Should Philosophy Provide Procedure for the Political Process or Constraints for its content? Political Liberalism and the fact of Pluralism
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2001
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Haverford College. Department of Philosophy
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Thesis
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The Charles Schwartz Memorial Prize in Philosophy
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eng
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Haverford users only
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Abstract
This essay will undertake a critical analysis of the level of justification of John Rawls's philosophical account of justice as fairness in its latest form, as articulated in his work Political Liberalism. In particular, it will consider Rawls's central arguments for the justification of his two principles of justice along the lines of the logical distinction between validity and defensibility described above. The conclusions of that analysis will then be related to Habermas's well-developed perspective of communicative theory and discourse ethics for the ultimate purpose of suggesting a more accurate and appropriate account of justice as fairness, especially given the fact of pluralism one which Rawls highlights as the leading insight of his theoretical redevelopment.