Go Ahead, Make My Day:

How Ethnic Discrimination Shapes Counterterrorism Policy

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Introduction

Many states across the world are faced with terrorist groups seeking political concessions. Some of these groups are broadly similar and are classified into categories like 'ethnonationalist groups.' Yet the actions states take in response to these groups are wildly different. Two states may face a similar threat yet choose divergent responses. This behavior is puzzling because if states are governed by similar logics, then they should choose similar policies. Clearly, some factor in the decision making process for these states leads them to reach different conclusions and take differing responses. Carefully examining how states choose their counterterrorism policies can provide insights to help answer this question.

One of the most extreme examples of two states reacting differently to similar threats can be found in the responses to the IRA in Northern Ireland and ETA in Spain. Spain, a country that had only recently emerged from fascism, was faced with a group of Basque separatists who wished to secede from the country. In response, the state launched an extensive police crackdown to bring the organization to answer for its crimes. Conversely, England, one of the world’s longest standing democracies, responded to Catholic demands for the secession of Northern Ireland from the UK with a military campaign to pacify the region. Despite the similar threat of these ethnonationalist separatist groups, the responses they received were very different.

Clearly powerful factors are at work to produce such disparate results. Isolating and examining them is necessary to understand the role that each plays in shaping counterterrorism practices. However, each of these factors is a complex explanation that requires in depth exploration to truly see the ways in which it affects policy. Once that is complete, it becomes
possible to answer the question of why similar states facing domestic terrorist groups of comparable threat sometimes choose radically different counterterrorism strategies.

This question is investigated by studying the counterterrorism efforts of three states during the past 30 years. In the 80s and 90s Turkey responded to the secessionist challenge of the Kurdish PKK with a massive military campaign. During the Second Chechen War, Russia responded to the separatist republic with a brutal crackdown. In Northern Ireland, Great Britain employed a strategy utilized both the police and military to combat the IRA. Each of these cases provides an example of a state that faced a domestic threat from a separatist terrorist group, and each responded differently.

One possible explanation that is explored is that ethnic discrimination may be responsible for more violent counterterrorism policies. Ethnic minorities often form terrorist groups and attempt to secede from states where they do not feel they have a large enough share of the power. When the minority in question is subject to widespread discrimination in society, then the state’s counterterrorism efforts are likely to be excessively violent. A number of mechanisms by which ethnic discrimination leads to violent counterterrorism policies are proposed and investigated alongside more traditional explanations. These inquiries represent a contribution to our understanding of how states choose their counterterrorism strategies.

In order to understand why states respond to terrorism the way they do, it is helpful to have an understanding of what terrorism is. The United States Code defines terrorism as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents" in its discussion of international terrorism.¹ Elsewhere,

¹ 22 USC § 2656f. 2008
under the category of crimes and criminal procedures, the United States Code defines terrorism as violent acts that attempt to "intimidate or coerce a civilian population...influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion" or "affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination."² Building on the work of Alex P. Schmid, who has analyzed hundreds of definitions of terrorism, Bruce Hoffman concludes that it can be described as "creation and exploitation of fear through violence ... in the pursuit of political change."³ The unifying element of these definitions is that terrorism is the use of violence to create fear that will effect political change.

Being a tactic that targets the populace as a whole, terrorism necessitates an emphatic response from the government. However, this response can take many different forms. The variety of available options means that it is difficult to nail down which factors affect this strategy. Since so much of society is affected by terrorism, there are a large number of actors who affect the response. Yet, understanding why states choose certain strategies over others is essential to being able to determine why states respond to similar threats differently.

To answer this question, this thesis will engage in an exploration of the factors that influence counterterrorism policy. First, it will explore the literature on different responses to terrorism. This literature will be examined and then used to create a typology of counterterrorism strategies. This four-part typology will be used to evaluate the counterterrorism strategies in the three case studies. This delineation makes it possible to organize the counterterrorism efforts in relation to one another. Doing so means that the impacts of each independent variable can be compared across all three cases.

² 18 USC § 2331
Next, it will examine the existing literature on the factors behind counterterrorism policy. By drawing on multiple sources, it will craft schools of thought that can explain state choices in counterterrorism. Each of these schools will be an explanation of why states choose the counterterrorism approach they do.

After exhausting the traditional sources of counterterrorism policy, it will look at the role of ethnic discrimination in responding to terrorism. Using literature from ethnic conflict and genocide studies, this school of thought seeks to explain how ethnic discrimination against the membership of the terrorist group can shape responses to their actions. The inclusion of ethnic discrimination is an attempt to fill a gap in the existing literature; many domestic terrorist groups have an ethnic component to their identity and overlooking the role of these factors seems to be a serious mistake.

Then this thesis will present its research design. Each of the schools of thought will be operationalized as an independent variable. These variables will be grouped into the ones traditionally used to explain state counterterrorism behavior, and ones that attempt to use ethnic discrimination to account for counterterrorism decisions. Translating these variables into measurable metrics will be discussed and sources of data will be explored. Hypotheses for each independent variable will be presented along with conditions for evaluating them.

With the setup complete, the thesis will then move on to the three case studies. The first case study will explore the factors behind Turkey’s response to the Kurdish rebels of the PKK. The second case study will dissect the influences on Russia’s response to Chechen separatists. The third and final case study will analyze the reasons behind England’s response to the IRA.
Each of these cases was chosen because they share broad similarities in the threat faced, but evinced a range of responses.

Finally, the results will be analyzed and conclusions will be drawn. Ethnic discrimination appears to have a serious impact on counterterrorism policy formation, but the biggest impacts are the result of interactions with other factors. A terrorist group that with an ethnic identity that is subject to discrimination will face a more violent counterterrorism campaign than other groups. However, the exact methods by which other factors lead to more violent campaigns when ethnic discrimination is involved are complex and must be investigated in depth.
Typology of Counterterrorism Strategies

In order to understand the factors that influence the nature of a counterterrorism campaign, it is necessary to create a system for categorizing and classifying counterterrorism programs. When evaluating counterterrorism systems, they can be broadly classified along two spectrums: the police-military spectrum and the positive inducement-negative inducement spectrum. Each spectrum encompasses the tactics used to address a different aspect of counterterrorism policy; the police-military scale examines which agencies the state uses to fight terrorism while the positive-negative inducements scale examines the range of incentives offered by the state. All counterterrorism campaigns fall somewhere on these scales. Even those that appear to occupy an extreme can be located on the scale; they simply rely on one strategy to the exclusion of the other.

The police paradigm is characterized by an attempt to deal with terrorism using the existing institutions of the criminal and judicial systems. Under this approach, the state views terrorism as a crime — albeit a dangerous and somewhat unique one — and as such the appropriate response is to prosecute terrorists through the legal system.\(^4\) Since terrorism is just a crime it is not necessary to significantly alter the structures of the legal system and constitutional rights are safeguarded against erosion in the name of fighting terrorism. Being a crime, the primary organizations tasked with combating terrorism are the various law enforcement agencies of a country. The police approach is largely non-disruptive and seeks to deal with the problem in an efficient manner without necessitating extensive social or political change.

Conversely, the military framework adopts an 'all available means' approach to defeating terrorists. Under this strategy, terrorism is seen as an act of aggression that “threatens the continued existence of the state.”5 Given the dire nature of the danger, adhering to constitutional provisions is less important than in the crime approach. Since terrorism is a serious threat, the military is the first choice to fight back because of its previous experience in fighting other wars.6 Legal measures that violate or invalidate existing rights are often enacted to ensure victory over the terrorist threat. The military method is disruptive and has the potential to seriously alter the structure of society because it is willing to do whatever it takes to defeat the terrorists.

In addition to the police-military divide, counterterrorism strategies exist along a continuum between positive and negative inducements. Positive inducements, or carrots, are the non-adversarial portion of counterterrorism while negative inducements, or sticks, represent direct confrontation with the terrorist group.7 A negative inducement is a warning that there will be detrimental consequences for participating in terrorism. A positive inducement is a promise of benefits for refraining from terrorism. Both approaches have their place in counterterrorism but a more thorough understanding of each explains how they relate to one another in a given counterterrorism campaign.

Negative inducements are important because any strategy to combat a terrorist group will need them. They are the building blocks of any campaign: arrests and raids on hideouts, intelligence gathering to better understand the group, or physical occupation of terrorist territory. Each of these is essentially a form of punishment being rendered against the terrorist, and the

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5 Ibid. 10.
ultimate negative inducement is the possibility of being killed by the state. Even when states do not explicitly advance a counterterrorism policy, terrorists still face the threat of being killed by security forces. Negative inducements are most effective when they constitute a credible threat to terrorists or potential terrorists; knowing that participation in a terrorist act will likely result in serious jail time is a strong disincentive. Negative inducements allow a government to avoid being seen as ‘soft on terror’ because they aim to dismantle the terrorist group. Even if a government wishes to pursue an approach to resolving the conflict that is largely reliant on positive inducements, sticks are still necessary to protect the state until the carrots can do their work.

However, positive inducements are equally important to a counterterrorism campaign. They can consist of anything from amnesty offers to attempts to gain the support of moderates to efforts to get terrorists to air their grievances politically instead of violently. Because terrorism is a political act, positive inducements are attempts to address the problems that lead to violence in the first place. Common examples of these incentives include “reform movements, increased spending, and creation of jobs.” These tactics are designed to address the political grievances of terrorist supporters, legitimize the state in the minds of the people, and provide more attractive alternatives to terrorism respectively. Positive inducements can function on both the individual and group level; amnesty programs target specific terrorists, while development efforts target entire populations. Each of these plans represents an attempt to dissuade people from

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9 Art and Richardson *Democracy and Counterterrorism* 574-578.
participation in terrorism. Without positive inducements, a resolution other than complete
annihilation would be unthinkable.

By considering both the positive-negative inducement and police-military continuums,
counterterrorism policies can be described as one of four possible combinations. Table 1 labels
these strategies using terms that describe what an approach based on each combination of tactics
will resemble.

Table 1: Typology of Counterterrorism Strategies

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<th>Police</th>
<th>Military</th>
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<td>Positive Inducements</td>
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Soft counterterrorism is a strategy where states use the police and legal system to fight terrorism
and offer significant inducements away from terrorism. Conversely, under the criminal justice
approach the police confront terrorists while the legal system is transformed to offer harsh
penalties for terrorism. A counterinsurgency strategy uses the military to combat terrorism but
attempts to draw support away from the terrorist group through government programs or offers
of amnesty. Finally, war is an accurate descriptor when the state combats terrorism militarily and
attempts to deter participation through strong sanctions.

These labels are not exact and are meant to convey the general character and texture of
each type of counterterrorism strategy rather than the exact definitions used in the fields they are
derived from. Of course, no conflict will fit easily into these categories. It will be a mixture of both components, but in most cases there will be a clearly dominant characteristic.

**Soft Counterterrorism**

Soft counterterrorism as a strategy is largely focused on harm reduction and prevention. Efforts are geared towards convincing people that terrorism is not a viable method of political action. The cornerstone of soft counterterrorism is the battle for the hearts and minds of both potential and actual terrorists. The state attempts to de-legitimize the use of violence as a tool of political change by dissident groups. The core of soft counterterrorism lies in combating the radicalization that leads people to use violence to achieve their goals. This contest occurs in two primary arenas: preventing the radicalization of at risk individuals and deradicalizing captured terrorists. Whether these programs are halting or reversing radicalization, they are designed to stop participation in terrorist activities.

Soft counterterrorism programs are in widespread use throughout the world, largely to combat jihadist groups. Countries with radicalization prevention or deradicalization programs include Algeria, Egypt, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Afghanistan. Saudi Arabia has one of the most well established and effective of these programs. The Ministry of Interior administers a counseling program for Saudis arrested in connection with terrorist activities. It begins with a series of sessions in prison, before moving

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detainees to a “halfway-house” facility where they attend classes that are designed to undermine justifications for violence against the state.\textsuperscript{14} The program also involves close support from the detainee’s family as well as financial assistance from the government to aid reintegration.

The Saudi strategy is remarkably soft in its approach. The aim of the program is not to convince detainees that their views are wrong, merely that using violence to realize them is unacceptable.\textsuperscript{15} Additionally, the provision of counseling and financial support by the state indicates that rehabilitation, and not punishment, is the goal. The Saudi system is a good exemplary case for soft counterterrorism; terrorists are arrested by the police and then offered positive inducements to renounce terrorism.

Not all soft counterterrorism policies are as full-featured as Saudi Arabia’s. The Yemeni Committee for Dialogue engaged in religious discussions with prisoners, but offered them little support once they had been released from prison. Due to lack of government support, the program failed to be institutionalized and fizzled out.\textsuperscript{16} Slightly more direct, but similarly one-dimensional is the Jordanian strategy of deradicalization. After the country’s first suicide bombing, a council of 180 Islamic scholars issued the \textit{Risalat Amman,} or Amman Letter.\textsuperscript{17} This letter condemned violence as un-Islamic and targeted the extremist ideology that condones attacks against other Muslims. Both of these measures were less resource intensive than the comprehensive Saudi strategy of rehabilitation and post-release support.

These three cases are just a small slice of the soft counterterrorism programs in existence throughout the world. No two strategies are exactly alike, but they all rely on the police as the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{14} El-Said “De-Radicalising Islamists” 37-39.
\item \textsuperscript{15} Boucek “Saudi Arabia’s ‘Soft’ Counterterrorism Strategy” 23.
\item \textsuperscript{17} El-Said “De-Radicalising Islamists” 22-23.
\end{itemize}
primary tool of the state in combating terrorists. Similarly, they engage terrorists and potential terrorists in an attempt to draw them away from terrorism. Soft counterterrorism strategies vary in their implementation, but they are all built around these principles.

Criminal justice

Criminal justice approaches to counterterrorism treat terrorism as a crime and as a result apply the normal techniques for combating crime to terrorism. Given that terrorism is a crime, the logical tool to employ in the fight against it is the police.\(^\text{18}\) Using any other tool to fight terrorism would not make sense when it is viewed as a crime.

Although the police are the ones engaging terrorists directly under a criminal justice approach, there is still a need to convince people not to participate in terrorism. This persuasion is found in the legal system. Given that terrorism is viewed as a crime, it is logical to use the existing structures of the legal system to punish convicted terrorists.\(^\text{19}\) The harsh sentences handed down by the legal system serve as a negative inducement against terrorism.

A criminal justice approach is the least radical of the four types of counterterrorism. Under it, terrorism is treated as yet another crime and accordingly, it is attacked with the same institutions as regular crime. While the legal system may give out long sentences for participation in terrorism, it also constrains the police and prevents wide scale abuse in the fight against terrorism. This restraint avoids the erosion of civil liberties and prevents the state from using extreme tactics such as targeting terrorists' families or employing collective punishment.


\(^\text{19}\) Crelinsten et al. *Terrorism and Criminal Justice* 45.
Criminal justice works within existing structures and does not result in radical changes to a country's institutions.

Counterinsurgency

While at first glance a military-carrots approach seems unlikely, looking towards the study of more traditional armed conflicts offers some insight into how such a program can be implemented. Counterinsurgency doctrine was born during the mid 20th century in response to communist insurgencies throughout the world and continues to evolve and offer new ideas for fighting nontraditional combatants. Although these tactics are the purview of the military, the principles behind them can be adapted and applied to fighting terrorists as well. While the target is different, a counterinsurgency inspired counterterrorism strategy can look very similar to a traditional counterinsurgency.

Counterinsurgency doctrine evolved in response to the need to fight asymmetric conflicts against nontraditional opponents. At its heart, counterinsurgency is based on the recognition that when fighting irregular forces a decisive military victory is an unrealistic expectation because the insurgents' goal is not to win militarily but to incite the entire population into taking up arms and joining their cause. A traditional military victory is impossible because of the diffuse nature of the insurgent force, and because the goal of the insurgency is not to defeat the state in combat. An insurgent force is too weak to achieve its goals through sheer military means, so it relies on popular support to bolster its strength by providing guerillas with intelligence or much needed

supplies. The goal of an insurgency is to recruit the mass of the population to their cause and become so powerful that the state cannot stand against them.

Since a total military victory is impossible, counterinsurgency reframes the goals of warfare. It relies on enacting wide-sweeping political reforms and contributing to economic development in an attempt to co-opt the people into the state. By meeting many of the people’s demands, the state is able to weaken the appeal of joining the insurgency. The United States Military developed a “hearts and minds approach” in the 1930s in response to the colonial insurgencies they spent the early 20th century fighting; this strategy stressed building up local police forces and governments so that the military could withdraw and allow these institutions to combat the guerrillas. These forces were better suited to combating the insurgents because they were able to more easily relate to the local populace, robbing the guerrillas of much of their advantage. Counterinsurgency aims to improve the lives of people and provide them with reliable institutions that, while loyal to the state, can meet their needs on a local level.

Modern counterinsurgency thought has largely distilled these earlier doctrines into their essential principles. David Kilcullen has written extensively on counterinsurgency and the American experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. He argues that the two keys to counterinsurgency are focusing on the causes of conflict at the local level and protecting and respecting the population. Understanding the conflict means understanding the needs of the population, and

22 Pustay Counterinsurgency Warfare 158.
putting that knowledge into action to protect them and foster economic development will win the population over.

Kilcullen builds upon the traditional hearts and minds approach by emphasizing the need to create networks with the local population. These connections give a counterinsurgency force a direct line to the demands of the local population that they need to effectively meet their needs and gain their trust. Counterinsurgency is ultimately about providing a more legitimate and effective alternative to the insurgents.

These principles can be easily adapted from counterinsurgent warfare to counterterrorism. The main difference is that instead of fighting insurgents, the state is engaged in fighting terrorists. The key components of counterinsurgency map neatly onto the two axes; the military is used to directly combat the terrorists while positive inducements are offered to the population and potentially to terrorists themselves. Economic development projects and bolstering the strength of the local police are both clearly positive inducements away from terrorism. The goal is the same as counterinsurgency; kill the terrorists when necessary but try and prevent people from taking up arms in the first place.

It should be noted that while counterinsurgency refers to the established military doctrine discussed above, that is not what it used to mean in this paper. Rather, counterinsurgency denotes a counterterrorism strategy that uses the military to fight terrorists while offering positive inducements against terrorism.

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25 Ibid. 37.
War

The war approach is quite simple; the state decides to treat the terrorist threat like a conventional one, and uses overwhelming force to crush it militarily. The military is seen as the most effective or able actor and is deployed against the terrorist threat. Sri Lanka has employed this strategy against the Liberation Tigers to Tamil Eelam and engaged in a protracted conflict between the military and the LTTE. The hostility finally ended in the destruction of the last of the LTTE’s forces by the Sri Lankan military in 2009.26 A traditional military victory or the destruction of the state are the only conceivable outcomes of this strategy. This approach uses the military to fight terrorists and is based on negative inducements.

These negative inducements include harsh prison sentences and the very real threat of being killed by the military. Such a strategy is not interested in drawing terrorists back into the state or convincing them to give up their goals. Instead, it seeks to destroy the terrorist group and dissuades recruits from becoming terrorists not by convincing them that their cause is misguided, but merely by making participation in terrorism so risky that people will decide against it. Since it does not dissuade potential terrorists from their goals, it can only succeed by crushing the terrorist group and keeping potential terrorists in fear of the state’s wrath.

Level of Violence

Understanding the four different types of counterterrorism and their basic attributes makes it possible to accurately describe the level of violence involved in a given counterterrorism strategy. War counterterrorism campaigns are the most violent because they use the military coupled with negative inducements, which means deterring terrorism through threat

of violence and punishment. A soft counterterrorism approach is the least violent because it uses the police and attempts to either reform terrorists or dissuade them from becoming terrorists in the first place.

Figure 1: Typology of Counterterrorism Strategies

When all four of these types are placed on a chart, they describe the relationship between the levels of violence in the ideal counterterrorism types. The closer a specific case strategy is to the war point, the more violent it is. Conversely, being near the soft counterterrorism point means that a campaign is relatively peaceful. Positioning a case on the graph is accomplished by determining where it falls on the police-military axis and the positive-negative inducement axis. Plotting its position based on these two factors gives the level of violence in a conflict.
This typology provides the tools needed to assess the levels of a violence in a given counterterrorism strategy. By determining the police-military balance of a conflict, and the level of positive and negative inducements, its place on the field of strategies emerges. Being able to analytically define its position is necessary to be able to compare different campaigns.
Literature Review

There are a number of explanatory factors that can account for the differing counterterrorism strategies chosen by different states. These explanations range from nuanced ones that focus on the motivations of individual politicians to those that are based on systemic pressures. Not only do they encompass a broad array of factors, many of these mechanisms work in distinctly different ways. These explanations are regime type, resource levels, bureaucratic politics, and electoralism.

Regime Type

The role played by regime type in determining counterterrorism policy is a relatively straightforward one. Democracies will be more constrained in their responses because of the nature of democratic government. In discussing democratic responses to terrorism, Art and Richardson state that democracies are limited in the options they can choose compared to their more authoritarian neighbors. Democratic states cannot employ repressive tactics such as widespread detention or use indiscriminate violence to combat terrorist threats. Max Abrahms argues that democracies operate under these restrictions because, as democracies, they must maintain their commitment to upholding rights and civil liberties. Consequently, any violation of these rights or deviation from societal norms concerning them must be heavily justified to the public. Wishing to avoid the hassle of justifying their actions to the public, these states will refrain from using repressive tactics when possible.

27 Art and Richardson Democracy and Counterterrorism 3.
While democracies are less repressive in their counterterrorism campaigns, not all democracies are created equal. In practice the term democracy can be applied to a broad swath of states whose governments are significantly different. As a result of this variation, the character of each democracy must be taken into account when analyzing their responses to domestic terrorist threats; if two democracies are not identical then this fact must be acknowledged when comparing their responses. However, if respect for civil liberties is what constrains democracies in their counterterrorism efforts, then that is the most important difference between various democracies. While other substantive differences may exist between democracies, respect for the rule of law and civil liberties are the most important differences between democracies for this analysis.

The strength of the rule of law is a good predictor of how a state will react to a terrorist group. If a country has strong constitutional safeguards and a culture of judicial restraint, then counterterrorism policies are more likely to fall on the police side of the military-police axis because treating terrorism as a crime protects civil liberties. If, however, a society is lacking in protections, then the military approach is more likely because the extralegal tactics it requires are more palatable. The stronger the rule of law is, the more resistance there will be to using tools other than the courts to deal with terrorists.

Another aspect of regime type that is relevant to counterterrorism policy is the strength of the executive branch compared with the strength of the judicial branch. John Finn argues that when the judiciary is strong and judicial review is applied to counterterrorism, measures are carefully scrutinized to ensure that they comply with constitutional provisions.29 A country with

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29 John E. Finn. “Counterterrorism Regimes and the Rule of Law: The Effects of Emergency Legislation on Separation of Powers, Civil Liberties, and Other Fundamental Constitutional
a strong judiciary is expected to rely primarily upon the police to combat terror because the
courts will reject any attempts to enact the extralegal provisions that a military strategy requires.
The opposite is also true. A state with a weak judiciary is more likely to use the military to fight
terrorism because the judiciary either does not oppose, or fails in its opposition to, questionably
legal directives. As the institutional manifestation of the rule of law, the judiciary’s toughness
has a large impact on how counterterrorism campaigns are prosecuted.

However, even the strongest democracy can find its constitutional safeguards weakened
by the process of securitization. Securitization is the process by which an issue comes to be seen
as a ‘security’ issue rather than a ‘political’ one. In doing so, the issue is established as belonging
to “a special kind of politics” or “above politics” entirely. A security issue is treated as special
and is exempted from many of the normal political restrictions because it is concerned with the
safety and survival of the state. If terrorism becomes securitized, then many of the legal
protections enshrined in a state’s constitution may be bypassed because of terrorism’s special
status as a security issue. This heightened status as a serious threat makes it easier to justify using
the military to combat the threat. Even strong democracies may resort to using the military to
combat terrorism because securitization can elevate it into a serious threat to the state’s
existence.

Regime type has a significant effect on where a state’s counterterrorism strategy will fall
on the police-military range. With a strong rule of law, a police based approach is likely, while a
weak rule of law encourages a military focused plan. Yet if a process of securitization has

occurred around the issue of terrorism, then even entrenched democracies will be likely to use the military. An analysis of the regime and its understanding of terrorism are necessary to predict which agency it will deploy against the terrorist threat.

Resources

The amount of resources dedicated to fighting a terrorist threat plays a large part in determining the state’s response. Two factors affect the level of available resources. The perceived threat posed by the terrorist group will dictate the amount of resources that a government will use to fight it. Yet whatever the perceived amount of danger, states are firmly constrained by the limits of their capacity such as the size of their budgets.

Threat level has a relatively straightforward impact on counterterrorism policy. The higher the perceived threat posed by a group, the more resources the state will devote toward combating it. Groups with few members or resources pose relatively little threat to the state because they are unable to execute attacks effectively. Conversely, groups that are well armed or have lots of members are more dangerous because they can plan and carry out significantly more devastating attacks. As a result, the more dangerous a terrorist group is, the more effort a state will put into defeating them.

If a terrorist group is seen as sufficiently dangerous, then the state may be able to justify counterterrorism policies that would otherwise be unacceptable to its populace. By claiming that the terrorist group poses an exceptional threat, the government might be able to justify repressive policies that violate the accepted norms of government power. Threat level plays a large part in government response to terrorism because it is one of the most basic factors that a state assesses when deciding on its counterterrorism plan.
Closely related to threat level is state capacity, which also has a large impact on the type of counterterrorism program chosen by states. State capacity serves as a primarily negative influence on counterterrorism policy; it limits which options are available to states. Just because a state can afford to mount an extensive intelligence gather campaign against a terrorist group does not mean it automatically will. However, if the state cannot afford to finance the campaign, then it will not. State capacity restricts which options are available to states simply because if they lack the capacity to engage in them, they will not do so.

Yet state capacity is also related to threat level in the opposite causal direction. If a state has a large capacity either for fighting terror, or the ability to quickly fund a counterterrorism program, then terrorist groups will not be seen as great threats. However, a group with similar finances, membership, weapons, and public support would be a much graver threat to a poor state or a state without weak security agencies. Thus the weaker the state, the greater percentage of its resources it will direct against a terrorist threat.

State capacity matters because counterterrorism is expensive. Using the military or police force to directly combat terrorist groups incurs costs, but both institutions are already extant and are a normal expense for the state. Conversely, setting up large scale intelligence gathering operations, cultivating informants within terrorist groups, or orchestrating outreach and in-group policing efforts are costly endeavors. For example, efforts to improve airport security are costly and the state must choose how much money to devote towards them.\(^31\) Similarly, programs like the Saudi Deradicalization program are very costly because they require the state to house,\(^31\)

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counsel, and provide financial support to detainees. These strategies are prohibitively expensive for some states to employ.

Another possibility is that poorer states will prefer methods that offer the promise of immediate results. Financing a long-term counterterrorism campaign could be too financially taxing on these regimes so they opt for a quick fix solution; they hope to deal with the threat as quickly, and therefore cheaply, as possible. Effective intelligence programs take a long time to develop and poor states may not be able to sustain the cost of a counterterrorism campaign while waiting for intelligence to deliver results.\textsuperscript{32} The cheapest options are often the most violent because more discriminating ones rely on intelligence gathering or other expensive tactics. State capacity has a real impact on counterterrorism choices because it constrains the options available to governments.

This analysis offers several predictions for the manner in which state capacity can affect counterterrorism strategy. Poorer states are more likely to employ negative inducements; it is cheaper to imprison or execute terrorists than it is to deradicalize and reintegrate them into society. Additionally, the military will be the more common counterterrorism choice for poor states because it offers more immediate results than the police and legal system can offer. Terrorism is outside of the mission of the police so using them for counterterrorism requires new training and equipment which poorer states cannot afford. Rich states are more likely to use the opposites of these tactics; soft counterterrorism and law enforcement based approaches.

Yet just because rich states can afford to implement these strategies does not mean they will. Threat level plays a role in how funding is allocated to counterterrorism; the greater the

\textsuperscript{32} Art and Richardson *Democracy and Counterterrorism* 567
perceived threat, the more money will pour into counterterrorism and the more expansive the programs will be. If a group is not seen as a serious threat, then less money will be allotted to combating it.

Threat level can also influence the police-military balance of a counterterrorism strategy. If the group is seen as a dire threat then mobilizing the military to protect the state is the natural course of action. There is an exception though; a repressive and inwardly focused state would have a stronger police force than military, so such a state would use the police instead of the military. However, if the terrorist organization is not viewed as a credible threat, then it makes sense to inform the police of the danger without instituting any serious changes in law enforcement. The more dangerous a terrorist group is seen as by the state, the more the state’s response will rely on the military.

**Bureaucratic Politics**

Bureaucratic politics can offer insight into the process behind the creation of counterterrorism policy by looking in depth at the interaction between the various security agencies responsible for protecting the state. Scrutinizing the actions of the organizations that actually carry out counterterrorism gives a more complete understanding of the decision making process behind choosing a counterterrorism strategy because these agencies have serious influence over how these policies are implemented.

The basis of bureaucratic politics theory is an acknowledgement of the reality that ‘government’ is really the aggregation of a series of disparate agencies and organizations. Each of these organizations has a specific mission that it is tasked with pursuing. In order to accomplish this mission, an organization has capabilities that it can use to achieve its goals. In
order to protect their capabilities, and by extension their ability to accomplish their missions, organizations acquire influence which they can use to guarantee their survival. Additionally, these organizations do not see this competition as problematic because each views its mission as vital to the national interest, so their struggles with other agencies are really an attempt to protect the country.\textsuperscript{33} The result of all this competition is that often policy is not the product of a rational calculation, but of an interplay between various agencies each attempting to secure their own interests.

Accordingly, the final policy may not be ideal or may even be counterproductive because of the process that led to its creation. Organizations wish to preserve their autonomy because they view any loss in autonomy as threatening to their survival, and therefore their ability to accomplish their mission.\textsuperscript{34} As a result of the desire to preserve autonomy, organizations jealously guard their budgets and will recoil at any suggestion of a reduction. One of the biggest ways this preservation instinct manifests itself is a refusal to cooperate with other agencies, often until forced to by pressure from higher up within the government.\textsuperscript{35} The consequences of this independent streak can be quite costly. American diplomat Richard Holbrooke has written about how this attitude can lead to waste and inefficiency as multiple agencies redundantly address the same issues.\textsuperscript{36} An even worse possibility is that this lack of communication could lead to programs that actively work against each other and undermine the state’s overall goals.

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid. 51.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid. 53.
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Sometimes agency self-interest causes problems not among different offices, but for the agency itself. When the United States Military began to develop drone technology in the early 2000s, they embraced it wholeheartedly. In 2002 they had only 167 drones, but by 2009 this fleet had grown to over 6,000 drones. However, the Air Force did not have nearly enough personnel to fly, maintain, and analyze the data collected by the drones. The military was so concerned about losing control of drone operations to another branch of the government that they bit off more than they could chew, just so other agencies couldn’t. In this example, bureaucratic politics resulted in one agency hurting itself because of perceived competition with the rest of the intelligence community.

This phenomenon can be particularly dangerous to the state in the field of counterterrorism. Like any government policy, counterterrorism policy is shaped by the various agencies involved. Counterterrorism may be even more prone to this problem than other arenas because it typically involves agencies from many different areas such as law enforcement, the military, and the intelligence community. A knock-on effect of this disorganization is that if it does indeed lead to less than ideal, or even counterproductive, policy it will negatively affect the morale of the agencies involved in counterterrorism. Further complicating the picture is the fact that even when agencies can reach an agreement on the best course of action, they are not always able to implement it consistently. Different agencies use different mechanisms to orchestrate the running of their day-to-day operations; some are rigidly structured hierarchies while others are

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39 Art and Richardson *Democracy and Counterterrorism* 568-570.
diffuse and leave more responsibility in the hands of individual offices. As a result, policy will be implemented unevenly throughout the country. Not only can organizational politics produce inefficient counterterrorism policy, they can further hamper efforts once the agencies see the consequences of their refusal to cooperate.

Many of the pitfalls of bureaucratic politics can be seen in the United States’ attempt to modernize and reorganize its counterterrorism apparatus after September 11th. Following recommendations from intelligence experts, congress created the position of Director of National Intelligence in 2004. Soon after his appointment to the office, John Negroponte became embroiled in a long-running conflict with the Pentagon over control of intelligence budgets. The Department of Defense controlled 80% of the intelligence community’s funding and was reluctant to relinquish over it. The DoD was unwilling to give up control of intelligence money because it feared loss of autonomy to the newly created Director. This obstinacy crippled the Director of National Intelligence because without financial oversight it effectively had no control over the Pentagon.

The American experience extends far beyond simple budget squabbles between agencies. Even when agencies attempt to work together, they frequently encounter roadblocks to cooperation. The vast amounts of data collected by the United States’ numerous intelligence agencies are locked away in their respective databases, and the complex web of security clearances prevents analysts from accessing data owned by other agencies. Being unable to

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42 Aid Intel Wars 213.
access all relevant information hurts intelligence agencies and prevents them from potentially detecting and thwarting terrorist plans. Bureaucratic politics and agency selfishness shape counterterrorism efforts by undermining intelligence gathering and analysis.

America’s efforts also illustrate the conditions under which bureaucratic politics can run rampant and sabotage counterterrorism policy. The lack of congressional and budgetary oversight has resulted in an intelligence community which has managed to turn tens of billions in funding into a byzantine, inefficient, and frequently clueless mess. The failure to hold the intelligence community accountable was directly responsible for the current failures.

Bureaucratic politics frequently results in miscommunication and misallocation of resources. In counterterrorism it can be especially devastating because the bureaucracies involved are all fiercely protective of their powers. In cases where there is little legislative oversight of counterterrorism efforts, it will be especially dangerous and can result in an utterly confused strategy. Bureaucratic politics shapes counterterrorism policy by preventing the articulation of a coherent and unified strategy.

Bureaucratic politics is not a simple explanation whose presence or absence results in an easily predictable outcome. Rather, it is the result of bureaucratic infighting and self-interest. Accordingly, the influence of bureaucratic politics must be found through process tracing. By carefully examining the decisions made by various agencies and commanders, the effects of bureaucratic politics begin to emerge. Whether or not it has had an effect on a state’s counterterrorism decisions can only be assessed after carefully looking at the actions of the involved agencies. If each security organization pushes for a different strategy, or if there is a

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43 Ibid. 214.
lack of cooperation between them, then bureaucratic politics has played a large role in shaping policy. However, if these agencies communicate and there are relatively few counterproductive operations, then bureaucratic politics has not played a large role. The impact of bureaucratic politics on a counterterrorism strategy can only be determined through in depth examination of the actions taken by the state’s security organizations.

**Electoralism**

Electoralism is another explanation that uses the realities of domestic politics to explain policy formation. However, unlike bureaucratic politics, it focuses on the relationship between the government and the electorate. Terrorism is a tactic designed to elicit public reaction, and so it is only natural to examine the public’s reaction to counterterrorism efforts. Terrorism is a high profile issue and threatens the security of the populace. As a result, it is an important electoral issue for voters.

Writing on how governments can satisfy this demand, and in doing so assure their reelection, Ethan Bueno de Mesquita divides counterterrorist policies into two distinct categories: highly visible measures that target specific terrorist tactics and largely invisible actions that target the terrorist threat as a whole.\(^{44}\) Airport security procedures and personnel are highly visible to voters because they encounter them in their daily life, yet they are limited in their effectiveness because they are designed to counter one specific terrorist tactic. Conversely, developing an information gathering network and intercepting terrorist communications is largely invisible to the public eye. However, they are very effective measures because they allow the state to learn more about the group as a whole and tailor its responses so they are most

\(^{44}\) Bueno de Muesquita “Politics and the Suboptimal Provision of Counterterro” 10.
effective. The largely uninformed public sees the visible policies while remaining ignorant of the more hidden ones. As a result, when the public demands more action be taken on counterterrorism, what they really mean is more visible programs.

The effect of this information asymmetry is that unless the public just so happens to demand the ideal amount of visible security measures, leaving the government free to spend what they want on the less-visible measures, there will be a glut of highly visible policies. In order to satisfy public pressure to preserve itself, the government will try and implement as many highly visible policies as the public demands. Because resources are limited, this overspending means that the less visible, and ultimately more likely to succeed, programs will be neglected and underfunded.

The key feature of this explanation is that imperfect information is responsible for a less than optimal utilization of available resources. Obviously state capacity and wealth determines which measures and policies are available to fight terrorism. However, the lack of clear lines of communication between the public and the government results in the government choosing counterterrorism strategies that are highly visible to guarantee that their efforts will not go unnoticed. Unlike other factors that restrict available options, electoralism results in a situation where options go unused because they do not make the headlines and increase the government’s public approval.

The problem of voter demands on counterterrorism becomes even more complicated when the effects of elections are considered. Erica Chenoweth and Laura Dugan advance the idea of electoral influence on counterterrorism by arguing that individual actions the government

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45 Ibid. 11.
takes against terrorist groups can be linked to electoral cycles. By looking at Israeli policy
towards the Palestinians in view of Israeli elections they find that politicians are likely to order
repressive actions shortly before elections because they are highly visible and can produce
immediate results for voters to see. Actions such as raids on terrorist strongholds or arrests of
members are easy ways to prove to voters that the government is doing something to combat the
threat. As a converse, they argue that conciliatory tactics, the carrots of counterterrorism, are
only used in the periods right after an election. These tactics may be important to the overall
success of the campaign but they are not popular with voters because their gains are long term
and difficult to measure.

A final caveat about the effect of elections on counterterrorism policy involves the
government in power at the time. The weaker and more insecure the current government is, the
more vulnerable they will be to this effect. The less popular a government is, the more
concerned it will be about meeting voter demands so that it will not be voted out at the next
election. While all democratic governments will be susceptible to this phenomenon, weak and
unpopular ones will be even more so.

Although democratic states are more vulnerable to these pressures, they also affect
autocratic ones. Instead of worrying about voters, these leaders worry that their populaces will be
dissatisfied enough with the security situation to consider rebelling. However, this formulation is
closer to the idea of popular pressure than electoralism. Electoralism is a time-based theory that
is unique from public pressure because it argues that policy is affected in the period of time

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46 Laura Dugan and Erica Chenoweth. “The Electoral Determinant of Counterterrorism.”
47 Ibid. 25.
48 Ibid. 26.
before an election. Since many autocratic states do not have elections, their public unrest worries are not tied to the specific points in time when elections occur. While all states must be conscious of their publics’ desires and demands, only states that hold elections are susceptible to the policy effects of electoralism.

Electoral politics play a complex role in influencing counterterrorism policy. There are two separate but related methods in which elections impact the choice of policy. It is difficult for a government to communicate the entirety of its counterterrorism plan, including its successes, to the public, and this shortcoming is felt even more acutely in the run up to an election. Several predictions can be drawn from these phenomena. First, states are in general more likely to employ negative inducements because imprisoning and trying terrorists makes the headlines and offers tangible proof of the government’s success to the voting public. Second, the less popular the government in power, the more likely it is to employ negative inducements for the same reason. Third, while governments may employ positive inducements as part of their overall counterterrorism strategy, negative inducements will be much more common during election periods to ensure that voters are aware of the ruling government’s efforts. Each of these three possibilities reflects the ways in which electoral politics affect counterterrorism policy.

Conclusion

These schools of thought reflect the current literature on counterterrorism policy formation. Regime type discusses the ways in which the rule of law and the strength of democratic institutions affect policy, resources focuses on the ways in which threat levels and available options dictate responses to terrorism, bureaucratic politics addresses the outcomes of competition between different security agencies, and electoralism explores the link between
elections and counterterrorism. Each describes a different mechanism for creating policy. Some of these schools of thought use different actors and mechanisms to explain how states reach their counterterrorism strategies. By gaining a detailed understanding of these factors, the overall puzzle of counterterrorism policy becomes much easier to decipher.

However, there are limitations to these explanations. They all consider the state and the terrorist group individually and fail to explore the relationship between the two. Since terrorism is a political act, some form of disagreement between the government and the terrorist group precipitated its formation. It is a serious oversight not to examine the relationship between the two sides and see if some factor in their shared history could influence counterterrorism policy.
Ethnic Discrimination

While the previously explored schools of thought do a good job of explaining the influences at play behind most counterterrorism campaigns, there are anomalies. In these cases the government chooses to employ a strategy that defies the predictions of these traditional explanations. Frequently, this surprise manifests as a very violent campaign even when conventional explanations point towards a less violent outcome.

Sri Lanka's attempts to deal with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam are a perfect illustration of this phenomenon. Prior to the conflict's outbreak, Sri Lanka had a "well-institutionalized democratic political system."\(^4^9\) Such a regime, with its strong institutions, should have produced a campaign that relied upon Sri Lanka's police to enforce its laws. Instead, the government chose an ever more confrontational series of measures that transformed the conflict into a civil war that ended with the Tigers' military annihilation.\(^5^0\) Why would the Sri Lankan government choose a much more protracted and costly strategy instead of more effective options?

The answer may lie in ethnic discrimination. Many cases of domestic terrorism arise in multi-ethnic states, such as Sri Lanka. In these examples, the state and the terrorist group stand on two different sides of an ethnic divide; their differences are so vast that the one group has resorted to terrorism. The majority ethnic group is unlikely to resort to terrorism because they frequently control the state. Instead, the minority group uses terrorism because they do not have


\(^5^0\) "Sri Lanka's Tamil Tigers 'defeated.'"
enough control over the state to meet their needs. In such situations ethnicity plays a huge role in the conflict between the state and the terrorists, and overlooking its impact is a serious oversight.

The role of ethnicity in national politics is complex and affects political outcomes in many different ways. By examining how the ethnic dimension has affected the relationship between the two groups, the state’s counterterrorism decisions can be more fully explained. This ethnic component affects counterterrorism policy in a multitude of ways. The role of ethnicity in a state’s national identity can greatly affect what counterterrorism policies it will consider. Additionally, distrust of the dominant ethnic group because of its discriminatory actions limits the choices available to states. Finally, ethnic opportunists within the government can greatly alter the course of a counterterrorism campaign. These three mechanisms represent the ways in which ethnic discrimination can shape counterterrorism campaigns.

Ethnic Terrorism and Ethnic Discrimination

Ethnicity and terrorism are often deeply intertwined so it is necessary to examine their relationship in more depth. Many terrorist groups have an ethnic basis for their membership and their mission is rooted in ethnicity. Terrorist organizations that are formed as a response to widespread and systemic ethnic discrimination and repression are a subset of this group. Terrorism is a weapon of the weak, so using terrorism to fight back against a discriminatory and oppressive state is a rational ‘last response’ when more peaceful attempts have failed.51 The founders of such groups have calculated that the risks entailed in being terrorists outweigh the costs of continuing to suffer the injustices visited upon them by the state. These organizations

51 Hoffman *Inside Terrorism* 22.
can either fight to try and improve their position and welfare in society, or they can attempt to withdraw from society entirely and form a new state.

While terrorist groups that are composed of a discriminated-against minority are ethnic terrorist groups, not all ethnic terrorist groups are formed by minorities that suffer from serious discrimination. A large number of ethnic terrorist groups are composed of an ethnic minority within a country that wishes to secede and form its own state. These separatist ethnonationalist groups attempt to create a new state where they are the dominant group and the national identity is constructed around them. In some cases, such terrorists groups do not even represent the view of a disgruntled minority population, but rather the ideas of a small group of leaders. These groups are not fleeing persecution but are merely dissatisfied with not being the dominant group in society.

Although ethnicity plays a role in all cases of ethnic terrorism, ethnic discrimination only plays a role in a subset of those cases. Understanding which cases constitute ethnic discrimination is necessary to analyze the role it plays in shaping counterterrorism policy. Ethnic discrimination will only be a factor in counterterrorism policy when the terrorist group in question was formed as a reaction to discrimination, not if it is merely a dissatisfied minority group. By focusing on cases where ethnic terrorist groups formed in response to widespread discrimination, the effect of that discrimination on counterterrorism policy can be studied. When ethnic discrimination is an important factor, there are several ways in which it can influence counterterrorism policy.

52 Ibid. 243.
Ethnic Identity

Nation states require the creation of a national identity to unify the countless discrete individuals who together make up the state. Frequently this national identity is based on an ethnicity, and the state will have a distinct ethnic character. As soon as a state is constituted around a specific ethnic group, the question of what to do with minorities arises. Minorities are an inherent threat to the state because their very existence undermines the state’s legitimacy.

Their status as reminders of this disunity is often responsible for the violence minorities suffer in genocides or other mass killings. However, it may also help to explain counterterrorism policy. If an ethnonationalist terrorist group is facing a state with a largely ethnic identity, then they may be subject to more negative inducements. The terrorist group’s existence and campaign undermine the credibility of the state’s foundational myths, so the state will use harsher measures to punish the group. If positive inducements are employed, then the ethnic group might give up terrorism and rejoin society, which would force an acknowledgement that the status quo ethnic identity of the state did not reflect the reality of its population. Relying on negative inducements lessens the chance of the ethnic minority becoming more widely accepted and protects the existing ethnic identity of the state.

Ethnic Mistrust

The effects of ethnic discrimination can have serious impacts on the policy process for counterterrorism. If the terrorist group is composed of people belonging to an ethnic group that faces widespread social discrimination, then certain tactics will be precluded from use. In-group policing is an effective tactic because it relies on members of the group who already have an

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extensive knowledge of their community; by using them to gather information and combat
terrorists, the government is able to accomplish goals it would otherwise be unable to because of
the hostile relationship between it and the group's constituents. Daniel Byman argues that states
that maintain a good relationship with the community that a terrorist group emerges from will be
able to effectively utilize in-group policing.⁵⁴ States that face terrorist groups composed of
discriminated-against minorities are seriously limited in the positive inducements they can offer
because people that have suffered discrimination at the hands of the state are unlikely to
cooperate with it.

Another limitation on available policies is public opinion. A racist public is an obstacle to
offering positive inducements because it will oppose any concessions to minorities it views as
inferior. If a state has built its political support, or national identity, on tales of superiority then it
cannot quickly unwrite those myths to make its counterterrorism policy more palatable to the
public.

Even if these states adopt the pragmatic stance of using positive inducements, and
manage to mollify their racist publics, they will see limited success because of high levels of
distrust between the minority population and the state. These limitations mean that even if a
counterterrorism campaign has a balance of positive and negative inducements on paper, in
reality it's all sticks. Long-running ethnic discrimination on the part of the state, or the majority
of society, will result in a counterterrorism campaign reliant on negative inducements.

149-169. 163-165.
Ethnic Opportunism

Ethnicity can be more than just a component of a state’s national identity. Governments use ethnicity as an easy way to mobilize support and build a political base, often by drawing a contrast between ‘their’ ethnic group and the ‘other.’ This form of mobilization frequently manifests as ethnic discrimination against another ethnic group. In cases of genocide, the elimination of reviled ethnic groups coincides with attempts to advance the standing of the dominant ethnic group. The same mechanism can be applied to counterterrorism as well as genocide. The dominant group in society can make gains at the expense of the minority while justifying its actions as necessary to protect the country.

Ethnic opportunism will manifest itself in counterterrorism policy as a preference for negative inducements. If outmaneuvering a rival ethnic group is one of the primary goals of the state, then it is highly unlikely to make concessions to terrorists fighting on behalf of that group. Ethnic opportunism can occur in states whose identity is not based on ethnicity; all that is required is that the terrorist threat is composed of an ethnic minority. By using that minority status, the state can turn public opinion against the group. Shutting the minority out of the halls of power is already the modus operandi, and terrorist attacks simply give the state another tool to consolidate its power. Negative inducements are the natural choice because positive ones entail at least a tacit willingness to negotiate or share power, which would be untenable to a state looking to further disenfranchise the minority. Accordingly, if ethnic opportunism plays a role in

Research Design

While there are numerous independent variables that can explain why counterterrorism programs possess the characteristics they do, looking for their presence in various case studies can help to determine their influence over counterterrorism policy. By carefully examining the role each factor plays in each case study, their role in shaping counterterror strategy will become clearer. As a result, when looking at each case study, it will be necessary to measure the level of effect that each factor has.

The Importance of Time

When analyzing counterterrorism campaigns it is very easy to overlook one very basic but very important reality. All policy, and counterterrorism campaigns are no exception, changes over time. 57 At first glance this fact can appear inconsequential or even inconvenient for investigations of counterterrorism campaigns. However, because counterterrorism campaigns change that means there are ample opportunities for investigation. Every significant change in a campaign’s course can be pinpointed in time. Then, it is merely a matter of seeing which independent variable, or variables, is in play around that time.

Changes in strategy over time provide a neat signpost to hang analysis off of. If policy were static, then only the factors in play at its inception would matter or could be analyzed. However, because policy changes frequently, there are lots of opportunities to test which variables can explain the outcome.

57 Art Richardson Democracy and Counterterrorism 565-567.
Measuring Variables

Although it is essentially impossible to measure things such as ethnic discrimination or the strength of a democracy, it is possible to find analogs that can approximate these values. These substitutes are real figures that can be accurately measured. These figures are chosen because they are close to the immaterial values that need to be evaluated. For example, level of violence in a conflict is nearly impossible to measure accurately. Instead, looking at statistics that list how many terrorists and civilians are killed in a conflict can give a sense of the level of violence. Similarly, the balance of law enforcement and military in a counterterrorist response cannot be easily measured. However, looking at the number of soldiers and police officers active in a given area can give a sense of the government's strategy. In cases where numbers are incomplete, examining the number of personnel killed in the line of duty can help to give a more accurate picture. By examining data that is measurable, abstract concepts become easier to engage with.

These statistics can also be supplemented with in-depth accounts that help to provide more information than statistics alone can. While such examinations are obviously anecdotal, they can be useful for understanding the full impact of events. Statistics must simplify the reality of complex incidents, but looking at individual events in-depth can help give an idea of what conditions are like on a broader scale. 30 people being killed in a village can mean very different things if those people were killed in the midst of a raging battle or if they were systematically shot by security forces. These detailed accounts give greater insight into the forces at play in shaping policy.
It is possible to find indicators for both the independent and dependent variables as well as the characteristics of counterterrorism policy.

**Dependent Variable**

The level of violence in a counterterrorism strategy is the dependent variable in this analysis. Although the typology of counterterrorism strategies presented earlier is able to describe different strategies in a nuanced and accurate manner, placing an empirical case study into this framework requires some effort. However, there are plenty of data that can be used to assess the position of a case along the police-military and positive-negative inducement axes.

To determine the police-military balance, records on the number of soldiers and law enforcement officers can be used. Additionally, the relative budgets for the police and the military during the counterterrorism effort can be assessed. Expert consensus on each case will also provide strong evidence for the chosen classification. If there is a sudden change in either of them at the outbreak of the terrorist campaign or at significant turning points during the course of the conflict then it can be assumed that these changes represent a shift in government policy.

The positive-negative inducement balance can be examined by looking at the major initiatives of the government during the course of the campaign. Examining government programs such as amnesty offers or efforts to attract moderates within the terrorist group’s constituency can give an idea of the carrot side of the equation. Conversely, looking at reports of terrorists killed by the government or intelligence operations against the terrorist group helps fill out the stick side of the balance sheet. Again, comparing changes in these figures with key points in the conflict can lead valuable insight.
Once both sets of characteristics have been analyzed, they can be combined to determine where the case belongs on the field of counterterrorism strategies. The closer campaign is to the war corner, the more violent it is. Conversely, the closer to the soft counterterrorism corner a strategy is, the less violent it is. Examining a case study’s position on the field gives the counterterrorism campaign’s level of violence.

**Independent Variables**

Regime type is a difficult variable to measure because even amongst democracies there are countless different variations. Yet the task is less daunting than it seems because what really matters is how much respect a country has for the rule of law. The arguments that regime type matters say so because there are more protections for rights and liberties in democracies and as a result, the government’s options are limited. If democracies are important because they value rights, then looking at the strength of the rule of law in a country can give an approximation of this respect. The rule of law is still an abstract concept, however there are existing projects, such as the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index, that attempt to measure it taking a number of factors into account.\(^5^8\) These databases measure numerous quantifiable factors and arrive at a rating for each country. By using their ratings, the impact of the rule of law can be assessed in each case.

Both the capability of the state and the threat level of the terrorist group are factors in the resources explanation. Each one looks at the situation from a different perspective. Threat level focuses on the terrorist group while capability examines the state’s ability to fight back.

Although each is concerned with the question of ability, they address the ability of different actors.

Threat level is difficult to assess but it can be roughly gauged by measuring a few pieces of information including strength of the terrorist group, popular support for the group, and offensive capabilities. Group strength can be found by examining government intelligence estimates as well as published works that rely on inside sources. Popular support for the terrorists can be seen in public opinion polls; higher levels of support makes the group more dangerous because they increase the chance of sparking a popular uprising. If the group receives willingly given assistance, then support is likely to be higher than if it coerces aid from the population. A final factor affecting support levels is whether civilian casualties arise from the group’s actions or if they are a result of government repression against the group. Popular support is closely tied to the manner in which a terrorist group treats the people it claims to fight for.

State capacity can be measured by looking at official state sources on the agents of counterterrorism. One of the simplest factors affecting state capacity is the number of soldiers and police officers a country has. A slightly more important statistic is the budget of these organizations; the higher the budget, the greater the capacity. The same is also true writ large; the larger the state, the more capacity it has. Such general capacity can be evaluated using measures such as GDP per capita that describe the overall economic strength of the country. Without money to finance them, even the greatest counterterrorism programs are useless.

The effects of bureaucratic politics are often somewhat harder to find because they happen behind the scenes. Yet they can be uncovered by examining parliamentary records because frequently the struggle between organizations will be played out before the legislature.
Although less easily accessible, sometimes key figures within these organizations will give interviews where they discuss the process that has lead to the counterterrorism policy. Finally, although less direct than information from inside sources, examining the interests of relevant actors can yield some insight into the forces behind policy. Having a clear understanding of what each actor wishes to accomplish is useful when there is limited information on how the program was actually hashed out. Combining statements with an analysis of motives gives the most complete picture of the role of bureaucratic politics.

Electoralism is relatively easy to track because it is intrinsically linked to the electoral cycle. All that is necessary is to compare changes in the campaign to the dates of elections. If there are significant changes in the government’s approach right before or after elections then political concerns likely played a large part in the decision making process. Conversely, if serious changes occur nowhere near elections, or around other events, then elections probably do not play a major role.

The role of ethnic discrimination is not a cut and dry one, and its presence can often be hard to identify as well. Statements by high-ranking officials within the state can provide an insight into the ‘official’ state position on the status of the ethnic group. However it is more difficult to know what the government as a whole feels about the ethnic group.

It is not hard to discern if a national identity is heavily based on ethnicity because the state often loudly proclaims that it is. Official materials that describe the state as having an ethnic character make it clear the ethnicity is a key part of the national identity. Ethnic dominance by one group may be institutionalized, with only members of that group being allowed to serve in
specific government posts and offices. Conversely, if a state values pluralism and diversity then its identity is not strongly tied to ethnicity.

Opinion polls, of either the general public or—for example, of soldiers—can give a better understanding of the levels of ethnic distrust within a society. It would be impossible to know the views of everyone involved in the counterterrorism campaign, but by combining polls with in-depth accounts of the views of leaders, a better picture emerges.

Ethnic opportunism is frequently tied to very specific events that can be blamed on an ethnic minority by the regime. The Reichstag fire preceded the beginning of the Holocaust and the crash of president Habarymana’s plane precipitated the Rwandan Genocide. If government officials frame specific terrorist acts as the responsibility of an entire ethnic group then it is clear that ethnic opportunism is influencing their strategy.

Each of these independent variables represents a potential influence on counterterrorism policy. They work in different ways and involve different actors, but each explains how policy is shaped and implemented. In the case study analyses, the independent variables will be separated into the two categories of traditional explanations and the ethnic explanations. By distinguishing between existing explanations for counterterrorism policy and the new ethnically based ones, it is easier to see the role

Case Studies

This paper focuses on both types of ethnonationalist terrorism; groups that are formed by minorities that suffer serious societal discrimination and groups that merely wish to create their own state. The cases have been chosen to provide a strong conclusion because of their many similarities. Russia and Turkey are both second tier powers on the world stage with only partially
established democracies. While the United Kingdom is a world power and a strong democracy, the terrorist groups all three faced are very similar. The PKK, the Chechen Rebels, and the IRA are all separatist movements with an ethnic identity. They all sought to secede from the state and form their own nation with a national identity based on their ethnicity. Additionally, they all have large memberships and blur the line between the neat categories of terrorist groups and insurgencies. The large number of similarities between the terrorist groups means that each state was facing a similar threat, and so the factors that led to their counterterrorism strategy should be generalizable.

While both democratic and authoritarian states face domestic terrorist threats, all three case studies feature states that are nominally democratic. Even though all states face terrorist threats, there are several reasons for studying how democracies deal with them. First, there are generally more political actors in a democratic state than in an authoritarian one. Analyzing a more complex situation will yield a better understanding of the basic forces that shape counterterrorism policy because there are more opportunities to see how different factors interact with one another. Secondly, democracies are often more open societies which makes data easier to obtain. Third, not all of the independent variables can be applied to authoritarian states because a state without elections cannot be affected by electoralism. Finally, all three case studies are democracies so that this paper's conclusions will be as strong as possible. By analyzing counterterrorism policy formation across three states that are broadly similar, the difference made by ethnicity will be easier to identify.

Each case study will feature a brief introduction to the conflict under analysis. This will be followed by a short historical background that sets up the two sides and the clash between them. Next, the counterterrorism strategy will be examined in-depth and located on the typology
of counterterrorism strategies. Then the various independent variables will be looked at. By determining which hypotheses hold true, the relationship between the variables and the counterterrorism strategies will emerge. Understanding how these two relate is essential to understanding why states choose the strategy they do.

**Hypotheses**

Looking at the independent variables, a series of testable hypotheses emerge. These hypotheses are ways of discovering the mechanisms that allow the variables to influence policy. If a state’s constitution or ingrained respect for the rule of law are very strong, then it will use the police as they create less societal upheaval than the military. Conversely, a state with weak constitutional safeguards and poor respect for the rule of law will use the military because there are fewer reservations about disturbing society. If the state is poor and unable to afford complex counterterrorism programs, then they will not be able to employ many positive inducements due to their prohibitive cost. Similarly, if the terrorist group possesses exceptional strength, the state will use the military to combat it. If multiple agencies are involved in counterterrorism and they fail to cooperate or even undermine each other, then bureaucratic politics has played a role in shaping policy. If large, highly visible counterterrorism efforts occur right before elections, then electoralism has influenced policy decisions. If the state has a strong ethnic component to its national identity, then ethnic identity has affected policy. If certain tactics that rely on cooperation from the targeted population are unfeasible due to a lack of willing participants, then ethnic mistrust has shaped policy. If the terrorist group ethnicity is a successful minority, and the national ethnic majority benefits from the counterterrorism campaign, then ethnic opportunism has played a role. Table 2 lists all of the hypotheses and their associated variables.
Table 2: Hypotheses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Variable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strong constitutional safeguards, high respect for</td>
<td>Use of police</td>
<td>Regime type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rule of law</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak constitutional safeguards, low respect for</td>
<td>Use of military</td>
<td>Regime type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rule of law</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State lacks financial resources</td>
<td>Few positive inducements</td>
<td>Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorist group is exceptionally dangerous</td>
<td>Use of military</td>
<td>Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple security agencies involved in counterterrorism</td>
<td>Dependant on specific agency interactions</td>
<td>Bureaucratic politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New policies are introduced in the run up to elections</td>
<td>Use of negative inducements</td>
<td>Electoralism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong ethnic component to national identity</td>
<td>Use of military and negative inducements</td>
<td>Ethnic identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distrust of minority group by majority</td>
<td>Inability to use positive inducements</td>
<td>Ethnic mistrust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic minority is economically successful</td>
<td>Use of negative inducements</td>
<td>Ethnic opportunism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By looking at which hypotheses hold true across multiple cases, it is possible to determine which independent variables have the most impact on counterterrorism policy. If the traditional explanations fail to account for the level of violence in a case, the ethnic explanations may be able to. If they can, then ethnic discrimination plays a significant role in shaping counterterrorism policy.
Turkey and the PKK

The Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or Parti Karkerani Kurdistan (PKK), is a Kurdish terrorist group that has been active in southeastern Turkey for over three decades. Founded by Abdullah Öcalan in 1974 as a leftist group dedicated to Kurdish independence from Turkey, the group has grown and changed over the years in response to diverse circumstances. From the beginning, the group’s goals have included the formation of a separate Kurdish state, a position that distinguished them from many other Kurdish groups.

Unsurprisingly, Turkey has not taken kindly to these secessionist aspirations. The state has waged a bitter campaign against PKK forces since the group’s formation in 1974. The tactics and strategies employed by the state have varied greatly during the course of this conflict. However, a unifying element throughout much of Turkey’s fight against the PKK was an utter unwillingness to negotiate or bargain on a settlement. While this position has softened in recent years with a program to allow select members of the PKK living in Northern Iraq to return to their homes, the government’s position was not always so amiable.59 For most of the PKK’s existence, the Turkish state has relied upon incredibly harsh tactics to try and crush the organization.

This case study will examine the factors at play behind Turkey’s choice of counterterrorism tactics in combating the PKK. First, it will provide a brief background on the PKK itself and an overview of its history, followed by a discussion of the reasons for choosing to analyze specific time periods. Next it will explore the state’s counterterrorism response between 1984 and 1999 and locate it on the field of counterterrorism strategies. Then it will address each

of the possible explanations in turn and attempt to link the evidence of these variables to the state’s decisions. Finally, it will examine the information and determine which explanation or explanations are most compelling and hold the greatest explanatory power.

**Background**

The PKK was founded in 1974 by a group of university students in Ankara. The group’s founder, Abdullah Öcalan, established it as a Marxist-Leninist group that was dedicated to the creation of a unified Kurdistan for the Kurds that were scattered across Turkey, Iraq, and Syria.\(^6^0\) This leftist stance distinguished the PKK from existing Kurdish groups because they were largely traditional, espoused conservative political positions, and were organized around existing leaders in the Kurdish community.\(^6^1\) Shortly after being formed, the group moved its operations to the mountainous southeastern region of the country in preparation for its violent campaign of national independence.

The newly formed group started small. It began by attempting to consolidate its strength and legitimize itself as the only vehicle for Kurds to express their grievances against the Turkish state; from 1974 to 1984 the group’s operations largely consisted of attacks on rival Kurdish groups along with a smattering of relatively small scale attacks on Turkish authorities in

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Kurdistan. The goal of these efforts was to build the organization’s strength for the eventual confrontation with Turkish forces that would then lead to Kurdish independence.

Deciding it had waited long enough, the PKK announced its arrival in 1984. On August 15th, the group launched an attack on Turkish military outposts in the districts of Eruh and Semdinli in Southeast Turkey. For the next fifteen years the PKK engaged in a brutal armed struggle with the Turkish military in the southeastern regions of the country. This phase of the conflict ended with the capture of Öcalan in 1999 after he fled to Kenya. Once captured, he decreed that the PKK would issue a ceasefire and end hostilities with the Turkish state. While the ceasefire was short-lived and the PKK has never fully renounced violence as a tactic, Öcalan’s capture marked the end of large-scale armed conflict with the state.

At its core the PKK is an ethnonationalist terrorist group. It is a reaction against the Turkish state which has banned the Kurdish language multiple times and discouraged expressions of Kurdish culture in favor of a homogenous Turkish national identity. Much of its support comes from Kurds who wish to preserve and celebrate their cultural heritage, and speak their traditional language. While this is a noble goal, in practice the PKK’s survival depends upon its ability to forge the many individual subsets of Kurds into a unified Kurdish identity. There are too many different groups that identify under the umbrella of Kurdish for the PKK to unify them all. Instead, it is engaged in its own project of identity building wherein it creates a

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64 Ibid. 251.
65 Metelits Inside Insurgency 122-128.
definition of Kurd that it then forces its constituents to conform to. Reshaping Kurdish identity is a necessary project because it creates a simple Kurdishness that can be contrasted with Turkishness. This homogenization of the Kurds is a logical step towards the formation of an independent Kurdistan. The new state is intended to have a Kurdish identity, and only by creating a one size fits all identity can the PKK hope to easily create a stable state.

Timeframe

The PKK has been active since 1974, offering a wide range of time for analysis of the Turkish counterterrorism regime. Their history can be roughly divided into three periods. The first, from 1974 to 1984, consists of power struggles with other Kurdish groups and small attacks against the state. The second, from 1984 to 1999, constitutes the period of large-scale armed conflict with the security forces of the state. The third, from 1999 to the present, consists of the group’s relative decline in military power and uncertainty about its organizational structure and future. This paper will focus on the second period between 1984 and 1999.

There are many beneficial reasons for this decision that enable a better understanding of Turkish counterterrorism policy to be achieved. The first is that this is the period of time where the PKK exhibits the most continuity. In the first phase the group grew from a handful of students to a guerrilla force while in the third phase it transformed into an amorphous organization whose motives were frequently unclear. By focusing on the PKK’s armed clash with the state, this paper can examine reactions to a group that did not radically change during the period of analysis.

The second reason for analyzing Turkish counterterrorism from 1984 to 1999 was that the Turkish government remained a democracy for this entire period. The military coup of 1980
resulted in the armed forces running the country for nearly three years. By focusing on a time period in which democracy was at least ostensibly maintained, this paper will be able to tie the quality of this democracy to the country’s counterterrorism strategy.

Finally, focusing on this fifteen-year period results in a case study that is most similar to the other two cases in this paper. The IRA and the Chechen rebels were both large, well armed terrorist groups that clashed with the state. Examining either the PKK’s incipient development, or its transformation after Öcalan’s capture does not provide a similar case. The higher degree of similarity offered by the 1984 to 1999 period means that any conclusions will be more valid and have greater applicability across all three cases.

Overview of the Conflict

In the early days of the fighting, the state’s tactics were very unrefined and heavy handed. Fighting PKK forces along the border the between Turkey and Iraq, the Turkish military launched airstrikes that frequently devastated villages uninvolved in the conflict.\footnote{Henri J. Barkey and Graham E. Fuller. *Turkey’s Kurdish Question*. Boston: Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998. 22.} This was not intentional state overreaction to send a message to the Kurds; it was merely the incompetence of the military. Eventually however, the Turkish military did begin to intentionally overreact against the PKK threat. Yet rather than doing so to send a message to potentially sympathetic Kurds, the military choose to do so for strategic reasons.

In areas where the PKK was particularly effective, the military began to effect the forced evacuation of entire towns, sometimes burning the towns to the ground to prevent the PKK from
using them as areas of operation.\textsuperscript{68} These massive overuses of force were justified as being necessary in the conflict between the military and the PKK, even if they have eventually hurt the state's position.

Parallel to this strategy of excessive force, retaliatory killings and raids became commonplace. After the shelling of government buildings in the town of Sirmak which was home to 25,000 people, the government launched a brutal operation in revenge. The town’s phone and power lines were cut, over 70% of the buildings were destroyed, and 22 people were killed after the military withdrew three days later.\textsuperscript{69} The attack was launched in response to PKK activities, but it indiscriminately targeted the entire town killed innocent people and destroyed lives. This punitive streak was also on display when Turkish soldiers would ransack cemeteries and deface the actual graves.\textsuperscript{70} Instead of trying to target actual members of the PKK, or even nonviolent sympathizers, these attacks represent a pattern of indiscriminate force directed against the Kurds as a whole.

While the military certainly had its share of blood on its hands, some of the worst violence was not carried out by it. Seeking to exploit existing class divisions within the Kurds, the state created the Village Guard Corps, a system where Kurds who did not support the PKK's goals or methods were paid or coerced into serving as guards for villages in the PKK’s area of operations.\textsuperscript{71} In theory these groups were supposed to take some of the workload from the military and allow them to focus on engaging the PKK. In reality, the system was rife with


\textsuperscript{70} Ibid. 143.

\textsuperscript{71} Barkey and Fuller \textit{Turkey's Kurdish Question} 147.
abuse. Guard Corps members from one village would accuse rival villages of supporting the PKK to give legitimacy to conflicts between the two that were based on by more pedestrian motives, or sometimes they would attack a village simply to try and justify their continued pay from the government.\footnote{Ibid.} Yet even when the program was functioning as intended there were serious problems. Villages that refused to join for any reason were seen as doing so out of sympathy for the PKK.\footnote{Kirisci and Winrow The Kurdish Question and Turkey 129.} Failure to join then opened them up to attack by the military as they were now viewed as potential hiding spots for the PKK. The Guard Corps exacerbated existing tensions within the Kurds as well as legitimated the targeting of innocent villages.

**Analysis of The Turkish Counterterrorism Strategy**

Although Turkey had been aware of the PKK’s activities prior to 1984, they were largely unprepared to deal with the group’s emergence as a serious threat. Faced with a rebellion in the southeast, the government sent in the military to quell it. While the state did not display a coordinated use of negative inducements, the utter lack of positive ones means that the Turkish response can be very easily categorized as belonging to the war paradigm.

The military was the primary instrument used to combat the PKK, and it was deployed in force against the group. From 1984 to 1999 the state’s response was primarily military in nature and relied heavily upon the armed forces.\footnote{Barkey and Fuller Turkey’s Kurdish Question 47.} This claim is substantiated by examining the troop levels in the Kurdish regions of Turkey during this period of the conflict. In 1990 the military had 65,000 soldiers deployed to the country’s southeast.\footnote{Jonathan Rugman and Roger Hutchings. Atatürk’s Children: Turkey and the Kurds. New York: Cassel, 1996. 35.} By 1995 the military had increased this deployment to 300,000 soldiers in its efforts to combat the PKK, which at the time
reportedly consisted of around 5,000 fighters.\textsuperscript{76} Deploying such an overwhelming force is indicative of the state's desire to use the military to crush the PKK.

In addition to these military personnel, Turkey also developed the village guard system to supplement the military's efforts. These paramilitaries, recruited from Kurds in the southeast, were intended to protect outlying villages from the PKK. The state had recruited 16,000 Kurds to the village guards by 1989, and managed to double that number by 1993.\textsuperscript{77} The village guards were frequently denounced as "collaborators" and were often the target of PKK attacks. The establishment of paramilitaries from within the Kurdish population further cements the Turkish counterterrorism strategy as a military based one.

Even though the military was the main component of Turkey's strategy to defeat the PKK, the police played a role as well. However, the police functioned less as a law enforcement agency and more as a paramilitary extension of the armed forces. In 1987 they were responsible for routinely torturing suspected PKK militants and supporters while they were detained.\textsuperscript{78} Additionally, the police were often indistinguishable from Turkish 'special forces,' and assisted in arranging the extrajudicial killings of Kurdish activists.\textsuperscript{79} While the police did play a role in fighting the PKK, their clear subordination to the military, along with the overwhelming number of soldiers deployed against the PKK, means that the campaign was a military one.

The greatest piece of evidence for the military nature of Turkey's counterterrorism policy is the fact that when the state finally saw gains against the PKK in the mid 90s it was not the

\textsuperscript{76} Kirisci and Winrow \textit{The Kurdish Question and Turkey} 130.
\textsuperscript{79} Rugman and Hutchings \textit{Atatürk's Children} 18.
result of changing strategies but rather of refining the military approach. In 1995 the army began to train commando units for the express purpose of countering elusive PKK fighters; these units operated with greater flexibility and possessed training in dealing with insurgent fighters. The arrival of these new units began to shift the tide of the conflict and seriously hurt the PKK. Turkey’s strategy was so heavily reliant on the military that when it did not succeed at first, the military adjusted its tactics and operations instead of letting the police try to deal with the problem.

While Turkey’s response was heavily military, it also relied largely on negative inducements. The government’s strategy rejected the idea of a political solution to the conflict with the PKK. Positive inducements are based on the idea that terrorists can be convinced to give up their arms in exchange for concrete benefits that meet some of their demands. Turkey’s rejection of this political avenue to a resolution of the conflict constitutes a negative inducement because instead of offering a peaceful alternative to the conflict, the state only offered punishment in the form of military action.

This rejection of negotiation was not something that was hidden or covered up; rather it was official policy. A captain in the Turkish Air Force described the state’s strategy as a refusal to negotiate, even during the PKK’s most successful period in the mid 90s. This obstinacy is illustrated by the repeated banning of Kurdish parties from parliament. This hard-line stance offered little in the way of explicit inducements in either direction. However, by declining to

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81 Bacik and Coskun “The PKK Problem” 251-252.
83 Kirisci and Winrow *The Kurdish Question and Turkey* 44-45.
offer a political solution of any kind, the state implemented a strategy that implicitly offered only negative inducements to Kurdish terrorists.

While the state offered only negative inducements as part of its counterterrorism strategy, there was one positive inducement in play in the conflict with the PKK. The Southeastern Anatolia Development Project is an immense project that has facilitated the construction of dams for irrigation and hydroelectric power and continues to aid the economic development of the region. This project was seen as a way to discourage terrorism; by raising the standard of living in the Kurdish areas of the country, people would have fewer grievances and be less likely to join armed terrorism. However, treating this program as a part of Turkish counterterrorism is a seriously flawed argument. The development effort was launched in the early 1970s, well before the PKK was a significant threat to the state. While the economic development brought by the program can be seen as a positive inducement, it was not a conscious effort as part of counterterrorism efforts. The program should be excluded from this case study because it was the result of an earlier decision and was not linked to terrorism in any way.

The Turkish counterterrorism strategy for dealing with the PKK lies close to the war point on the field of different strategies. It relied heavily on the military, and other security actors that were involved served at the military's behest. The campaign failed to offer any positive inducements to Kurds and instead promised them a violent death if they continued to support the PKK. By choosing to not negotiate with the PKK, Turkey waged a very violent counterterrorism campaign.

85 Zehni “Turkey and PKK Terrorism” 28.
86 “GAP | What is GAP.”
Independent Variables

The independent variables that affect Turkey's counterterrorism strategy can be divided into two groups: traditional explanations and ethnic explanations. Separating these two groups of variables makes it easier to discern the influence they had over Turkish counterterrorism policy. Both sets of explanations will be examined and the impact of each on Turkish policy will be assessed.

Traditional Explanations

The nature of Turkish democracy has had substantial influence on the counterterrorism policies chosen by the government. Although the country was under civilian rule from 1984 to 1999, the military's presence was still keenly felt. The military had returned the country to democracy only a year earlier and so it still enjoyed considerable influence over the nation's politics. The National Security Council, which is controlled by the military, has a large say in all security matters in Turkey. Even though it is ostensibly part of the civilian government, the military's stranglehold on the council means that it is able to exert large amounts of control over national policy. Given the military's degree of control over policy, it makes sense that Turkey would use the military as the main agent of combating the PKK.

The use of the military to fight terrorism is a predictable outcome because of Turkey's weak constitution. The military's position in society through the National Security Council is a clear indicator that Turkish democracy is not particularly strong. Weak respect for the rule of law and a lack of constitutional safeguards confirm that regime type played a role in Turkey's counterterrorism decisions.

The PKK was never particularly strong in terms of numbers. The group’s strategy of violent intimidation often failed to win over recruits and it frequently found itself frustrated at the dearth of volunteers. In addition to being unable to field a serious military force, the PKK faced several other disadvantages. They were located in the mountainous eastern region of the country, far away from the major cities. This unfortunate geographic situation made it very difficult for the group to carry out attacks in areas where they would have a large impact on popular opinion. Additionally, they faced difficulties gaining popular support because their Kurdish cause did not resonate with the Turkish public. Due to their lack of resources, and their message’s difficulty in finding traction, the PKK did not pose a large threat to the Turkish government.

Given the low threat level of the PKK, it seems highly unlikely that the group’s resources played a role in Turkey’s counterterrorism strategy. The hundreds of thousands of troops sent against the group would seem to be overkill from a purely resource based perspective. Some other factor must be at work here.

Bureaucratic politics did not play a large role in determining Turkey’s counterterrorism strategy. This relative absence is due to the strength of the Turkish military. While in many states the military is just one of many security agencies tasked with countering terrorism, in Turkey the military reigns supreme. Although the power and influence of the Turkish military has declined recently, it was still the primary national security organization during Turkey’s conflict with the PKK. The dominance of the military means that few other agencies were even considered to deal

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with the terrorist threat. Even the police were subordinate to the military when it came to counterterrorism. Other agencies simply weren’t strong enough to challenge the military.

Although it lacked competition, the military was still behaving according to the bureaucratic politics model. By assigning itself all duties related to fighting the PKK it protected its influence and preserved its autonomy. So while bureaucratic politics is at play, it has very little influence over the actual policies of counterterrorism.

Electoralism has little bearing on the counterterrorism strategy because the strategy remained largely unchanged throughout the conflict. Additionally, the high degree of control exercised by the military meant that electoral politics were less relevant to counterterrorism because the military was in control, not the civilian government. Accordingly, electoralism could not apply to the Turkish case because security was not an electoral issue. The military had such autonomy that civilian politicians could not seriously dictate counterterrorism strategy. Without governmental control of military operations, elections cannot have any impact on counterterrorism policy.

Ethnic Discrimination

Ethnic discrimination played a large part in Turkey’s counterterrorism strategy because of the strongly rooted ethnic identity of the state. When the Turkish state was created, it was accompanied by the formation of a powerful national identity based on Turkishness. This identity was so strong that it involved the marginalization and exclusion of all other identities. 89 This denial of the existence of the Kurds continues to this day. Official Turkish government discourse on the Kurdish question is not merely a denial that the unrest in the country’s southeast

89 Metelits Inside Insurgency 128.
is a Kurdish issue; it is a denial of the very Kurdish identity.° Such a strong rejection of Kurdish claims, and existence, makes violence against them easier. By delegitimizing their grievances and very identities, the state allows exclusion and violence to occur.

While it may be difficult to determine the exact mechanisms by which ethnic discrimination influences Turkish counterterrorism policy, there is no doubt as to its prevalence. Much of the state’s policies towards the Kurds are based on a long held view that the Kurds simply do not exist, that they are just poor Turks. This view is reflected in the fact that mainstream Turkish political parties are practically required to deny their existence and as a result refuse to engage with them.° An example of this mindset is former prime minister Bulent Ecevit who stated that the unrest in the southeast was not due to ethnic issues but rather represented anger at the region’s underdevelopment.° Denying the Kurds’ very existence limits the options available for dealing with Kurdish unrest. If they do not exist, they cannot be negotiated or bargained with, leaving only military action as an option.

Public opinion reflects a similar reality. People who discuss the merits of Kurdish grievances or even the necessity of Kurdish rights are considered “terrorists and enemies of the state.”° Such a strong and absolute reaction is indicative of a climate where ethnic discrimination plays a large role in shaping people’s views of the conflict. Additionally, a “silent majority” of Turks accept the narrative that the unrest is merely dissatisfaction at economic

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° Barkey and Fuller *Turkey’s Kurdish Question* 101.
° Barkey and Fuller *Turkey’s Kurdish Question* 118.
inequality and that there is no need for a Kurdish state.\textsuperscript{94} Public opinion is largely against the Kurds and views their struggle as illegitimate and unfounded.

Most telling are the attitudes held by individuals within the government. Some hardliners within the military viewed the PKK as a blessing because it is easy to gain support for the harsh methods used against such a violent group that would not be possible with a more moderate adversary.\textsuperscript{95} The way the statement is framed, that the PKK makes justification of violent policies easier, makes the role of ethnic discrimination clear. These sentiments make it clear that ethnic opportunism played a role in shaping Turkish counterterrorism policy because the state used discrimination to legitimize its policies. The government already wanted to use violent tactics, and the nature of the PKK simply made them acceptable. If the government spoke of having to use force to counter the PKK then it might be a tactical decision, but since the use of violence is predetermined, then ethnic discrimination against the Kurds is responsible.

Conclusion

The two most prominent explanations for Turkish behavior are regime type and ethnic discrimination. Regime type clearly matters because the large role of the military within society has dictated the government's counterterrorism policy throughout its struggle with the PKK. Ethnic discrimination is a large factor because racist views are used to delegitimize the Kurds' goals and promote violent action against them. The discrimination justifies a brutal repression, and the military's large presence provides the tools for it.


\textsuperscript{95} Barkey and Fuller \textit{Turkey's Kurdish Question} 44-45.
Examining the Kurdish case yields some insights into the roles of the various factors that shape counterterrorism campaigns. Turkish policy towards the Kurds can only be described as aggressive. The use of the military as the only instrument of conflict and the lack of any political overtures reveals a deeply antagonistic view towards the Kurds. Ethnic discrimination plays a large part in shaping this view. The decades long denial of the Kurds’ very existence makes acknowledging any of their demands a near impossibility, and this denial is rooted in ethnic discrimination. Similarly, military leaders who view the PKK as a benefit because it allows them to justify their violence are motivated by ethnic discrimination. They want to use excessive violence simply because their enemies are Kurds; they are just lucky that the international community condones using violence against violent groups. Ethnic discrimination is a major factor in Turkish counterterrorism policy against the Kurds.
Russia and the Chechens

The population of Chechnya has had a long and mutually distrustful relationship with Russia. These feelings came to a head in the 90s after the collapse of the Soviet Union when Chechen nationalists attempted to secede and create an independent republic. The Russian government responded with force and crushed the incipient separatist movement. A few short years later, the Chechens were again in Russia’s sights after a series of apartment bombings throughout Russia.

The Russian counterterrorism campaign has been incredibly violent. Understanding the factors behind such a savage strategy offers insights into how such policies are formulated and the factors that shape them. This case study will look at the Second Chechen War, which began in 1999 and ended in 2009. Following Russian strategy throughout the duration of the conflict, it will examine the various independent variables and how they affect counterterrorism strategy.

Background

The current Chechen conflict began in 1999 after the bombing of several apartment complexes throughout Russia. Although the First Chechen war lasted from 1994 to 1996, it ended without resolving many of the issues that led to its outbreak. The beginning of the Second Chechen War was a direct result of the terrorist tactics that came into vogue at the end of the first war. Both conflicts were a Russian reaction to the desire for Chechen independence. This desire for independence can be traced far back into the history of these two groups.

Animosity between Russians and Chechens is longstanding and well deserved. The Chechen attempt at independence came at a time when other countries were struggling into existence by tearing themselves away from post-Soviet Russia, but the desire for autonomy was
a long held one. This hope for freedom was the result of centuries of mistreatment at the hands of the Russians. One of the earliest examples of this abuse was when Tsarist Russia annexed the region in the early 1800s, and in 1816 installed a governor who repressed and terrorized the Chechens now living under Russian control.96 The Chechens were forced to accept the rule of a distant power that did little but victimize them.

The Chechens' fortunes did not improve with time. During World War II the Soviet Union decided to internally deport the Chechens because they were a potentially troublesome minority. In February 1944 nearly the entire population of Chechnya was deported within a week. People were summoned to local community centers and forced onto trucks that took them to rail depots where they were loaded onto trains. Soviet records indicate that between 478,479 and 521,247 people were shipped this way from Chechnya to Central Asia.97 Those that were too infirm or unwilling to leave were often simply murdered as in the village of Khaibakh where over 700 people were forced into a barn that NKVD soldiers set on fire.98 The few groups of Chechens that had managed to avoid the Soviet sweep did not fare any better. Soon after the deportation was complete, Lavrenty Beria, the NKVD official in charge of the operation, ordered the "liquidation" of any remaining Chechens.99 The Soviet aim was not merely to displace the Chechens to a new home, but the complete erasure of Chechnya as a place.

Yet the hardships were not over for the Chechens. Faced with harsh conditions and deadly winters in their new home of Kazakhstan, they died by the thousands. Between the

99 Dunlop Russia Confront Chechnya 67.
killings during the deportation, deaths that occurred while in transit, and the trials of surviving in a new land, approximately one third of all Chechens died.\textsuperscript{100} As time went on, deportees were granted more leeway after Stalin’s death, and people slowly began to return to their homes. Then in 1957, the region was officially recognized again and the Chechens returned \textit{en masse}.\textsuperscript{101} Although they were eventually allowed to return to their homes, the Chechens never forgot the horrors of their ordeal.

The Chechen experience in 1944 has lead to a deep distrust of Russia and a desire for independence from the state responsible for such injustices. The Chechen deportation was the single strongest element in nationalist rhetoric during the lead up to the declaration of independence from Russia.\textsuperscript{102} Unsurprisingly, this language was highly effective with the Chechen people. The Chechen decision to seek autonomy and secede from Russia was largely a result of the injustices inflicted on them in the past.

The first Chechen war began in 1994 when Russia sent troops into the region to reassert control. The military action was intended to prevent the secession of Chechnya and preserve Russia’s integrity.\textsuperscript{103} Russia faced serious opposition from the Chechens and the war proved incredibly unpopular at home.\textsuperscript{104} Given these setbacks, Russia agreed to a ceasefire in 1996 that effectively ended the war.

\textsuperscript{100} Gall and de Waal \textit{Chechnya: Calamity in the Caucasus} 61.
\textsuperscript{101} Ibid. 72.
\textsuperscript{102} Ibid. 74-75.
The First Chechen war was a conflict with many causes and even more effects on the relationship between Russia and Chechnya. However, there are two particularly salient factors from the first war when considering the Russian response in the first war. The first factor is that the violence and brutality of the war gave Chechens even more reason to fight in the second conflict and served as a useful tool for recruiting new terrorists. The second factor is that as the war went on, the Chechens increasingly began to adopt terrorist tactics in their fight against the Russian forces. The shift in strategy began with an increase in train bombings by the Chechen rebels.\(^{105}\) This trend culminated in the Budennovsk Hospital hostage crisis in June of 1995. Shamil Basayev, one of the Chechen leaders, led a group of Chechens into neighboring Dagestan where they took over 1,500 Russians hostage in the local hospital.\(^{106}\) The spread of terrorist tactics in the first war is important because it meant that such options were more easily available to the Chechens and were seen as highly effective.

While the First Chechen War set the stage for the second one, the two states had been headed towards a conflict for a long time. Centuries of repression at the hands of the Russians and the brutality of the first war practically guaranteed that the newly declared peace would not be long for this world.

**Timeframe**

This case study consists of the entirety of the Second Chechen War, even though the Russian efforts cannot truly be considered a counterterrorism operation for the beginning of the war. While the initial Russian response was a military one, the organic nature of the Chechens'...


\(^{106}\) Ibid. 394.
transition from conventional combat to terrorism meant that Russia was forced to use its already deployed forces to meet this new threat. As a result, any factors that had an impact in shaping their initial strategy remain relevant when analyzing their attempts to deal with the terrorist threat.

The First Chechen War is not considered as a case study because it lasted for far less time than its successor and it remained largely a conventional conflict. The first war lasted barely two years and so provides much less opportunity to understand the mechanisms that influence counterterrorism policy. Additionally, while terrorism did play a role towards the end of the war, it was used alongside more traditional warfare. In the second war, terrorism almost completely replaced standard war within the first year of the campaign. Focusing on a case where Russia was faced with a more ‘pure’ terrorist threat will result in a better analysis of the factors that affect its response to terrorism.

A final reason for choosing the Second Chechen War has to do with Russian perceptions of the war. Even though the conflict began as a war, the Russian government has referred to it as a counterterrorism operation from the very beginning. This was accompanied by a tendency to call Chechens terrorists and not rebels or fighters.\(^{107}\) If the Russians had decided to describe their efforts as a counterterrorism campaign, it makes sense to investigate their response and see if it truly holds up to this definition.

Overview of the Conflict

Given the trajectory of the First Chechen War, it should hardly be surprising that the Second Chechen War was ignited by an act of terrorism. In September 1999, massive blasts tore

through five separate apartment blocks across Russia. Almost 300 hundred people were killed and Russia responded by invading Chechnya once more.\textsuperscript{108} The Russian government hoped that by attacking the source of the Chechen terrorists they could thwart future attacks against Russian citizens in their cities.

Given their superior numbers, the Russian forces easily made their way into Chechnya. Less than a year later, Russia successfully occupied Grozny and the majority of the remaining Chechen forces fled into the mountains surrounding the capital.\textsuperscript{109} However, after this quick victory, the conflict began to follow the familiar trajectory of the First Chechen War. Defeated in conventional combat, the Chechen forces quickly accelerated the pace of their terrorist attacks in an attempt to defeat the Russians through alternative means.\textsuperscript{110} This time the Chechens increased the ferocity of their terrorist attacks beyond simply taking hostages. In 2004 they assassinated President Akhmad Kadyrov, Putin’s chosen leader in the republic, and attempted to assassinate his temporary successor, Sergei Abramov.\textsuperscript{111} The purpose of these increasingly bold attacks was to force the Russians to withdraw as they had done in the First Chechen War.

Such high impact attacks were not limited to the territory of the republic either. In April of 2002, Chechen militants took more than 800 Russians hostage inside the Dubrovka Theater in Moscow.\textsuperscript{112} This pattern was continued in 2004 when approximately 30 Chechen fighters took over a thousand civilians hostage in Beslan, North Ossetia. Like the Budennovsk terrorists, they demanded that all Russian forces be removed from Chechnya. However, unlike Budennovsk, the

\textsuperscript{109} Cronin “Russia and Chechnya” 396.
\textsuperscript{110} Ibid. 391.
\textsuperscript{111} Kramer “Counterinsurgency” 46.
\textsuperscript{112} Cronin “Russia and Chechnya” 397.
situation ended in tragedy when Russian special forces stormed the school resulting in over 330 deaths.\textsuperscript{113} During the course of the second war, Chechen use of terrorist tactics escalated dramatically.

However, these terrorist actions did not have the same impact they did during the first war, and Russia continued to fight in Chechnya. The terrorist campaign that made up most of the Second Chechen War grew out of the defeat of the Chechens' more conventional military forces. Yet the effort has grown far beyond either the border of Chechnya or the scale of the initial resistance, with dramatic hostage takings in Moscow and routine ambushes of soldiers in the areas around Grozny. Realizing the scope of this terrorist undertaking is necessary when examining the Russian response.

Analysis of the Russian Counterterrorism Strategy

The Russian counterterrorism strategy when dealing with the Chechens has been heavy on the use of military force while offering almost no positive inducements to terrorists. While the conflict began as a traditional military engagement, Russia has not shifted its strategy far from the military one it initially employed.

Russia has relied overwhelmingly on its military to bear the burden of defeating the terrorist campaign in Chechnya. In the initial days of the war, Russia sent in large numbers of troops to capture Grozny and stamp out the Chechen threat. As the conflict transformed into a terrorist effort, Russia increased the size of its military presence.\textsuperscript{114} In the face of the emergence of a genuine terrorist threat, Russia's response was to deepen its reliance on the military in the

\textsuperscript{113} Ibid. 406.
\textsuperscript{114} Ibid. 411.
situation, clearly showing that the preferred agency for combating terrorism was the military and not the police.

While the military is the primary tool used to fight the Chechens, the actual picture is not quite so simple. Russia had soldiers in Chechnya serving under 13 different government agencies ranging from the Federal Security Service (FSB) to the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) to the Federal Railroad Troops Command.\(^{115}\) Although the Russian military presence is large, it is not a unified force under the command of a single authority because each agency has soldiers under its command; the Federal Railroad Troops Command used its soldiers to protect troop trains even though the trains carried soldiers from other agencies into the theater. The sheer number of soldiers deployed to the conflict becomes is made more conceivable by considering that the Russian armed forces outnumber the entire population of Chechnya.\(^{116}\) Russia has relied heavily on the military to carry out the fight against the Chechen separatists.

While the Russian government has called upon the military to fight the terrorist threat, they have offered few inducements to the Chechens. Russia has refused to negotiate with all but the most supplicant of Chechen leaders. They have only conducted talks with Chechens who are willing to accept Russia’s authority over the region.\(^{117}\) Referred to as Chechenization, this strategy resulted in the election of a pro-Russia Chechen government that was willing to fight the Russians’ fight for them. Ultimately, this government was only interested in defeating the terrorists militarily as the Russians had tried and so it did not address any of the root grievances of the Chechen people that led to the conflict in the first place. Despite its shortcomings, this

\(^{115}\) Kramer “Counterinsurgency” 12-15.
\(^{117}\) Cronin “Russia and Chechnya” 399.
plan was the only non-military solution offered to the conflict.\textsuperscript{118} By only negotiating with Chechens that were willing to give up secession as a goal, Russia failed to politically engage the majority of the groups involved in the conflict.

In addition to rejecting a negotiated political solution, Russia did not offer any positive inducements to the Chechen people in the form of public works projects. Despite the military’s long stay in Chechnya during the second war, it did not undertake any reconstruction efforts in the region.\textsuperscript{119} Organizing reconstruction efforts would have improved the lives of average Chechens and forced some of them to reconsider their participation in terrorism. Addressing Chechen grievances could have served as a positive inducement away from terrorism.

Even a cursory glance at Russian counterterrorism policy makes it clear that the war classification is the only way to describe it. The heavy reliance on soldiers as the personnel in the fight against the Chechens and the lack of positive inducements clearly identifies it as such. And while there are no explicitly stated negative inducements, the lack of positive ones constitutes an implicit negative inducement; Chechens are faced with the prospect of being killed by Russian soldiers if they become terrorists, an obvious negative inducement. The one factor preventing Russia’s strategy from being a perfect example of the war paradigm is their negotiations with certain pro-Russia Chechen groups. However, because they limited these negotiations to groups that opposed secession, Russia did not truly negotiate with the terrorists. As a result, the Russian response is very close to the war archetype, but these negotiations prevent it from employing only negative inducements.

\textsuperscript{119} Kramer “Counterinsurgency” 9.
The warlike character of the counterterrorism operations is well illustrated by the response to the Dubrovka Theater hostage crisis. In 2002 a group of Chechen terrorists infiltrated the theater in Moscow and held the approximately 800 occupants hostage. They issued demands for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya, hoping to replicate the success of the Budennovsk hospital seizure where Chechen soldiers were able to force Russia to begin negotiations. The MVD and FSB responded by pumping the theater full of a still unknown gas that incapacitated everyone inside. Once the gas had done its job, the soldiers entered and shot every terrorist, regardless of if they were unconscious or not. The Russian government was unwilling to negotiate with these actual terrorists and responded with an incredibly brutal military assault. The Russian counterterrorism campaign built on the military and eschewed all but the most hollow of positive inducements.

The Russian counterterrorism strategy was a very violent one. It was also a strategy that resulted in numerous civilian deaths, not only in Grozny and the surrounding areas, but also at home in Russia. Relying on the military and neglecting to negotiate resulted in a counterterrorism campaign that falls very close to the war point on the field of different strategies.

Independent Variables

In the Russian case there are a number of variables that have a significant impact on the counterterrorism strategy that emerged in response to the Chechen conflict. Examining each one individually will provide greater insight into how they each affect the campaign.

Traditional Explanations

120 Cronin “Russia and Chechnya” 397.
In this case, the causal relationship between regime type and counterterrorism actually flows in the opposite direction. In most cases, the strength of the democracy in question limits the options available to combat terrorism. In Russia's case however, the terrorist threat is directly involved in the reshaping of Russian democracy. In September 2004 a group of Chechen terrorists took more than 1,000 people hostage in a school in the village of Beslan in North Ossetia. Russian security forces responded with a raid that resulted in the deaths of over 300 hundred of the hostages. In the wake of this disaster, President Vladimir Putin greatly strengthened the executive by passing reforms that gave the president authority to appoint all 89 of Russia's governors and modified election policies so that representatives to the Duma were elected solely by party list, largely eliminating local influence from national politics. These changes were presented as necessary to help avert such a tragedy from recurring in the future.

In Russia the counterterrorism campaign is directly affecting the quality of democracy. Instead of limiting the counterterrorism campaign, democracy is being warped by it. A process of securitization may be occurring around the issue of terrorism, making it easier to enact broad changes to the rule of democracy. If Russian democracy is so tenuous that it is affected by a counterterrorism campaign, then clearly it does not play a large part in shaping the counterterrorism strategy.

Russia has ample resources available to it in the fight against the Chechen threat. In 2005 the country had 90,000 troops deployed in Chechnya to fight an enemy that consisted of between 1,600 and 1,800 people. Yet despite this seeming abundance of personnel there were problems. The Russian troops were often poorly equipped, undertrained, and received inadequate

122 Kramer “Counterinsurgency” 12.
healthcare. Although Russia was able to field a large number of soldiers, they often could not afford to properly supply them.

While the Chechen rebels were well armed and effective in combat, they did not pose a large threat to the Russian state because their cause was not popular with the Russian public. However, Russia did fear that the Chechens might encourage other minorities to try and secede as well. Such copycat antics would threaten the state, and so the government feared the Chechens not for the damage they might do, but for what they might inspire others to do. The Chechens were a significant threat because Russia was worried about what the consequences of a Chechen victory might be.

The resources available do not seem to have dictated the nature of the counterterrorism operation. Rather, they affected the success of the operation, but given the shortcomings of the military for the task, it seems unlikely that resources played a part in the decision to use military force.

With the large number of security agencies involved in the conflict in Chechnya, it seems inevitable that bureaucratic politics would play a role in shaping the counterterrorism strategy. However, merely uncovering the interplay between these groups does not explain why they behaved the way they did. Answering that question will illuminate how bureaucratic politics shaped the Russian counterterrorism campaign.

The primary manner in which this bureaucratic minefield affected the campaign was simply the effects of its sheer mass. There were 13 separate security agencies operating in

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123 Ibid. 16.
Chechnya during the war. Their lack of coordination often resulted in massive waste and redundancy. The MVD purchased its own armored troop train without consulting the Federal Railroad Troops Command and ended up with a train that was more expensive than, and inferior to, the ones the government already had. This misallocation of resources has hampered the ability of the Russian government to present a united military presence in Chechnya.

This failure to communicate extends beyond the procurement departments of these agencies. The FSB and MVD clash often on counterterrorism decisions and are loathe to share intelligence or engage in joint operations. In order to correct this counterproductive behavior, the Unified Grouping of Federal Forces (OGV) was created to coordinate all operations within Chechnya. Yet even this supposedly independent office could not escape the powerful influences of the security agencies; it was subordinated to the FSB until control was handed over to the MVD in 2003. Even after the creation of an office to manage all of the disparate security agencies, they still continued to exert their own individual influence.

If these security agencies can thwart all attempts to rein them in, then it is clear that each has a large degree of influence and greatly values its autonomy. The independence of these agencies means that each one was eager to get its share of action in the Chechen conflict. If one had refrained from joining in, then it would risk losing influence to other security agencies. As a result, the fierce competition between agencies led to a counterterrorism strategy that was heavily reliant on them.

125 Kramer "Counterinsurgency" 12-15.
One example that illustrates how the power of these agencies shaped Russian counterterrorism is the election of Akhmad Kadyrov. Putin's government supported the idea of electing a compliant Chechen whom they could then devolve responsibility for prosecuting the conflict to. However, the FSB categorically opposed endorsing anything other than a total military victory. A political solution would have meant accepting that the FSB had failed to resolve that conflict by its methods and such an admission would threaten the agency's standing within the government. The FSB's resistance to a political solution meant that the campaign would continue on as a strictly military affair.

In addition to competition within the military, the military as a whole had a vested interest in being the tool of choice for fighting the Chechens. The country's military elite felt humiliated after the conclusion of the first Chechen war. This new conflict offered them the opportunity to restore their lost honor and repair their standing with the government. Accordingly, the military strongly pushed to be included in the counterterrorism campaign as a means of redeeming themselves.

While this information makes clear the ways in which bureaucratic politics affected the Russian counterterrorism strategy, the motivations of many of these agencies remain unclear. However there are some insights into why the military acted like it did. The Russian military high command resisted modernizing the Chechen campaign because they feared doing so would expose the inefficiencies and inadequacies of the command structure. They decided against a more effective strategy because updating the Chechen operation would draw a stark contrast with

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128 Cronin "Russia and Chechnya" 398.
129 Russell Chechnya – Russia's 'War on Terror' 76.
130 Baev "Chechnya and the Russian Military" 129-130.
their aging and ineffectual structure. Their self-interest prevented a more organized and cohesive strategy, thus allowing bureaucratic politics space to shape policy.

The Chechen campaign was directly connected with the electoral politics of Russia in a very concrete way. Both Yeltsin and Putin used the Chechen conflict as a campaign issue.\footnote{Russell Chechnya – Russia’s ‘War on Terror’ 69-70.} After the 1999 apartment bombings, Putin responded to Russian desires to exterminate the Chechen adversary at any cost.\footnote{Sergei Kovalev. “Putin’s War.” The New York Review of Books. 10 Feb. 2000.} For this promise, he was well rewarded in subsequent elections.

This success can be easily seen by comparing major actions in the Chechen conflict with Putin’s popularity among the Russian people. Emil Pain quotes a Russian study that tracked Putin’s approval rating during the course of the war. After the beginning of the Second Chechen War, the assault on Grozny itself, and the Dubrovka Theater crisis Putin experienced a significant increase in approval ratings. Only the Beslan School Siege negatively affected with, with a 2-4% drop, but this dip only lasted one month.\footnote{Emil Pain. “The Chechen War in the Context of Contemporary Russian Politics.” Chechnya: From Past to Future. Ed. Richard Sakwa. London: Anthem Press, 2005. 71.} What is clear is that the public responded to Putin’s actions in the fight against Chechen terrorism.

However, it is also clear that Putin understood this relationship and deliberately exploited it. During his first State of the Federation address, he spoke extensively about the need for military action in Chechnya even though the campaign had not come under attack yet.\footnote{Ibid. 72.} By going out of his way to justify the campaign, Putin demonstrated that he intentionally used the operation as a way to gain approval from voters. Instead of shying away from the military’s
actions in Chechnya, Putin took ownership of them and clearly used his success in fighting the insurgents to further his political career.

Ethnic Discrimination

Ethnic discrimination played a significant role in shaping Russian counterterrorist policy through both ethnic mistrust and ethnic identity. Each mechanism affected the final strategy differently but each had a notable impact.

The options available to combat Chechen terrorists were severely limited by ethnic mistrust. Alexander Litivinenko alleged that FSB and MVD intelligence officers refused to recruit Chechens to infiltrate terrorist networks because they feared that any operatives would betray them and simply pass information to the terrorists. Without detailed intelligence, Russian troops were forced to rely on brute force military operations intended to defeat terrorists in combat.

The necessity of employing violent confrontations with Chechen terrorists suited the Russian public who felt their ethnic identity threatened by the Chechens. Displays of overt racism against Chechens are common in Russian society. These attitudes can be seen in Russian labeling of Chechens as “wolves” and “blacks” despite that most Chechens are light skinned. Calling them wolves dehumanizes them while referring to them as blacks signals that Russians view them as just another inferior minority. The result of these perspectives is that the

135 Kramer “Guerrilla Warfare” 249.
136 Cronin “Russia and Chechnya” 387.
137 Russell Chechnya – Russia’s ‘War on Terror’ 60-64.
Russian public favored aerial bombardment and the use of chemical weapons against the Chechens.¹³⁸ Such harsh tactics are a natural position when the Chechens are viewed as inferior.

However, such behavior seems contradictory to Russia's actions in the First Chechen War, which involved negotiation. There is a key difference between the two cases though. The first war was widely criticized and unpopular, while the second enjoyed broad support from the Russian public. Yeltsin wanted to end the first war quickly through negotiation and compromise to try and avoid paying political costs. Conversely, Putin's actions met with approval from the people, meaning he could continue to fight the war without facing political costs. The unpopularity of the first war led to its negotiated settlement while the second war's popularity allowed it to continue to its violent end.

Interestingly, Russians' fear of the Chechens may derive from the fact that by virtue of being ethnic separatists, they remind the Russian public that ethnicity exists. When Russia removed ethnicity as a category from internal passports, Minister of Nationalities Valery Tishkov justified the move on the grounds that focusing on ethnicity causes conflict. His decisions reflected a fear that Russia might suffer from a breakup along ethnic lines the same way the Soviet Union did.¹³⁹ This viewpoint sees ethnicity as threatening because it holds the potential to split the state. Ethnic minorities are dangerous because they endanger the ethnic identity of the state. Russians have called for harsh policies against the Chechens because merely being forced to acknowledge that the Chechens are an active ethnic group undermines the state's integrity.

¹³⁸ Evangelista *The Chechen Wars* 75.
¹³⁹ Aktürk "Regimes of Ethnicity" 146-148.
Ethnic opportunism played a small but important role in Russia’s counterterrorism efforts. The Moscow apartment bombings in 1999 provided the government with the perfect opportunity to vilify the Chechens. Any actions taken in the region could be justified to the public based on the heinous crime of these bombings. This opportunism is in line with the limited use of positive inducements in dealing with the Chechens.

Ethnic discrimination affected Russia’s counterterrorism strategy by limiting the non-military options available, and exhibiting a preference for military operations among the public. Military operations are both a tactical necessity and a crowd pleaser.

Conclusion

The Russian counterterrorism campaign is clearly a very close relative of the war model. The largest factors behind this strategy are ethnic discrimination and bureaucratic politics. Each of the many security agencies exhibits a high degree of autonomy and did much to make sure it would not be shut out of the conflict. Ethnic discrimination limits the state’s response to military ones on both a strategic and public approval level.

The massive post-Soviet military divisions made it unlikely that a police based approach would ever be implemented. In addition, the significant discrimination against Chechens in Russian society meant that no serious conciliatory measures would arise; it is difficult to offer positive inducements to people who seem to threaten the very existence of your state. These two elements combined to produce an exceedingly bloody campaign that attempted to beat the Chechens into submission without ever being forced to acknowledge them or their grievances.

However, recently Russian efforts in Chechnya have taken a slightly different direction. The city of Grozny has been revitalized and is experiencing a period of peace and growth that
stands in stark contrast to its earlier treatment under the Russian counterterrorism program. The city is enjoying such success under the leadership of Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov, son of assassinated former president Akhmad Kadyrov.\textsuperscript{140} Like his father, Ramzan is Russia's chosen leader in Chechnya. The economic development under him would appear to be evidence of positive inducements from Russia to the Chechen people. However, these developments might shift the Russian strategy from all out war to a more controlled counterinsurgency; things are far from peaceful in Chechnya as Kadyrov has a checkered human rights record and his government uses paramilitary forces to deal with rivals.\textsuperscript{141} Even though Russia is now offering positive inducements through Kadyrov's government, the military character of its counterterrorism campaign has not been abandoned.

At first glance, the shift from a war paradigm to a counterinsurgency one seems puzzling. The point of the war approach is to destroy the terrorist group entirely, and abandoning it would be tantamount to admitting that it had failed. However, the description of Russia's strategy as "extraordinary violence, followed by extraordinary investment" offers some insight into their thinking.\textsuperscript{142} By beginning with a very violent counterterrorism strategy, Russia was able to neutralize much of the Chechen resistance. Following it up with massive investment in development and quality of life can help pacify many of the people caught in the crossfire. Those who lost their homes in the fighting are less likely to resist the government if they receive new ones. Providing new jobs in the region will prevent others from becoming dissatisfied with Russian rule. It appears that the Russian strategy was to militarily crush the rebels and then buy the loyalty of everyone else in the region. Understanding the forces that led to this final phase of

\textsuperscript{141} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{142} Ibid.
the Russian counterterrorism strategy will require more investigation, but it appears that it may represent a recognition on Russia's part that combating terrorism produces consequences that must be dealt with.
Great Britain and the IRA

The conflict in Northern Ireland during the latter half of the 20th century was incredibly long and violent. At its heart, it was a struggle over the fate of Northern Ireland: whether it should remain a part of the United Kingdom, or if it should unite with the Republic of Ireland and secede. Loyalists and republicans fought over this question for decades. The British response was a large-scale operation that saw police and military units working together to combat the threat of the IRA.

With such a large, long-lasting operation, the opportunity to study how states form their counterterrorism strategies is highly attractive. There were a number of factors at play in shaping British policy in Northern Ireland and examining how they affected it offers insight into the ways in which counterterrorism policy is made. Additionally, such a long period of time offers opportunities to discover the conditions under which a state might shift its strategy over the course of a counterterrorism campaign.

Background

The Troubles, as the period of conflict between 1968 and 1998 is known, were a clash over whether Ireland should stay divided or reunite and withdraw from the United Kingdom. This divide in visions for the future of Ireland emerged as a result of the nation's tumultuous history with Britain. Although this hostility was centuries old, the events of the Irish War for Independence in the early 1900s had the largest influence.

The relationship between Ireland and England has been a strained one for hundreds of years. After ruling Ireland like a colonial holding, the British began a program of transporting
protestant settlers into the northern region of largely catholic Ireland in 1609.\textsuperscript{143} Over the next several centuries the British violently put down a series of revolts by the catholic population in Ireland. The British hoped that filling the region with protestant supporters would result in a more compliant Ireland. However, the small number of settlers meant that they largely stayed in the northern province of Ulster and their influence over the country as a whole was limited.

At the start of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century the country was divided into nationalists, who wished to see Ireland independent of England, and unionists, who wanted to stay under British rule. Nationalists who employed violent tactics to free Ireland were referred to as republicans and unionists that used violence were called loyalists.\textsuperscript{144} These tensions eventually came to a head and precipitated the Irish War of Independence that lasted from 1919 to 1921. At the conclusion of the war, the Anglo-Irish Treaty divided the island into Northern Ireland, which remained a part of the United Kingdom, and the Irish Free State, which eventually became the independent Republic of Ireland.\textsuperscript{145} Although this division created a temporary peace, it did not resolve the deep seated problems plaguing Ireland.

The Troubles themselves were a direct result of the protestant reaction to the catholic civil rights movement in Northern Ireland in the late 1960s. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) was a republican group that had fought in the Irish War of Independence from 1919 to 1921.\textsuperscript{146} Although it would later splinter to from the Provisional IRA, the group was the premiere Irish republican group at the time. In response to several civil rights marches, the Royal Ulster

\textsuperscript{145} Dillon \textit{The Dirty War} 2-6.
Constabulary (RUC) – the largely protestant police force – abused numerous protestors leading to outrage among the catholic community. The widespread anger at the failure of the Northern Irish authorities to protect these civil rights marchers was a primary factor in the eventual formation of the Provisional IRA.\(^\text{147}\) While the Provisional IRA did not split from the IRA – afterwards referred to as the Official IRA – until 1970, these events catalyzed a faction within the IRA who wished to take a more proactive role in Northern Ireland to protect their fellow Catholics.

As the Provisional IRA increased activity in Northern Ireland, the authorities sought to contain the spreading violence. They introduced a policy of internment without trial whereby those suspected of being IRA members could be arrested and held without being charged; the goal was not to prosecute suspects but to hinder the IRA. However, this policy backfired as the number of attacks increased dramatically after it was implemented.\(^\text{148}\) With the situation deteriorating, the British government deployed the army to keep the peace and protect the Catholics from further abuse. While the soldiers were intended to protect the catholic population from further abuses by the protestant authorities, they frequently sided with those same authorities. Their mission was to preserve order and that meant propping up the government of Northern Ireland, located in Stormont. As a result, the soldiers quickly came to be identified with the Stormont government. After a violent crackdown on riots in Belfast, the IRA was easily able


to portray the soldiers as enemies of the nationalist cause. Catholic unrest only continued to grow as each security solution made the situation worse in their eyes.

It was against this backdrop that the events of Bloody Sunday unfolded. An illegal civil rights march through Derry in Northern Ireland was violently broken up by British soldiers and resulted in 13 deaths. The division assigned to arrest the protestors, the 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment, was one of the most combat hardened units of the entire British military and was known to have a “shoot first” attitude. As they began the arrest operation, chaos broke out and the soldiers of 1 Para began firing. After the shooting ceased, 13 marchers were dead. Soon after, the Provisional IRA (hereafter referred to simply as the IRA) began a campaign of violence intended to reunite the two Irelands to protect Catholics from protestant abuses.

Timeframe

The Troubles lasted from the unrest in 1968 until the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. This case study examines British counterterrorism policy over this entire period. Analyzing their strategy over such a long period offers several benefits. First, it offers a complete picture of British counterterrorism efforts from their inception to success. Second, it makes it possible to determine the factors that were responsible for shifts in British policy over time. Third, it follows the campaign across multiple prime ministers, which allows for analysis of the forces behind policy rather than the actions of individual leaders. Careful examination of the Troubles offers many insights into the factors behind British counterterrorism strategy in Northern Ireland.

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149 Dillon *The Dirty War* 212.
150 Mullan *Bloody Sunday* 11-18.
Overview of the Conflict

Perhaps unsurprising, given the length of time they lasted for, the Troubles featured a number of different tactics from both the IRA and the British security forces. These attacks took their toll in human lives and economic damage throughout the conflict.

The IRA’s tactics focused on making British involvement in Northern Ireland politically untenable at home in England. After realizing that killing civilians hurt their support, the IRA targeted soldiers and economic targets in an extensive bombing campaign designed to undermine support for the military operations. They also attempted to assassinate several British politicians, including Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. More directly, they attempted to undermine support for the war by targeting off duty soldiers in Northern Ireland. They conducted extensive operations where young women lured soldiers they met at pubs and social gatherings to isolated areas or IRA safehouses. Once there, IRA gunmen would arrive and kill the soldiers. Targeting soldiers aimed to reduce support for the war by causing an increasing tide of young men returning home to England in coffins.

As the bombing campaign continued, it became far more sophisticated. At first their bombs used simple time delay mechanisms, but to better avoid detection they developed bombs that used radio control technology. To counter this, the British devised a jamming device that prevented these bombs from detonating. In response, the IRA created bombs that used electronic

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151 Richardson “Britain and the IRA” 72-73.
152 Ibid.
153 Dillon The Dirty War 212-223.
detonations systems that bypassed British countermeasures.\textsuperscript{154} This arms race between the IRA and the British forces continued throughout the duration of the conflict.

However, the IRA did not limit its operations to Northern Ireland and occasionally attacked targets in England itself. They bombed multiple pubs in England to try and bring their cause to the British public. Yet the majority of their efforts were focused on combating the security forces at home in Northern Ireland.

The IRA’s strategy largely relied on targeting its opponents intelligently. It quickly avoided unnecessary casualties once the cost they had for the organization’s support became apparent. As the conflict continued, the group became more organized in its bomb making as well as in its organization, making it a serious foe for the British.

Analysis of the British Counterterrorism Strategy

Describing the character of the British counterterrorism strategy in Northern Ireland is no easy task. Throughout the course of the conflict the British employed a number of different strategies against the IRA. This broad range of tactics means that the campaign does not neatly fit into one of the typology’s ideal classifications. However, an accurate description can be found by examining British tactics over the course of the entire conflict. With all of this information in hand, it becomes possible to divide the British counterterrorism efforts into discrete phases. Analyzing the factors responsible for policy in each of these phases gives a good understanding of how they affect counterterrorism policy more generally.

The police-military balance of counterterrorism efforts shifted multiple times during the course of the conflict. Initially, the military wanted to use its units in the lightest roles possible;
preventing them from becoming overly involved in the conflict meant that a quick withdrawal would be easier.\textsuperscript{155} They were intended to bolster the local security forces rather than serve a direct role in the conflict. These soldiers were deployed as a temporary measure to preserve order and protect the Catholics.\textsuperscript{156} The British Army was only willing to accept a larger role for the military once they realized that the IRA had grown from a handful of terrorists to a significant operation bordering on an insurgency.\textsuperscript{157} Although initially unwilling to commit to the conflict, the military soon found itself occupying a prominent role within the British counterterrorism strategy.

Although they ended up bogged down in the conflict, the British took extensive steps at the beginning to avoid that result. They created the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR), which was a regiment of the British Army recruited locally in Northern Ireland. However, the UDR soon proved ineffective because it was thoroughly penetrated by loyalists and quickly came to serve as a source of intelligence and training for them.\textsuperscript{158} As a result, the UDR frequently aided loyalist paramilitaries instead of protecting Catholics from them.\textsuperscript{159} This failure meant that the British Army was forced to stay in Northern Ireland and fill the role intended for the UDR.

As the years went on, the British government finally decided that it could no longer support the conflict due to its high cost and the large number of casualties. In 1974 they began a policy known as Ulsterisation, which consisted of decreasing the number of British soldiers serving in Northern Ireland while increasing the ranks of the local security forces. This process is commonly thought of as an attempt by the British to merely pass off the cost of the conflict to

\textsuperscript{155} Neumann \textit{Britain's Long War} 51-52.
\textsuperscript{156} Richardson “Britain and the IRA” 75.
\textsuperscript{157} Neumann \textit{Britain's Long War} 54.
\textsuperscript{158} Dillon \textit{The Dirty War} 192.
\textsuperscript{159} Richardson “Britain and the IRA” 79.
Northern Ireland itself. Under this interpretation, the role of the police and military in the conflict did not change, rather the military involved in the conflict transitioned from the British Army to the UDR. However, this account is incorrect. Careful examination of strength figures for both the UDR and the RUC by Peter R. Neumann reveals otherwise. After the advent of Ulsterisation in 1974-75, the RUC’s numbers grew significantly while the UDR experience almost no growth. Ulsterisation was not a simple buck-pass but rather an attempt to demilitarize the conflict.

This strategy of demilitarization is reflected by changes in troop levels in Northern Ireland throughout the duration of the conflict. The strength of the British Army units in Northern Ireland, the UDR, and the RUC are depicted in figure 2. These numbers represent figures from 1969 to the end of the conflict in 1999.

\[\textit{Ibid. 365-375.}\]
The number of British soldiers grew quickly at first, and then began to decline in 1974 before leveling off in 1985. In 1969 the British Army had only 2,700 soldiers present in Northern Ireland, but by 1973 this number had grown almost tenfold to 25,343 soldiers. The small initial deployment reflected desires within the British army to take on a minimal role and withdraw quickly, while the rapid growth before 1973 represents the British realization that the IRA was a formidable foe. After the introduction of Ulsterisation in 1974, the numbers of British soldiers
fell steadily until 1985 when there were an all time low 16,194 soldiers in Northern Ireland. For
the next 14 years the number of soldiers fluctuated without exceeding 18,412, and when they
finally began to withdraw in 1999, there were only 16,200 left.\footnote{Neumann \textit{Britain's Long War} appendices 189-190.} After 1974 the number of
soldiers declined significantly and then varied slightly for the remainder of the conflict.

The UDR experienced a similar though less pronounced decline in its numbers after
Ulsterisation began. It reached its peak in 1972 with 8,476 members, but had only declined by
about 800 members in 1974. From 1975 onwards the UDR witnessed a steady decline in
numbers until in 1999 they had only 4,377 soldiers. Conversely, the RUC’s numbers grew
throughout the duration of the entire conflict. In 1969 they had only 3,500 members. By 1974
their ranks had grown by a modest thousand police officers to reach 4,563. However, during
Ulsterisation the RUC experience rapid growth, expanding to 8,003 officers by 1983. By 1999
the RUC had 8,465 personnel.\footnote{Ibid.} Although its growth slowed as the conflict continued, the RUC
doubled in size in only ten years.

The numbers of the police and military changed dramatically during the conflict. What
began as a police operation quickly became strongly dominated by the military, before being
gradually demilitarized and returned to the police. This complicated picture defies easy
categorization of the British counterterrorism efforts as reliant on either the police or military.

Taken together, these data and the narrative behind them offer the necessary information
to locate British efforts along the police-military continuum. Analyzing them yields several
insights into the police-military balance of the conflict. First, either extreme from the axis can be
excluded because the strategy never relied entirely on one force over the other. Second, although
England employed large numbers of soldiers early on, they only did so because local police forces were inadequate, which demonstrates a desire to use the police when possible. Third, as the conflict continued, the trajectory was towards greater reliance on the police. Finally, at the end of the conflict, the RUC’s numbers were steady while the UDR’s continued to decline. For these reasons, the British response to the IRA is located very close to the center of the police-military gradient, but it resides on the side of the police.

Finding the place of Britain’s efforts on the positive-negative inducement spectrum is not much easier. Their strategy can be briefly summarized as negative inducements for the rank and file of the IRA, with positive inducements for the leadership. The use of internment without trial was a serious disincentive to membership in the IRA, or any republican organization, because it was incredibly difficult for the accused to fight. This practice was replaced by detention with the Detention of Terrorists Order (Northern Ireland) 1972, under which detainees were granted the right to appeal their imprisonment within 12 months. Although this represented a reduction of negative inducements, other actions would strengthen them.

The British used emergency legislation extensively during the Troubles, and the vast majority of it offered negative inducements to members of the IRA. The Prevention of Terrorism Act increased powers of arrest and detention after Birmingham pub bombing in 1974, and the Criminal Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act restricted the right to silence after Omagh bombing in 1998. Both of these acts increased the ability for law enforcement to convict suspected terrorists, offering a strong incentive against participation in terrorism.

165 Richardson “Britain and the IRA” 85.
This trend towards expanding the legal tools available to punish terrorists was exemplified by the Diplock Courts. They abolished the right to a jury trial and created a judicial system that was strongly biased towards the state. A system that was concerned not with justice and the truth but with supporting the state’s counterterrorism efforts was a strong negative incentive against terrorism. These laws were a constant danger to anyone who was a member of the IRA.

In contrast to this treatment, the British repeatedly tried to engage with the leadership of the IRA. A 1972 negotiation with the IRA ultimately proved fruitless but it convinced the British government that talking to the IRA would be essential for any practical solution to the conflict. Evidently the British heeded this lesson because the Good Friday Agreement eventually ended the Troubles in 1998. This political settlement, accompanied by decommissioning of arms, was reached after extensive talks between the England, the IRA, and unionist groups in Northern Ireland. England succeeded in forging this peaceful solution because they engaged the moderate leadership of the IRA to offer “incentive[s] for abandoning violence in favor of politics.” This political solution is a very clear example of a positive inducement away from terrorism. The Good Friday Agreement succeeded because it was a largely consociational power sharing agreement that guaranteed representation for both sides in the new government. By finding a politically acceptable compromise, the British were able to convince the IRA to abandon violence as a tactic.

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166 Walsh *Bloody Sunday and the Rule of Law in Northern Ireland* 229-233.
167 Richardson "Britain and the IRA" 91.
169 Richardson “Britain and the IRA” 92.
Looking back at the course of the conflict, the Troubles can be divided into two distinct periods. The first, which takes place from 1969 to 1983, was characterized military dominance in counterterrorism. At the beginning of this period, the number of soldiers grew dramatically, and although it began to decrease with the introduction of Ulsterisation in 1974, the military was still the primary counterterrorism agent until 1983. During this period the mix of positive and negative inducements described earlier was introduced, so the British strategy falls in the middle on the inducement axis, while leaning heavily toward the military on the other axis. The second period, from 1984 to 1998, witnessed a continuing increase in the number of police officers and a decreasing emphasis on the importance of the military. Since the inducements held relatively steady into this period the British strategy again lies in the middle of that axis, with the other leaning towards the police.

British counterterrorism efforts in Northern Ireland can be divided into two phases. The first phase can be described as military-heavy with a balance of inducements, while the second can be described as police-heavy with a balance of inducements. Analyzing the factors at play during each of these periods can give insight into how they affect counterterrorism policy.

Independent Variables

Given the complicated nature of Britain’s counterterrorism strategy in Northern Ireland, untangling the roles played by the numerous independent variables is a highly important task. Looking at each variable in turn reveals its influence over British policy in a given period of the conflict. By examining them separately, their overall influence can be determined.
Traditional Explanations

The strength of England’s democracy had a significant impact on the trajectory of counterterrorism policy in Northern Ireland. These effects were visible in the use of anti-terrorism legislation and the primacy of the judicial system in Britain’s strategy. Neither of these outcomes would have occurred in a society where the rule of law was weak or did not command respect.

The respect for the rule of law in England was reflected in the extensive use of legislation to fight terrorists throughout the duration of the conflict. The Prevention of Terrorism Act, which was passed in 1974, gave authorities expanded powers to arrest, try, and convict terrorists. As the conflict continued, this legislation was amended in 1976, 1984, and 1989. The decision to update this law over the course of the Troubles demonstrates the importance of the rule of law to England. Instead, of simply allowing the army to do whatever it deemed necessary, civilian politicians carefully expanded these powers through gradual legislative change.

In addition to anti-terrorism legislation, the British relied heavily on the judiciary to combat the IRA. The Diplock Courts were born when a commission was convened to determine if modifying the “administration of justice” was necessary to more effectively combat terrorism. Although the Diplock Courts undermined many of the protections enshrined in the British legal system, they represented an attempt to fight the IRA within the existing framework of the legal system. The decision not to throw out this system was a result of the strong respect for the rule of law in England.

171 Walsh _Bloody Sunday and the Rule of Law in Northern Ireland_ 220.
The clearest indicator of the effect England’s democracy had on its counterterrorism strategy was the process of criminalization. This program classified terrorism as an ordinary crime instead of a political act, and was only possible because of the strong respect for the rule of law in British society.\(^{173}\) Only a strong judiciary with a long history would be trusted to handle the extreme cases that terrorism would present. Criminalization did not mean that the justice system had been entirely subordinated to the needs of fighting the IRA. Multiple wardens were brought to court during the Troubles over unacceptable conditions in their prisons.\(^{174}\) Even though the justice system was being used to fight terrorism, it retained provisions designed to protect prisoners. Criminalization was an available option to the British because of their respect for the rule of law.

While criminalization was possible because of the rule of law in England, it may have actually weakened it in the long run. Over time, criminalization normalized emergency legislation designed to fight terrorism and made these harsh measures more acceptable. This shift may have been responsible for a decline in respect for the rule of law; England has the most violations of any nation in the European Court of Human Rights since its inception.\(^{175}\) Even though criminalization was designed to reduce the violence of the conflict, it may have normalized extreme penalties and unfair legal rules in the long run. This shift is similar to securitization but slightly different. Where securitization reflects a change in the level of justification needed for actions against terrorism, this normalization was the result of people becoming accustomed to the negative impacts of antiterrorist legislation over time. The rule of

\(^{173}\) Ibid. 77-79.


\(^{175}\) Gormally et al. “Criminal Justice in a Divided Society” 79.
law may have been weakened in England by the extraordinary legal measures taken against the IRA.

Regime type played a large part in shaping England’s counterterrorism strategy in Northern Ireland. The strength of democracy and respect for the rule of law meant certain policies were more easily implemented than others. Additionally, the British strategy of criminalization was only workable because the country had a strong judiciary that people trusted to deal with terrorists. However, these policies may have eroded the rule of law in the long run. Even though these long-term effects are unclear, the strength of England’s democracy had a clear role it shaping efforts to combat the IRA.

The strength of the IRA had an influence on British policy in Northern Ireland. The group’s resources forced the British government to take the threat seriously and allocate real resources to deal with it.

The IRA possessed considerable resources that made it a serious threat. Its arsenal contained handguns, rifles, assault rifles, explosive, rockets and bombs. It received considerable material support from abroad, especially from Libya, which attempted to ship 150 tons of arms to the IRA. Although this shipment was seized off the coast of France aboard the *Eskund*, other shipments did make it to Northern Ireland. Beyond these concrete resources, the IRA received extensive financial support from Irish immigrants living in America. This support was not limited to money however as these Irish supporters were also responsible for stealing enough ammunition for 8,000 soldiers from an American military base. These resources made

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176 Coogan *The IRA* 433.
177 Ibid. 598-591.
178 Ibid. 456.
the IRA a significant threat to British control of Northern Ireland. Such a significant threat explains why the British were to quick to deploy large numbers of soldiers to Northern Ireland.

Given the participation of both the police and the military in Northern Ireland, it is hardly surprising that bureaucratic politics had a large role in shaping counterterrorism policy. However, the interplay of different agencies was not limited to just the security forces and affected legislative attempts to combat terrorism as well. Tracing the ways in which different branches of government affected policy gives an impression of how bureaucratic politics influenced the overall strategy.

When troops were initially sent to Northern Ireland, it was done with the understanding that it was a short-term mission to provide temporary assistance. The military was unwilling to commit to a long deployment because they feared being tied up in Northern Ireland would hurt their readiness against a potential Soviet threat in Europe. In retrospect the military was right to be worried because it soon found itself committing ten times as many soldiers as it had intended. Another area where the British government failed to heed the military’s warning was internment. The Army objected to the policy of internment because they feared it would backfire, but they were overruled. The army was responsible for the initial underprepared response to the IRA, but they were also ignored when they offered sound advice on internment.

In addition to ignoring certain agencies, coordination between them proved difficult once counterterrorism efforts began. There were multiple officials in disparate branches of government who had responsibility for the situation in Northern Ireland in some capacity or another. Anti-terrorist legislation was the responsibility of the Home Secretary, the police in

179 Richardson “Britain and the IRA” 78.
180 Neumann Britain’s Long War 56-57.
Northern Ireland were under the direction of the Northern Ireland Secretary, and the army in Northern Ireland was controlled by the General Officer Commanding Northern Ireland.\(^{181}\) Counterterrorism policy was the result of decisions made by officials from the military and different branches of the civilian government. Making matters worse, each organization had its own intelligence agency. Beyond the usual difficulties redundancies produced by this arrangement, rivalries often resulted in the arrest of informants working for other agencies.\(^{182}\) British intelligence policy in Northern Ireland was the result of competing security agencies and poor coordination.

Bureaucratic politics played a large role in shaping British counterterrorism strategy throughout the conflict. It led to the uncoordinated initial response to IRA attacks and undermined counterterrorism efforts as the Troubles continued. This confusion is unexpected because of the number of different agencies involved in the conflict. Using the combination of police and military to fight the IRA meant that the interaction between the various agencies was guaranteed to shape the nature of counterterrorism efforts as the conflict continued. Bureaucratic politics affected strategy throughout the Troubles because the many different agencies operating in Northern Ireland meant that there was ample opportunity for miscommunication and distrust.

Electoralism played a very minor role in creating British policy in Northern Ireland. The conflict had very little electoral salience at home in England due to the country’s professionalized military.\(^{183}\) The bombing of pubs in England such as the Birmingham Pub Bombing may have been an attempt by the IRA to force British attention to the conflict, but they were not particularly successful. One possible reason that Northern Ireland was not a serious

\(^{181}\) Richardson "Britain and the IRA" 76.
\(^{182}\) Ibid. 82.
\(^{183}\) Ibid. 75.
electoral issue is that it is geographically removed from the rest of the United Kingdom. Since people in England were in relatively little danger from the IRA, other issues became more important for them during elections. Electoral concerns played a bigger role in IRA strategy than in British counterterrorism policy.

Ethnic Discrimination

While the Troubles were not an ethnic conflict, they were a religiously based one. They were not caused by a conflict over resources or disagreements over ideology. A person’s religion is part of their identity much like their ethnicity. Shirin Akiner argues that religion has been an important force for political mobilization in Central Asia during the past 150 years in the same way that ethnicity has. Additionally, in Central Asia religion and ethnicity have intertwined as they’ve shaped identity. In this example, ethnicity and religion are shown to be similar in terms of political mobilization, and terrorism is certainly a political act. So while the Troubles were not an ethnic conflict, they were motivated by powerful identity concerns, which means they can be viewed as equivalent to an ethnic conflict.

The religious identity of England did not seriously factor into its counterterrorism strategy. Although England’s national identity is somewhat based on Protestantism, this does not factor into counterterrorism policy. The United Kingdom had already survived the secession of the Republic of Ireland, so catholic activities in Northern Ireland did not seriously threaten the state’s religious identity.

Where religious differences did play a large difference was in the range of options available for the British in counterterrorism operations. In-group policing failed in Northern Ireland because of religious mistrust. Tensions were largely a result of employment discrimination against Catholics by the Protestant majority. An investigation by the Northern Ireland government after the civil rights unrest of the 60s concluded that discrimination against Catholics, especially in the public sector, was rampant.\textsuperscript{185} When the RUC was reformed at the beginning of the conflict, there were expectations that up to a third of its membership would be catholic, but this number never reached higher than 12\%.\textsuperscript{186} The blatantly partisan nature of the RUC severely limited its ability to gather intelligence from the catholic community. The extent of this mistrust was reflected in the high levels of segregation between Protestants and Catholics in Belfast.\textsuperscript{187} Further hampering efforts at outreach to Catholics, false convictions of Catholics were common while the system often failed to convict loyalist groups.\textsuperscript{188} Religious discrimination engendered high levels of religious distrust, which prevented the use of tactics that engaged Catholics in Northern Ireland.

British counterterrorism policy was largely shaped by the constraints placed on it by religious mistrust. Religious identity did not play a large part because the Republic of Ireland had already seceded from the United Kingdom. Religious opportunism did not play a role because England is very wealthy and had no need to protect the economy of Northern Ireland. Religious mistrust seriously limited the available counterterrorism options and shaped policy.

\textsuperscript{186} Coogan \textit{The IRA} 150.
\textsuperscript{188} Richardson "Britain and the IRA" 88-90.
Conclusion

A few factors had the biggest impact on England’s counterterrorism policy. The nature of British democracy directly influenced their responses to the IRA threat. Bureaucratic politics contributed to the policies implemented in Northern Ireland. Religious discrimination prevented certain measures from being used. Each of these factors has clear evidence for their impact on British actions in Northern Ireland.

British counterterrorism policy was affected by these factors in combined ways. The rule of law prevented excessively harsh tactics against terrorists, while the levels of religious mistrust prevented tactics that utilized the Catholic community. The interaction and competition between the various security agencies meant that these policies were imperfectly implemented. British counterterrorism policy was strongly affected by these factors.
Conclusions

Counterterrorism policy is a special type of policy. It deals directly with protecting the security of the state, which is the primary concern of the state. Dealing with such a tricky situation inevitably entails listening to many different voices. With so much at stake, and with the security of the state threatened, responding to terrorism is no easy task. Given these high stakes, understanding how states choose their counterterrorism strategies is very important.

Examining these three case studies provides numerous important insights into the forces that shape counterterrorism policy. Each case study is a distinct situation with a unique counterterrorism response. Looking at the roles played by the independent variables in all three cases makes it possible to gauge how important each of them is to counterterrorism policy. In addition to creating a greater understanding of how these policies are formulated, this study reveals some interesting information about the nature of counterterrorism policy itself.

In each case study there are clear links between the independent variables and the type of counterterrorism employed. Turkey's weak democracy and strong ethnic national identity led to a violent military campaign against the PKK. In Russia, Putin shrewdly manipulated public perceptions of the Chechens to justify his violent policies. The strong character of British democracy prevented excesses in Northern Ireland where counterterrorism efforts employed a mix of tactics and agencies. Ethnicity, or religion in the case of Northern Ireland, played a significant part in the creation of all three counterterrorism strategies. The counterterrorism campaigns of the three cases are placed on the field of counterterrorism strategies in figure 3.
While regime type only had a significant impact in the formation of British policy in Northern Ireland, it plays unexpected roles in other cases. In Russia, counterterrorism efforts have been used as a justification for laws that have seriously altered Russian democracy. Putin was able to consolidate power in the office of the president and increase his influence over national elections. Conversely, in England, the normalization of counterterrorism policy may have weakened respect for the rule of law. The country’s high number of violations in the European Court of Human Rights indicates that its laws may be responsible for a dangerous attitude shift in law enforcement agencies and the justice system. In both of these examples, counterterrorism policy has had an unexpected impact on the character of democracy.

This backward causal effect on the independent variable highlights the gravity and importance of counterterrorism policy. It can have unintended consequences on the nature of
democracy if it is not carefully considered before being implemented. In the two states with relatively weak democracies, counterterrorism efforts were incredibly violent and offered few, if any, inducements to terrorists. Conversely, the strong English democracy produced a campaign characterized by moderate violence and a profusion of positive and negative inducements. The role of regime type in shaping counterterrorism policy is undeniably strong. In the end, all three strategies appear to be relatively effective. Turkey and Russia have crushed their enemies and now contend with only a few remnants. Similarly, the British reached a settlement with the IRA and now contend only with small splinter groups.

Resources, however, have a relatively minor impact on counterterrorism policy. Each state faced a group that posed a serious threat. However, the policy constraints they faced in confronting the terrorist groups arose from ethnic mistrust, not a lack of resources as each state mobilized significant numbers of personnel to the conflicts. Resource levels did not seriously influence counterterrorism policy because Turkey and Russia were able to deploy large contingents of their militaries, while Britain employed elements of its military as well as its police force.

Bureaucratic politics played a large role in the two cases where the response was not a purely military one. The Turkish military was the only agency to fight the PKK so it did not face any serious institutional competition. Additionally, the military was such a powerful agency that it is doubtful if any other institution could have challenged it. Yet the Russian and British response utilized both police and soldiers, necessitating the cooperation of separate agencies. The level of cooperation was frequently less than ideal however, with redundancy, and sometimes outright conflict, between agencies running rampant. It played the largest role in the British case
because of the use of both force and inducements. When the military and the justice system are engaged in a conflict, cooperation between the two will inevitably be below ideal.

Bureaucratic politics plays a large role in shaping counterterrorism policy. Unsurprisingly, the more elements employed in a counterterrorism strategy, the larger the role bureaucratic politics will play. Increasing the number of players increases the chance for conflict between them and means that the final policy will be less cohesive.

Electoralism can play a role, but only when skillful leaders take advantage of counterterrorism operations for political gain. In Turkey and England it did not play a role because in the former case the military controlled policy and in the latter the professional military meant that policy was not a serious political issue. In Russia however, Putin was able to use counterterrorism policy as an effective electoral tool. He tied himself to the campaign in Chechnya at the outset of the operation, using it to generate support for his reelection. By explicitly taking responsibility for the effort to combat terrorism, he was able to gain support for its successful execution. A side effect was that even when his efforts slipped and an attack was carried out inside Russia, he experienced a popularity boost. By making terrorism a key electoral issue, he benefitted even when he failed. Clearly, counterterrorism can be a powerful electoral tool, and so the desire to reap its benefits can be a powerful motivator of counterterrorism policy.

Ethnic discrimination played a large role in all three cases. In Turkey, the PKK threatened the ethnic component of the Turkish national identity, so the state responded with force to defeat the challenge to its national identity. In Russia, the Chechens again threatened the emerging identity of Russia as a largely minority free society of ‘Russians.’ In both of these cases, ethnic mistrust also limited the tactics available for counterterrorism efforts. Russian
security forces were unable to find informants, and were unwilling to trust any informants they did recruit. Similarly, the British failed to recruit Catholics into the Royal Ulster Constabulary, which hurt the force’s legitimacy with Catholic populations. Ethnicity did not threaten the national identity of England, but it did seriously affect the British counterterrorism strategy by limiting intelligence operations. In each of these cases ethnicity affected the character of the counterterrorism campaign.

Ethnic discrimination is a powerful factor behind counterterrorism when terrorism is based on ethnic grievances. It can result in violent responses to terrorism because the group’s ethnic status threatens the identity of the state. It also makes counterterrorism more violent by limiting the government’s ability to gather intelligence or carry out in-group policing. It can also make it easier to justify excessive and violent policies because the public is less concerned about the lives of unimportant or disloyal minorities. In these ways, ethnic discrimination directly affects counterterrorism policy.

The three biggest factors behind counterterrorism policy are bureaucratic politics, ethnic discrimination, and regime type. Bureaucratic politics can explain differing responses to similar threats by looking at the number of agencies used to fight the terrorist group. The more elements in the puzzle, the more of an impact bureaucratic politics will have on the final strategy. States that choose to use only one agency will be largely spared from its effects. Conversely, states that use a multidirectional approach will feel the effect of bureaucratic politics as efforts are accidentally duplicated and resources misallocated.

Each of these factors affects counterterrorism in specific ways, but they also interact with one another. Regime type determines whether the police or the military will be the primary agent
in fighting the terrorist group. However, the process of securitization can shift the acceptability of using the military if the terrorist group is considered a large enough threat. One of the ways in which a terrorist group’s threat is magnified is through ethnicity. If the group’s goals challenge the ethnic identity of the state, then using the military, and the extra force that implies, becomes logical. Ethnicity also shapes policy by making it difficult to employ tactics that engage member of the ethnicity in the fight against the group. Finally, bureaucratic politics affects the ultimate implementation of whatever policies result from the previous factors. These three forces build on each other as a campaign evolves.

Looking at the three cases some other observations emerge. Turkey and Russia, which had the more violent campaigns, are weaker democracies than England. Accordingly, it seems ethnic discrimination can only affect counterterrorism strategy in a significant way if democratic protections are weak. However, securitization can also shift the discussion and make more violent options palatable. Either way, there needs to be a lack of mitigating factors for ethnic discrimination to cause a truly violent counterterrorism campaign.

Ethnic discrimination affects the texture of a counterterrorism campaign at ground level by shutting out tactics that rely on cooperation from members of the terrorist group’s ethnicity. However, it can also affect efforts on a larger scale if the group threatens the national identity. If this identity is threatened, then securitization can be used to justify exceptionally violent policies against the terrorists. However, for a government to violently protect its national identity, it must also have a weak democracy. The lack of safeguards means a violent response is possible. Additionally, weak democracies are also more likely to respond with excessive violence because they feel any threat poses a large danger to them.
States choose different counterterrorism strategies to similar threats because of ethnic discrimination and the quality of their democracy. Once this overall response has been chosen, its details are filled in by bureaucratic politics and the number of agencies involved affects the final policy. These three factors are responsible for the wide range of counterterrorism policies seen in the world.

This information also raises some avenues for future research. One obvious area where more work is needed is counterterrorism in nondemocratic states. With the exception of electoralism, all of the independent variables apply to authoritarian states. Do these forces have similar effects on democratic and nondemocratic states? Another key investigation is whether different types of discrimination affect counterterrorism differently. This paper examined two instances of ethnic discrimination and one of religious discrimination. Examining a range of case studies that includes more cases of each type of discrimination would reveal if they behave differently. Additionally, careful investigation of the relationship between discrimination and securitization may reveal that it is easier to securitize terrorism when the terrorists are a feared minority. These options all build upon these findings and promise to reveal more about the way counterterrorism policy is made.

The British case raises several important issues for the study of counterterrorism policy formation. The campaign in Northern Ireland was a long one that became less violent over time as emphasis shifted from the military to the police. Given the length of the conflict, it would be natural to expect some degree of securitization to occur; as the terrorist attacks continue they will eventually come be seen as a serious threat to the state's safety. However, British counterterrorism efforts in Northern Ireland actually became less violent over time. Somehow the process of Ulsterisation also resulted in a desecuritization of the issue of terrorism in
Northern Ireland. One possible explanation is that because Ulsterisation was meant to devolve responsibility for the conflict to Northern Ireland, terrorism became less of a security issue in England because it came to be seen as a Northern Irish issue and not a British issue. Further investigation of the discourse around IRA terrorism in the British legislature is needed.

The recent Russian efforts at redeveloping Grozny also need to be explored. Even though Chechnya is still far from free or democratic, Russia's current policy towards the region is nonetheless a significant departure from its previous attitudes. Examining the factors behind this decision offers a glimpse of how exceptionally violent counterterrorism campaigns might end in something other than wholesale annihilation.

While a number of factors shape counterterrorism policy, sometimes ethnic discrimination is the one that matters. It allows for violent responses in cases where otherwise they would be politically unacceptable. However, ethnic discrimination alone is not enough to produce a violent counterterrorism strategy. While it may provide the motivation for violent response, other mitigating factors must be neutralized for this to happen. Weak democracies, with their lack of constitutional safeguards and legal protections, provide ample space for this violence to transpire. Similarly, democracies where terrorism has been securitized tolerate such excesses because they are seen as necessary to protect the state. While ethnic discrimination can lead to a violent counterterrorism policy, other factors must be at work for these ethnic aims to be realized in policy.
Bibliography

18 USC § 2331

22 USC § 2656f. 2008


