Back to Sanity: Overcoming an Unknowable Reductionism in the Philosophy of Mind

Kovacs, Hannah

dc.contributor.advisor	Macbeth, Danielle
dc.contributor.advisor	Yurdin, Joel
dc.contributor.author	Kovacs, Hannah
dc.date.accessioned	2010-07-10T02:59:13Z
dc.date.available	2010-07-10T02:59:13Z
dc.date.issued	2009
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10066/4816
dc.description.abstract	Reductive philosophers of mind tell us that scientific explanations can account for meaning with brain function and human action in terms of cause/effect outputs. Before accepting this, we should consider whether there is something lacking in these mechanistic descriptions. I will argue that there is something essential missing from an atomized depiction of experience, and I will show that there are powerful resources to create a picture that preserves it. I will contend that it is impossible for reductive accounts of self-consciousness to achieve a rich picture of human experience, and I will attempt to offer an alternative view
dc.description.sponsorship	Haverford College. Department of Philosophy
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/us/
dc.subject.lcsh	Philosophy of mind
dc.subject.lcsh	Reductionism
dc.title	Back to Sanity: Overcoming an Unknowable Reductionism in the Philosophy of Mind
dc.type	Thesis
dc.rights.access	Haverford users only