A Cooperative Theory of Success for INGOs in Developing Countries

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Political Science
Over the past two decades, global civil society has ballooned. Every year governments and private donors funnel billions of dollars of international aid through International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs). For many states, INGOs have become their primary recipient of foreign aid. Global civil society has become a central force for developmental politics. Charles Chatfield asserts, “Non-state actors have become significant international actors and will increase in importance as the world stage becomes more complex and integrated”. INGOs have received acclaim for their work in countless regions and on countless issues. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon recently applauded the role of INGOs, claiming that INGOs have done an exceptional job at institution building in transitional states. He said, “There can be no success without a healthy civil society”. Kriesberg demonstrates that social movements, INGOs, and global civil society have become a part of the global governance structure and can exert influence beyond the basic constraints of a state-based system. Since the end of the Cold War, many INGOs have even begun to directly address issues of security and conflict resolution. If INGOs have actually become as influential as this scholarship might suggest, then private donors can choose INGOs that match their own ideology and directly affect change at the international level. Individuals can now affect the global order both through the state system and through the transnational advocacy networks compromised of INGOs.

However, there is not substantial evidence to suggest that individual INGOs can consistently create change, or that even with sufficient funding INGOs are able to

1 Lange 116.
2 Chatfield xiii.
3 Ban.
4 Kriesberg 3.
5 Lange 113.
accomplish their goals. Grugel claims that many INGOs are severely limited by states. Because of the power difference between INGOs and governments, Grugel claims that “bypassing the state is simply not feasible” even for the strongest INGOs or the weakest states.  

Even weak states have militaries, so it is impossible for an INGO to operate without minimal compliance with the state. INGOs engaging with states are unlikely to have any effect if the state refuses to allow the organization to act. Realist logic suggests that INGOs do not have hard power in the international system and thus do not have the ability to affect change at all. Even more troubling are the cases in which INGOs are counterproductive. Brysk cites a Christian INGO, the Summer Institute of Linguistics, which actually sparked intense local anti-Christian sentiment in several villages in Ecuador.  

Donors should be very skeptical of organizations that act counterproductive to their own mission. A report commissioned by the Norwegian government in 1995 suggested, “The NGOs do not have the comparative advantages that they are generally assumed to have…. On the contrary, in some cases they have comparative disadvantages”.  

If INGOs are actually powerless on many issues and do not have the ability to act except as the arm of a state, then it is puzzling that they would receive funding at all.  

 Nonetheless, as there are clearly some INGOs that have accomplished their goals, the real puzzle is to explain why all such INGOs do not succeed. We need to ask why some INGOs are successful in developing countries while others are not. By answering this, we can develop recommendations for INGOs, governments, and donors that will

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6 Grugel 39.  
7 Brysk 225.  
8 Tvedt 19.
hopefully improve the effectiveness of global civil society in dealing with issues of
development.

The paper will try to test three basic theories of success. The schools of thought
are (1) INGOs with stronger organizational capabilities are more likely to succeed, and
(2) INGOs that are more willing to cooperate at the local, state, and international levels
are more likely to succeed, and (3) INGOs that deal with security issues are less likely to
succeed. The first theory will be called “Organizational”, the second, “Cooperative”, and
the third “Spheres of Influence”. This paper will assert that organizations that focus on
cooperative relationships are much more likely to be successful. Organizations that
actively cooperate with other INGOs, governments, and local actors are able to tap into
networks that improve their opportunities for success. Organizations that fail to cooperate
will have much more trouble accomplishing their goals. Organizational competence, on
the other hand, is not as important to the success of an INGO. While INGOs should not
neglect their organizational strength, organizational improvements do not ensure the
achievement of a mission.

In the first section, this paper will examine the existing literature on INGOs and
the role they play in global civil society. It will then develop and discuss the three
theories of success. The second section will outline a research design to test these three
theories. The third section will use three INGOs to test the theories. It will look at two
programs from each INGO, and try to find which programs and which INGOs tended to
be the most successful. The final section will compare the INGOs and their programs to
each other and attempt to draw conclusions. This paper will attempt use the theories to
answer why some INGOs are successful while others are not.
Literature Review

The World Bank has published a list of guidelines for INGOs. They are endorsed by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the International Labor Organization (ILO), and KIVU Nature, and are a commonly supported standard for INGOs. They are:

1) Ensure that your objectives and those of the indigenous peoples are the same.
2) Create a representative NGO for the community or join one.
3) Work with the indigenous peoples to help estimate the impacts.
4) Help by providing access to information.
5) Assist indigenous peoples to communicate in different media.
6) Assist indigenous peoples to understand the powers at play.
7) Be sure you understand the nature of traditional knowledge.
8) Encourage the inclusion of indigenous knowledge in finding innovative solutions.

-World Bank

These guidelines stress two main points. First, the guidelines support cooperation at the local level, and second, they support an access to the media and information. They do not mention cooperation with developing states or other INGOs. Although the guidelines do suggest a high level of cooperation with indigenous people, the organization they depict is still one that is intervening and controlling the situation. Oddly, even though they are designed for all INGOs, they use the term “indigenous” which suggests a native, non-globalized way of life. Many INGOs act in countries where large non-indigenous populations exist, and so only interacting with indigenous peoples seems unusual. The World Bank guidelines exclude non-indigenous locals in their solutions.

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9 Guidelines for Non-Government Organizations.
10 For example, about half of Fiji’s population is of Indian descent. There has been a large Indian presence in Fiji for over a hundred years. The Indo-Fijians are considered to be Fijian in terms of national identity, but are not technically indigenous to Fiji.
The guidelines also ignore organizational differences. They do not provide recommendations for funding, staff, flexibility, or expertise. While they do suggest that INGOs should try to find “innovative solutions”, they do not convey the message that organizations themselves can be strong. On the whole, the guidelines are not backed by research and do not cover a range of aspects. It is clear that while many groups believe INGOs play an important role, there is little research to define exactly what INGOs ought to do.

Waltz argues that states are the only important units in the international system. He agrees that “states are not and never have been the only international actors”.\textsuperscript{11} However, he claims that states are the “major actors” and power is consolidated within them.\textsuperscript{12} Therefore, although non-state actors do sometimes play a role, they never have the ability to affect an outcome if they disagree with an interested state. Waltz is clear that states will always be interested in issues of security because they are constantly worried about their own survival.\textsuperscript{13} Accordingly, INGOs have no role to play in security politics, and are extremely limited in all other spheres. Yet, Waltz spends very little time talking about weak states, and is largely unconcerned with actors that are not trying to transform the entire system. Clearly a weak INGO would have little chance in altering the interests of a superpower or transforming world politics, but it is possible that strong INGO could alter the interests of a weak state, or transform a situation in which no major powers are interested. Although Waltz fervently claims that INGOs have no power, it is possible that they could have some opportunities where the sovereign system is weakest.

\textsuperscript{11} Waltz 93.
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid 164.
Kriesberg diverges from Waltz by arguing that social movement organizations have already entered into a global governance structure. While they do not have the hard power or sovereignty to compete with states, they are developing the ability to fill in between states. They have authority in areas that states are unable or unwilling to exert control. Global governance, as Kriesberg understands it, is a structure made up primarily of states, but also has roles for INGOs, social movements, and international institutions.\textsuperscript{14} As global integration increases, the role of the state will have to become more mediated by social movement organizations.\textsuperscript{15} This means that INGOs will have larger roles to play in determining the limits of the state system. INGO authority is increasingly becoming what INGOs make of it.

Smith suggests that there has been a constant trend in the increase of INGOs. Smith claims that INGOs and Transnational Social Movement Organizations (TSMO) help provide connections between similar national movements, especially in areas in which national solutions are not reasonable.\textsuperscript{16} By using the international system to align movements, TSMOs and INGOs are able to create international agendas and are increasingly able to accomplish globalized goals. Smith claims that international movements have a wider range of experiences and so should lead to more “politically saavy (sic)” movements.\textsuperscript{17} However, Smith warns that a proliferation of movements and organizations may soon lead to competition for resources that could slow the growth of global civil society or even lead to “organizational decline”.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{14} Kriesberg 7.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid 9.
\textsuperscript{16} Smith 47.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid 57.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid 58.
Hurd suggests that the primary method that actors use to accomplish their goals in the international sector is coercion. Coercion occurs when there is “a relation of asymmetrical physical power among agents” and “this asymmetry is applied to changing the behavior of the weaker agent”.\footnote{Hurd 383.} This poses a problem for INGOs because in the realm of physical power, an INGO will \textit{always} be the weaker agent. States and Violent Non-State Actors (VNSAs) can rely on the military force when diplomatic measures fail. INGOs, on the other hand, can never use a power imbalance to coerce weaker actors. Hurd contends that if an actor cannot be coerced into obeying norms then has to perceive these norms as legitimate. Therefore, Hurd suggests that INGOs can only obtain authority when their role in the international sphere is believed to be legitimate, rather than backed by hard power.\footnote{Ibid 388.}

Duffield examines the growing role of conflict resolution INGOs. According to Duffield, the opening of the international system has given INGOs the opportunity to operate in a much more powerful, unregulated manner than they would have even twenty years ago.\footnote{Duffield 82.} He argues that INGOs participate in development in order to “change the behaviour (sic) and attitudes of institutions, groups and individuals within the countries concerned”.\footnote{Ibid 80.} This is opposed to a model of development that seeks to empower existing institutions. Duffield is claiming that INGOs view local institutions as flawed and recognize that their role is to return the local institutions to the correct path. This claim suggests that organizations are less likely to involve themselves cooperatively at the local level and are more likely to demand radical changes to the institutions within developing
states. Duffield also contests the assumption that strong organizations tend to be more effective. He says that because conflicts are not of a technical nature, increases in organizational competence do not necessarily lead to greater organizational success.\(^{23}\) Therefore, while organizations should not neglect their own competence, the ability to achieve *organizational* goals should not be the only priority of an INGO. Instead, Duffield recommends an assessment-implementation-evaluation strategy. He claims that organizations that assess conflict, develop and implement strategies, and then evaluation and improve upon those strategies are more likely to achieve success.\(^{24}\) Duffield’s recommendations are directly opposed to the organizational school of thought. By claiming that technical competence is not directly linked to strategic success, Duffield is proving that stronger organizations do not consistently produce higher rates of success.

However, Duffield ignores the fact that stronger organizations do have a wider range of options available. They have the staff, the funding, the expertise, and the flexibility to implement more strategies. They can use strong research teams to assess situations and produce strategies. They have the resources to implement these strategies. They have the funding to employ firms to evaluate their results. Accordingly, while it is certainly possible for strong organizations to fail to work towards their own missions, stronger organizations are also more likely to have the ability to succeed. Therefore, while technical competence may not be the key to success, Duffield’s argument does not prevent the possibility of an organizational answer to INGO success.

Keck and Sikkink look at global civil society in terms of Transnational Advocacy Networks. These networks are alliances of local NGOs, INGOs, social movements,
foundations, media sources, churches, trade unions, consumer organizations, intellectuals, intergovernmental organizations, and government branches that are all working towards the same general demands. INGOs may be working specifically towards their own goals, but Keck and Sikkink argue that their role is only understood as part of an overall network. By pushing for peace in Sri Lanka, International Alert is advancing the demands of the entire peace and conflict resolution network. Advocacy Networks give attention to concerns that are not directly in line with “national interest”. Because these networks do not have the traditional realist state needs of security, power, and survival, they are able to advocate for interests that are popularly supported but not accounted for by the state system. However, Keck and Sikkink see advocacy as the main role of a network and thus an INGO. Networks attempt to influence “behavior changes in target actors”. Therefore, INGOs can only affect change by acting within the state system and advocating for their concerns to states. INGOs can only thus be successful by pushing states to executing their own authority. Keck and Sikkink do not consider the possibility that the state system leaves some room for INGO authority. Although INGOs cannot use force to accomplish their goals, it is possible that INGOs can provide forms of authority that states, especially weak developing states, do not have access to. If INGOs do have their own authority, then they have important roles beyond advocacy networks, and can actually enact change themselves.

Ghimire supports this claim by suggesting that power does exist in transnational social movements. Although many social movements claim that they operate under

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25 Keck and Sikkink 9.
26 Ibid 6.
27 Ibid 203.
28 Ibid 201.
norms of democratic equality, Ghimire argues that most social movements are led by organizations that actually wield power.\textsuperscript{29} Movements are not democratic in the sense that the authority is spread amongst the entire constituency. Instead, they are democratic because any individual can choose to support or exit the movement at any time. By choosing to support a movement, individuals are democratically choosing to support its consolidation of power.\textsuperscript{30} Conversely, by removing their support for a movement they are limiting its authority. This consolidation of authority gives INGOs the right to exercise power in the gaps of the sovereign system. Movements are not freeform powerless entities relegated to advocating states. Rather, they are dynamic, quasi-sovereign alliances led by INGOs that sometimes have the ability to exercise authority when states do not deny it.

Goodhand and Lewer examine the roles of INGOs in Sri Lanka and they contend that because the state government allows INGOs to act, the INGOs do indeed have power.\textsuperscript{31} INGOs of course cannot combat either the government or the rebel faction in Sri Lanka, but they do have the ability to alter the domestic cultural and structural context.\textsuperscript{32} However, the ability to exercise power does not necessitate that INGOs do so effectively. In fact, Goodhand and Lewer conclude that INGOs frequently fail to create change despite their ability to do so. They contend that INGOs typically do not anchor themselves locally and thus are unable to do more than provide temporary relief.\textsuperscript{33} They claim that INGOs in Sri Lanka had more success when they had a high level of cooperation at the local level, and were not afraid to spend a lot of time in a single

\textsuperscript{29} Ghimire 136.
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid 11.
\textsuperscript{31} Goodhand and Lewer 71.
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid 79.
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid 81.
community. 34 This supports the cooperative hypothesis at the local level. According to Goodhand and Lewer, INGOs can be successful by forming cooperative relationships with local populations.

Nonetheless, there are still serious obstacles to the success of INGOs. Even if they are able to influence other actors, execute their own power, and cooperate at the local level, the international system has many constraints that could prevent the success of an INGO. Grugel contends that although INGOs have authority when the state does not claim it, INGOs can also lose their authority whenever a state decides to claim it. INGOs exist within governance structures, but they only do so as long as states allow them to. 35 Developing states tend to be weaker, so they rarely have the ability to prevent all civil society participation. However, all states have the capacity to block any single INGO as they please. Therefore Grugel concludes that INGOs must operate in a fashion that is acceptable to its host state. 36 Certainly this does not prevent INGOs from having an impact but it does constrain their range of options.

Tvedt warns that INGOs do not have serious comparative advantages over state aid programs because they have institutionalized goals and methods. 37 INGOs have professional staff that depends on the continued existence of the INGO for their careers. They exist as part of a globalized structure and rely on continued inter-organizational interaction for their success. They operate under the basic ideological premise that global civil society is good. This means that although INGOs prioritize their missions, they also must inherently prioritize their organizational survival and the growth of global civil

34 Ibid 84.
35 Grugel 38.
36 Ibid 39.
37 Tvedt 19.
society. This means that while their security, power, and survival cannot be understood in quite the same realist terms as states, they are still constrained by their existence as INGOs to perpetuate their own organizations and the role of global civil society as a whole. Certainly it is impossible to remove either of these two constraints from an INGO. However, the constraints do not prevent INGOs from operating. It simply requires them to continue to fit within the system.

Cortright and Pagnucco argue that because transnational social movements seek to unite similar state-level movements, they are met with the problem of reconciling the differences in these movements. They force movements with different priorities coming out of different national contexts to pretend that they are similar.\(^{38}\) This means that unless domestic social movements happen to correspond, then it is rarely possible for a transnational social movement, and thus the INGOs that lead it, to be successful. However, Smith provides the valuable contention that many issues require an international solution. Therefore, many domestic social movements do in fact follow similar trajectories and can easily cooperate at the international level.\(^{39}\) The necessarily international nature of conflict resolution has meant that most state-level peace and interstate cooperation movements have been easily reconcilable. Therefore, while Cortright and Pagnucco’s critique is a concern, it should be less troublesome for conflict resolution INGOs than INGOs dealing with racial inequalities, labor movements, or women’s rights, for example.

Mutua presents the problem of perceived neutrality for INGOs. Most INGOs, especially conflict resolution INGOs, claim to be dedicated to political neutrality.

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\(^{38}\) Cortright and Pagnucco 173.

\(^{39}\) Smith 57.
However, Mutua claims that INGOs operate under the inherent belief in the necessity of global civil society. Furthermore, INGOs almost always actually do have a political stance within a developing country. In areas of conflict resolution, INGOs certainly take stances for or against particular local actors. By hiding behind neutrality, Mutua claims that INGOs are limiting their own authority. INGOs are not neutral and domestic actors do not believe them to be. Therefore, rather than pretending to have no political goals in developing states, INGOs should publicly and partially back local actors that merit support. This does not mean that INGOs should oppose neutrality, should be unwilling to cooperate with multiple parties, or should ever guarantee their unconditional support of a local actor. However, given the hostile nature of violent conflict, INGOs should be willing to side aside neutrality when it prevents them from achieving their mission.

McCarthy suggests that, like national social movements, transnational social movements rely on the accumulation of resources. Movements and organizations rely on external resources, primarily money, for their own perpetuation. If organizations are unable to generate enough resources, then they will be unable to survive. Conversely, movements are able to grow rapidly even without strong constituencies if they are able to rapidly mobilize resources. However, McCarthy’s theory speaks of movement strength, not success. Resource mobilization can control how active a movement is, but the accumulation of resources does not ensure success. It only ensures the perpetuation of a movement. Movements should be careful to make sure to have enough resources, but the success of the movement is not dependent on the maximization of resources.

McCarthy does raise one worrisome point for INGOs. He argues that resources are limited, and that the proliferation of INGOs within a movement will inevitably lead to competition for resources. This will slowly turn into a lack of resources that could lead to the decline of global civil society. Therefore, even as INGOs improve and new INGOs are founded, the lack of resources could quickly lead to organizations consistently lacking the funds to accomplish their goals.

The final critique of INGOs and transnational social movements comes from Thomas Davies. Davies demonstrates that many INGOs have a bureaucratic tendency to overspend. Some INGOs attempt to show potential donors that they need a larger budget by making sure to use their entire budget. Furthermore, as non-profits, they are not rewarded for operating cost-effectively. Therefore, INGOs fall victim to overspending and wasting donor funds. They can sometimes be less effective than cheaper alternatives.

Although the literature dances around it, few authors touch on the explicit issue of what makes an INGO successful. One author briefly touched on the lack of importance of organizational competence, and another suggested that possibly local relationships are important. However, the vast majority of scholarship has only been able to examine the constraints that affect INGOs. Therefore, this paper will synthesize the literature and provide three methods for predicting the success of an INGO in conflict resolution. The next section will outline these three schools of thought.

42 Ibid 254.
43 Davies 42.
This paper will use the existing literature to develop three theories of INGO success, and then test the theories using a set of cases. The three theories it will test are “Organizational” Theory, “Cooperative” Theory, and “Spheres of Influence” Theory. The following section will discuss each of the three theories in depth and examine how each ought to operate.

The first school of thought that this study will test is Organizational Theory. It argues that stronger organizations tend to have more success, or more accurately, organizations with stronger capabilities tend to have more success. According to Organizational theory, organizations that can do more and can do it more effectively will be better at achieving their goals.

The capabilities of an organization can be broken into two categories. The first is resources, and the second is organizational framework. Organizational resources are the most basic tools at an INGO’s disposal. Stronger organizations are organizations that have a larger budget and more employees. They employ experts with a vast knowledge of conflict resolution. Their trustees provide the organization with special resources such as connections with government officials and access to media sources. The resources of an organization are its most basic advantages. The Organizational school of thought argues that INGOs with greater resources will be more likely to succeed.

However, the Organizational school of thought also applies to the structural capabilities of an organization. Simply having funding, personnel, expertise, and access does not necessarily guarantee organizational strength. An organization with ample resources can still prove to be incapable without a strong organizational framework.
Effective organizations also have strategic flexibility, an effective decision-making process, and the ability to enact rapid responses. These three factors together compose the keys to an organizational framework. Organizational theory thus contends that organizations with more resources and a stronger organizational framework are more likely to be successful at achieving their goals.

This theory contains two competing hypotheses for what sort of framework creates a "stronger" organization. The first is hypothesis that INGOs with greater oversight and a stronger bureaucracy are more likely to be successful. This sort of organization relies on decision making from its leadership, and implementation from the bottom. Its decision making structure is closed. It is highly bureaucratic and places responsibility on a larger group of people. This type of structure is "closed". The second hypothesis is that INGOs that are more streamline and rely on fewer employees with a less defined power structure are more likely to be successful. This sort of an organization allows its employees that are lowest on the totem to frequently make consequential decisions. It uses very little oversight and instead trusts its employees to generate their own solutions. Some of the most streamline organizations even rely on their local allies to dictate their tactics. This sort of structure is "open". The organizational theory will test whether bureaucratic or streamline organizations are more likely to create a "stronger" organization, and thus which organizations are more likely to succeed.

INGOs also tend to prioritize particular programs within their organization. Higher priority programs tend to receive larger portions of resources, or have natural access to special resources. Many programs develop their own framework within the organization. As the structural and resource capabilities of each program within an
organization are not equal, the Organizational school of thought would suggest that different programs would have different levels of success. Therefore, the Organizational theory also contends that the programs with the strongest capabilities will also be the most likely to succeed, while those that lack in resources or contain structural deficiencies are unlikely to accomplish their goals.

The second school of thought that this paper will examine is the Cooperative Theory. It argues that if an organization cooperates effectively in order to increase its capabilities and the capabilities of its allies, then it will be more likely to succeed. Organizations that act in cooperative networks working towards similar goals are much more likely to achieve them. Like Keck and Sikkink, this theory recognizes that many actors at the state and international levels are constantly and cooperatively working towards reconcilable goals. By working together, organizations can maximize their own capabilities and provide more opportunities for success. Conversely, INGOs that attempt to work alone or even form antagonistic relationships with other actors are much more likely to run into trouble. By instigating competition rather than developing alliances, INGOs can increase the obstacles present in a target state. The Cooperative theory thus argues that INGOs should look for alliances and avoid increasing hostility in order to achieve their goals.

INGOs can attempt to cooperate for a variety of reasons. The Cooperative theory does not suggest that all relationships serve the same purpose. Generally speaking, INGOs attempt to cooperate in order to increase their capabilities, or the capabilities of allies working towards the same goal. More specifically, they cooperate to increase access to resources, information, and to gain legitimacy at the international and local

44 Keck and Sikkink 9.
levels. By cooperating for access to resources, we mean that INGOs might be able to increase donations, or develop new sources of funding, or that they might be looking for access to particular leaders or communities that they might not otherwise be able to reach. For example, INGOs might cooperate with the demands of a particular state in order to receive aid. INGOs can also use cooperation to access information. An INGO might cooperate with a local organization so that it could better understand the local situation. Finally, an INGO might cooperate because it is seeking legitimacy at the international or local levels. An INGO might cooperate to increase their international exposure or the legitimacy of an advocacy network. Suchman defines legitimacy as “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity (such as an INGO) are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions”. An organization that holds significant legitimacy is more likely to alter the decisions of both local and international actors in its favor. By cooperating with other actors, an INGO may be more likely to be perceived as legitimate by the international community. INGOs may also struggle for legitimacy at the local level. By gaining the support of domestic actors, INGOs can overcome local suspicion and increase their local legitimacy. Thus they can increase their likelihood of achieving success. INGOs can use alliances to develop a variety of capabilities. This paper will focus on resources, information, and international and local legitimacy as the four primary roles of cooperation. When INGOs cooperate, they are doing so to increase these four factors for themselves and their allies.

45 Tvedt 19.
46 Suchman 574.
47 Goodhand and Lewer 81.
However, cooperation can also be problematic for INGOs. Developing alliances can be expensive, require compromising goals, or even delegitimize an INGO. First, cooperation frequently requires resources. Especially at the local level, cooperation might mean an INGO would act as the financial support for a local actor or organization. INGOs looking to cooperate might waste their resources on undeserving or ineffective allies. Even when the alliance might produce real benefits, the financial strain of some alliances can outweigh its advantages. Second, cooperation can frequently require an INGO to compromise. An INGO looking to increase its resources, for example, might be forced to meet the demands of donors. An INGO looking for access to a particular leader might be forced to compromise its own goals to meet the demands of the leader. Finally, an INGO that poorly chooses its alliances might actually end up delegitimating itself. By incorrectly identifying peacemakers, or choosing to work only with particular ethnic groups, an INGO could cost itself impartiality or accidentally back those that do not fit with its goals. Therefore, although cooperation does have a strong upside, poor alliance choices can result in failure for an INGO. The Cooperative Theory thus also argues that INGOs that cooperate ineffectively and fail to increase their capabilities will be less likely to succeed.

The Cooperative Theory looks at a variety of alliance choices. INGOs are not limited to cooperating only with similar organizations that have similar goals. The theory understands that not all cooperative relationships are equal, and that certain partners acting at certain levels can have stronger effects on the capabilities of an INGO. INGOs can form relationships with other INGOs at the state (1) and international levels (2), states (3), rebel factions (4), local organizations (5), and local populations (6). As
cooperation between an INGO and each of these groups can operate very different, this paper will be careful to avoid comparing relationships with different sorts of actors. International Alert’s relationship with the Sri Lankan government\textsuperscript{48}, for example, operates very differently than its relationship with the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone.\textsuperscript{49} This paper will not attempt to compare alliance choices between INGOs and unlike actors. It will instead compare the cooperative choices made by INGOs at each of the six levels.

Relationships can also have a range of strength. This paper will classify relationships as strong (1), moderate (2), or weak cooperative (3), no relationship (4), or antagonistic (5). It will assess each relationship between an INGO and an actor using these five categories. By using this scale, we can identify which organizations were more likely to cooperate, and assess which relationships were the strongest.

In sum, the Cooperative Theory argues that organizations that form strong relationships at all six levels in order to increase their capabilities are more likely to succeed. It will use the different types of allies and strengths of relationships to demonstrate which relationships actually matter, and which do not. This theory will be supported if we can demonstrate that organizations with higher levels of cooperation tend to be more successful. Accordingly, if organizations that elect not to cooperate, or are willing to form antagonistic relationships also tend to be successful then this theory can be easily refuted.

The third school of thought that this paper will assess is Spheres of Influence Theory. It targets the idea that different schools of political theory carry more weight in

\textsuperscript{48} Sorbo et al., 46.
\textsuperscript{49} Abraham 205. Macrae and Atkinson 212.
different spheres of politics. Realism, for example, is much more influential on security issues, whereas liberalism tends to more correctly predict trends in political economy and social development. Accordingly, INGOs are more likely to have success in certain spheres than in others. The Spheres of Influence theory yields to Waltz that states maintain a monopoly on power in the field of security, and yet also grants to Kriesberg and Grugel that INGOs can fill in the gaps between state sovereignty in spheres such as environmentalism, political economy, and human rights. Therefore, this theory argues that INGOs engaging in security politics are less likely to have success whereas INGOs working towards more “liberal” goals are much more likely to succeed.

Waltz argues that the international system is structured around states, and states are the only major actors in the system, especially in the field of security. He sees interstate interactions as the only important interactions in the international system. States are constantly concerned with ensuring their survival, so they are unwilling to yield authority on security issues. As INGOs do not have military backing and lack the ability to enforce their policies, they cannot alter the interests of a state that fears for its survival. It follows that INGOs attempting to change the security paradigm are unlikely to have any success achieving their goals.

Yet Kreisberg adds a critique to Waltz’ theory when it moves beyond realist security concerns. He argues that global civil society and INGOs can fill in the gaps in the sovereign state system. Grugel claims that although states are unwilling to yield authority in the security sphere, they are much more ready to cede the authority to deal

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50 Waltz 95.
51 Kriesberg 7. Grugel 38.
52 Waltz 94-5.
53 Ibid 164.
54 Kreisberg 7.
with issues like environmentalism, political economy, and human rights. Therefore, INGOs that do not infringe on state security will open more space for themselves and are much more likely to achieve their goals.

The Spheres of Influence theory thus argues that INGOs are more likely to have success in some spheres than in others. It combines Waltz’ realist Theory of International Politics with Kreisberg and Grugel’s liberal critiques. Synthesizing these two ideas, it argues that there is room for civil society in politics only in the areas where state authority is weakest. INGOs approaching issues of security are less likely to have success, whereas INGOs dealing with other issues will be more likely to succeed.

These three schools of thought will be carefully tested in the remainder of the paper. They will be assessed to determine which theory can correctly predict the success of an INGO in development. The next section of this paper will develop a research design and set scope conditions and methodology for the study. It will set independent and dependent variables and briefly discuss the cases.

Scope Conditions and Methodology

Although security issues occur in all states, this paper will only focus on INGOs operating in developing states. The most obvious reason for this is that the bulk of INGO funds and operational focus is on developing countries. However, there are several other reasons why developing states are more helpful. First, developing states are typically weaker, and so intervening INGOs tend to have greater relative power. Grugel suggests that states are always dominant over civil society organizations, but that the range of

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55 Grugel 33.
possibilities is much greater for INGOs in developing states. Because INGOs have more options, we can see a greater spectrum of success and failure. Second, the lack of domestic resources in developing states makes the reliance on INGOs much greater, thus highlighting their results. Finally, developing states tend to have weaker civil societies, giving more maneuverability to INGOs and removing the possibility for confounding variables. Therefore, this study will only look at INGOs operating in developing states.

The per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) index controlled using purchasing power parity (PPP) compiled by the CIA is one of the main indicators of development. The seven countries used in this study have controlled GDP indexes of $5,600 (Sri Lanka), $800 (Sierra Leone), $4,600 (Fiji), $1,300 (Uganda), $3,100 (East Timor), $300 (DR Congo), and $500 (Zimbabwe). This ranks the four African states as some of the very poorest in the world, but it also still places Sri Lanka, Fiji, and East Timor solidly in the developing world. The per capita GDP of the United States is nearly nine times that of Sri Lanka, the wealthiest country on this list. Therefore, all seven states clearly qualify as developing.

This study will also control for the presence and severity of conflict. As some organizations are only interested in conflict resolution, this study will only look at states with an ongoing conflict. This will be controlled for even if the INGOs do not have a clear interest in conflict resolution. However, this study is careful in selecting one additional case from an organization acting in a state that is not experiencing conflict to test to see if the presence of conflict has an adverse affect on the research.

56 Grugel 33.
57 CIA World Factbook. Most South American states have about twice the PPP of Fiji and Sri Lanka. Western Europe tends to have a PPP of about $35,000; seven times that of Sri Lanka and eight times Fiji.
This study will also only look at International NGOs, as opposed to domestic or indigenous NGOs. INGOs must operate in *more than one* country.\(^{58}\) While indigenous NGOs play an important role in development, this study is interested in the transnational nature of development. As Chatfield suggests, INGOs are a piece of a complex network of transnational advocacy groups.\(^{59}\) That network influences how INGOs operate. Because local NGOs are not part of that network, they have a very different set of constraints on them that take them outside the scope of this study. This study is also interested in the relationships between INGOs and local civil societies. Therefore, we will only consider local NGOs in how they affect that relationship. The NGOs that this study seeks to describe are exclusively international.

This study will also only examine *non-violent* organizations. Certainly plenty of violent organizations exist, and many employ some of the same strategies as non-violent groups. However, violent INGOs are also choosing to engage in hard power relationships. They are questioning states’ monopoly on violence, and thus are either opposed to the sovereignty of a single state, or to the entire system of sovereign states. Even if sometimes they do participate in non-violent advocacy or act in ways that a legitimate civil society organization might, a violent organization’s choice to sometimes rely on a military removes it from the realm of traditional civil society and places it solidly in the arena of power politics. This study will only examine non-violent organizations because it believes that their interactions are fundamentally different than their violent counterparts. Although some of the conclusions that this study draws may

\(^{58}\) This could include INGOs that attempt to influence only one country but are headquartered in and run by citizens of another country. However, because this study is comparative, the cases I have selected are ones in which an INGO is operating in several difference countries and dealing with several different conflicts.  
\(^{59}\) Chatfield xiii.
be tested on violent organizations in the future, this study will only consider non-violent organizations.

**Methodology**

The basic methodology that this study will follow is comparative case studies. It will attempt to test the three schools of thought against each other using several cases. It will select three INGOs from two different fields of global civil society. Two INGOs will deal with conflict resolution and one will deal with human rights. The study will then select two programs from each INGO and analyze them using the theories. It will also select a third program from the human rights INGO that does not operate in a conflict region. This will help control for the presence of security concerns. The results from the analysis of each INGO and each program will then be compared to each other in order to draw conclusions.

The main hurdle that this study will attempt to overcome is the issue of success. INGOs are responsible for developing their own mission statement and their own goals, and so it would be impossible to hold all INGOs to the same standards of success. Even when in the same field, INGOs can emphasize different objectives and can have their own qualifications of success. Furthermore, all INGOs claim to be successful because they have an interest in attracting funding. Many INGOs adopted less lofty goals because they want to be able to demonstrate to donors that they have the ability to succeed.

In order to control for this problem, the study will select two INGOs from each field that have similar mission statements and similar goals. It will first examine two

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60 Lange 121.
programs from a single INGO and assess them using the INGO and the programs’ own self-determined goals. It will then compare the two conflict resolution INGOs to each other, and analyze the outcomes of all four programs using the general goals of a conflict resolution INGO. Finally, the study will compare the two conflict resolution INGOs to the human rights INGO. It will do so modestly, with the understanding that INGOs in different fields are attempting to achieve different goals, but it will also be careful to hold each to a standard to see which organizations were successful at achieving their own goals and which were not. By comparing INGOs and their respective programs in several different countries, we should be able to identify different levels of success. The problem of success will be limiting for this study, but because we are comparing INGOs with similar goals acting in similar conditions, we can identify which cases were actually successful and which were not.

The dependent variables, or outcomes, that this study will attempt to predict range from an INGO or a program’s failure to its success. The study will not place particular values on different levels of success or failure, and it will not develop a scale from failure to success. However, it will work from the assumption that there are different levels of success and failure. Success can be strong or mild. Failure can range from wastefulness to counter-productivity. INGOs can have a transformative affect on the local political sphere that achieves their goals at a high level in the short and long term. They can also be mildly successful and promote some change without really altering the system or completely achieving their goals. They can act wastefully and expend time and resources without creating any real change. At their very worst, INGOs can act counterproductively towards their own goals. For example, the intervention of a conflict resolution INGO
could escalate violence or prevent peace talks. By examining several cases, this study will be able to find a range of success and failure, and will be able to identify a range of dependent results.

The independent variables that should control the outcomes are much more ranging. Each of the three theories has a set of independent variables that could potentially explain which dependent variables are produced. Organizational Theory suggests that resources (1) and a strong structural framework (2) lead to success. According to the theory, the lack of (1) and (2) should lead to failure. Cooperative Theory claims that INGOs that cooperate with other INGOs at the international (3) and state levels (4), states (5), non-state actors (6), local organizations (7), and local communities (8) should be more likely to succeed. Furthermore, INGOs that cooperate with each in order to increase their own and their allies’ access to resources (9), information (10), and legitimacy at the international (11) and local levels (12) will increase their capabilities and are more likely to achieve their goals. Finally, Spheres of Influence Theory suggests that INGOs that engage in conflict resolution (13) are unlikely to achieve their goals whereas those that do not are more likely to succeed. Any of these 12 independent variables can be present or absent from an INGO’s work. According to Organizational Theory, the presence of independent variables 1 and 2 should cause success. Cooperative Theory relies on the presence of variables 3 through 12 to dictate success. Spheres of Influence Theory, on the other hand, relies on the absence of variable 12 for success. This can be shown through the following table.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theory</th>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Dependent Variable Prediction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organizational</strong></td>
<td>Resources (1)</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Success</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Failure</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Structural Framework (2)</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Success</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Closed</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Strong Open</td>
<td>Success</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cooperative</strong></td>
<td>Cooperation with INGOs at the International Level (3)</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Success</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Failure</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cooperation with INGOs at the State Level (4)</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Failure</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cooperation with the State (5)</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Success</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Failure</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cooperation with violent Non-State Actors (6)</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Success</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Failure</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cooperation with local NGOs (7)</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Success</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cooperation with local communities (8)</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Success</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cooperation for access to resources (9)</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cooperation for information (10)</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Success</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Failure</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cooperation for international legitimacy (11)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Failure</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cooperation for local legitimacy (12)</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Absent</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Spheres of Influence</strong></td>
<td>Deals with Security (13)</td>
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<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.

This table shows the independent variables that each theory suggests may lead to success or failure. The first column shows the school of thought. The second column shows the twelve proposed independent variables. The third column shows the potential values for each independent variable. The final column shows the predicted value of the dependent variable: success or failure.
Cases

The cases used to test these schools will be International Alert’s (IA) interventions in Sri Lanka (1993) and Sierra Leone (1995)\(^1\), Conciliation Resources’ (CR) interventions in Fiji (1995) and Uganda (1997)\(^2\), and Human Rights Watch’s (HRW) interventions in Indonesia and East Timor (1997), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (1994), and Zimbabwe (2000)\(^3\).

IA and CR were selected as the two conflict resolution organizations because they have similar basic missions and each operates in several countries, but both adopt different strategies for dealing with conflict resolution. IA is a moderate sized London-based organization that employs researchers and peace workers to help deal with issues of conflict resolution around the world.\(^4\) CR is a smaller INGO that is also based in London. It primarily serves as a resource for local peacemaking NGOs in conflict regions.\(^5\) Both organizations are focused on conflict resolution and security issues. Because their overarching goals are essentially the same and they chose to intervene under the same conditions, we can identify the organizational differences that led to different outcomes.

HRW was selected as an organization with a different basic mission to help test the effects of an organization’s self-determined goals on its success. HRW also operates in many countries so we can test HRW in multiple cases. HRW is a large human rights organization based in New York City that primarily functions as a research organization designed to expose human rights violations and then use the international community to

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\(^1\) International Alert.
\(^2\) Conciliation Resources.
\(^3\) Human Rights Watch.
\(^4\) International Alert.
\(^5\) Conciliation Resources.
Because HRW does not deal with the same issues as IA and CR, it is harder to accurately assess their success. This study will attempt to compare the organizations and it will do so with the understanding that the organizations are attempting to achieve quite different goals. It will only use an INGO’s own goals to assess itself, and it doing so, it will attempt to provide strategies that any INGO can following to achieve the goals that it desires. It will not argue that certain goals are better than others, but it may take the stance that certain goals may be harder to achieve.

The countries will focus on were chosen because they represent several of the largest projects undertaken by the three organizations. None of the represented countries will be repeated. As each organization maintains a global focus, each should be tested across multiple regions. However, this study will also attempt to control for advantages or disadvantages that civil society might experience in certain climates. Therefore, this study will select one state from Sub-Saharan Africa and one state from the Asian Pacific. For each organization, the state from the Asian Pacific will also be an Island nation. Island states tend to have certain unique characteristics and political aspects, such as a heavy reliance on imports and limited migration, which this will control for.

Additionally, a third case will be chosen under HRW that will not experience conflict at the time of involvement. This case will be chosen from Sub-Saharan Africa and will still meet all other criteria required by this study. Zimbabwe was not in a state of violence conflict at any point that this study will examine.

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67 East Timor actually only covers half of an island. The Western portion of Timor remains occupied by Indonesia. This study will compare East Timor to the other two island states, but will not attempt to draw any serious conclusions about the effects of Island politics on civil society.
The chosen cases represent several INGOs in a variety of situations. They give a fairly strong understanding of the assets and strategies of each organization, and show several different implementations for each organization. They allow for strong comparison of the tactics employed by security-oriented INGOs, and a more modest comparison between INGOs working towards different goals. By using comparative testing, we can assess the success of the three INGOs in each of the seven cases and thus attempt accuracy of the three theories.

**International Alert**

International Alert (IA) is a London-based conflict resolution organization founded in 1985. It was founded based on the concern that while there were many human rights organizations, there were no organizations trying to prevent conflict. IA believed that human rights were not possible in the presence of conflict. Furthermore, it felt that many human rights organizations were acting out of noble intentions, but many failed to research the effectiveness of their strategies.\(^{68}\) IA uses the mission statement:

"We work with people who are directly affected by violent conflict to improve their prospects of peace. And we seek to influence the policies and ways of working of governments, international organisations (sic) like the UN and multinational companies, to reduce conflict risk and increase the prospects of peace."\(^{69}\)

This stresses that their main goal is conflict resolution, and defines IA as a security oriented INGO. They attempt to do so in a cooperative fashion with people, governments, and organizations but all interim goals are dedicated to the overarching mission of increasing the "prospects of peace."

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\(^{68}\) Sorbo et al. 12.  
\(^{69}\) International Alert.
IA is strong in terms of resources. Although it does not publish a copy of its financial reports, IA does have active partnerships with 50 major donors.\textsuperscript{70} This is more than twice the number of major donors of either of the other two INGOs that this study will examine. Furthermore, the organization is willing to implement a variety of quite costly strategies. International Alert does not publish its budget so we cannot know precisely how large its budget is, but we can conclude that IA is likely financially very strong. It employs 155 global employees based in its London office and in its programs around the world.\textsuperscript{71} The majority of its employees are scholars who are responsible for researching conflicts. It employs very few aid workers and instead relies on its researchers to structure the implementation of its strategies.\textsuperscript{72} IA’s researchers have large staffs and publish frequent papers on conflict resolution innovations. The bulk of its sizable annual budget is spending on travel costs, salaries, and publications\textsuperscript{73}, because IA places a high value on the quality of its research. IA has no particular special resources. On the whole, it is clear that IA has significant organizational resources.

The structural framework that IA’s organization follows the assessment-implementation-evaluation strategy proposed by Duffield. IA believes that each individual conflict should be researched, and each merits its own unique solution. The importance of this research is that it makes IA’s responses highly flexible and in tune with the needs of each particular conflict. It values the individual contributions of each researcher, so it is able to apply a different response for a different conflict. IA does not maintain a singular strategy because it believes that research can find a unique optimal

\textsuperscript{70} International Alert.  
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{72} Sorbo et al. 22.  
\textsuperscript{73} Ibid.
solution to each unique conflict. This makes AI’s responses far more creative and innovative than many other INGOs. Its implementation strategies have been incredibly varied. IA has demonstrated that it is willing to use virtually any strategy that its researchers propose. It has sent local politicians on peace exposures to other countries to witness other peacebuilding processes, used the media to reduce tensions, acted in an advisory capacity to local groups, and led countless local workshops to increase the “prospects of peace”. It is therefore impossible to outline the particular implementation strategies followed by IA. The organization’s generalized strategy is instead defined by the use of research to create a unique solution for each problem. Because of IA’s extensive research, it rarely misunderstands a conflict, and its tactics do not backfire. Its strategies are not simply believed to work; they are shown to be effective only after they are backed by substantial research.

According to this strategy, IA can be defined as an open organization. It suggests that it relies on its researchers to develop tactics rather than using its central body or its program directors to control the organization. In practice, however, it is apparent that Program Directors are given considerable authority, and the Secretary-General has even frequently dictated decisions. Nonetheless, while some IA programs have proven to be more bureaucratic, from an overarching organizational standpoint it is clear that IA is fairly open.

The organizational downside to IA’s research is that it takes time. IA is typically unwilling to act quickly in a crisis situation without the necessary research to back up their actions. Given the swift nature of many conflicts, IA’s dedication to research prevents it from acting as quickly as other INGOs. IA established a “Rapid Response
Programme” to combat this problem. The program is designed to “act swiftly in situations where it is confident that its intervention will have a positive and significant effect”.74 While this does give some added speed to IA’s process, it still contains strong qualifiers that exempt most situations. Of course, an INGO always wants to be confident that they will be both positive and significant. However, this sort of risk aversion is odd in conflict situations where other actors are not risk averse. IA may miss many opportunities to act when it may have actually had the tools to create a swift positive change. Other organizations that rely on predetermined strategies that do not adapt from conflict to conflict have a greater opportunity to deal with the temporal nature of a conflict. Because IA is willing to implement a variety of strategies, but lacks the ability to make speedy decisions, it can be concluded that while IA is highly flexible in terms of tactics, it is also highly rigid in terms of timeframe. IA is willing and able to apply a wider range of tactics than most INGOs, but it is only willing to intervene under its own timeframe.

In terms of relationships, IA has few cooperative interactions at the international level. It has worked with the Center for Conflict Resolution (CCR) and Search for Common Ground (Search)75 but beyond that, IA has no consistent INGO cooperation. This is surprising given that IA’s mission statement contains a clause about “working with ... international organizations”.76 Sorbo et al. claim that IA is “often not successful in achieving its objectives of partnership and coalition building”.77 While IA does intend

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74 Ibid 21.
75 Lange 149.
76 International Alert.
77 Sorbo et al. 70.
to interact cooperatively with other INGOs, it has not had significant success. We can classify this as weak interaction at the international level.

IA is a conflict-oriented INGO. It engages in active dialogue with states on security issues and deals directly with resolving conflict.

To summarize, International Alert has ample organizational resources including funding, staff, and expertise. It does not have any special resources. The structural framework of the organization is very strong and open, with lots of freedom and support for its researchers. It is also a very slow framework that may have trouble reacting in emergencies. IA’s relationships with other INGOs and institutions at the international level are weak. International Alert is a conflict-oriented INGO. The next two subsections will examine International Alert’s interventions in Sri Lanka and Sierra Leone.

International Alert in Sri Lanka

IA’s intervention in Sri Lanka began in 1993.78 IA was worried about the ongoing crisis between militant Tamil groups, especially the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), and the tensions between the Tamil minority and the Sinhalese majority. Sinhalese repression and rioting against Tamils had created a culture of violence. The LTTE responded by trying to push out or kill all non-Tamils living in the Northern and Eastern portions of the island in order to form an independent Tamil state.79 IA saw its role as reducing tensions and collaborating towards a peacebuilding process.

From 1985 until 1993, IA researched the tensions and developed its strategy. Finally, led by IA’s Sri Lankan Secretary General Kumar Rupesinghe, it founded the Sri

78 Sorbo 151.
79 Goodhand and Lewer 72.
Lankan Peace Programme. The program involved using media, establishing local NGOs and peacebuilding organizations, and trying to give politicians on both sides of Sri Lanka’s heavily divided parliament a greater grasp of peacebuilding processes in other countries. Rupesinghe’s involvement in the organization was critical to its local legitimacy. Because Rupesinghe was a Sri Lankan with a political background, IA was not seen as a meddling Western organization. Instead, it was seen as a group that understood the Sri Lankan context and was therefore better equipped to help.

In terms of organizational resources, the Sri Lankan program was quite strong. The program received the most funding of any IA program at the time. The program had money to carry out an array of activities. It produced several TV programs, worked directly with media groups, and took several Sri Lankan journalists and activists on a trip to view the peace processes in other countries. At the peak of its operation, the program employed six people. Although this may seem small, it is actually quite large for a research organization. Most of the staff were researchers with significant expertise. The Secretary General’s special relationship with the program also gave it additional special resource, and increased its organizational expertise.

The structural framework of IA’s program was a bit unclear at moments because of the over-involvement of the Secretary General. The intended structure was that researchers would propose implementation strategies to the program, which would then choose whether or not to follow the strategy. Whenever possible, the program would follow the recommendations of the researcher. However, given that the Secretary

80 Sorbo 162.
81 Ibid 160.
82 Sorbo et al. 22.
83 Sorbo 160.
General’s office was hyper-involved in the Sri Lankan program, it appears that both recommendations and approval were coming from both directions. This clearly posed serious structural problems for the program. It had intended to be an open program, but in practice it was quite closed.

Furthermore, the timeframe that the program followed was incredibly slow. The program became involved in Sri Lanka in 1985, yet it only began to implement strategy in 1993. Given that violent conflicts tend to erupt and fade quickly, an eight-year research period is a serious problem for an organization. Failing to act quickly can be the determining factor in the failure of a program. Therefore we can characterize the structural framework of IA Sri Lanka as both bureaucratic and weak.

IA did not attempt to cooperate with any INGOs or international institutions acting in Sri Lanka. We can classify this relationship as absent.

IA did have a strong relationship with one local NGO in Sri Lanka. IA helped established the National Peace Coalition (NPC), a local peace NGO. Its sponsoring and support of the NPC ensured that the organization had a sure footing. IA used its cooperation with the NPC to provide a resource for accomplishing its goals. IA used the NPC to help foster a culture of peace and to provide a forum for different ethnicities and political factions to cooperate. IA engaged in several similar actions with Sri Lankan media sources. The organization sponsored peace exposure trips in order to help bring media officials together and to give Sri Lankan journalists access to evidence of successful peace processes. IA used relationships with both the media and the NPC as

84 Sorbo et al. 46.
85 Ibid 47.
resources to improve the role of civil society in Sri Lanka. Therefore, IA’s moderate cooperation with domestic civil society occurred in order to maximize IA’s capabilities.

IA’s relationships with individuals at the local level were much less common. IA’s interactions with locals who were not either civil society or government leaders tended to be limited and even suspicious. One study reported that some Sri Lankans believed that IA was politically motivated by Secretary General Rupesinghe’s former party, and others were concerned that IA, like many INGOs in Sri Lanka, was acting paternalistically and were unconcerned with creating positive change in Sri Lanka. The only workshops that IA had intended to keep open to the public were canceled because IA feared that they would become easy targets for violence. IA’s focus was a top-down approach to conflict resolution, so it had very little interaction with those who had not already involved themselves in the peace process. When IA did interact with local communities, they were typically viewed as isolated occurrences. Like most INGOs invested in Sri Lanka, IA was unwilling to anchor itself in the local communities and so was unable to gain the trust of the local population. Therefore, we can classify the relationship between IA and individuals at the local level as absent in Sri Lanka.

The Secretary-General’s identity further exasperated this problem. Rupesinghe’s political past meant that many Sri Lankans incorrectly believed that IA was attempting to take sides in the conflict. They were suspicious that IA was not interested in creating a peace that met the needs of the Tamil minority. Because IA was not interacting on the local level, it had trouble combating issues of local suspicion. By failing to develop

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86 Ibid.
87 Goodhand and Lewer 81.
88 Sorbo et al. 42.
strong relationships at the local level, IA was unable to generate a positive image in Sri Lanka, and thus had greater trouble accomplishing some of its goals.

IA did have a moderately cooperative relationship with the government of Sri Lanka. The organization constantly looked to engage in dialogue with Sri Lankan officials. It sponsored a second peace exposure trip for a bipartisan group of parliamentarians. The trip took officials to several countries that had experienced successful peace and reconciliation processes. It sought to use the trip to bring fresh ideas to the Sri Lankan political dialogue. At the same time, it was working to create bonds across parties that might help to ease the polarization of Sri Lanka. IA’s relationship with the government shows that it was cooperating with officials in order to gain a special resource. The organization believed that government officials could solve many of the problems facing Sri Lanka, and so it cooperated in order to establish the capability of using government to create peace. IA’s relationship with the government was designed to increase capabilities and can be characterized as a moderate strength.

IA did not interact with militant factions in Sri Lanka.

The overall success of IA in Sri Lanka was weak. IA had some success in developing the local civil society and improving the cooperation between parties at the national level. However, because most of the people it worked with were already interested in developing these goals, it is hard to mark the improvements as major successes for IA. Furthermore, because IA was unable to establish itself locally and create a positive image at the local level, it was unable to achieve serious long-term improvements. The amount of time it took for IA to act in the Sri Lankan case should also be considered a failure. IA was spending time and resources on the case between

89 Sorbo et al. 46.
1985 and 1993, but was not even attempting to create change. While it is important for INGOs to be confident in their strategies, an eight-year research period is problematic in a conflict that could kill hundreds in a day. The fact that the organization took that long to produce any recommendations is clearly a failure. Certainly, its important successes at the national level should not be overlooked, but the fact that IA was not able to reduce internal tensions and push Sri Lanka towards a peace process is problematic. In the long term, the Sri Lankan conflict was not alleviated by peace accords. Instead, the government eventually was victorious over the LTTE after a 26-year conflict. Although this end brought peace, it was essentially a military victory and thus cannot be viewed as the result of INGO involvement in Sri Lanka. We cannot classify IA Sri Lanka as a failure because IA’s involvement did have a clearly positive, albeit limited, impact on the Sri Lankan peace process. However, the fact that IA spent considerable time and resources in Sri Lanka and had a very mild effect, IA Sri Lanka must be characterized as a weak success.

In summary, IA’s program in Sri Lanka can be characterized as having ample organizational resources such as funding, staffing, expertise, and the special attention of the Secretary-General. The framework of the program was closed and weak because the over-involvement of the Secretary-General clouded the chain of command and increased the bureaucratic inefficiency, and because the program was slow to react. It did prove to be quite strategically flexible, but its inefficiency and slow pace of change limited the program. IA Sri Lanka had no relationships with other INGOs. It had moderately cooperative relationships with domestic civil society designed to increase its capabilities.

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90 Weaver and Chamberlain.
It had moderately cooperative relationships with government officials in order to increase its capabilities. IA had no relationship with violent Non-State Actors.

The International Alert’s program in Sri Lanka is defined as a weak success because it bolstered civil society and worked to create some bipartisan bounds but did little else. It did not succeed in opening any significant space for peace. IA Sri Lanka is thus characterized as a weak success.

**International Alert in Sierra Leone**

IA’s intervention in Sierra Leone took a very different tone. The conflict in Sierra Leone pitted the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) against the popularly elected government. The government responded to the rebellion by hiring Brazilian and South African mercenaries and engaging in a brutal war. Both groups committed serious abuses. By 1996, over half of the population had been displaced. The RUF eventually managed to draw international attention and force peace talks by instigating a hostage crisis. IA’s entrance in 1995 was intended to help end the hostage situation and facilitate peace talks.

However, IA hardly took the role of neutral facilitator during the course of the talks. Instead, IA decided to act as an advisor and negotiator for the RUF. This was a very novel and risky step for an INGO to take. Even though the RUF claimed it was fighting against government corruption and injustice, many viewed the faction as an...

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91 Sorbo et al. 56.
92 Macrae and Atkinson 196.
93 Abraham 205. Macrae and Atkinson 212.
94 Macrae and Atkinson 195.
anti-democratic militant force fighting against a democratic government.\textsuperscript{95} It is certainly odd for an INGO to act on behalf of a militant group. However, IA believed that the peace process was clearly impeded because other groups were unwilling to cooperate with the RUF. IA saw its job as working to legitimize the RUF so that it could participate in the peace process. Without IA, it is possible that the government and other involved INGOs would not have trusted the RUF to keep to its terms of peace. One author even claims that IA kept the RUF from reigniting the war. He asserts, “International Alert ... made the RUF rethink its hardline position”.\textsuperscript{96} This could have jeopardized the entire process. The benefits of IA’s relationship with RUF were especially clear during the hostage crisis. RUF leaders have publicly stated that IA convinced them to engage in prisoner release.\textsuperscript{97} Accordingly, IA may have played a key role at keeping RUF at the table and ensuring that peace talks continued.

The program in Sierra Leone had slightly fewer resources to work with. It had a slightly smaller, though still comparable budget.\textsuperscript{98} Its staff was smaller, it did not have a program headquarters due to the short time of the intervention, and it did not have the direct attention of the Secretary-General’s office. The program still maintained a high level of employee quality, but it did not have an extended research period to maximize its expertise. Therefore we can characterize IA Sierra Leone’s access to general resources as moderate.

The program did have one special resource. The connection between the program director and the RUF gave IA direct access to one of the chief parties in the conflict.

\textsuperscript{95} Macrae and Atkinson 197.
\textsuperscript{96} Abdullah 227.
\textsuperscript{97} Sorbo et al. 58.
\textsuperscript{98} Macrae and Atkinson 200.
Foday Sankoh, head of the RUF, trusted IA and was willing to allow IA to be its advocate. This gave IA the opportunity to directly affect the outcome of the conflict. They could work with Sankoh and the RUF to establish peace even while Sankoh was mistrusting of virtually all other actors in Sierra Leone. Therefore, this can be categorized as a special resource that could help IA find success.

The structural framework of IA’s program in Sierra Leone was closed and had only a single strategy. It relied on the Program Director to make virtually all decisions. It was nowhere near as diverse as the Sri Lankan Peace Programme. IA only played an advisory role to the RUF. It did not engage in any other peacebuilding activities. This could be because the program did not feel that it had the resources to develop other objectives. It seems more likely that IA had chosen to work exclusively as an advisor for the RUF rather than diverting funds to other projects. As compared to IA’s operation in Sri Lanka, the program in Sierra Leone had fewer organizational capabilities but a much clearer closed structural framework.

IA’s relationships with other international actors in Sierra Leone were quite clearly antagonistic. IA developed extremely competitive relationships with several other INGOs and representatives of the UN acting in Sierra Leone. Despite IA’s claims to be working with other organizations, it actually consistently undermined the endeavors of other groups, especially the International Red Cross (ICRC) and the UN SG Special Representative (UNSGSR). These interactions were consistently antagonistic. IA insisted on prioritizing its own role in the conflict and cutting out other international actors. It refused to allow the ICRC into negotiations and frequently blocked meetings.

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99 Macrae and Atkinson 204.
100 Macrae and Atkinson 206.
between the RUF leadership and UN officials. This may have been because IA wanted to ensure that it received due recognition for its work.\textsuperscript{101} While it is important for INGOs to receive recognition to continue to attract donors, IA’s unwillingness to cooperate with international groups undercut the peace process.

IA did not attempt to form relationships with local NGOs, civil society, or individuals at the local level. These relationships all remained absent.

The relationship between IA and the government of Sierra Leone was also very interesting. IA had a very \textit{negative} relationship with the government of Sierra Leone. IA was working as RUF’s advisor in the negotiations \textit{against} the government. Initially, IA had some success in this. However, after the government started to understand the extent of IA’s mission, it “accused IA of having entered the country illegally”.\textsuperscript{102} For a while the government was tolerant of IA, but eventually the government began to revoke IA visas, preventing several activists from entering the country,\textsuperscript{103} and attempted to get IA to leave. IA demonstrated that acting against the state is not \textit{infeasible} as Grugel suggests.\textsuperscript{104} By refusing to work within the parameters set by the state IA severely limited its options.

IA’s relationship with the state was clearly antagonistic.

IA had a strong cooperative relationship with the RUF, a violent Non-State Actor (VNSA). The organization cooperated with the RUF in order to capitalize on its special resource. It used its relationship with the RUF to attempt to negotiate a peace agreement that it viewed would be most in line with its goals. IA cooperated strongly with a VNSA in order to maximize its capabilities.

\textsuperscript{101} Macrae and Atkinson 211.
\textsuperscript{102} Ibid 198.
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid. Bundu.
\textsuperscript{104} Grugel 29.
While IA’s strategy in Sierra Leone was innovative and aggressive, it was also very problematic. It seems clear that IA played an important role in the release of hostages. However, IA also lengthened and weakened the peace process. Despite Abdullah’s claim that IA may have kept the RUF away from hard-line tactics, it seems that the organization’s negative relationships with other international actors produced a resoundingly negative result. The choice to legitimize the RUF was overdone to the point that it was often unwilling to compromise. In fact, the RUF returned to hard-line tactics almost immediately after signing the peace agreement, indicating that IA had done nothing to convince them to end the war. One author is so critical of IA’s involvement that he says, “International Alert actually made the task more tortuous”. In all, IA’s presence was counterproductive. It wasted donor funds and stymied a peace process that was already underway. Therefore, IA Sierra Leone can be described as a clear failure.

IA’s program in Sierra Leone can be characterized as moderately strong in terms of staffing and expertise. It did have ample funding, and its special status with the RUF leadership was a valuable resource. The program had a strong, closed structural framework. IA formed highly antagonistic relationships with other international actors in Sierra Leone. It did not interact with civil society or individuals at the local level. IA developed a strong antagonistic relationship with the state. It formed a strong cooperative relationship with a VNSA designed to maximize IA’s capabilities. In the end, International Alert’s involvement in Sierra Leone had a negative impact on the peace process. The program can easily be characterized as a clear failure.

105 Macrae and Atkinson 212.
Comparative Analysis of International Alert

It is odd that the same organization could produce two such different programs. IA Sri Lanka was overly timid. The organization was slow to intervene and was careful to ensure that none of its endeavors had a backlash. Their actions did little to alter the situation for the better or for the worse. They rarely sought out allies, although they were willing to work with other groups when the opportunity presented itself. From an organizational perspective, the program did receive the largest amount of funding and had the largest staff out of any IA program. On the whole, IA Sri Lanka had a weak, yet positive impact on the situation.

IA Sierra Leone, on the other hand, could be characterized as overly aggressive. The organization intervened quickly without enough research, and failed to recognize the potential consequences of its actions. Its lack of allies was due to its pugnacious attitude. It created enemies at the international and state levels, and failed to seek out allies in the local civil society or at the individual level. IA was antagonistic towards the government, the UN, and the ICRC. Its risky choice to cooperate with a VNSA backfired. IA Sierra Leone sought out enemies and drove away allies.

There were also organizational differences between the two programs. The program’s funding and staffing was not as sizable as IA Sri Lanka, but it still represented the second largest budget of any IA program at the time. The organization’s special access to the RUF certainly constitutes an additional resource that was squandered. On the other hand, the structural framework of IA Sierra Leone should have actually been a clear advantage. The program was able to act quickly and did not have the bureaucratic
problems of IA Sri Lanka. This should have predicted that IA Sri Lanka should have been the miserable failure.

Returning to IA’s mission statement, IA seeks to “reduce the risk of conflict” and “increase the prospects for peace”. At a very minimal level, IA increased the prospects for peace in Sri Lanka. The organization brought together members of opposing parties, provided exposure to other peace processes, and helped establish a local peace organization. All of these had a positive impact in terms of IA’s mission. They did not, however, have a significant impact in Sri Lanka. There is little evidence that IA did much to resolve the conflict in Sri Lanka. In Sierra Leone, on the other hand, IA likely decreased the prospects for peace and increased the risk of conflict. Several scholars have argued that IA’s support of the RUF initially kept the organization at the table, but in the long term it convinced the RUF to adopt hardline tactics and prevented the possibility of a peaceful resolution. For this reason, IA’s mission in Sierra Leone must be characterized as a failure.

The evidence provided by International Alert’s two programs seems to support the Cooperative Theory. The more successful program had advantages in international cooperation, local cooperation, cooperation with states, and cooperation with individuals. It used these relationships primarily to increase its capabilities and the capabilities of its allies. It also had mild advantages in terms of organizational resources. On the other hand, the more successful program had disadvantages in terms of structural framework. The less successful program had a stronger structural framework that still managed to fail.

107 International Alert.
The next section of this paper will look at the conflict-resolution organization Conciliation Resources (CR), and it will examine CR's effects in Fiji and Uganda.

**Conciliation Resources**

Conciliation Resources (CR) is also a London-based conflict resolution INGO. The organization was founded in 1994 out of a belief that there was not enough local cooperation in peacebuilding efforts. The organization uses the mission statement:

"Conciliation Resources is an independent charity working internationally to prevent violent conflict, promote justice and build lasting peace in war torn societies."

- Conciliation Resources

It also claims the following as its primary goals in accomplishing its mission:

*Our goals are to:*

- **support people working at local, national and international levels to develop effective solutions to social, economic and political problems related to violent conflicts**

- **provide opportunities for inclusive dialogue and improved relationships within communities and across conflict divides at all social and political levels**

- **influence governments and other decision makers to employ conflict transformation policies that promote alternatives to violence**

- **improve peacemaking practice and policies by promoting learning from peace processes around the world**

- **challenge stereotypes and increase public awareness of human rights, conflict and peace issues in divided societies**

- Conciliation Resources

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108 Lange 134.
109 Conciliation Resources.
110 Ibid.
CR’s basic mission is very much in line with that of IA. They both are working to resolve conflict and promote peace. They both claim to have the same overarching strategies too, valuing cooperation and improving upon existing strategies. Because their self-assigned missions are so similar, we can compare the two and assess their respective attempts at conflict resolution.

CR’s principle mode of operation is cooperation within local civil society. CR describes its organization as “an international resource for local organisations (sic) pursuing peace or conflict prevention initiatives”.\textsuperscript{111} CR is therefore entirely reliant on local NGOs for its success. It may offer its assistance to local NGOs, but it is up to those organizations to choose whether or not to cooperate with CR. Local organizations, not CR, determine the style of its intervention. At least according to its basic mission, CR attempts to cooperate significantly at the local level to bolster civil society and create space for peace.

From a resource perspective, CR is a very small organization. Its 2010 expenditures only consisted of £1.6 million, or about $2.5 million.\textsuperscript{112} It only has 20 major partners, and simply does not have the donor access of a larger organization. Ten of its major partners are either governments or international institutions that are composed of governments.\textsuperscript{113} The entire INGO only has 37 employees\textsuperscript{114}, most of whom work in the London office. The INGO is not research based, and does not consistently have the same level of expertise. CR does rely on some internal experts, but it is not a basic requirement for many positions. The organization has no special resources available. In terms of basic

\textsuperscript{112} Conciliation Resources 3\textsuperscript{rd} Annual Report.
\textsuperscript{113} Conciliation Resources.
\textsuperscript{114} Ibid.
organizational assets like funding, staffing, and expertise, most INGOs would have a
definite advantage over CR. We can define CR’s organizational resources as weak.

The structural framework of CR is virtually opposite IA. It does not attempt to be
strategically flexible. CR does not employ tactics other than support for local
peacebuilding NGOs.\textsuperscript{115} It provides training, media attention, advice, and access to the
international community to local groups. If no such group exists then CR does not
intervene at all. While it may believe that local groups can use a range of tactics to
construct peace, CR itself is unwilling to stretch the limits of its operation. This defines
CR as a very open organization. Its decisions frequently come from outside of the
organization, and it uses very little oversight.

In terms of flexibility of timeframe, however, CR is actually much more adaptive.
CR is ready to support any pre-existing peacebuilding NGO. They do not require a long
research process to determine their tactics. As they use the same set of tactics each time
and rely on the local NGO to decide on the particulars, CR is able to quickly embed itself
in a local setting and have confidence in its tactics. Therefore, CR can be characterized as
strategically inflexible, but able to rapidly respond to conflict situations provided that
they are invited by a local NGO. It has an uncreative, streamline framework that can
easily apply a similar solution to many situations.

Beyond its basic donor partners, CR has also developed several major cooperative
relationships with INGOs and networks. CR is a member of the Alliance for
Peacebuilding (AfP), Bond for International Development, the Centre for Peace and
Conflict Studies, the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO), and the Mediation

\textsuperscript{115} Ibid.
Support Network (MSN). Each group seeks to link INGOs working on similar issues and helps promote cooperation in transnational advocacy networks. CR uses these linkages to strengthen its own international legitimacy and to gain access to resources. Although CR does not use the networks to gain funding for itself, it does use its international resources to link its local allies to donors. Participation in INGO networks has provided CR with key resources.

CR has also cooperated extensively with the INGO "Saferworld". The two organizations are working together on a project called “People’s Peacemaking Perspectives”. The project will comparatively examine the causes of violence in 18 conflict situations and attempt to provide the European Union with a comprehensive set of solutions to future crises. The project is working proactively to find solutions to conflict before they arise rather than waiting for violence to erupt before the conflict can be assessed. CR’s choice to cooperate with Saferworld has increased the international legitimacy of the project, but it seems evident that the two are cooperating in order to maximize each other’s capabilities and ensure the success of the project. CR has demonstrated a strong commitment to cooperation with INGOs at the international level in order to maximize its capabilities and the capabilities of its allies.

CR is a conflict-resolution organization. It is security-oriented. It deals directly with governments, militaries, and militias on issues of security.

On the whole, CR is seen as a typically effective organization. A Stockholm Policy Group evaluation of CR said, “There appears to be little debate that Conciliation Resources has made significant contributions to preventing and managing violent conflict

116 Ibid.
117 People’s Peacemaking Perspectives.
and building peace”.

They contend that CR has an effective organizational structure that provides local groups with real opportunities to promote peace. By relying on local organizations, CR is able to act aggressively while still preventing itself from acting counterproductively. Of course, CR still depends on local groups to make intelligent choices. However, given that local peace organizations tend to understand the causes of internal conflict better than INGOs typically can, CR’s choice to rely on local actors is not unreasonable. Accordingly, CR appears to have played a consistently positive role in many conflicts despite relying on a small staff and budget.

In summary, Conciliation Resources has few organizational resources. It has a limited budget, a small staff, limited expertise, and no special resources. Its structural framework is small and open. It has cooperated with a range of INGOs and international institutions in order to increase its international legitimacy and maximize its access to resources. CR is a security-oriented organization. The next two subsections will discuss Conciliation Resources’ interventions in Fiji and Uganda.

Conciliation Resources in Fiji

The Fijian conflict is a narrative of tension between two ethnic groups, the Indo-Fijians and the indigenous Fijians. Up until the mid-2000s, the island nation was roughly divided between the two groups. By now it is actually 57% indigenous Fijian and only 38% of Indian descent due to the flight of main Indo-Fijians. While Fiji does not have a “culture of violence” as compared to Sri Lanka, its tension has been highlighted

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118 Ganson and Svensson 1.
119 Ibid 2-3.
120 Indo-Fijians are of Indian descent.
121 CIA World Factbook: Fiji.
by four military coups since 1987.\textsuperscript{122} The first coup in 1987 marked a shift from Indo-Fijian dominance of the government towards an opening of the political system. The shift has since grown out of hand, and many Indo-Fijians feared the dangers of an indigenous ascendancy that would be a reversal rather than an opening of the power structure.\textsuperscript{123} The rival groups initiated a storm of coups that had no end in sight.\textsuperscript{124}

CR’s involvement in the Fijian crisis is almost entirely defined by its relationship with the Citizens’ Constitutional Forum (CCF)\textsuperscript{125}, a local NGO working to uphold the (former) Fijian constitutional democracy. At the CCF’s request, CR began helping train local activists and provided organizational support to the NGO in 1995. It helped the CCF build an international funding base, primarily in Europe, that allowed a small local NGO to rapidly develop. CR continued to provide support in “strategic planning, project management, and financial management”.\textsuperscript{126} While it is important to distinguish between the actions of CR and the CCF, CR’s key role in the establishment and continued development of the CCF should certainly give it some shared credit for the local NGO’s actions. With CR’s backing, the CCF went on to play a key role in maintaining constitutional authority in Fiji despite civil unrest.\textsuperscript{127} In 1997, the CCF led a highly successful push for general elections.\textsuperscript{128} As a major member of Fijian civil society, the CCF was able to provide some level of democratic accountability, even in the context of a cycle of military coups. Because Fiji has a low level of democratic legitimacy, it relies

\textsuperscript{122} Emde 387. Hereniko 75.
\textsuperscript{123} Lal 274.
\textsuperscript{124} Emde 389.
\textsuperscript{125} Conciliation Resources, Lange 134. CR extended its support to the Pacific Centre for Peacebuilding (PCP) and Dialogue Fiji in 2009. As both of these relationships are very recent and still developing, it is hard to assess their success. This paper will only look at CR’s relationship with the CCF.
\textsuperscript{126} Citizens’ Constitutional Forum.
\textsuperscript{127} Prasad and Snell 273.
on civil society to act as watchdogs over governmental institutions. CR gave the CCF the local legitimacy and the means to accomplish this at least a minimum level. As an international actor, CR’s backing pressed local actors to cooperate with the CCF. This involvement should clearly be described as successful.

In terms of resources, CR’s intervention in Fiji has been inexpensive and has required very little staff. Even given CR’s limited budget, its work in Fiji has been one of its least expensive programs. The program actually spent less money in some years than it received in grants earmarked for Fiji. While many INGOs are accused of overspending in order to demonstrate greater need, CR’s program in Fiji stands as a case to suggest that INGOs can be successful without large budgets. Furthermore, it shows that the relationship with the CCF prioritized improvement while still acting in a cost effective manner. Because CR had money earmarked for Fiji and could not be spent on other programs, and CR still chose not to spend it all, we can conclude that CR’s budget was not a limiting factor in its intervention. The program in Fiji can be characterized as one with a small staff, small budget, no serious expertise, and no special advantages that still had a surprisingly high level of success.

The structural framework that CR Fiji relied on was small and open. CR employs one project manager who is responsible for the entire relationship between Fijian organizations and CR. The CCF, not CR, is responsible for all decision making and policy, so CR has been able to keep its framework open, adaptable, and streamline. The organization has also consistently demonstrated that it could answer the CCF’s requests quickly. Because CR does not rely on extensive research to develop solutions, it was

129 Conciliation Resources Bi-Annual Report 2001/2.
130 Ibid.
131 Davies 42. Sorbo.
able to involve itself quickly in Fiji and was easily able to identify the CCF as an ally. Therefore, CR has clearly also acted with a flexible timeframe in Fiji. This can be characterized as a strong, open framework.

CR produced several clearly cooperative relationships in Fiji. CR's relationship with the CCF is clearly an example of strong cooperation with an NGO at the local level. CR is also developing relationships with the Pacific Centre for Peacebuilding (PCP) and Dialogue Fiji\textsuperscript{132} that demonstrate that same level of cooperation. CR cooperated with these organizations to provide access to resources for its allies. It sought to provide the CCF access to training, funding, and international exposure, and is now trying to extend these resources to the PCP and Dialogue Fiji. Therefore, we can characterize CR's cooperation with local NGOs in Fiji as strong, with the intention of providing access to resources.

CR has not attempted to cooperate or interact with the state, local actors, violent non-state actors, or other international organizations operating in Fiji. All of these can be classified as no relationship. CR's only relationships in Fiji have been with local civil society.

CR's success in Fiji should be tempered by the fact that it was unable to end the coup culture. CR became involved in Fiji in 1995.\textsuperscript{133} The country experienced a coup in 2000\textsuperscript{134}, at the peak of CR's intervention, and then again in 2006.\textsuperscript{135} The CCF's efforts to support an election in 1997\textsuperscript{136} were wasted by the breakdown of the system just three years later. However, it appears that while the CCF was unable to prevent coups, it was

\textsuperscript{132} Dialogue Fiji. Conciliation Resources.
\textsuperscript{133} Conciliation Resources.
\textsuperscript{134} Emde 387. Conciliation Resources Bi-Annual Report 2001/2.
\textsuperscript{135} Conciliation Resources.
\textsuperscript{136} Prasad and Snell 274.
able to maintain democratic accountability for the government over the course of several military regimes. The bolstering of Fijian civil society meant that even though violent military takeovers were frequent, the resulting regimes were forced to deal with a developing civil society that was able to mostly contain the violence to the government. CR’s role in Fiji provided support to local civil society members that allowed them to be successful. Despite the fact that Fiji continues to be in crisis, it seems evident that CR’s intervention was a success.

Conciliation Resources in Uganda

The Ugandan conflict began in 1981 in retaliation against a rigged election a year prior. The initial guerrilla war ballooned into several dozen rebel groups vying for power. While most groups faded over time, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) only grew in power. By the mid-1990s, the war between the LRA and the government had swept away the other lesser rebel groups. The rebel force had lost the political and ideological demands of the original movement, and instead was entirely focused on the political goals of its leader Joseph Kony. In fact, large portions of the army were child abductees forced to fight for Kony. But despite the lack of demands, the LRA has succeeded in carrying on a war for 20 years. The war has spilled over into South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Central African Republic. Many have been abducted or killed and over 350,000 Ugandans have been displaced over the course

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137 Finnstrom 202.
138 Invisible Children.
of the conflict. Although in recent years the war zone has mostly moved out of Uganda and into neighboring countries, at its peak the war had encompassed the entire nation.

Conciliation Resources entered Uganda in 1997. Unlike in Fiji, CR’s support was not limited to just one organization. CR has instead supported six different local NGOs in Uganda. It has also supported a local group in South Sudan dealing with the same issue, and an International organization representing former Ugandan and Sudanese nationals who are working to end the violence. Part of this is because the multidimensional nature of the Ugandan crisis has sparked the development of many local NGOs that only deal with one issue within the conflict. Some organizations are dedicated to ending the violence; others want to assist former child soldiers reenter Ugandan society. Several of CR’s relationships are with organizations that are religiously or culturally based. By supporting Catholic, interfaith, Acholi, and unaffiliated organizations, CR has demonstrated a genuine commitment to a quick, fair, peaceful resolution to the conflict.

Uganda represented by far the largest expenditure on CR’s budget in the mid-2000s. At its peak, CR was training many more peace workers, sending more representatives, and in general spending more money in Uganda than it ever did in Fiji. Because CR was working with a range of organizations, it had to employ a large team to manage its relationships. However, CR was still spending much less in Uganda than IA did on a typical project. It did not have any special resources, opportunities, or expertise in Uganda. CR Uganda did have a slightly larger staff and budget, but in

139 Conciliation Resources LRA Policy Brief.
140 Conciliation Resources.
141 Ibid.
142 Acholi is the largest ethnic group in Northern Uganda. The vast majority of the people affected by the conflict are Acholi. The Acholi people do not have a uniform religion. There are many Acholi Catholics, Protestants, and Muslims.
general did not rely on a strong supply of resources. Therefore, we can classify CR Uganda’s access to resources as moderate.

CR also did not demonstrate strategic flexibility. While CR did support a range of organizations working towards a range of goals, its support was still characterized primarily as training, guidance, and access to international sources of funding. In all, CR’s only real organizational asset in Uganda was its flexible timeframe. CR has quickly developed relationships with many local organizations and has relied on the timeframe that they set. Therefore, we can characterize CR’s structural framework in Uganda as open and strong.

CR has forged several key relationships in Uganda. The organization has cooperated with other INGOs acting in the crisis. Kacoke Madit is an INGO representing the Acholi Diaspora and its interests in ending the conflict. They have had significant dialogue and interaction with CR. Quaker Peace and Social Witness (QPSW) is a Quaker organization interested in issues of peace that has also worked closely with CR in Uganda. CR has demonstrated on multiple occasions that it is willing to cooperate with other INGOs in order to provide further resources for its allies in Uganda. However, it is clear that although CR has been willing to cooperate with INGOs, these relationships have not been the focal point of CR’s involvement in Uganda. Therefore, we can categorize CR’s relationships as moderate at the international level in Uganda, with the goal of increasing resources.

CR has had limited direct interaction with the Ugandan government, local individuals, or violent non-state actors in Uganda. It has sought neither a cooperative nor

\(^{144}\) Kacoke Madit. Conciliation Resources.

\(^{145}\) Conciliation Resources.
an antagonistic relationship with any of these groups. We can define these relationships as absent.

The success of CR and its efforts in civil society development in Uganda lay in its efforts to contain the war, and to ensure that the government did not match the brutality of the LRA. The array of organizations supported by CR have helped to keep pressure on the government and have worked to prevent the government from responding with its own campaign of violence like that seen in Sierra Leone. CR and its partners have also been able to bring enough of an international eye on the conflict to help corner the LRA and limit its destructive ability. The LRA is no longer able to wreak havoc across the entire region. However, even with the level of international intervention in Uganda and its neighbors, Kony is still at large and the conflict continues. While CR has succeeded in developing a culture that is opposed to violence, it has not succeeded in confronting the LRA and ending the violence itself, and it has not given other actors the tools to do so. Despite CR's 13-year involvement in the region, the war has not ended.

**Comparative Analysis of Conciliation Resources**

The two programs under Conciliation Resources did not produce radically different results. CR's program in Fiji did seem to greatly improve the status of civil society in Fiji. Its support of the CCF has produced strong improvements to government accountability, even in spite of a continuing cycle of coups. CR's program in Uganda had more modest, but equally evident benefits. CR's allies in Uganda have helped to prevent escalation by the government and have worked to contain the violence. Although this
study found that CR Fiji was more successful than CR Uganda, it did not find that the
difference between the two results was enormous.

CR’s basic mission is to “prevent violent conflict”, “promote justice”, and “build
lasting peace”. It intends to do this by supporting peace workers, increasing the national
dialogue, and influencing national conflict resolution policies\textsuperscript{146}. It cannot be argued in
either case that CR prevented conflict or built lasting peace. However, it is clear that in
both countries CR created opportunities for both in the long term, while promoting justice
in the short term. Both cases are clear examples of CR supporting peace workers,
increasing the national dialogue, and influencing conflict resolution policies. The
difference in the cases is that CR Fiji was able to create a significant opportunity,
whereas CR Uganda was less able to address its problems. Yet, as previously stated, the
two programs produced significant positive results. It appears that CR has had more
affect in Fiji, but its efforts in both countries have been successful.

The difference in the organizational predictions for the two programs, however, is
worth noting. CR Uganda had far greater organizational resources and an equally
effective structural framework. Organizational theory would predict that CR Uganda
should then be significantly more successful. As the two programs experienced similar
levels of success, with CR Fiji actually being slightly more successful, this evidence
refutes the Organizational hypothesis that access to resources leads to success.

The difference in cooperative choices made by the two programs was likely not
even enough to draw any solid conclusions. CR Uganda cooperated slightly more with
international partners at the local level, whereas CR Fiji cooperated slightly more with its
local allies and did not interact with other INGOs. This would tend to suggest that
\textsuperscript{146}Conciliation Resources.
relationships with local organizations are more important than relationships with international allies. However, as the two programs had relatively little difference in their independent variables relating to cooperating, no strong conclusions may be drawn.

The next section of this study will comparatively analyze the two conflict-resolution INGOs and their four respective programs.

Comparative Analysis of International Alert and Conciliation Resources

The four programs that this study has analyzed had a wide range of success and failure. CR's program in Fiji was the most successful. CR also had some more moderate success in Uganda. IA's program in Sri Lanka was positive but its overall success was weak. IA's intervention in Sierra Leone can be definitely termed a failure because at best it was a waste of resources and at worst it was an obstacle to the peace process. We can rank the four programs from most successful to least successful by CR Fiji, CR Uganda, IA Sri Lanka, and finally IA Sierra Leone.

The four cases do not suggest that funding, staffing, or expertise played a strong role in the success of the programs. Fiji was the least well-funded and staffed program of the four and it was the most successful. All four programs appear to have had enough funding and staff to implement their strategies so neither was a limiting factor. However, it should be noted that IA Sri Lanka might have been more successful than IA Sierra Leone because of its added expertise.

The strategic flexibility employed by IA had no clear positive effect on its programs. Some level of internal flexibility was necessary for CR to support local partners, but this flexibility was very little compared to what IA attempted to assert. The
failure of strategic flexibility may actually be more about the slow responses of IA than
the failures of its strategies. In Sierra Leone, IA intervened part of the way through the
hostage crisis, when other parties were already negotiating. In Sri Lanka, IA’s
intervention came only after an eight-year observation period during which thousands of
Sri Lankans were killed. It is possible that if IA had rapidly implemented its strategies
then they might have been effective. However, because IA valued strategic flexibility
over a rapid response, its innovative strategies were less useful.

Cooperation at the international level seemed to be important but not required for
both INGOs. CR’s cooperation with other INGOs in Uganda helped it coordinate its
actions. These relationships were clearly an asset to the program. On the other hand, CR
Fiji had no interaction with other INGOs and was still quite successful. IA Sri Lanka also
did not attempt cooperation, which did not appear to be a problem. However, it is clear
that antagonistic relationships with other INGOs working towards the same goals are
definitely a problem. IA Sierra Leone’s constant attempts to undermine the UN and the
ICRC proved to be an enormous problem for the program. INGOs should not feel
compelled to seek out INGO allies if they do not readily present themselves, but INGOs
should avoid competing with other groups working towards the same goals.

IA Sri Lanka was the only program to have significant cooperation with the state.
While this may have been helpful in the short term, it did not appear to do more than alter
the opinions of a handful of parliamentarians. IA Sierra Leone’s antagonism towards the
state did eventually turn into a problem because the government was able to limited IA’s
access. CR Fiji did have some success pressuring the state through the CCF. However,
this interaction was very limited, and could hardly be viewed as antagonistic. CR actually
did its best to legitimize the government, even while pressuring it to move ahead with elections and maintain democratic accountability. INGOs should be careful when dealing with states because states do have the ability to cut an INGO out of the process. However, it seems that there is not much to be gained from seeking a strong cooperative relationship with a weak developing state.

So far, the evidence suggests that strong cooperative relationships with local civil society are vital to the success of an INGO. The strongest cases of success were also the ones in which INGOs invested themselves in local civil society. CR's relationship with the CCF proved crucial to its success in Fiji. IA's primary limitation in Sri Lanka was its inability to work with grassroots civil society organizations. Its only real interaction, the NPC, was an organization that IA attempted to exert its own control over. IA's relationship with the RUF in Sierra Leone could be seen as a strong case of this. However, the RUF was acting much more as a faction and much less as a civil society member at the time of IA's intervention. The RUF was certainly not playing the role of peacebuilding NGO. Furthermore, IA was really only able to gain contact with the leadership of the RUF, so its cooperation was not really at the local level. Had IA actually worked to engage with the RUF as a civil society organization and tried to achieve some of its political goals, then IA might have been more successful. In all, it seems clear that INGOs are much more successful when they develop strong cooperative relationships with local peacebuilding NGOs.

Unfortunately, neither organization developed relationships at the local level except through local NGOs so this study cannot make conclusions about INGO relationships with local populations.
Human Rights Watch

Human Rights Watch (HRW), or originally “Helsinki Watch”, was founded in 1978. It was originally focused on human rights violations in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. It pushed for democratic transformation and liberalization throughout the 1980s. The organization grew over the next decade to adopt a more global focus, with allied organizations in the Americas, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. In 1988, the five “Watch Committees” unified under the name “Human Rights Watch” and created the global INGO that it is today.

Human Rights Watch uses the mission statement:

“Human Rights Watch is dedicated to protecting the human rights of people around the world. We stand with victims and activists to prevent discrimination, to uphold political freedom, to protect people from inhumane conduct in wartime, and to bring offenders to justice. We investigate and expose human rights violations and hold abusers accountable. We challenge governments and those who hold power to end abusive practices and respect international human rights law. We enlist the public and the international community to support the cause of human rights for all.”

-Human Rights Watch

This mission statement makes it clear that HRW is focused on dealing with human rights at the global level. Unlike International Alert and Conciliation Resources, HRW is a human rights organization. It is concerned with the resolution of conflict, but only as it directly pertains to human rights abuses. HRW acts in countries experiencing violent conflict, peaceful countries suffering from abusive governments, and even occasionally

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147 Gorvin 478.
148 Human Rights Watch: Our History.
149 Human Rights Watch: About Us.
liberal countries dealing with isolated human rights violations. It works at the global level to end human rights abuses in developing and developed states.

One of the primary claims that Human Rights Watch makes is that it intends to "investigate and expose" violations. This means that, like IA, HRW focuses on research as one of its primary modes of operation. The organization employs researchers to investigate potential human rights violations around the world and expose them to the public. Every year, HRW produces hundreds of publications fill with exposed violations and recommendations suggested by their researchers. They travel to countries, conduct research, and interview victims, witnesses, and government officials in an attempt to accurately describe the situation to the world. By employing their own researchers, HRW is attempting to ensure the legitimacy of its claims of violation. They are working to create a strong understanding of situations before they determine whether or not violations have occurred.

The second step of HRW's process is called "Naming and Shaming". The organization publishes its research and recommendations globally in an attempt to provide internal and external pressure on the violating government or actor. By publicly shaming violators, HRW is seeking to generate a negative public sentiment that forces the violator to change its actions. It seeks to increase the audience costs such that violations are not worth the price of shaming. Roth suggests that HRW's shaming is most effective at creating change when the research is able to clearly identify a violation, a violator, and a remedy. The need for a violation is obvious. If human rights abuse has

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150 Ibid.
151 Human Rights Watch: Our Research Methodology.
152 Human Rights Watch: Our History. Roth 64.
153 Roth 68.
not occurred then there is no need for it to be fixed. The need for a violator is important because it allows for the public to place blame on an actor, and it gives that actor the responsibility to correct the violation. Finally, Roth claims that HRW must always seek to provide clear remedies because it gives a clear route for the public and the violator to follow.\textsuperscript{154} HRW reports always contain a recommendations section because it provides all involved actors a route to avoid negative audience costs and remedy the situation. By employing this carefully structured strategy, HRW is able to effectively maximize its assets and accomplish its goals.

There is strong evidence that naming and shaming is an effective strategy. HRW is not alone in its use. Many INGOs, media institutions, and the United Nations employ naming and shaming to enforce global norms, especially as they apply to human rights standards.\textsuperscript{155} The collection of these organizations and institutions creates a transnational advocacy network for human rights. Hafner-Burton argues that this tactic is effective at ensuring political rights, even when the shamed governments are opposed to those rights. She claims that shamed governments are more likely to “hold elections or pass legislation to increase political pluralism or participation”.\textsuperscript{156} Yet, when shaming is used in situations when responsibility is not consolidated in a centralized authority, it is much less likely that the shaming will be successful. A dictator or government feels the direct effects of international pressure, whereas an individual rioter or abusive police officer is less likely to cease violations in a culture of abuse. In fact, Hafner-Burton cites several examples in which political terror may have \textit{increased} following to naming and

\textsuperscript{154} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{155} Hafner-Burton 698.
\textsuperscript{156} Ibid 691.
shaming. This should not deter INGOs from shaming violators. However, it should make organizations like HRW hesitant to shame if they are not confident that they can produce a positive result. In general, naming and shaming helps provide accountability for perpetrators and typically results in an increase in human rights.

Applying the analytical framework to HRW, we can see that HRW is a resource heavy organization. It has a very sizable budget compared to most INGOs. In its 2009 external evaluation, HRW had a budget of $31 million. The organization is recognized as one of the premier human rights INGOs in the world and thus draws on a very wide range of donors and public exposure. HRW’s large budget exists in spite of the fact that it refuses funding from governments and aid programs, both directly and indirectly. It only has nine major funders, compared to Conciliation Resources’ 20 and International Alert’s 50. These include the Open Society Institute, the Atlantic Philanthropies, and the Ford Foundation. This means that it relies heavily on private donors. Its substantial budget gives HRW the ability to invest heavily in a wide range of projects. HRW is able to employ researchers in many countries, and is not compelled to choose its missions selectively. HRW is clearly strong in terms of economic resources.

The bulk of HRW’s funding goes to employ a large staff. In 2011, HRW had a staff of 265. In the late 1990s, HRW’s staff was considerably smaller, but was still a good deal larger than that of IA or CR. Its staff is also primarily researchers and experts. The vast majority of HRW employees are highly skilled and educated researchers.

157 Ibid 706.
159 Human Rights Watch.
investigating human rights concerns around the world. In terms of basic assets, it is clear that HRW is very well off.

HRW also has one very important special resource. It publishes its own reports. The recommendation reports written by HRW’s researchers are published and distributed by HRW. This allows the organization to publish frequently and cheaply. As its reports are not for profit, it does not have to worry about whether or not copies will sell. Instead it distributes them to interested organizations, companies, states, and institutions. Given that HRW functions primarily as a research organization, this resource is a key capability.

The structural framework employed by HRW is very open. The organization divides the world into five “Watches”: Africa, the Americas, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East and North Africa. An executive director organizes each Watch. The central leadership selects which programs to fund, and where researchers should be sent. For a smaller organization, this process might be more crucial, but given HRW’s considerable resources and the comparably low cost of introducing a new program, HRW is likely to investigate many countries. It then employs researchers who are given the task of investigating potential violations, write press releases, and publish recommendation reports. As with IA, the researchers are given the task of finding solutions to abuses. The organization trusts the recommendations provided by its researchers and does its best to ensure that the recommendations are followed.

Yet, unlike at IA, the organization is not responsible for the implementation of the policy. HRW’s work ends with shaming and a recommendation. The responsibility to repair the violation rests on the public and the violator. The public, not HRW, chooses how to pressure governments and other actors. Those actors then dictate which
recommendations will be employed. By removing itself from the implementation process, HRW is yielding that it may not always have the capabilities to implement the best strategies. It relies on the governments and the public to use their capabilities to ensure that the most basic and most effective solution is reached.

Also unlike IA, the organization does not have programs targeted at particular countries. In fact, the Watches do nothing other than coordinate researchers and publish press releases. There is no “HRW program in East Timor” for example. Instead, Asia Watch simply coordinates researchers who happen to be investigating in East Timor or Sri Lanka or China. HRW tailors its research to particular violations by investigating individual cases rather than using programs that focus on an entire country.

They can quickly send one or two researchers to investigate a potential problem rather than having to wait for a national crisis to grow to the point that it merits an entire program. They do not have to invest in a local office, and do not have to finance a temporary local program. If they perceive that the problem has changed, the Watch can easily increase or decrease the focus in a particular country. This also allows HRW to spread its resources over many situations rather than focusing heavily on just a few.

According to its 2009 evaluation, HRW was investigating concerns in over 70 countries, and was poised to react in many more.\textsuperscript{161} HRW’s choice to focus on situations rather than states means that it is able to react quickly and appropriately to far more crises, and is able to play the role of a genuine watchdog for the entire world.

The problem with electing not to use country programs is that it is possible for HRW to miss some crises. Because each Watch has only two or three primary employees that are focused on coordinating researchers across an entire region, it is easy for one or

\textsuperscript{161} Ibid.
two crises to go unnoticed. Gaps in employment can also lead to serious problems for the organization. By skipping the step between regional director and researcher, HRW does not give itself a safety net. Although in the past we have seen a strong record of watchfulness, there is little to ensure that a weak executive Watch director could not miss serious violations. Yet, HRW does have ways around this problem. Because HRW acts as a part of an advocacy network, rather than shouldering the responsibility for human rights violations alone, it is simply responsible for adding its resources to the network. If HRW were to miss a violation initially, it is likely that another organization would identify it. Therefore, although this does act as somewhat of an organizational deficiency, gaps in research do not necessarily limit HRW or its advocacy network.

This framework makes HRW both strong and agile. By relying on its researchers, HRW is able to come up with effective solutions. It avoids bureaucratic confusion that might otherwise limit the utility of the organization. It tries to see situations as they arise, thus allowing it to quickly arrive at helpful recommendations. However, by relying on the international community to pressure violators, HRW is assuming that violators are willing to change. HRW can only have successful results when the violators themselves recognize that the audience cost is too high to continue violations. It is clear that HRW has carefully learned its bounds and knows not to overstep them, but is also unable and unwilling to push the role of civil society to find innovative solutions to accomplish its mission. Like in Keck and Sikkink’s analytical framework, HRW operates under the assumption that INGOs can only act as advocates, and do have authority to claim for themselves.
At the international level, HRW has several strong cooperative relationships. It works closely with several INGOs including the Open Society Institute and the Campaign to Ban Landmines. The organization did work extensively to increase the capabilities of the human rights transnational advocacy network, especially on the issue of landmines, and has collaborated in order to promote the goals of the network. These relationships exist to further the international legitimacy and resources of HRW and its allies. Therefore, we can characterize HRW as cooperative at the international level for international legitimacy and resources.

From its mission statement, we can see that HRW is committed to cooperation at the local level. The INGO stands “with victims and activists”. The organization interviews local actors to determine the presence of violations, and then uses those actors to help generate the pressure to fix the violations. HRW uses local cooperation primarily to gain information. Local interviews comprise the primary source that most of HRW publications and recommendations rely on. Therefore it is clear that HRW intends to cooperate at the local level, and it intends to use its cooperation to increase its access to information.

Contrarily, HRW also uses its mission statement to demonstrate that it is not afraid to vilify governments. HRW “challenge[s] governments and those who hold power to end abusive practices and respect international human rights law”. This indicates that HRW believes that governments tend to be the most common human rights violators, and the organization is ready to condemn governments in order to achieve its goals. While certainly it is possible that HRW cooperates with some governments, it also

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162 Human Rights Watch.
163 Ibid.
164 Ibid.
believes that a central portion of its mission is to provide accountability when governments step over the line.

Although HRW is concerned with Security issues, and does believe that war causes human rights violations, it does not directly seek to affect conflict resolution. Therefore, HRW is not a security-oriented INGO.

We can now effectively characterize HRW as an INGO. We have determined that HRW has a high level of resources, including funding, employment, and expertise. It has a strong open structural framework, but also relies heavily on the violator to achieve its goals. HRW is willing to cooperate with other INGOs at the international level to increase access to resources. It cooperates directly with local actors in order to increase its access to information. The organization has indicated that it is willing to establish antagonistic relationships with governments and non-state actors when necessary. HRW has no stake in security concerns and is not a conflict resolution organization.

The next three sections will look at three programs run by HRW. The first is in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The second is in Indonesia and East Timor. The final program is in Zimbabwe.

**Human Rights Watch in East Timor**

Until 1999, East Timor was simply a region occupied and governed by Indonesia. It was the eastern portion of the island of Timor, one of the southernmost islands in the country. Since the 1975, the Indonesian government had controlled the island. Support for independence slowly grew during the 1980s and 90s, especially following the massacre of independence protestors by Indonesian forces in 1991. Following Indonesian
31-year President Suharto’s resignation in 1998, the independence movement began to garner actual legitimacy. Finally, on August 30, 1999, the people of East Timor were allowed to vote in a referendum to determine whether they would become an autonomous region of Indonesia or an independent state.\textsuperscript{165} When independence garnered a vast majority, the Indonesian military and various pro-Indonesian militias responded with violence.\textsuperscript{166} The conflict killed approximately 1,400 Timorese and pushed hundreds of thousands into refugee camps. Within weeks, the U.N. intervened to bring an end to the violence, and to ensure that the results of the referendum were held. By 2002, East Timor, or Timor-Leste, was an officially recognized state.\textsuperscript{167}

Human Rights Watch (HRW) became concerned with the situation in East Timor during the mid-1990s, when violence between resistance militias, government forces, and pro-Indonesia militias began to take over the region and limit the rule of law.\textsuperscript{168} The organization continued to investigate and report as the violence slowly escalated and the region began to push for a referendum. INGOs like HRW swooped in to help generate accountability. As the violence reached a crescendo, HRW and other INGOs had begun to draw the eye of the international community. HRW’s intervention focused on pressuring the Indonesian government, Indonesia’s donors, and the U.N. Security Council (UNSC).\textsuperscript{169} This pressure paid off when the UNSC announced that an Australian-led team would intervene in East Timor and protect the people of East Timor.

Yet, HRW’s concerns in East Timor did not end when the intervention force landed. Although the Indonesian forces largely complied with the U.N. forces, HRW was

\textsuperscript{165} Human Rights Watch, 2 Sep 1999.
\textsuperscript{166} Ibid 6 Sep 1999.
\textsuperscript{167} CIA World Factbook: Timor-Leste.
\textsuperscript{168} Human Rights Watch, 4 Jun 1997.
\textsuperscript{169} Ibid 6 Sep 1999.
worried that no justice process would take place. They continued to push the Indonesian government to convict the military officials, soldiers, and militias who perpetrated the crisis. They also worked to ensure that the fledgling state of East Timor adopted a culture and legal system that was based on human rights. When torture and mistreatment by East Timor police forces became frequent, the INGO began to pressure the government to adopt stricter training programs and to punish officers who violated rights. HRW continues to have an involved presence in pushing for justice for the 1999 crisis and for guaranteeing human rights in the young island nation.

HRW’s intervention in East Timor fell under the authority of the “Asia Watch” division of HRW. Asia Watch is responsible for evaluating all human rights crises in Asia, including Australia and the Indian and Pacific Islands but excluding Central Asia and the Middle East. Asia Watch has a single executive director, Sidney Jones from 1989 until 2002, and Brad Adams from 2002 until the present. The Watch employed a slightly of investigators in East Timor in the late 1990s given the severity of the violations. However, the group still stayed quite small as compared to other involved INGOs. The intervention’s only real costs were the salaries and travel cost of its researchers. It did not have an official office in East Timor or Indonesia and had virtually no other expenses. The organization did employ researchers with a very high level of expertise, and HRW’s reputation did give it easy access to many other INGOs and local groups. In general, however, HRW’s intervention in East Timor relied on very few resources.

171 Tortured Beginnings 3, 48.
172 Human Rights Watch.
174 Human Rights Watch: Brad Adams.
HRW also demonstrated strong flexibility in East Timor. It was able to react quickly as the crisis grew, and was able to quickly publish reports that made sure that the international community was aware of the crisis. Because it is really only a research organization, HRW found itself with few decisions to make in East Timor. It followed the basic strategy of investigating, naming perpetrators, and then using the public to shame them. Its actions in East Timor fit very with the basic strategy followed by the organization. Its structural framework did not give it any unusual strategic strength. It merely effective followed the strategy laid out in the organization’s basic mission. Therefore, we can characterize HRW in East Timor as having few strong resource or structural framework advantages over other organizations, but also no organizational disadvantages. The organization relied on an open framework for its success.

HRW’s activity in East Timor demonstrates a high level of cooperation with INGOs at the state level. On many occasions, HRW worked with other INGOs on the human rights crisis in East Timor. In August of 1998, HRW and Amnesty International published a joint report designed to bring attention to prisoner releases by the Indonesian government, and meant to apply pressure for more releases.175 HRW again worked with Amnesty International the next October to present their concerns about East Timor to the United Nations General Assembly.176 By cooperating with another major human rights organization, HRW was seeking to increase the legitimacy of its reports at the international level. The organization extended this strategy several times to working with a network of organizations rather than cooperating with an individual INGO. In June

2004, HRW participated in a coalition of six INGOs pushing for justice in East Timor.\textsuperscript{177} HRW used the same tactics again in the East Timor case in August 2005. Each time the group wrote a joint letter to the UN issuing their demands, and pushed for a revisiting of the justice process in East Timor.\textsuperscript{178} It is clear that in East Timor, HRW did not view itself as a solitary actor, and regularly sought to participate in a network of organizations in order to increase its legitimacy at the international level. By seeking out likeminded INGOs, HRW was trying to demonstrate the legitimate need for action in East Timor. Like Keck and Sikkink suggest, HRW saw its role as part of a transnational advocacy network that could increase its ability to create change by increasing the connectivity of the network. We can classify HRW’s cooperation with INGOs at the state level strong and focused on increasing international legitimacy.

HRW also collaborated with local NGOs for the same reasons. The joint letter to the UN in August 2005 also included several local NGOs in its coalition. The East Timor Alliance for an International Tribunal, East Timor and Indonesia Action Network, The Hak Association, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign, Watch Indonesia!, and Indonesian NGO Coalition for International Human Rights Advocacy all worked with HRW on the initiative.\textsuperscript{179} By including local NGOs in the coalition, the network was demonstrating that Indonesians and East Timorese also supported international involvement. They were increasing their international legitimacy by showing the international community that the domestic population was calling for the same demands. Therefore, we can see that on at least one occasion, HRW cooperated with local NGOs in order to increase its international legitimacy and the legitimacy of the network.

\textsuperscript{177} Human Rights Watch, 25 Jun 2004.
\textsuperscript{179} Ibid 22 Aug 2005.
HRW also clearly used its connections with a variety of groups in order to maximize its access to information. In one report, the organization suggested that it relied on individuals, domestic and international NGOs, international institutions such as the UN, and East Timor government officials for its access to information.\(^{180}\) It later argued that actors involved in East Timor need to “work more closely together” for several reasons including “to identify patterns and perpetrators, and to highlight structural problems that allow human rights violations to emerge in the first place”.\(^{181}\) HRW not only uses cooperative relationships to increase its access to information, it also pushes other groups to do the same. In one case, HRW worked with the International Committee of the Red Cross to gain information on militant groups in East Timor.\(^{182}\) At other points HRW worked with staff from the U.N., especially the U.N. mission to East Timor and the U.N. Human Rights Unit, to get information.\(^{183}\) This proves that although HRW primarily cooperated with international organizations and institutions to gain legitimacy at the international level, they also occasionally used them for access to information.

Local NGOs, on the other hand, were relied on much more heavily for information. In April 1999, HRW relied on a local human rights organization in Dili for information on a militia attack a few days earlier. The same report also cited the Hak Foundation and several other organizations as sources about local militia threats.\(^{184}\) Human Rights Watch special report “Tortured Beginnings” claims to have interviewed many local NGO officials in order to generate its understanding of the situation in East

\(^{180}\) Tortured Beginnings 9.
\(^{181}\) Ibid 55.
\(^{182}\) Human Rights Watch, 9 Apr 1999.
\(^{183}\) Tortured Beginnings 9.
\(^{184}\) Human Rights Watch 9 Apr 1999.
Timor. The Judicial System Monitoring Programme provided key recommendations HRW eventually published in the report. One authored claimed that HRW worked with local organizations to ensure that East Timor's new legal code met with international law. It is clear that HRW values cooperation with local NGOs for the purpose of gaining information.

HRW has the same basic relationship with local individuals. It has sought out victims and witnesses on many occasions in East Timor for access to information. Its reports frequently relied on witness testimony rather than official government reports. Tortured Beginnings, for example, cited the use of victim and witness interviews as its central research methodology. HRW does typically rely on local organizations instead of individuals, but in its more comprehensive reports on East Timor, it was always willing to seek out victims and witnesses and use them as key pieces of its understanding of the crisis. Therefore it is clear that HRW's cooperative relationships at the local level in East Timor produced information and had an important effect in determining the recommendations of the organization.

HRW even cooperated with East Timor government officials for access to information. Tortured Beginnings cited interviews with East Timor officials including Police Commissioner Paulo Martins and Vice Minister of the Interior Alcino Barris. Even though the report identified many East Timorese police officers as perpetrators, it was ready to cooperate with the government in order to ensure an accurate understanding.

185 Tortured Beginnings 9.
186 Ibid 54.
187 Simonsen 583.
188 Tortured Beginnings 9.
189 Ibid 41.
190 Ibid 52.
of the problem. In fact, by working with government officials, HRW discovered that in many cases the government was aware of violations and was working to prevent future instances. Barris told HRW that “there is still very little real understanding of what human rights are” amongst the police force.\textsuperscript{191} This indicated to HRW that the problem of police violence was not based in corruption. Instead, the police forces were not adequately trained. Without using the government for access to information, HRW would not have been able to correctly identify the cause of the problem. Its choice to cooperate with the government allowed HRW to create a more effective solution. It is certainly rare for HRW to cooperate with a government, especially when it is the perpetrator, but it is clear that the organization is occasionally willing to do so in order to get information.

Tortured Beginnings also demonstrated that HRW was able to cooperate for the purpose of increasing its access to special resources. HRW cited its cooperation with the police for as the reason for its access to “several police stations, detention facilities, and the national training academy”.\textsuperscript{192} Its willingness to work with the government gave it special resources that allowed HRW to maximize its capabilities. Of course, each of these resources eventually produced information. However, access to the facilities themselves must be regarded as a special resource, rather than direct access to information. Therefore we can conclude that in at least one situation in East Timor, HRW cooperated with the state in order to increase its access to resources.

Contrarily, however, it is clear that on many occasions HRW formed antagonistic relationships with the governments of Indonesia and East Timor. HRW’s Asia director Sidney Jones asserted that the initial post-referendum violence was “planned and

\textsuperscript{191} Ibid 52.
\textsuperscript{192} Ibid 9.
coordinated beforehand. The Indonesian army may be trying to teach a lesson” to separatists. 193 Jones aggressively condemned the Indonesian military, government, and president of promoting and perpetrating the human rights violations in East Timor. At other points HRW attempted to convince donors to stop funding the Indonesian government 194, or pushed Indonesia to change its policies towards East Timor. 195 When the newly established government of East Timor began engaging in police brutality and other human rights violations, HRW was again quick to condemn the state. 196 The INGO has frequently and aggressively targeted both states at various points during the conflict. It has demonstrated a willingness to form antagonistic relationships with states that it identifies as perpetrators. In virtually every instance, HRW’s relationship with the Indonesian state can be characterized as antagonistic. HRW’s relationship with the government of East Timor, on the other hand, has had moments of cooperation paired with other more sour periods. Clearly HRW is not afraid of antagonizing a state when the INGO believes that it is necessary.

Antagonism is even clearer in HRW’s relationships with Indonesian and Timorese non-state actors (NSAs). The primary NSAs in East Timor have been pro-Indonesian or pro-Timorese militant forces. In June 1997, HRW blamed several guerilla groups on both sides for violence and human rights violations. 197 According to HRW, the peak of the post-referendum violence was carried out by violent NSAs. 198 Throughout the course of the conflict, HRW has condemned both “anti-independence militias” 199 and “resistance

193 Human Rights Watch, 6 Sep 1999.
194 Ibid 1 Sep 1999.
199 Ibid.
forces" for serious violations. Rather than picking a particular side in the conflict, HRW has aggressively antagonized all NSAs that have violated human rights. In the case of East Timor, we can classify all of HRW’s interactions with local NSAs as antagonistic.

Although it is clear that a conflict did break out in East Timor during the period of HRW’s involvement, HRW was not directly concerned with resolving the conflict. It did not worked with the government or the militias to seek an end to the violence. It was instead concerned with the many human rights crises that accompanied the conflict. Furthermore, the organization remained involved in East Timor long after the conflict had subsided. Therefore, even though violence occurred, HRW’s campaign in East Timor was not dealing directly with security concerns.

When we assess HRW’s intervention in Indonesia and East Timor, it is clear that HRW had several large successes. Through the use of a transnational advocacy network, HRW was able to generate global support for intervention and accountability in East Timor. Within days of the start of the violence, the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) had approved an intervention force, and had commanded Indonesian forces to stand down\textsuperscript{201}. The overwhelming global pressure on Indonesia and the UNSC forced a rapid solution to the problem. In part due to HRW’s work, the UN found itself able to quickly reach a decision on East Timor. British UN Ambassador Jeremy Greenstock said, “It is not often that the UN works as quickly as this”\textsuperscript{202}. Of course, HRW did not accomplish this alone. Instead, its choice to cooperate with INGOs and participate in a transnational advocacy network was key to the timely solution to the crisis.

\textsuperscript{200} Ibid 5 Jun 1997.
\textsuperscript{201} BBC: “UN approves Timor force”.
\textsuperscript{202} Ibid.
Yet it is also clear that there were some serious setbacks to HRW’s solution. Although much of the crisis was averted and East Timor was granted a U.N. backed independence process, HRW failed to keep the attention of the international community long enough to prevent the amnesty of the perpetrators. According to an HRW report, only 12 people were ever tried for their crimes during the post-referendum violence, and of those only two were convicted. The two convicted were both East Timorese. No Indonesian was ever convicted for their crimes during the crisis.\textsuperscript{203} Although succeeded in using international pressure to end the crisis and protect human rights, it failed in its goal to “hold abusers accountable”\textsuperscript{204} This should not be seen as a serious failure because HRW relies on pressure from the public for its success. However, it should be noted that HRW was unable to sustain pressure for long enough for their full goals to be achieved in East Timor.

The more long-term results of the conflict should also be noted. Simonsen argues that post-independence state building ought to have been more straightforward in East Timor than in many more fractured societies. He claims that East Timor was not ethnically divided, and the nation had experienced an overwhelming support for the independence movement, so there were not clear obstacles to the process.\textsuperscript{205} Yet for some reason, East Timor has swayed dangerously away from democracy at moments. Freedom House currently ranks East Timor as “partly free” following independence.\textsuperscript{206} HRW reported on many cases of police violence and a lack of understanding of the basic role of

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{203}] Justice Denied for East Timor.
\item[\textsuperscript{204}] Human Rights Watch: About Us.
\item[\textsuperscript{205}] Simonsen 576.
\item[\textsuperscript{206}] Freedom House: Freedom in the World.
\end{itemize}
government in East Timor. Simonsen raised concerns about the failure to develop a culture to support a formalized democracy in East Timor. He argued that East Timor lacks the ability to resolve basic conflicts in society, and thus has been largely unable to operate effectively as a state. While this concern is not necessarily the fault of organizations like HRW, it is clear that INGOs did not give local organizations the support they needed to create domestic accountability. HRW used domestic NGOs in order to gain access to information and bolster the legitimacy of its cause at the international level, but then failed to teach its local allies how to create accountability from a local level. The gap between the government and the people of East Timor has not been adequately filled with a domestic civil society. If HRW and other INGOs had worked to promote local civil society and pushed for a culture of rights then it is possible that East Timor may have had a stronger basis for state building.

On the whole, it is clear that HRW’s intervention in East Timor was an enormous success. Through naming and shaming, the organization was able to rapidly generate a public outcry that pressured the U.N. and the government of Indonesia to end the violence and restore human rights. Rather than attempting to work alone, HRW participated in an international network that was able to cooperate in order to achieve its goals. Although not all of HRW’s goals were fully realized in East Timor, the speed and effectiveness of its solution should be carried as a strong success.

Human Rights Watch’s intervention in East Timor relied on few resources other than expertise. Its structural framework was open and effective, and yet did not give HRW any special advantages. HRW showed strong cooperation with other INGOs in

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207 Tortured Beginnings 54.
208 Simonsen 596.
East Timor in order to increase its international legitimacy, and also to a lesser extent to gain information. HRW also showed strong cooperation with local NGOs. This cooperation occurred primarily for information, but also was sometimes used to increase HRW’s international legitimacy. HRW cooperated more moderately with individuals at the local level, exclusively for information. HRW cooperated very minimally with the government of East Timor. When it did so, HRW was looking for resources and information. HRW sometimes formed an antagonistic relationship with the government of East Timor. HRW’s relationships with the Indonesian government, pro-Indonesian militias, and pro-Timorese militias were always antagonistic. HRW did not attempt to target the underlying security issue. HRW’s intervention in East Timor was mostly a success. It did have some setbacks in convicting abusers and establishing a democratic society, but HRW’s success at quickly ending the violence and preventing abuses was enormous.

**Human Rights Watch in the Democratic Republic of the Congo**

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has spent the past several decades as one of the world’s most unstable, deadly nations. In recent years, the conflict has caused over 5.4 million deaths, making it the most deadly war since World War II.⁹⁹⁹ Although violence did not start at a particular most in recent Congolese history, this study will focus on the refugee crisis caused by the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, the 1996-7 war to oust President Mobutu, and the subsequent conflict beginning in 1998 between new President Kabila, Rwandan and Ugandan militias. The refugee crisis began in 1994 following the genocide of Tutsis and moderate Hutus in neighboring Rwanda by the Hutu

⁹⁹⁹ Bavier.
The violence subsided when the Tutsi militia, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) took over the government. Two million Hutu soldiers, militiamen, and civilians fled the country out of fear of retaliation. More than half of the refugees were hosted by the Congo. Although the vast majority of the refugees were non-military, a small handful of ex-Rwandan soldiers and militiamen began launching attacks across the Congolese border into Rwanda, using the refugee camps as a base. The refugee crisis and attacks added tensions between the two countries and reduced the stability of the situation.

By 1996, Rwanda had allied itself with the Congolese resistance leader Laurent-Désiré Kabila against the regime of President Mobutu. The Ugandan military had also entered the fray on the side of the resistance. The odd collection of allies ousted the president and massacred all the Hutu refugees that they could find. Refugees again fled the scene, spreading into northern and western Congo. Human Rights Watch (HRW) condemned the uses of ethnic cleansing by the resistance and yet also believed that the Congo had reached an opportunity for peace. The situation remained hostile for the Hutu and the pro-Mobutu Congolese, but for most other Congolese, Rwandan, and Ugandan civilians, the defeat of Mobutu meant an era of relative peace and security.

Yet within months, the nation took another turn for the worse. The alliance between Rwanda, Uganda, and the new government of the Congo grew uneasy. Rwandan and Ugandan forces refused to exit after stability had been restored, and Kabila quickly found himself engaged in a war against his recent allies. The militaries of all three

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210 Emizet 165.
211 Ibid168.
countries, along with countless militias and resistance groups, sent the territory cascading down the spiral of violence. Each force was less interested in ideological goals or the good of the country, and was more concerned with access to the unprotected resources of the Congo.\textsuperscript{214} One TIME article called the Congo “the playground of foreign armies”.\textsuperscript{215} The Congo spent five years as a battleground until finally a peace agreement was reached in 2003.\textsuperscript{216} The perpetual presence of armed militias and the deterioration of the rule of law have kept the Congo in a state of disarray, but it is clear that the recuperating nation is on the upswing.

HRW has long been concerned with violations in the Congo. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the organization worked to end abuses by President Mobutu.\textsuperscript{217} It was worried about the Rwandan refugee crisis spilling into the Congo and wanted to ensure human rights in the camps. As violence intensified in 1996, and again in 1998, HRW upped its involvement and worked to bring an international eye to the situation. It applied pressure to all parties to maintain human rights even as violence ignited. The organization researched and published reports to keep the world aware and to seek a minimum level of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

HRW’s involvement in the DRC was once again a very small operation. It consisted of just a few researchers with only enough funding for their travel and basic research needs. HRW did not have an official office in the Congo and did not have staff on the ground that was doing anything other than research. The organization sponsored a series of research teams to travel through the country, interviewing victims, witnesses,

\textsuperscript{214} Hochschild 288.
\textsuperscript{215} Robinson 1.
\textsuperscript{216} Robinson 4.
\textsuperscript{217} Human Rights Watch, 23 May 1997.
local organizations, and government officials. The researchers did have a high level of expertise, and had been trained in HRW's research methodology, but had no other special resources available to them. Therefore, although HRW may have had the resources to engage in a more expensive mission, they still limited their intervention in their typical research-oriented style.

The organization's intervention in the DRC did have the added focus of not one, but two primary programs under HRW. The violations in the Congo obviously fell under the concern of “Africa Watch”. However, the presence of child soldiers in the conflict meant that HRW's Children's Rights Advocacy program also took a special interest in the conflict. The involvement of a second program did not necessarily alter the intervention, and likely did not create any bureaucratic inefficiency. As HRW Watches and Programs are all research oriented, they cannot have competing “goals”. The only possible adverse impact could have been over researched, which is not really a problem. However, it did provide the added assurance that a second major program was observing, and so it was unlikely that violations would go unnoticed. Therefore, the added involvement of the Children's Rights Advocacy program functioned as a small special resource for HRW in the Congo.

The structural framework of HRW in the DRC was much the same as in East Timor. Africa Watch coordinated research teams that entered the country, conducted interviews, and then sent reports back to the organization. It then relied on governments, donors, and institutions to act to prevent further violations. It was able to involve itself quickly, and increase its interest as the hostilities grew. The framework gave HRW's intervention ample opportunities, but also relied on both uninterested actors and the
perpetrators themselves to resolve the problems. HRW's framework seemed to be neither a strong asset, nor a clear hindrance to its involvement in the Congo. We can characterize HRW's framework as open with moderate strength.

HRW did form some cooperative relationships with other INGOs acting in the Congo. The organization worked with Amnesty International and four other INGOs to establish the "Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers" (CSI) in August of 1998, after the Congolese government began recruiting children as young as 12 years old.\(^{219}\) HRW cooperated initially with Amnesty International and the other INGOs in order to establish international legitimacy for the new organization. It then continued to cooperate with CSI in order to maximize the resources of its new ally, and to maximize its own resources in furthering its goals of ending child soldiering in the Congo.

HRW also cooperated with the U.N. mission to the Congo (MONUC) and other U.N. officials initially for access to information, and then later as a resource towards accomplishing its goals.\(^{220}\) However, HRW was also willing to criticize the U.N. and MONUC. In one report, HRW said, "the UN Security Council was slow to authorize a force to supervise the initial Lusaka Peace Accords and the force it mustered was small and inadequately equipped".\(^{221}\) Turner agrees with HRW's assertion, calling MONUC ineffective and passive. He says that the mission saved "hundreds of individuals" in a conflict that killed millions.\(^{222}\) Yet, HRW's criticism of MONUC and the U.N. was not exactly antagonism. Instead the organization was pushing the U.N. to do more. HRW is

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\(^{219}\) Ibid 11 Aug 1998.  
\(^{220}\) Covered in Blood 47.  
\(^{221}\) Ibid 51.  
\(^{222}\) Turner 159.
not afraid to pressure its allies when it believes that they are failing in their responsibilities.

We can see from the case in the DRC that HRW sometimes attempted to cooperate with other international actors in the country. For the most part, however, the organization found itself acting alone. Turner said, “Amid the intense emotion and manipulation, Human Rights Watch was a lonely voice”. 223 It is evident that there were not very many international actors in the Congo during the heart of the conflict, and that HRW only occasionally attempted to cooperate with those that were present. Therefore, we must classify HRW’s cooperation with INGOs at the state level as moderate.

HRW did also attempt to form relationships with local organizations in the Congo. Most notably, HRW advocated on behalf of the local rights group, the Association for the Defense of Human Rights (AZADHO), when the government began to shut down AZADHO’s operations. 224 This interaction can be characterized as HRW intervening to provide resources for its ally. The INGO furthered this method by speaking out against the arrest and silencing of all civil society activists and human rights defenders in the Congo. It issued support for many local NGOs including the Promotion and Support of Women’s Initiatives (PAIF) and others. 225 HRW also voiced concerns about the collection of information during the conflict. It argued that many states had information that they were unwilling to share. 226 This forced HRW to rely on local organizations for information as well. The report, “Covered in Blood” suggests that HRW

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223 Turner 104.
224 Human Rights Watch, 8 Apr 1998.
226 Turner 152.
worked with several local NGOs for access to information. We can see that HRW used its relationships with local NGOs both as resources and for information.

However, this seems to be the extent of HRW’s interaction with local groups. It frequently advocated on their behalf and occasionally relied on their reports, but rarely actually cooperated directly with them. Although this trend may be surprising, it is also unlikely that it reflects a conscious choice by HRW. Turner suggests that the prevalence of threats against local human rights activists made it very hard for local NGOs to operate. Pascal Kabungulu, Secretary-General of Héritiers de la Justice, was assassinated for his involvement in Congolese civil society. Very few other local NGOs were willing to remain in the open in the Congo. The DRC thus suffers from an enormous gap in between the governance structure and the population. Therefore, we cannot characterize HRW as failing to cooperate with domestic NGOs. Instead, we must claim that HRW largely lacked the opportunity to cooperate with such groups.

Without local NGOs active in Congolese society, HRW was forced to rely on individuals for the bulk of its access to information. Many reports relied on eyewitness accounts rather than government or NGO interviews. "Covered in Blood" relies heavily on victims and witnesses for the bulk of its information. HRW viewed victim and witness testimony as virtually its only access to information in the Congo. Therefore, we can characterize HRW’s cooperation with individuals for access to information as strong.

HRW had many cases of condemning governments operating in the Congo. It antagonized both the Mobutu and Kabila regimes, accusing each of major violations.

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227 Covered in Blood 25.
228 Turner 197.
further condemned the presence of the Rwandan and Ugandan militaries in the country and the respective violations of each government.\textsuperscript{231} The organization accused all three governments of committing grave human rights violations, and of sponsoring militias to do the same.\textsuperscript{232} HRW was not hesitant to antagonize governments that it believed were violating human rights. HRW even further pressured the United States to treat the situation more aggressively, and to “hold the Ugandan and Rwandan governments responsible for their actions in the DRC”.\textsuperscript{233} HRW took the stance that governments that failed to act to prevent violations were not themselves violators, but were at least complicit in the violence. At no point during its involvement in the Congo did HRW attempt to cooperate with any state.

HRW was even more damning of violent Non-State Actors in the Congo. At different points, the INGO has accused nearly all of the militant factions of violating human rights. It named the Rally for Congolese Democracy- Goma (RCD-Goma) as a violator when it began abusing civil society activists.\textsuperscript{234} It named the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC) as the perpetrator of two major civilian massacres.\textsuperscript{235} It named the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) as the perpetrator of genocide of Hutu refugees in 1997.\textsuperscript{236} Few NSAs involved in the Congo escaped HRW’s ire. The organization generally took the stance that militias were opposed to the establishment of human rights and that their constant violations should be prosecuted. In nearly every case, HRW’s relationship with NSAs in the Congo can be characterized as antagonistic.

\textsuperscript{232} Covered in Blood 3.
\textsuperscript{233} Human Rights Watch, 5 Mar 2002.
\textsuperscript{235} Covered in Blood 22-24.
\textsuperscript{236} Emizet 180.
HRW’s attempts to bring human rights to the Congo were met with few successes. The organization was unable to quickly bring the public eye to the Congo. Although it briefly succeeded in pushing for a strong mandate from the U.N. Security Council, the mandate quickly fell flat.\footnote{Emizet 169.} The people of the Congo had to wait until early 2000 before any sort of U.N. action was approved. The eventual mission that was sent to the Congo, MUNOC, spent two more years waiting for states to provide troops.\footnote{Prunier 247-8.} Even in the end, MUNOC was small, ineffective, and unable to act. It was not able to capitalize on its Chapter Seven mandate, and spent its time in the DRC impotently waiting for the war to end.\footnote{Turner 159.} HRW was not able to generate the necessary public outcry over human rights violations in the Congo to transform the situation. It was largely unable to “protect human rights”, “uphold political freedom”, “protect people from inhumane conduct during wartime”, or to “bring offenders to justice”.\footnote{Human Rights Watch Mission Statement.}

Much of HRW’s failure can be attributed to the fact that HRW was unable to work in a network of organizations and instead often found itself acting alone. Very few INGOs were interested in the Congo, and very few local NGOs existed at all. This posed two problems for HRW. First, HRW was unable to participate in a system of international accountability by working inside of a transnational advocacy network. When many organizations working on similar goals cooperate to apply pressure, governments are much more likely to listen. In the case of the Congo, HRW became a “lonely voice” for human rights\footnote{Turner 104.} and was thus unable to generate international outcry. Second, threats against local civil society activists meant that the civil society in the Congo was largely...
absent. HRW was not refusing to cooperate with local NGOs. It simply could not find local NGOs. This left a gap in DRC governance that prevented any sort of government accountability. These two problems ensured the continuation of human rights violations in the DRC. It is evident that HRW failed to cooperate with both international and domestic NGOs in the DRC, yet it is also clear that this failure was not from a lack of trying.

HRW cannot stand alone in its failure in the Congo. HRW relies on the local and international community to implement the strategies that the organization provides. HRW does not have the ability to end human rights abuses or achieve its goals on its own. It can do little more than expose crimes and then petition states, institutions, and donors to act. The organization even relies on the perpetrators themselves to rectify their actions. The case of the Congo illustrates the problem with such a strategy. When states are unwilling to act or perpetrators are unwilling to change their ways, then advocacy organizations cannot expect to see positive change. HRW undoubtedly failed to improve the situation, but the international community also failed to listen to HRW and to bring an end to human rights violations in the DRC.

In summary, during its intervention in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Human Rights Watch (HRW) spent very few resources. It spent little money, had a small staff, and needed few other resources. It did have strong expertise and used the focus of two different HRW programs. HRW’s structural framework was open and mostly unremarkable. It was able to act quickly, but also was over reliant on states and perpetrators for its success. The organization used moderate cooperation with other INGOs in order to gain international legitimacy, provide allies with resources, and gain

\[242 \text{Ibid 197.}\]
information. It cooperated moderately with local NGOs to provide its local allies with resources and to gain information. It cooperated strongly with individuals at the local level for information. It antagonized governments and militant factions.

In sum, HRW’s work in the DRC was a failure because it was unable to bring the public eye to the DRC, and to encourage those with power to act in favor of human rights. It was unable to find allies to participate in an advocacy network that could keep the attention of the international community, and it was unable to strengthen the local civil society in order to create a system of domestic accountability. Therefore, regrettably, Human Rights Watch’s work in the Democratic Republic of the Congo much be classified as a failure.

**Human Rights Watch in Zimbabwe**

Unlike the first six countries that this study has examined, Zimbabwe has spent the past decade at internal peace. Since achieving independence from Britain in 1980, the country has been stable and peaceful. The state has engaged in a foreign war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, but they have not had any serious level of violence on the domestic level. Nonetheless, human rights violations were abundant.

Robert Mugabe, hero of the Zimbabwean independence movement, was elected prime minister in the first election of the newly established government. Although his title has since changed to president, Mugabe has remained in power for three decades. Mugabe and the Zimbabwe African National Union- Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) have used election irregularities ranging from gerrymandering to blatant repression and

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243 Saul and Saunders 953.
244 Rotberg 53.
fraud. The government frequently uses brutal tactics to suppress opposition movements and has been known to torture civil society activists. Mugabe uses a democratic façade to continue a system of authoritarianism and perpetual violation of human rights.

The government structure of Zimbabwe is indisputably democratic. It has national elections for president and parliament. The state relies on the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) to guarantee that elections meet the standards of democratic accountability. Dissenters are violently beaten, sometimes arrested, and occasionally killed. Civil society organizations are hassled. Their meetings are shut down. Their leaders find themselves faced with arbitrary arrest. Freedom House has given Zimbabwe a rating of “Not Free”. The regime has manipulated the formal democracy to ensure that it is consistently reelected.

Yet, the electoral process in Zimbabwe is by no means closed. Elections do occur and the votes do actually get counted. The incumbent regime has done its best to keep opposition parties from having a chance, but they rarely have the ability to shut opposition members out of the process. The current major opposition party to ZANU-PF is the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Even given Mugabe’s brutal tactics, the MDC had enough of an opening to take nearly half of the seats in parliament in 2000, denying Mugabe the possibility of pushing constitutional amendments through. At two different moments in recent Zimbabwean history, it has appeared that MDC head Morgan

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245 Rotberg 48.
246 Kasambala A 7.
247 Kasambala B 25.
248 Kasambala A 10.
249 Freedom House.
250 Rotberg 48. Saul and Saunders 969.
251 Rotberg 58.
Tsvangirai would defeat Mugabe in the Presidential election. In both instances, election irregularities and threats of violence ensured that Mugabe was the victor. However, it is clear that the government has some aspects of democracy that prevent Mugabe from engaging in true authoritarianism and give some level of political opportunity in Zimbabwe.

Human Rights Watch (HRW) has been primarily concerned with violations of political rights, beatings, and torture in Zimbabwe under Mugabe. It has sent a constant stream of researchers to Zimbabwe to try to create accountability for human rights since the mid 1990s. It has published a series of reports on election irregularities and state-sanctioned violence designed to pressure the Mugabe regime to begin respecting human rights.

HRW’s involvement in Zimbabwe has not required a substantial allocation of resources. Given the relative level of security in Zimbabwe as compared to the other nations that we have studied, travel options and research processes are much safer and simpler. HRW has been wary of the government of Zimbabwe, but has not had serious concerns about the safety of its researchers. Once again, HRW has relied on a very small research team for the bulk of its efforts. A single researcher, Tiseke Kasambala, wrote most of the reports in the later half of the 2000s. Its staff has a high level of expertise and no other special resources. We can classify HRW’s mission in Zimbabwe as resource weak, with the exception of expertise.

As HRW was relying on an even smaller staff than usual in Zimbabwe, and only had the attention of the Africa Watch program, there was a much higher chance that the

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253 Kasambala A.
research might overlook key aspects of the Zimbabwean situation. However, the organization was once again able to trust its employees on the ground, and would have been able to increase its interest had the situation turned more negative. HRW was still reliant on either external actors or the perpetrators themselves to alter the situation. Once again, the framework provided no special opportunities and also did not create any significant inefficiency. We can classify the strength of HRW’s framework in Zimbabwe as moderate and open.

HRW did not seek out many international allies in Zimbabwe, and has not formed any relationships of note with any INGOs acting in the country, according to their reports. The organization did cooperate with several INGOs for international legitimacy to sponsor a resolution at the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and it did occasionally use representatives of INGOs for information. However, these interactions were so rare and so weak that they could largely be defined as absent.

The only international partner that HRW has sought was the Southern African Development Community (SADC), an international institution composed of 15 member states from the Southern portion of Africa. The organization is interested in a range of issues that are all centered on “economic wellbeing, improvement of the standards of living and quality of life, freedom and social justice and peace and security for the people of Southern Africa.” However, as SADC is an international institution composed of states, the combined interests of its member states actually determine its goals. HRW

254 Human Rights Watch.
256 All Over Again 5.
257 Southern Africa Development Community.
worked extensively to convince SADC to take a more aggressive stance on human rights violations in Zimbabwe. It petitioned individual governments and the institution as a whole to investigate violations and pressure Mugabe to alter his course.\textsuperscript{258} HRW commended SADC for its past efforts in Zimbabwe and suggested that the institution had "played an instrumental role in finding a resolution to Zimbabwe's political crisis".\textsuperscript{259}

HRW recognized that SADC could be a valuable resource against perpetrators in Zimbabwe. The authority of SADC could be key in forcing Mugabe to end abuses and allow for free and fair elections. HRW did its best to put itself in a position to cooperate with SADC in order to increase its resources.

Yet, SADC proved unwilling to cooperate with HRW. The SADC leaders have consistently issued their complicit support for Mugabe. After the 2007 summit, Mugabe boasted, "We got full backing; not even one [SADC leader] criticized our actions".\textsuperscript{260} It is evident that although HRW did seek to cooperate with SADC, its advances were met with failure. Therefore, HRW's cooperative relationships with INGOs and international institutions were entirely absent in Zimbabwe.

At the local level, HRW had many active cooperative relationships. HRW relied on activists from many local NGOs for information in Zimbabwe. It has used interviews from the activists in the Progressive Teachers Union of Zimbabwe (PTUZ)\textsuperscript{261}, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU)\textsuperscript{262}, the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA)\textsuperscript{263}, the Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA)\textsuperscript{264}, and the Zimbabwe Association of

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\textsuperscript{258} Human Rights Watch, 14 Aug 2007.
\textsuperscript{259} All Over Again 46.
\textsuperscript{260} Human Rights Watch, 6 Apr 2007.
\textsuperscript{261} All Over Again 18. Kasambala A 7.
\textsuperscript{262} Kasambala A 7.
\textsuperscript{263} Ibid 13.
\textsuperscript{264} Ibid.
\end{flushright}
Doctors for Human Rights (ZADHR) to provide information on anti-civil society repression and violence. The Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum and the Zimbabwe Peace Project (ZPP) gave reports of election related violence and intimidation to HRW. HRW researchers formed relationships with several local activists, including Raymond Majongwe, secretary general of PTUZ, who provided personal testimony of abuses.

In return, HRW provided a special resource for local NGOs and activists. It advocated on their behalf and worked to prevent violence. By publishing their testimonies in an international journal, HRW hoped to increase accountability for the Zimbabwean government and open space for local NGOs. It demanded that the government of Zimbabwe should “take all necessary steps to ensure that police, armed forces, and other security forces in Zimbabwe abide by Zimbabwe’s obligations under international law, including respect for the rights to freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention, and from torture and other mistreatment”. HRW was allowing local organizations to make demands at the international level. The cooperation between local NGOs and HRW gave the INGO information and provided important access to international resources for its local allies.

HRW also provided an important resource to one local NGO that did not provide HRW with information. When Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe (GALZ) was excluded from a UN sponsored meeting of NGOs working on HIV/AIDS, HRW petitioned the

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265 Kasambala B 9.
266 All Over Again 16.
268 Kasambala A 3.
General Assembly to allow GALZ to rejoin. HRW provided international advocacy to an organization that may not have otherwise had strong access to the international community. HRW’s request was unsuccessful, but the case still demonstrates how HRW used its position to provide resources to its allies.

The cooperation between HRW and local civil society is most evident in HRW’s relationship with Zimbabwean activist Arnold Tsunga and the Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR). In December 2005, HRW and the ZLHR worked together to bolster each other’s international legitimacy and used that legitimacy to push a resolution through the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. HRW has worked to keep the international eye on Tsunga and the ZLHR in order to ensure their security in their work. HRW has also served as an outlet for Tsunga’s advocacy. It publishes Tsunga’s commentary and reports of violations in Zimbabwe through its website. HRW functions as an access point for Tsunga and the ZLHR to the international community. In 2007, HRW bestowed upon Tsunga the Human Rights Defender Award, demonstrating the value it placed on Tsunga, and on the relationship between HRW and the ZLHR. HRW has cooperated extensively with many organizations in Zimbabwe to gain access to information, to provide an important resource to local allies, and on one occasion to increase its international legitimacy.

HRW has also cooperated with individuals at the local level. It relies on victim and witness testimony for its reports. HRW researchers cooperated consistently with

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270 Ibid 1 Nov 2006.
many local individuals on all sides of abuses.\textsuperscript{273} It should be noted, however, that many of the individuals that HRW interviewed participate in Zimbabwe as individuals and as members of civil society. Most of the abuses recorded in HRW reports "You Will Be Thoroughly Beaten", "Our Hands are Tied", "Bashing Dissent", and many of HRW's press releases were focused on interviews with civil society activists participating in the dissent. HRW's focus on civil society abuses means that we must classify much of HRW's cooperation with individuals instead as an act of cooperation with local civil society. Therefore, HRW cooperated moderately with individuals at the local level for access to information.

For the most part, HRW took an antagonistic approach towards the Zimbabwean government. The INGO was especially concerned with President Mugabe and the police forces. It condemned fraudulent elections, the suppression of civil society activists, and the prevalence and acceptability of police brutality.\textsuperscript{274} HRW condemned the practices of the government of Zimbabwe and it pushed other leaders to apply pressure to Mugabe's regime.\textsuperscript{275} We can characterize HRW's relationship with the government of Zimbabwe as antagonistic.

HRW also developed an antagonistic front towards South Africa due to its influence in Zimbabwe. Given South Africa's important role in the region and President Mbeki's relationship with Mugabe, HRW regarded South Africa's inaction in Zimbabwe as a tacit approval of the human rights violations. President Mbeki consistently refused to bring up issues of human rights with Zimbabwean officials. HRW believed that by simply speaking out, South Africa could have helped to ease violations in Zimbabwe.

\textsuperscript{273} All Over Again 5.
\textsuperscript{274} Kasambala A 1. Kasambala B 4.
\textsuperscript{275} Human Rights Watch, 14 Aug 2007.
HRW found South Africa’s refusal to do so as a violation by itself. This characterizes the relationship between HRW and South Africa as limited, but also clearly antagonistic.

Interesting, HRW also briefly attempted to form a cooperative relationship with the Chinese government over Zimbabwe. It specifically asked to provide Zimbabwe with trade and aid deals, but to use the deals to push Zimbabwe towards human rights. HRW asked China to uphold its promise to look for “good friends, good brothers and good partners” in Africa. Given China’s less than stellar human rights record, it is odd to see HRW attempt to enlist China as an ally. However, as China did not respond to HRW’s requests, no such cooperative relationship emerged.

HRW had no relationship with violent Non-State Actors (NSA) in Zimbabwe. Violent NSAs are largely absent from Zimbabwean society, so no such opportunity existed.

HRW’s effect on the situation in Zimbabwe was strong. The organization helped bolster local civil society and bring an international eye to limit violations. Although did not succeed in producing any real international pressure from SADC, China, the U.N., or other states, it was able to help develop a domestic civil society that would be able to provide a greater level of internal accountability. HRW’s relationships with many local NGOs helped to push Zimbabwe towards democratic change. Human Rights Abuses are still prevalent in Zimbabwe, but in February 2009, Zimbabwe made a formal transition towards a power sharing agreement between the ZANU-PF and the MDC. Tsvangirai has been elected Prime Minister to go along with the Mugabe presidency. The solution is

276 Human Rights Watch, 8 Sep 2008.
278 False Dawn 3.
obviously both temporary and ineffective, and yet it also represents a clear step towards democratic accountability.

It would be incorrect to say that HRW caused this change. Many internal actors worked hard to bring about the recent reforms. However, it is clear that HRW played an important role in creating a thriving civil society in the face of injustice. HRW invested itself in domestic civil society and gave many local NGOs and activists the tools they needed to push for change. Therefore, Human Rights Watch’s intervention in Zimbabwe can be characterized as a strong success.

Human Rights Watch’s mission in Zimbabwe required very few resources. It relied on a small staff with a high level of expertise and few expenses. It had no special resources. The structural framework of the mission was highly adaptable and open, but had little real strength. HRW did not form relationships with other international actors in Zimbabwe. It formed many strong cooperative relationships with domestic NGOs and local civil society activists for the purpose of accessing information and providing resources. It cooperated moderately with individuals at the local level to gain access to information. It formed antagonistic relationships with the governments of Zimbabwe and South Africa. HRW did not interact with any violent NSAs in Zimbabwe.

The mission proved largely successful at achieving its goals in Zimbabwe. It has not ousted Mugabe or guaranteed the future of human rights in Zimbabwe, but it has done substantial work to ensure that Zimbabwe has a civil society that is capable of promoting human rights and compelling government accountability. Although this success is incomplete and represents the work of many actors, HRW’s involvement in Zimbabwe should be regarded as a clear success.
Comparative Analysis of Human Rights Watch

Comparing the three Human Rights Watch (HRW) programs is of limited usefulness because the three programs produced identical independent variables in several categories. All three Human Rights Watch interventions, in East Timor, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Zimbabwe relied on few organizational resources, with the exception of expertise. All three relied on the same basic structural framework.

Furthermore, each involvement antagonized states and violent Non-State Actors (VNSAs), and cooperated with individuals at the local level in order to gather information. We cannot draw conclusions about the effects of any of these variables on the success of an INGO.

However, there were clear differences in how each interacted with international and local NGOs in their target countries. HRW cooperated strongly with INGOs in East Timor primarily for international legitimacy, but also for information, and it cooperated moderately with local NGOs first for information and then for international legitimacy. The outcome of HRW’s involvement in East Timor was success. HRW cooperated strongly with local NGOs in Zimbabwe to provide resources and gain information, but failed to cooperate with international actors in the country. Its involvement in Zimbabwe also resulted in success. Finally, HRW failed to cooperate with international or local NGOs in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and then found itself failing to meet its goals. This affirms Cooperative theory by suggesting that cooperation with NGOs, either
at the local or at the international level, must be very important to the success of an INGO.

When we look at why the HRW was successful in each case we can see how the theory operates with greater precision. HRW cooperated with other INGOs in East Timor and was able to generate external accountability for East Timor. International pressure forced the U.N. Security Council to act. Indonesian forces were compelled to stand down because they recognized the dangers of further angering the international community. Those they did not leave found themselves confronted by a U.N. military force.

In Zimbabwe, on the other hand, HRW cooperated with local NGOs and was able to generate internal accountability. HRW helped to bolster and secure Zimbabwe's civil society. With its own active civil society, Zimbabwe was able to pressure its own government and create a transformative shift towards a culture of human rights and democracy. Unfortunately, this process is slow. After decades of civil society development and protesting, Zimbabwe still faces a power-sharing government that includes its longtime abuser, and it still faces its fair share of human rights violations. Nonetheless, by empowering itself through civil society, Zimbabwe has increased the possibility that its next president will not be an authoritarian and will not be able to or want to abuse the rights of its citizens.

Certainly the process in East Timor was quicker. Within days of the U.N. intervention, the violations had ceased. Yet, the new government of East Timor slowly fell back into the ways of the oppressor. Simonsen suggests that East Timor's failure to develop a culture of human rights has severely limited its ability to construct a

\footnote{279 False Dawn 5.}
democracy\textsuperscript{280}. By providing an external safety net, the international community may have limited the long-term growth of an East Timor democracy.

If we return to the basic mission of HRW, we remember that the organization strives to protect human rights, "prevent discrimination", "uphold political freedom", "protect people from inhumane conduct during wartime", and "bring offenders to justice". It intends to do this by investigating and exposing violations and challenging governments.\textsuperscript{281} We can see that HRW largely succeeded in upholding political freedom in Zimbabwe, and protecting people from inhumane conduct in East Timor. As intended, the organization consistently relied on investigation and exposure, and it challenged governments in all three cases. The organization predominantly failed to protect human rights on all levels in the DRC, and there were almost no examples in any case of HRW succeeding in bringing offenders to justice. However, it is clear that HRW was largely successful at improving human rights standards in Zimbabwe and East Timor. Only the DRC proved problematic. HRW's work in the DRC is characterized as a weak success because although HRW's impact was clearly positive, it was also mostly negligible. In sum, HRW clearly worked towards its mission in all three cases, but only achieved that mission in two. HRW's involvement in East Timor and Zimbabwe will be defined as strong successes, whereas its involvement in the DRC was a weak success.

**Comparative Analysis of INGOs**

When analyzed together, the three organizations and the seven countries produce some interesting results. Returning to our original twelve independent variables, we can

\textsuperscript{280} Simonsen 596.
\textsuperscript{281} Conciliation Resources.
test the theories using the cases. This section will carefully analyze each independent variable using the cases, and determine which hypotheses are correct. The general results of this study are displayed in the following table.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Int'l Alert</th>
<th>IA Sri Lanka</th>
<th>IA Sierra Leone</th>
<th>Con Resources</th>
<th>CR Fiji</th>
<th>CR Uganda</th>
<th>Human Rights Watch</th>
<th>HRW East Timor</th>
<th>HRW DRC</th>
<th>HRW Zimbabwe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Resources</strong></td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Very Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Structural Framework</strong></td>
<td>Strong, Open</td>
<td>Weak, Closed</td>
<td>Strong, Closed</td>
<td>Strong, Open</td>
<td>Strong, Open (1 Org)</td>
<td>Strong, Open</td>
<td>Strong, Open</td>
<td>Moderate, Open</td>
<td>Moderate, Open</td>
<td>Moderate, Open</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coop at Int'l Level</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Antag.</td>
<td>Strong, for resources</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Strong, for Int'l legit and info</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coop with local NGOs</td>
<td>Moderate, for resources</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>Strong, for resources</td>
<td>Strong, for resources</td>
<td>Strong, for resources</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>Moderate, for info and Int'l legit</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Strong, for info and local legit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coop with States</td>
<td>Moderate, for resources</td>
<td>Antag.</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>Antag.</td>
<td>Antag.</td>
<td>Antag.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coop with Individuals</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>Moderate, for info</td>
<td>Strong, for info</td>
<td>Moderate, for info</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coop with VNSAs</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Strong, for resources</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Antag.</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>Antag.</td>
<td>Antag.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deals With Security</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome</strong></td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>Strong Success</td>
<td>Moderate Success</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>Strong Success</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Strong Success</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
According to Organizational Theory, the independent variables that determine success are (1) resources and (2) structural framework. This study found no relationship between access to resources and success of an organization. International Alert's (IA) program in Sri Lanka had the strongest access to resources, and yet only had a weak success. On the other hand, Human Rights Watch relied on very few resources in Zimbabwe and still had a strong success. In fact, only one program with weak resources did not have a strong success, and the three programs with the greatest access to resources (IA Sri Lanka, IA Sierra Leone, and CR Uganda) had three of the four poorest results. Across the board, access to funding, staff, expertise, and special resources did not determine success.

On the other hand, an organization cannot succeed without any access to resources. Resources do increase the options available to an organization. A lack of resources can constrict an organization and can prevent it from having an opportunity to succeed. Therefore, it can be concluded that although organizations should make sure that they have enough resources to succeed, they should not continue to prioritize the accumulation of resources over the success of the organization.

In terms of structural framework, it is again clear that a weak framework can deny the opportunity for success, but a strong framework does not guarantee success. IA's program in Sri Lanka demonstrated that structural problems can prevent an organization from accomplishing its goals. The combination of the over-involvement of the Secretary-General, the strong oversight of the Program Director, and the initiative of its researchers made for a confusing organizational structure. Lack of clarity within a power structure is a serious problem for an organization. However, it is again clear that a strong structure
does not lend itself to success. HRW consistently demonstrated that its structure provided opportunities, but its researchers still had to capitalize on those opportunities. Similarly, CR’s structure gave it opportunities for success, but it was entirely reliant on local organizations for its success to be realized. An organization with a strong framework can still fail for many other reasons. Therefore, this study concludes that weak structure determines failure, but a strong structure has no role in determining success.

Furthermore, organizations and programs that tend to be more open and less bureaucratic are more likely to succeed. The two programs with a relatively closed structure (IA Sri Lanka and Sierra Leone) resulted in a weak success and a failure, respectively. All of the programs that resulted in moderate or strong success relied on open structures. It is likely that this was because an open structure allows an organization to act more quickly and use more innovation. Because INGOs already have very little authority, it is important to not water their authority down further with a rigid bureaucratic structure. Streamline organizations can integrate themselves better at the local level and are less likely to implement misguided strategies. Closed structures can lead to serious bureaucratic concerns. In Sierra Leone, for example, IA’s structure meant that it relied too much on the Program Director’s decisions. A more open structure may have given IA the opportunity to correct the Director’s mistakes. Therefore, organizations should avoid an overly bureaucratic structure.

However, this recommendation is limited because both of the programs with closed structures were IA programs that had other serious flaws. This study was not able to show variation between the structures of programs in the same organization, and it was not able to provide a program with a closed structure that did not have other serious
problems. Of course, it is likely that the structure of an organization is intimately related to its flaws. A rigid structure typically relies on decision making from the top, so there are fewer opportunities to identify problems with a decision. A wider variety of cases may be able to more definitively indicate the problems with a closed structure.

The Cooperative Theory relies on the independent variables: (3) Cooperation with other INGOs at the International level, (4) cooperation with other INGOs at the state level, (5) cooperation with local NGOs, (6) cooperation with individuals at the local level (7) cooperation with governments, (8) cooperation with violent Non-State Actors, (9) cooperation for access to resources, (10) cooperation for access to information, and (11) cooperation for legitimacy at the international and (12) local levels.

In terms of relationships, it is clear cooperation at the international level is important, especially for gaining access to resources and improving international legitimacy. CR developed key relationships at the international level that later allowed it to provide access to funding for its local partners. HRW has formed long term relationships with a variety of organizations that help increase the international legitimacy of the organization and the overall human rights advocacy network. By developing relationships with INGOs outside of the context of a particular situation, INGOs can later use those relationships to improve their capabilities and the capabilities of their allies. Therefore, this study can affirm the hypothesis that INGOs should cooperate at the international level.

Cooperation with international actors is also important at the state level. INGOs that cooperated with other international actors were more likely to accomplish their goals. CR formed key relationships with several organizations in Uganda that gave it access to
resources and helped lead to success. HRW demonstrated in East Timor that cooperation with other INGOs can vastly increase the international legitimacy of a network, and can bring the necessary international pressure to alter a conflict. Without its relationships with other INGOs, HRW’s mission in East Timor would have undoubtedly failed. HRW had serious problems in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in part because it could not find international allies. Therefore, this study concludes that alliances between INGOs at the state level are key for providing resources and improving international legitimacy.

On the other hand, refusing to cooperate with INGOs at the local level can be catastrophic for an organization. IA’s failure in Sierra Leone can clearly be attributed to its oddly hostile relationships with the UN, the Red Cross, and other international actors in the country. IA’s choices delegitimized its work in Sierra Leone and stripped it of important opportunities. INGOs do have the option to not form relationships with other international actors, but they cannot form antagonistic relationships with actors working towards the same goals.

The strongest recommendation that this study can make is about relationships with local NGOs and local civil society. The three programs that showed the highest levels of cooperation with local civil society all had strong or moderate success at achieving their goals. The two programs that had the weakest interactions had the poorest outcomes. HRW’s success in Zimbabwe can be attributed to its extensive support of Zimbabwean NGOs. It relied on civil society for information and provided key resources to its local allies. Similarly, the resources that CR provided to the Citizens’ Constitutional Forum (CCF) in Fiji were key to the program’s success. The CCF was able to create
internalized accountability that an INGO would not have been able to establish alone. HRW’s weak result in the DRC occurred in part because it was not able to find local allies. Organizations should do their best to find local NGOs that want to work towards the same goals. INGOs typically have the necessary resources to accomplish their goals, but they rarely have the ability to do it themselves. They should use their relationships to provide access to resources for the local allies, and give their allies the tools they need to accomplish their goals. INGOs should think of themselves as enablers, not problem solvers. Therefore, this study strongly recommends that cooperation with local civil society is key to the success of an INGO, and failure to do so is a clear route to organizational failure.

Relationships with states can be a little trickier. IA Sri Lanka was the only program that attempted to cooperate at all with a state, so this study cannot make conclusions about the need for such a relationship. On the other hand, antagonistic relationships were prevalent. HRW consistently demonstrated that condemnation of the state was not limiting. In fact, HRW’s antagonistic relationships typically increased the organization’s local legitimacy. HRW gained allies by identifying a common opponent. IA did not have the same experience in Sierra Leone. Its choice to antagonize the government eventually resulted in the organization being forced out of the country. Antagonizing the state proved to be a real problem for IA. Although the evidence is limited, it initially seems that the two different outcomes occurred because of the issues that the two organizations addressed. HRW dealt with human rights abuses, but did not take a clear stand on security or on the outcome of conflicts. IA did directly address the security issue in Sierra Leone. Waltz suggests that states are much less likely to yield
authority when they fear for their survival. Similarly, Grugel asserts that “bypassing the state is infeasible”. States are unlikely to yield authority on security issues. Sierra Leone felt threatened by the RUF, so it was unwilling to accept the condemnations of IA. On the other hand, when INGOs do not engage on security issues, states are much more likely to cede authority. Therefore, this study recommends only antagonizing a state when it is central to the goals of the INGO.

This study cannot make any clear recommendations about cooperation with individuals. HRW was the only organization that cooperated with individuals at the local level. It only did so in order to gain access to information. This was a clear asset for the organization in all three cases, but it did not seem to have a clear effect on the outcome. Therefore, this study will not draw any conclusions about cooperation with individuals.

The only relationship that an organization formed with a VNSA was IA’s cooperation with the RUF in Sierra Leone. This relationship initially was a valuable resource for the program. IA was unexpectedly able to keep the RUF at the negotiation table. Yet, the relationship clearly grew beyond acceptable, and IA accordingly lost legitimacy. From IA’s experience in Sierra Leone, we can recommend that a relationship with a VNSA can be a valuable tool. However, an organization should be careful not to try to actually support a violent actor. Antagonistic relationships, on the other hand, can clearly serve to legitimize an INGO. HRW and CR both took antagonistic stances towards deserving VNSAs and used them to seek legitimacy. This was definitely a small, yet helpful tactic. Although the cases did not provide a significant amount of evidence, this study suggests that INGOs should not hesitate to antagonize clear opponents.

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282 Waltz 93.
283 Grugel 39.
This study has found that cooperation for all four reasons are important to the success of an organization. Organizations should cooperate for resources, information, and legitimacy at the international and local levels. However, it is clear that cooperation for resources and local legitimacy were the most important modes of cooperation. INGOs that worked to provide access to resources for their allies were able to enable local actors to succeed. INGOs have resources, but they tend to have an inability to directly achieve their goals. They should provide resources to allies who can directly accomplish goals. Local legitimacy is equally important because an INGO cannot succeed if they are not trusted locally. IA failed to develop legitimacy in Sri Lanka, which prevented many of its strategies from taking root. HRW demonstrated that cooperation with local groups could generate a high level of local legitimacy. This legitimacy was key for its success. When organizations cooperated to provide access to resources or to improve their own local legitimacy, they greatly improved their opportunities for success.

Nonetheless, HRW demonstrated that cooperation for international legitimacy and for information can be helpful tools for success. It used international legitimacy as a key asset in East Timor. An INGO can effectively work towards its goals by improving the international legitimacy of an advocacy network. Cooperation for information is less of a tool and more of a necessity for an INGO. INGOs must have a baseline reliance on information. The lack of information in Sierra Leone and the slow collection of information in Sri Lanka were problematic for IA. INGOs should collect information from a variety of actors, including the perpetrators or those opposed to an INGOs goals. Yet, there is a limit to the utility of information gathering for an INGO. Collecting information is key, but it is the implementation of tactics, not the information itself, that
determines the success of an organization. Therefore, this study recommends that while cooperation for international legitimacy and information are important, they are not key to the success of an organization.

The Spheres of Influence Theory relies on the choice to deal with security as its only independent variable. This variable seemed to have no effect clear effect on the outcome for an INGO. The two security oriented organizations had a range of effectiveness, as did the human rights organization. CR had a strong success in Fiji despite its role in the conflict. HRW had a negligible effect in the DRC even though it was not attempting to deal with the security issue. Therefore, this study concludes that INGOs can succeed in the field of security.

This study found no clear difference between the two regions analyzed: Africa and the Asian Pacific. There were cases of strong success and weakness in both regions.

This study also found no evidence that INGOs are unable to succeed in conflict. Several organizations produced strong success in the presence of conflict. HRW did have a strong success in Zimbabwe, but its outcome was comparable to other organizations operating in conflict. Therefore, we can see that the presence of a conflict does not prevent an INGO from acting.

On the whole, it is clear that the Cooperative Theory was the most accurate in determining the success. INGOs should cooperate with other international actors (Variables 3 and 4) and local NGOs (7) for the purpose of providing resources for their allies (Variable 9) and improving their local legitimacy (12). Cooperation with states (5), VNSAs (6), and local communities and individuals (9) were not important for success. INGOs should cooperate for information (10) and international legitimacy (11), but these
reasons were not as important as resources and local legitimacy. Organizations should make sure that they have enough resources (1) and a strong enough framework (2) that they have the ability to succeed, but the Organizational Theory cannot actually predict success. According to this study, the Spheres of Influence Theory cannot predict success. Organizations that dealt with security (13) were still able to be successful. In sum, the Cooperative Theory held up against the evidence while Organizational Theory and Spheres of Influence theory did not.

Conclusions

In all, it is clear that the organizational hypothesis did not hold up. Organizations are reliant on funding, staffing, expertise, and flexibility for a minimum level of competence. However, as Duffield contends, success in the realm of conflict resolution is not based on technical competence. IA had greater organizational assets and was able to achieve its short-term objectives effectively, but because those objectives were poorly chosen the organization was unable to achieve its mission. CR was able to work towards its mission despite having a less robust organizational structure. INGOs should be careful to have enough organizational competence to achieve their objectives, but they should not become overly concerned with increasing resources, because the mobilization of resources does not directly improve the prospects for success.

The evidence can even more solidly refute Spheres of Influence Theory. This study found cases of success and failure from organizations that were conflict-oriented and organizations that were not. INGOs can succeed in the sphere of security when they are careful about how they treat the state. Acting aggressively and antagonistic can
prevent an organization from succeeding. However, as long as an INGO acknowledges that a state may coerce, then the INGO can have some real success in the field of security. Thus Spheres of Influence theory is incorrect.

The Cooperative theory, on the other hand, held up much stronger against the cases. Organizations and programs that were able to achieve higher levels of cooperation in local civil society and with other peacebuilding INGOs were much more likely to be successful. Cooperation with the state did not seem to be as important. The key to the success of an INGO is apparently its willingness to cooperate with and support local NGOs and INGOs working towards the same goals.

Certainly this study should not overstep its bounds. INGOs have a very limited role in the state system. As Kriesberg indicates, INGOs only have a role in the gaps in the sovereignty. They can only take authority when states cede it.\textsuperscript{284} They rarely can dictate the outcome of a conflict or ensure that human rights abuses end by themselves. They rely on states, non-state actors, and the international community to alter situations and create positive change. We cannot assume that INGOs are always directly responsible for their own success or failure. Furthermore, it is rare for an INGO to act alone. INGOs inevitably participate in networks that are working on the same general goals. Even if INGOs are not intentionally cooperating, they are constantly pushing for similar goals and trying to bend the international system towards their demands. INGOs may contend that they are responsible for their own success, but in reality many actors a working towards the same goals so it is very hard to identify which ones were most responsible.

\textsuperscript{284} Kriesberg 7.
This has served as a serious limitation for this study. INGOs have very little authority and rarely act alone, so it is very hard to accurately assess success. By using comparative case studies we have been able to identify some clear differences in outcome, but it is sometimes hard to identify what is a result of an INGO's involvement. Therefore, although this study is generally confident of its assessments of success, it should be clear that much of the evidence is anecdotal, and could be interpreted slightly differently.

This study has several recommendations for future research. First, this study could not make any strong conclusions about the most effective structure for an INGO or a program. Future research should seek to determine if, in fact, an open framework is more effective, and should look into why a closed framework is problematic. This study also found only one attempt at cooperation with a VNSA. Future research should examine other cases of cooperation between INGOs and VNSAs, especially when the goals of the two are opposed. It should seek to find whether an INGO could succeed in convincing a VNSA to alter its choices and end abuses or violence. Third, future research should delve into the dynamic between an INGO and a perpetrating state. It should attempt to determine when an INGO can safely antagonize a state, and when it cannot. Finally, this study was unable to find strong evidence of INGOs cooperating with individuals at the local level. Future research should examine what such cooperation would look like and what purpose it could serve. These four areas could vastly improve the recommendations provided by this study, and could help to fill in the gaps left by the chosen cases.
It is clear from this study that INGOs are not able to use soft power to end violent conflicts. None of the four conflict-oriented programs had success in getting forces to lay down arms, for example. INGOs are unable to confront terrorist organizations, rebel militias, state militaries, or any other group that is able to employ hard power. Few INGOs attempt to do so. Instead, INGOs can have a role in altering institutions and creating cultural changes that limit the support for violent conflicts, increase accountability, and improve the prospects for peace. So far, INGOs do not have a clearly defined role in the state system. However, they can do their part to fill in the gaps in state sovereignty and can act in collaboration with states to accomplish their goals. INGOs are most successful when they use their authority to build cooperative relationships at the local level. By cooperating with other local and international organizations, INGOs can help to build societies that are resilient against conflict.
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