Browsing by Subject "Philosophy of mind"
Now showing 1 - 5 of 5
Results Per Page
- ItemBack to Sanity: Overcoming an Unknowable Reductionism in the Philosophy of Mind(2009) Kovacs, Hannah; Macbeth, Danielle; Yurdin, JoelReductive philosophers of mind tell us that scientific explanations can account for meaning with brain function and human action in terms of cause/effect outputs. Before accepting this, we should consider whether there is something lacking in these mechanistic descriptions. I will argue that there is something essential missing from an atomized depiction of experience, and I will show that there are powerful resources to create a picture that preserves it. I will contend that it is impossible for reductive accounts of self-consciousness to achieve a rich picture of human experience, and I will attempt to offer an alternative view
- ItemFallibility, Skepticism, and Distance in John McDowell's "Mind and World"(2009) Weiss, Zachary; Macbeth, Danielle; Dostal, Robert J.For my thesis, I looked at skepticism in terms of John McDowell's philosophy in Mind and World. In this work, McDowell explains how concepts mediate the relation between our minds and the world. He does so by making use of Kant's distinction in The Critique of Pure Reason between sensibility, our receptive capacity, and understanding, our spontaneous capacity. McDowell argues, similarly to Kant, that sensibility and understanding must be mutually implicated in any cognitive activity; theories of mind that try to explain thought by separating the contributions of sensibility and understanding are, he contends, incoherent. On these grounds, he refutes Davidson's Coherentism and what McDowell calls the Myth of the Given. As such, we will begin by rehearsing McDowell's claims refuting the Myth of the Given and Coherentism, and see how that brings him to assert that "we need a conception of experiences as states or occurrences that are passive but reflect conceptual capacities, capacities that belong to spontaneity, in operation" (McDowell 23). This will lead into his address (or lack thereof) of skepticism, upon which we will look again at The Critique of Pure Reason, utilizing Kant's idea of an intellectual intuition as a foil to McDowell's philosophy. In doing so, we will come to a richer understanding of McDowell's standpoint with regards to skepticism as well as his philosophy as a whole. This richer understanding will be furthered by addressing Charles Larmore's objection to some of McDowell's language, after which we can come to a more thorough understanding of the process of knowing the world.
- ItemThinking About What You Already Know: Structure, Uncertainty, and Evolution(1992) Haas, Brant
- ItemYou Don't Know What You Do Know: The Curse of Knowledge in Cognition and Teaching(2016) Conrad, Kimberly; Boltz, MarilynThe curse of knowledge refers to the common experience of having difficulty setting aside one’s own knowledge when inferring the knowledge of others. Within heuristics and biases research, the curse of knowledge is discussed as a bias arising from the availability, anchoring, and adjustment heuristics, and is conceptually analogous to hindsight bias towards one’s past self. Within theory-of-mind literature, the curse is discussed as a failure to employ mature mentalizing skills, though there lacks consensus on the conceptual relationship between mechanisms driving the curse and those driving theory-of-mind. This paper seeks to bridge the gap between the the heuristics and biases and theory-of-mind approaches by proposing an integrated cognitive mechanism underlying the curse of knowledge. Implications for teachers, strategies for combatting the curse in the classroom, and ideas for future research are discussed.