Abstract:
The First Amendment protects the free exercise of religion, but nowhere in the religion clauses or even in the Constitution does a clear definition of ‘religion’ exist. This poses a problem to justices trying to determine what kinds of beliefs are ‘religious’ free exercise cases and can receive protections. In this paper I look at how they rely on their own conceptions of religion to make decisions that affect the abilities of others to practice theirs. To determine what these conceptions look like, I engage in a close reading of the language in the Wisconsin v. Yoder opinions, as well as in the arguments made in related cases. This analysis has revealed that the rhetoric of the opinions in each free exercise decision has an impact on how religions and religious groups are treated by the public, which in turn affects how individual biases towards religion are shaped.
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