Browsing by Subject "Self (Philosophy)"

Now showing 1 - 6 of 6
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    Generation(s) of Self: Understanding the Nietzschean Alternative to Self as Causal Substratum
    (2020) Floyd, Isabel; Miller, Jerry
    Nietzsche writes "The doer is merely a fiction added to the deed—the deed is everything" (GM I:13). And yet, though Nietzsche's rejection of the theoretical import of ‘doers' in favor of an account of ‘deeds' is clearly a central part of his philosophical approach, it is a move that is not sufficiently understood in the secondary literature. Many Nietzsche theorists struggle to accept the radical character of this assertion and instead attempt to integrate it into an account of human agency in which being is still more theoretically fundamental than doing. In this thesis, I will examine existing interpretations and attempt to offer a reading of Nietzsche's views on the self that more fully captures the radical nature of his disavowal of doers. The Nietzschean self is active—it ​is​ deeds, it does not cause deeds, and such a self destabilizes the notion of causal responsibility that we typically use to understand the connection between subjects and deeds. I propose that the dissolution of causal responsibility makes way for an alternative picture of responsibility as radical, active self-claiming. The Nietzschean self that is claimed in this picture is not a ​substance ​but rather an ​inheritance of enacted relationships​ in which doing is theoretically central and explanatory of anything that we might call ‘being'. Nietzsche's account compels us to practice self-creation by embracing an understanding of the self as a transformative ​process of becoming ​in which change—rather than stability—is theoretically foundational.
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    The Path Not Taken: Self-Restriction in Nietzsche, Freud, and Plato
    (2012) Lowenthal, Matthew H.; Wright, Kathleen, 1944-; Miller, Jerry
    The idea of a physical path is commonly used as a metaphor for different situations in life. Three different philosophers also make arguments that can be viewed in terms of a path. Nietzsche’s notion of the promise in On the Genealogy of Morals is akin to a path in that the promiser vows to achieve a goal and follow a course of action that is required to get there. Freud’s idea of normal human sexuality in Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality can also be seen as a path in that he feels it is normal for a person to narrow down their initially vast sexual impulses and conform to the normal straight path. This idea is also expressed in Plato’s Phaedrus when the character of Socrates claims that he never leaves the city walls because there is nothing to learn outside of them. All three of these philosophers promote the idea that sticking to a path is more valuable than deviating from it; deviating is seen as a sign of weakness, or psychological illness, or just valueless. Although these philosophers go to great lengths to promote these views, their arguments are undone by the internal contradictions and ambiguities of the arguments themselves. Nietzsche’s promise is based on the existence of memory, but memory is actually a product of forgetfulness, which Nietzsche says is valuable, and could not exist without it. Freud concedes that there may be no person who actually follows his normal path of sexuality, and that to deviate from the path actually is normal. Plato’s Socrates realizes upon deviating from his path that there is much to be learned outside the city walls, and that deviating from it can help him appreciate the path even more. Though this does not prove that deviating from the path is actually more valuable than sticking to it, it does suggest that such valuations are not as clear as the three philosophers would make it seem.
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    The problem of the self-constituted individual in modern liberalism
    (2004) Cory-Watson, Damon; Miller, Jerry; Gangadean, Ashok K., 1941-
    The modern conception of what it means to be a self in a liberal society is fraught with problems. It was Plato who wrote that the unexamined life is not worth living and that one should know oneself above all. But what is this self that we are to know? Modern liberalism recognizes people's rights on the basis of an understanding of the self. This recognition attempts to resonate with the truth of what it means to be a human being. A clear basis for this truth is necessary for these liberal politics to work. The politics of liberalism connects the meaning of the self with the meaning of human being. If we do not have a clear understanding of what it means to be a self, then there is no way to understand how fundamental human rights can be recognized. Thus, it would serve us well to take a closer look at the constitution of the self out of which modern liberalism is operating.
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    The Relational Self in Heidegger, Zhuangzi, and Derrida
    (2012) Siqueiros, Benjamin; Wright, Kathleen, 1944-
    In Derrida, Heidegger, and Zhuangzi, there is a certain resonance to the idea of a self. Not the self, as an essential form or transcendental ontological concept, but a self, the instance of an individual being in a given time and space. Where and when we are determines, to a large extent, who we are, in that we are products of our social and historical environments. Since these social and historical environments are constantly changing for us, then we to must be constantly changing within these new times and spaces. The instance of a self, then, is contingent on its social and historical contexts. However, throughout all these contexts, there remains one thing that is determined by them: the self. This self is the intersection of social, historical, and ontological contexts, and is constituted by the relations between these concepts. The shifts in these relations are traced through the works of Heidegger, Zhuangzi, and Derrida, and their conceptions of the self all come to a similar conclusion, that, as Werner Heisenberg puts it, “modern man confronts only himself”, and to some degree humans have always primarily confronted themselves, because we are only here as ourselves. However, we also have potential, we change, and then we cease to exist. This change occurs mainly according to our colloquial descriptions, when we say that someone really put his or her self out there, or when one invests one’s self in an endeavor, or again in the general description of selflessness. Strictly speaking, existentially, we never step outside or leave ourselves, but our sense of self expands as we allow ourselves to take part in life’s changes. This putting of ourselves into relation with our own changes is the most authentic way of being in the world.