Browsing by Subject "Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, 1844-1900 -- Criticism and interpretation"

Now showing 1 - 10 of 10
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    Empiricism, Determinism, and Naturalism
    (2012) Sergay, Nathaniel; Wright, Kathleen, 1944-; Miller, Jerry
    Brian Leiter’s naturalistic interpretation of Nietzsche’s ethics reduces the cause and explanation of all facts about an individual to biological and psychological properties. He makes two central claims. First, that empiricism is the distinctive scientific way of looking at the world, providing access to objective, valueless truth. Second, that Nietzsche seeks to identify the causal determinants of human values, actions, thoughts, feeling, etc. in a fixed psycho‐physical human nature. I argue that Nietzsche’s endorsement of empiricism does not entail his endorsement of Leiter’s strong naturalism. Leiter misconstrues Nietzsche’s arguments concerning truth, failing to realize that his own thesis of truth is susceptible to Nietzsche’s attack on metaphysics. In fact, Nietzsche subscribes to a “postmodern” falsification thesis, rejecting the scientific and/or empirical claim to access “valueless,” objective reality. Nietzsche believes all of our “truths,” “knowledge,” judgments, and experiences are infused with subjective values. Instead of seeking “objectivity” through disinterested empiricism, we must seek objectivity by engaging with our values and affective interests. I go on to show that Leiter also misconstrues Nietzsche’s arguments concerning causality. As a result, Leiter’s thesis that Nietzsche seeks to identify deterministic causes of human facts is untenable. Finally, I show that, due to his naturalistic interpretation, Leiter misconstrues Nietzsche’s dismissal of the Kantian problem of freedom (of the causa sui) as an endorsement of determinism.
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    Generation(s) of Self: Understanding the Nietzschean Alternative to Self as Causal Substratum
    (2020) Floyd, Isabel; Miller, Jerry
    Nietzsche writes "The doer is merely a fiction added to the deed—the deed is everything" (GM I:13). And yet, though Nietzsche's rejection of the theoretical import of ‘doers' in favor of an account of ‘deeds' is clearly a central part of his philosophical approach, it is a move that is not sufficiently understood in the secondary literature. Many Nietzsche theorists struggle to accept the radical character of this assertion and instead attempt to integrate it into an account of human agency in which being is still more theoretically fundamental than doing. In this thesis, I will examine existing interpretations and attempt to offer a reading of Nietzsche's views on the self that more fully captures the radical nature of his disavowal of doers. The Nietzschean self is active—it ​is​ deeds, it does not cause deeds, and such a self destabilizes the notion of causal responsibility that we typically use to understand the connection between subjects and deeds. I propose that the dissolution of causal responsibility makes way for an alternative picture of responsibility as radical, active self-claiming. The Nietzschean self that is claimed in this picture is not a ​substance ​but rather an ​inheritance of enacted relationships​ in which doing is theoretically central and explanatory of anything that we might call ‘being'. Nietzsche's account compels us to practice self-creation by embracing an understanding of the self as a transformative ​process of becoming ​in which change—rather than stability—is theoretically foundational.
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    Inciting a Tragedy
    (1998) Miller, Brian J.
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    Nietzsche's Aestheticism: A Language of a New Morality
    (1995) Frias, Eleanor
    Nietzsche's account of morality and ethics in On the Genealogy of Morals delineates a history that presents problems to our understanding of morality today. Nietzsche reveals that our important concept of "good" emerged from a "slave revolt of morality," that our institutions of law and justice are the contemporary manifestations of ancient systems of punishment and humiliation and that our philosophic and priestly ascetic ideals are fundamentally life-denying mechanisms. Nietzsche's critique of the three main components of morality seems to unveil a history to our current beliefs and law systems that completely denies the possibility of maintaining any semblance of morality. The distinctions between good and evil become ambiguous and therefore open the possibility for lawlessness, corruption, violence and danger, where disregard for everyone else is the norm. However, I propose that Nietzsche's critique is only a critique of a morality as we presently understand it and not of morality in general. His genealogy presents criticisms of our current system of ethics in order to deconstruct the binary rigidities of its language. In place of the old language, Nietzsche proposes a new aesthetic language that accommodates a new version of ethical and moral action. The opposition of good and evil are replaced by the will to power as manifested in art. Because the possibilities extend beyond the restraints of either being good or being evil, emphasis is diverted from the "thou shalt nots" and once again placed on activity, individuality, and creativity. Thus, the introduction of this new language of aestheticism allows us to see that it is possible to have multiple or alternate moralities and that Nietzsche does not kill morality but suggests new moralities that allow us to affirm our lives and our humanity.
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    Structures and Perspectives: A Comparative Study of Chuang-Tzu and Nietzsche
    (1999) Turrell, Alex; Wright, Kathleen, 1944-; Macbeth, Danielle
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    The Complexities of Nietzsche’s Fight With Socrates
    (2004) Degnan, Michael; Gangadean, Ashok K., 1941-; Wright, Kathleen, 1944-
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    What is the Virtue of a Philosopher?: Plato, Nietzsche, and the Love of Wisdom.
    (2013) Duncan, Robin; Yurdin, Joel; Wright, Kathleen, 1944-
    To answer the question of how a philosophical life and character are a virtuous life and character, I begin by surveying Plato and Nietzsche, both directly and through secondary commentaries. For each, I develop a view of their ideal, virtuous philosopher. For Plato this ideal is partly embodied in the natural philosophers of the Republic, but more fully displayed in the figure of Socrates. Figures defined by a philosophic Eros, which drives them to pursue wisdom and truth unrelentingly and despite all resistance. For Nietzsche, the chosen figure is that of the philosopher of the future, a character of supreme mental strength, self-confidence, and a playful experimentalism. Both Plato and Nietzsche's philosophers are seen to have an interest in education, at least insofar as it can cultivate exceptional individuals to achieve true philosophic character. Based on the points of agreement between these two philosophers, I present an ideal of philosophic virtue that focuses on the motivating love of wisdom and the strength of mind and character to pursue that love to its fullest in the face of all obstacles, which I claim will be available only to few, even potentially. Following the formulation of this ideal virtue, I defend the virtuous character of the love of wisdom as the fullest development of a human excellence in knowing the world; it is a virtuous excellence in both answering questions and in determining which questions are worthy of deep study. This second part of philosophic excellence, the determination of what is worth valuing, addresses concerns about the objective value of truth and allows us to argue against reliance on motivational value alone. Finally I answer the objection that may stem from my assertion that most people do not have even the potential to achieve philosophic virtue, this restriction however, is seen to follow naturally from the formulation of philosophic virtue presented.