but also others) this stage of the revolution is at the level of goals, RevoG.

The Variables for the Nazis in the Government

The revolutionaries in the government were the core revolutionaries, Nazis who had been planning for this going back to the early 1920s. The following variables will be covered: Strain at the level of goals (SG), an open illegitimate opportunity structure ($O_g$), both components of a neutralizing belief ($NB_g$), a precipitating factor ($P_g$), and both components of the legitimizing belief ($LB_g$).

**Strain at the level of goals, $SG$:**

The core revolutionaries (e.g., Hitler, Göring, Frick, etc.), who include Nazi party leadership, some of which were present at the party’s founding in 1919, others who joined prior to the Beer Hall Putsch, had many of the variables (including SG) present for several years. Strain at the level of goals was overdetermined, which is to say, manifest from multiple occurrences of SG. Each will be briefly covered.

First, there is the relative deprivation generated from the belief that the polity, and society broadly, has been treating “lessers” as equivalent or better than the “real Germans,” at the “Volk’s” expense. As this perspective is derived from Hitler’s understanding of what defines Germans as German (race, blood, culture,
language, genetics, etc.), which is defined in terms of his re-evocation of traditional-hierarchical values, this relative deprivation (SG) is generated “top-down” developmentally (by strain at the level of values, SV). The particularistic definition of ‘volk’ was not Hitler’s creation, though his re-evocation of traditional-hierarchical values (where race is the primary thing fought for) significantly increased the importance of the volk. It is for this reason that while many, who found Hitler’s re-evocation of values appealing, were antisemitic and racist, it was not as fanatical as Hitler’s, and therefore a less significant source of strain.

The second source of relative deprivation comes from the belief that Germany has incurred a great humiliation due to both the actions of traitors at home and the international community. These can be split into two codependent sides. The first are the traitors, the pro-democrats, the socialists, the Jews, the ‘November criminals,’ the reparationists, all of whom sabotaged Germany from the inside (thereby causing Germany to lose WWI) and capitulate to the other countries’ reparation demands (further weakening the German volk). The second is the international community, whether united by the specter of a ‘marxist international’ conspiracy or simply the allies’ abuse, which has taken what is rightfully Germany’s away.²⁹

²⁹ I am not suggesting that any of this, or the typical blame of the Treaty of Versailles as being an overly punishing treaty, is true. It was, however, the Nazi perception of reality.
**Opportunity structure, $O_g$:**

The opportunity structure can be split into two: (1) the opportunity to campaign while controlling state resources, and (2) government positions.

Hitler planned to redefine the polity from within, which would require using legal procedures. To carry out his plans, the Reichstag had to be redefined. Once he and other Nazis were able to take advantage of state apparatus, they moved to create an election, hence Hitler ensuring negotiations with the Centre Party fell apart. As Goebbels wrote, “the struggle is a light one now…since we are able to employ all the means of the State. Radio and Press are at our disposal. We shall achieve a masterpiece of propaganda. Even money is not lacking this time” (Jarman [1956] 1968:118).

The vital government positions the Nazis controlled were Reich Chancellor (Hitler), Reich Minister of the Interior (Frick), Reich Minister without Portfolio (Göring), and Minister of the Interior for Prussia (Göring). Göring was also the President of the Reichstag, a position affording him the opportunity to change the norms of Reichstag procedures, but that will be covered more later. Being Prussia’s Minister of Interior let Göring control the Prussian police and state administration, and “since Prussia was by far the largest state,” this amounted to “nearly two-thirds of Germany” (Jarman [1956] 1968:119).
Neutralizing belief, $NB_g$:

The neutralizing belief has two components: a deflation of power and a non-negative orientation to potential revolutionary actions. For the Nazis, especially the core revolutionaries, a deflation of power had been present since at least the Beer Hall Putsch, if not further. The Weimar Republic, for Hitler, had never been valid or legitimate, making adherence to institutionalized norms purely an issue of calculation. Similarly, a non-negative orientation to revolutionary actions was present, as long as it didn’t contradict the long-term goal of bringing about the desired state. There was some difference in opinion, within the Nazi party leadership, as to what exactly the final “end” state of the revolution was, but that difference won’t be relevant until the RevoN.

Precipitating factor, $P_g$:

The precipitating factor, for the core Nazis in the government, was the opening of an opportunity structure (primarily the government positions of the Chancellor and Minister of Interior) which let them control half of the social control mechanisms (police). While they would still have to act carefully, to avoid President Hindenburg removing them via the Military, few people were in a position to stop them, at least in their initial revolutionary actions.
Legitimizing belief, LBₘ:

The legitimizing belief has two components: the legitimizing values and the orienting belief. The values legitimizing the violations of institutionalized norms and the revolutionary actions are Hitler’s re-evocation of traditional-hierarchical values, where the Volksgemeinschaft and strengthening the Aryan race are the ultimate ‘goods.’ So long as revolutionary action would lead, in the long run, to the strengthening and survival of the racially defined volk, any action would be acceptable. The orienting belief was concerned with replacing all traitors, who had previously harmed Germany from within, from government, both to stop them from blocking the revolution, and to take revenge for what they had done in the past.

Actions Taken- The First Phase of the RevoG

The first phase of the RevoG entailed replacing certain positions with Nazis and otherwise setting the stage for the next phase of the RevoG. Göring was ruthless in the use of his office to give the Nazis a distinct electoral advantage. He purged, and replaced with Nazis, “those officials whose loyalty to the new Government was doubtful” within the Prussian police and civil service (Jarman [1956] 1968:119). He created “auxiliary police” made up of many Nazis “from the S.A. and S.S., and supplied them with arms.” He forced the police to “co-operate with [the] S.A., S.S., and the Stahlhelm,” and instructed them “to use their firearms ‘without regard for the effect of their shots’.” As Jarman summarizes,
“with Göring in charge of the coercive machinery of the Prussian state, German citizens were helpless; the law afforded no redress to Nazi violence” ([1956] 1968:119). Thus, throughout the election, the Nazi militias were practically immune from consequences, while counter militias and those they targeted were anything but.

Early on during the 1933 election, “it was announced that, in a raid on the Communist headquarters, the police had found plans for a Communist revolution.” This claim is almost certainly false, considering Hitler and Göring never published the hypothetical plans, despite promising to do so (Jarman [1956] 1968:119). This was done with the hope of exacerbating the SG of groups in the societal community, by fabricating a Communist threat. When this was insufficient, the Reichstag burned.

On the night of February 27th, 1933, a week before the election, the Reichstag building burned down. The official government explanation was that this was a part of an ongoing Communist campaign of terrorism, and “a young Dutch Communist, van der Lubbe, was caught in the act of starting fires” (Jarman [1956] 1968:119). Historians disagree over whether this was a lucky break for the Nazis, the riotous act of an individual Communist, or staged by the Nazis themselves. Jarman concludes that “it appears certain, the Nazis themselves had used an underground passage leading from the palace of the President of the Reichstag (Göring) to the Reichstag building to fire it, and used the Dutchman as a cover-up” ([1956] 1968:119). Fraenkel seems to imply it was a lucky coincidence,
by saying “even National-Socialists occasionally admit that the Reichstag fire came at an opportune time and… was a welcome” excuse (2017:12). Remak remains on the fence by claiming the fire’s “origins are unclear to this day” (1990:51). Regardless of whether the Nazis did it themselves, the combination of the Reichstag fire and the raid was sufficient to exacerbate fears over a Communist Revolution. This will be relevant to the variables in the societal community. A result of the Reichstag’s burning, and its genuine appearance (regardless of whether the Nazis set it up themselves), was an expansion of the Nazi opportunity structure through the Fire Decree.

The day after the Reichstag burned down, Hitler and the coalition government convinced Hindenburg to declare a state of emergency and pass an emergency decree using article 48 of the Constitution. The decree is retyped below.\textsuperscript{30}

\begin{center}
\end{center}

On account of Article 48, paragraph 2 of the Constitution of the Reich, the following decree is issued for the defence against Communistic, state-endangering acts of violence:

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{footnotes}{30}The decree is sourced from the appendix of Ernst Fraenkel’s \textit{The Dual State}, p.241.\end{footnotes}
\end{footnotesize}
§1.

The Articles 114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124, and 153 of the Constitution of the German Reich are put out of force until further notice. Restrictions of personal freedom, the right of free expression of opinion, including the right of the press, the right of associations and meetings, interference with the secrets of letters, of the post, the telegraph and the telephone, the issue of search warrants, as well as of orders for confiscation or restriction of property – all these restrictions are therefore also admissible beyond the otherwise legally fixed limitations.

§2.

If the necessary measures for the re-establishment of public security and order are not taken the Government of the Reich may then temporarily exercise the authority of the supreme Government of the land.

§3.

The authorities of the lands and municipalities (Municipal Associations) have to comply with the orders of the Government of the Reich issued on account of 2 within the framework of their competence.\(^\text{31}\)

\(^{31}\) The language “orders…issued on account of 2” refers to orders and decrees of the Reich Government made through Article 48, paragraph 2, which delineates the terms of emergency powers. The language “within the framework of their competence” refers to matters which, according to the Weimar Constitution and the state’s Constitution, are typically within the state’s purview. Taken together, this basically means that State governments must comply with emergency decrees and take action to accomplish them when within their legal jurisdiction. Although not mentioned in this decree, if a State government failed to do so, the Reich government could use emergency powers and armed forces to force the State to comply.
The Variables for Nazi Supporters in the Societal Community

There are two groups of Nazi supporters in the societal community: those who chose to participate in revolutionary and riotous action, and those who only supported in was not violating institutionalized norms (campaign financing and voting). With precise data, the makeup of each group is just as ambiguous as the previous analysis of the voting group from the 1928 to the 1932 elections. Nevertheless, certain conclusions can still be drawn.

*Strain at the level of goals, SG:*

The strain at the level of goals experienced by most groups was the fear of losing your desirable way of life, as previously explored. The perception of an imminent communist uprising, which would theoretically entail the inability of most groups to have their interest demands *ever* be met, generated relative deprivation. This further caused some groups to view their current representative in a calculating manner

*Opportunity structure, O_g:*

For the various militias, other than the militia and party organization themselves, the newest, and most significant, part of the opportunity structure was the ability to (informerly) order police, and utilize official government resources.
On top of that, Göring’s position ensured the militias would be legally immune, such that social control mechanisms (the police) were no longer a problem.

For those who were potentially riotous or revolutionary, but not immediately apart of the militias, tying the militias to the police allowed the SA, SS, and Stahlhelm to informally ‘allow’ new disorderly actions to occur without punishment (so long as it was beneficial to the Nazis).

For supporters of the Nazis, who were not disorderly, there was little to do apart from participating in voting, Nazi marches, etc. Generally, the opportunity structure is less relevant to that group. For those in the past who had found aspects of the Nazis attractive, but was repelled by the possibility of them being socialist (big business, for example), the Nazi crackdown on Communists was reason to reconsider.

Going back a bit, “big business money went overwhelmingly against the Nazis” throughout the 1920s and 1932 (Turner 1969:66). In December 1932, when General Kurt von Schleicher replaced Papen as Chancellor, it horrified big business leaders for two reasons. Their ire was, in part, due to “his role in bringing down Papen, the one Chancellor they had admired and trusted” (Turner 1969:67). More importantly, Schleicher announced “he was neither a capitalist nor a socialist,” spurring fears he might “be a socialist in military garb” (1969:67). Since big business groups received their information from Papen, they mistakenly believed the Hitler cabinet would be a revival of Papen’s cabinet. “By the time the leaders of big business were disabused of this illusion, they were ready to make
their peace with Hitler… [since he had] demonstrated [through the attacks on Communists] that he was, as he had always reassured them, not a socialist” (1969:68).

*Neutralizing belief, NB_g:*

For those in the militias, just like others in the Nazi or nationalist parties, the Weimar Republic had either never been considered legitimate, or it had lost its fragile rationalization of legitimacy long ago. As such, a deflation of power was already present in the militias. The non-negative orientation had been expanded. Due to the risk the Communists posed, what was considered acceptable (for some militias and for potentially revolutionary and riotous actors) was also extended, such that far more egregious actions were treated as acceptable.

Through various interactions with Hitler during the campaign, big business leaders were more likely to believe the economy would be more stable under his proposed rule, a rule less volatile than Weimar democracy. Due to this, and the already present deflation of values (as big business’s rationalization of Weimar’s ‘legitimacy’ mainly relied on it facilitating economic success), big business became neutral to the possibility of Nazis violating institutionalized norms. Their non-negative orientation deemed the only nonacceptable violations as those which might harm their profits.
**Precipitating factor, \( P_g \):**

The burning of the Reichstag acted as a precipitating factor, for the militias and the newly riotous or revolutionary actors alike. It made, for both groups, the threat of a Communist uprising immediate and pressing, which spurred both into action. The severity of militia attacks on Communists increased substantially following the Reichstag’s burning (Jarman [1956] 1968:119-120).

**Legitimizing belief, \( LB_g \):**

The legitimizing values for Nazi supporters in the societal community was mostly Hitler’s re-evocation of traditional-hierarchical values (except for artisans and big business, who supported the Nazis through calculation mainly). The orienting belief took different forms for different groups. For some, it was purely a reaction to the Communist threat, where the only goal was to destroy Communist collectivities (parties, organizations, etc.) of the Polity.

For militias, the threat of Communists taking power *just* as the Nazis finally took the power ‘they deserve,’ resulted in a need to combat the traitors in the streets. Furthermore, the rush of violence and perception of an unstoppable victory for the Nazis, predisposed these groups to view other political rivals as equally traitorous (the SPD, for example). Insofar as these actions were revolutionary, they were attempting to redefine the Reichstag in the polity (a collectivity) by intimidating, suppressing, and attacking political rivals (Communists in the KPD mostly, though as mentioned, several others were also targeted). Insofar as these
actions were riotous, they were mainly attempting to ‘destroy’ and ‘punish’ the Communists, for daring to harm the volk.

**Actions Taken- The Second Phase of the RevoG**

The second phase mainly entailed using the emergency decree to repeal legal protections, allowing severe voter intimidation, suppression, and coercion. Göring, taking advantage of the now withdrawn legal protections, “arrested the Communist Deputies of the Reichstag and a number of Social Democrats as well” (Jarman [1956] 1968:120). Generally, the revocation of Constitutional rights let the Nazis (militias and police) target political enemies mercilessly. However, they did not ban the Communist Party. Instead, keeping the Communist Party technically in the election would let the strain generated from the fear of Communists remain and ensured the working-class left’s vote would remain split between the Social Democrats (SPD) and the Communists (KPD) (Jarman [1956] 1968:120).

Unlike the “five exhausting election campaigns” (Fritzsche 1998:207) of 1932, funds were not an issue in 1933 for the Nazis. Göring met with important industrialists, “including Krupp and Dr. Schacht, and a subscription list from the leading German firms was drawn up” (Jarman [1956] 1968:119). Using their positions of power, and making certain promises, the Nazis were able to acquire significant campaign funds. By combining those funds with their privileged position in radio and the press, Hitler effectively campaigned, not only to bolster
support, but to continue to appeal to his re-evocation of values—promises of a strong Germany based on the Volksgemeinschaft, the national community, which would be the subject of history.

The S.A., S.S., and the Stahlhelm allowed the Nazis to create disorderly conditions, and then show up to “fix them,” in a manner akin to the Reichstag Fire (although evidence is mixed, I personally think the Nazis did it). The militias had been serving that basic purpose within the societal community long before the Nazis’ breakthrough electoral success in 1930, though it wasn’t until this election, and Göring’s position, that they could do so with legal impunity. Furthermore, with the public squarely against the Communists, it required very little persuasion to represent every fight as having been started by the revolutionary communists, and won by the brave German volk.

Thus, we are brought to the March 1933 Reichstag elections. For the first time, the Nazis could act as more than just an oppositional party. Hitler was able to use his position as Chancellor to emphasize the promises the Nazis had made and “the weakness and futility of the old [democratic] regime…which has rested chiefly on the Social Democrat and Catholic Centre parties” (Jarman [1956] 1968:118). This was, of course, aided by “weeks of oratory, threats, street violence, vast meetings, demonstrations, and torchlight parades, which all helped to create the impression of an invincible mass movement advancing to victory” (Jarman [1956] 1968:120).
On March 5, 1933, the NSDAP, with 43.9% of the vote, won 288 of the 647 Reichstag seats (44.5% of Reichstag). With the addition of their Nationalist ally’s 53 seats, “the Nazis thus had a bare majority” (Jarman [1956] 1968:121). Although it wasn’t the landslide Hitler had been hoping for, so long as “the Communists were absent—and most of them were under arrest—the Nazis would have a majority in the Reichstag without the support of the [DNVP]. And that made Hitler independent of Papen and Hugenberg” (Jarman [1956] 1968:121).

Actions Taken- The Third Phase of the RevoG

The third phase mainly entailed the finalization of the RevoG, aided by Hitler’s new majority, and passing the Enabling Act (which would facilitate the RevoN). In between the election (March 5th) and the Enabling Act’s passage (March 23rd), Hitler used his slight majority, his position, and the Fire Decree to begin his policy of Gleichschaltung, which translates to co-ordination or alignment, through which all potential checks or counters to his power were systematically reduced or destroyed. This policy was first targeted towards the states, effectively taking them over. On March 5, Göring ordered a coup on the Hamburg Government. On March 9, the Bavarian Government was filled with Nazis by General von Epp. Between the 5th and 16th of March, Frick sent “Reichskommissars to replace the state governments [with] Nazi ministers” (Jarman [1956] 1968:121,123). Hitler and the Nazis had succeeded at replacing most of the critical positions with Nazi sympathizers or had reduced their power. While this
process would continue to some extent, the brunt of the RevoG was over. As the Nazis only began their revolutionary actions once they controlled the social control mechanisms, there was no one to stop them. It is possible, however, they still could have failed. Despite having a small majority, they lacked the votes to pass the Enabling act (requiring a two thirds majority to amend the Constitution).

Hitler acted conciliatory and put on an elaborate ceremony “at Potsdam…to mark the reconciliation of old and new in Germany. The ceremony…to mark the opening of the new Reichstag…evoked memories, not of Weimar and a democratic Germany, but of the military spirit of the Kaisers.” The ceremony paid homage to Hindenburg, the former Crown prince, and several other symbolic figures of significance for Hindenburg specifically. The S.A. and Stahlhelm marched, and the entire ceremony was used to pacify Hindenburg and the conservative politicians into believing Hitler meant to compromise. And it worked (Jarman [1956] 1968:121-122).

Just two days later, the Reichstag met at the Kroll Opera House (their temporary location), which was surrounded by the S.S. with the S.A. stationed inside. Hitler continued to play the role of centrist wanting to compromise, making all manner of promises to various party officials to gain support. He said, “the Government…offers to the parties of the Reichstag the opportunity for friendly co-operation.” When the Reichstag voted on the Enabling act, only the Social Democrats voted against it. It passed, 441 for, and 94 against (Jarman [1956]
With the enabling act in hand, the next stage of the revolution, the RevoN, began.

It is worth briefly reflecting on whether the first stage of the Nazi revolution, the RevoG, was a ‘legal’ revolution. Readers should be able to identify multiple institutionalized norms which were violated, clearly indicating this was a revolution, and not a legal transformation: replacing officials with Nazis in order to avoid disloyalty (broke informal norms of appointments), raiding the communist party under false pretense, causing or taking advantage of the Reichstag fire, using the Fire Decree to target non-Communists (the explicit targets of the decree), giving militias legal immunity, severe voter intimidation and suppression, taking over the states through appointments and coups, and lastly, passing the Enabling act when the Reichstag was, essentially, held hostage.

**RevoN: The Nazi’s Normative Revolution**

With the Enabling Act in hand, Hitler and the Nazis proceeded to vastly redefine the polity’s roles and their powers. However, Hitler never tried to completely change the Weimar Constitution (by creating a new one). Instead, it was sufficient to make the Constitution subordinate to him. There have been some claims that this part of the revolution was also legal. As should become clear by the end, it could not be farther from the truth.
Generating Variables

There were few checks on the Nazis within the government (mostly President Hindenburg), such that popular support in the societal community was far less relevant. If the Nazis could stay united in the government, it would only be a matter of time. Therefore, to save space, I will only focus the generating conditions for the Nazis within the government. As the neutralizing belief (deflation of power and non-negative orientation) is identical to the $NB_g$, that variable will be skipped.

Strain at the level of norms, $SN$:

Strain at the level of norms, $SN$, had not been present within the revolutionary movement broadly. Therefore, it must have been generated in either a bottom-up or top-down manner. In this case, it developed top-down from the already present fundamentalist strain at the level of values, $SV_f$. Hitler’s role-expectations, within the revolutionary movement, consisted of bringing about the version of Germany where his re-evocation of traditional-hierarchical values could be implemented. Meanwhile, his role-expectation as a Chancellor within democratic Weimar consisted mainly of reasserting the Rule of Law as soon as possible. This role-conflict manifests as strain at the level of norms.

To continue operating through his legal veneer (not necessarily legal, but providing plausible deniability), he had to change one or both role-expectations (and therefore, the institutionalized norms). Obviously, Hitler felt no loyalty to the
Weimar republic, so choosing between them was by no means difficult. It is important to note that ameliorating this strain would not necessarily require an entirely rebuilt constitution. So long as the norms didn’t conflict, norms could remain unaltered.

*Opportunity structure, Oₘ:*

The opportunity structure consisted of two things: (1) the Enabling Act and (2) the government positions held. On March 23rd, 1933, the Enabling Act was passed, and it was proclaimed the next day. The law is retyped below:\(^{32}\)

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**Law for Terminating the Suffering of People and Nation of March 24, 1933**

The Reichstag has passed the following law, which has been approved by the Reichsrat. The requirements of legal Constitutional change having been met, it is being proclaimed herewith.

**Article 1**

In addition to the procedure outlined for the passage of legislation in the Constitution, the government\(^{33}\) also is authorized to pass laws. This applies

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\(^{32}\) Quoted in Remak 1990:52-53.

\(^{33}\) Or, more accurately, administration. Uses of the word ‘government’ in this law refer to the cabinet, of which Hitler is Chancellor.
equally to legislation specified in Articles 85, paragraph 2, and 87 of the Constitution.\textsuperscript{34}

Article 2

Laws passed by the government may deviate from the Constitution, provided they do not deal with the institutions, as such, of Reichstag and Reichsrat. The prerogatives of the President continue unchanged.

Article 3

The laws passed by the government shall be issued by the Chancellor and published in the official gazette. In the absence of contrary provisions, they shall enter into effect on the day after they have been published. Articles 68 to 77 of the Constitution do not apply to laws passed by the government.\textsuperscript{35}

Article 4

Treaties with foreign nations which bear on matters of domestic law do not require the approval of the institutions involved in such domestic legislation. The government shall decide on the regulations necessary to implement such treaties.

\textsuperscript{34} Related to the Reichstag’s input on taxation, this clarifies the government (administration) can pass budgets relating to taxation without the Reichstag.
\textsuperscript{35} Articles 68 to 77 of the Constitution define the procedures for introducing and passing legislation, including amendments to the Constitution. Effectively, this means the Government can pass laws completely independent of the procedures outlined, making it independent of the Reichstag and Reichsrat. Additionally, it makes laws passed by the Government immune to referendums.
The law is valid as of the day it is proclaimed. Its terminal date is April 1, 1937; it shall also cease to be in force if the present government should be replaced by another.

If President Hindenburg signed a law, and the Nazis within the government remained united, Hitler had nigh-free reign.

*Precipitating factor, $P_g$:*

Put simply, the successful passing of the Enabling Act, which expanded the opportunity structure, was the precipitating factor.

*Legitimizing belief, $LB_g$:*

While the legitimizing values are identical, it is worth investigating a difference of orienting belief within the Nazi leadership. The Nazi Party had, for a long time, been internally divided between a ‘left’ and ‘right’ wing. The ‘left,’ emphasized socialist economic reforms as being the fundamental mechanism to ‘uplifting’ the volk. The ‘right,’ meanwhile, had little to no interest in serious

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36 Regardless of whether a particular Nazi was “right” or “left,” it is important to recognize they are all still fascists (patrimonial fundamentalists led by a charismatic leader). The only substantive difference was the perspective of economic policy. Both wings are ‘far-right’, which is to say, developmentally, regressive.
economic reforms, and were instead far more concerned with the racial outcome of the revolution. In short, both sides agreed on the larger party platform, but once they were in power, this difference became severe. Hitler, belonging to the ‘right,’ saw the economic reforms as useful to winning over voters, “but the work of managing the economic system he was prepared to leave to industrialists and economic experts, so long as they provided employment and produced goods” (Jarman [1956] 1968:125). Thus, the orienting beliefs diverged in terms of which norms should be redefined and how. Those in the ‘left,’ upon seeing Hitler’s reluctance to do their desired economic reforms, had strain at the level of goals generated “top-down” from the belief that they were serving the ultimate revolution, of which Hitler’s was only the first phase. Put differently, their understanding of a Germany serving the volk necessarily included economic reforms, such that the difference in envisioned outcome constituted strain at the level of values, which then generated “top-down” strain at the level of goals. The next section will address this internal divide, in addition to the events of the RevoN.

**Actions Taken- The RevoN and Counter RevoG**

In early April 1933, Hitler continued the policy of *Gleichschaltung* (alignment) by appointing to each federal state a *Reichstatthalter* (governor), who could, at will, “appoint and remove the state government and dissolve the state parliament.” Using this newly created post, Hitler reduced Papen’s authority in
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Prussia by naming himself the *Reichstatthalter* of Prussia, “with Göring as Minister-President” (Jarman [1956] 1968:123). On May 10, the Nazis attacked the Social Democratic Party (SPD), seized its “buildings, offices, newspapers, and funds,” before formally banning the party in June. The other parties didn’t fare much better. The Communists (KPD) had already been arrested and their property taken in prior months. By the beginning of July, other parties (including but not limited to the DDP, CVP, and DNVP), seeing the writing on the wall, “liquidated themselves… Seldte, the leader of the Stahlhelm, joined the Nazi Party, and his organization was eventually merged in the S.A.” (Jarman [1956] 1968:122-3).

On July 14, 1933, two laws were passed. The “Law Against the New Formation of Parties” made the NSDAP (Nazi Party) the only legal party, effectively transforming the state into a single party government (Remak 1990:54; Jarman [1956] 1968:123). The other law changed the nature of referendums by “[allowing] the government ‘to consult the people’ on particular policies on its own initiative,” unlike the plebiscites of Weimar, which could be initiated by the people. These were used “to provide the appearance of popular legitimacy for controversial measures” (Evans 2006:109). It is vital to understand that the Nazis had complete control over the outcome of these plebiscites. For example, consider this selection from Victor Klemperer’s diary:

37 German People’s Party, the Catholic Centre Party, and the German National People’s Party (Nationalists), in respective order.
…no one will dare not to vote, and no one will respond with a No in the vote…Because 1) Nobody believes in the secrecy of the ballot and 2) a No will be taken as a Yes anyway. (qtd. in Evans 2006:109)

The methods the Nazis employed to ensure a favorable outcome in these plebiscites are numerous. On confidential orders of the Reich Interior Ministry, “returning officers [had] wide latitude to interpret spoiled ballot papers as ‘yes’ votes” (Evans 2006:109). Groups were marched to polling places by the S.A. and forced to vote in public. A number of ballots were already marked ‘yes.’ This was to the extent that “so many ‘no’ votes were replaced with one or more forged ‘yes’ votes that the number of votes cast actually exceeded the number of” voters in some areas. Yet, despite this overt election interference, a non-insignificant portion of the German electorate still felt such plebiscites were free elections. This is due, in part, to the voter intimidation mechanisms being highly targeted to areas with high Nazi opposition, such that areas with majority Nazi supporters would only be aware via word of mouth (Evans 2006:110-111).

On January 30, 1934, a law abolished elective state parliaments, such that, in Frick’s words, “the state governments from today on are merely administrative bodies of the Reich” (Jarman [1956] 1968:123). On August 1, 1934, the day before Hindenburg’s death, Hitler merged the office of the President with the office of Chancellor and appointed himself. The law doing so is typed below:

38 (qtd. in Remak 1990:54-55)
Law Concerning the Head of the German State of August 1, 1934

The government has passed the following law, which is being proclaimed herewith:

Article 1

The office of the President shall be combined with that of Chancellor. Thus all the functions heretofore exercised by the President are transferred to the Führer and Chancellor Adolf Hitler. He has the right to appoint his deputy.

Article 2

This law is in force as of the date of the death of President von Hindenburg.

The next day, on August 2, 1934, Hindenburg died. Weeks later, on August 19, a plebiscite was held to affirm the law, and thereby the ascension of Hitler. In total, 38 million out of 45 million voted ‘yes,’ though as previously stated, these elections were entirely fraudulent (Evans 2006:131).

Another dimension to the RevoN was some of the decisions made by the courts, although there is considerable overlap with decisions relevant to the next stage, RevoV, and then the institutionalization after it. To simplify matters, I will only briefly address the court decisions relevant to the RevoN here (the rest will be examined in upcoming sections). These court cases showed the evolving treatment
and application of the Constitution in law, which is why it belongs primarily within the RevoN.

In one case, a Minister of the Interior dissolved a branch of the Jehovah’s Witnesses and justified this action through the Reichstag Fire decree. The branch sued, claiming this was unconstitutional, since freedom of worship and belief are protected by Article 137 of the Constitution, an Article which cannot be suspended through Article 48’s emergency powers. The court dismissed the branch’s claim by reasoning “the Constitution is amendable by administrative decrees and similar measures” (qtd. in Fraenkel 2017:15). Thus, decrees or actions based on decrees are “interpreted as legislative action based on the Enabling Law” (Fraenkel 2017:15).

On September 24, 1935, a later court decision “granted the validity of Art. 137,” but concluded such protections were not unlimited, especially “if the activities of that association are incompatible with public order.” Thus, “so-called fundamental rights…[are] dependent on the discretion of the authorities” (Fraenkel 2017:15). At least this recognized fundamental rights.

In later cases, “the Reichsgericht and the Prussian Supreme Administrative Court (Oberverwaltungsgericht)...abolished the right of the civil servant to examine [her] official records,” another right theoretically immune to Article 48. They reasoned this right was “in contradiction to the National-Socialist conception of the relationship between civil servant and state, and...is therefore no longer in force” (Fraenkel 2017:15-16). The primacy of a “National-Socialist conception”
over the Constitution clearly indicates the new function of the Weimar Constitution. Specifically, it is used to facilitate the revolution, but is not strictly a ‘Constitution’ for Nazi Germany, as it can be overridden (not just amended) at will. This is related the dual state nature of Nazi Germany that Fraenkel writes about, but that will be explored during the institutionalization section.

Initially, the courts had tried to restrict the application of the Reichstag Fire decree to matters relating exclusively to the Communist threat. This was soon replaced with the “theory of the indirect Communist danger” (Fraenkel 2017:17). Under the theory, “the goal of National-Socialism was the realization of the ideal ‘ethnic community’ (Volksgemeinschaft) and the elimination of all conflicts and tensions” (Fraenkel 2017:18). Therefore, anything counter to that goal indirectly helps Communism, and can thus be targeted through the Reichstag Fire decree. In effect, this made the ‘Constitutionality’ of the Constitution dependent on alignment with Nazi goals. Having outlined the successful process through which the Nazis redefined the state (as they would continue to do so), I will briefly address the divisions within the Nazi movement.

Going back to June 1933, the Nazi movement was fracturing over two primary issues, resulting in four general groups. The first issue concerns those in the Nazi movement who had supported the revolution due to (primarily) calculating reasons. As Jarman says, “there were many in the Nazi Party, and many who joined it later in its time of success, who had hoped to get something out of it. Some of them were disappointed…[having done worse than] they had
hoped. At first there was excitement and expectancy, then anti-climax” ([1956] 1968:124).

There were a limited number of powerful positions and resources to acquire, and many who wanted a ‘better’ result were considering the possibility of replacing Hitler, thereby beginning a RevoG within the Nazi movement. Without looking at all the variables, the strain at the level of goals was manifest from relative deprivation. Many felt as though they had worked just as hard for the revolution where others (who they viewed as comparable) were better rewarded. Two groups developed from this: (1) Nazi revolutionaries throughout the movement’s hierarchy and (2) Nazi Party leaders. There had been rivalries among the leaders of the movement, even going back to the early 1920s (Jarman [1956] 1968:124). And anxiety over who would receive what position in the new government generated relative deprivation perhaps more severe than just the average foot soldier. The second issue had to do with ideology, or the difference in orienting belief between the ‘left’ and ‘right’ Nazi wings.

To summarize events, from June 1933 until June 1934, those experiencing strain within the Nazi Government had been growing more restless, appearing closer to a “second revolution,” despite Hitler repeatedly trying to resolve the matter through a combination of threats and reconciliation. By June 1934, in the face of Papen threatening to resign and Hindenburg threatening to declare martial law, Hitler was out of time to resolve the internal issues through more peaceful means. From June 30 to July 2, 1934, those loyal to Hitler carried out the Röhm
purge, through which a number of party officials, some of whom were revolutionary, some Hitler’s political rivals, were captured and executed on the charge of having plotted a coup. The S.A. leadership, especially, was targeted. As far as historians can tell, although many of those killed were planning revolutionary action, eventually, no such coup seemed likely to occur in the short term. The precise number killed is not known, but “estimates [range] from the official figure of seventy-seven to a figure of over 400” (Jarman [1956] 1968:124-130). Within the theory, Hitler managed to stop the generation of a revolutionary movement by removing their opportunity structure prior to the manifestation of a precipitating factor.

**RevoV: The Nazi’s Total Revolution**

Institutionalized norms of authority are, themselves, legitimate by aligning with the “political culture,” the conscience collective of the polity, or the polity’s implemented values. Although German society at large had not institutionalized rational-egalitarian values, they were implemented within the polity. Redefining values cannot occur without violating the values that are being redefined. It is in this way, that the RevoV can be understood as a disorderly movement.

**Generating Variables**

Due to the neutralizing belief and precipitating factor (access to necessary opportunity structure) being the same as the previous stage, only the following
variables will be examined: strain at the level of values, SV, the opportunity structure, Oₙ, and both components of the legitimizing belief, LBₙ.

**Strain at the level of values, SV:**

The strain at the level of values was first manifest, in large portions of Germany, when the conflict between internalized traditional-hierarchical values and the implemented rational-egalitarian was manifest. However, since there was little desire to return to the Kaiser, this strain would be somewhat subdued until a re-evocation of the traditional-hierarchical values was popularized, by Hitler and the Nazis. Finally, with Hitler in complete control, and even having dealt with internal divisions, this strain could finally be ameliorated.

**Opportunity structure, Oₙ:**

There are two elements to the opportunity structure: (1) complete control over state institutions and (2) the lack of judicial review. Hitler’s control over the government has been demonstrated previously, so I won’t repeat myself here. Of more importance was the recognition by courts that certain actions taken, those considered within the “political” sphere, are outside of courts’ jurisdiction. Further, the way in which these decisions were made not only enabled but emphasized the RevoV taking place. If court decisions’ formal justice could be overridden by Nazi considerations, the ultimate evaluative standards are National-
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Socialist doctrine, hence a set of values, ones different from Weimar or the former Kaiser. An example demonstrating this will be shown in the success section.

*Legitimizing belief, $LB_g$:*

The legitimizing values were the replacement for the rational-egalitarian values, such that the orienting belief was simply the full implementation of Hitler’s evocation of the Volksgemeinschaft.

**RevoV’s Success**

With no mechanisms to stop them, and the time to slowly work through the courts, the values constitutive of the polity, and thereby the standard of evaluation, were successfully redefined. Consider the following excerpt from an official Nazi document concerning the concept of justice: “in the criminal law of the National-Socialist state there is no room for formal justice; we are concerned only with material or substantive justice” (qtd. in Fraenkel 2017:47). Formal justice, here largely based on the Weimar Constitution, is legitimized by rational-egalitarian values. Material justice, on the other hand, is that “in accordance with National-Socialist doctrine for the purpose of strengthening the ‘race’” (Fraenkel 2017:47), which is to say, that which is legitimate in terms of the re-evocation of traditional-hierarchical values constitutive of Nazi doctrine. Fraenkel recognizes this distinction further in the difference of ‘treason’ and ‘crime.’ A crime is the violation of an institutionalized norm. Treason, which Fraenkel associates with the
concept of heresy, is an act against the German community, the state, or the values themselves (2017:49). The primacy of Nazi values as the evaluative standard over the rational-egalitarian values in formal law is clear in the following excerpt from a court decision:

In serious cases of high treason an adequate sentence has to be imposed in all circumstances regardless of all legal principles! The protection of state and people is more important than the adherence to formalistic rules of procedure which are senseless if applied without exception. (qtd. in Fraenkel 2017:52)

The fact that norms and procedures governed by rational-egalitarian values were not universally redefined, and were instead left to function, may appear to be a contradiction. This seeming contradiction, which Ernst Fraenkel explains as the Dual State, is a direct result of not only the developmental position the Nazis were in, but also a result of institutionalizing the new polity. This will be explored in the next section.

**Institutionalizing the Nazi State**

Each of the four subsystems making up society (the economy, polity, societal community, and evaluative/fiduciary) require certain exchanges with one another to function correctly. To become institutionalized, the polity requires adaptive resources as a means for action (from the economy), integrative resources
for justification (from the societal community), and evaluative resources for legitimization (from the fiduciary). In some cases, revolutionaries can find alternative sources of these inputs, or the current state of the other three subsystems can accommodate the new polity without trouble. However, it is equally possible (perhaps more likely) that one or more of the other subsystems will be incapable of providing the necessary inputs to the polity, requiring the revolutionaries to, in whole or part, redefine that subsystem as well. For those unfamiliar with the interchange, most of this section will be argued in simplified, accessible terms.

As previously shown, Hitler had little interest in interfering with or restructuring the economy. He “was a realist: at all events he must retain on his side the real forces of the country…[including] large-scale industry” (Jarman [1956] 1968:128). Therefore, his economic concerns can be summed up as (1) maintain the stable functioning of the economy and (2) redefine who could be a part of the labor force and who could be a capitalist. Had Hitler’s ideology lacked the racial dimension, it is likely he wouldn’t have interfered in the economy to any degree. Nonetheless, his only true redefinition of the economy was excluding ‘undesirables’ from participating in it. However, for a capitalist economy to function, it requires a certain degree of predictability, requiring stable norms which constitute the legal contracts facilitating capital accumulation. These norms and standards are found within the societal community, which is the next subsystem to address.
Unlike the economy, the societal community was more drastically redefined, though not completely. Again, the legal contract procedures and norms maintaining them (including the court systems) are required to enable a capitalist economy’s functioning. However, these norms and procedures are founded on the basis of rational-egalitarian values, values which the Nazis were determined to do away with entirely. The compromised solution is what Ernst Fraenkel calls the Dual State. I will briefly summarize his analysis, though more nuances can be found in his book.

The Dual State consists of the prerogative state, where authority originates from prerogative powers of the sovereign, and the normative state. The prerogative state is analogous to a patrimonial government. However, patrimonial governments tend to result in arbitrary decisions, which interfere in predictability and would, therefore, interfere with a capitalist economy’s functioning. To maintain the predictability of legal contract while also maintain prerogative powers requires either an administration and legal system which operates largely independently of the sovereign, or it requires the sovereign to enact economic policy exclusively on the advice of economic experts. However, even in the latter case, there is more opportunity for predictability to be infringed. The former case refers to the normative state, where the legal institutions and procedures are maintained within certain spheres of public life (including the economy).

The balance between these two, in Nazi Germany and other patrimonial societies, functionally determines not only the economy’s functioning but also the
engagement within the societal community. In Nazi Germany, a distinction was made between “political matters” which fell under the jurisdiction of the prerogative state, and “non-political matters” which fell within the domain of the normative state. The dividing line between these categories, however, is up to the prerogative state. The normative state, therefore, functions independently of the prerogative state, but only insofar as the prerogative state allows. In other words, “no sphere of social or economic life is immune from the inroads of the Prerogative State” (Fraenkel 2017:44).

One further aspect of the dual state, which should be emphasized, is the interaction between the two. While the prerogative state holds all real power, a facade was maintained to give the appearance that those within the prerogative state were still subject to normative laws (which they were, so long as they didn’t claim such matters were political). For instance, the relationship between the NSDAP and the courts can demonstrate this. In a case concerning activities of members of the party, the court ruled: “although it has been pointed out that the Party as such is superior to the State, this does not exclude the principle that…it is subject to the general rules of public life” (Fraenkel 2017:34). Thus, at least in theory, the NSDAP is not exempt from the jurisdiction of the courts, and therefore, the laws of the normative state. In practice, however, this “does not prevent [the party] from exercising the sovereign powers in the Prerogative State…[such that] acts of party officials, in so far as they are within the scope of their political authority, are beyond the jurisdiction of courts” (Fraenkel 2017:35).
Another impact of this dual state which needs to be explored, is how the normative state is maintained. Originally, such institutions operate based on rational-egalitarian values. In Nazi Germany, such values are targeted ruthlessly. Instead, akin to how the public viewed Weimar for most of its duration, the normative state is evaluated in terms of (1) its efficacy at creating desirable outcomes and (2) enabling the prerogative state to act on behalf of the German volk. If an outcome of the Normative State runs counter to Nazis’ desirable outcomes, the Prerogative State can step in to ‘correct’ it.

Apart from the Normative state, other aspects of the societal community were redefined. The policy of *Gleichschaltung* was applied to the trade unions on May 2, 1933, where the unions were occupied by the S.A. and S.S. They “were then taken over by the Nazis, and re-formed into the new German Labour Front” (Jarman [1956] 1968:122). By taking over and recreating numerous organizations which previously served as foci of interest demands, the Nazis were able to redefine the makeup of the societal community capable of providing interest demands, insuring they would be aligned with Nazi goals, doctrine, and practices. The same was done to institutions unrelated to interest demands, and instead relevant to the legitimation and justification of loyalty and expertise. In general, “from chess clubs to medical associations, from lawyers’ guilds to little theater groups, the policy was that of ‘Gleichschaltung’—of ‘alignment’ with Nazi principles and Nazi practice” (Remak 1990:55).
By redefining the portions of the societal community relevant to the provision of interest demands and political support, in addition to value-based associations, the Nazis were able to mobilize the necessary inputs from the societal community to justify their political actions. Furthermore, by leaving certain parts of the societal community unchanged (forming the Normative State), the Nazis enabled the capitalist economy’s functioning, thereby mobilizing the adaptive inputs from the economy to the polity.

Lastly, the only remaining inputs to mobilize are in evaluative/fiduciary, which is constitutive of values and social reproduction. Since the underlying values of the population remained traditional-hierarchical, even during Weimar’s duration, the Nazis didn’t need to redefine the values themselves. Instead, they had to redefine the articulation/specification of those traditional-hierarchical values, from that which supported the Kaiser and Catholicism, to the Nazi ideology. This redefinition includes altering the enforcement mechanisms of certain values (again, the distinction in punishment and treatment of ‘treason’ versus a ‘crime’) and the mechanisms used to justify the allocation of loyalty in terms of Nazi values.

Having done so, the new articulation of values was used to redefine the collective interest (what was desirable collectively). Nazi aims, as dictated by these values, ended up being conflated with Hitler’s moral responsibility to these collective aims. Put differently, there was a tendency to conflate belief in Nazi values with a belief in Hitler (Remak 1990:68-69). This is due both to Hitler being
a charismatic individual (embodying the values), and the values themselves legitimizing the position of an ultimate leader to save the German volk. The last element which was redefined within the evaluative subsystem was the structures integrating people into common values. This includes schools, places of worship, community centers and organizations, among many others. The Hitler Youth, especially, ensured that the next generation would fully internalize Nazi ideology, regardless of their parents’ beliefs. Thus, the redefined evaluative subsystem was capable of seamlessly providing the necessary evaluative inputs to the polity for legitimation. The Nazi state was institutionalized, and would remain stable so long as it could maintain the mobilization of those inputs, and avoid other disorderly movements.

There is a final note to consider ending the thesis. Nazi Germany fell due to losing the Second World War. If it hadn’t lost, or if the war had resulted in a stalemate, could the fascist state have remained stable? Put differently, what, if any, potential sources of instability arise within fascist (patrimonial) states? The one potential source of instability is if, due to arbitrary rulings of the prerogative state over the normative state, there is insufficient predictability to support the economy. In this case, one might expect a revolutionary movement to eventually arise, one comprised of capitalists who find it progressively less doable to function under Nazi rule. Since the economy provides the primary energy (means) for action to the polity, economic instability, or a refusal to cooperate might result in the polity’s control mechanisms collapsing. But what might cause this to occur? If
a contradiction were to arise, requiring further interference in the economy, that may cause it.

As I gestured to earlier, Hitler’s only economic interference was removing certain groups from the economy. If, over several years, Nazis continuously identified new ‘undesirables’ to remove from positions of power in the economy, it might result in fear amongst those left that their time will come. This seems unlikely to have occurred in Nazi Germany, however, for two reasons. First, those considered ‘undesirables’ were already defined from the outset, and while there was a progression of how extreme the treatment of them was, it is not as if the groups of desirable and undesirable were changing. Second, had the Nazis achieved their ultimate plans, they would have used conquered territories and people to enable the prosperity of the German volk, akin to how imperialistic powers have done in the past. However, even this has its theoretical limit. Suppose the Nazis, over a long enough period of time, manage to either expand too much or exploit available resources too much resulting in shortages for the German volk. In such a situation, the government might be forced to choose between benefitting the majority of the German volk, or the capitalists. Either choice has the potential to result in disorder. While this thought experiment is less relevant for Nazi Germany, it is vitally important for another case which needs to be analyzed: the contemporary United States.
References:


