

**Mini States or Major Headaches:
Why Jihadis Have Targeted
Journalists for Attack**

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I. Introduction

A. *Do Terrorists Want a Lot of People Watching?*

As a new and constantly evolving field, terrorism studies has few aphorisms. Yet one speech has emerged relatively unscathed from a generation of scholarly critique. "Since most terrorists groups are small and have few resources, the violence they carry out must be deliberately shocking," Brian Michael Jenkins, a young analyst at the RAND Corporation, told the California State Assembly in 1975. "Terrorism is violence for effect. Terrorists choreograph violence to achieve maximum publicity. Terrorism is theater...Terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead" (Jenkins 1975, 4). Jenkins' final sentence became his most famous, and the idea that terrorists impose constraints on their own actions to avoid public backlash has been a staple of scholarly literature ever since. Implicit in Jenkins' statement is that an external entity – the media – will provide publicity if the terrorists carry out a truly shocking act. Former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher made this destructive relationship explicit when she said that terrorism is fed in part by those who supply the terrorists with the "oxygen of publicity" (Irvin 1992, 65). In 1988, her administration banned live interviews with members, supporters and elected representatives of Irish political party Sinn Fein due to the group's alleged links to the IRA (64).

Those who use terrorist tactics are assumed to be weak, sub-state actors who resort to psychological tactics to achieve their political aims since they lack the capacity to defeat most states in a purely military battle. In the words of psychiatrist Dr. Frederick Hacker, terrorists seek therefore to "frighten and, by frightening, to dominate and control" (Hacker 1976, xi). Terrorism is thus a violent act conceived specifically to attract attention and then, through the publicity it generates, to communicate a message

(Hoffman 2006, 173-4). As the principal conduit of information in today's world, the media are responsible for expanding the impact of a terrorist attack from the immediate victims to a wider target audience whom the terrorists are looking to influence. Assuming that terrorists are rational actors, one would expect them to curry favor with the media.

However, the actions of religious Islamic terrorists have undermined these theoretical assumptions. Not only do jihadis criticize the media in their speeches and writing, but they have also devoted human and capital resources to threatening, targeting, kidnapping and even killing journalists. My analysis of incident reports from press freedom websites have led me to conclude that jihadis have likely been responsible for the deliberate murder of 172 journalists since the beginning of 1992. Of all the journalists who have died on the job since 1992, intentional targeting by jihadis has been the reason for 21.3 percent of the deaths, and jihadis have been behind 29.4 percent of the cases in which journalists have been murdered (as opposed to getting caught up in crossfire or being on a dangerous assignment) (Journalists Killed, 2010).

Although never repudiated, Jenkins' maxim about terrorist motives has gradually come under more scrutiny. Bruce Hoffman argued in the mid-1990's that the rise of religiously-motivated terrorism would lead to more slaughter since religious terrorists were eager to kill not only others but themselves in the name of their faith (Miller 2008, 1). Jenkins acknowledges that the self-imposed constraints were eroding by the mid-1980's, which he attributes to fainthearted terrorists being shoved aside by more ruthless elements and the need to escalate death rates to maintain public attention and coercive power (Jenkins 2006, 9).

Based on these changes in terrorist behavior, Jenkins revised his original dictum

in 2006. "Today," he wrote, "many (although not all) terrorists want a lot of people watching *and* a lot of people dead" (Jenkins 2006, 9). Although the second portion of Jenkins' original aphorism has received virtually all of the scrutiny, my evidence suggests problems with the first portion of his creed. There are clearly some terrorists who do not actually want a lot of people watching – something Jenkins (perhaps inadvertently) acknowledges in his revised statement. Under what conditions would terrorists not want people watching? And what would this mean for the people most directly responsible for watching the terrorists?

B. Key Terminology

Before going any further, I should explain precisely what I mean by "jihadis targeting journalists" for attack. This phrase is in fact shorthand for a more complex and specific set of boundaries that I have placed on my study.

Jihadi is a political neologism that spread to the West after September 11 referring to an individual who participates in advancing jihad. Jihad can refer to the non-militant struggle undertaken by Muslims for self-purification, but in this paper, the term jihad will be used exclusively in reference to warfare undertaken with the aim of expansion or defense of Islamic territory. For the sake of this study, the term jihadi will refer to jihadist salafies, a school of thought of Salafi Muslims who support violent jihad. Salafism is a Sunni Islamic movement that sees the first three generations of Muslims as exemplary models for how Islam should be practiced. Its principal tenet is that Islam was perfect and complete during the days of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions, but that undesirable innovations have been added over later centuries due to materialist and cultural influences (Shaikh 1). Salafies have traditionally been conservative, apolitical and hesitant to call for violence, but a new, more radical school

emerged in the mid-1990's.

Like conservative Salafi scholars, jihadist Salafies place immense emphasis on the oneness of God, or tawhid. However, they disagree about how to evaluate when behavior has crossed the line from piety into apostasy (Hafez 2007, 66). Traditional Salafies and jihadist Salafies disagree as to when takfir – declaring a Muslim to be outside the creed – must take place. Jihadis argue that Muslims commit apostasy when exhibiting great unbelief in word or action, but other Salafies say that Muslims are infidels only if they commit a sin and publicly justify it through words (70). Based on this discrepancy, Jihadist Salafies believe that jihad is an Islamic obligation against regimes that do not rule according to God's laws while conservative Salafies would require the regime to verbally insult or criticize Islam before supporting jihad. Salafist jihadis have a broad definition for defensive jihad (which is considered an obligation for all Muslims); they consider all lands that were ever under the rule of Islam to rightfully belong to Muslims and therefore classify all efforts to regain these lands as defensive battles. Unlike many of their Salafi counterparts, jihadist Salafies see jihad as continuous until all of humanity submits to Islam or the authority of Muslim rule, which is necessary for believers to properly practice their faith (70).

This more detailed explanation should provide clearer parameters for which groups should and shouldn't be considered jihadis. Even though Shia militants such as Hezbollah and the Mahdi Army advocate violence to advance Islamic causes, I do not consider them to be jihadis for my analysis since they do not belong to the Salafi sect of Islam. Likewise, jihadis must have the ultimate professed goal of establishing a global Islamic caliphate, so groups such as the Islamic Army of Iraq that embrace nationalism and see the establishment of a local Islamic state as the end goal (rather than a means

for pursuing a global empire) aren't jihadis under my definition. Yet since I am more concerned with group functionality than stated ideologies, groups such as the Taliban which might not meet the technical definition for jihadist Salafies but have consistently received support and praise from these groups will be considered jihadis. Thus, groups that have feuded with the the jihadi base such as Hamas will not be considered jihadis.

Targeting encompasses all threats of physical violence directed toward journalists, regardless of whether or not any attacks are actually carried out. Journalists must be intentionally sought out by jihadis for the case to be considered targeting, so if a journalist incidentally gets caught up in jihadi crossfire, no targeting has occurred. Likewise, journalists must be the primary group of people jihadis are seeking to attack, so if journalists are collateral damage in a jihadi bombing of a government minister's convoy, the case would not be considered targeting.

I am using an inclusive definition of journalists that includes all people who provide paid assistance to reporters and all personnel associated with a media organization. Thus, not only are reporters, columnists, editors and publishers considered journalists, but the people who work with reporters and news organizations in supporting roles such as drivers, interpreters, guards and kitchen staff are classified as journalists as well. A broad definition for journalists is necessary to determine whether specific reporters are targeted for presenting information or opinions unfavorable to jihadis or whether collective identity and associations serve as the significant or primary factor in determining whom jihadis attack.

C. *Jihadis Threatening Journalists: The Headlines and The Statistics*

The attacks on several high-profile journalists since September 11 have captured the attention of a horrified Western public. Wall Street Journal South Asia Bureau Chief

Daniel Pearl was kidnapped and murdered in early 2002 in Kirachi by Jaish-e-Mohammad militant Omar Sheikh and Al-Qaida leader Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (Police 2005). Christian Science Monitor reporter Jill Carroll was kidnapped and released in early 2006 in Baghdad by the Brigades of Vengeance militant group, which unsuccessfully demanded that all female detainees under American custody be released. And BBC reporter Alan Johnston was kidnapped and released in mid 2007 in Gaza City by the Army of Islam militant group (Army 2007).

The statistics, however, tell a very different story than the headlines. Pearl is, in fact, the only American journalist to have been murdered by jihadis since 1992. Only seven of the remaining 171 journalists intentionally killed by jihadis come from developed countries, according to classifications by the International Monetary Fund and the United Nations. Only 21 percent of those killed work for a foreign news organization, and just 20 of those 39 journalists work for a publication that has a primarily Western audience. Citizens and policymakers in Western countries – who are considered by global jihadi organizations to be the far or ultimate enemy – probably would recognize neither the names of most of the dead journalists nor the names of most of the news organizations they worked for. The vast majority of these murders have received essentially no coverage in the Western press. If jihadis kill journalists as an extension of their theatrical efforts to attract and frighten a global audience, then most jihadis would make very poor directors.

To be fair, attacks on high-profile journalists that culminate short of murder could also attract significant attention. Journalists who have been kidnapped in Iraq (whether eventually murdered or released) have a very different identity than those who have been killed (Iraq is the only country in which the Committee to Protect Journalists

has kept track of journalist abductions). Nearly two-thirds of the journalists and media workers killed in Iraq – by jihadis or others – work for local news outlets while 87 percent are Iraqi (Iraq, 2009). However, only 40 percent of the journalists kidnapped in Iraq are Iraqi while only 30 percent work for Iraqi news organizations – these figures include both those who were eventually released and those who were eventually murdered (Iraq, 2009).

There are a few plausible explanations for the insurgents' trend of killing local journalists while kidnapping foreigners. First, kidnapped journalists could serve as an effective bargaining chip for jihadi or other sectarian groups; dead journalists, however, offer no bargaining power beyond a more credible threat of future killings. Therefore, jihadis might attempt to use foreign journalists to extract concessions from generally powerful Western states while killing journalists of Iraqi origin, since the Iraqi government is weak and decentralized and thus has little to offer in return for sparing the journalists. Second, since many foreign governments – in particular, the United States – have far greater military power than the Iraqi government, they would have the capacity – and most likely the will – to retaliate harshly against any jihadi groups that kills journalists from their country. Therefore, jihadi groups might be able to achieve their aims through the kidnapping and eventual release of foreign journalists without incurring the full wrath of these powerful nations. Finally, the majority of foreign journalists are Christian while the majority of Iraqi journalists are Muslim; therefore, the jihadis might consider most of the Iraqi journalists guilty of apostasy (for colluding with Crusader interests) and deserving of greater punishment than most of the foreign journalists, who do not claim to follow the word of Allah.

Since the fate of kidnapped journalists remains in limbo, these incidents typically

attract more publicity for the terrorist groups, giving them more leverage in extracting concessions – monetary, political or otherwise – from governments or news organizations. To decrease expectations about how much publicity or ransom hostage-takers could garner for journalists, the Afghan and foreign news media struck an informal agreement not to publicize the kidnappings of journalists in Afghanistan if their organization requested it (Rohde, 2009). Canadian media honored a blackout request regarding the October 2008 kidnapping of CBC correspondent Mellissa Fung, and *The New York Times* collaborated with *Al-Jazeera* and Wikipedia to remove all news of David Rohde's November 2008 kidnapping from the public eye.

The fact that only four Western journalists – three from a single 2001 incident and Pearl a year later – have ever been kidnapped and killed by jihadis could indicate that journalists from developed countries make an effective negotiation tool. However, journalists such as Carroll, Johnston and Rohde have escaped or been released by jihadis for little or nothing in return. Several forces – namely a fear of reprisal from Western governments, an overvaluing of journalists' ransom potential and an underestimation of the ability of journalists to escape or be freed – combine to discourage jihadis from murdering Western journalists, including those they have already abducted. These forces must be compelling since the dearth of dead Western journalists has diminished the credibility that future jihadi threats and kidnappings pose to Western journalists' lives.

A disconnect clearly exists between the perception and the numbers regarding the nationality of journalists threatened by jihadis. At the same time, not every incident has an equal impact, and targeting journalists from developed countries certainly gives jihadis more coercive power in dealing with Western governments and populations than

targeting locals. The jihadis have perhaps calculated that the West would become desensitized if their journalists were routinely targeted and murdered and have therefore deliberately only done so sparingly to maximize the impact of each incident. But if killing Westerners remains the exception rather than the rule, then what explains jihadis more typical behavior of targeting local, Muslim journalists for attack?

II. Schools of Thought

My thesis will attempt to explain the phenomenon of jihadis targeting journalists for attack by testing four possible explanations, which will hereby be classified as schools of thought. Each school of thought is functionally different than the rest, meaning that each school will propose that jihadis are attempting to achieve a unique set of outcomes through their actions. At the same time, functions take on heightened or diminished importance in particular structural contexts. This section will describe, distinguish and evaluate each of the schools of thought and present four different hypothesis. It will conclude by offering a thesis statement. The criteria used to measure the validity of each school will be explained in the research design section and the schools will be thoroughly evaluated in the data analysis section.

The first school of thought sees the targeting of journalists as an effort to force political rivals and their membership to acquiesce to the power of jihadi organizations. My second school of thought ascribes the targeting of journalists by jihadis as actions aimed at stifling ideological opposition to their values or norms. My third school of thought identifies threats or actions against journalists as a function of jihadis attempting to strengthen their organizational solvency through extracting concessions from opponents. My final school of thought attributes the targeting of journalists to their diminishing utility, which has been caused by jihadi organizations shifting toward

communications primarily through internal media.

A. *Force Acquiescence of Political Rivals*

This school of thought is unique in its focus on the relative power of jihadi groups to other political actors in the arena. This school of thought determines that the relative power of jihadis is most pertinent when their control of a territory is viable or barely achieved due to the propensity of rewards that accompany being the most powerful actor in a region (and lack of spoils that accompany being the penultimate power or worse). I therefore anticipate that jihadis will be most likely to attempt to force the acquiescence of their political rivals when they can make a credible claim to territorial control. While this scenario is the most prevalent, cases in which jihadis are clearly sub-state actors are also possible. Nonetheless, I imagine that jihadi organizations in this scenario will typically operate not like sub-state actors as is assumed by most theoretical literature but rather like quasi-states, particularly emerging authoritarian regimes.

Jihadi statements make it clear that these organizations view democracy very unfavorably since they see it as a man-made religion because it replaces Allah's legislative rights with elected officials, who thereby become worshipped in place of Allah (Ibrahim 2007, 130). Jihadi groups would therefore favor having the state enforce Allah's rule -- a very literal interpretation of the Sharia -- by any means necessary. History indicates that jihadi groups have only been able to sustain control over limited swaths of territory for limited periods of time. These characteristics coupled with a lack of recognition from other states and political actors means that jihadi groups typically feel a high level of threat to their territorial control, thereby keeping them akin to emerging autocrats. The instability surrounding jihadi rule makes it more likely for opposition press to destabilize the regime than in an established autocracy. Thus, jihadi

organizations seek to consolidate authority over their territory by strengthening their legitimacy, which can be done through controlling the flow of information.

In order for jihadis to be concerned about whether individual journalists acquiesce to the power of their organizations, the journalist must pose a credible threat to the regional hegemony typically enjoyed by jihadi organizations in this scenario. The most convincing way a journalist can challenge the jihadi system of rule is by being linked to a political rival since collective organizations threaten the established order much more effectively than individuals. Through allegiances and alliances, journalists can be part of a network that threatens jihadi control. Jihadis can most effectively force acquiescence by silencing the viewpoints of news organizations and journalists who best represent or symbolize political rivals. Such attacks would discourage other journalists from aligning themselves with the media of political rivals.

B. Stifle Ideological Opposition

Jihadis stifle ideological opposition to their values and norms to enhance their absolute power or because they are convinced of the righteousness of their beliefs, both of which distinguish this school of thought from the first. Since jihadis wish to maximize their base of potential recruits and fundraisers and see their own cause as religiously pure and noble, they want to prevent journalists from covering topics or expressing opinions that would embarrass jihadis or portray their cause in an unfavorable light. They would therefore target journalists who advocate or participate in immoral behavior (such as women being uncovered), attempt to reveal weaknesses in jihadi or Muslim culture, or sympathize with alternative religious or political viewpoints (not necessarily those of a political rival). In particular, jihadis disagree with the Western norm that journalists should be seen as neutral, impartial and off-limits. Jihadis therefore seek to

eliminate criticism for their practice of targeting journalists and stop public demonstrations of support for slain journalists.

C. Strengthen Organizational Solvency

Jihadis strengthen their organizational solvency by extracting concessions from opponents in the form of exchanges or pledges, both of which can improve the organization's human or capital resources. The exchanges most often involve ransom for kidnapped journalists and mirror the operations of criminal groups, particularly drug cartels. The ransom can either be monetary – a bribe, – or political – the release of prisoners affiliated with the jihadi group. Indirect concessions involve pledges from either governments or news organizations and the impetus can be either the fate of a kidnapped journalist or the credible threat of future attacks on journalists. Jihadis might try to get a local or foreign government to promise to alter the behavior of their military or police force so that they no longer disturb the operations of the jihadi organizations (by ending drone strikes, for example). Jihadis could also try to coerce news organizations into publishing their statements or get journalists to reduce their coverage of unknown illegal or banned activities undertaken by jihadis for which external recourse is likely.

Articles must meet several criteria to be considered threatening to the organizational solvency of a particular jihadi organization rather than merely representing ideological opposition. The reporting in the article – which must be investigative in nature rather than an opinion column – must be about the particular jihadi organization responsible for the eventual targeting and must reveal sensitive information about the organization that was previously unknown (such as operational secrets). In addition, the publication of this article must be likely to result in tangible,

concrete repercussions for the jihadi organization from external actors.

D. The Utility of Journalists Has Diminished

In order to clarify one of my schools of thought, I must define several media-related terms. First, the term mass media denotes the section of the media designed specifically to reach a very large audience. The growth of the mass media over the past century has been driven by new technology, and the internet has served as the most recent catalyst (Rogan 2007, 24). The internal media consists of organizations for which jihadis directly or indirectly control both the production and distribution of content. Groups that clearly support jihadi ideology are understood to be indirectly controlled by the organization and will therefore be classified as internal media (47). External media therefore denotes all media sources other than internal media. My paper will only consider the communicative – and not any instrumental – uses for internal media since the former most directly mirrors the function served by external media. Emerging media denotes all forms of media enabled by digital technology, including websites, e-mail, CD/DVDs and interactive television. Traditional media, therefore, are the means of communication that existed before the emerging media, specifically the printed press, radio and television.

Jihadis have had less use for journalists over the past 15 years as they have shifted from external media to internal media as their primary communications forum. This school of thought assumes that jihadi groups tolerated but always disliked external media back when they had to rely on the external press for the key components of their communications strategy since jihadis have seen external media as promoters of apostasy and atheism and agents of their own government. Now that the utility of journalists has diminished due to this shift in communications strategy but the threat

posed by these media actors remains, weakening external media through physical violence or other coercive action becomes the rational course of action since the threat posed by journalists outweighs their utility.

This school of thought will focus on al-Qaida since most of the academic literature about jihadi groups shifting to internal media exclusively discusses this group. Most scholars have accepted the three factors outlined in Corman and Schiefelbein's 2006 study as al-Qaida's primary goals for communication. These strategic objectives are legitimizing the movement, propagating the movement and intimidating opponents. Legitimizing the movement occurs primarily through establishing its social and religious viability. Social legitimation means having the communities in which al-Qaida operates know its story, share its goals and accept and support its efforts (Corman and Schiefelbein 2006, 6). Religious legitimation means having al-Qaida's efforts be seen as acceptable under the religious tenets of Islam, even though the organization engages in violent acts that on their face seem to violate these tenets (6). Al-Qaida aims to propagate its movement by spreading messages to sympathetic audiences in areas where it wants to expand, continually linking its efforts to a struggle involving Muslims everywhere (2). Al-Qaida attempts to intimidate its opponents – along with jihadi sympathizers in the Muslim world who would consider turning against them – by putting both groups on notice that there can be no room for compromise (8).

The establishment and growth of emerging media venues most thoroughly explains why al-Qaida has shifted from primarily external to primarily internal media venues over the past 15 years. The lower barriers to entry, broader distribution and rapidly improving production quality offered through emerging venues have greatly aided al-Qaida's propagation efforts. The internet's global reach coupled with the

traditional media's monitoring of emerging media venues has improved al-Qaida's ability to intimidate opponents. And the use of audio-visual techniques makes it easier for al-Qaida to gain social legitimacy, while religious legitimacy remains relatively unaffected. Changes in external media behavior and al-Qaida's communications strategy correlate to the shift in media venues at a lower level of significance. The external media's increasing propensity to tune out al-Qaida statements or present opposing views – particularly in the Arab world – harmed the organization's social and religious legitimacy. Propagation and intimidation remain unabated, however. A greater emphasis on audience segmentation and coordinating attacks with media outreach – two of al-Qaida's primary adjustments in communications strategy over the past 15 years – have aided the organization's propagation and social legitimacy, yet both have had a negligible impact on religious legitimacy and intimidation.

III. Literature Review

A. *Relationship Between Terrorists and the Media*

Substantial scholarship has been conducted on the relationship between terrorists and the media. Most academics, politicians, and journalists believe that the media provides greater publicity and wider access for the terrorists' message, which I would classify as the orthodox point of view. Subsequent material has critiqued this claim, countering that news coverage of terrorists' attacks and terrorist groups actually serves Western interests, which I would classify as the revisionist argument in this debate.

From the orthodox perspective, terrorist attacks are a means to win media attention and news coverage for their actions, their grievances, and their political ends (Nacos 2007, 14). Terrorists want people to see something, and the media are the means

by which their shows of force are disseminated (Gerrits 1992, 36). In the words of William Catton Jr., "Terrorist activity is basically a form of theater. Terrorists play to an audience. Without the mass media they would seldom be able to reach audiences as large as those from which they do now gain attention" (30). And as Schmid and de Graff have pointed out, the "immediate victim is merely instrumental, the skin of a drum beaten to achieve a calculated impact on a wider audience ... For the terrorist the message matters, not the victim" (Nacos 2007, 14).

In the wake of a terrorist attack, the terrorists often do not have to explain the political causes and motives behind the attack themselves – the media does it for them (Nacos 2007, 21). Regardless of a public statement by the terrorist group, the media is used as a platform for securing a broad dissemination of the terrorists' ideology (Frey and Rohner 2006, 20). As the news increasingly becomes a source of entertainment as opposed to a source for information, terrorism is exploited as infotainment for increased ratings and circulation (Nacos 2007, 38). Television simply looks for attention-drawing elements, and newsworthiness is determined by the extent of the emotional and dramatic visual images (El-Ibiary 2009, 6). This sensationalist coverage makes it easier for terrorist leaders to establish their organizations as a well-known brand, facilitating fund-raising and increasing notoriety (Frey and Rohner 2006, 7). Throughout history, developments in media have been viewed in relation to developments in terrorism, and researchers have argued that paradigmatic shifts in mass media have been accompanied by new and more deadly forms of terrorism (Rogan 2007, 13). Thus, new media, niche audiences, and citizen journalists have extended the range of the information front, commanding greater attention for any terrorist action or threat (Taylor 2003, 103). With the help of the media, terrorists acquire the heightened attention of the general

public, the political elite, and the decision-making circles (Nacos 2007, 13).

As a byproduct of the media coverage, terrorists in different parts of the world can learn about and embrace the most successful methods of "mass-mediated" terrorism (Nacos 2007, 23). More specifically, a lot of know-how on how to organize and execute a terrorist attack is transmitted by the media (Frey and Rohner 2006, 4). Even when terrorists appear unconcerned with news coverage, orthodox scholars nonetheless believe that the media maintains a prominent role in their calculations and that terrorists are still pleased that their deeds will be highlighted in the news (Nacos 2007, 18). Even when terrorists do not claim responsibility for a particular act of political violence, they remain aware that they will usually be recognized as the primary or only suspects and that the news media will report on them and their motives (19). Bassiouni argues that terrorists take advantage of reporters' subjectivity in their attempts to manipulate the media (Irvin 1992, 63).

In addition, successful terrorist attacks increase the desire among members of the print and broadcast press to conduct interviews with terrorist leaders. Terrorists normally lack access to the mass media since they do not share the mainstream views of society, but by performing spectacular deeds, they can attract media attention (Rogan 2007, 13). Interviews are the most productive kind of publicity for terrorists because they decrease the terrorist's distance from the public and often provide leaders with opportunities to make unfiltered political statements (Gerrits 1992, 54). In the eyes of orthodox scholars, interviewing terrorist leaders elevates their status to the level of legitimate political figures since the terrorists are treated like news sources worthy of being part of the serious public discourse (Nacos 2007, 22). Interviews also give terrorists further access to the channels of political communication. Theorists believe

that the media provides the lines of communication between public officials and the general public in mass societies (15).

In the face of spectacular terrorist acts, the media will open their gates for all kinds of incident-related reporting, including the well-calculated messages that terrorists want publicized (Nacos 2007, 16). By grabbing the attention of domestic and international media, terrorists are assured an audience that includes domestic and foreign publics and governments. In orthodox literature, terrorism has only become what it is due to media coverage: "Without the media aspect, terrorism remains one more cause of death, one of many, and not necessarily the most important or most dangerous one" (Hauner 2007, 3).

In response, the revisionist school of thought has proposed an oppositional framework between terrorists and the media. Revisionists argue that media coverage of political violence has a limited, and generally negative, impact on public attitudes toward terrorist organizations (Irvin 1992, 66). First, terrorism is a phenomenon that long predates modern mass media, meaning that the development of the mass media is hardly the primary cause for the spread of terrorism and certainly cannot be blamed for its existence (Rogan 2007, 12-3). In addition, media coverage can hurt terrorist organizations by relying largely upon frameworks of interpretation by public officials and neglecting their watchdog role in times of war (Kern, Just and Norris 2003, 294). In his study of the coverage of Northern Ireland in the British media during the mid-1970's, Philip Elliott found that the stories were predominantly ones of irrational violence, lacking in any background on the conflict, and largely based upon official sources (Irvin 1992, 79).

In times of crisis, journalists collaborate with government officials out of concern

for damaging public morale and fear of public backlash (Kern, Just and Norris 2003, 296). Even if journalists seek opposing views on government war policies, they are constrained by their dependence on government access in order to write the news. Balanced presentation is often difficult in wartime because opposition leaders either concede leadership to the party in government or are unwilling to counter government views out of fear of being accused of a lack of patriotism. From a revisionist perspective, news prepared and presented by the terrorists themselves could be more advantageous to their case (Rogan 2007, 14).

I believe that both orthodox and revisionist scholars make valid, though not mutually exclusive, arguments regarding the relationship between terrorist organizations and the media. It seems likely that media coverage of terrorism could facilitate fund-raising, recruiting and training efforts, and elicit fear among victim populations, while at the same time altering public opinion to better serve the interests of target governments. The biggest flaw of the literature rises not from any particular school of thought, but from the fact that virtually no studies consider the terrorists' perception of the impact of media reports on their struggle. Terrorists' own perspectives on the external media – specifically regarding the value of media coverage to their organizations – are critical in obtaining a comprehensive understanding of how the media covers terrorism. After all, it is not the conclusions of third party observers, but rather the assessment of terrorist organizations that will ultimately determine how such groups treat journalists. I will therefore examine the views of terrorist organizations on outside media.

Data obtained from members and supporters of terrorist organizations shows that these organizations perceive the media as hostile, if necessary, commentators on

their struggle (Irvin 1992, 67). In general, terrorists consider the media as an integral element of the capitalist, hegemonic power structure that generally conspires with government to suppress alternative political views. The media are seen not so much as a medium through which publicity and legitimacy for terrorist organizations can be achieved, but rather as an entity that assists in the perpetuation of the political status quo. Former Sinn Fein national spokesperson Sean MacManus said, "You must understand that media reports of IRA actions, irrespective of whether they are actions its supporters would view as successful ... will be negative publicity for our movement" (73).

In a series of interviews carried out by Irvin in 1988 and 1989 with representatives and supporters of Sinn Fein and Herri Batasuna, — a Basque nationalist political organization with alleged ties to ETA —, the issue of propaganda offensives by the establishment press against their movements were described as "very important" by about 89 percent of respondents in both cases (Irvin 1992, 68). A 1991 statement by a member of the IRA General Headquarters staff reflects this concern: "It has been part of their [the British] modus operandi for many years to feed certain journalists stories when they seek to float an idea, undermine individuals, [or] sow dissension ... Censorship also plays a large role, preventing a creditable reply to the British line from being heard" (74).

B. Relationship Between Jihadis and the Media

To orthodox scholars, the importance of communications technology in promulgating al-Qaida's radical ideology and winning support are encapsulated in the comment "if Bin Laden didn't have access to global media, satellite communications and the internet, he'd just be a cranky guy in a cave" (Gerrits 2007, 14). Al-Qaida's use of

these emerging media technologies has not only enabled it to survive as an organization after losing its territorial base in Afghanistan, but to continue its war through a propaganda campaign. From spectacular terror attacks, to carefully timed videos, to the burgeoning realm of jihadi internet forums, the centrality of the mass media to al-Qaida's political strategy has long been evident (Lynch 2006, 1).

From the orthodox point of view, al-Qaida's embrace of and dependence on both external and internal media is emblematic of the symbiosis that has occurred between jihadis and the mass media. Unique to jihadi terrorists is their exceptional ability to deliberately choose their targets and timing in order to maximize media attention (Frey and Rohner 2006, 3). Media coverage encourages jihadi attacks in Western democracies because every victim of terrorism in such locations receives more attention from Western media than a similar death in a developing country (17). Likewise, the high density of press agencies in big cities makes jihadi attacks in such locations more appealing since the availability or lack of audiovisual material determines what will be aired and what will be excluded in the visual culture of television (3 and El-Ibiary 2009, 6). Jihadis recognize the phenomenon at play – in the words of Algerian National Liberation Front leader Abane Ramdane, “Is it better for our cause to kill ten of the enemy in the countryside of Telergma, where no one will speak of it, or one in Algiers, that will be mentioned the next day in the American press?” (Gerrits 1992, 50).

Publicity is also the overriding objective in the Manual of the Afghan Jihad, which is used by al-Qaida as a training guide. The manual recommends targeting “sentimental landmarks” such as the Statue of Liberty, Big Ben and the Eiffel Tower since their destruction “would generate intense publicity with minimal casualties” (Nacos 2007, 19). And indeed, hitting major landmarks where the largest television stations and film

studios were concentrated guaranteed al-Qaida exhaustive coverage and a global projection of their September 11 attacks (El-Ibiary 2009, 6). "These young men...said in deeds, in New York and Washington, speeches that overshadowed all other speeches made everywhere in the world," Bin Laden said in November 2001. "The speeches are understood by both Arabs and non-Arabs...it is above all of what the media said" (Rogan 2007, 40).

In addition, the increased media coverage of terrorism following the attacks of September 11 has encouraged jihadis, leading to increased terrorist activity (Frey and Rohner 2006, 15). A Granger causality test conducted by Frey and Rohner determined at a 95 percent level of confidence that the media attention of *The New York Times* results in terrorist-caused fatalities. Through the media, jihadis can embarrass their opponents by showing that those in power are more vulnerable than was commonly assumed (Gerrits 1992, 36).

An orthodox analysis of jihadi terrorism concludes that the media's constant use of the one-sided War on Terrorism news frame magnifies feelings of threat in victim populations by blocking the reception of contrary independent evidence (Kern, Just and Norris 2003, 283). Indeed, a 2004 study found that respondents who pay a high level of attention to television news about national politics and the War on Terror are more likely to believe that a terrorist attack will occur in the next 12 months – 43 percent – than those who pay little attention to television news – 31 percent (Nacos 2007, 180). Between 2001 and 2003, the levels of public concern regarding terrorism reflected patterns of coverage of terrorism shown on national TV network evening news (Kern, Just and Norris 2003, 290).

When Americans were asked by the Gallup Organization about "the most

important problem facing the country,” the proportion responding “terrorism” shot up from zero in the three months prior to September 2001 to almost half of the population immediately following September 11 (Kern, Just and Norris 2003, 290). This heightened public fear enables jihadis to intimidate a targeted population to the point where the mere threat of additional terrorism will increase anxieties (Nacos 2007, 21). The elicited fears caused Americans to trust one another less on an individual level and to more frequently believe that Arab-Americans supported the September 11 terrorist acts, and are therefore disloyal (Kern, Just and Norris 2003, 296).

However, American perceptions of the terrorist threat do not reflect reality. Evidence provided by the U.S. State Department indicates that the actual dangers from international terrorism have fallen substantially around the world since the mid-1990’s, due perhaps in part to strengthened security measures at airports, border crossings, and buildings (Kern, Just and Norris 2003, 4 and 291). From the orthodox point of view, Western media coverage of jihadis – and al-Qaida in particular – has deeply exaggerated their power and impact on the Arab and Western public, assisting the organizations in their attempts to achieve their propaganda goals (El-Ibiary 2007, 7).

Jihadis believe press coverage can work in their favor, with Bin Laden emphasizing in July 2003 that the media “enters every home” and “touches the entire public” (Rogan 2007, 26). Jihadis have made concerted efforts to develop media contacts outside their immediate sphere of influence because they view the media as the vehicle that will make their message heard worldwide. In a 2002 letter to Taliban leader Mohammed Omar, Bin Laden writes that press interviews are “a good opportunity to make Muslims aware of what is taking place over [in] the land of two Holy Mosques as well as what is happening here in Afghanistan” (Corman and Schiefelbein 2002, 8). Al-

Qaida indeed recognizes that external media can add fear and helplessness to the psyche of its own people by spreading propaganda about jihadis. "What the enemies of the U.S. cannot do, its media is doing," bin Laden told a Pakistani newspaper in 2001 (Rogan 2007, 26).

There is little revisionist literature specifically about the relationship between jihadi organizations and the media. Abu Bakr Naji, a rising star in the jihadi strategist movement, said that the United States's media campaign has convinced the masses of U.S. invincibility, making it more difficult for jihadis to evoke fear in Americans (Rogan 2007, 30). More specifically, news magazines held terrorists responsible for their own actions in the aftermath of September 11 (Kern, Just and Norris 2003, 295). Although the media helped put jihadis on the public agenda, revisionists think the media has generated public opinion in opposition to religious Islamic terrorism, thereby serving U.S. interests.

Most statements from jihadi leaders frame the outside media in an unfavorable light, accusing them of promoting apostasy and atheism. Islamic State of Iraq Emir Abu-Umar al-Baghdadi said, "today's news media, the space channels, the press, and the trumpets of the agents, writers, and poets, are launching the most hideous disinformation campaign Islam has been exposed to since the start of the mission of the prophet, may God's peace and blessing be upon him. They aim their spears and arrows at the so-called world jihadist salafi movement, focusing on the heart of its home and the center of its strength" (Jihadist Website 2007, 6). Al-Qaeda founder Osama Bin Laden said that the media "do not comply with the law of God, disdain the rituals of religion under the name of humor, spread atheism under the name of the freedom of expression, and seek to distort the image of mujahidin and weaken them" (Bin Laden

2008, 4). He also said that Arab rulers have “opened the media to bad ulema to discourage this generation’s youth from struggling against America and its agents” (3).

Al-Qaeda official Abu-Yahya al-Libi accused the news media of disseminating and propagating falsehoods in regards to a recent interfaith dialogue conference: “When a malicious idea of corrupt theory is created, people are gathered to support, nurture, and advertise for it in groups and individually, and pens are dedicated to it and the media are mobilized to broadcast and embellish it” (Abu-Yahya al-Libi 2008, 3). And al-Qaida lieutenant commander Ayman al-Zawahiri said the media engage in campaigns of lies and deception: “And in vain, the Western media and with it the international false witness, the UN, sought to cover up the catastrophe [of the successful jihadi resistance in Tora Bora and Shah-i-Kot, Afghanistan]” (Al-Zawahiri 2006, 4).

From my perspective, jihadis believe external media can occasionally provide unintentional support through coverage that frightens its viewers, yet the organizations primarily see the media as harmful. It is therefore unsurprising that jihadi groups such as al-Qaida have pursued alternative forums for communication.

C. Relationship Between Governments and Media

I concluded earlier that state-level jihadi actors would most resemble authoritarian regimes. Most scholarly literature hypothesizes that democratic and authoritarian regimes interact very differently with the media, and my examination will therefore focus on the later. Authoritarian-centered literature focuses predominantly on the obstacles regimes place on journalists and media organizations which attempt to carry out independent reporting. Autocrats employ a variety of obstructive techniques including physical harassment, active censorship, legal regulations and political and economic pressure.

My analysis of the literature will place obstructive tools into two categories. Media repression is characterized by the state's aggressive use of violent or legal power with the aim of forcing the press to comply with the regime's interests. Media coercion attempts to pressure journalists or press organizations into agreeable behavior through economic or other non-forceful incentives. Repression and coercion should be viewed as a linear continuum rather than two discrete points, as most obstructive tools combine elements of both and are often complementary. In addition, repression and coercion should not be seen as mutually exclusive since the two are often complementary. For example, East Germany used four different systems of regulation and manipulation to secure total control of the press. Their methods of surveillance and establishment of a centrally organized institutional structure relied primarily on repressive means, while restrictive personnel and recruitment policies and the regulation of language relied primarily on coercive means (Barck, Classen and Heimann 1999, 214).

My discussion of primarily repressive techniques will start with the most blunt and gradually move toward those in which coercion plays a greater role. Physical violence – or threats of violence – represents one of the most direct attempt to silence journalists. Of the nearly 600 murders of journalists that have occurred since 1992, governments are suspect in 140 of them (Journalists Killed Since 1992, 2010). The vast majority of government violence directed toward journalists, though, falls short of murder. One bizarre and extreme example of violence occurred in 1977 in the Central African Empire when Jean-Bedel Bokassa crowned himself emperor. Associated Press reporter Michael Goldsmith wrote a story that Bokassa found insulting. Bokassa came to believe that Goldsmith was a spy and then beat him unconscious with a boot and embossed stick (Collins 2001, 135-6). Judges in Yemen and Iran have sentenced

journalists to lashes for libel, five cops reporters for Mexico City news media were severely beaten by the police in one month, and Nigerian soldiers have horsewhipped journalists unconscious who have exposed improper behavior or corruption by the government (139-140). Violent threats can be intended to intimidate journalists into obedience. In El Salvador, the right-wing ARENA party – known for their death squads in the 1980's – routinely accosted journalists and shouted at them to “tell the truth” (Simon 55, 2006). And in Russia, a colonel used the front pages of a newspaper to threaten Yelena Masyuk – a television correspondent who covered the Chechnyan rebels – with physical harm (Collins 2001, 28). This unsafe environment is perpetuated by a sluggish or nonexistent government response to attacks on journalists, which occurs amid suspicions that higher-ups are complicit. Nearly 90 percent of those responsible for killing journalists since 1992 have done so with completely impunity, while perpetrators have been brought to full justice – meaning that both perpetrators and masterminds have been convicted – in only 26 of the 581 cases (Journalists Killed Since 1992, 2010).

Regimes can attempt to centralize their media control in a more holistic manner by nationalizing all publications. If successful, nationalization is the most effective way of keeping the media out of hands hostile to government policies and ensuring that all government and administration actions are supported (Amin 2002, 128). Gamal Abdel Nasser forced all privately owned Egyptian press organizations to surrender their ownership to the National Union in 1954, and East Germany erected a centralized and regulated press “supersystem” that allowed little room for independent subsystems to develop (Amin 2002, 126 and Barck, Classen and Heimann 1999, 232). Dissolving all independent media requires an incredible amount of state capacity, however: leaders of

the 1991 Soviet coup d'etat attempted to ban most newspapers, but newspapers defied the order and photocopied editions that made their way back onto the street (Simon 2006, 56).

Direct, overt state censorship is commonplace in authoritarian regimes. Censorship of news agencies usually involves blocking news or information sources and is implemented through both proclamation and deed (Amin 2002, 128). Following a March 1976 coup in Argentina, an army officer read this proclamation to editors in Buenos Aires: "From today on, it is forbidden to report, comment on, or make references to subversive incidents, the appearances of bodies and the deaths of subversive elements and/or members of the security forces unless they are announced by a responsible official source. This includes kidnappings and disappearances" (Simon 2006, 54). A major tool governments use to implement bold declarations like this is ownership or control of printing plants, ink or other means of production. After a paper in Azerbaijan ran articles criticizing the government, the printing plant refused to print any more copies of the newspaper for weeks (Collins 2001, 148).

Another common barrier for newspapers in authoritarian regimes is mandatory licensing requirements, with the government having control over the issue, renewal and revocation of licenses (Amin 2002, 130-1). When the Chinese-language press covered the decline of Chinese-medium schools in Singapore in 1971, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew accused the papers of being involved in "black operations" against Singapore and revoked the license of one of the papers. However, shutting down publications can result in a public outcry and end up backfiring, which happened when the Russian government considered revoking a television license and when the Croatian government tried to revoke a radio license (Collins 2001, 29 and Levitsky and Way 2002, 58).

Autocratic regimes censor individual journalists through deportations, legal restrictions and arrests. In 1997, Panama initially refused to renew the work visa of foreign journalist Gustavo Gorriti after he revealed drug money contributions to the president's campaign fund; that same year, Peru revoked the citizenship of Baruch Ivcher after he exposed torture and corruption in the military (Collins 2001, 148). East Germany more systemically controlled its media personnel through a comprehensive 1949-1952 purge of radio journalists accused of the "English disease" – liberalism and pluralistic tendencies – or "ideological negligence" – criticism of conditions and developments in East Germany or the Soviet Union and the use of Western sources (Barck, Classen and Heimann 1999, 214).

In another unbridled use of power, regimes will often arrest and hold in custody without charges, or imprison and charge with a crime, journalists who run afoul of their wishes. Chinese journalist Gao Yu was accused of being a major conspirator behind the Tienanmen Square protest movement based on an interview she published the prior year, and was held for 14 months without charge (Collins 2001, 55). Yu was later sentenced to six years in prison in 1994 because a different article contained information from official Chinese Communist Party documents marked top secret (56). Goldsmith was held in a Central African Republic prison for a month based on what he wrote about Bokassa, while his travel companion, *Washington Post* journalist Jonathan C. Randal, was also held incommunicado for a week (136-7). Libyan leader Muammar el-Qaddafi had the dubious distinction of having held a journalist for the longest period of time. A local journalist and writer was arrested in 1973, Libyan authorities never said why he was being held and no charges were ever brought against him; 26 years later, press freedom organizations presumed him dead (141).

Censorship is most frequently implemented through laws and penal codes that allow governments to imprison or fine journalists who insult the president of the state or other top government officials, negatively portray the armed forces or criticize the president of a foreign country (Amin 2002, 129). Authoritarian governments typically use media laws to discipline journalists whose news reporting is critical of the government, which sends a message to them and other journalists about provocative writing (130). Autocrats often expand the libel laws found in democratic societies to offer themselves and their cronies a far greater shield of protection. Libel in democracies typically deals with factually inaccurate claims, but many autocracies have "insult laws" that forbid the publishing of anything that offends leadership figures. For example, journalists in Panama, nominally a democracy, are legally prohibited from criticizing officials or showing "disrespect" toward the government (Collins 2001, 145).

Most Western countries only have civil libel charges, which carry a monetary penalty and an apology, but many authoritarian countries have criminal libel charges with the prospect of imprisonment (142). Yryspek Omuzrakov exposed the poor living conditions at a hostel for workers at a Kyrgyzstan state-owned factory and was convicted of criminal libel against the factory owner and sentenced to three years in prison. Three Taiwanese journalists faced prison time for accusing a senior intelligence official of tapping the phones of legislators, while six Egyptian journalists were sentenced to a year in prison for alleging corrupt business dealings by President Hosni Mubarak's sons (144).

Moreover, libel laws across Eastern Europe, Africa, Asia and Latin America grant special protection to public officials. These laws often forbid truth as a defense in libel cases, meaning the reputation of public officials is deemed worthier of protection than

the public's right to know (Peters 2002, 49). An independent paper in Kazakhstan reporting on state officials' involvement in the oil trade was sued 17 times for libel in four years, chiefly by company executives with close links to the government. Since Kazakh law does not recognize truth as a defense, no evidence regarding the involvement of public officials in bribery could be considered and the paper was fined \$180,000. This example demonstrates another repressive phenomenon whereby governments or criminal elements file a massive number of libel lawsuits to harass or intimidate journalists into dropping a damaging story even when they have little chance of winning the suits. A powerful Mexican businessman accused of receiving \$30 million from a politician convicted of murder and money laundering sued 12 journalists who tried to follow up on the story (local reporters said the businessman had no chance of winning the suits), while major newspapers in Croatia were hit with more than 230 libel suits in 1997 alone (Collins 2001, 143 and Levitsky and Way 2002, 58).

Autocrats generally control radio and television journalism more closely than print media since the broadcast media can bypass the widespread illiteracy in the developing world and thereby appeal to mass audiences (Amin 2002, 126). Until the advent of satellite television and radio, broadcast media have typically been absolute monopolies where regimes not only own but also operate and control the press institutions. For this reason, independent journalists in repressive countries tend to be newspaper reporters, not broadcast correspondents (Collins 2001, 33). Further, democratic regimes generally have a higher level of ownership of television than of newspapers, and conversely autocrats actually own a disproportionately large share of newspapers in comparison with their democratic counterparts (in absolute terms, autocrats own both more newspapers and television stations than democrats).

Unsurprisingly, a recent analysis of media ownership structures in 97 countries found that state-owned media tend to be less effective than private media in monitoring government (Peters 2002, 49). At the same time though, studies have found that the oppressive techniques highlighted above can serve as a substitute to state ownership for autocrats (Hosp 2003, 18).

Some of the literature attempts to explain why authoritarian regimes with a similar degree of overall repression take disparate approaches to controlling the press. Attacks against journalists are more prevalent in Africa and Latin America, even though journalists have no more freedom in many parts of Asia. Some scholars attribute this discrepancy to press behavior, arguing that the Asian press tends to be more restrained (Collins 2001, 138). Other analysts attribute the difference to rapid social and economic development, positing that conflict is most prevalent in arenas where the development of a more independent press has not been accompanied by the establishment or strengthening of democratic institutions. This imbalance most often occurs in partly free nations such as Mexico, Peru, Nigeria and Pakistan, which are gradually transitioning toward a more open, pluralistic society (22).

Other literature has explored the relationship between regime longevity and media repression. Most theorists propose that the credibility of a regime will decrease over time and media repression will therefore have to increase to maintain the same degree of government control over society. Hosp's quantitative study finds that the chief executive's years in power and the stability of the system have different effects on media freedom. As the tenure of a ruling individual increases, media repression rises as well; however, the longevity of a system has a four times larger negative impact on media repression (Hosp 2003, 16). Overall, though, state control and manipulation of the

media have been insufficient in sustaining nondemocratic forms of government. At the very same time that vast technological improvements have occurred in the communications media – which were expected to enhance the regime's legitimacy in the eyes of their populations – democratization movements have swept across the world. As a result of this pressure to democratize – at least on a symbolic level – regimes have sought out more covert and less forceful ways to manipulate their media.

Over the past few decades, many regimes have realized that subtler forms of coercion can be just as effective in silencing reporters without provoking the popular indignation and protest sometimes caused by more overt measures. While a previous generation of autocratic leaders favored direct confrontation and often resorted to violence to keep the press in line, this new breed relies more on media manipulation and control over the government bureaucracy to achieve the same ends (Simon 2006, 51). Repressive tactics often turn journalists into press freedom martyrs and elicit stern condemnations from the West, while coercive techniques can be just as effective in controlling the media while avoiding the backlash. The 1971 media repression in Singapore resulted in fundraising campaigns to save the newspapers that lost licenses and tarnished the nation's image as an investor-friendly economy (George 2007, 134). The repressive instruments of discretionary licensing and preventive detention are adequate for a state content to rule by force but excessively crude for regimes who want to convey a consensual appearance to their rule and thus be embraced by the international community. "Friendly autocrats" must avoid open battles with the media – even if the regime would never lose such battles – and turn them into willing ideological vehicles of the state (135).

Coercive measures allow the press just enough autonomy to preserve a modicum

of public credibility. These techniques provide journalists with periodic reminders of who is in charge yet at the same time give them enough room to practice some professionally satisfying journalism (George 2007, 136). This system of press management relies on an equilibrium between realism and hope: realism dismisses as foolhardy any dream of changing the media system's wider political framework, while hope reassures journalists that there is a professional role for them even within the current system. In coercive media environments, independent media outlets are not only legal but often quite influential, and journalists – albeit under intense government pressure – often emerge as important opposition figures (Levitsky and Way 2002, 57).

Coercive techniques commonly used by autocrats include establishing norms of self-censorship and maintaining economic control over the media. One of the reasons media repression decreases with the longevity of a regime is that the regime is gradually able to solidify its control as the norm of self-censorship becomes more prevalent (Amin 2002, 128). Journalists begin to use the term “responsible freedom” when they cover issues dealing with the image of the country or national concerns. By establishing certain standards of behavior, the state delegates censorship downwards to the journalists, resulting in the appearance of censorship without censors (Barck, Classen and Heimann 1999, 214). Some of the literature argues that journalists in autocratic societies reflexively embrace self-censorship since they retain a pervasive fear of the political system, while the other school of thought argues that these journalists seldom take full advantage of the marginal freedom that exists (Amin 2002, 130).

Some authoritarian regimes have attempted to manipulate media control through measures with a more cooperative appearance. The East German Council of Ministers laid out guidelines for scheduling programming up to six weeks in advance and the

editors were expected to draw up their own programming in conjunction with the Council, which would then have to approve the contents (Barck, Classen and Heimann 1999, 214). In addition, leaders of the party's agitation division held weekly meetings nominally to provide media editors with information about recent debates and controversies. Even though the resulting specifics were deemed mere "recommendations," the meetings created binding rules of discourse and identified subjects considered off limits as well as those the party wished to emphasize. Another element of the state's efforts to subordinate media to the ruling party were the recruitment and socialization policies. Starting in the 1950s, almost all journalists had to complete their studies at a single university where ideological concerns took center stage and the state determined individual career paths and job choices after graduation (216). Membership in the Association of East German Journalists was essentially a prerequisite to landing a job, and career advancement was aided by belonging to the communist party.

One common way in which autocrats economically control the media is through bribes, which can take many forms. Since pay levels are generally low in developing countries, even small bribes can greatly influence the story (Peters 2002, 52). Up until the late 1970's, Mexican journalists almost universally received monthly envelopes from government officials stuffed with cash ranging from \$20 to \$2,000 (Collins 2001, 23). Other bribes included free nights at nightclubs, the services of prostitutes, and gifts of new-model cars and European vacations. Many authoritarian regimes also grant subsidies to opposition newspapers, making them somewhat dependent on remaining in the regime's good graces (Amin 2002, 131). And the Mexican government continues to pay newspapers to run advertising disguised as news stories. While some media

companies around the world increase revenues by passing off advertising as editorial content, others make favorable coverage of an enterprise contingent upon paid advertising (Peters 2002, 52). Since the advertising departments of many private African newspapers are understaffed, reporters are expected to solicit advertising while on assignment, earning a share of the fee if successful. Even without an explicit agreement about advertising and editorial content, governments that purchase significant ad space in publications end up with significant leverage. As William Orme wrote in *A Culture of Collusion*: "For many publications, reliant as they are on government cash, a declaration of independence would be tantamount to a declaration of bankruptcy" (Collins 2001, 22).

Autocrats can also exert control over news organizations through more broadly focused financial regulations. Many regimes have laws requiring minimum amounts of capital needed for the establishment of a newspaper to inhibit the proliferation of small publications that may be politically opposed to the government; countries such as Armenia control the price for newsprint and other means of production and will raise them to express irritation at independent publications; and countries such as Russia have used publisher debts to engineer an ownership takeover by government-friendly forces (Amin 2002, 131; Collins 2001, 149; and Levitsky and Way 2002, 58).

Private media ownership in authoritarian nations is often more susceptible to government pressure since the publications tend to be concentrated in the hands of a few wealthy businessmen. The desire of these private media owners to maximize profits in all their business ventures often results in government corruption going uncovered (Peters 2002, 49). In the Philippines, the publisher of the *Manilla Times's* family also owns companies involved in food manufacturing, real estate, airline operations,

banking, and department stores (Collins 2001, 149). The paper accused Filipino president Joseph Estrada of being the “unwitting godfather” for an improper government contract. Even though the paper’s owners told employees that there was “nothing really wrong with the story,” they realized the government could hurt their business empire, and the paper soon ran a page-one apology saying the story “was never intended to malign or impugn [Estrada’s] sterling reputation.” One Hong Kong publisher experienced business problems after he called then Chinese premier Li Peng a hermaphrodite – his clothing chain suddenly had financial and regulatory problems in China, and an investment bank dependent on Beijing’s goodwill withdrew from backing the publisher’s public stock offering (149-150).

The Russian government under Vladimir Putin has targeted media owners – vulnerable because of their own shady business practices and efforts to use their media empires to influence politics – with the aggressive enforcement of tax laws and personal intimidation to install a new compliant ownership (Simon 2006, 51). Even sharper conflicts of interest occur when media control and political power are combined in a single individual; in Italy, Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi owned several major newspapers and controlled most of Italy’s private television market before taking office, and as head of the government, he now controls Italy’s public television market as well (Peters 2002, 51). Thus, journalists for virtually any publication who report too aggressively on the prime minister’s business interests risk inconvenient transfers or the loss of their jobs. Finally, governments can implement policies that help consolidate media ownership in the hands of government-friendly businesses. Since 1977, all newspaper companies in Singapore must be publicly listed and ordinary shareholders have been limited to a three percent stake in the company; however, management

shares with 200 times the voting rights of ordinary shares have been allocated to banks and other establishment entities (George 2007, 135).

D. Relationship Between Criminal Groups and the Media

The previous section highlights the threats autocratic regimes can pose to independent media, but free expression could be in even more peril if these regimes were not in power. Terrorists, both jihadi and otherwise, are just one set of actors who thrive in a weak or stateless environment. This section will examine how other sub-state actors – particularly criminal groups – interact with the media, focusing in particular on arenas with weak or non-existent states. Criminal groups have been the suspected source of fire in 71 murders of journalists since 2002 (Journalists Killed Since 1992, 2010). One of my schools of thought hypothesizes that jihadi behavior toward the media mimics criminal groups, so it is therefore essential to understand how criminal groups operate to test the validity of this assertion.

An independent press requires a stable and functioning state and is not viable as long as states are unable to meet some of their key obligations (Waisbord 2007, 116). States matter because they remain the primary repository of power that can enforce authority and control violence with geographical borders, providing a safe place for reasoned public discourse (118). International bodies and non-government organizations can also provide spaces for public debates, but unlike states, they cannot enforce domestic and international laws designed to protect the press. For millions of people in the developing world, the presence of sub-state actors engaged in the illegal trafficking of various commodities – such as diamonds, oil, minerals, timber, drugs and people – is more tangible than the state. Civil society institutions might be active in settings where organized crime is more organized than the state, but civil society is a

poor substitute for the state as the guarantor of order and law (119). The uncontrolled violence and lack of effective rule of law that accompanies a diminished role for the state results in a dearth of independent journalism (127).

A major reason failing states are so ominous for independent media is that sub-state actors do not tolerate dissent. Empirical evidence demonstrates that most sub-state groups oppose any form of democratic deliberation and seek a lapdog press that presents them only in a favorable light (Waisbord 2007, 120). Sub-state actors such as criminal groups often operate illegal networks that profit only as long as they operate below the public's radar and remain invisible to scrutiny. Targeted journalists are most often attempting to report on drug trafficking or corruption, both of which tie into dimensions of statelessness: how sub-state groups are economically supported and their links to government officials. Many Mexican journalists say that the most dangerous thing a reporter can do in their country is to name the perpetrators of drug murders and their ties to the police who protect them (Collins 2001, 16). Statistics show that anti-press violence is most frequent in areas distant from large urban centers; such areas are typically characterized by a thinner state presence (Waisbord 2007, 119).

In Mexico, attacks on journalists have served as an indicator of the strength of the drug trade in a particular region (Collins 2001, 16). Some sub-state actors – such as jihadis – thrive when open war and domestic insurgency attract consistent attention from Western media and policymakers (Waisbord 2007, 119). Other stateless areas – such as urban slums, trafficking points and desolate countrysides – are equally dangerous yet fail to create a blip on the international news radar. Sub-state actors typically have fewer subtle repressive tools at their disposal and therefore most frequently resort to shootings, assaults and abductions of journalists.

For years, J. Jesus Blancornelas exposed details of Mexican drug traffickers (Collins 2001, 13). One morning, ten gunmen attempted to assassinate Blancornelas but failed. Colombian radio reporter Norvey Diaz exposed investments by drug criminals in property at vacation resorts, which resulted in him receiving many threatening letters and funeral wreaths (141). Diaz was killed in his car with a bullet to the back of his neck. Although criminal actors generally thrive in failing states, journalists in developing nations face threats for reporting on similar topics as well. Veronica Guerin, Ireland's leading investigative journalist, covered the "violence, money and evil" pervasive in Dublin's criminal underworld (58). Just before Guerin was going to publish a story naming the three biggest heroin dealers in Dublin, she was shot in her face and chest six times with a pistol (60). One year earlier, a businessman slammed Guerin's head against her car and threatened to kill her if she wrote anything about him. Sometimes, journalists are targeted by both governments and criminal groups for connecting the illicit activities to officials. Just two weeks after Russian authorities threatened Masyuk with a newspaper ad, Chechnyan rebels kidnapped her (26-7) . They beat her and held her in a cold, wet cave for 101 days until her employer paid \$2 million in ransom.

IV. Research Design

A. Selecting Case Studies and Contextualizing Findings

The validity of each school of thought will be tested using 172 case studies and 13 independent variables. Each journalist who was murdered by a jihadi since the beginning of 1992 will be a case in my study. Even though my analysis will consider the entire universe of cases in which journalists were targeted – whether or not an attack occurred and whether or not a death resulted – the scope of the cases will be limited to murdered journalists since none of the press freedom organizations keep

comprehensive data on kidnapped, attacked or targeted journalists (only the Committee to Protect Journalists – CPJ – has ever tracked abductions, and they only did so in Iraq from 2003-2009). I used CPJ as my primary source for identifying cases, and once I selected my cases, I obtained information on each of the variables from the databases of several press freedom organizations including CPJ, Reporters Without Borders (RWB), the International Press Institute (IPI), the Freedom Forum Journalists Memorial, reports by UNESCO and the International Crisis Group, and searches using the name of each of the journalists.

Only three organizations – CPJ, RWB and IPI – thoroughly explain the methodology they used to include fallen journalists in their database, and of those three organizations, CPJ's database covers the most years, 1992 to present, which is why I decided to use them as my central source. Each case CPJ identifies as a violation of press freedom is corroborated by more than one source for factual accuracy (Frequently Asked Questions 2010). CPJ tends to have fewer cases on its journalists killed list because it only counts cases for which the motive has been “confirmed” – a reasonable degree of certainty exists that the murder occurred in retribution for, or to prevent, news coverage or commentary – and because CPJ tracks media support workers using a separate list.

I considered all of the 1,170 incidents in which CPJ believes a journalist or media worker was killed (CPJ has only tracked deaths of media workers since 2003) due possibly to their professional duties when determining which deaths met my criteria for jihadis targeting journalists. In this process, I first confirmed that the target should in fact be considered a journalist. Since I'm using an inclusive definition for journalist that mirrors what the CPJ considers reporters or media workers, I relied almost entirely on their classifications. Then, I attempted to determine if the case met my criteria for the

journalist being the primary target or whether the journalist was collateral damage or incidentally hit. I generally relied on CPJ's criteria for "confirmed" to determine my targeting, but if CPJ did not suggest an alternative motive and the majority of other press organizations considered the journalist targeted for his or her work, I would include the journalist in my targeted list.

Finally, the most challenging part of selecting cases was determining whether or not the perpetrator of the killing should be considered a jihadi. I wanted my universe of cases to be a representative rather than a definitive sample of the incidents in which jihadis targeted journalists, so I therefore attempted to identify the most likely perpetrator for each case rather than only including cases in which jihadis were the confirmed perpetrators. In my determination, only including cases in which the perpetrator was known would bias my study toward cases in arenas with fewer competing actors and more stability, thereby skewing my analysis of the variables. If nobody claimed responsibility for the murder and the government did not bring any suspects to trial, I would look for any mentions of possible actors or motives in the text of the CPJ capsules on each incident. If that didn't help, I would then look at CPJ and other sources for mentions of state or sub-state actors who have a history of committing violent acts in the area. If that didn't help, I would look at the suspected source of fire; if it was listed as a criminal group, government officials, local residents, military officials, mob violence or a paramilitary group, I would discard the incident. If the suspected source of fire was a political group (CPJ includes anti-government parties, combatants, insurgents and terrorists in this classification) or unknown – which combined to cover about half of the overall cases –, I would identify the various political groups or general actors, respectively, in the region and include those incidents in which jihadis were the

strongest.

Relying primarily on CPJ information, I initially determined that 178 of the 1,170 incidents met my criteria for inclusion in the study. I then confirmed that jihadis were the most likely perpetrator during the variable testing phase of my data collection process when examining the incident reports from RWB, IPI and the Journalists Memorial. A significant amount of contradictory or subsequent information on the incidents – RWB did a far better job than CPJ of updating the likely suspects for killed journalists, particularly for those cases that went to trial – caused me to remove 8 of the cases I selected in the first round. Though I did not actively examine incidents from sources other than CPJ, information from other databases or related research caused me to add 2 cases to my study, bringing the total number of cases to 172. CPJ does not even attempt to identify a perpetrator for the deaths of media workers or when the motive for killing a journalist is unclear, which covers 365 of their incidents. Of the remaining 805 incidents, they identify political groups – a category in which jihadis are only one of many possible actors – as the killers in only 178 incidents, which is surprisingly close to the number of jihadi-specific cases I identify.

My independent variables include all of the empirical and quantitative elements that could potentially assist in validating or refuting my schools of thought. Nine of my 15 independent variables are also tracked by CPJ for all of their incidents, and these are: year of incident, location of incident, medium in which the killed journalist was published, job of the killed journalist, beat(s) covered by journalist, name of news organization that published the journalist's work, whether the audience was local or foreign, whether the journalist was taken captive before being murdered and the gender of the journalist. Four of my independent variables are frequently noted by CPJ in their

capsules but are not separately tracked for all incidents. They are: language of publication, nationality of journalist, religion of journalist and affiliation of news organization in which the journalist was published. Two of the independent variables – known stories about jihadis and jihadi organization of attacker – are unique to my study due to its jihadi-specific orientation. The rationale for testing each variable and its relationship to each of my four hypothesis will be detailed in future sections.

Much of the data requires context in order to be meaningfully interpreted. In particular, my analysis would benefit from being able to compare the relationship between the independent variables with a more generalized dependent variable (e.g. the percentage of overall journalists killed who cover a politics beat) along with surveying the distribution of the independent variable in each of the arenas (e.g. the number of overall journalists in Algeria who cover a politics beat). The first item – all cases of killed journalists – are tracked by CPJ for the nine overlapping independent variables and will be noted in the data analysis section. The second item – overall distribution of independent variables – is available for some independent variables in some arenas, will be generalized to the other arenas when appropriate, and will be noted in the data analysis section.

Some of my independent variables can be tested against a proxy dependent variable to assess the generalizability of my study. This takes on added importance since my study examines a more narrow dependent variable – journalists murdered by jihadis – than my paper, which intends to look at journalists targeted by jihadis. The most applicable measure of generalizability is a survey conducted in 2007-8 of 404 Iraqi journalists in 23 different cities (Kim 2009, 11). Six of the independent variables in the survey match the independent variables for my study. The dependent variable in the

survey – journalists' perception of physical danger – correlates more closely with the dependent variable this paper intends to examine than my own study. Four of the six measures in the survey's physical danger index – receipt of threats due to journalistic work, frequency of threats, colleagues kidnapped, and colleagues killed – are also aspects of targeting under my definition. From this examination, I will ascertain how well my study's findings regarding the murder of journalists can be applied to the broader universe of targeting cases that do not end up in murder. This generalizability will be examined in the data analysis section. Finally, the literature provides qualitative data on the relationship between (aspects of) five of the independent variables and the dependent variable of this paper. These findings will also be presented in the data analysis section to assess for generalizability.

B. Implications for Year of Cases

CPJ provides the date and year that each journalist was killed for all of their incidents, so I had little trouble testing this variable. The findings will play a significant role in confirming or refuting my schools of thought. This is the most important variable in assessing the validity of my fourth school of thought which argues that the utility of journalists has diminished as jihadis switch from external to internal media. Since the establishment and growth of emerging media venues most thoroughly explains this school, the number of cases must rise dramatically in the mid-to-late 1990's with the explosion of the internet (the most important emerging media tool to jihadis) and continue to rise gradually since then for this school to be valid. The external media began behaving much more unfavorably to jihadis following September 11, so the rate of increasing cases should also be significant in the early 2000's. Due to the high level of correlation between this variable and the fourth school, a constant or diminishing rate

of cases would play a major role in refuting this school. Likewise, since external media have taken on a more unfavorable tone toward jihadis, a slight rise in cases over the past decade would strengthen the validity of the second school of thought, that jihadis target journalists to stifle ideological opposition (and more opposition has manifested itself since Sept. 11). This variable will only provide mild insight into the second school since other variables correlate more strongly.

Since the first school of thought, forcing acquiescence of political rivals, is predicated on jihadis vying for control of territory, fluctuations in the caseload – with a higher number of cases concentrated over consecutive years – would indicate a greater validity for this school. I hypothesize that jihadis are only able to behave like states for limited periods of time due to limited military capacity, lack of international recognition and external threats, so a constant rate of incidents would help discredit this school. Other independent variables correspond to the features that define this school, so like the second school, the correlation between the first school and this variable is moderate. No meaningful relationship exists between the third school – strengthening organizational solvency – and the year of the case.

C. Implications for Location of Cases

I categorized all of the cases into four arenas so that the independent variables could be analyzed and compared across geographically contiguous areas. The arenas were classified in light of the universe of cases in my dataset. About three-quarters of the cases occurred in one of two countries – 75 cases in Iraq and 54 cases in Algeria – so I classified each of these nations at its own arena. The following two countries with the most cases are Afghanistan and Pakistan with 11 and 8 cases respectively. The national-level geopolitical situation for these two countries has differed considerably since 1992,

but neither federal government has had strong control over the border region between the two countries. Moreover, characteristics in the border provinces – the North-West Frontier Province, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and Balochistan for Pakistan; and Herat, Kandahar, Zabul, Paktika, Khost, Paktia, Lowgar, Nangarhar, and Konar Provinces in Afghanistan – appear quite similar. Ethnic Pashtuns dominate both sides of the border – they make up only 42 percent of Afghanistan's total population and 15 percent of Pakistan's total population –, the physical landscape is very mountainous, and both areas have been sympathetic to or supportive of jihadi groups, most notably al-Qaida and the Taliban. Since I believe each side of the border shares more in common with the other side of the border than the rest of its respective nation, I consider the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region to be its own arena, covering a total of 14 cases, 8 from the Pakistani side of the border and 6 from the Afghan side.

The remaining 29 cases occurred in geographically disparate areas – no more than five cases occurred in any particular country – so I group all of these cases together in an outliers arena. The outliers arena includes three cases from Pakistan and two from Afghanistan that did not occur near the border.

I also gathered sub-national location data for each case, including the province, city and part of the city (if possible) in which the murder occurred. CPJ generally provides the city, province and nation for each case, and I was able to pinpoint many of the cases to a particular region within the city based on capsule reports from one of the press freedom organizations. City areas provided an analytical benefit only for those cases occurring in particularly concentrated areas, so I will only present sub-city data for those cases. In addition, some of the cases occurring in more geographically disparate areas will be grouped by province rather than by city.

Two of the schools will be more validated by the cases occurring in a more concentrated area, while the other two will be more validated by the cases occurring in a more disparate area. The strongest relationship exists between the independent variables and my first hypothesis, forcing acquiescence of political rivals. This school predicts that murders should occur predominantly when an actor can make a credible claim for being the most powerful in a territory. Since jihadis have only been able to make that claim in a few locations, the caseload should be concentrated mostly in those areas. Because this school is predicated on jihadis behaving in a state-like manner and one of most salient features of states is a defined territory, contiguous territory will serve as one of the primary variables in determining the accuracy of the first school. Likewise, jihadis with higher coercive capacity are more likely to be able to extract concessions from other actors since they are able to make more credible threats. Jihadis do not have to be the dominant territorial actor (or even vying for dominance) to present a credible threat, yet for the third school – strengthening organizational capacity – to be true, jihadis must have a foothold in the region in which they are targeting journalists. This school would therefore expect a moderate concentration of the caseload location, and the findings will have a mild relationship to the overall validity of the hypothesis.

The most important factor driving the fourth school – the utility of journalists diminishing – is the growth of emerging media. The new media allows jihadis to rely on internal media for communications worldwide while, when only traditional media existed, jihadis were dependent on external media in many locations. This school therefore predicts a caseload distributed across many locations, with a considerable number of murders occurring in areas that have not traditionally been jihadi strongholds (meaning they did not have traditional internal media in the region). A

moderate relationship exists between this variable and the overall accuracy of the hypothesis. The second school – stifling ideological opposition – emphasizes absolute power and cultural uniformity. One would therefore expect to see cases occurring in disparate areas with a slightly heavier concentration in places with majority non-Muslim populations (or non-Muslim governments) since journalists would likely express stronger opposition to jihadi beliefs or promote immoral behavior in these areas. A limited relationship exists between this variable and the overall hypothesis.

D. Implications for Medium and Job for Journalists Killed

CPJ provided data on the medium and job for each journalist killed. It should be noted that some journalists worked across multiple mediums (e.g. radio and television) while others held multiple positions within the same medium (e.g. editor of one print publication and reporter for another). Thus, there are 24 more data entries than cases for this variable. CPJ, however, did not collect data on media workers killed before 2003. Whenever a press organization's capsule report mentioned that a media workers was killed in the same incident as the journalist, I would include the media worker in a separate case, but there will be no cases prior to 2003 of media workers who died independent of journalists. For presentation purposes, some of the less common media worker positions – technical director, kitchen staff, accountant, public relations, board member, printing technician, gardener and copy editor – were grouped into a composite category called “other media workers” for the macro-level data, which had 11 data points. My analysis will classify the data points into three media – print, radio and broadcast – and four job categories – editor/publisher, reporter (this classification encompasses all content producers, so photographers and camera operators will be tabulated into this category as well), reporter-oriented media workers (ex. translators

and drivers) and news organization-oriented media workers (ex. administrative workers and engineers). Most cases will fit into two categories. For example, a print editor would be counted in both the print medium and the editor/publisher job category.

The second and fourth schools predict similar patterns of targeting based on job category. However, the correlation between this variable and the overall validity of the second hypothesis is high because journalists in certain positions are far more capable of producing ideologically-oriented work than their peers; the correlation between job position and utility is tenuous for the fourth hypothesis. Individual behavior – as opposed to collective identify – is the key determinant in a journalist's expression of ideology or utility to jihadi organizations. These schools therefore predict that reporters will be most frequently targeted since they have the greatest capability of expressing a point of view or helping jihadis legitimize and propagate their movement. Editors, publishers, and reporter-oriented media workers play a limited role in expressing ideology (editors and publishers do this through staff editorials and coverage decisions) and spreading the jihadi message, and both schools therefore envision some targeting of these actors (though much less than reporters). News organization-oriented media workers play little role in either of these schools, and they therefore should be targeted very sparingly. For the second school, high illiteracy rates in developing countries make broadcast and radio journalism a more substantial ideological threat; therefore, journalists in these mediums should be targeted more than their print counterparts. For the fourth school, the utility of newspaper journalists was initially lower since they had a more narrow reach and has diminished more rapidly since most emerging media (particularly the internet) is more visual than auditory in nature; therefore, emerging media can better replace print than broadcast or radio media. Thus, print journalists

should be targeting more often than their broadcast or radio counterparts.

The third school predicts that greater concessions can be extracted from the targeting of more notable and valuable journalists. In terms of job position, this school expects those at the top of the hierarchy (editors and publishers) to be targeted most frequently. From there, the most skilled and specialized positions should be targeted with greater frequency, meaning reporters should be targeted second most often, reporter-oriented media workers third most often and news organization-oriented media workers least often. Less significant is the medium in which the journalist is employed since the medium enjoys a weaker relationship with notoriety. The visual nature of broadcast journalism makes its employees the most valuable target, while this third school would anticipate more targeting of radio than print journalists since radio has greater penetration in highly-illiterate societies. Since most of the cases occur in developing countries, illiteracy takes on a greater relevance.

In contrast with the second and fourth schools, the first school sees collective identity – rather than individual behavior – as the key determinant in whom jihadis seek to target since individual journalists can most effectively challenge the jihadi system of rule through links to the organizations of political rivals. This school therefore predicts that journalists within a news organization will be targeted rather indiscriminately – such as by car bombs or gunmen storming the news organization – since each individual working for the same employer poses a relatively similar political threat. Thus, the ratio of data points for each job position should correspond roughly to the ratio of journalists working in each position within the given arena. This school therefore projects a much higher caseload involving media workers (either reporter or news organization-oriented) than any of the other schools.

In terms of media, broadcast and radio stations tend to be aligned with the government or a political or ethnic group more often than print publications. Even though independent publications can embrace ideas antithetical to jihadis, it is less likely that they will be seen as aligned with a threatening political rival than an explicitly-affiliated news organization. The first hypothesis therefore argues for a slightly higher caseload in broadcast and radio media than in print media, with broadcast the highest since it is typically most aligned with the state.

E. Implications for Beats Covered by Journalists

CPJ lists one or multiple beats for most of the journalists killed. These beats include, but are not limited to: business, culture, crime, corruption, human rights, politics, sports and war. Whenever CPJ indicated a beat, I included it as a data point. For some of the reporters who died in the 1990's, particularly in Algeria, CPJ did not list a beat. For those cases, I would examine the capsules from CPJ and other press organizations to ascertain which beat(s) were central in the reporter's work. If I was unable to get any indication of the types of stories produced by the murdered journalist, I would leave the beat blank, but for most cases, I could figure out at least one beat relevant to their work. Media workers (both reporter and news organization-oriented) are not responsible for producing content, and I therefore did not record any data points for these cases (CPJ did not indicate beats for media workers either). In sum, there are 34 more data entries than cases for this variable since individual journalists covered up to five beats.

Since the first hypothesis emphasizes collective identity, it therefore expects journalists within a news organization to be relatively interchangeable. Thus, the ratio of data points for each beat covered should correspond roughly to the ratio of journalists

working in each beat within the given arena. This school therefore projects a higher caseload involving beats seemingly unrelated to jihadis (such as sports) than any of the other schools. The third school correlates significantly with this variable since certain beats are more likely to threaten the organizational solvency of a jihadi organization rather than merely representing ideological opposition. Four of the beats – crime, corruption, human rights and war – could reveal sensitive information unknown about that particular jihadi organization. Articles about crime, corruption and human rights could expose jihadi participation in illicit activities, while war-related articles could reveal secret battle missions or targets identified by jihadis (I anticipate that few war-related articles actually end up doing this, however). In addition, external repercussions are most likely to occur when they threaten other actors' cashflow or security, which will occur most frequently in articles about crime, corruption or war (human rights offenses tend not to directly harm external actors with the capacity to intervene). Overall, therefore, this hypothesis projects the highest caseload from journalists covering crime and corruption, followed by human rights and war. Substantially fewer cases should involve journalists covering the other four beats.

As far as the fourth school is concerned, two of the three communications objectives – legitimation and propagation – can be better achieved by jihadi internal media since emerging media outlets have enabled jihadis to reach an audience of potential supporters. Since the third communications objective – intimidation – requires reaching opponents, this remains better achieved through external media. Thus, this hypothesis predicts that jihadis would be most likely to target journalists covering a beat that could conflict with their internal legitimation and propagation efforts, which would most likely be the politics beat.

The second school would predict the highest caseload for beats where journalists have the greatest propensity for supporting positions antithetical to the ideological values and norms of the jihadis. Ideological opposition to the jihadis is most likely to arise in writing about politics, culture and human rights. Thus, this school expects journalists covering these three beats to be targeted more often than their peers. The lowest caseload should arise from beats unrelated to jihadi views, namely sports, war and business. Although war coverage could impact the effectiveness of a military operation, jihadi military tactics are generally not motivated by cultural or religious ideology. Business, however, has a slightly stronger relationship to jihadi ideology since the Sharia prohibits interest or investing in businesses that provide haraam (forbidden) goods or services. There should be a moderate caseload from the remaining two beats – crime and corruption – that relate only somewhat to ideology.

F. Implications for Known Stories About Jihadis

I used incident capsules from press freedom organizations along with additional information to determine whether they had written any stories about jihadis. If so, they are in the “yes” group; if not, they are in the “no” group. I considered both direct references to particular jihadi groups or jihadis in general along with indirect references to jihadi-related topics – such as fundamentalist Muslims, Wahhabism, extremist groups, and insurgents (particularly in the Iraq or border region arenas) – sufficient for inclusion in the ‘yes’ category. Several types of articles could contain references to jihadis: most of the ‘yes’ cases involve opinion or investigative pieces on jihadi organizations, though some of the ‘yes’ cases also pertain to incident coverage where jihadis were a primary focus (such as a gunfight involving jihadi forces or an anti-extremism rally). However, the threshold for inclusion in the yes category was ‘known’ –

higher than the 'most likely' threshold I used for case inclusion – so unless the incident capsules referenced jihadis in one of the aforementioned ways, a data point in the 'no' category was added for this variable.

'Yes' data points would help validate my second, third and fourth hypotheses. Although some journalists in the 'no' category might actually write about jihadi-related topics (even if their incident capsules did not mention it), it is imperative that most of the data points be 'yes' for the second and fourth schools to be proven true. From the perspective of the fourth school, journalists' utility could not have diminished with a shift in the communications forum for those who do not reference jihadi topics in their work since these reporters never played a part in advancing the jihadis strategic communication objectives to begin with. Likewise, journalists cannot pose ideological opposition to jihadis without addressing jihadi-related topics.

Only those journalists addressing jihadi-related topics can threaten the solvency of a particular organization, but the targeting of journalists with 'no' data points can still result in concessions that strengthen the jihadi's organizational capacity, so this variable has a weaker correlation to the third school. As with the previous variables, the first hypothesis expects journalists within a news organization to be relatively interchangeable. Thus, the ratio of data points for known stories about jihadis should correspond roughly with the ratio of journalists within the given arena writing stories about jihadis. The first school therefore projects more 'no' data points than any of the other schools.

G. Implications for Name and Affiliation of News Organizations

The CPJ incident capsules list the name of the publication or publications that employed the murdered journalist. For journalists who freelanced or contributed to

multiple publications, data points for all of their publications were included. For a couple of freelancing journalists, neither the press organization incident capsules nor the additional literature mentioned particular news organizations that published the reporter's work. For those cases, I did not enter any data points for this variable.

I also classified each news organizations by one of five possible affiliation options: the government, a political party or movement (some of the political organizations do not have an actual party due to a government ban), a religious organization, a press organization or independent. The press organizations and the related literature usually classified news organizations into identical or similar categories. The press organizations, however, only explicitly mentioned an affiliation for some of the news organizations. In many of the remaining cases, I ascertained a definitive affiliation through independent research on the news organization. For those cases where I could not find an absolute answer, I used contextual clues to predict a most likely affiliation (e.g. if an incident capsule said that the public perceived the publication as having a pro-government editorial stance, I would assume the publication is government-affiliated). For journalists who wrote for multiple publications with the same affiliation, I included a single data point under the appropriate affiliation. Therefore, more data points exist for some of the individual news organizations than for the overall affiliation category (e.g. 36 journalists worked for government-affiliated news publications in Iraq, but since two of the journalists worked for multiple government publications, 38 data entries exist at the news organization level).

I will restrict my data analysis for this variable to three categories: news organizations affiliated with the government, a political party/movement or independent, since virtually all (167 of 172) cases fall under these three categories. The

first three hypotheses all predict the highest caseload for government-affiliated news organizations, followed by political party/movement-affiliated organizations and independent news organizations. The rationale, importance and category variance differs, however, for each of the three schools. This variable correlates most strongly with the first school since affiliations provide a prime indication of collective identity. More specifically, the government is, by a considerable margin, the most likely entity to be competing with a jihadi organization for territorial control, so the vast majority of the data points should appear in this category. In addition, independent news organizations could only be considered political rivals of jihadis in very unusual circumstances, so this should make up a very small portion of the caseload. Political parties or movements can occasionally compete with jihadis for relative influence (though rarely territorial control), so some of the caseload should fall into this category.

The monetary and political capacity of a news organization has the most direct impact on its ability to make concessions, so third school would therefore expect jihadis to target government-affiliated news organizations most often since they can make the most significant concessions. Governments are wealthier than political parties or individuals, which makes it easier for them to make monetary concessions; more importantly, only governments can make political concessions such as a prisoner release or ceasing military or police missions that disturb jihadi organizations. Political parties tend to have more access to political capital than individuals; therefore, the third school predicts a slightly higher caseload for parties than independents but a more substantial gap between governments and political movements.

The second school – stifling ideological opposition – assumes that jihadis would be largely uninterested in the affiliation of a particular news organization since they

target journalists based on individual behavior. However, governments are almost always opposed to jihadi organizations regardless of ideology since sub-state actors threaten state control; therefore, the highest caseload should come from the government. A small number of political parties and some individuals might also support jihadis, thereby making it somewhat less likely that news organizations and individuals would express ideological opposition to jihadis. Affiliation, however, has only marginal impact on the overall validity of the second school.

Governments tend to implement policies that deprive jihadis of the "oxygen of publicity" mentioned earlier. They generally refuse to provide jihadis with any space to directly air their grievances and even refrain from discussing jihadi grievances or goals (preferring instead to paint them as irrational or delusional). The fourth school – diminished utility of journalists -- therefore believes that government-affiliated publications never had much utility to begin with. Thus, the journalists with some diminished utility – i.e. those who work for politically-affiliated and independent news organizations – are more likely to become targets.

The distribution of murdered journalists across individual news organizations also tests the validity of each school of thought. Since a relatively small number of news organizations can actually help threaten jihadi control of territory, the first school anticipates a large amount of the caseload being concentrated in relatively few news organizations. Outside of policies that restrict hiring to journalists with a particular editorial viewpoint, there is little reason why individuals who challenge jihadi ideology should work at only a few news organizations. The second school would therefore predict the caseload to be spread across disparate news organizations. The third school expects jihadis to target news organizations with a history of providing concessions for

threatened journalists. Likewise, jihadis should avoid targeting those organizations which have previously refused to give concessions for threatened journalists. Since some news organizations in a given arena would meet each of the criteria, the third school would expect this variable to have a moderately concentrated caseload. No relationship exists between this variable and the fourth hypothesis.

H. Implications for Local or Foreign Audience?

CPJ keeps data on whether each slain journalist worked for a local or foreign news organization. This classification is based on the site of the news organization's headquarters; if the organization is headquartered in the country where the journalists was murdered, the case is classified as 'local.' If not, the case is classified as 'foreign.' Emerging media – particularly internet and satellite television – allow media outlets to reach an audience far beyond the country of their headquarters. This applies in particular to the pan-Arab satellite television stations Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya. Even though both stations target in part an Iraqi audience (Iraq has the highest concentration of cases in my study by a considerable margin), most of their audience is non-Iraqi; therefore, news organizations headquartered outside the country of the incident with an multinational audience will remain classified as foreign.

Two of the hypotheses predict a higher caseload for local organizations, one expects a significantly higher caseload for foreign organizations, and the remaining one anticipates a slightly higher caseload for foreign organizations. As discussed with the affiliation variable, the capacity of a news organization has the most direct impact on its ability to make concessions, so the third school would therefore expect jihadis to primarily target journalists working for foreign news organizations. Foreign news organizations tend to be larger than local ones and are usually based in developed

countries, meaning they often have a greater ability to make ransom payments. The second school depends on what jihadis see as their primary audience. It expects jihadis to be most concerned about ideological opposition that threatens the organization's absolute power, and therefore depends on the internal calculations of jihadis. Because I define jihadis as having the ultimate professed goal of establishing a global Islamic caliphate, this school would expect foreign journalists to be targeted slightly more often since their audience matches the jihadis end goal.

Virtually all political entities that pose a threat to a jihadi organization's regional hegemony would operate within that region. Likewise, news organizations operating within that region are far more likely to be associated with political rivals of jihadi groups than news organizations from outside the region. Thus, the first school predicts that journalists working for local news organizations would be targeted in most cases. The fourth hypothesis links this variable to the beat(s) covered variable. The two communications objectives – legitimation and propagation – where jihadis wish to reach an audience of potential supporters would predominantly require local media. The third communications objective – intimidation – requires reaching opponents, which is better achieved through foreign media. Since jihadis continue to rely on external media to intimidate their opponents, the utility of journalists writing for a foreign audience remains the same. But since jihadis have shifted their propagation and legitimation efforts to internal media, the utility of journalists for local audiences has diminished. Thus, this school predicts that jihadis would be most likely to target journalists working to reach local news organizations, and this variable – local or foreign audience – enjoys a significant relationship to the overall validity of the school.

I. Implications for Language of Publication

The incident capsules from the press organizations only explicitly mentioned the language(s) of publication for some of the cases. In many of the remaining cases, I ascertained a definitive language of publication through independent research on the journalist or news organization. For those cases where I could not find an absolute answer, I used contextual clues to predict a most likely language (e.g. if a newspaper had an Arabic name, I would assume the paper published in Arabic). For journalists who produced work in multiple languages, I included data points for each language in which they regularly published. Therefore, there are 14 more data points than cases for this variable.

This variable contains several composite measures used to simplify the presentation and analysis of data in the overall and outlier arenas. I reference some journalists publishing work in Romance languages, Balto-Slavic languages and Indo-Iranian languages. The Romance languages comprise all of the languages descended from Latin, and there are more than 800 million native speakers worldwide. The data points for French are listed separately because of the number of data points. Balto-Slavic languages are spoken in Eastern and Northern Europe, experienced a period of common development, and share several uncommon linguistic traits. More than one billion people speak Indo-Iranian languages, which are used from Europe to western China. More than 300 varieties exist, with the most common being Hindi, Urdu, Bengali, Punjabi and Farsi.

My analysis will classify the data points into three categories: Western languages (such as English and French), official, national or majority languages (such as Arabic or Turkish), and regional or minority languages (such as Kurdish or Berber). Some languages will have different statuses in different nations: for example, Urdu is the

national language of Pakistan and a regional language of India, while Pashto is a national language of Afghanistan and a regional language of Pakistan. My analysis is based on the nation in which the murder took place when classifying languages into categories.

The relationships between each hypothesis and this variable are largely linked to the rationale provided for the 'local or foreign audience' variable. The fourth hypothesis is particularly linked to the audience and beat(s) covered variables. The two communications objectives – legitimation and propagation – where jihadis wish to reach an audience of potential supporters would predominantly require national or regional languages. The third communications objective – intimidation – requires reaching opponents, which is better achieved through Western media. Since jihadis continue to rely on external media to intimidate their opponents, the utility of journalists writing in Western languages remains the same. But since jihadis have shifted their propagation and legitimation efforts to internal media, the utility of journalists writing in national or regional languages has diminished. Thus, this school predicts that jihadis would be most likely to target journalists producing work in national or regional languages and this variable enjoys a significant relationship to the overall validity of the school.

Likewise, the second school expects jihadis to be most concerned about ideological opposition that threatens their organization's absolute power. Because my definition of jihadis is restricted to organizations having the ultimate professed goal of establishing a global Islamic caliphate, this school would expect journalists publishing in Western languages to be targeted most often since their work can be understood by the far enemy. This school also hypothesizes that jihadis would be particularly sensitive to

ideological opposition published in Arabic since that is the preferred language of most transnational jihadi leaders. Even more importantly, Arabic is the sacred language of Islam, the language of the Qur'an and the native language of Muhammad. Since Arabic is the national language throughout the Middle East and North Africa, this school predicts a slightly higher caseload for national languages than regional languages.

As discussed previously with the affiliation and audience variables, the capacity of a news organization has the most direct impact on its ability to make concessions, so the third school would therefore expect jihadis to primarily target journalists writing in Western languages followed by those producing work in national languages. News organizations producing work in Western languages (and to a lesser extent, national languages) tend to be larger than their regional language counterparts since Western and national languages are understood by more people, meaning these publications can cater to a larger audience. Moreover, Western language publications are frequently based in developed countries, resulting in them often having a greater ability to make monetary payments.

Most political entities that pose a realistic threat to a jihadi organization's territorial hegemony would need to speak the common tongue of that territory. News organizations publishing work that can be understood by most of the local actors and population pose a far more credible political threat to jihadi groups than news organizations publishing only in the language of the elites. Thus, the first school predicts that journalists publishing in Western languages would be targeted the least. Even though jihadis generally vie for control over a region of the state's territory (or part of a city) rather than the entire nation, national languages are also often the dominant language of many regions (e.g. Arabic is the primary language in all but the north of

Iraq). Therefore, this school predicts that journalists publishing in national and regional languages will be targeted at equal levels.

J. Implications for Nationality of Journalists

Incident capsules from the press organizations would occasionally mention that the national origin of a journalist is different from the location where he or she works. If none of the press organizations mentioned that the journalist was a foreigner and the journalist published in the local language, I would assume that the journalist was native to the nation where they were murdered. If the journalist published in a language not common to the region, I would conduct additional research into the background of the journalist. If that failed to yield any conclusive evidence, I would assume the journalist shared the nationality of the location of their press organization's headquarters. Again, I sought the most likely nationality in uncertain cases to obtain a more representative sample.

As with the language of publication variable, this variable also has a few composite measures used to simplify the analysis of data. When discussing the nationalities of journalists, I refer to some journalists as being from "developed" or "other developing" countries. Countries with high levels of income, industrialization and quality of life are considered to be developed, while countries not fitting such definitions are classified as developing countries. I will consider the 34 countries classified by the International Monetary Fund as "advanced economies" to be developed, and my paper will interchangeably refer to these developed countries as Western. The developing countries with a small caseload were compiled into a composite "other" category in the overall and outliers arena to streamline the presentation of data.

My analysis will classify the data points into three categories: local (journalist is

from the nation where the murder occurred), foreigner from a developing country, and foreigner from a developed country. All cases occurred in developing countries. The relationship between the fourth hypothesis and this variable is largely linked to the rationale provided for the 'local or foreign audience' variable since local journalists tend to produce work for a local audience while foreign journalists tend to produce work for a foreign audience. Outside of this connection though, this school perceives the nationality of a journalist as having a very marginal impact on whom jihadis decide to target. The nationality variable, however, allows for slightly better segmentation since it divides the data points into three categories while the 'local or foreign audience' variable only has two categories. Most foreign journalists from developing countries should be expected to produce content for people within the same region where the targeting occurred since neighboring countries typically enjoy more ties with one another and share ethnic, religious and cultural characteristics more so than two countries from different regions. These ties and shared characteristics lead to a heightened interest in one another's affairs. Thus, both local journalists and foreigners from developing countries are best positioned to reach an audience of potential supporters, while foreigners from developed countries can most easily reach opponents of jihadis. Since jihadis continue to rely on external media to reach their opponents, the utility of foreign journalists from developed countries remains the same. But since jihadis have mostly shifted to reaching potential supporters through internal media, the utility of local journalists or foreigners from developed countries has diminished. The fourth hypothesis therefore predicts that jihadis would be most likely to target local journalists or foreigners from developing countries.

As discussed with previous variables, the likelihood of jihadis receiving

concessions for a targeted journalist depends largely on the wealth and political influence of a journalist's family or the news organization they work for. Since the richest journalists tend to be those from developed countries (and news organizations in developed countries are better endowed than their counterparts in developing countries), this school predicts that the majority of the targeted journalists will come from developed countries. Although both local journalists and foreigners from developing countries have similar financial means, jihadis can pose a more credible threat to a journalist, their family and their community if they are from the area. Moreover, a threatened journalist from a foreign country can return home without having to make concessions, but since leaving is less of an option for local journalists and their families, they would feel much more pressured into making an exchange with the jihadis for their continued safety. Therefore, local journalists would be targeted more often than foreigners from developed countries, and this variable had a moderate correlation to the overall validity of the third school.

Nationality is generally a key indicator of collective identity, which suggests that this variable should have high pertinence in assessing the first school. To that effect, this hypothesis perceives journalists as being agents of their country of origin. However, jihadi groups are most often sub-state actors, meaning their territorial rivals are most often other sub-state actors or the state in which they operate. Therefore, even though foreign journalists – both those from developed and developing countries – are seen by jihadis as part of their foreign government, foreign governments do not often present a threat to the regional hegemony of a jihadi organization. To wit, local governments would normally have a higher stake in maintaining control over all the territory belonging to them. Therefore, the first school expects local journalists to be targeted far

more often than foreigners.

A core tenet of jihadi ideology is that all lands that were ever part of the Muslim ummah (community) should remain or be returned to the ummah, and statements from jihadi leaders have made it clear that a non-Muslim presence in Muslim lands is seen as an encroachment that threatens the survival of the umma. For most variables, stifling ideological opposition has to do with preventing individuals from expressing ideas antithetical or contradictory to the jihadi worldview. For this variable, however, the mere arrival of non-believers within the umma is enough to pose a significant ideological threat to the jihadis. Therefore, this second school expects foreigners to be targeted more than locals, with foreigners from developed countries being the most frequent target since a larger percentage of them are non-believers than foreigners from developing countries. This variable has a moderate correlation to the overall validity of this hypothesis.

K. Implications for Religion of Journalists

This variable was, by a considerable margin, the most difficult to categorize and obtain data for. From a categorization standpoint, I needed to predict which divisions would be relevant to my study along with what exactly fits within the purview of religion. As I scanned the incident capsules while selecting my cases, I got a sense of what religious cleavages were seen as relevant to the murder of a journalist. I therefore created categories for each of the Abrahamic religions (Judaism, Christianity and Islam), and for the two major denominations of Islam: Sunni and Shiite Islam. This division within Islam has greater significance to jihadis than any of the divisions within any of the other Abrahamic religions since jihadis see Shiites as apostates and (some sects of) Sunnis as the only true believers. Some of the incident capsules identified

journalists as supporting secular-oriented political parties or organizations or questioning the tenets of Islam or another religious faith (e.g. whether or not Arabic is truly spoken in heaven), and in those instances, I identified the journalists as secular. This classification only includes cases where support for secular or non-religious views was explicitly identified; some of the journalists in the other religious categories could also be non-practicing or self-identify as secular. Nonetheless, it would be analytically useful to put cases where skepticism or reservations about religion were expressed into their own category.

For some of the cases, the incident capsules from one of the press organizations identified the religion or denomination of the journalist. When that did not happen, I would search additional literature to see if the religion of the journalist was explicitly identified. If I could not find clear identification, I would then see if the news organization was affiliated with a religious group or had an editorial policy supporting a political party affiliated with a religious denomination. If that did not help, I would then consider the arena where the incident took place; if the population overwhelmingly fit into one category, I would assume the journalist was part of that category (e.g. Algeria is virtually all Sunni Muslim). If that did not help (which was most often the case in Iraq, particularly Baghdad), I would attempt to figure out the religious breakdown of the neighborhood in which the journalist lived or worked and assume the journalist was part of the majority faith. If the incident capsule did not identify a neighborhood of residence or employment, I would then research the etymology of the journalist's family name and surname and see if it matches with a historical figure from one of the denominations of Islam or if the name is currently more popular with one of the denominations. I once again used the "most likely" threshold for categorization because

only categorizing cases in which religious identity was considered notable by press organizations would have provided a misleading representation of the overall caseload.

As noted for several previous variables, the likelihood of jihadis receiving concessions for a targeted journalist depends largely on the wealth and political influence of a journalist's family. For the third hypothesis, this variable is closely linked to the nationality of the journalists – the journalists most able to make concessions are those from developed countries, and most Jewish and Christian journalists come from developed countries. Even though developed countries have more people that do not practice a religion and favor a separation of religion from the government, most of the secular journalists noted in the incident capsules are presenting challenges to local Muslim religious norms and therefore live in the developing world. Thus, this school predicts that Jews and Christians will be targeted at a higher rate than Muslim or secular journalists.

The first school views religious identity in terms of the threat religious-based entities could pose to the jihadi control of territory. Since the arena with the most cross-religion or cross-denomination cohabitation is Iraq (with Sunni and Shiite Muslims), Shiite Muslim journalists have the highest likelihood of being affiliated with co-religionists challenging jihadis for land. Few of the cases occurred in arenas with sizable Jewish, Christian or secular-oriented organizations, so this school anticipates that it is least likely for jihadis to target journalists of these religious backgrounds. Intra-sect conflicts with Sunni Islam are possible (e.g. nationalist Salafies and Baathists challenged jihadis for territorial control in Iraq) but not as likely as sectarian conflicts due to the more established cleavages between the two denominations; therefore, Shiites should be targeted more than Sunnis.

Jihadi ideology on other faiths and apostasy are illuminated through statements by their leaders. Mainstream Muslim scholars consider apostasy to be a profound insult to God and interpret the Qur'an to mean that male apostates should be punished with death. Jihadis embrace this most literal interpretation and see apostates as the greatest ideological threat since they betray Islamic values while claiming to act in accordance with Islam. Jihadi statements indicate that Shiites are apostates, the fiercest enemy of Islam and, according to former al-Qaida in Iraq leader Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, they "have always been the spearhead in every war against Islam" (al-Zarqawi 2005, 1). By sheer virtue of their religious orientation, Shiites pose the greatest ideological threat to jihadis and the second school therefore predicts that the majority of the caseload will involve Shiites. Likewise, secular-oriented journalists would clearly be apostates in the eyes of the jihadi and would be targeted at the same level as Shiites, according to this hypothesis. Jihadi literature also makes it clear that non-believers are not viewed as a uniform whole. A 2003 statement by Osama Bin Laden accuses Jews of tricking the Creator, killing the Prophets, being "the lords of usury and leaders of treachery" and says that killing Jews "is the greatest of obligations and the most excellent of ways to gain nearness to Allah" (Bin Laden 2003, 2-3 & 15). Thus, Jews will be targeted less than apostates – Shiite and secular journalists – but more than Christians. Some Sunnis would be considered true believers by jihadis and therefore worthy of protection, but many self-identified Sunnis are seen as apostates in the eyes of jihadis. From a jihadi perspective, Muslims can be guilty of apostasy by adhering to UN principles or rules, embracing democracy or democratic principles, legitimizing usury or promoting interfaith convergence. The second school argues that jihadi targeting of Sunnis is largely dependent on how many of them jihadis would consider apostates.

In a similar light, the fourth school sees apostates – all Shiite and secular journalists along with many Sunnis – as the biggest threat because they undermine the religious legitimacy jihadis seek through their internal media. These religious groups should therefore be targeted most frequently by jihadis. But since jihadis continue to rely on external media to reach their opponents and most Jewish and Christian journalists produce content for people in developed countries, their utility remains the same. Thus, the fourth hypothesis foresees Jews and Christians rarely being targeted.

L. Implications for Jihadi Organizations of Attackers

In most cases, the easiest way to figure out the jihadi organization behind the targeting was to see who subsequently took credit for the murder. It was often difficult to independently verify this claim and, on rare occasion, multiple jihadi organizations would make contradictory claims of credit for the same incident. Overall though, the press organizations typically regarded jihadi claims as accurate. Nobody claimed responsibility for most of the cases though. In those instances, I would investigate who the government convicted for the crime and see if I could figure out which jihadi organization they were affiliated with. However, there has been complete impunity in 89 percent of the cases in which journalists were murdered (by jihadis or non-jihadis), so this was only helpful on rare occasion. At this point, I would examine the incident capsules and related literature on the journalist to see if any government officials or independent agencies had suspected a particular group of carrying out the murder. As with the 'stories about jihadis' variable, the threshold for including a particular jihadi group was 'known,' higher than the 'most likely' threshold I have used for most other variables. Due to the small, fragmented, and anonymous nature of jihadi groups operating in many arenas, it would have been virtually impossible to determine which

jihadi group carried out a murder without any leads. Thus, unless the incident capsules referenced a particular jihadi group in one of the aforementioned ways, a data point in the 'unknown' category was added for this variable. This distinction, however, will prove useful in my analysis.

The jihadi groups involved in virtually all of the cases were sub-state rather than transnational actors, and it would have required tremendous knowledge of each group to distinguish their ideology, methods and motives from one another. To me, the most meaningful distinction resulting from this variable is whether or not the specific jihadi organization behind the attack is known. While this measure does not align exactly with which jihadi organizations have taken responsibility for an attack, based on the presence of the jihadi group within the arena and the scope of the incident, jihadi organizations might expect the public will know they were responsible for the murder even if they do not explicitly take credit (e.g. al-Qaida after September 11).

The third hypothesis sees it as imperative that the identity of the jihadi organization be known in most of the cases. The jihadi organization most effective at extracting exchanges or pledges from opponents have developed a public profile, a reputation for violence in the arena, and are known for retaliating against those who do not cooperate with their initial demands. Opponents are most likely to cooperate with jihadi groups that can cause problems in the future, and the highest capacity jihadi groups are virtually all known (while the smaller, newer and less effective ones remain anonymous to most of the public). Even if a jihadi group occasionally calculates that it would be to their strategic advantage to remain anonymous, it is likely that their identity will eventually be revealed as they negotiate with other actors for concessions.

The fourth school of thought predicts with a high level of certainty (though not as

much as the third) that the particular jihadi organization behind most cases should be known. Since this hypothesis is contingent on internal media operating within the arena (thereby diminishing the utility of the external media), investigators should typically be able to figure out which organizations had strong internal media operations within the region. This effort could be slightly complicated by the fact that jihadi internal media relies mostly on emerging venues – and therefore doesn't leave as clear of a paper trail – , which is why the organization's identity could occasionally remain unknown.

Similar to the third school, the first school believes jihadi organizations would be more effective in getting political rivals to acquiesce to their power if they heighten their public profile and reputation for violence by making their identity known. Likewise, jihadi groups with sufficient capacity to be vying for territorial control would usually fit the profile of known groups discussed above. However, since the first hypothesis does not anticipate jihadi groups engaging in protracted negotiations with opponents (and instead committing a single action) where jihadis calculate it would be to their strategic advantage to remain anonymous, there is a reduced likelihood of their identity being revealed due to the longevity of their actions. In sum, this hypothesis also predicts that jihadi groups will be known in most cases but with a smaller relationship to the overall validity than with the third or fourth schools.

The second school sees it as inconsequential whether the public knows a particular organization was behind the attack. Since these attacks occur to silence criticisms of overall jihadi values and norms, effectiveness is not contingent on opponents knowing which exact group committed the murder. In addition, jihadi rationale for targeting journalists under this school makes it less likely that the public would be able to predict which jihadi group was behind the attack. Therefore, this school

expects the ratio of targeting journalists cases in which jihadi group identity is known to align with the ratio of overall incidents in which jihadi group identity is known.

M. Implications for Taken Captive Before Murder?

Obtaining data for this variable was incredibly straightforward. CPJ also kept data on whether jihadis took a journalist captive before murdering them, and I relied entirely on their findings. This variable is, by a considerable margin, the most important in determining the validity of the third hypothesis. Controlling the fate of a kidnapped journalist gives jihadis tremendous leverage in extracting concessions from opponents. It is possible that a jihadi organization with a tremendous history of violence within the arena could extract pledges from opponents by just threatening to attack journalists, but most jihadi groups lack the stature to force opponents to cower from mere threats. Therefore, the third hypothesis expects journalists to seek a bargaining chip – a kidnapped journalist – in virtually all cases.

The second school contends that killing a journalist takes less human and capital resources than kidnapping a journalists and is just as effective in silencing their point of view (and deterring other journalists from expressing dissent). Moreover, there is always the possibility that a kidnapped journalist will escape (e.g. David Rohde) or be freed by another political actor (e.g. Alan Johnston), meaning they can continue to criticize jihadis in their work and the jihadi organization will have diminished coercive credibility in the eyes of other critics. Based on the reduced costs and risk of an unsatisfactory outcome, the second school predicts that most journalists will be killed.

The first school recognizes the validity of these arguments. Successfully holding a journalist for an extended period of time before killing them really indicates that the jihadi group has strong control over the territory and should therefore deter political

rivals from contesting jihadi power. At the same time, jihadis run the risk of great embarrassment and diminished credibility if the captured journalist goes free against the jihadis' will. Therefore, the first hypothesis expects jihadis to kidnap journalists when they have solid or absolute control over the territory and immediately kill journalists if they are vying for territorial control with other political actors. This variable is unrelated to the fourth hypothesis.

N. Implications for Gender of Journalist

Acquiring data for this variable was also easy. CPJ kept data on the gender of all murdered journalists, and I relied entirely on their findings. This variable should have the most significant impact on the second hypothesis. Jihadis believe that women claiming to be Muslim must travel with a mahram (a trusted guide, usually a male family member) at all times. Therefore, simply carrying out the job duties of a journalist would force Muslim women to violate the tenets of their faith in the eyes of jihadis. At the same time, jihadi statements indicate that women can be subjected to similar levels of torture and imprisonment as men, which differs from other branches of Islam. Therefore, the second school would expect to see a disproportionate number of cases involving women. The third hypothesis predicts that jihadis would be able to garner more concessions for kidnapped females than males due to cultural norms regarding the presence of women in physical danger (particularly females with young children). This heightened level of sympathy from families and communities should cause jihadis to target slightly more women than men. Neither the first nor the fourth school see this variable as related to their overall argument.

V. Arenas for Case Study

A. Iraq: October 2003 to June 2008

Nearly half of the murders of journalists by jihadis occurred in Iraq between October 2003 and June 2008. Appendix #1 details how many cases occurred in each year while appendix #2 describes where in Iraq each murder occurred. The security situation in Iraq deteriorated following the 2003 United States invasion, and the Al Askari mosque bombing in February 2006 caused conflict between Iraq's Sunni and Shiite factions to erupt into a civil war. About 100,000 Iraqis have died in the conflict, 2 million refugees have relocated abroad and about 2.7 million people have been internally displaced. The situation gradually stabilized during 2008, and in May of that year, the Department of Defense reported the lowest death toll since the invasion.

On the eve of the invasion, the Baathist government was running five daily newspapers, four radio stations and a handful of television stations, which accounted for all of the daily sources available to the Iraqi public outside of the Kurdish region in the north (Rousu 2010, 1). Each of these media sources was terminated in April 2003, as Coalition forces took control of Baghdad and ended the reign of the Baath party. Over 200 independent newspapers were created in 2003 and 2004, but that number has steadily declined due to the newspapers with the poorest substance being naturally weeded out and through publications eroded their trustworthiness through sensationalistic coverage (8).

Between March 2003 and October 2009, 190 reporters or media workers were killed and another 40 reporters were kidnapped and released (CPJ 2009). In a survey of Iraqi journalists, the 404 respondents rank-ordered the physical danger coming from the following groups on a five-point scale, with 5 representing "extremely dangerous" and 1 "least dangerous." Shiite militias received a 4.67, insurgent groups received a 4.25, religious groups received a 3.84, the Iraqi government received a 3.09, the U.S. military

received a 3.03 and the Iraqi police received a 3.01 (Kim 2009, 13-4). According to Ziad al-Ajili of Iraq's Journalist Freedom Observatory, 169 journalists were killed by the insurgents (Sunni or Shiite), 22 by the U.S. Army, two by the army of Iraq and one by the Spanish legion (Kevorkova 2010, 1).

The security situation caused virtually every Western news organization except for *The New York Times* to significantly reduce the size of its reporting team in Iraq; the number of Western reporters in Iraq declined from more than 1,000 in 2003 to a couple of dozen in 2008 (Mnookin 2008, 3). More than one-third of the Iraqi respondents reported that their news organization had stopped publishing or broadcasting temporarily, with 14 percent doing so based on threats from militant groups and 65 percent doing so due to financial difficulties, which were perhaps related to the extra cost of security (Kim 2009, 14). The local journalists and Westerners who remained in Iraq have taken precautions in every aspect of their life. Journalists travel together in unmarked, guarded vehicles and only conduct pre-scheduled interviews with security in tow (Kevorkova 2010, 3). Even then, they rarely name their company or give out their telephone number or e-mail address. Most journalists remain guarded 24 hours a day and never tell their neighbors or friends where they work. Nonetheless, six-in-ten respondents hoped to still be working as journalists in Iraq in five years (Kim 2009, 14).

B. Algeria: December 1992 to August 1996

In late 1991, the Islamic Salvation Party (FIS) won free parliamentary elections in Algeria (Durant 2007, 1). Fearing that this result would mark the end of democracy, the country's military voided the elections in January 1992 and took control of the government. The subsequent civil war between radical Islamists and the Algerian state would last nearly a decade and claim more than 100,000 lives (1). Following the election

of Abdelaziz Bouteflika in 1999, a new law gave amnesty to most guerrillas, motivating large numbers to “repent” and return to a normal life. The violence declined substantially and had practically disappeared by 2002.

In 1989, President Chadli Benjedid championed a new constitution – adopted by national referendum in February – legalizing political parties and ending 27 years of one-party rule by the National Liberation Front (Campagna 1999, 4). In line with the political opening, the state ended its monopoly over the media by authorizing and assisting in the creation of private print media and ending government censorship. The first private newspapers appeared in 1990 and, over the next two years, dozens of independent or party-affiliated daily and weekly publications in both French and Arabic emerged. The government, however, remained in firm control of all radio and broadcast media (Campagna 1999, 4). In 1997, the press consisted of 32 titles with a circulation totaling 775,000 copies per day; 18 of those were daily publications with a daily circulation totaling 648,000 (9). Nearly 4,000 Algerians worked as journalists (Ibrahim 1995, 1).

Nearly one-third of the total murders of journalists by jihadis occurred in Algeria between December 1992 and August 1996. Appendix #1 details how many cases occurred in each year while appendix #2 describes where in Algeria each murder occurred. Overall, 59 journalists were killed between 1992 and 1996, with two additional murders in 2001 (Journalists Killed 2010). Up until the Algerian Civil War, groups rebelling against the state had made use of the press to publicize their cause (Why Violence 1995, 52). “This is a totally new situation, unprecedented,” said Djallal Malti of RWB. “That’s why it’s so frightening” (Baldwin 1995, 2).

Jihadis were responsible for more than 90 percent of the dead journalists during

the Algerian Civil War, and accordingly they were under considerable pressure from the government. The state crackdown first focused on publications affiliated with the FIS along with those media outlets sympathetic to the party (Campagna 1999, 4-5). The government then began to censor independent journalists by arresting them and charging them with offenses such as "spreading false information" and "endangering state security" for their published calls to the army not to shoot at demonstrators (5). A June 1994 ministerial decree on the handling of "security-related information" announced the establishment of an Interior Ministry "communication unit" which journalists must use as their "sole source of information" on security matters or face punishment (Why Violence 1995, 53).

Arena-specific literature provides qualitative arguments validating or refuting the first two hypotheses. The first hypothesis is strengthened by jihadi statement that accused journalists of being "on the state's payroll" (International Crisis Group 1998, 4). In January 1995, the Armed Islamic Group (or GIA – the principal jihadi group based in urban areas) published a statement: "The Mujaheddin consider that every reporter and journalist working for radio and television [both state-owned] is nothing but a renegade...the GIA calls on journalists to stop working immediately...those who fight us with words will die by the sword" (5). Local news organizations also saw the death of their employees as being tied to collective identity. "He wasn't killed for who he was but for what he did, for being a journalist who worked here," news director Abbas Reda said about Mourad Hmaizi (Ibrahim 1995, 1). Even for those journalists who were not directly affiliated with the government, government censorship gave the impression that they were (Baldwin 1995, 2-3).

Other jihadi statements and behavior, however, help validate the second school

while refuting the first school. Jihadis targeted all ideological opponents to Islamic fundamentalism – included those with no ties to the government – such as academics, artists and musicians (music was seen as an “un-Islamic vice” to be eradicated). Moreover, jihadis issued death threats for broad swaths of the population who clearly present more of an ideological rivalry than a territorial challenge. According to a 1995 Human Rights Watch report, jihadis “issued death threats against broad categories of people including journalists, women who did not wear headscarves, foreigners who do not wear headscarves, butchers who did not lower their prices during the holy month of Ramadan, proprietors of cinemas, and vendors of such “forbidden” products as musical cassettes, French newspapers, and tobacco” (Durant 2007, 2). Individuals were singled out for death through “black lists” circulated by jihadis in Algiers (Campagna 1999, 5). However, some journalist could not figure out what work of theirs had merited inclusion. “I thought I was an anonymous journalist,” said Malika, who works in the state broadcast media. “I didn’t know that the list was so long.” Perhaps, then, the list is designed to target those aligned with political rivals rather than ideological enemies. None of the arena-specific literature addresses strengths or weaknesses in the third or fourth schools of thought.

The AIS released the following statement in December 1996: “The Islamic Salvation Army disowns all murders [for] those who carry the free pen, which is put to service to the principles of our Algerian and Muslim people, be they in the media or other” (International Crisis Group 1998, 5). Since that statement, no Algerian journalists have been killed by jihadis.

C. Afghanistan-Pakistan Border Region:

November 2001 to Present

Since the U.S. military and its Northern Alliance allies routed Afghanistan's Taliban regime and drove Osama bin Laden from Tora Bora at the end of 2001, the fight against al-Qaida and Taliban fighters has centered largely on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border (Terzieff 2003). This 300-mile stretch has become a haven for al-Qaida and operatives loyal to the deposed Taliban regime in Afghanistan. "Almost every tribe in the area is supporting al-Qaida, actively or passively, as guests," said Seramgul, a landowner from Wana, the capital of South Waziristan, in the region of the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA). FATA is believed to harbor the largest number of al-Qaida and Taliban fighter (Terzieff 2003). Ethnic Pashtuns comprising dozens of tribes make up the vast majority of the 27 million people living on both sides of the border. Many Pashtuns have argued for decades that they should have their own homeland – "Pashtunistan" – forever free from the interference of the Pakistani or Afghan central governments (Terzieff 2003).

As jihadi coalesced their control over the border region during the late 2000's, both states realized that they need to made efforts to reestablish their influence throughout their territory or else jihadis could threaten to take over the rest of the country. Up until 2009, jihadis with links to the tribal areas had succeeded in establishing control, as demonstrated by abrogating peace treaties with successive Pakistani, and obtaining control over areas only 60 miles from the capital, Islamabad (Attacks 2010, 132). In July 2009, the Pakistani military launched the "Back on Track" operation to regain control of the Swat District of the North-West Frontier Province. Three months later, the military began a second offensive into Waziristan. Attacks in Afghanistan's capital, Kabul, were rare before 2008, but since that time a dozen major assaults were reported in the city, including attacks by jihadis on the headquarters for

the NATO-led force, the Information Ministry and the Justice Ministry buildings (110). As a result, the U.S. committed to sending 50,000 additional troops to Afghanistan during 2009. As with Iraq, the conflict in the border regions pits a range of jihadi and criminal groups against well-equipped military forces and weak central governments (108). According to Robert Reid, a veteran Associated Press journalist who has served as bureau chief in Kabul and Baghdad, the border conflict is not as intense as the Iraqi fighting. "We don't hear the hourly explosions or the heavy nighttime bursts of gunfire that were fixtures of life in Baghdad for years."

Nearly one-in-ten of the total murders of journalists by jihadis occurred in the border region between November 2001 and the present. Appendix #1 details how many cases occurred in each year while appendix #2 describes where in the border region each murder occurred. Overall, 60 journalists have been killed in Afghanistan or Pakistan since 1992, with 19 of those murders having been perpetrated by jihadis. (Journalists Killed 2010).

The dangers in Pakistan have been borne largely by local reporters, many of whom were uprooted from their homes during the Swat military offensive (Attacks 2010, 107). Journalists faced bombings, attacks, and threats from the Taliban and other jihadis, but government and military officials had also exerted political pressure on journalists and, at times, shown a disregard for their welfare. Foreign journalists became more commonplace in Afghanistan during 2009, and dangers there came in good part from roadside bombs and abductions. Foreign news organizations have taken heightened precautions in both countries but have not yet established the sort of armed, fortified compounds that housed their operations in Baghdad (108). The relative lack of security is due in part to tight news budgets. "If things get worse, I don't know what the

plan will be: More security, or less coverage?" asked a journalist who wished to remain anonymous. "Maybe both?" (111).

Arena-specific literature provides qualitative arguments validating the first three hypotheses. The first hypothesis is supported by international security forces warning of credible threats to kidnap journalists in retaliation for the U.S.-led attacks against al-Qaida and Taliban forces based on the widely held view in jihadi communities that journalists double as CIA informants. "One of our translators warned overheard two of them talking about taking us hostage because one of their commanders had been arrested by the U.S. military," said former *Washington Post* reporter Peter Baker. "That's when we decided to get out" (Ricchiardi 2002, 4).

However, a fine line exists between statements that would validate the first hypothesis and those which would validate the second hypothesis. Jihadi statements indicating opposition to American journalist because of their collaboration with the U.S. government or military would best fit the first school since the identified threat deals with being aligned with political rivals. However, opposition to American journalists based on cultural or ideological enmity to the West would be best addressed through the second school. To wit, American journalists without any alleged ties to their government have taken to purchasing fake Canadian passports, while fixers, guides and interpreters have taken to introducing American clients as Swiss or French. "In a new war in which everything American is the enemy, so are we," said *New York Times* foreign correspondent John Kifner (Ricchiardi 2002, 5).

The development of independent media in Afghanistan has provided some evidence for the validity of the third hypothesis. As investigative reporters have become increasingly bold in revealing the deeply rooted problems of Afghan society, they and

their families have faced intimidation and death threats from the Taliban (Synovitz 2008, 1). Distinguishing the prime motives behind any particular incident remains challenging, however, as evidenced by the lone jihadi murder of an American journalist. The first hypothesis would note that Taliban leaders accused Pearl of being a secret agent for the CIA and Mossad. The second hypothesis would emphasize the ideological threat posed by Pearl's American nationality and his position as "an Islam-hating Jew." And the third hypothesis would note that Pearl was working on a story at the time of his kidnapping detailing connections between shoe bomber Richard Reid and the Taliban. The publication of this story could have weakened the organizational solvency of the Taliban and made particular individuals susceptible to retaliation by U.S. forces. In addition, the gruesome nature of Pearl's death – his severed head was displayed on a pile of newspapers as a message crawled on the screen threatening: "If our demands aren't met, there will be more scenes like this" – was meant to extract pledges from the United States not to interfere in Taliban affairs (Ricchiardi 2002, 1).

D. Outliers: 1992 to Present

The remaining 29 cases did not occur in one particular region but were instead spread out across several different countries. Five cases occurred in Kashmir between 1994 and 2003; five cases have occurred in Mogadishu since 2005; four cases occurred in Turkey during the 1990's; and three cases occurred in the North Caucasus in the 2000's. A long-running dispute over sovereignty in Kashmir escalated into an all-out war between separatist militants – many of whom belong to jihadi organizations – and Indian government forces in 1990 (Parekh 1995, 1). The Kashmiri separatist movement embraces nine major – and over 100 minor – militant groups (2). The Somalian collapse began in 1991 when Siad Barre's repressive government was overthrown and the country

has been in civil war ever since (Somalia 2008, 1). There has been no semblance of a national government, and warlords and regional administrators have ruled over blocks of the state ever since. Since 2006, the Ethiopian-backed Transitional Federal Government has clashed with clan-based insurgents, many of whom are part of jihadi organizations. Ethiopia withdrew from Somalia in January 2009 as Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, a moderate Islamic politician, was elected president. Bin Laden denounced Ahmed in March and urged militant groups to topple him. By May, the jihadi group al-Shabaab had taken control over most of southern Somalia including areas within a mile of the presidential palace in Mogadishu.

The starting point for the jihadist offensive against the Turkish secular establishment was 1990: a professor, journalist, political scientist and writer were assassinated by Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Operation (Karmon 1998, 106). The opening of the Madrid peace talks between Arab countries and Israel in 1991 compelled jihadi groups throughout the region to further action, with 1992 seeing a dramatic uptick in jihadi activity. Most of the jihadi activity in Turkey has been focused in the southeastern region, with the Turkish Hizbullah (made up primarily of Kurds and distinct from its Shia namesake in Lebanon) and the Islamic Jihad Union both operate in this area (Wigen 2009, 2). The leaders and sponsors of these jihadi groups hope to install an Islamic state by targeting secular symbols of the Turkish state such as intellectuals, journalists, and representatives of 'imperialism and Zionism' (Karmon 1998, 101). The electoral success of the religious Refah party in the 1995 parliamentary elections and 1996 presidential elections led to Turkey's first Islamic government following 73 years of secular regimes (106). During the mid-1990's period when the Refah Party was in power, no significant jihadi activity was registered in Turkey. But

jihadi activity started to increase again in the late 1990's and particularly following September 11 when Turkish jihadis trained in Afghanistan and Pakistan returned back home (Wigen 2009, 1). The North Caucasus have been the scene of a low-level jihadi insurgency, ethnic tensions and terrorism since the 1990's. Russian security forces regained control of Chechnya in 2000 and suppressed the Islamic separatist movement there by the late-2000's (Barry 2008, 1). However, much of the conflict bled over to the neighboring republic of Dagestan, where the jihadi organization Shariat Jamaat has been largely responsible for escalating violence over the course of the decade.

VI. Data Analysis

A. Results for Year of Cases

The overall year of cases data along with that for each of the four arenas can be found in appendix #1. The findings for this variable almost entirely refute the fourth hypothesis since neither the overall caseload nor the caseload in the outliers arenas have increased since 1992 (these are the only two categories where the entire sample of years is covered). Moreover, the number of cases actually falls dramatically when the internet bursts on the scene during the mid-to-late 1990's. The first hypothesis, however, is significantly validated by these findings. The annual caseload fluctuates from one to 23 murders and the years with more than 15 cases fall consecutively (1994, 1995 and 2005 through 2007). Moreover, the same trends hold up in two of the arenas – Iraq and Algeria – where there is no caseload for at least two-thirds of the years, and all of the years in each arena where more than 15 murders occurred fall consecutively. The second school is validated to a small degree by the data. The caseload rose every year between 2002 and 2006 due to the strengthening of ideological opposition after September 11, and then plateaued and fell as memories of September 11 faded. However, the arena-

specific data demonstrates that the caseload declined after 2007 almost entirely due to a fall of cases in Iraq, and nothing in the second hypothesis explains why there would be such a dramatic fall in just one arena. Therefore, the second school is weakened to a very small degree. This variable does not correlate with the third hypothesis.

B. Results for Location of Cases

Of the 172 cases, 75 occurred in Iraq, 54 occurred in Algeria, 14 occurred in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region, and 29 occurred in outlying locations. Appendix #2 provides more specific location data for each arena, including the region or province, city or district, and – for Baghdad, Mosul and Algiers – area of the city. Additional quantitative data provides more context for the Iraqi arena. The survey of Iraqi journalists found that 46 percent of them work in big cities – Baghdad, Mosul, Arbil, Basra, Kirkuk, Najaf, Salaymaniyah and Hillah – while the remaining 54 percent work in small cities (Kim 2009, 18). The analysis indicated that Iraqis journalists working in the big cities have a higher perception of physical danger than those working in small cities. My murder-only data is consistent with the broader-based finding of this survey: 88 percent of the cases (66 out of 75) occurred in big cities. Qualitative literature indicates that journalists are generally the easiest targets in working class neighborhoods.

Other qualitative literature helps to strengthen the relationship between this variable and my first hypothesis. “If journalists live in a neighborhood where fundamentalists abound, word spread that there is a journalist around,” a senior Western diplomat said. “Sooner or later some aspiring Islamic revolutionary offers them as the ‘contribution to the cause’” (Ibrahim 1995, 1). This statement is consistent with the premise that jihadis target journalists to consolidate their territorial control. My

quantitative cases provide even stronger evidence of the validity of this school. Three-quarters of the caseload is concentrated in two arenas – Iraq and Algeria – and in both of those arenas, jihadis could make a credible claim for being the most powerful actor in the territory. In addition, the caseload within each of the arenas is highly concentrated: nearly four-fifths of the Iraqi cases occurred in Baghdad or Mosul even though only about one-in-four Iraqis live in those two cities; three-quarters of the Algerian cases occurred in Algiers Province even though less than one-in-ten Algerians lives there; and nearly six-in-ten of the outliers cases occurred in 4 countries.

Even within Algiers and Baghdad, most of the jihadi activity has occurred in contiguous areas: two-thirds of the cases in Algiers Province occurred in five bordering districts stretching south and east from the downtown waterfront (these districts are home to four-in-ten residents of Algiers Province). Nearly half of the incidents in Baghdad occurred in nine bordering neighborhoods in the Western portion of the city. Eight of those 18 incidents occurred in Sunni neighborhoods, five occurred in mostly Sunni neighborhoods, four occurred in mostly Shiite neighborhoods, and one occurred in a Shiite neighborhood (based on September 2007 demographics). There is an increased likelihood that jihadis had control of many of these neighborhoods based on the large Sunni populations; there had been large Shiite displacement in six of the eight now Sunni neighborhoods, which would likely occur had they been under jihadi control. Moreover, Sunnis had been displaced in three of the five mostly Shiite neighborhoods, meaning that jihadis could have been vying for control of their neighborhood in 2006 and early 2007, where sectarian violence was the highest. High caseload concentrations also occur in the other arenas as well: nearly six-in-ten outlier cases occurred in one of four countries. At every level, the first hypothesis successfully explains the findings for

this variable.

From the perspective of the third hypothesis, the tremendous level of concentration indicates that jihadis had at least a foothold in the vast majority of regions in which they targeted journalists. All but five of the cases occurred in countries where there was at least one additional case, which takes on heightened importance in relation to the outliers arena. Predictions from the fourth hypothesis regarding this variable were largely refuted: the caseload was not distributed across many locations and the jihadis had a presence in many of these arenas prior to the arrival of emerging media. And although this variable is less correlated to the overall validity of the second school, the findings are even less consistent with expectations: cases did not occur in disparate locations and almost none of the cases happened in places with mostly non-Muslim populations.

C. Results for Medium and Job for Journalists Killed

Qualitative data indicates that some widespread views exist regarding the dynamics of different communications mediums. Most notably, broadcast media is seen both as a symbol of power and the primary way for influencing the masses in developing countries due to high illiteracy rates. Appendix #3 provides the breakdown by profession, and the number of journalists killed in each medium is presented below. Overall, 55 percent of the journalists killed by jihadis worked in print media (print reporter, print editor or photographer), 33 percent worked in broadcast media (broadcast reporter, television producer or camera operator) and 12 percent worked in radio media (radio reporter or editor). A disproportionately high number of murdered Algerian journalists worked in print media (68 percent), while a slightly lower than average number worked in broadcast and radio – 23 percent and 8 percent, respectively.

In the border region, eight journalists worked in print media while seven worked in broadcast media. A disproportionately low number of killed journalists in the outlier region worked in broadcast media (23 percent), while a higher than average number worked in print and radio – 60 and 17 percent, respectively. And in Iraq, the percentage of murdered journalists working in print and broadcast media was almost identical – 43 and 42 percent, respectively – while 15 percent worked in radio media.

The survey of Iraqi journalists found that 56 percent work for newspapers, 17 percent work for television outlets and 12 percent work for radio outlets (Kim 2009, 13). My cases would therefore suggest that, in the Iraqi arena, broadcast journalists are disproportionately murdered by jihadis while print journalists are disproportionately not targeted. Kim also finds higher overall (jihadi and non-jihadi) casualty rates for Iraqi broadcast journalists, yet Iraqi broadcasters do not have a higher perception of danger compared to their print counterparts (16). Iraqi print journalists should therefore be threatened, attacked and kidnapped at higher rates to explain the equal danger perception.

The first three hypotheses all predict that broadcast journalists will be targeted the most while print journalists will be targeted the least. The composite results will be analyzed against the sample from the Iraqi survey, while the arena results will be compared with the composite results and the Iraqi survey. Even if broadcast journalists do not constitute the majority of the cases in Iraq or the border region, they are targets more often than their representation in the workforce would predict. However, in Algeria and the outlying regions, broadcast journalists are targeted at low levels while print journalists are murdered at rates slightly higher than their workforce representation. Overall, print journalists make up a clear majority of the cases, though

cases involving broadcast journalists are higher than expected. Therefore, this variable very slightly refutes the first three schools. In contrast, the findings in Algeria and the outlying regions are completely consistent with the fourth hypothesis, inasmuch as print journalists still make up the majority of the cases in the border region. On the whole, this variable very slightly validates the fourth school.

In terms of job categories, 58 percent of those murdered by jihadi worked as reporters, 22 percent worked as editors, 10 percent worked as reporter-oriented media workers and 10 percent worked as news organization-oriented media workers. In comparison to the overall data, a higher percentage of those killed in Iraq were media workers (16 percent are news organization-oriented entities and 19 percent are reporter-oriented) while a lower percentage were reporters (42 percent). In the border region, the vast majority of the cases involved reporters (15 out of 17), while the other two involved a reporter-oriented media worker and a news organization-oriented media worker. Media workers deaths have been separately tracked in all but the first 14 months that this arena has been volatile. In the outlier regions, a higher percentage of those killed were reporters (72 percent) while a lower percentage were media workers (3 percent, all news-organization oriented). Media workers deaths have been separately counted for much of the time data has been collected from this arena.

And in Algeria, a higher percentage of those murdered were editors (32 percent) while a slightly lower percentage were media workers (7 percent news-organization oriented and 5 percent reporter-oriented). The latter discrepancy, however, is rather immaterial given that media worker deaths were not independently tracked during the entirety of the Algerian Civil War. The initial discrepancy probably explains why most editors ended up living in protected compounds at the "Club des Pins," 12 miles outside

of Algiers.

The second and fourth hypotheses excel at predicting the case trends in the border region and outlier arenas, where the vast majority of incidents involve reporters and media workers generally are not murdered. Algeria slightly validates both of these schools, though editors are killed at a surprisingly high rate given that they do not often publish works with their point of view or play a role in the propagation or legitimization of jihadi movements. Although reporters are still the plurality of cases in Iraq, neither hypothesis addresses why so many editors and media workers would be targeted. Overall, these schools do a good job in projecting which job position will be targeted, though this variable correlates much more with the second school than the fourth.

Given that editors make up a small percentage of the newsroom, the third hypothesis does a tremendous job of foreseeing in Algeria that those at the top of the newsroom hierarchy will merit the most concessions. Editors are disproportionately targeted in Iraq while media workers are avoided in the outlier region, so the third hypothesis does a solid, though not spectacular job, of explaining these two arenas. Although media workers are again generally not targeted in the border region, this school does not provide any rationale for why jihadis would prefer reporters to editors in all instances. Overall, the number of media workers targeted is surprisingly high and the number of editors targeted is a little low given the premises, but the school does a decent job in addressing the variable. The first hypothesis nails the Iraqi incidents, with the caseload almost exactly reflecting the standard job position demographics of a newsroom. The three-to-one editor-to-media worker case ratio in Algeria indicates a certain degree of individual targeting, though media workers are not altogether avoided. This school fails to explain either the border region or the outlier arenas due to the

paucity of cases involving editors in the border region or media workers in either arena. Given that nearly half of the cases occurred in Iraq though, this school does a fair job in projecting how the variable plays out overall.

D. Results for Beats Covered by Journalists

The overall beats covered by journalists data along with that for three of the four arenas can be found in appendix #4. In the border region, nine journalists cover a war beat while five journalists cover a politics beat. The survey of Iraqi journalists found that 40 percent write political stories and 60 percent report non-political stories (Kim 2009, 16). Since war is related to the overall political situation in Iraq – and would not fit the classification Kim offers for non-political stories – I will include cases in both the war and politics beat when comparing my data to hers. With that caveat in mind, 81 percent of the journalists murdered by jihadis cover political stories. However, Iraqi reporters who mainly write political stories and opinion columns do not have a higher perception of physical danger than the reporters who write non-political stories (16). Therefore, non-political reporters in Iraq must either be threatened, attacked and kidnapped at higher rates or targeted at high rates by non-jihadi actors to explain the equal danger perception.

The first hypothesis uses Kim's survey finding as an indicator of typical beat coverage within an arena. Since this school expects data points for each beat to correspond roughly to the ratio of overall journalists working the beat, about four-in-ten cases should involve political journalists and six-in-ten should involve non-political journalists. This premise fails to explain the data for this variable. At least two-thirds of the cases in each arena involve political journalists, and every case in the border region results in the death of a political journalist. This variable has a moderate relationship to

the overall validity of the first hypothesis. The third school is also largely unsuccessful at explaining this phenomenon because none of the cases in two arenas – Iraq or the border region – involve beats highly related to organizational solvency and 78 percent of the cases in Algeria involve journalists' covering beats entirely unrelated to solvency. This hypothesis does a marginally adequate job of explaining the outliers arena, though there are still many more cases with unrelated beats than with highly related beats. The school overall does a pretty poor job since the majority of cases are unrelated while only a few are highly related.

The fourth hypothesis aligns more closely with the data for this variable. The politics beat conflicts with propagation and legitimization efforts through jihadi internal media, and indeed, most, and a slight majority, of murdered journalists cover political beats in Algeria and the outliers arenas, respectively. A decent number of killed journalists, albeit less than the majority, cover politics in Iraq and the border region. Overall, just under a majority of targeted journalists cover politics, indicating that this hypothesis has some validity in regards to this variable. However, this variable has a tenuous relationship with the overall school of thought.

Beats most likely to result in the expression of ideological opposition to jihadis received heavy coverage in the Algerian and outlier cases, with around three-quarters of journalists in both arenas covering these beats. In both Iraq and the border region, however, most cases involved journalists who covered beats unrelated to jihadi views. Overall, most journalists cover beats highly likely to result in ideological opposition, but nearly three times as many journalists cover beats unrelated to jihadi views than beats somewhat related to their values. Therefore, this variable is somewhat explained by the second school of thought.

E. Results for Known Stories About Jihadis

The overall known stories about jihadis data along with that for the four arenas can be found in appendix #5. The discrepancy between each of the arenas is really apparent with this variable. The second, third, and fourth hypotheses accurately foretold the caseload in the outliers arena, were mildly helpful for the border region, and missed the mark in Algeria and Iraq. But since three-quarters of the cases occurred in Algeria and Iraq, these hypotheses would prove unhelpful in analyzing this variable for the overall data set. This is more problematic for the second and fourth schools than for the third because the targeting of journalists with 'no' data points can still result in concessions that strengthen the jihadi's organizational capacity.

Once again, Kim's survey finding that four-in-ten journalists cover political issues will be used as a baseline for analyzing the first hypothesis. Jihadis are generally only one of several political actors operating within an arena – and often very difficult to cover due to state restrictions and safety concerns – so it seems reasonable to assume that about one-in-three journalists covering politics in an arena where jihadis are present will produce at least one known piece of work about a jihadi. Therefore, the caseload in Iraq and Algeria should correspond almost exactly with the ratio of journalists within each of those arenas writing stories about jihadis. In the border region and the outlying cases, the caseload with known stories about jihadis is higher than the total number of journalists in a typical arena covering political issues, meaning this hypothesis fails to explain these two arenas. But since Iraq and Algeria have most of the data points, this school explains the overall variable dynamics pretty well.

F. Results for Name and Affiliation of News Organizations

Qualitative data indicates that some widespread views exist regarding the

dynamics of news organizations. First, journalists at larger news organizations tend to have a higher perception of danger compared to journalists at small news organizations (Kim 2009, 17). In addition, journalists who believe their news organization has a higher impact on politics tend to have a higher perception of physical danger than those who believe their news organization has a lower impact on politics. Appendix #6 provides the arena-by-arena breakdown of cases by the name and affiliation of each news organization. The survey of Iraqi journalists found that 40 percent work for independent news organizations, 37 percent work for news organizations affiliated with a political party or religious movement and 23 percent work for government-affiliated news organizations (Kim 2009, 17). The Iraqi caseload has about double that percentage of journalists working for government publications – 45 percent – and somewhat lower percentages working for independent and political/religious news organizations – 30 percent and 25 percent, respectively.

During the mid-1990's in Algeria, one-third of the newspapers belonged to the public sector and two-thirds of the newspapers were independent (International Crisis Group 1998, 9). The private newspapers were read by a small part of the population, mainly in urban areas. Half of the private publications are noted for their wide circulation, their open matter, their criticisms of the authorities and their fight for freedom of expression (9). All radio and broadcast media, however, were government-affiliated (18). By linking this variable to the medium of publication variable, it is evident that about two-thirds of the caseload of Algerian journalists work for print publications and about two-thirds of the overall print media publications are private, while one-third of Algerian journalists caseload works for radio or broadcast stations, all of which are about government-owned. Therefore, if jihadis did not target journalists

based on the affiliation of their news organizations, about an equal amount of the cases would impact government-owned and independent media. However, one-third more cases involve government media, indicating that jihadis in Algerian arena target journalists because they work for a government-affiliated publication. As with Algeria, the broadcast media in Kashmir is also entirely government-affiliated. Of the Kashmiri print publications, one dozen are supportive of the separatists, one is politically independent and one is pro-government (all are privately owned and therefore classified as independent). To wit, three of the five cases in Kashmir involved journalists working with government-affiliated publications (all were broadcast journalists) and two of the cases involved journalists with independent publications (both were print journalists).

The prognostications from the first three hypotheses most accurately reflect the data from the Iraqi and Algerian arenas. Even though more cases involved independent organizations than political parties, fewer politically-affiliated publications existed in both arenas (slightly fewer in Iraq and significantly fewer in Algeria) so that is not too problematic, especially considering that targeting of government-affiliated journalists occurred in both arenas. These schools did a very poor job of explaining the other two arenas, though, where independent publications had a far higher caseload than those with direct affiliations. Yet since government-affiliated news organizations were targeted in the plurality of cases – slightly more than their representative share of the media – these school did a fairly good job of predicting this variable. These results are more significant in validating the first school than either the second or third.

The fourth hypothesis predicts every arena at least somewhat accurately. It expects most cases to involve non-government affiliated publication, and non-government publications make up a clear majority in the border region and the outliers,

a slight majority in Iraq, and a slight minority in Algeria. Overall, the fourth school does a stellar job in explaining this variable, but affiliation of the news organization has limited relevancy to the overall validity of this hypothesis.

The first hypothesis successfully explains the distributions of cases across individual news organizations in the Iraqi and Algerian arenas. One-third of the Iraqi cases occurred at five media outlets while one-half of the Algerian cases occurred at five media outlets, a high rate of concentration given that several dozens news organizations operate in both countries. One-third of the outlying cases also occurred at five media outlets, but this arena has a significantly smaller caseload, no news organization had more than three cases and only these five entities had multiple cases. Therefore, this arena slightly discredits the first school of thought. The border region, however, completely contradicts this hypothesis with 14 different publications represented by 12 journalists and only a single news organization with multiple cases. In sum, the evidence from this variable slightly discredits the first school.

In contrast, the second school's expectation of disparate news organizations is best exemplified by the border region and the outliers arena, where cases took place across 28 different news organizations. Even though much of the caseload in Iraq and Algeria was concentrated for a couple of news organizations, 21 Algerian news organizations and 42 Iraqi news organizations had three or fewer cases, indicating that some diffusion also took place in those arenas. Thus, the second hypothesis also does a decent job at explaining those two arenas and a pretty good job at explaining the whole variable. The concentration and diffusion present in Iraq and Algeria coincide with the projection of the third hypothesis, while the caseload in the border region and outliers is a little more spread out than anticipated. Overall, the third school also does a solid job

at explaining this variable. No relationship exists between this variable and the fourth hypothesis.

G. Results for Local or Foreign Audience?

The overall local or foreign audience data along with that for the four arenas can be found in appendix #7. The third hypothesis offers its strongest interpretation in the border region arena, where approximately 40 percent of the cases have involved foreigners. Given the preponderance of locals working on insecure arenas, this result indicates there was some targeting of journalists working for foreign publications, albeit not to the extent predicted by the hypothesis. This rationale has little traction in the other three arenas though, where at least three-quarters of the cases involve journalists working for local publications. Overall, this variable helps refute the third school of thoughts, which takes on moderate significance given the higher capacity of foreign news organizations to make ransom payments. The second hypothesis, while misguided in regards to this variable, is less problematic than the third because it only expects foreign journalists to be targeted slightly more often. This finding only has a marginal impact on the overall validity of the second school.

Both the first and fourth hypothesis accurately foresaw the murder in most arenas of primarily journalists producing for a local audience. The high percentage of journalists working for foreign news organizations in the border region arena comes as a slight surprise to these schools. Nonetheless, both schools accurately projected the overall situation regarding this variable, though this data finding is more relevant to the fourth school than the first.

H. Results for Language of Publication

Qualitative data indicates that some competing dynamics exist regarding

perceptions surrounding the language of publication. First, jihadis often target English-speaking journalists because they appear to be spies (Attacks 2010, 16). Yet at the same time, reporters for local language news outlets come under great pressure because of their wider influence among the masses (131). Appendix #9 provides the overall breakdown of cases by language of publication along with examining the data in each arena. Overall, 63 percent of murdered journalists published work in the official, national or majority language, 30 percent published work in a Western language and 7 percent published work in a regional language. For instances where a language could be national or regional depending on the country of the incident, I counted it as national. In comparison to the overall data, significantly more journalists in the Iraqi caseload produced work in the national language (80 percent) while significantly fewer produced work in a Western language (13 percent). A slightly higher percentage of the border region cases produced work in Western languages (40 percent) while none produced work in a regional language. For the outlying cases, slightly fewer journalists published in national or Western language (56 percent and 25 percent, respectively) while significantly more journalists produced work in a regional language (19 percent).

Two-thirds of the Algerian daily newspapers in the mid-1990's were published in French even though the majority of Algerians no longer speak the language (International Crisis Group 1998, 9). Moreover, jihadis issued threats specifically targeted for the French-language press and ordered newsstands to stop selling newspapers published in French (Why Violence 1995, 55-6). By linking this variable to the medium of publication variable, it is evident that about two-thirds of the caseload of Algerian journalists work for print publications and about two-thirds of the overall print media publications are published in French, while one-third of Algerian journalists

caseload works for radio or broadcast stations, most of which broadcast in Arabic. Therefore, if jihadis did not target journalists based on the affiliation of their news organizations, about an equal amount of the cases would French-language and Arabic-language media. Yet despite jihadi statements and qualitative data detailing the additional dangers for French-language publications, there is only one additional French-language case in comparison to Arabic. It is possible, of course, the Francophone journalists and news organizations receive a greater amount of threats that culminate short of murder.

The first and the fourth hypothesis accurately predict the situation in the Iraqi and outlier arenas, where journalists who publish in national or regional languages comprise the majority of the cases. Neither of these schools offer a coherent explanation for why so many cases in the border region and Algeria involve journalists publishing in Western languages. Overall, though, these schools offer a pretty accurate explanation for why journalists publishing in national or regional languages are targeted. The second hypothesis explains the dynamics of Algeria exceptionally well, where virtually all of the cases involve journalists publishing in Western languages or Arabic. The lack of Western languages cases in Iraq casts a shadow of doubt onto the school, but the fact that most of the other cases involve Arab-language publications makes it less consequential. Neither the border region nor the outliers arenas are explaining particular well since the majority of the cases are not either in Western languages or Arabic. Overall, though, the concentration of cases in Iraq and Algeria results in the second hypothesis explaining the composite data quite well.

The third hypothesis best explains the border region and Algerian arenas, although most of the Algerian publications in Western languages are locally-based and

therefore might not be as well-endowed. However, there are a paucity of Western language cases in either Iraq or the outliers arena. Therefore, the third school does a subpar job at explaining the overall phenomenon, though this variable is not that relevant to the overall validity of the school.

I. Results for Nationality of Journalists

The overall nationality of journalists data along with that for two of the four arenas can be found in appendix #9. All but two of the Iraqi cases involve Iraqi nationals and 53 of the 54 Algerian cases involve Algerian nationals. The first and fourth hypothesis accurately predict that the vast majority of cases will involve local journalists (and, in the case of the fourth hypothesis, foreigners from developing countries), though this variable has a marginal connection to the overall validity of both schools of thought. Both the second and third hypotheses erred in asserting that foreigners from developed countries would bear the brunt of most cases, though there was a marginally higher rate of murdering journalists from developed countries in the border region and the outliers. Overall, though, these findings help refute the overall validity of the hypothesis, and this variable is moderately connected to the overall validity of each school.

J. Results for Religion of Journalists

The overall religion of journalists data along with that for two of the four arenas can be found in appendix #10. All but two of the cases in Algeria involved Sunni Muslims and 10 of the 14 cases in the border region involved Sunni, 3 involved Christians and one involved a secular-oriented journalist. The third hypothesis incorrectly predicts that members of faiths based in the West (Judaism and Christianity) will be targeted more often since practitioners tend to be wealthier; the data, however, belies that claim. This variable only has a marginal relationship to the overall validity of

the hypothesis. The first hypothesis accurately foresees that members of locally-based faiths will be targeted most often, but mistakenly predicts that Shiites will be targeted most often due to sectarian conflicts (more than two-thirds of Iraqi cases involve Sunni Muslims). Therefore, this hypothesis is partially valid for this variable. The second hypothesis is a little more misguided than the first with its emphasis on Shiite apostasy and ideological tension with the Jews, neither of which is substantiated through the case data. The relationship between this variable and the validity of the second school, though, is limited. Despite the very marginal connection between this variable and the fourth school, its unified focus on apostates – all Shiites and secular-oriented people along with many self-identified Sunnis – explains most of the case data.

K. Results for Jihadi Organizations of Attackers

The overall jihadi organizations of attackers data along with that for one of the four arenas can be found in appendix #11. The perpetrator is unknown for more than two-thirds of the Iraqi cases, while Al-Qaida in Iraq, the Islamic State of Iraq or the Mujaheddin Council are perceived as responsible for more than one third of the cases. The perpetrator in 47 of the Algerian cases is unknown while the GIA is seen as responsible for 7 cases. And in the border region, the Taliban is seen as responsible for eight cases, Sipah-e-Sahaba for two cases, and the attacker in four cases remains unknown. The third, fourth and first hypothesis hold up in the border region and for the outliers, but falters in the other two arenas, thereby dealing it a major blow. The second hypothesis explains Iraq and Algeria well but struggles to address the border region or the outliers.

L. Results for Taken Captive Before Murder?

The overall 'taken captive before murder' data along with that for all four arenas

can be found in appendix #12. The third hypothesis holds some water in the border region, but falters critically everywhere else. The second school holds up well in Iraq, Algeria and the outlying areas and is adequate for the border region. The first variable offers the most through explanation for all cases. This variable is unrelated to the fourth hypothesis.

M. Results for Gender of Journalist

This variable turned out not to be relevant to any of my hypothesis.


VII. Conclusion



Of the four schools of thought, the jihadis' wish to force political rivals and their membership to acquiesce to jihadi power best explains why jihadis have targeted journalists in most of the universe of cases. Most incidents resulting in the death of a journalist occurred in arenas where jihadis could make viable claims to territorial control and in most of these cases, the allegiances held by the targeted journalists seemed more problematic to jihadis than their individual reporting behavior. Jihadi organizations' desire to stifle ideological opposition to their values and norms most thoroughly explains some of the universe of cases, while efforts to strengthen organizational solvency through extracting concessions best explain a few cases. Journalists in these cases are more notable for reporting and editorializing directly about jihadis and often work on a more independent basis. In addition, many of these cases occur in arenas where jihadis do not have a viable chance of reaping the benefits of territorial control and therefore should be less concerned with their relative power. On the whole, though, these two schools are valid only as secondary, or supporting, explanations. The premise of the argument that jihadi shifts to internal media venues have caused the utility of journalists to diminish might be accurate. However, the fact

that the targeting of journalists has remained relatively constant over the past two decades invalidates this school as a method for explaining the phenomenon of jihadis targeting journalists for attack.


VIII. Appendices

A. Appendix #1: Year of Incidents






Number of Incidents Per Year Border Region




Number of Incidents by Year - Outliers



B. Appendix #2: Location of Incidents

1. Arena A: Iraq

National Map of Iraq



Baghdad Neighborhood Map

<http://www.understandingwar.org/files/Baghdad.jpg>




Location of Incidents in Iraq

City	City Total	Area Within City	Area Total
Mosul	20 (10 with known locations)		
		Al-Bakr	2
		Al-Hadbaa	1
		Al-Jazair	1
		Al-Karama	1
		Al-Moharibeen	1
		Al-Muthana	1
		Al-Noor	1
		Central District	1
		Wadi Aqab	1
Bagdad	39 (30 with known locations)		
		Mansour	5
		Haifa Street	4
		Al-Adhamiya	3
		Al-Jamia	3
		Adil	2
		Al-Aamariyeh	2
		Al-Saydiya	2
		Shurta	2
		Al-Aamal	1
		Al-Etifiyah	1
		Al-Jihad	1
		Al-Washash	1
		Camp Sara	1
		Hurriya	1
		Yarmouk	1
Baqubah	6		
Kirkuk	5		
Ramadi	2		
Al-	1		
Amarah			
Basra	1		
Fallujah	1		
Total	75		

2. Arena B: Algeria

The Thirteen Districts of Algiers Province



The districts are: (1) Zeralda; (2) Cheraga; (3) Draria; (4) Bir Mourad Rais; (5) Birtouta; (6) Bouzareah; (7) Bab El Oued; (8) Sidi M'Hamed; (9) Hussein Dey; (10) El Harrach; (11) Baraki; (12) Dar El Beida; (13) Rouiba


Location of Incidents in Algeria

Region	Region Total	City/District	City/District Total	Area within City/District	Area within City/District Total
Algiers Province	40 (37 with known city/ district)				
		Baraki District	7	Baraki Les Eucalyptus Sidi Moussa	4 2 1
		Sidi M'Hamed District	6	Alger Centre Bacha El Madania	4 1 1
		Hussein Day District	5	Kouba Badr Mohamed Belouizdad	3 1 1
		Bab el Oued District	4	Rais Hamidou Bab El Oued Casbah	2 1 1
		Bir Mourad Rais District	4	Gue de Constantine Birkhadem	3 1
		Cherarga District	3	Dely Ibrahim	2


Region	Region Total	City/District	City/District Total	Within City/District	Within City/District Total	
Blida Province	8	Dar el Beida District	3	Hammamet	Novinson 120 1	
		Rouiba District	3	Ain Taya	1	
				Bab Ezzouar	1	
				Mohamemedia	1	
		Beau Fraisier El Herrach District	1	1	Rouiba Reghaia	2 1
		Dellys District	3	3	Blida	3
					Boufarik	3
					Larbaa	1
					Ouled Yaich District	1
Constantine	1					
Oran	1					
Tipaza	1					
Total	54					
Regions						

3. Arena C: Afghanistan/Pakistan Border Region





Central Border Area



Border Provinces



Location of Incidents – Border Region

Nation	Nation Total	Region within Nation	Region Total	City/District	City/District Total
Pakistan	8	Federally Administered Tribal Areas	4	Wana Jamrud Khar	2 1 1
		North-West Frontier Province	4	Mardan Matta Mingora Pershawar	1 1 1 1
Afghanistan	6	Nangarhar Province	4	Sorubi	4
		Hemland Province	2	Garmsir District	2
Total	14				

4. Arena D: Outliers


Location of Incidents - Outliers

Regional Grouping	Regional Total	Nation	Nation Total	City	City Total
South or Southeast Asia	13	India	5	Kashmir	5
		Pakistan	3	Karachi Rawalpindi	2 1
		Afghanistan	2		


		Novinson 127	
		Chesitoon	1
		Mazar-i-Sharif	1
	Philippines	2	Jolo
			1
			Zamboanga City
			1
	Tajikistan	1	Yovon District
			1
Africa	7	Somalia	5
		Mogadishu	5
		Egypt	1
		Cairo	1
		Sudan	1
		Khartoum	1
Middle East	5	Turkey	4
		Ankara	2
		Diyarbakir	2
		Saudi Arabia	1
		Al-Suwadi	1
Eastern Europe	4	Russia	3
		Makhachkala	2
		Nazran	1
		Bosnia	1
		Foca	1
Regional Total	29		

C. Appendix #3: Medium and Job for Journalist Killed


Medium and Job for Journalists Killed - All




Medium and Job for Journalists Killed - Iraq




Medium and Job for Journalists Killed - Algeria



Medium and Job for Journalists Killed - Border Region




Medium and Job for Journalists Killed Outliers




D. Appendix #4: Beats Covered by Journalists


Beats Covered by Journalists




Beats Covered by Journalists - Iraq



Beat Covered by Journalists - Algeria





Beats Covered by Journalists - Outliers



E. Appendix #5: Known Stories by Journalists About Jihadis

Known Stories by Journalists about Jihadis



*F. Appendix #6: Name and Affiliation of News Organization***Affiliation of News Organization - All****Journalists Killed – by News Organization- Iraq**

Type of News Organization	Incidents	Organization	Journalists in Incidents
Government	34		
		Al-Iraqiya	7
		Al-Arabiya	5
		Al-Sabah	4
		Diyala TV and Radio	4
		Atyaf	3
		Nineveh TV	2
		Radio Free Iraq	2
		Al-Alam	1
		Al-Hurra	1
		Al-Mosuliya	1
		Azzaman	1
		Jumhuriyat al-Iraq	1
		National Iraqi News Agency	1
		Sawt Baghdad	1

		Novinson 134	
Independent	23	TG3	1
		Voice of America	1
		As-Saffir	4
		Al-Mashriq	2
		Al-Sabah al-Jedid	2
		Associated Press Television News	2
		Aswat al-Iraq	2
		Radio Dijla	2
		Akhbar Al-Mosul	1
		Al-Ahali	1
		Al-Dustour	1
		Bilah Ittijah	1
		Christian Science Monitor	1
		European Pressphoto Agency	1
		Mursalon	1
		The New York Times	1
		Time	1
Political Party/Movement	17	Al-Watan	3
		Baghdad TV	3
		Kurdistan TV	2
		Talafar al-Yawm	2
		Al-Bashara	1
		Al-Bayinnah al-Jadida	1
		Al-Hurriya	1
		Dar al-Salam	1
		Kirkuk TV	1
		Rayat al-Arab	1
		Al-Masar	1
		Al-Sharqiyya	1
		Religious or Press Organizations	3
Al-Sa'a	1		
Al-Siyassa al-Karar	1		

Journalists Killed - by News Organization - Algeria

Type of News Organization	Incidents	Organization	Journalists at Organization in Incidents		
Government	28	Algerian State Television	11		
		El Moudjahid	5		
		Algerian Press Service	3		
		Algerian Radio	2		
		Algerie-Actualite	2		
		El-Chaab	1		
		El-Djounhouria	1		
		El-Massa	1		
		National Agency of Filmed News	1		
		Radio Chaîne 1	1		
		Radio Cirta	1		
		Independent	21	Le Soir d'Algerie	4
				Liberte	3
Al-Hayat	2				
Echourouk	2				
Le Matin	2				
L'Hebdo Libere	2				
ABC	1				
El-Khabar	1				
El-Watan	1				
Media-TV	1				
Nouveau Tell	1				
Ruptures	1				
Political Party/Movement	5 (4 with known organizations)			El-Irshad	1
		El-Minbar	1		
		Revolution Africaine	1		
		Revolution et Travail	1		
			1		

Journalists Killed – by News Organization- Border Region


Type of News Organization	Incidents	Organization	Journalists at Organization in Incidents
Independent	11	Reuters	2
		Aaj TV	1
		Associated Press Television News	1
		Corriere della Sera	1
		Daily Express	1
		El Mundo	1
		Express TV	1
		Frontier Post	1
		Geo TV	1
		Khyber TV	1
		Shamshad TV	1
		The News	1
Press Organization	1	Peshawar Press Club	1

Journalists Killed - by News Organizations - Outliers

Type of News Organization	Incidents	Organization	Journalists at Organization in Incidents
Independent	16	Cumhuriyet	2
		Radio Shabelle	2
		Al-Wifat	1
		Asian News International	1
		Chattan	1
		Greater Kashmir	1
		HornAfrik	1
		MindaNews	1
		The Nation	1
		News and Feature Alliance	1
		Novoye Delo	1
		October	1

		Radio DXLL	1
		Subhi Yovon	1
		The Wall Street Journal	1
		Waqt TV	1
Government	9		
		BBC	3
		Doordarshan TV	2
		Agence France-Presse	1
		Islamic Republic News	1
		Agency	
		ITAR-TASS	1
		Radio Foca	1
Political	5		
Party/Movem			
ent or			
Religious			
Organization			
		Aftonbladet	1
		Gercek	1
		Ozgur Gundem	1
		Parcham	1
		TV-Chirkei	1

G. Appendix #7: Local or Foreign Audience?




H. Appendix #8: Language of Publication


Language of Publication by Journalists - All

Other Indo-Iranian Languages	6
Balto-Slavic Languages	5
Other Romance Languages	3
Filipino	2
Pashto	7
Urdu	6
Somali	2
Kurdish	6
Berber	2
Arabic	92
Turkish	3
Swedish	1
French	29
English	22


Language of Publication by Journalists Iraq




Language of Publication by Journalists Algeria



Language of Publication by Journalists Border Region




Language of Publication by Journalists Outliers




I. Appendix #9: Nationality of Journalist


Nationality of Journalists - All



**Nationality of Journalists
Border Region**




Nationality of Journalists - Outliers




J. Appendix #10: Religion of Journalist

Religion of Journalists - All




Religion of Journalists - Iraq

Christian, 1
Secular, 1




Religion of Journalists - Outliers


Jewish, 1



K. Appendix #11: Jihadi Organization of Attacker



L. Appendix #12: Taken Captive Before Murder?



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