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Performance Compensation: How Are NBA Collective Bargaining Agreements and Players’ Union Movements Improving Players’ Compensation for Their Performance?

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dc.contributor.advisor Gaus, Eric
dc.contributor.advisor Owens, David M.
dc.contributor.advisor Preston, Anne Elizabeth
dc.contributor.author Duris, Luke
dc.date.accessioned 2019-09-01T21:48:17Z
dc.date.available 2019-09-01T21:48:17Z
dc.date.issued 2019
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10066/21732
dc.description.abstract The consolidation of corporations has brought monopsony power to many labor markets in America. As labor exploitation is a known and potential outcome connected to monopsony power, unions are essential for protecting workers’ bargaining power. As worker production is often challenging to quantify, this research uses the National Basketball Association as a field of study to examine the trends in player compensation and exploitation relative to changes made through the 2011 collective bargaining agreement and recent union movements to increase salaries and team salary cap. With the NBA as a monopsony power, and the players’ union bargaining for better compensation, the study aims to discover the success of unions when faced with monopsony power. Using player statistics, team statistics, and revenue data, the research generates a player’s marginal revenue product and compares it with the player’s salary. This study hypothesizes that newly negotiated collective bargaining agreements and other players’ union movements, will result in a decrease in exploitation, as the players would presumably bargain to decrease the exploitation upon themselves. Some of the results back this hypothesis while other instances do not, as variability in league revenue generation outweighed salary increases over a time span. The research concludes with a more in depth dissection of player compensation, as it analyzes exploitation of three different groups of player; superstar players, star players, and non-star players. The results also agreed and disagreed with the hypothesis, depending on which years are examined.
dc.description.sponsorship Haverford College. Department of Economics
dc.language.iso eng
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
dc.subject.lcsh National Basketball Association
dc.subject.lcsh Basketball players -- United States -- Salaries
dc.subject.lcsh Collective bargaining -- Sports -- United States
dc.title Performance Compensation: How Are NBA Collective Bargaining Agreements and Players’ Union Movements Improving Players’ Compensation for Their Performance?
dc.type Thesis
dc.rights.access Haverford users only


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