Revision and the Realm of Actuality: Problematizing Wittgenstein’s Account of Logic

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2016
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Haverford College. Department of Philosophy
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eng
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Open Access
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Abstract
The project of this paper is to problematize the Wittgensteinian account of logic which treats what we understand to be the laws of logic as infallible and claims that logic does not constitute a branch of knowledge. In his essay “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” Quine takes a radically different position; he argues that all of our beliefs are revisable, including what we believe to be logical laws. In this paper I will argue in favor of logical revisability – citing three instances that I believe demonstrate why we have and why we are able to revise our system of logic (the three instances being: the inconsistency between syllogistic and first-order logic, the evaluative nature of the accepting or rejecting certain laws of logic, and finally, how logical notation mediates our access to truth). By first establishing what I believe to be a shared characterization of what logic is, I will then follow a Wittgensteinian course of reasoning to expose the assumptions that Wittgenstein mistakes as universal truths – specifically that there is no difference between “the laws of logic” and “what we understand to be the laws of logic”. This discussion will make space for considering how and when one revises the laws of logic as well as the relationship between our systems of logic and what we perceive as the realm of actuality evolving – both of which will call for a reconceptualization of logic as a branch of knowledge.
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