On the Thesis Argument of Immanuel Kant's Third Antimony
Date
2012
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Haverford College. Department of Philosophy
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Thesis
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eng
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Haverford users only
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Abstract
I reconstruct the thesis argument of Immanuel Kant's third antinomy, which seeks to prove that if one does not accept Kant's sharp distinction between appearances and things-in-themselves, one can prove that there is a free cause. Drawing on a close historical methodology, I argue that Kant's argument is valid, but that its soundness depends on whether one is committed to contingent historical notions which Kant invokes about the sorts of things that are involved in causality, the way in which one ought to notate arguments about the infinite, and the possibility of an infinite series of appearances. I discuss Kant's argument in light of the contemporary free will debate, but leave the question of its relevance to the contemporary free will debate unanswered. Is the relevance of Kant's argument historical, contemporary, both, or neither? I leave this question to the reader.