Back to Sanity: Overcoming an Unknowable Reductionism in the Philosophy of Mind

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dc.contributor.advisorMacbeth, Danielle
dc.contributor.advisorYurdin, Joel
dc.contributor.authorKovacs, Hannah
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-10T02:59:13Z
dc.date.available2010-07-10T02:59:13Z
dc.date.issued2009
dc.description.abstractReductive philosophers of mind tell us that scientific explanations can account for meaning with brain function and human action in terms of cause/effect outputs. Before accepting this, we should consider whether there is something lacking in these mechanistic descriptions. I will argue that there is something essential missing from an atomized depiction of experience, and I will show that there are powerful resources to create a picture that preserves it. I will contend that it is impossible for reductive accounts of self-consciousness to achieve a rich picture of human experience, and I will attempt to offer an alternative view
dc.description.sponsorshipHaverford College. Department of Philosophy
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10066/4816
dc.language.isoeng
dc.rights.accessHaverford users only
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/us/
dc.subject.lcshPhilosophy of mind
dc.subject.lcshReductionism
dc.titleBack to Sanity: Overcoming an Unknowable Reductionism in the Philosophy of Mind
dc.typeThesis
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