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Does Normative Anti-Realism Entail Nihilism?

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dc.contributor.advisor Miller, Jerry
dc.contributor.author Papenhausen, Vaughn
dc.date.accessioned 2019-01-04T16:59:48Z
dc.date.available 2019-01-04T16:59:48Z
dc.date.issued 2018
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10066/20539
dc.description.abstract Derek Parfit argues that normative anti-realism, the thesis that all normative truths are dependent on our normative attitudes, is a form of Nihilism, the thesis that nothing matters. I shall argue that Parfit is right: normative anti-realism is a form of Nihilism, in the sense that it entails Nihilism. I shall then argue, more tentatively, that this fact is grounds for us to reject anti-realism.
dc.description.sponsorship Haverford College. Department of Philosophy
dc.title Does Normative Anti-Realism Entail Nihilism?
dc.rights.access Open Access


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