Science, Narrative, and Our Fundamental Comprehension of the World: A Meta-Reflection on the Split in Human Understanding
Date
2017
Authors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Producer
Director
Performer
Choreographer
Costume Designer
Music
Videographer
Lighting Designer
Set Designer
Crew Member
Funder
Rehearsal Director
Concert Coordinator
Advisor
Moderator
Panelist
Alternative Title
Department
Haverford College. Department of Philosophy
Type
Thesis
Original Format
Running Time
File Format
Place of Publication
Date Span
Copyright Date
Award
Language
eng
Note
Table of Contents
Terms of Use
Rights Holder
Access Restrictions
Open Access
Terms of Use
Tripod URL
Identifier
Abstract
My focus is on two very different forms of understanding—what I call scientific understanding and narrative understanding. I argue that scientific understanding is characterized by its non-agential perspective and non-relational notion of time; by removing oneself from the world, one is able to grasp objective truth. Within narrative understanding, on the other hand, one is immersed in the world; this form is essentially agential and adopts a relational notion of time—i.e. time is in relation to the agent who does things in the world. This split in understanding itself can either be understood scientifically or narratively. The scientific picture of the split makes it seem like narrative understanding is a biased and therefore corrupted form of understanding. This picture of the split accords an epistemic priority to science as the enterprise capable of grasping what objectively is. The narrative picture of the split, on the other hand, shows how science is a useful tool for ascertaining certain types of knowledge, but it must be restricted to the domain within which it is useful. I conclude that there is a distinction between narrative understanding and scientific understanding—and furthermore, that narrative understanding contains a distinction between knowing persons and knowing objects, while scientific understanding is only able to know things (even persons) as objects.