Browsing by Subject "Knowledge, Theory of"
Now showing 1 - 8 of 8
Results Per Page
Sort Options
- ItemBecoming Subjective: Theories of Knowledge in Coleridge and Wittgenstein(1996) Ruegg, Jessica
- ItemDescriptive Ontology: A Synthesis of Logos and Language-Game(1991) Brennan, William; Gangadean, Ashok K., 1941-; Desjardins, Rosemary, 1936-
- ItemGrammar and Meaning: An Analysis of Wittgenstein's "Forms of Life"(1991) Benjamin, Stephen; Macbeth, Danielle; Desjardins, Rosemary, 1936-
- ItemReenacting Knowledge: Human Intentions in a Natural World(1995) Okrent, Nicholas
- ItemThe Epistemic Hypothesis : A Study in the Early Pragmatism of Charles Sanders Peirce(2004) Pober, Jeremy
- ItemThe Success of Skillfully Knowing(2013) Padilla, Miguel A.; Macbeth, Danielle; Yurdin, JoelIt is nearly universally acknowledge among epistemologists that knowledge is non-accidentally true belief. In this work, I will give an account of what it means to have a non-accidental true belief, that is, an explanation to what is referred to as the nature of knowledge. In doing so, I build around reliabilist virtue-theoretic approaches to give an account that solves Gettier problems that have plagued defenders of justified true belief accounts. Tackling the problem with the virtue-theoretic approach, complemented by a new understanding of ability as fallible, will give us insight into the character-revealing aspects and rational components of abilities. The notions of animal knowledge and reflective knowledge stemming from rationality will show that we can avoid problems of luck that Gettier problems exemplify. Though this formulation will appear as unconducive to cases of knowledge from testimony, our analysis will show that testimony only elucidates the various forms our abilities take, including practical and perceptual. Specifically, knowledge through testimony will show how we come to train our abilities, which are part of our second nature, and in testimony, our testimonial sensibility.