Getting Diplomats to Lie Down With Devil Dogs: Building a Foreign Policy Establishment for the 21st Century

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Introduction

No one would dispute the need for a coherent foreign policy. The notion of states as unitary actors is the foundation of much of International relations theory. Despite this, however, America does not possess anything like an integrated approach to foreign policy. No one has ever denied Clausewitz' assertion that "War is a continuation of politics by other means." but the American foreign policy establishment remains organized as if war and peace were binary states, with a Departments of State and a Department of Defense. However, particularly since the demise of the Soviet Union, America has found itself embroiled in situations that lie somewhere between peace and war that are nevertheless considered vital to national interests. These situations have tended to become dominated by the Department of Defense, despite the fact that it often lacks the training and resources to handle properly. It also means that the Department of Defense has increasingly come to dominate the conduct of foreign affairs.

To its credit, the military has recognized the limitations of "kinetic" solutions and has made great strides in areas like cultural expertise and linguistic training but these are not, and never can be, their primary area of expertise. It is also profoundly wasteful to use highly trained and exceedingly expensive soldiers for tasks outside their core competencies, especially when such talent already exists, but is languishing un-utilized in the Department of State.

There seems to be significant public appreciation of the need for an integrated foreign policy. During the 2008 campaign, both Obama and McCain called for "civilian surges" in
Afghanistan, and repeatedly stated that American objectives there could not be achieved with military force alone. In the Inter-agency Policy Group's Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Department of Defense's official strategy for the Afghanistan/Pakistan region, the very first policy recommendation is the integration of civilian and military efforts, and the second calls for expanding civilian efforts. Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense, is fond of pointing out that there are more people in military bands than there are in the entire Foreign Service. Despite this bi-partisan, across the board realization, little has been accomplished. For example, In 2004, the State Department created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, but it has fewer than 100 people and almost no budget. The Civilian Reconstruction Corps, the crown jewel of this new way of thinking, is only planned to have 250 full time positions, and hasn't even received enough funding for that small number.

Belief that the State Department has been failing to live up to its duties is widespread. In February, 2001, the U.S. Commission on National Security for the 21st Century, a bi-partisan task force chartered by Defense Secretary Cohen also referred to as the Hart-Rudman Commission reported that:

"The Department of State, in particular, is a crippled institution, starved for resources by Congress because of its inadequacies, and thereby weakened further. Only if the State Department's internal weaknesses are cured will it become an effective leader in the making and implementation of the nation's

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1 John Nagl, "The Expeditionary Imperative", Wilson Quarterly, Winter 2009
foreign policy. Only then can it credibly seek significant funding increases from Congress. The department suffers in particular from an ineffective organizational structure in which regional and functional policies do not serve integrated goals, and in which sound management, accountability, and leadership are lacking.

The failure of the Department of State to reform, despite damning reports is puzzling. Bureaucracies are always resistant to reform, but usually eager to do so when reform means more responsibilities and larger budgets. Even more unusual is for an organization to call for the massive expansion of its traditional rival, but this is exactly what the Defense Department has done.

James Q Wilson claimed once that “It is regrettable, for example, that any country must have a foreign office, since none can have a good one”\(^2\) and, to a degree, he was right. The problem of foreign affairs would be hard enough on its own, but there are also the inherent tradeoffs between desires like equity and flexibility or democracy and professionalism that are present in all government agencies. Yet the United States does have a foreign office and it is currently performing below even Wilson's low standard. The purpose of this paper is to examine why this has been happening and to recommend changes to ensure it happens less in the future.

\(^2\) Wilson, “The Bureaucracy Problem”, Public Interest 6, 1967
An Integrated Foreign Policy

The United States engages in a great deal of activity that can be considered foreign policy. These activities are carried out by a great many agencies, from the military to the Foreign Agricultural Service. Simply put, an integrated foreign policy is one that makes full use of all of these activities and agencies in coordinated manner in pursuit of policy goals. While this seems a simple enough desire, it has eluded Presidents for more than 60 years.

Part of the problem is the great variety of activities that can be considered foreign policy. For example, agricultural subsidies for domestic producers might appear to be a purely domestic issue, but they are a significant concern for other countries who wish to export agricultural products to the United States. Moreover, as the world grows more interconnected, the number of issues likely affect foreign policy will only increase. In such a world it is imperative that the United States have a coherent system for effectively communicating our desires to other countries, ensuring their communications to us are understood, and carrying out any tasks that may be required to advance American interests.

In international relations, there is often a distinction, first articulated by Joseph Nye, between hard power, meaning the ability to coerce and control, and soft power, meaning the ability to convince or cajole. In practice though, the two are not separable. Not only can it be hard to tell one from the other (e.g. is a threat to withdraw aid hard or soft power?) but the one
depends very much on the other. As Al Capone liked to say, "You can get much further with a
kind word and a gun than you can with just a kind word." A polite request from America carries
much more weight than one from Jamaica because of the difference hard power behind it.
Similarly, instruments of hard power, like the military, can wield a great deal of soft power
through activities like disaster relief and military to military cooperation.

Clearly, a coherent foreign policy requires the United States to speak with one voice. While it
would not be possible to control literally everything America does that affects other
countries (which would be almost everything it does) at present even the activities we carry out
overseas are a cluttered mess. There are dozens of agencies and programs operating abroad,
including the Defense Department, the State Department, seventeen separate intelligence
agencies, USAID, and dozens of smaller agencies and aid programs. Often, they are not even
aware of each others activities and frequently work at cross purposes.

There is no clearer example of the confused and tribal nature of the American foreign
policy process than the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq. Within the administration, Colin
Powell had been opposed to the invasion, and a was bitter rival of Donald Rumsfeld. As a result,
one invasion was decided upon he and the State Department were largely shut out of the
planning for it, despite having studied the issue extensively during the 1990s. The original
agency put in charge of post-conflict Iraq, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian
Assistance was created only 2 months before the invasion. While it was run by Jay Garner, a
retired three star general, and was officially part of the Department of Defense, it was
technically a civilian operation. For the most part, both the State Department and the rest of the Defense Department ignored it, except when they thought they could use it for intrigue. For example, on the eve of the invasion, the Pentagon tried to prevent the more senior State Department officials that were part of ORHA from going to Kuwait, and only relented when Colin Powell threatened to turn the affair into a public relations fiasco.\textsuperscript{3} Once in country though, the Defense Department refused to assign it any soldiers beyond personal bodyguards, and precious few of those.

The chaos that engulfed Iraq post-invasion led to a significant reappraisal of policy. Garner was fired, and the ORHA was replaced with the Coalition Provisional Authority, or CPA whose position was just as nebulous. It was headed by Paul Bremer, a former ambassador and career Foreign Service Officer. Bremer's official title was Presidential Envoy, traditionally a diplomatic title, but the CPA was organized as part of the Department of Defense, and Bremer reported directly to Donald Rumsfeld and President Bush, not Colin Powell. The media was fond of referring to Bremer as American Pro-Consul for Iraq but he was, despite officially being part of the Department of Defense, completely outside the military chain of command. Not only did he have no official say over what the military was doing, he was often not even informed of what they were up to. What information he did get was largely the result of his cordial relationships with John Abizaid (Commander of Central Command), Ricardo Sanchez, and George Casey (Commanders of Multinational Force, Iraq). Bremer constantly cited security as the number one issue facing Iraq, but it was something he had essentially zero control over.

\textsuperscript{3} Chandrasekaran, \textit{Imperial Life in the Emerald City}, 38
The Department of State was of even less help. There was no institutional infrastructure in Iraq when Bremer arrived. There had not been an American Embassy in Iraq since the Gulf War, so there was nothing to build on, and the State Department had no ability to rapidly establish one. A substantial part of Bremer's staff came from current or former members of the Foreign Service, but for the most part they were assigned because they were willing to go, not because they were magnificently qualified. For the most part they were career or retired Foreign Service Officers who were trained to talk as diplomats, not experts in running Ministries of Agriculture or Energy. Moreover, most of the Foreign Service wanted nothing to do with the invasion, and the State Department eventually had to take the almost unheard of step of actually ordering FSOs to Baghdad. Even USAID was of little help. USAID had its own people, organization, budget, and agenda, which was also completely outside Bremer's control. They were reluctant to lend him staff, and were constantly sabotaging his efforts to carve out his own budget.

With a surfeit of jealous rivals and without a Department to support it, the Coalition Provisional Authority was constantly short on funds. What it did have came inconsistently and from a bewildering variety of sources, everything from Iraqi funds frozen by the UN to the hundreds of millions of dollars of cash found secreted in Iraqi government facilities. The largest source of funding was the US government, principally an 18 billion dollar package known as "The Supplemental." The supplemental rapidly became politicized the bill was, which meant that budgets were built backwards. Politically correct numbers were generated, and then people were told what they were expected to accomplish with them. Almost everything was based more
on what was thought to be politically acceptable rather than what was thought to be necessary, which meant a bill providing only about half of the 35 billion the CPA requested. The CPA had to be funded by supplemental means because neither the State Department nor the Pentagon has an established procedure for funding ongoing operations of this sort, and neither wanted to pay for it in any case. As a civilian, Bremer was required to follow the normal budgeting and accounting rule of domestic government agencies, which meant requirements for things like competitive bidding that were downright ludicrous in lawless Iraq. As a result, despite the political hurricane surrounding the supplemental, less than $400 million of the $18 billion appropriated had been spent by the time sovereignty was officially transferred to Iraq, while $19 billion had been spent from other sources under less stringent controls.

The attempts to restore Iraq's electrical grid makes for an excellent demonstration of the difficulties the CPA faced. On the eve of the invasion, Iraq needed about 6200 megawatts of power, but only about 4400 megawatts were being produced. Saddam had "solved" this problem by powering Baghdad and leaving most of the rest of the country in the dark. After the invasion, things rapidly got much worse. American air power had disabled most of Saddam's communication systems, but had deliberately attempted to spare the electrical grid. Saddam's soldiers realized and used the grid as a crude form of communication, using power surges to send messages. This put even more strain on a system that was already creaking along and the whole thing collapsed completely. By the time American troops rolled into Baghdad, Iraq was generating essentially no power.

4 Chandrasekaran, Imperial Life in the Emerald City, 180
5 ibid., 171
The CPA rapidly identified electricity as a major issue, but fixing the problem was a monumental task. Power plants, like cars, need a significant amount of power to start up. However, to do this they rely on power from the national grid, but none was available. Moreover, power plants that had already suffered years of overuse, under maintenance, and neglect were dealt even more damage by the power surges and looting. The State Department had no experts on energy infrastructure, so Bremer tasked the job to an Army Engineer by the name of Steve Browning. At first there was no money, so Browning begged Army engineers to do emergency repairs on an ad hoc basis. Once the Supplemental was passed, a more comprehensive plan was developed, but political interference was rife. Originally the plan was to build large numbers of small power plants. This would mean both that there was less strain on the grid and bring small amounts of power online quicker, but contractors lobbied hard and got Congress to require the CPA to switch to a much smaller number of large plants, which would have the benefit of generating contracts for firms from the Coalition Countries. Through rather heroic efforts on behalf of the staff, power supply did exceed prewar levels by the transfer of sovereignty, but they did not achieve the stated goal of 6000 megawatts.

The US government as a whole possessed more than enough technical expertise to repair and operate the Iraqi power grid, but it totally lacked the institutional ability to deploy such knowledge. The Foreign Service Specialist program is supposed to be flexible enough to provide technical expertise that Foreign Service Officers lack, but in practice most of them are medical, security, or management personnel. USAID is supposed to specialize in development,
but its staff has been pared to the bone and it is not well integrated with the rest of the Department of State, or anyone else. Somewhat miraculously, the situation in Iraq seems to be stabilizing, but that has come about despite the design of our institutions, not because of them.
The History of the Department of State

The State Department is the United States' first department. The conduct of foreign affairs is one of the few powers explicitly granted to the President by the Constitution. It was the first agency created by the First Congress; before there was a Census, or Courts, or the Treasury, there was a Department of State. The Secretary of State has always been first in precedence and prestige within the Cabinet. Almost as old as the Department, however, is its tradition of impotence. Thomas Jefferson stewed while he served as the Secretary of State while Alexander Hamilton pushed through much of his agenda as Secretary of the Treasury, leaving Jefferson impotent even over matters of foreign policy.

For most of its history, the Department was quite small and decidedly unprofessional. Officially the service was divided into the Diplomatic and the Consular services, which had little to do with one another. The Diplomatic service consisted of the ambassadors and their staffs, charged with the traditional responsibility to act as a resident representatives of the United States, while the larger and less prestigious Consular Service was charged with assisting Americans abroad and handling commercial matters. Posts were obtained through the spoils system, and especially among the diplomats there was little to no institutional continuity. They were rarely and poorly paid (the consuls were entitled to pocket fees for their services, which led to a not inconsiderable amount of graft), almost entirely without training, and little sense of

6 [The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors.
These informality of these institutions reflected the fact that American diplomacy during the 19th century was a mostly ad-hoc affair driven by immediate domestic political needs and not the result of Bismarkian scheming. While a great many people who subsequently became famous held the office of Secretary of State, few actually made their name there. Rather, its prestige meant that the office was often awarded to rising political stars, but Secretaries from Jefferson onward came to the realization that their power came entirely from their closeness to the President, not from control of the Department. Indeed, given the slow speed of communication and the lack of a systematic approach to foreign policy it is not surprising that few lists of important Secretaries of State contain anyone from the 19th century.7

As the twentieth century dawned, three trends began roughly simultaneously which would dramatically alter the State Department. First, America began to play a much more active role on the world stage, first in the Spanish American War, and, more importantly, in the First World War. Second, the rapid increase in communication speed, particularly across the Atlantic, meant that the traditional isolation of the Ambassador was eroded. Instructions and information could now be sent and received in minutes or hours, not weeks. Third, the progressive era attack on the spoils system and evolution of management science began to radically alter the traditional arrangements of American government.

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7 The one exception would be John Quincy Adams who, before he was president, served as Secretary of State to James Monroe. He was largely responsible for formulating the Monroe doctrine, even writing the speech Monroe used to promulgate it to Congress.
The State Department was never a large agency, and initially most of its personnel were stationed overseas. In 1900, of the more than 1200 official employees, fewer than 100 were based in the United States. However, by 1920, this trend had reversed. Of approximately the same number of employees, more than 700 were based in the United States. Ever since then, the majority of the employees at the Department of State (though not the Foreign Service) have served in the United States, not abroad. This dramatic expansion of staff in Washington occurred at the same time as a dramatic reform of the department’s hiring procedures. Efforts to reform the State Department culminated 1924 with the Rogers Act. Typical of civil service reform legislation of the time, it sought to rationalize, regularize, and professionalize the operation of government. It merged the Diplomatic and Consular services into a single Foreign Service, established regular pay and benefits for that service and established a system of entry exams and merit based promotion.

These changes, however, did not manage to alter the fundamental weaknesses of the Secretary of State and his department. Of the pre-war State Department, Dean Acheson claims that it “was close to its 19th century predecessor in both what it did and how the work was done” American re-entrenchment and depression meant shrinking budgets during the twenties and thirties, and World War Two did not improve the situation. While the Department rapidly gained numbers, it lost influence. For the most part, the war was conducted by military men concerned with military objectives. Even before the war, Roosevelt had largely ignored Cordell Hull and often did not even bother to him of his foreign policy decisions. Even the State Department’s own official biography rather tactfully admits that:
“Secretary Hull proved influential only in one area—preparation of plans for a postwar international organization. In 1942, Hull established an Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy to avoid the partisan fighting that characterized the period after World War I. In 1944, representatives of 44 nations met at Bretton Woods to agree on plans for post-war economic policy, to stabilize currency, and to establish a World Bank. Later that year at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, world leaders hammered out a draft charter for a new international organization—the United Nation.”

As the war ended though, things seemed like they would improve. The Department was ten times the size it had been before the war, with more than 15000 Americans in either the Civil or Foreign Service. Projects such the Marshal plan were taken on and successfully administered. Perhaps most importantly, Truman believed in expanding the Department's role, stating that “The most important Cabinet officer is the Secretary of State”. Additionally, his first Secretary of State (Roosevelt's last) was James Byrnes, who was Truman's close confidant and mentor. Unfortunately, these advantages did not translate into permanent institutions. The Cold War was generating a revolution in America's foreign policy and institutions, but in contrast to the vigorous debate going on within and around the military, the department of State remained oddly passive. While new bureaus were created and Washington staff continued to expand, the only fundamental reform of the Department was the reclassifying of a great number of Civil Service jobs into Foreign Service billets, and the consequent expansion of the Foreign Service.

8 http://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/short-history/wartime
9 DeConde, The American Secretary of State, 18
Even when it was handed roles on a platter, the State Department failed to pick them up. With the end of the Truman disbanded the OSS, but soon grew frustrated with the overlapping and conflicting intelligence reports he was receiving. He and requested that Byrnes “take the lead in developing a comprehensive and coordinated foreign intelligence program for all Federal agencies concerned with that type of activity”10. Byrnes ignored this request, much to the dismay of Dean Acheson, who was Undersecretary of State at the time. Despite Acheson’s disapproval, he was acting in full compliance with State Department tradition. When Henry Stimson was appointed Secretary in 1929, he cut off funding for a joint Army-State intelligence unit, despite its success is cracking Japanese codes, on the grounds that “Gentlemen do not read each others' mail.”

The anti-communist movement of the early 50s was especially hard on the Department of State. For a variety of reasons, the Department, and the Foreign Service in particular, was saddled with the blame for the “loss” of China. While much of the anti-communist crusade was nothing but hysterical witch hunting, the Foreign Service actually did house a number of witches. The very public accusation and trial of men like Alger Hiss did little for the Department's image. Even George Kennan, career Foreign Service officers, admits that “The penetration of the American governmental services by members or agents of the American Communist Party in the late 20s was not a figment of the imagination of the hysterical right wingers of a decade later...The Roosevelt Administration was very slow in reacting to the

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10 Acheson, Present at the Creation, 158
situation and correcting it."

After the fifties, there was a proliferation of regional and functional bureaus, but no real fundamental change until the Foreign Service Act of 1980. This created a Senior Foreign Service to parallel the newly established Senior Executive Service created by the Civil Service act of 1979. It also introduced mandatory retirement at 65.12

The most significant change happened not within the department, but outside of it. When Kennedy created United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in 1961, it was not expected to exist permanently, but foreign aid persisted as an important part of American foreign policy. At its height during the Vietnam War, it had more than 15,000 employees and was an integral part of the CORDS program, which sought to unite military, intelligence, and development efforts into a single program. After the war though, the agency waned. By 1999 when it was made into an adjunct of the State Department, it had fewer than 3000 employees, most of whom were managerial.

11 Kennan, Memoirs, 191-192
12 Kopp and Gillespie, Career Diplomacy, 20
The Department Today

Today, about 60,000 people work for the Department of State, though only about 19000 of them are American citizens. The non-Americans are referred to as Foreign Service Nationals and essentially all of them work overseas. Of the Americans, approximately 11500 work in the United States (almost all in Washington) and 7500 work abroad. The Foreign Service is the heart and soul of the State Department. Almost all of the personnel posted abroad are Foreign Service. Since the Service numbers around 11500 this means than about two thirds of it are abroad at any moment, an extremely high ratio of "tooth to tail". The military, by contrast, has less than a third of its forces deployed at any moment. The Foreign Service consists of two branches, Foreign Service Officers and Foreign Service Specialists. The Specialists (FSSs) provide technical expertise (e.g. Construction Engineering and Health Services) while the Officers (FSOs) carry out diplomatic functions. While they are supposed to be generalists, FSOs are all grouped into one of 5 career tracks, officially called cones, Management Affairs, Consular Affairs, Political Affairs, Economic Affairs, or Public Affairs (Public Diplomacy).

In Washington, the State Department resides in a building originally built for the War Department during World War Two. Both the building and the Department are quite hierarchical. The Secretary of State is assisted by the Deputy Secretary of State, who oversee the Executive Secretariat. Under them are Undersecretaries for Political Affairs, Management,

13 Kopp and Gollespie, Career Diplomacy, 40
Economic, Business and Agricultural Affairs, Public Diplomacy, and Arms Control, and Democracy and Global Affairs. Under them are more than 40 Assistant Secretaries (or positions of equivalent rank) who control the various bureaus. These are normally divided into two categories, the generally more influential regional bureaus (e.g. The Bureau of African Affairs) which are supposed to monitor and coordinate diplomacy in geographic areas under the supervision of the Undersecretary for Political Affairs, and the functional bureaus (e.g. the Bureau of Public Affairs), which are supposed to look after a specific policy area on a global basis. The bureaus are each responsible for a number of offices under them.

Also part of the picture is the United States Agency for International Development, USAID. Technically it is an independent agency, though its head reports to the Secretary of State. Though it has only 1800 employees, more than a thousand of them are Foreign Service Officers, and its budget is as large as the rest of the State Department's put together.
Reasons for Weakness

A possible explanation for the weaknesses of the State Department in recent years could be the George W. Bush Administration's well publicized disinterest in diplomacy and go it alone attitude, but this is simply not the case. The problem was not only around before the Bush Administration, it was even widely acknowledged before them. The Hart-Rudman Commission reported that the State Department was a failed agency in February of 2001, when the Bush Administration had been in office for less than a month. While the Bush administration certainly had little love for the Department, it was hardly unique in that regard. Presidents as diverse as Woodrow Wilson, FDR, Johnson, Nixon, and Reagan were also suspicious of it. Historically strong secretaries, such as Kissinger and Dulles achieved their strength not by using their Department, but by cutting it out of the process of diplomacy as much as possible.14 Moreover, the Bush's second term saw the appointment of his close confidante Condoleeza Rice as Secretary of State, and the replacement of Donald Rumsfeld with Robert Gates - a vocal advocate for an expanded State Department - at the Department of Defense.

Besides, things have not improved for the Department since the departure of the Bush administration. The widespread perception of the failure of the militaristic “Bush Doctrine”, the election of a president promising to repute it, and the ascension of Hillary Clinton to the Secretaryship were all seen as signs of rising influence and large budget increases for the State

14 Warwick, A Theory of Public Bureaucracy, 119
Department, but none of this has come to pass. The most visible example of this in recent history might be the US response to the earthquake in Haiti. Within a week, Southern Command reported that “More than 10,000 Sailors and Marines are currently involved in the Haiti humanitarian relief effort. A total of approximately 17 ships, 48 helicopters and 12 fixed-wing aircraft are engaged in delivering relief supplies for distribution to affected areas.” The State Department’s response was to grant temporary visas to Haitian illegal immigrants in the United States and to evacuate American citizens from Haiti.

There is a strong temptation to ascribe these different responses not to the institutions in question, but purely to resources. After all, the State Department does not have nuclear powered aircraft carriers or squadrons of helicopters. After all, according to the GAO, the foreign Affairs budget (not all of which is controlled by the State Department) was around sixty three billion dollars, while the budget for the national defense (almost all of which is controlled by the Defense Department) was six hundred and sixty seven billion dollars, a difference of an order of magnitude.

Given this disparity, it might make sense that the traditional American solution of throwing money at the problem would be enough to solve it, but this is not the case. First, the disparity is so large that no conceivable increase in the State Department’s budget would meaningfully close the gap. Foreign aid is traditionally the one area of government a majority of Americans say should be cut, and with trillion dollar deficits projected as far as the eye can see, no administration will want to propose an aid budget of hundreds of billions of dollars,
More seriously, while the resource story is compelling, it is limited. While it can explain why jobs no one wants to do end up in the arms of the Defense Department, it cannot explain why those jobs slipped through the cracks in the first place. Neither can it explain the deeper bureaucratic drift taking place behind the scenes. Despite dramatic budget decreases after the end of the Cold War (declining from more than 6 percent of GDP in the '80s to 3% by the late '90s) the Defense Department has been acting in areas that were traditionally the sole province of the State Department, such as economic aid and public diplomacy.

Even more serious than the resource disparity between the two Departments is the organizational disparity. The State Department seems utterly unable to act coherently while the Defense Department, seemingly alone among America's institutions of foreign policy, has been able to act with purpose in the international state. As a result, it is not surprising that more functions would accrue to it. But this coherence has not always existed at the Defense Department. It has only come into being recently, and the reasons it exists today are an important part of the puzzle when it comes to understanding the State Department's failings.

Prior to the Second World War, the United States maintained two completely separate military organizations. The Army, which was operated by the War Department, and the Navy, which had its own department, the need for naval infantry being met by a bureaucratically subservient Marine Corps. The traditional insistence on absolute civilian control of the military

15 Lobe, “Foreign Policy Increasingly Flows Through Pentagon”, March 6, 2008, IPS
16 Armstrong, “Hitting Bottom in Foggy Bottom”, Foreign Policy Magazine, September 11, 2009
had prevented the emergence of the sort of General Staff arrangements that were common in Europe, which meant the services were unified only at the level of the Commander in Chief. There were inevitably conflicts between the services during wartime, but the relative rarity of combined military operations meant that the problem was limited.

World War Two proved a challenge of an entirely different order. Modern warfare and global military operations required a level of integration between land, sea, and air assets much higher than had ever been previously required. Fighting between the services over resources and strategy was intense. By the end of the war, there was broad agreement on the importance of Service unification, though a great deal of debate over how it should be accomplished. The 1947 National Security Act was, at the time, considered a moderate approach. It established a civilian Secretary of Defense to oversee the entire military, but maintained the services (Army, Navy and newly created Air Force) with separate departments and chains of command. The Act also created the Joint Chiefs of Staff which consisted of the four Service Chiefs (the military heads of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps) as well as the separate office of Joint Chief of Staff. These 5 men were not only charged with advising the President and Secretary of Defense on matters military, but also training, supplying, supervising, and commanding the active duty forces. Ultimately, every chain of command in the military ran through one of them. The act also established the CIA and the National Security Council (NSC). The NSC meets regularly and is chaired by the President, and consists of the Vice President, the Secretaries of Defense, State, and Treasury, the head of the CIA\(^\text{17}\) and whomever else the President sees fit to include.

\(^\text{17}\) Originally, the Director of the CIA wore a second hat as the Director of National Intelligence, the titular head of all of the United States' Intelligence agencies. In 2004, these functions were split and today it is the DNI who
The structure was in trouble from its very beginning. Postwar budget cuts were severe, and inter-agency fighting exploded. While a division between land, sea, and air assets makes intuitive sense, in practice the separation proved difficult. For example, the Air Force was keen to control all airplanes, so they reject the Army's request to build its own planes for close air support. But the Air Force was dominated by bomber pilots like Curtis LeMay, veterans of the strategic bombing campaigns of World War Two, who believed in an independent role for the Air Force and did not want to play second fiddle to the Army. So, having fought to prevent the Army from building its own aircraft for close air support, the Air Force proceeded to not build a plane for that role until the mid 70s. There were hundreds, if not thousands, of issues like this to fight over, like who should fly the planes that Army paratroopers jump out of or who controls the ships that carry Army tanks across the ocean.

While this strife might be dismissed as the birth pangs of a new agency, the problem never went away. The existence of three services rather than two dramatically increased the amount of inter-service politicking, since any two could conspire against the third. For example, the Air Force greatly resented the existence of the Navy's aircraft carriers as a source of air power they did not control. The navy was terrified that the Army and the Air Force would cut a deal where the Army would support the elimination the carriers while the Air Force would support the elimination of the Marine Corps. The fighting over this issue grew so severe that it culminated in an event known as "The Revolt of the Admirals" when a number of top officers resigned, leaked classified documents, and published articles directly attacking the Secretary of sits on the Council, not the head of the CIA
Defense's decision to cancel the USS United States, the first nuclear powered aircraft carrier. The incident ended a number of careers, and courts-martial were only avoided because of the outbreak of the Korean War.

The Korean War and Eisenhower's immense status and authority within the Defense establishment smoothed out inter-agency conflict during the 1950s but the fighting picked up again in the 1960s as the system matured and budgets tightened. Robert McNamara became the first civilian Secretary of Defense to really run the military in peacetime, as Eisenhower was mostly his own Secretary, and Truman's secretaries had less statutory authority until just before the Korean War broke out. Mostly for reasons of efficiency, McNamara was a constant proponent of inter-service unification. He was responsible for the creation of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Defense Communications Agency, and the Defense Supply Agency. But while bureaucratic inertia meant that the stakes were less severe than they had been in the 1940s, the services remained fundamentally separate organizations. McNamara, for example, failed to get the Air Force and the Navy to share airplane platforms (a goal that remains largely unachieved to this day).

More seriously the conflicts between the services affected the ability of the country to wage wars. While the war in Vietnam was formally unified under Pacific Command and Military Assistance Command Vietnam, in practice the Army, Navy, and Air Force fought, for the most part, completely separate wars. Fights over operational control, strategic goals, and
tactics were often driven not by rational military calculation but inter-service politics. For example, the Army's strategy centered around large units and firepower because these are the things the Army needed for the Cold War in Europe, which drove its budgetary considerations. The Marines though had a long tradition of fighting smaller scale wars (e.g. Haiti and the Philippines) and drew upon this tradition when they first arrived at Vietnam. They emphasized small actions, protecting the South Vietnamese from the North, rural development, and fighting directly with South Vietnamese forces, the Combined Action Platoons (CAP). This proved quite successful, but their methods were at first ignored, then actively opposed by the Army, which succeeded in eliminating program, though it was eventually re-introduced.18

It took the dramatic failures of the early 80s to solidify the case for organizational reform. The failure of the Iranian Hostage Rescue attempt was directly attributed to poor inter-service cooperation and planning. The plan for Operation Eagle Claw was excessively complicated, partly because each service insisted on having a role in the operation. Having Navy helicopters fly Marines to a rendezvous with Army Rangers and Air Force planes was a recipe for disaster. While the 1983 invasion of Grenada was more successful, it nonetheless exposed serious problems within the military. Intelligence was terrible, and inter-service communication was so bad that one soldier gave up using official communication, and used a pay phone call to his division headquarters to direct air support19 for his unit.

The result was Goldwater-Nichols. First and foremost, the chain of command was

18 Krepinevich, *The Army and Vietnam*, 172-177
19 Anno and Einspahr, 42
dramatically altered. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were completely reorganized. The position of the
Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs was greatly strengthened. He was given a vice chair to act as his
deputy, and responsibility for advising the President and the Secretary was given to him
personally, not to the Chiefs as a body. More importantly, control of operation forces was taken
entirely away from the Service Chiefs. Command of deployed forces was given entirely to the
Unified Combatant Commands, organizations run by a single general or admiral responsible for
all of the forces under them, regardless of branch. These Commands may be either geographical,
like Pacific Command which controls all forces in the Pacific and East Asia or functional like
Transportation Command, which is responsible for strategic transportation, but the regional
commands predominate. While such integrated commands existed before, they were much less
independent. Under Gold-Water Nichols the commanders are not responsible to their Service
Chiefs or the Joint Chiefs and report directly to the Secretary of Defense and the President.

The Gulf War was seen as overwhelming evidence of the success of defense
reorganization. A single general (Norman Schwarzkopf) was in absolute command of Army,
Navy, and Air Force assets, and was able to use them as he saw fit, with a minimum of
squabbling. And the military has only grown more unified since then. Communications and
logistics are increasingly inter-service; even the next fighter plane being built (the F-35) is
finally going to be used by the Air Force, Navy, and Marines. But the new system has had
effects beyond merely service integration. Unfettered from inter service rivalry, the Regional
Combatant Commanders have begun to take a broader view of their mission and become real
players in Foreign policy. They have become aware of the weaknesses in American foreign
policy and have attempted to address them.

The Defense Department through realizes that it does not have the skills and resources for the task. It desperately want the input of other agencies. Admiral Stavridis, head of Southern Command (responsible for Latin America) says he wants it to want to be "like a big Velcro cube that these other agencies can hook to so we can collectively do what needs to be done in this region"\textsuperscript{20} and officially defined Southern Command's goals as:

"GOAL #1 - Ensure Security

We will participate in and lead, when called upon, collective partnerships to ensure security within the Western Hemisphere. The most important mission we have is to protect our homeland. We ensure the forward defense of the United States by defending the southern approaches. We must maintain our ability to operate in and from the global commons of space, international waters, air, and cyberspace. Our ability to operate in and from the global commons is critical to the defense of the United States and our partners, and provides a stabilizing influence throughout the hemisphere. We cannot do this alone. Partnerships are critical to the success of the USSOUTHCOM mission, the U.S., and the nations of South and Central America and the Caribbean. As a result, every command activity, event, and task must focus on developing and strengthening enduring partnerships. We are committed to ensuring lasting and inclusive partnerships for

\textsuperscript{20} Glain, "The American Leviathan", The Nation, September 9, 2009
the betterment of all.

GOAL #2 - Enhance Stability

Stable environments help reduce the threat of extremism and are likely to support peace and prosperity while encouraging investment. A stable environment at the national level filters stability through the intra-state, local community, and family to the individual. An individual living in a stable environment can take advantage of opportunities that enable support for family, local community, intra-state, nation state, and hemispheric growth. The United States Southern Command will help focus interagency efforts to move beyond traditional security cooperation activities such as combined/multinational exercises, counter-narcotics assistance, and defense and military contacts to integrate combined, joint, and interagency efforts. The United States Southern Command will actively support interagency, non-governmental entities and public/private institutions to enhance regional stability.

GOAL #3 - Enable Prosperity

Hemispheric prosperity in 2016 requires a coordinated effort, using all instruments of national power to include diplomatic, information, military, economic, finance, intelligence, and legal. Future success also requires
employment of all available instruments including the interagency and coordination with non governmental organizations. The synergistic effect of these efforts will harness the power of the entire U.S. Government to work with partner nations to enable peace and prosperity throughout the Western Hemisphere.

**GOAL #4 - Transform the Enterprise**

The United States Southern Command is working to build a culture of innovation to meet the challenges and opportunities for the 21st Century. We will work to transform USSOUTHCOM from a traditional military organization into a Joint Interagency Security Command by 2016. We envision a future organization that has a regional focus seen through an interagency lens. This organization will have the capability to reach across traditional government stovepipes and provide holistic solutions.”

No one would call these goals traditionally military. And the Defense isn't the only organization that recognizes the mission creep. A report prepared by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee states:

> The U.S. military has taken on numerous new tasks in the war against terror that are resulting in its having greater presence in embassies. Following the September 11 attacks, combatant commanders were directed by the Secretary of

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21 United States Southern Command Strategy 2016, 11-14
Defense to develop plans within their areas of responsibility that would identify and eliminate terrorists, as well as identify and influence regions susceptible to terrorist influence.

Some tasks are traditional boots-on-the-ground military missions. Some of the new tasks have military content, but are not necessarily war fighting. For example, there is a new security assistance program intended to boost recipient nations' ability to partner with the U.S. military in the war against terror. Still other new tasks go well beyond what one would normally consider to be a soldier's job, for example digging wells, building schools, and providing public affairs programming.

In Afghanistan and Iraq, the military has often had to take on emergency reconstruction tasks. There has been an effort to create a more robust civilian capability to work in hostile environments, but the State Department-organized effort is still nascent and civilian agencies, especially USAID, are still cobbling together ad-hoc teams that, while talented and dedicated, are limited in number. As a result, military civil affairs teams have built bridges, schools and hospitals, organized local political councils, and provided humanitarian relief. Much of the funding came from the Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP), initially supported by the hundreds of millions of dollars found in Saddam Hussein's secret caches throughout Iraq. Subsequently, the Congress appropriated
funding from the Department of Defense budget for the CERP, and included funds for firefighting, repair of damage to oil facilities and related infrastructure, and medical assistance to Iraqi children.

Building on the experience in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Defense Department requested and received authority to broaden a previously existing Combatant Commander Initiative Fund to allow combatant commanders to carry out such projects in any countries where military operations are being conducted. Combatant Commanders are now funding joint military exercises, military education and training, and humanitarian and civic projects that include medical and veterinary care, construction of transportation systems, wells, sanitation facilities, and landmine clearance and education.

Such an expansion of military-provided humanitarian and civic assistance is nowhere more evident than in the Horn of Africa. U.S. Central Command oversees some 1800 troops stationed at Camp Lemonier, Djibouti, who are tasked with building health clinics, wells and schools in remote areas where government influence is weak and terrorists are known to be recruiting. In an effort to provide evidence of alternatives to religious extremism, small military teams train local forces, gain access and gather information, and provide practical assistance in an attempt to improve the lives of local residents in areas that terrorists may be targeting.
The Defense Department has taken on the additional mission under the direction of the Secretary of Defense to counter terrorist propaganda in key regions and countries of the world. The purpose is to discourage sympathy for terrorists and their efforts to recruit, marginalize radical Islamic ideology, and increase popular support for U.S. operations and multilateral counterterrorism activities. In one of its most recent forays into the civilian world of international public affairs broadcasting, the Pentagon has produced a report that is highly critical of the Broadcasting Board of Governors radio and TV broadcasting into Iran.

In embassies, military teams of 3-4 persons are being sent to key countries to carry out informational programs. There are currently 18 such deployments, expected to rise to 30 countries if current plans are realized.\textsuperscript{22}

In short, the military possess both significantly greater resources than the State Department, and the organizational capacity to use what it has more effectively. Given this disparity, it's hardly surprising that policy makers would choose Defense when deciding who should run a given program. But defense cannot handle all of Foreign policy on their own. The same report makes clear that:

"Staff found that country teams in embassies with USAID presence are far more

\textsuperscript{22} Embassies as Command Posts, Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate
capable of ensuring sufficient review of military humanitarian assistance projects than those that have no USAID office. Budgetary cutbacks at USAID, affecting both personnel and programs, are repeatedly cited as a deficiency in the U.S. campaign against extremism in susceptible regions of the world.”

The report goes on to suggest strengthening the relationship between the Department of State and Defense, and “making clear” the Ambassador's authority over in-country military operations, but partnerships requires someone to partner with, and right now the defense Department is being forced largely to dance alone.

One of the earliest students of the behavior of bureaucracies was Max Weber. While in general he lauded their consistency, rationality, and impartiality, he did not believe that they were flawless institutions. In particular, he felt that the individual bureaucrats would not exists as selfless entities, but would seek to enhance their own status within the organization. This means that they will attempt to maximize their budgets (status) and autonomy while minimizing their accountability. This does generally seem to be the case, which means that the State Department's repeated failure to embrace additional role and responsibilities must be explained. There is a definite pattern at work. For example, while Dulles felt that the lost of control over intelligence matters was a gross stupidity, most of his colleagues were, for the most part, either disinterested or actively hostile to the idea. Today, the State Department seems curiously uninterested in control over Foreign Aid and Public Diplomacy, to say nothing of expanding its authority over counter-insurgency operations.

23 Ibid.
In *Bureaucracy*, James Q Wilson explains that organizational culture can be a powerful determinant of bureaucratic behavior. One example he cites is the very different nature of the United States Forest Service and the National Parks Service. These agencies were created a mere decade apart, 1905 for the former and 1916 for the latter. Both have essentially the same task, to manage the vast tracks of land owned by the US government. Despite their similarities, the two have often been bitter bureaucratic rivals with very different ideas about how Federal land should be managed. The difference, claims Wilson, is that the Forest Service is part of the Department of Agriculture and has, for its existence, dedicated itself to the notion of scientific management and professional forestry, that is extracting the maximum sustainable amount of resources from the forests. As early as 1950, more than 90% of the forest rangers in the service were professional foresters, meaning they had either a bachelors or masters degree in forestry.\(^{24}\) Over time, the outlook of these professional foresters has come to dominate the agency's thinking. The Park Service, by contrast, is part of the Department of the Interior. Their conception of their mission was to balance wilderness preservation with the desire of the people to enjoy it. These goals required managing people more than trees. As a result, the main career path in the Parks Service today is the Ranger track, which is concerned with visitor safety, not the naturalist track which includes research.\(^{25}\) These differences not only result in different ideas about how land should be managed, but dramatically different approaches to controversy. When confronted, the Forest Service is likely to engage in detailed research and planning to defend its decision, while the Park Service tends to look for external allies to bolster its case. The agencies

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\(^{24}\) Wilson, *Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It*, 63
\(^{25}\) Ibid., p. 64.
have come to have fundamentally different personalities, despite the similarity of their missions.

Though he was looking at the the State Department's response to security issues, Wilson's critique of its culture is relevant here as well. He argues that departments can develop a strong sense of what is and is not their job. Confronted with missions that seem outside their sense of self (e.g. intelligence in the 1940s) the desire to say “not my job” is stronger than the traditional bureaucratic imperative to maximize budgets. The State Department, and especially the Foreign Service Officers that dominate it, have a strong institutional culture and sense of mission. They see their mission as that of “communication” and “maintaining relationships”.\footnote{Ibid., p. 40.} To this mindset, Public Diplomacy, with its emphasis on press releases, broadcast, and one way communication, seems cold, and while administering foreign Aid programs mostly irrelevant. To make matters worse, both functions were only recently assigned to the Department of State. The Public Diplomacy cone in the Foreign Service is the smallest, and made up from the remnants of the US Information Agency and has suffered with extremely small budgets. USAID has more funding, but much less of an effort was made to integrate it into the Foreign Service, technically, it isn't even part of the State Department.

This problem is reinforced by formal systems for pay and promotion. With most government bureaucracies, promotion is heavily dependent on seniority and specified requirements, such as advanced degrees or serving a certain type of assignment. The effect of these systems is to dramatically increase the disincentives to step outside an agency's sense of self. Jobs within an agency's traditional sense of self will tend to have well defined career paths
that will ensure anyone walking down them will check off the right boxes to advance as rapidly as possible. So not only is taking an unusual job something most people in the agency are already disinclined to do, if they do do it their career prospects might be damaged. A senior FSO who takes an assignment as, say, head of a provincial reconstruction team in Afghanistan is an FSO who is not running a desk in the Embassy, which might mean delaying his prospects for advancement.

A disinterested culture though cannot completely explain State's weaknesses. After all, decade ago was the Defense Department was firmly in the embrace of the Powell Doctrine, utterly uninterested in issues like public diplomacy, but things have change. At present, even if the Department of State wished to be a more active participant, it would struggle to so the way it is currently structured.

Of course, no system of organization is perfect, especially when the organization in question is governmental. In fact, a perfect organizational structure is theoretically impossible. Wilson identifies five qualities that every bureaucracy should have, but that are in tension with each other:

"First there is the problem of accountability or control - getting the bureaucracy to serve agreed-on national goals. Second is the problem of equity - getting bureaucrats to treat like cases alike and on the basis of clear rules, known in advance. Third is the problem of efficiency- maximizing output for a given-
Maximizing any one of these traits is easy, but it always comes at a cost. A welfare office that was given an annual budget and complete discretion with how to spend it would do very well on points three and four, but would do terribly on one two and five. Government institutions in general and American government institutions in particular tend to place a very heavy emphasis on equity and integrity, which means that they suffer a lack of control, efficiency, and responsiveness.

Control, in particular, is a weakness of American institutions. The concepts checks and balances and the separation of powers means that no one is ever really in charge. Laurence Lynne puts it especially bluntly, saying that in the private sector:

"Though the effective exercise of control is difficult, there is none the less substantial scope for effective leadership. Authority- to acquire and divest, to hire, fire, and relocate, to spend or not to spend, to accelerate to slow down- is there to be used. No public executive wields nearly so much authority. No

27 Wilson, “The Bureaucracy Problem”, Public Interest 6, 1967
political executive would dream of saying "I am the one who in the final analysis makes the decisions".  

The State Department suffers very badly from this lack of control. It hasn't gone rogue, it isn't on a rampage, it's just that no one is really in charge. Of course, no one has ever really been in charge of the State Department. Strong Secretaries of State like like Henry Kissinger were not strong because they bent the Department to their will. Instead:

"His success was directly proportional to his willingness to ignore the department he nominally headed.... Kissinger dominated the State Department by centralizing all important decisions in his office, ignoring lower level officials, and leaving them even uninformed as to what he was doing. Kissinger ably served two presidents, but he did not thereby place the Department under presidential control. Policy was under Henry Kissinger's control; the department was under no body's control."

Foreign policy is a nebulous domain. It cannot be carried out by rules or formula. It is an area that requires personal discretion and initiative. In their absence, there is not the continuation of old policy, but the absence of policy. This is why, historically, ambassadors were granted a great deal of authority to make their own way. This tradition though, has paralyzed the modern Department.

28 Lynn, Managing the People's Business, 134
29 Wilson, Bureaucracy, 262
In all departments of the federal government over the last forty years, there has been a pronounced growth in the number of mid to high level officials and a profusion of titles, what Paul Light refers to as "thickening." This is not the growth of government per say, but the growth of supervisory layers. Where there were once secretaries, undersecretaries, and perhaps assistant secretaries, there are now also assistant undersecretaries, deputy assistant undersecretaries, associate deputy assistant secretaries, and dozens of other permutations.

The State Department has been particularly vulnerable to this phenomenon. Between 1960 and 1992, when there was no substantial change in the size of the department, the number of top officials increased from 50 to more than 154.30 The position creep has reached absurd levels. The Secretary of State current has a Deputy Secretary of State who is supposed to serve as her chief of staff, but also has a separate chief of staff. The Deputy Secretary of State also has his own chief of staff, and their office, the Executive Secretariat, has its own separate Chief!

These positions have not been created by accident. Each one was created for a rational purpose. Light shows how every president from Eisenhower to Reagan contributed to this process. Each one did so as a way to obtain more control over the departments and their decisions. Given how frequently the State Department has been mistrusted by presidents, it is no surprise that thickening would be extensive there. The result though, at least at the State Department, has been the exact opposite of what was intended.

30 Light, *The Thickening of Government*, 11
The traditional of deference to ambassadors combined with the multiplication of senior officials has created the worse of both worlds, a hierarchy with a large number of people who are nominally responsible for any given issue, but where no one is actually accountable. The excess of people at the top confuses the chain of command, creates incessant bureaucratic bickering, and prevents people from being held accountable. If a scandal breaks out, say in the Economic Affairs desk in an Embassy in the France, who should be held accountable, the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, the Undersecretary Economic affairs, or the Ambassador. As the officer at that desk if you receive competing orders on how to deal with said scandal, which ones should you obey?

No one know who is responsible when things go wrong because knowing is impossible. The more levels in an organization, the less the chance the people at the top will have the correct information. Assume there is a 90% chance that a given layer will transmit the right answer to a given question. After 10 layers, the chance of it still being correct are less than one in three, and State has, on average, 18 layers, and many of those are duplicated at least once.

This is, of course, exactly what *Parkinson's Law* predicts, that staff will grow, year after year, regardless of the the absolute amount of work that needs to be done. He points out that between in 1954, the year it was abolished for a lack of colonies to administer, the British Colonial Office had more than 1600 people working for it, which is more than four times the number it had 20 years earlier, when Britain still had a globe spanning empire. This is not

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31 Light, *The Thickenning of Government*, 161
32 Parkinson, *Parkinson's Law*, 8
because the people in these offices are lazy or corrupt or stupid. In fact, Parkinson assumes the opposite. But each one, in attempting to do his job, imposes costs on the system. For the people below, an additional supervisor is one more person for whom reports must be written, paperwork must be filed, questions answered, and requests handled. The supervisors then turn the work from their subordinates into work for their supervisors, all the way up the line. "The amount of work expands so as to fulfill the time available for its completion." The surfeit of managers at the State Department is not just a waste of resources, they actively impede the functioning of the Department.
There is a clearly a need for integration in the realm of foreign policy. That is to say, a foreign policy that makes full use of all the resources available both in planning an execution. The best way to achieve this is to unify the foreign policy apparatus at the operational level. This will mean significant changes for both the Department of Defense and the Department of State, but more changes for the Department of State.

First and foremost, the Department of State needs serious reorganization. There are currently more than 50 people at the rank of Assistant Secretary or higher, that is one for every
650 employees. The Treasury Department, by contrast, has only 30 such august positions, one for every 4500 employees. Not only top heavy, it has become, to borrow a phrase from computer science, a giant ball of mud, a construct that has been patched, modified, and tweaked so many times that any organizational logic it once has disappeared or become irrelevant.

To become more efficient, the department must be re-organized solely on either regional or functional lines. There are advantages and disadvantages to either approach. Regional divisions are, ultimately, quite arbitrary. Debates about what which countries belong in which regions (e.g. is Turkey a part of Europe or the Middle East) can go on endlessly. Functional divisions, however, are even more complicated. As we learned with Defense unification,

33 Kopp and Gilespie, *Career Diplomacy*, 39
functional divisions are never as clear as they sound. Plus, functional divisions might institute a preference for single track diplomacy (negotiating every issue with a given country separately) when most negotiations require agreement on multiple fronts. Geographic organization also has the virtue of creating a clear chain of command on any given issue, even if it is not exactly the right chain of command. A regional organization also makes it easier to interact with the department of defense, which is, operationally, organized on regional lines.

Thus, the Department of State should be reorganized on regional lines. The functional Under and Assistant Secretaries and their respective bureaus should simply be abolished, their personnel assigned to work for the regional bureaus. The current Assistant Secretaries of the Regional Bureaus should be promoted to Undersecretaries, made ambassadors-at-large to their regions, and made to report directly to the Secretary of State. (abolishing the Undersecretary for Political Affairs). The exact borders of these regions is debatable, but there should be approximately five regions with roughly the following borders: one for the Americas, Europe (incl. Russia, Turkey, Georgia, and Armenia) Asia (Incl. India, China, Mongolia) the Near East (incl. Egypt, Pakistan, and the 'Stans) and Africa (incl. Sudan, Libya, and Somalia). Whatever their boundaries the regional bureaus and the Defense Department's regional commands should be made the same.

The regional bureaus should not be located in Washington, but within their area of operation whenever possible for a number of reasons. First, it will make them more connected with their host regions and make it easier for the Regional Secretary to make the personal
connections that are so essential to diplomacy. Second, it will separate them from the Washington bubble. Third, it will reinforce the Foreign Service's tradition as an expeditionary agency. Too much of the State Department has become concentrated in Washington.

They should not be charged with merely overseeing and coordinating the national missions in the countries in their area, but actively directing them, a significant increase in responsibility that should come with a commensurate increase in authority. The State Department in Washington should resemble the Defense Department, where. The services and their departments (Army, Navy, and Air Force) are charged with training equipping, and preparing forces, while active command of troops is handled by Unified Commanders (from any service) that report directly to the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary should leave day to day operations in the hands of the regional undersecretaries and concentrate on broad policy questions, the allocation resources between regions, and long range planning, with the Undersecretary of Management remaining in charge of training and logistical issues. Issues of genuinely global concern, such as UN Representation, should be handled directly by the Secretary and the Secretariat in consultation with the Regional Undersecretaries or, if necessary, consolidated under an Undersecretary for Global Affairs.

This will mean a significant change in the role, status, and independence of the ambassadors, but while there is often value in tradition, it should not be maintained when it directly conflicts with efficiency. The notion of empowered Ambassadors dates to a time before instant communication and an integrated world. Too often, foreign policy must be conducted on
a regional, not national basis for ambassadors to retain their traditional role.

The increased authority of regional ambassadors also raises significant question. There is an inherent tradeoff between professionalism and political control. Today, a great many ambassadors, particularly in difficult countries, are career Foreign Service Officers, while the Assistant and Undersecretaries are often outsiders. The question of where the "professionals" should stop and the civilians take over is a contentious one. Currently, every ambassador, career or not, has a career deputy, referred to as the Deputy Chief of Mission. Technically, these jobs are filled by the ambassador, but they choose the name off of a list prepared by a committee of senior FSOs. The same committee also recommends career FSOs for ambassadorial appointments to the Secretary, who usually accepts them and passes them on to the White House. The system seems to work well, providing both flexibility and discretion, while maintaining professionalism. A similar setup could work for the regional ambassadors. They could choose professional deputies from a slate of recommendations. The regional secretaries themselves though, should not be career foreign service, or at least, should accept their positions only upon retiring from the service. Professionalism has its place, but diplomacy consists of fundamentally political decision making which must remain firmly in the hands of elected officials.

More controversially, the Regional Bureaus should be directly integrated with their respective Unified Command. While separate lines of command will be maintained, they should be located in the same building. Each of these regional commands/bureaus should be responsible for preparing an integrated operational budget, requesting money, bodies, and other
resources from their parent service, and be responsible for carrying out those operations, or any others that may be required. These budgets should be kept separate from those of either parent organization.

This structure should be repeated on a national level, with ambassador for any given country will be paired with the highest ranked military commander with forces in his country, assuming there are any. They will be tasked with carrying out the agenda laid out by their respective regional bureau and advising that bureau on future plans. However, the regional bureaus should remain capable of direct control of operations. In situations where there is a sudden call for a dramatic increase in American presence in a region (e.g. the invasion of Iraq) much time and effort could be saved by not having to build new institutions from the ground up. Direct control could also be useful in situations where problems cannot be divided along national lines, such as the current situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In general though, decentralization should be the accepted practice.

There must also be significant changes to the Foreign Service as well. USAID must be brought fully into the rest of the State Department. The best way to accomplish this would to create a fully equal USAID cone in the Foreign Service. This “Development Affairs” cone should have the primary responsibility for the management of economic aid programs. This approach has had only limited success at integrating Public Diplomacy into the Sate department, but part of the problem there has been extremely limited budget, a problem the development affairs cone will not have if it has control over the foreign aid budget. The Foreign Service
Specialist corps should also be expanded. In addition to gaining broader expertise in development related areas, it should be capable of rapidly drawing on the resources of other departments of the government (e.g. Agriculture and Energy) for on a short term basis should the need arise. There also should be more Foreign Service Officers posted as advisers to military units. The Army's official doctrine calls for such advisers on at least the battalion level (around 700 soldiers) if not the company level (around 150 soldiers) but so few are available now that they are restricted to the brigade (~4000 soldiers) or division (10,000+ soldiers) level.\textsuperscript{34}

In general, Foreign Service Officers, especially senior officers, should be deployed to the same region as often as possible. Such a policy runs counter to current practice, but would have a number of benefits. First, it would make better use of the language skills the Department is desperately short on. Posting Officers who speak Arabic to China is a waste of resources, particularly when we are desperately short of Arabic speakers. Knowing they will spend much of their career in a given area should also give greater incentives for Officers to acquire language skills. The current system requires that Officers be posted to multiple areas, which means that they often don't bother spending their two years in Kabul years learning Pashtun because they know that just they become proficient, they'll be deployed to Latin America or France. More subtly, long residence in a given area will give Officers the time it takes to develop relationships with their counterparts within a specific region. John Whitehead, Deputy Secretary of State for Reagan, claims that this is one of the most important aspects of diplomacy, and one the current system does not cultivate.\textsuperscript{35}

\textsuperscript{34} John Nagl, "The Expeditionary Imperative", \textit{Wilson Quarterly}, Winter 2009
\textsuperscript{35} John Whitehead, Personal Interview, 2010

48
These proposals would significantly alter the Department of State but they are not outside the realm of possibility. In 2001 U.S. Commission on National Security for the 21st Century called for a State Department organized on regional lines with regional undersecretaries, the abolishing of the functional secretaries and bureaus, consolidating foreign aid and USAID within the State Department, and refocusing the Secretary of State’s attention on strategic planning and resource allocation. Changes will be coming whether the department likes it or not. One of the Obama Administration’s first acts was to appointing George Mitchell and Richard Holbrooke as presidential envoys to the Middle East and Afghanistan/Pakistan, respectively. They have been charged with leading and coordinating American diplomatic efforts in the region, clearly recognizing the weaknesses in the State Department’s ability to coordinate multilateral diplomatic efforts.

36 Road Map for Security: Imperative for Change, 52-61
Objections

The thought of merging the State Department and the Defense Department operationally will no doubt prove controversial. In particular, the State Department will fear being swallowed by the much larger Defense Department. While the Defense budget dwarfs that of State, but that will be the case no matter what the State Department does. Besides, most of the Department of Defense's budget goes to maintenance, procurement, research, and salaries, not operations. This plan will not only give the State Department a larger budget, but they will gain influence over that larger defense budget, something today that they utterly lack. It will also give them far more control over the budget that they currently receive.

As with any substantial change, a great deal could go wrong. Most significant would be a failure of the regional bureaus to actually work as a unit. But even if the two camps end up just ignoring each other and doing their own thing, the situation would not be worse than it is today. And it is unlikely that this would happen. By putting them in the same building, they will constantly be exposed to each other. It will be natural for them to turn to each other for assistance, even even grudgingly. Tensions will obviously run high at first, but overtime the two

Besides, even if the suggestion of merging prove too controversial, great gains could still be realized just be reorganizing the State Department internally and expanding its size and budget.

However, this does not seem likely. Currently, relations between departments within
embassies tend to be good, despite the fact that less than a third of them work for the State Department. Kopp and Gillespie claim four main reasons for this:

1. Embassies are policy takers not policy makers. There are fewer fights because there is less to fight about.

2. Small is Beautiful. In all but the largest posts, everyone knows everyone else. Relationships are more personal, less bureaucratic. There are few or no layers of staff. Decisions can quickly and cleanly be taken.

3. We're in this together. In a foreign clime and culture, agency identification fades and national identity takes over. And the more difficult the circumstances, the closer the embassy staff becomes. Morale tends to be high in hardship posts.

4. The boss is nigh. In Washington, the president is distant, his wishes made known through surrogates and artifacts— an initial on a memo, an ambiguous speech. Like Russian peasants thinking of the tsar, even high-level officials may believe against the evidence that the president really sides with them. But overseas, the president's representative is right there, face to face. There should be no doubt about what the boss thinks or what the boss wants.

With the possible exception of one, all of these would apply to the joint bureaus/commands, and even in regards to one the regional bureaus are should be concerned with implementing policy objectives that come from the Secretaries of State and Defense, not concocting their own. There will also be the additional bonus of having everyone collecting into just two chains of command,
What is not enough is the current plan to expand the number of FSOs by around a thousand. While there are certainly places that could use more FSOs, The State Department's budget will never be anywhere near that of Defenses. Even if they had more resources, the current structure of the State Department makes it impossible for them to be deployed effectively. Commanders like David Petraeus, Raymond Odierno, and Stanley McChrystal have been arguing for literally years for a more robust State Department, but their pleas have gone unanswered because State remains fundamentally trapped within an outdated vision of itself. Unless the existing institutional priorities are fixed, no feasible amount of money is going to change anything. If State is expanded but not reorganized, foreign affairs will continue to become more and more the province of the Defense Department.

Some though, such as Thomas Barnett, former professor at the Naval War College, would argue for an even more radical approach. Barnett sees the world divided into essentially two main categories, the Core, the Gap. The Core consists of both the developed countries like the United States, Japan, and Europe and the developing countries like China, Brazil, India, and Russia. These are the countries that are either already integrated into the global economy or are rapidly becoming integrated. The Gap countries, consisting of much of sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia, and Central America, are those which are not connected. He points out that the vast majority of American military action over the last several decades, and especially since the end of the Cold War, have been to the Gap countries, but that our institutions are structured for

37 Kopp and Gillespie, Career Diplomacy, 113

52
dealing with the Core countries. Barnett argues that the United States' foreign policy apparatus is built around two institutions, a Department of War (Defense) and a Department of Peace (State) and that these Departments were designed for dealing with Core states. The War Department acts as the Leviathan, deterring war between the Core states (which he refers to as "Great Power War") while the Peace Department actually resolves most of the differences. However, in recent years, most of the genuine threats to American security and interests have not come from the Core, but from the Gap. Because it has the most resources, we've used our Leviathan Department of War to solve these problems of "System Administration", but it is not trained, organized, or equipped for those tasks.

He claims that what we need is a third department, one designed for handling the sorts of situations between peace and war that are so common in the gap, a Department of Everything Else (DoEE). This DoEE would operate has a hybrid, combining military and civilians in a single chain of command and charged with helping the weaker, non-integrating states of the Gap to integrate themselves with the core, taking on issues like development, building state capacity, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, counter-insurgency, and peacekeeping. It would operate under quasi-military discipline, like a police force or the Coast Guard, but be subject to the jurisdiction of international institutions such as the International Criminal Court, a sort of "pistol packing Peace Corps". 38

However, there are problems to this approach. One of the largest is political. Foreign aid is already the least popular portion of government spending, creating an entire new Department

38 Barnett, A Blueprint for Action, 39
dedicated to foreign aid is likely to be far more visible and unpopular than expanding and reorganizing the State Department, even if it could be done in the name of national defense.

More importantly though, while Barnett's division makes a great deal of sense on paper, in practice deciding what goes to which Department will prove contentious. He is making the same mistakes that were made with the creation of the Defense Department in the 1940s. His proposals for the DoEE explicitly call for taking over whole chunks of other Departments, such as the Marine Corps and USAID, and partitions are always bloody affairs. Even worse, his proposal calls for large chunks of the military such as aircraft carriers and airborne units to do double duty, but has not explained how he intends to structure these Departments to institutionalize cooperation in practice. Barnett expects that the DoEE will reduce tensions within the foreign policy establishment, but the same was thought of the Air Force when it was created.

Some might question merging the Departments of State and Defense on an operational level, but not going all the way and establishing a single Department of Foreign Affairs, but there is value in these separate institutions. While there is a great deal to be gained from them working together the fact is that soldiers and diplomats do fundamentally different jobs. They are responsible to different legal regimes both domestically and internationally, and require those different rule sets to operate efficiently. There is also much that can be gained from productive competition. The soldiers and the diplomats will clash, but they will emerge the stronger for it. Their unique culture produce unique worldviews, neither of which has a monopoly on the truth. Together though, they can add up to more than the sum of their parts.
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