Abstract:
Perspectivism of knowledge, in conjunction
with common epistemic assumptions, entails that perspectives are an inherently distortionary
force in the knowledge relation. Often reduced to the thought that “there are no facts, only
interpretations,” perspectivism can seem to lead to a skeptical or relativist theory of
truth and knowledge. When interpreted as an extension of the Kantian notion of the
thing-in-itself and the Correspondence Theory of Truth, it is assumed that a view from
nowhere, or a non-perspectival knowledge, would be preferable. This thesis explores the
basis of these different assumptions about knowledge, and the aspects of perspectivism that
make them untenable. Different versions of perspectivism arises in the works of Arthur
Danto, Alexander Nehamas, and Maudemarie Clark, who each argue for a characterization of the
theory which in various ways misconstrue the role of the cognitive perspective in knowledge.
Perspective always impels access to knowledge, and sometimes impedes it – knowledge
originates from an approach to the world which is always taken through a perspective. In
some cases, the perspective adopted can confuse our understanding, but that understanding is
always made initially possible by the perspective. Rather than making knowledge meaningless
through distorting the interpretations made by cognizing subjects, perspectives enable the
cognitive relation to occur, and has a structural role in the relation between a cognizing
subject and objects of their cognition.
