Does Normative Anti-Realism Entail Nihilism?

Simple item page
dc.contributor.advisorMiller, Jerry
dc.contributor.authorPapenhausen, Vaughn
dc.date.accessioned2019-01-04T16:59:48Z
dc.date.available2019-01-04T16:59:48Z
dc.date.issued2018
dc.description.abstractDerek Parfit argues that normative anti-realism, the thesis that all normative truths are dependent on our normative attitudes, is a form of Nihilism, the thesis that nothing matters. I shall argue that Parfit is right: normative anti-realism is a form of Nihilism, in the sense that it entails Nihilism. I shall then argue, more tentatively, that this fact is grounds for us to reject anti-realism.
dc.description.sponsorshipHaverford College. Department of Philosophy
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10066/20539
dc.language.isoeng
dc.rights.accessOpen Access
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
dc.titleDoes Normative Anti-Realism Entail Nihilism?
dc.typeThesis
Files
Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 2 of 2
Thumbnail Image
Name:
2018PapenhausenV.pdf
Size:
708.85 KB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Description:
Thesis
Download
Thumbnail Image
Name:
2018PapenhausenV_release.pdf
Size:
159.71 KB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Description:
** Archive Staff Only **
Download
Collections
Philosophy