Ideological Dissonance, Civil War, and Revolutionary Failure during the Great Rebellion of Peru and Bolivia, 1780-1783

History 400: Thesis
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Abstract

From 1780 to 1783, Peru and Bolivia were embroiled in a bloody revolution against colonial Spain. Spanning from well north of Cuzco to provinces south of Lake Titicaca, the Great Rebellion was the most serious threat to Spanish power in the region between conquest and independence. Its two primary leaders were Túpac Amaru, an indigenous noble and wealthy trader who fought in Peru, and Túpac Katari, an illiterate peasant who led an army against La Paz. The rebellion, however, was highly decentralized and ideologically inconsistent. Of the various ideologies present during the revolt, two emerged as the most widespread and influential. The first was that of the Europeanized indigenous nobility and upper class, as well as the creole and wealthy mestizos. These groups generally fought to end exploitative colonial practices and revoke newly implemented laws and taxes that they saw as directly threatening their economic and political power. The second ideological strand was that of the indigenous peasantry. This group was far more radical and fought for the total eradication of all vestiges of Europeans and European culture and a near total return to pre-Columbian culture and power structure. These two groups, though each interested in expelling the colonial Spaniards from the continent, were otherwise fighting for distinctly incongruous and opposed ends. This irreconcilability eventually became manifest in direct, violent confrontation as the revolution against Spain turned into a civil war between the Europeanized upper class and the radical indigenous peasantry. This transformation and subsequent political failure to maintain insurrectionary unity made military success impossible for either ideological strand, resulting in the failure of the Great Rebellion.
Introduction

The Great Rebellion, as the Spaniards called the rebellion against colonial rule in Peru and Bolivia from 1780 to 1783, was the largest military threat to Spanish colonial power in South America between conquest and independence. It transformed Andean politics and culture and continues to be an important historical marker for Peruvian identity. Rather than a single coherent event, the Great Rebellion is best understood as a convergence of multiple revolutionary strands and tendencies in a context of political upheaval and social explosion. This thesis will examine the two principal branches of this rebellion: the revolution led by Túpac Amaru in Peru and the geographically and ethnically distinct rebellion under Túpac Katari's leadership in Bolivia, principally around La Paz. It will then engage in a case study of the revolt in the province of Oruro, in southern Bolivia, that turned from a unified revolt against the Spaniard colonists into a civil war between the indigenous peasantry and the Europeanized upper class. This thesis will show that, despite numerous instances of nominal and tactical unity, there were two distinct, ideologically disconnected, and incompatible rebellions in the Andes from 1780-1782, seen both in the larger movements of Amaru and Katari, as well as at the local level in places like Oruro. Creoles, Europeanized mestizos, and the indigenous nobility led the first of these movements while the radical indigenous peasantry fought the second. These two rebellions were not only different; they were fundamentally opposed and turned what began as a rebellion against colonial Spain into a civil war between the conservative, Europeanized upper classes and the radical, Quechua and Aymara peasants. When the movement ceased to be a rebellion against Spain and became a civil war
between colonized classes and ethnicities, military success for any of the rebel groups of the Great Rebellion became impossible.

On November 4th, 1780, in the Tinta province, about 50 miles south of Cusco, a prominent muleteer and indigenous leader named José Gabriel Túpac Amaru and his followers took Antonio de Arriaga, the Spanish corregidor, or governmental administrator, prisoner. Amaru and his wife Micaela Bastidas forced Arriaga, in chains, to write to his superiors asking for money and arms. A week later, after the weapons and money were seized, Arriaga was hanged and the Great Rebellion had begun. In a few short weeks, José Gabriel Túpac Amaru’s forces captured Quispicanchis, Cotabambas, Calca and Chumbivilcas. After just five months, he controlled the vast majority of southern Peru from the coastal area of Atacama to as far south as Jujuy and Salta to Cochabamba in the east.¹ Despite this success, at the end of these five months Amaru and eight members of his innermost circle, including his wife, were captured and executed in Cuzco’s main square. Though the rebellion then continued under the leadership of Amaru’s cousin Diego Cristobal Túpac Amaru, the main theater of war shifted southward to La Paz and the surrounding regions where Julián Apasa, a poor, illiterate Aymara trader who adopted the name Túpac Katari, became the leader of a revolutionary peasant army. His first name was an obvious reference to Túpac Amaru I and his last name was taken from Tomás Katari, another Bolivian rebel leader who was executed shortly before Amaru began fighting in Peru. Katari led his army of peasant Quechua and Aymara rebels against La Paz in a prolonged siege, twice occupying the city before being captured and executed in November of 1781. Though fighting did not truly end until the

The execution of Diego Cristobal in August of 1783, Katari’s death signaled the end of the true threat to the colonial power of Spain.²

The Great Rebellion threw the nearly 200,000 square miles of Peru and Bolivia into absolute chaos and violence. Important cities and economic centers such as Arequipa, Cuzco, La Paz, Potosí and the surrounding silver mines became embroiled in siege and rebellion. Hundreds of roads that connected Lima to Buenos Aires, bringing resources as diverse as silver and sugar to colonial centers and eventually to Spain, turned to transporting armies and martial goods. The main theaters of the rebellion stretched from the provinces to the north of Cusco in Peru to far south of La Paz in Bolivia. Rebels controlled more than 600,000 people, or over a third of the population, in the Lima and La Plata districts.³ Boleslao Lewin estimates that 100,000 Indians fought on the side of the rebels in the three years between 1780 and 1783.⁴ Historian and statistician Michael Clodfelter estimated that there were a total of 140,000 casualties on both sides, including civilians that died principally during the sieges of La Paz and Cuzco.⁵ With a population under a million in the region, this represents more than a tenth of the total population. The scope of the aptly named Great Rebellion was staggering and its consequences were proportionally transformative of Andean life.

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Unsurprisingly, this period continues to be an important aspect of Andean cultural memory and identity. In 1980, as part of a bicentennial celebration of the rebellion, Peru released a massive compendium of related letters and court documents and publicly claimed its most widely known leader, Túpac Amaru II, as a precursor to and cause of modern Peruvian independence.\(^6\) His face adorned Peru’s 500-inti note between 1985 and 1991 (fig. 1). Furthermore, Amaru supplied the nominal inspiration for leftist rebel groups such as the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement in Peru and the Tupamaros in Uruguay. In appropriating Amaru’s name, these groups inherently made an ideological claim connecting his movement and ideas to their own. The question then becomes: what exactly was the revolutionary ideology of the hundreds of thousands of rebels, and loyalists, who fought and died during these brief three years? What truths about colonial Andean culture does understanding these ideologies impart?

\(\text{Fig. 1}^7\)

This thesis will seek to answer these questions, beginning by demonstrating that those segments of the indigenous upper class and creole populations that chose to rebel wanted to end the corrupt economic and political practices of Bourbon era colonial

\(^6\) It is also worth noting that Afeni Shakur, an active Black Panther, took inspiration from Amaru in the naming of her son, Tupac Amaru Shakur.

functionaries and change exploitative trade and tax laws. These goals were made clear in several riots and peaceful movements before the Great Rebellion, as well as in the nobility and upper classes’ correspondence and actions during the revolt. However, the upper class rebellion explicitly did not call for fundamental change in the colonial system, racial hierarchies, orthodox Catholic tenets and power structures, or even loyalty to the Spanish monarch. Amaru, himself a noble and a mestizo, officially embraced the relatively conservative revolutionary ideals of his peers in an attempt to gain their support. This conservatism was clear in Amaru’s edicts, letters, and in many of his actions such as the organization of his military and policy toward church officials. This thesis will show that the indigenous nobility that chose to revolt was fundamentally reformist and operated strictly within the colonial framework rather than calling for a true revolution in the social and political order.

However, the revolutionary ideology of the Andean peasantry participating in the rebellion was significantly more radical than that of their noble and upper class counterparts. These peasants viewed the rebellion in indigenous religious and cultural terms. In this view, the revolution represented a new pachacuti: a historical phase of destruction, chaos, and cleansing that would end in a stable utopia under Incan leadership. They defined all Europeanized indigenous people, cholos, mestizos, and creoles were a single enemy working against that goal. Many indigenous peasants, both Aymara and Quechua, literally saw these groups as nak aq, or demons that, in the Andean religious tradition, required eradication in order to purify Incan cultural lands and reach a new era of Incan utopia. The actions of many Quechua peasants that served under Túpac Amaru initially reflected this radicalism and it was clearly visible in the independent
actions of the peasantry in Oruro. However, Túpac Katari, an illiterate, Aymara peasant, wholly embraced the indigenous religious view of the rebellion and allowed it to define his movement. His military strategy and organization; the widespread use of violence against cholos, mestizos and Europeans; and his public dedication to indigenous Catholicism with its Incan roots were all manifestations of a fundamentally different revolutionary ideology and agenda from that of Amaru and the nobility.

This paper will show that these differing revolutionary ideologies were fundamentally irreconcilable. In theory, one can see this incompatibility in the policies and actions of peasants and the upper class during the Tupamarista and Katarista rebellions. However, this incompatibility is most clearly evident through finely grained local analysis, as in my concluding analysis of the Oruro province. This localized rebellion displays the most direct interaction between followers of these different ideological strands and cultural traditions. Though the conservative upper class and radical peasantry fought together against the Spanish colonial functionaries, they soon turned against each other, resulting in infighting and ultimately civil war. The conflict in Oruro reveals the inherent and immutable conflict between the starkly differing revolutionary goals and understandings present in the colonial Andes. It therefore serves as a microcosm of the entire rebellion, illustrating the clash between the ideology of the radical peasantry and that of the conservative upper classes.

Each major revolt, the first spearheaded by Amaru and the second by Katari, as well as the smaller revolt in Oruro, failed in its immediate military goal of overthrowing the Spanish colonial state. This failure was at least partially due to the incompatibility of the revolutionary goals of the peasantry and the reformist ones of the nobility. Amaru
was unable to inspire peasants to revolt against their *caciques*, or local indigenous nobles and leaders within the colonial hierarchy. This was especially true during his crucial failure to capture Cuzco during the siege of late 1780 and early 1781. Simultaneously, the fear of peasant radicalism and genocidal tendencies, especially after the battle of Sangarará, led the vast majority of the indigenous nobility and creole class outside of Amaru’s home province of Tinta to reject him and join the colonial forces. Conversely, Katari almost exclusively attracted peasants to his army, which increased the radicalism of his forces and therefore limited his ability to build cross-class alliances that had the necessary material resources and military knowledge to successfully implement their revolutionary vision. The military failure of the Great Rebellion in Peru and Bolivia of 1780-1783 was at least partially due to the vast and irreconcilable ideological difference between the peasantry and the upper class.

**Revolutionary Reformism of the Andean Nobility under Túpac Amaru**

Spain had long relied on Incan nobility to aid their *corregidores* in governance of areas in which the indigenous population was far larger than the creole or Spanish population. The principal actors in this assistance, known as *kurakas* or *caciques*, were descendants of Incan nobility that the Spanish colonial government appointed to regional governorships within the colonial bureaucracy, answering to Spanish *corregidores*, their direct superiors who were critical in the indirect control and maintenance of the Spanish Empire. The *caciques*, therefore, held dual sources of authority: that which came from the indigenous peasantry, who recognized them as Incan leaders, and that which came from the Spanish colonial structure. The *caciques*, therefore, received not only preferential
treatment in terms of land acquisition and trade rights that they had as members of the indigenous nobility, but also received privileged positions from the Spaniards in the new colonial bureaucracy and economy.

For two centuries, these positions were universally hereditary, as Spanish corregidores appointed the children of previous caciques to their fathers’ position. This practice sustained highly developed notions of indigenous nobility and hierarchy throughout the Andes. Cacique succession disputes hinged almost exclusively on the parties’ ability to trace their bloodline back to ruling classes during pre-colonial times rather than on Spanish appointment or evaluation. After only a few generations, however, all of these caciques and their families had intermarried with wealthy creole families, and eventually many members of this noble class adopted the cultural and religious expressions of the Spanish families into which they married and the colonial bureaucracy of which they were a part. Though this racial mixing and acculturation makes “indigenous nobility” a bit of a misnomer, the mestizo and Europeanized nobility continued to derive much of its authority from the indigenous population and tradition.

Amaru himself was a descendant of the last Inca, Túpac Amaru I and a mestizo. Before the rebellion he was named José Gabriel Codorqanqui, dressed in a strictly European fashion, served as the cacique of Pampamarca, Surimana, and Tungasuca in the Tinta province of southern Peru, and was a wealthy trader that headed a vast web of commerce throughout the Andes in both Peru and Bolivia.

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9 Ibid., 13.
However, this careful balance of indigenous and Spanish identity, legitimacy of power, and economic and political benefits, was inherently fragile and resulted in the participation of nobles in the series of revolts against colonial powers that led up to the Tupamarista revolt and in the revolt itself. This section will examine changes in the colonial economic and political structures that affected the nobility and to which the nobility had previously reacted with rebellion and riot. It will then show that the principal motivation for rebellion amongst the indigenous nobility under Túpac Amaru was the preservation of their economic and political power in the face of threatening, Spanish corruption and the Bourbon reforms. Though there were various levels of Incan nationalism and revolutionary sentiment towards the Spanish monarch among rebellious indigenous nobles, they all generally sought to maintain the existing economic, political, racial, and religious power structures and systems. The rebellious nobles were critical of certain aspects of the colonial system, but sought reform, not rejection of that system through rebellion.

*The Bourbon Reforms and Economic Motivation for Rebellion*

When the War of Spanish Succession ended in 1714, Phillip V assumed the throne and ushered in the Bourbon era of the Spanish monarchy. Phillip V and his successors, influenced by their French Enlightenment upbringing and advisors, put into practice a series of economic and political reforms in Spain and throughout the New World. The principal enforcer of these reforms was the Visitor General Jose Antonio de Areche, sent to Lima in 1777 by the Bourbon monarchy. The Bourbon reforms were intended to rejuvenate the economically and militarily fading Spanish empire. In the
Andes, these steps threatened the centuries-old practices of the *caciques*, and shifted much of the economic and political power from their hands to those of the Spanish *corregidores*. They also threatened the interests and upward mobility of much of the creole population, which found itself prevented from achieving higher levels of political power and economic success because of the legal monopoly that Spaniards held on these important positions.

During Hapsburg rule, colonial actors such as *corregidores*, priests, and judges were all following similar paths toward enriching themselves within the Andean colonial economy. The fact that these Spaniards were competing for the same resources, positions, or favors, meant that the Indian nobility, in exchange for the labor of the indigenous peasants whom they led, could make demands, accept bribes, and generally maintain some level of power and respect from the colonial officials.\(^{10}\) This practice softened the blow of colonial exploitation on native peasant populations by using indigenous leaders, who needed to maintain the support of their peasant base, to deliver it. This system, however, allowed for more indigenous protectionism than the Bourbons found acceptable after Spain's decline in the international market.\(^{11}\)

One of the first and most far-reaching aspects of the Bourbon reforms that substantially reduced the economic and political power of the *caciques* was the legalization of the *repartimiento de mercancias* or the *reparto* in 1751, and its official

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\(^{10}\) Steve J. Stern, *Peru's Indian Peoples and the Challenge of Spanish Conquest: Huamanga to 1640*, (Madison, WI: University of Madison Press, 1982), 89.

\(^{11}\) Many historians are doing important work closely examining different, individual *cacicazgos*, both rebellious and loyalist, in comparison with the extent of the effects of the Bourbon reforms in that particular province. See especially Magnus Mörner's and Efrain Trelles' "A Test of Causal Interpretations of the Túpac Amaru Rebellion" in *Resistance, Rebellion, and Conscience in the Andean Peasant World*. This section will deal with the broader trends within which significant regional variance occurred.
implementation in 1756. The reparto was the practice of forced distribution of unwanted goods at inflated prices by Spanish corregidores to Indian peasants, bypassing the caciques entirely. For example, a basket of coca sold for eight pesos at the market, but in Canas y Canchis, a center of the Tupamarista rebellion and leadership, it was sold in the reparto for twelve. Similarly, mules had a market price of eleven pesos but were sold in the reparto for thirty-five.\textsuperscript{12}

Aside from supplementing the relatively low pay of the corregidores, the reparto artificially created an internal market in the New World for Spanish goods, especially for Spanish textiles and non-exported metals that were extracted from the expanded mining that occurred at the same time.\textsuperscript{13} Because the cacicazgos had, in 1678, become speculative ventures auctioned off to the highest bidder in Spain for five-year terms, the corregidores were almost universally severely in debt. This debt turned corregidores into “one-dimensional exploiters of Indian land and labor” and soon enough the officially unauthorized practice of the reparto had become widespread throughout the Andes.\textsuperscript{14}

José Hipólito Unanue, in his Guía Política, Eclesiástica y Militar del Virreinato del Perú from 1793, wrote that “with the title of ‘corregidor,’ those who obtained the power of the repartimiento found a new manner in which to wield their authority to the point of degenerating into despotism.”\textsuperscript{15} This despotism often, and notably in the home province of Amaru, resulted in the arbitrary and vast increase of the reparto by the corregidores. A

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{12} Stavig, World of Túpac Amaru, 216. \\
\textsuperscript{13} Scarlett O’Phelan Godoy, Rebellions and Revolts in Eighteenth Century Peru and Upper Peru, (Cologne, Germany: Bohlau Verlag GmbH & Cie, 1985), 99. \\
\textsuperscript{14} Stern, “Age of Andean Insurrectionism,” 74. \\
\textsuperscript{15} Cited in O’Phelan, Rebellions, 109. Translation mine. In its original Spanish: “con el título de corregidores los que habían obtenido la facultad del repartimiento en tiempos posteriores encontraron una nueva vereda por donde llevar su autoridad a aquel punto que se hizo degenerar en despótico.”
\end{flushleft}
priest in Quispicanchis wrote that the *corregidores* “break the tariffs set by law, that having been told that [the *repartimiento*] should not be more than a hundred and forty thousand pesos...it is well known that one [corregidor] distributed more than three hundred thousand pesos.”

The newfound despotism of the *corregidores* naturally created conflict with the indigenous leadership of the *caciques*. The most feasible way for many indigenous peasants to pay for the goods they were forced to purchase was through selling their labor. Through this reallocation of labor, the *reparto* effectively took control of the local labor force from the hands of the *caciques* and put it into those of the *corregidores*. Furthermore, when the peasants were unable to pay their *reparto* debts, the *caciques* were forced to pay them on their community’s behalf. This led to *caciques* being appointed based on their ability to pay their community’s *reparto* rather than being inherited hereditarily. Once the absolute hereditary nature of the *cacicazgo* was called into question, debates, lawsuits, and conflicts over *cacicazgos* became relatively widespread. José Gabriel Túpac Amaru himself was involved in a serious lawsuit regarding the legitimacy of his *cacicazgo*.

However, one must be careful not to overstate the effects of the *reparto*, as many of the first works examining the Great Rebellion did. Its application was geographically inconsistent and many provinces and communities were able to reconcile the *reparto*.

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demands with imperial tributes and payments required to churches such as the diezmos and primicias. Furthermore, there were several dozen revolts in Peru and Upper Peru during the fifty years before the Bourbon reforms and Jose Antonio de Areche, who did not arrive in Lima until 1777. Nonetheless, one cannot ignore its effect on the indigenous nobility, both those whose positions were threatened and those who gained or maintained power within the terms of the reparto and its economic demands, nor the fact that the largest rebellion in Spanish colonial history occurred soon after the implementation of these reforms. Jürgen Golte, in his incredibly detailed study of individual provinces, Repartos y rebeliones, Túpac Amaru y las contradicciones de la economía cultural, analyzes the effects of the reparto on the various provinces of Peru and compares it with their cacique's participation in the rebellion. He finds startlingly consistent evidence showing that regions where reparto demands exceeded their ability to pay "coincides almost exactly with the regions in revolt during Túpac Amaru's rebellion." Magnus Mörner, in another detailed microstudy of the bishopric of Cuzco, found that many of the districts most highly taxed remained loyal, such as Aymaraes and Paucartambo. However, many of the provinces that did rebel, such as Chumbivilcas and Cotobambas, experienced proportionally, much larger increases in taxation under the reparto, or drastic shifts in economic policy such as extending tribute payments to non-indigenous groups. Though historians have found flaws in both studies, as they are attempts to apply scarce and faulty documentary sources in microscopic detail, they nonetheless make compelling cases for the importance of the Bourbon reforms on the

20 Golte, Repartos y rebeliones, 178.
21 Cited in Campbell, Social Structure, 677-678.
Tupamarista revolt.\textsuperscript{22} Though Golte's assertion that "the attitudes of the population, especially the Indian [population], towards the general insurrection can be explained on the basis of their economic capacity to meet the demands of the corregidores" is an oversimplification, there was indeed significant overlap between the cacicazgos most threatened by the reparto and the provinces that supported Amaru and his family in the rebellion.\textsuperscript{23}

The Bourbon reforms also drastically affected interprovincial trade in a number of ways. They mandated the drastic redrawing of provincial lines, including the separation of Upper Peru, or much of what is modern day Bolivia, from Lower Peru, or much of what is modern day Peru. In 1776 Upper Peru became part of the newly created Viceroyalty of Río de la Plata, whereas it had been previously part of the Viceroyalty of Peru.\textsuperscript{24} This division put important economic centers such as Potosí and Oruro under the control of the new Viceroyalty, complicating the important trade that had occurred between the two provinces. Furthermore, in 1772, the alcabala tax on traded goods was increased from 2 to 4 percent and in 1777 increased from 4 to 6 percent.\textsuperscript{25} Additionally, many of the centuries-old exemptions for both certain families and goods began to be denied.\textsuperscript{26} New customs houses were built along the trading routes that crossed Viceroyalties, each exacting the newly increased and expanded alcabala tax.\textsuperscript{27} These reforms made interprovincial trade significantly more expensive and subject to the rule of

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{22} For a more in depth discussion of these flaws, see Stern, "Age of Andean Insurrectionism," 78 and David Block, "Review," in The Americas, Vol. 38, No. 2, Catholic University of America Press, 1981, 290-291.
\textsuperscript{23} Golte, Repartos, 182.
\textsuperscript{24} O'Phelan, Rebellions, 46.
\textsuperscript{25} Stavig, World of Túpac Amaru, 224.
\textsuperscript{26} Thomson, We Alone, 134.
\textsuperscript{27} O'Phelan, Rebellions, 165.
\end{footnotesize}
the corregidores. Many corregidores took advantage of this fact for their own gain, challenging the business of many creole landlords and merchants as well as indigenous nobility and traders. Among such traders were José Gabriel Túpac Amaru and his family.\textsuperscript{28}

Even before Amaru killed Arriaga, these economic changes had caused several revolts in Peru and Bolivia. In March of 1780 in La Paz, after the opening of a new Customs House, an anonymous, Spanish-language broadside circulated throughout the city wrote:

\begin{quote}
Long live God’s law and the purity of Mary! and Death to the king of Spain and may Peru come to an end! For he is the cause of such iniquity. If the monarch knows not the insolence of his ministers, the public larceny...long live the king and death to all these public thieves, since they will not rectify that which is asked of them.\textsuperscript{29}
\end{quote}

Though this conditional call for the death of the king was written and published anonymously, it is clearly of creole or indigenous noble provenance, as these were the only disaffected classes with the ability to publish their threatening letters not to mention be literate in Spanish. Furthermore, the rhetoric was matched by groups of creoles and Indian peasants brought by their offended caciques, massing on the outskirts of La Paz and forcing the closure of the Customs House shortly after its opening.\textsuperscript{30} Similar riots occurred during the same year in Cuzco and Arequipa against their respective Customs Houses. These uprisings clearly foreshadow the economically reformist motivations and propaganda of the Tupamarista rebellion.

\textsuperscript{28} O’Phelan, \textit{Rebellions}, 167.
\textsuperscript{29} Cited in Thomson, \textit{We Alone}, 135.
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., 136.
Economic Reformism under Túpac Amaru

An examination of Tupamarista communications with other caciques, members of the creole population, and other literate leaders makes clear the economic reformist goals of the Europeanized upper class during the Great Rebellion. Through the first few months of the uprising, before the allegiances of caciques became clear, Amaru wrote numerous letters asking, commanding, and threatening caciques and other powerful leaders to join his rebellion. These letters show a clear concern with perceived economic injustices, especially those created or legalized by the Bourbon reforms, and the corruption of many Spanish colonial bureaucrats and leaders. Furthermore, there is a noticeable and important near-total absence of the radical Incan nationalism that would later define the Tupamarista movement.

In a letter to Antonio and Gabriel Ugarte, creole brothers that were cabezas principales of a city near Tungasuca, Amaru asks them to “imprison the corregidor and those soldiers that are armed and waiting to surprise me.” He offers as justification for this request the ultimate goal of “eradicating the bad government of the malicious Europeans, who oppress us and take the bread from our mouths,” a clear reference to the economic oppression of the colonial system. In his letter to Don Gregorio Mariano Sanchez, a powerful parish priest that Amaru courted for support early in his movement, Amaru outlines his principal revolutionary goals:

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32 Translation mine. In its original Spanish: “arrasar el mal gobierno que nos infieren los malevolos europeos, oprimiéndonos y quitándonos el pan de la boca.”
My desire is that this kind of corregidores be eliminated entirely, that the repartimiento cease, that in each province there be an alcalde mayor from the Indian nation itself and other persons of good conscience, with no other mission that the administration of justice.\(^{33}\)

In another letter, this one to the cacique of a strategically important territory along the trade route from La Paz to Cusco, Amaru orders that he take the corregidor prisoner and that “all mitas to Potosí should be extinguished, as well as taxes, customs [duties], and other pernicious burdens.”\(^{34}\) Those opposed to Amaru also recognized the reparto and other economic burdens as being prime motives. Bishop Moscoso, who was fairly close to Amaru before the rebellion and shared his dislike of Arriaga, wrote that Amaru’s army was “fueled by” the desire to “free themselves from the reparto.”\(^{35}\) Amaru’s economic demands, like many of the riots and protests that occurred before his rebellion, are fundamentally reformist and did not seek the radical overhaul of the Andean political or economic structure.

Incan Nationalism and Racial Hierarchies in Tupamarista Practice and Propaganda

Túpac Amaru inarguably attempted to build a multi-ethnic coalition of indigenous, creoles, mestizos, and even blacks in order to remove the “malicious Europeans” from the continent. A common trope of his edicts was that he was taking

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\(^{35}\) Bishop Moscoso, “Bishop Moscoso of Cuzco Writes to Antonio de Areche about Tupac Amaru Threatening Cuzco,” in *The Tupamarista and Catarista Rebellions*, 80.
steps that would be “conducive to the preservation of Spaniards, creoles, mestizos, zambos, mulatos, and Indians and their well-being.” Some scholars, notably Sinclair Thomson, go so far as to argue that Amaru called for the “dismantling of the colonial caste hierarchy and an unprecedented racial egalitarianism.” However, the fact that Amaru tried to build a multi-ethnic coalition was hardly radical and did not signify the dismantling of any colonial caste hierarchy. The demographics of the continent meant that the majority of wars and battles in the Andes were necessarily fought by multi-ethnic coalitions of creoles, mestizos, and indigenous, including the army that opposed and ultimately defeated Amaru. This section will work to draw a clearer picture of Tupamarista racial ideology, focusing on elements that seem to contradict Thomson’s claim that Amaru was truly striving to create a casteless, racially egalitarian society. The Tupamarista view of race, and the view of the Europeanized upper classes, will then be shown to be incompatible with other, more radical racial revolutionary ideologies. Firstly, this section will address the racial definitions under which Amaru and the upper classes operated, especially regarding which groups were inherently the enemies of the movement, and which could be included. Secondly, it will look at Amaru’s own military structure and leadership cadre, showing that it was extremely racially hierarchical. Lastly, it will address the Incan nationalist aspect of his movement, which was one of its most racially radical elements, and show that it was almost wholly excluded from propaganda aimed toward creoles, nobility, and the upper class.

36 See various edicts in CDBRE, especially Tomo 1, pp. 420-450. Translation mine. In its original Spanish: “aquellas medidas que han sido conducentes a la conservación de los españoles, criollos, mestizos, zambos, mulatos, e indios y su tranquilidad.”

37 Thomson, We Alone Will Rule, 171.
Andean visions of race were, and still are, anything but simple and differed vastly across class and ethnic lines. Amaru, on multiple occasions, called for the annihilation and removal of the Europeans from the continent.\(^{38}\) It is important, then, to note that Amaru and his literate, upper class audience understood this racial classification to exclusively mean those who were born in Spain, not creoles or mestizos or others with European blood or who had adopted facets of European culture. In fact, as discussed earlier, Amaru himself was a generally Europeanized mestizo creole. He not only expressly forbade the killing of creoles, but also publicly included other mestizo leaders and creoles in both his military leadership, propaganda, and ideology.\(^{39}\) In dozens of public, Spanish-language edicts written by Amaru, which could only be read by the literate upper class, Amaru directly addresses creoles and their desires in his attempts to gain their loyalty. For example, Amaru addresses an edict specifically to his “criollo countrymen” of the province of Chichas and refers to them as “beloved” and calls them the “source of my courage.” He invites them to join with his movement so they could “together, as one body, destroy the Europeans.”\(^{40}\) This edict clearly shows the division in Tupamarista understanding between “Europeans” and those with European blood. There are also many letters to creole and Europeanized leaders, including a whole series of letters to the powerful Ugarte brothers, asking for support and threatening defeat and punishment if support were not given. In Tupamarista ideology, Spaniards that were born in Spain were the only inherent enemies, while the culturally European, including


\(^{39}\) His prohibition of massacre of creoles occasionally resulted in indigenous soldiers capturing creoles in nets and dragging them to their military leader. Szeminski, “Why Kill the Spaniard?” 171.

\(^{40}\) Amaru, “Tupac Amaru’s Edict to the Province of Chichas,” in Anthology of Sources, 73.
creoles, mestizos and the indigenous nobility, were courted and included in the revolutionary coalition.

A study of the structure of Amaru’s army and military leadership suggests that Tupamarista treatment of these creole and Europeanized populations went beyond simple inclusion and that there was, in fact, a racial hierarchy similar to what existed under colonial Spain. Like royalist forces, companies under Amaru were divided by ethnicity and non-indigenous soldiers received twice as much pay as their indigenous counterparts, four reales daily instead of two.\textsuperscript{41} Furthermore, the upper echelons of leadership within his army was almost entirely creole or of the indigenous nobility, meaning mestizo. Though Amaru freed the slaves in a proclamation to the captured province of Tungasuca on November 16, 1780, there was not a single black, \textit{zambo} (mixed African and Amerindian), or \textit{mulato} (mixed black and European) in the military leadership cadre.\textsuperscript{42} Indeed, the higher one looks in the leadership of the Tupamarista forces, the less the movement appears to represent an egalitarian, multiethnic coalition against a common enemy and the more racially hierarchical it becomes. Of the forty-two people holding high military offices, as determined at their trials after their capture, sixteen were creole, seventeen were mestizo, and only nine were Indian. Of these, only two Indians served in the highest military command.\textsuperscript{43} The Council of Five, Túpac Amaru’s personal group of advisors, was made up of four creoles: Tomás Parvina, Francisco Torres, Jose Unda, and Diego Berdejo, a \textit{mestizo}, Blas Quiñones, and Amaru’s wife Micaela Bastidas, a

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\textsuperscript{41} Campbell, \textit{Social Structure}, 684.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., 685.
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., 685.
\end{flushright}
While Amaru’s edicts and letters to the indigenous nobility and creole populations suggest an ideology without explicitly “racial” equality, the organization of Amaru’s army suggest that the maintenance of racial hierarchies was more than simple propaganda designed to attract wealthy regional leaders.

Such evidence of racial hierarchies may be counterbalanced by the fact that Amaru publicly asserted his own status as the successor of Túpac Amaru I and declared the establishment of a new Incan, or fundamentally indigenous, empire. He began many of his edicts and letters by referring to himself as “D. José Gabriel Tupac-Amaru, of royal blood and heritage.” Additionally, he and his wife regularly donned imperial Incan garb and symbols, including the gold sun, and had their portrait painted and distributed in this apparel. Thomson underscores the importance of the fact that Amaru asked creoles to be subservient to him, a mestizo and a descendant of the pre-Columbian emperor.

Indeed, the idea of a new, Incan empire suggests the elevation of indigenous peoples to the same or an even higher level of cultural legitimacy as creoles, Europeanized mestizos and indigenous nobles. However, an examination of his letters and edicts shows that this aspect of Amaru’s revolutionary ideology did not come to the forefront of his public image or propaganda until caciques outside of the provinces immediately around his own

44 Ibid., 686-7.
45 For example, see Túpac Amaru, “Edicto a los Moradores de Lampa,” La Rebelión de Túpac Amaru, Ed. Carlos Daniel (Valcarcel, Comisión Nacional del Sesquicentenario de la Independencia del Perú, 1971), 84. Translation mine. In its original Spanish: “de la sangre real y tronco principal.”
46 Stavig, World of Túpac Amaru, 237.
47 Thomson, We Alone, 170.
had rejected his rebellion, and well after the official end of the reparto and removal of the most objectionable trade fees in late 1780.  

In his letters to the Ugarte brothers, Diego Choqueguanca, the Marques de Salinas, the cacique of Azangaro, Mateo Garcia Pumacahua, the cacique of Chinchero, the noble chieftains of the eight royal ayllus, and clans of the Cuzco region, Amaru does not mention his imperial aspirations.  

In fact, in many of these letters, Amaru claims to be working on behalf of the Spanish monarchy. In his letter to Choqueguanca, he writes:

Honorable sir and esteemed relative- Following higher orders I inform you that you should extirpate all corregidores on behalf of the public good...It is for this reason that I inform you of my authority as a loyal subject of the King, Our Lord, so that you can carry out these orders with the greatest of care.

In another letter, this one to Governor Bernardo Sucacagua, Amaru asserts, “the King has ordered me to proceed in an extraordinary manner against several corregidores and their lieutenants.” Furthermore, the Loyalist forces were more likely to emphasize the imperial aspects of Amaru’s rebellion in their propaganda directed towards the nobility and creole classes. In an edict published throughout the Viceroyalty of Peru, Viceroy Agustin de Jauregui, refers to Amaru as “presumptuous” and writes that Amaru was “investing himself with an authority he does not have,” a reference both to his alleged

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48 Don Fernando Ynclan y Valdes, “Edict Due to the Revolt of José Gabriel Tupac Amaru to the End of the Repartimiento and Some Other Established Contributions,” in Anthology of Sources, 35.


loyalty to the Spanish monarch and his self-designation as the new Inca. The nobles that participated in the Tupamarista rebellion, who were the recipients of letters such as these, were clearly not motivated by the radical Incan nationalism that Amaru would later espouse.

Orthodox Catholicism and Religious Reformism under Túpac Amaru

The role of Catholicism in Tupamarista ideology was very similar to that of the Spanish monarchy. Just as Amaru argued that the Spanish bureaucrats and governors were perverting the will of the unseen king across the ocean, the Spaniards were presented as being obstacles to the true worship of God. Therefore, just as the king ordered him to remove the Spaniards, God ordered Amaru to eradicate the corrupt obstacle to proper practice of Catholicism that was the colonial Spanish presence. His frequent and vehement defense of Catholicism and the majority of its functionaries imply the substantial existence of an ideological strand that was religiously conservative in its revolutionary goals. These nobles were not rejectionist or religiously radical; they were simply calling for reform to the practice of Catholicism in the Andes through the removal of the spiritually corrupt corregidores.

In the most straightforward of his edicts and letters, Amaru simply argued that religion played no part in his rebellion, instead pointing to political corruption and the new exploitative economic practices under the Bourbon reforms. For example, in his edict to the creoles of Chichas, he explicitly states that his movement “does not oppose in

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52 Agustín de Jauregui, “Edict Published to Exhort the Indians of all Provinces of this Viceroyalty not to Help the Rebel José Túpac Amaru,” in Anthology of Sources, 114.
the slightest way our sacred Catholic religion, but is only to suppress disorder.”53 In other letters he makes religious conservatism and dedication to the Catholic hierarchy and order a central aspect of his religious ideology. Amaru called the Spaniards “heretics...apostates condemned to hell, traitors to the king, and not Christians at all, whose deeds were perverse impositions.”54 He compared them to the Roman emperors such as Nero, calling them “idolaters of gold and silver.”55 Amaru, therefore, as he wrote on many occasions, received divine orders to “end the offenses against God” that the corrupt rule of the corregidores represented.56 He argued that through his rebellion, the Andean world would come to know the “true God,” something that was impossible to do under the corrupt Spanish rule.57

These references alone, of course, offer only small evidence that the God to which Amaru refers is, as Szeminski calls it, “the God of the Bible and the Catholic Church.”58 However, when placed in the context of his Spanish-language letters and edicts, it becomes clear that Amaru was genuinely attempting to convince his noble and upper class supporters that his movement was truer to orthodox Catholicism than what was allowed under the corregidores.59 Firstly, though the indigenous nobility understood the hybrid Andean Catholicism, they generally believed in the

53 Amaru, “Edict to Chichas” in Anthology of Sources, 73.
55 Amaru, CDBRE, Tomo 2., p. 327. Translation mine. In its original Spanish: “idolatras del oro y de la plata.”
56 Amaru, CDBRE, Tomo 1, 419. Translation mine. In its original Spanish: “cesen las ofensas del Dios.”
58 Ibid., 174.
59 These arguments were made even more explicit during the trials of Amaru and his followers, though the utilitarian aspect of this emphasis is clearly present in such a context. CDBRE Tomo 3, pp.204-223.
Catholicism that was practiced in Europe, including its pantheon of saints and the nature of the Trinity. It makes sense, therefore, that in his letters and edicts to these nobles, Amaru did not use coded religious language to refer to indigenous gods or beliefs, but would instead appeal to their orthodoxy. Furthermore, Amaru himself, and often his supporters, analogized Amaru and his movement with that of Moses and the Israelites or of David slaying Goliath. Amaru also wrote that the corregidores “look like atheists, Arrians, Calvinists and Lutherans.” This literacy with the Bible and contemporary religious schisms, also seen in his reference to Nero, contextualizes these letters and edicts squarely within the orthodox Catholic tradition. In some letters, Amaru and his followers even justified their rebellion by claiming that the Spaniards had done an inefficient job Christianizing the indigenous population.

Of course, Amaru and his army were excommunicated only a few weeks after the execution of Arriaga. Tellingly, he was excommunicated on the grounds that his followers burned several churches, which Amaru did not publicly condone, and “for being a rebellious traitor of the king.” He was not excommunicated for any personal or ideological heresy. Furthermore, over twenty religious personnel continued to support Amaru even after he was excommunicated. Principal among these were Amaru’s personal priest, Gregorio de Yepes. During his trial, a relative of Amaru’s claimed, “the

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61 Amaru, CDBRE, tomo 2, p. 327.
63 Szeminski, “Why Kill the Spaniard?” 176.
64 Juan Manuel, “Excommunication of Tupac Amaru and his followers,” in Anthology of Sources, 74.
entire affair was the priest's fault, and that he should be punished for his sins. The inclusion and participation of priests in the movement is indicative of the general orthodoxy of the rebellion, which lent the movement legitimacy in the eyes of religiously conservative nobles and creoles.

Peasant Radicalism: Andean Catholicism, Millennialism, and Genocide

Occurring simultaneously as this conservative, reformist rebellion led by the upper class and nobility was another revolution, this one fought almost exclusively by the indigenous peasantry. These peasants were Quechua, under Tupamarista leadership, and Aymara in the Katarista movement of Upper Peru. These rebellions, though chronologically and occasionally geographically and even tactically aligned, were vastly different in their goals and ideologies. Rebellious indigenous peasants, comparatively isolated from colonial culture and religion, operated within a complex, syncretic religious and cultural framework that ultimately called for the complete eradication of all that was European, including creoles, mestizos, and all obvious European cultural vestiges such as clothing and even the practice of drinking water from a water fountain. This eradication would be followed by the reestablishment of a period of Incan utopia, though now with elements of Christianity added to religious life. This revolutionary model was fundamentally radical. Unlike the reformist movement visible among the Tupamarista nobility, the Andean peasants were engaged in a battle for the complete destruction of the colonial order and its replacement with a completely different political, religious, and

social order. In practice, this ideology quickly spawned to a genocidal cycle of insurgency and counter-insurgency.

After the traumas of the conquest era and the consolidation of the Spanish colonial state in the late sixteenth century, overt political conflicts generally subsided. By the 17th century, the Andean peasantry was permitted to hold public parades and celebrations. In the words of Alberto Flores Galindo, “the long period of siege on the indigenous culture had ended and the Spanish opted for tolerance...The extirpation of idolatries ceased. The evangelizers concluded that the Indian was Christian.”

This allowance of indigenous cultural action and independence led to more cohesive indigenous culture and a revolt led by Juan Santos Atahualpa in 1752. For the previous ten years, Atahualpa had been the leader of a group of people in the rain forest and outside of the control of the colonial power before he invaded the Spanish highlands. Though Atahualpa led a large guerrilla movement in the sierra, he never gaining a solid foothold outside of the jungle and he soon returned to the Amazon having los his military power.

Though this revolt occurred several decades earlier and was significantly smaller than Amaru and Katari’s, it bore many of the same ideological features, including Incan nationalism and belief in the Inca’s resurrection.

There are several writings by indigenous nobles that deal with the various indigenous cultural traditions, especially earlier in the colonial period. However, as indigenous nobles and the literate classes became more Europeanized, direct, written

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evidence of indigenous peasant belief and culture diminished. As discussed earlier, Túpac Amaru had to carefully balance dual sources of authority and rebellious populations. His propaganda to the nobles was in letters and edicts, but to peasants, his propaganda was oral and in Quechua. Túpac Katari, a peasant, was illiterate and spoke only Aymara. Though he had scribes and was in occasional communication with the Tupamarista leadership, the majority of the historical record of the strand of radical rebellious ideology that guided the entire Katarista movement and the peasant movement under Amaru is seen in court testimony, eyewitness accounts of oral propaganda, and in the actions of the armies themselves, such as burning churches and mutilating the corpses of Spanish officials and soldiers. Analysis of these sources shows a complex web of indigenous radicalism and religious syncretism in both Quechua and Aymara cultures. Among these multiple religious ideologies and cultural responses to colonial injustice and oppression was a genocidal, millenarian strand that was evident in the actions of the rebellious peasantry throughout the Great Rebellion. This most radical strand eventually came to dominate and define the rebellion under Katari.

*Indigenous Andean Religio-Historical Understanding and Tradition*

Time, in the understanding of the vast majority of the Andean peasantry, began with the creation of the world by the God Viracocha. The spirit of this world was Pacha Mama, who was simultaneously the feminine part of Viracocha and his creation. Together, these two created Wari Viracocha Runa, or “The Living Stone People,” which was made up of farmers. They were followed by the Wari Runa, who were pastoralists and priests. Third came the Pura Runa, or artisans, and fourth the Awqa Runa, a race of
warriors. Each additional class resulted in increased levels of chaos and disorder, reaching its pinnacle with the addition of the Awqa Runa and the violence they caused. Therefore, the Gods created a fifth race, the Inkap Runan, or the Inca. This fifth phase brought stability and peace to the world.\textsuperscript{68} In the indigenous Andean understanding, each of these five-part cycles ended in a period of social disorder and natural disasters known in Quechua as \textit{pachacuti}. These periods were the result of moral or religious failures of the previous order and consequent divine retribution in the form of natural disasters, deaths of monarchs, or other phenomena.

One can see this cyclic, five-part historical vision in the writings of many indigenous nobles, especially during the early years of colonialism in the Andes. An indigenous scholar, Cristóbal de Molina, wrote during another, smaller rebellion that

\begin{quote}
The Spanish conquered the Indians: but now the world was completing its cycle, God and the Spanish would this time be vanquished and all the Spanish slain, their cities engulfed and the sea would swell up to drown them and abolish their memory.\textsuperscript{69}
\end{quote}

Felipe Guaman Poma de Ayala, another 16\textsuperscript{th} century indigenous historian, outlines these five phases of creation in great detail, blending them with Christian histories of creation and the Flood. Guaman Poma argues that the period of Incan stability ended with the civil war between Huascar and Atahualpa that occurred immediately before and during the first few years of Spanish conquest. He then outlines four more phases, situating himself immediately before the dawn of the fifth, peaceful phase, which would be under a new

\textsuperscript{68} Szeminski, "The Last Time," 288-9.
Christian order. These written, Spanish language works, which deal so directly with indigenous cultural understandings and visions, are clearly indicative of a wider oral tradition throughout the Andes. During the late sixteenth and throughout the seventeenth centuries, understandings of when the cycles began and who represented the next phase of stability became more universally consistent. Much of the indigenous peasantry saw the original phase of Incan peace as ending with the conquest of the Incan empire by the Spaniards. Consequently, they believed the Spanish conquest of the Incan empire would be followed by increasing chaos and destruction before the fifth phase: a second era of Incan-led social harmony.

The vision of a new, Incan utopia that would be found within the final phase of the five-part series was common throughout the colonial Andes. In 1609, Garcilaso Inca de la Vega published a book called *Comentarios Reales de los Incas* that portrayed the Incan era and empire, called *Tawantinsuyo*, as a golden era of stability and peace. For example, de la Vega writes that under the Inca the fields were all worked communally and charitably, contrasting greatly with the corruption and greed of the *corregidores* of the Bourbon era.

First they worked the fields of the sun, then those of the widows and orphans and all those disabled by old age or illness...The Inca decreed that the fields of their vassals should have precedence before their own, for they said that the prosperity of his subjects was the source of good service to the king.

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73 Quoted in Stavig “Body Politic,” 36.
In this world of utopian communalism under the Inca, “everyone had what was necessary for human life, food and clothes and shoes, such that no one could be called poor or could beg for money.”⁷⁴ De la Vega was the son of an Incan princess and a Spanish conquistador who grew up with his mother in Peru, where he heard his family discuss indigenous beliefs and traditions.⁷⁵ The picture he paints, therefore, is likely based on an oral tradition that was widespread among the indigenous peasantry. Another example of Incan utopianism is found in the widespread myth of Gran Paititi, a hidden Incan community somewhere on the Amazon side of the Andes. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries missionaries to these areas heard many tales of a great Incan city just further down the river.⁷⁶ This idea of the coming Incan utopia, clearly widespread, albeit in different forms, among the indigenous peasantry, left no place for Europeans.

Alongside the idea of Incan utopianism was that of the second coming of the Inca himself. The widespread myth of the second coming of the Inca was called inkarrí, derived from the Spanish “Inca rey” or “Inca king.”⁷⁷ There were innumerable versions of this myth involving different Incas and sometimes even personifying the Inkarrí into a ruler himself, rather than simply being the name of the myth.⁷⁸ Some pockets of belief held that Atahualpa, the first Inca emperor killed by Pizarro and his forces, was

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⁷⁴ Garcilaso de la Vega, Comentarios Reales, (Mexico City: Editorial Porrúa, 1984), 180. Translation mine. In its original Spanish: “lo necesario para la vida humana, de comer y vestir y calzar, lo tenían todos, que nadie podía llamarse pobre ni pedir limosna.”
⁷⁶ Ibid., 41.
⁷⁷ Robbins, Genocide and Millennialism, 36.
⁷⁸ This myth has persisted to the present day, as 20th century Peruvian novelist José María Arguedas, heard a group of Andean peasants discuss the inkarrí, saying “only the Inkari’s head still exists. But from the head he is growing, growing down towards his feet. And when everything is complete, Inkari will return.” Quoted in Stavig, “Body Politic,” 41.
regenerating in his grave and would restore native rule upon his resurrection.  

Others held that the head of the first Túpac Amaru had not rotted on the pole on which the Spaniards stuck it, but rather grew constantly more impressive until the Spaniards removed it. This head was, according to some, growing a new body in the grave in preparation for a second coming. In a prologue for Comentarios Reales, published in a 1723 version, Gabriel de Cardenas, citing a prophecy by Sir Walter Raleigh that may have been written in jest, predicted a rebellion against the Spaniards and a renewal of a just, Incan empire. Furthermore, two Catholic saints of the New World, Saint Rose and Saint Francisco Solano, each made a famous prediction that Lima would be destroyed by tidal waves that would spare Indian areas, heralding the beginning of a new, Incan, Christian era. Indigenous understandings of historical time led to a radical vision of the coming reestablishment of the utopian, wholly indigenous, Incan empire through the resurrection of the Inca himself.

Inextricably related to the indigenous beliefs in historical cycles is the indigenous Andean religion and the role of Catholicism, Jesus, and Christians within it. In traditional Andean cosmogony, the creator God Viracocha, before creating man, created a tripartite world that was very similar to the Christian construction; there was the sky, the Earth, and the underworld, known in Quechua as Hanaq Pacha, Kay Pacha, and Hurin Pacha, respectively. Each of these areas had a ruler to whom the people owed religious devotion. In Hanaq Pacha there was Viracocha, in Kay Pacha there was the Inca, and

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79 Robbins, Genocide and Millennialism, 36.
81 Robbins, Genocide and Millennialism, 38.
either a vague, less important god called Pacha-Kamaq or simply no one ruled the underworld.\textsuperscript{84} While this hierarchy was not universal, its basic construction was the ideological norm throughout the Andean peasant world, both Quechua and Aymara. Szeminski argues, using fifteenth and sixteenth century chronicles by literate indigenous writers and twentieth century oral traditions that he found through his own research, that Jesus either came to be widely identified with Pacha-Kamaq, or was given that name and position as ruler of the underworld. Therefore, Pacha-Kamaq could not have been properly worshipped before the introduction of Jesus to the religious hierarchy. Many indigenous peasants believed that the pre-Columbian indigenous peoples had not properly worshipped Pacha-Kamaq, resulting in the \textit{pachacuti} that was the Spanish conquest.\textsuperscript{85} In other words, Jesus had sent the Spaniards in order to teach the indigenous how to properly worship him, as well as destroy the offending system and punish those that had failed to meet their religious obligations. This belief system meshed nicely with many Spaniards' claims to have been sent by God to convert the indigenous heathen.

However, after having successfully destroyed the Inca and instituted themselves at the head of a new social order, as well as having taught the peasants the proper way to worship Jesus-Pacha Kamaq, the Spaniards themselves began to become corrupt. Indians were slaughtered for no immediately obvious reason, peasants were sent away from their families to work in the Potosí mines, and entire ethnic groups were uprooted and moved. Furthermore, indigenous people were not allowed to become priests and thereby properly worship Jesus, nor were they allowed to properly worship Viracocha or his female

\textsuperscript{84} Ibid., 188.
\textsuperscript{85} Ibid., 189.
counterpart Pacha Mama.\textsuperscript{86} The Spaniards, therefore, ceased to be divine instruments of Pacha Kamaq's will and turned into \textit{nak-aq}, or demons from the underworld.\textsuperscript{87} Like the corrupt Inca before them, the Spaniards no longer allowed for the proper worship of the Gods and therefore required punishment and destruction through a new \textit{pachacuti}. The indigenous religious views of the Spaniards shifted from messengers of an offended God to demons from the underworld that required genocidal annihilation. This shift, while it fit within the indigenous cyclical historical narrative, was in fact a direct response to Spanish intolerance, racism, and cruelty.

It is, of course, important to note that there was great variance between different communities in the tenets of this belief structure based on the number of Spaniards, the power of the church, and the economic role of the area, as well as the pre-Columbian relationship of a given ethnic group with the Incas. Though there was a spectrum of variance regarding the details, the general indigenous ideological context for the Great Rebellion was one in which the Spaniards were seen as being the corrupt, demonic leaders of an unjust system that required divine annihilation. This unjust social order would be replaced by a new, utopian, Incan society that now included the proper worship of Jesus-Pacha Kamaq. In the eyes of the insurgents, such a reversal was necessary and preordained. The Andean cultural view of time and religious classification of the Spaniards played a crucial role in attracting and motivating peasants to participate in the Great Rebellion, though it would also place the goals of the revolutionary peasantry in direct opposition with those of the upper classes.

\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., 189.
\textsuperscript{87} Ibid., 190.
The indigenous religious understanding of history and religion, and its revolutionary implications for Spaniards, began to appear in earnest before the Great Rebellion, especially regarding the year 1777. During the rebellion itself, in Upper Peru, Tupamarista oral propaganda often closely followed the indigenous revolutionary ideas and understandings of historical time and prophecy. Furthermore, Amaru’s rebellion was highly decentralized and the bulk of the leaders that nominally fought in his name were often in very rare communication with the leader. This allowed for many rebellious peasants—outside of the direct control of Amaru, who was so intent on courting creole and upper class mestizos and Europeanized indigenous—to engage in actions that were indicative of their radical ideology such as church-burnings and corpse mutilation. Furthermore, the entire Katarista movement, in both propaganda and in action, operated entirely within this strand of revolutionary peasant ideology. These manifestations of radical ideologies, from inkarri to visions of the Spaniards and the acculturated indigenous Andeans as nak-aq, show that the peasant revolutionary populations held motivations and goals that were not only different than those of the nobility, but were in fact fundamentally opposed.

During the 18th century, the many rebellions and social disturbances caused by the erosion of the indigenous nobility’s power under the Bourbon Reforms and other colonial injustices, such as mass displacement of indigenous groups, lent credence to the theory that the Andes were undergoing a period of pachacuti. Accordingly, there were hundreds of conspiracies and rumors of inkarri, a second coming of the Inca and the expulsion of
the Spaniards, or what would be the fifth part of the new cycle. In 1776, an Indian named Juan de Dios Orcoguaranca, after being arrested in Paucartambo, declared that:

Much is to be feared in the year of the three sevens, which is the soon approaching year of 1777 ... because in that year all the Indians of this kingdom will rise up against the Spanish and kill them, beginning with the corregidores, mayors, and other people with white faces and blonde hair. This will doubtlessly occur because the Indians of Cuzco have already named a king that governs them.88

Orcoguaranca also claimed that this rebellion would fulfill the prophecies of Saints Rose and Solano, would be fundamentally Catholic and Incan, and that it’s coming was common knowledge among the indigenous.89 Arrested revolutionaries in several other provinces gave similar prophecies about the expulsion of the Spaniards and restoration of the Inca through violent revolution in 1777.90 During the Great Rebellion itself, a prisoner of Túpac Amaru quoted him as having said to a group of indigenous soldiers in a speech given at a huaca, or indigenous holy site, that “The time for the prophecies of Saint Rose of Lima to be fulfilled is upon us, the time when it will be necessary to return the kingdom to its former rulers.”91 Father de la Borda, a priest taken captive by the Katarista army, noted that Katari made frequent reference to the prophecies that the land would return to its original owners and that the “Indians revolted exactly under the hope that was suggested to them by those leaders.”92

88 CDBRE, Tomo 2, 229. Translation mine. In its original Spanish: “era mui de temer del año de los tres sietes, que es el de mil setecientos setenta y siete próximo venidero... todos los yndios de este reyno se habían de alzar contra los españoles y se les había de quitar la vida empezando por los corregidores, alcaldes, y demás gente de cara blanca y rubios que no tuviese duda pues tenían los yndios del Cuzco nombrado rey que los governarse.”
90 CDBRE, Tomo 2, 230-232.
92 Quoted in Robins, Genocide and Millennialism, 141.
that "everything will return to its owner, as have predicted the first Santa Teresa to San Ignacio de Loyola," doubtlessly a mistaken reference to the prophecies of Saints Rose and Solano.\textsuperscript{93} These references to the \textit{inkarri} show the widespread acceptance of the indigenous religious and historical views of a cyclical history and the preordainment of the Inca's ascendancy, and imply the accompanying belief in the necessary annihilation of the Spaniards.

It is this genocidal aspect of revolutionary peasant ideology that is most starkly dissimilar to that of the nobility and upper classes. As previously mentioned, Amaru so badly wanted to include the mestizo and creole populations in his revolution that he called only for the eradication of the Spanish, meaning those born in Spain. Peasant views of race, however, were vastly different. Differentiation between Spaniards, creoles, and mestizos was rare, as all were part of the same demonic, corrupt system, which required excision for a stable, Incan future. The prophetic quote cited earlier from Juan de Dios Orcoguaranca shows the peasantry's willful ignorance of these ethnic divisions, as he claims that the rebels shall justly kill "all those with a white face and blonde hair."\textsuperscript{94} Furthermore, for many peasants, race was not a function exclusively of skin color, but was rather a fluid category that took into account class, dress, and behavior.\textsuperscript{95} In Aymara, one word that Father de la Borda often heard used to refer to the enemy was \textit{q'ara}, meaning barren or naked. This term encompassed all those who lived off the exploitation of Indian labor and goods, including the vast majority of Spaniards, creoles, and mestizos as well as much of the indigenous nobility and \textit{caciques} that were party to colonial

\textsuperscript{93} Ibid., 141, Stavig, "Body Politic," 49.
\textsuperscript{94} CDBRE, Tomo 2, 229.
\textsuperscript{95} Robins, \textit{Genocide and Millennialism}, 152.
corruption. Túpac Katari, therefore, unlike Amaru, vilified indigenous landowners and members of the upper class. Before ending his siege of La Paz, Katari demanded that “the present and past corregidores that were in the city, their deputies, priests, helpers and substitutes, royal officials and their dependents in the customs house, Europeans, and landlords” be turned over to his forces. This category of q’ara was far more important to the rebellious Andean peasantry than any arbitrary racial classification. It was these people, and their oppressive practices that were direct results of their European blood and culture, that required expurgation.

In an attempt to eradicate European culture, Katari forbade the Spanish language, any dress that was not indigenous, and outward signs of Spanish culture, such as eating bread and the use of water fountains. These forbidden actions and objects were all markers of European acculturation, and therefore markers of membership in the q’ara class or race and of demonic association with the underworld. Many indigenous nobles, and even some mestizos and creoles, adopted indigenous dress and customs in order to save their lives. Their efforts were, of course, not universally successful. The cacique of Rondocan, writes that a Spanish leader who “was against us (despite being a Spaniard and a creole), arrived at Papres after having served the rebellions rigorously; the Indians of that town, for no other crime than having a white face, knowing who he was, stoned him to death right in front of me.” In Bolivia, what began as fringe instances of

97 Ibid., 219.
100 *CDBRE* Tomo 1, 433-4. Translation mine. In its original Spanish: “El Cacique de Rondocan, que en el combate estuvo contra nosotros (sin embargo de ser español y criollo), llegó a Papres después de haber servido rigurosamente al rebelde; los
genocide became officially sanctioned practice. At the beginning, Katari publicly held the same accepting beliefs as Amaru. However, the majority of the creoles and cholos—which, tellingly, referred to both Europeanized indigenous people and mestizos—who abandoned La Paz in favor of the rebellion were executed when they arrived in the Katarista camps. In one of his letters, Katari demanded “that all creoles die” and said that he would “finish off everyone with the objective that there be no mestizos.” His sister, Gregoria Apaza, admitted in her confession that Katari and his followers’ goal was “to take the lives of the whites whenever they had the opportunity.” Dozens of indigenous soldiers who fought under Amaru, and even more that fought under Katari or on their own in fringe groups, admitted in their confessions to the Spanish courts that their goal was to eradicate all white faces and vestiges of European culture from the Andes.

As previously discussed, the eradication of the European and acculturated indigenous Andeans was a result not only of their corruption and cruelty, but also of their consequent categorization in the indigenous mindset as nak-aq, or demons from the underworld of Hurin Pacha. The siege of La Paz was full of magical attempts to decrease the power of the European demons. According to the report of Francisco Tadeo Diez de Medina, during the siege of La Paz, Indian soldiers shouted to the city that they had

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103 Ibid., 156-8.
"decapitated the statues of Christian figures and saints and that since the Spaniards could no longer put themselves under their protection, they would be vanquished."

In the Calca province, just southeast of Cusco, indigenous rebels exterminated the entire European population, including women and children. The Spaniard commanding officer reported that two of his soldiers, the Gutierrez brothers, were killed, "their hearts were ripped out, tongue and eyes, and [the Indians] relished in their blood." In La Paz there are far more accounts of corpse mutilation, specifically involving the removal of the heart and destruction of the genitals, including one mass slaughter of over 50 Spaniards, from whose corpses their heads and genitals were removed. These corpse mutilations mirror the traditional indigenous method of capital punishment of the guilty in order to prevent their return or reincarnation. Specifically, the demon of indigenous religion called in Spanish el degollador, or the throat-slitter, and in Quechua, among other things, nak-aq, was to have his incarnations' hearts, eyes, and genitals removed in order to prevent their incarnations' return to Kay Pacha. Much of the peasantry saw the Europeans and the acculturated upper class as demons. This classification led to genocidal practices, especially in Lower Peru, where it was accepted as doctrine by the revolutionary leadership.

The widespread destruction of churches and massacres of Catholic priests by indigenous peasant forces was another manifestation of the classification of the Spaniards as demons, or as the functionaries of a malevolent God that was doomed to be relegated

104 Thomson, We Alone Will Rule, 218.
105 CDBRE, Tomo 1, 200. Translation mine. In its original Spanish: "le sacaron el corazón, lengua y ojos, y se saborearon en su sangre."
106 Szeminski, "Why Kill the Spaniard?" 169.
107 Ibid., 170.
exclusively to the underworld during the *pachacuti*. The Catholic Church, which in some instances was progressive and caring on a small scale, all too often simply competed with the *corregidores* for the right to indigenous labor and goods. Furthermore, in the indigenous view, the priests and churches were the primary actors that prevented the proper worship of either Jesus or Viracocha and Pacha Mama. Like the indigenous case against the Spaniards, this fury toward European Catholicism was not purely founded in religious ideology. It was instead fundamentally caused by Spanish cruelty and exploitative practices that were consequently placed within a revolutionary, religious ideology. Though some indigenous actors certainly feared the power of the church and the priests as representatives of a Jesus-Pacha Kamaq, many saw Catholicism's power as rightfully diminishing and consequently attacked churches and included priests among those that should be exterminated from the continent.

In cities and towns that were being attacked by indigenous forces, it was common for the Europeans, creoles, and mestizos to seek refuge in the local church. The priests would then, often carrying a cross or a holy relic, come out to try to calm the amassed forces. This strategy, especially toward the beginning of the rebellion, did find some success in provinces such as Palca, Ocuri, and Pintatora. However, by February of 1781, only a few months following the beginning of the rebellion, these places afforded no protection. Occasional accounts of the upper class finding refuge in churches until being safely expelled from the town under the care of the priest suddenly turned to dozens of accounts of massacres within churches, which were often subsequently looted.

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and burned. For example, in the Peruvian province of Caylloma, rebels killed Spaniards who had taken refuge in a church, yelling that the “time of mercy is finished, there are no Sacraments here, nor God with any power.” Similarly, in a Bolivian community called Macha, when the corregidor sought refuge from the rebellious peasants in the church, a woman named Tomasina Silvestre “headed the invasion with a sling in her hands, shaking it as if it were the countryside, and she uttered these formal words: ‘why are you worshiping this piece of tortilla when the sacristan makes it with the flour of the valley?’”

In a further manifestation of their belief that Catholic power was waning and that European Catholic functionaries were corrupt, churches were often ransacked and burned and their priests killed. In Tapacari, the religious statuary was burned in the public square while in San Pedro de Buenavista, the Indians took the silver and gold from the church, stripped the statuary of their clothing and broke them into pieces. Then, in a pattern that was not rare in the peasant-led rebellions, they executed the priests. A peasant in Aymaia, while killing the priest, allegedly yelled “Thief! Priest! It is because of you that we are naked!” This quotation indicates the economic corruption that led to the classification of priests as spiritual enemies. Tomás Catillisaya, a peasant leader in

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109 Ibid., 147. Examples include Oruro, San Pedro de Buenavista, Tapacari, Yura, Colcha, Tarata and more.
110 Stavig, World of Túpac Amaru, 243.
112 Robins, Genocide and Millennialism, 147-149.
113 Ibid., 151.
Bolivia, explicitly ordered his forces to “pass under the knife the priests.” This widespread peasant violence towards churches and priests is perhaps the clearest manifestation of the radical peasant rebellious ideology that completely rejected the colonial structure rather than working toward reform within it.

Katari himself represents a distinctly more complex religious figure than the leaders of smaller riots and revolts. In the camp outside La Paz, he had a chapel constructed and filled with looted liturgical objects, in which he held mass on a regular basis. The captive priest Borda reported that, when Katari returned to camp to find that his followers had killed the priest Father Antonio Barriga, Katari made a point to let:

everyone know that he had not been an accomplice of the disastrous and tyrannical death of the Reverend Father Fray Antonio Barriga so that he would receive no punishment whatsoever, much less meet defeat at the hands of the Spaniards.

A close investigation of these actions shows that Katari’s views toward Christianity and priests were less hostile than the bulk of his followers, though they were of the same indigenous ideological strand. Borda also reports that Katari would listen to a silver box from which he received divine guidance. Thomson shows this practice to be a manifestation of the indigenous practice of the Uru Chipaya peoples of the southern altiplano, who would construct similar boxes to contain secret amulets that acted as guardians against demons, or the Aymara version of nak-aq. Furthermore, Bordas reports that Katari often, during mass, looked into a mirror, made faces and gestures and claimed “Now I am seeing. I know everything that is happening everywhere in the

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114 Quoted in Robins, Genocide and Millennialism, 148. Other examples of the murder of priests include Poopó, Colcha, Tinquipaya, and Aymaia among others.
115 Ibid., 149.
116 Quoted in Thomson, We Alone Will Rule, 200.
117 Ibid., 202.
world.” Though Bordas found this practice “laughable,” it was, in fact, grounded in indigenous beliefs about the relationship between mirrors and eradication of the demonic presence. In the Laymi culture of Bolivia, mirrors and eyes are closely associated and mirrors were often used in shamanic practice to help the practitioner “to see and think more clearly.” The etymology of the Aymara word for mirror is worth noting. The noun form is “quespirlipu,” and Ludovico Bertonio, in his Aymara dictionary of 1612, translates the verb “quespiata” as to free, but also to “redeem from the hands of the Devil.” Katari was therefore using the mirrors to gain clarity and guidance in his effort to free his people from the demonic Spaniards. Katari’s use of mirrors and the silver box shows that, though he was still wary of the power of the Catholic Church and desirous of staying the good graces of Jesus-Pacha Kamaq, he also fundamentally saw the Spaniards as demons from the underworld that required eradication. Radical beliefs such as this would ultimately prove to pose more of a threat to the Europeanized upper classes than did Spanish corruption and exploitation, leading to a civil war that erased any hopes for the revolution’s military success.

**Ideological Clashes, Civil War, and Revolutionary Failure**

Though the belief structures of the peasantry and the upper class were absolutely incompatible in the larger sense, many individuals were in fact able to operate within both the radical and reformist revolutionary ideologies of the indigenous peasants and nobility. Indeed, many of the caciques had been straddling the line between Spanish and

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118 Ibid., 202.
119 Ibid., 203.
120 Ibid., 203.
121 Ibid., 203.
indigenous cultures since the establishment of the colonial system. However, this personal bicultural fluency is entirely different than successfully constructing one revolutionary movement from these two radically different and often contradictory ideologies. The theoretical incompatibility of these revolutionary ideologies is clear. The rebellious upper class included creoles, mestizos, and the acculturated indigenous. The indigenous peasants rarely differentiated between these groups, viewing them all as at best heathens and at worst demons sent from the underworld that required complete expulsion or annihilation. Thus, the indigenous peasantry viewed the rebellious upper class, or the potentially rebellious upper class, as the enemy against whom they were rebelling. Furthermore, the upper class believed in a traditional, European Catholicism while much of the peasantry saw the Catholic Church, Jesus, and the saints as newly introduced parts of the Andean divine hierarchy.

While these two views are not necessarily diametrically opposed, they became so when peasant forces began looting churches and killing priests as a result of their vision of a corrupt Catholic Church and God that was losing power during the pachacuti that was the rebellion. Lastly, the upper class desired only changes to the colonial structure by revoking the reparto and mita, ending the restrictive customs taxes, protecting their hereditary cacique positions, opening institutions of power such as universities and churches to the indigenous nobility, and ridding themselves of the corrupt corregidores. These changes, while perhaps seemingly fair, were designed to serve primarily the upper class, landowning and trading creoles, mestizos, and indigenous nobility.

The rebellious upper class continued to operate and even rebel within the colonial paradigm, maintaining property law, religious and political tribute, and the rule of local
elites. Indeed, many of the same goals espoused by Amaru had been fought for through legal, colonial channels for several years and were arguably on the brink of official implementation. The peasantry, however, operated within a distinctly indigenous paradigm. Fueled by a utopian, millennial drive to end unfair labor practices by white and indigenous landowners and long-distance traders, the peasants incorporated Europeans and European culture into the indigenous views of history and religion in a different way. The most influential of these new ideologies answered Europeans' corruption and exploitation by calling for their absolute expulsion and eradication. The upper class participated in a reformist revolt against corruption while the peasants participated in a radical attempt to destroy every vestige of an oppressive system and culture and replace it with a purely indigenous, Incan state. These two groups' ideals and goals were not merely different, but rather fundamentally opposed. This basic ideological incompatibility was one of the principal causes of the military failure of the Great Rebellion.\textsuperscript{123}

\textit{Ideological Incompatibility and Revolutionary Failure under Túpac Amaru}

Though Amaru made a concerted effort to appeal to both the relatively conservative nobility and to the more radical peasantry, this ideological balancing act ultimately failed to attract enough support of either group to achieve military victory. Amaru's movement achieved almost universal support in the areas in which his family or

\textsuperscript{122} Garret, "His Majesty's Most Loyal Vassals," 610.

\textsuperscript{123} A discussion of whether or not the rebellion was truly a failure, as many of the reformist goals were implemented during the rebellion or shortly after its end, is outside of the scope of this thesis. For more information, see Thomson, \textit{We Alone Will Rule}.
trading partners were powerful leaders, specifically Canas y Canchis. However, as the rebellion spread from these areas, he found less and less support among the caciques and creoles, and was unable to inspire the peasants to revolt against their loyalist caciques. In Quispicanchis, the province from which Amaru drew the second strongest support after Canas y Canchis, only fifty percent of the caciques supported his revolt, and in several provinces surrounding those, he was resisted almost universally. Principal among the reasons Amaru was unable to attract the support of this important group is the actions of the peasant forces outside of Amaru’s control, such as the aforementioned looting of churches and murder of priests and colonial figures. These actions were indicative of the more radical, peasant ideology, which was highlighted by colonial and loyalist propaganda. This led to the widespread perception in the upper classes that Amaru’s movement was against the entirety of the colonial order rather than simply aspects of colonial society. As the insurgency and popular uprisings progressed, it became clear that either Amaru could not truly be leading the reformist revolt that he described and called for in his edicts and letters, or that he had lost control of his movement to the more dangerous peasantry. Because of this belief and fear of Incan, peasant radicalism, the vast majority of the indigenous nobility and creole populations rejected Amaru and joined with the Loyalists, turning the rebellion against Spain into a civil war among Indian caciques that was ultimately unwinnable for Amaru.

The most noteworthy manifestation of this ideological incompatibility in Peru is the rebels’ first significant military victory, which occurred on November 19, 1780 in Sangarará. During this victory, Amaru’s forces defeated the royalist regiment based in

124 O'Phelan Godoy, Rebellions and Revolts, 222. These provinces include Calca y Lares, Cotabambas, and Abancay.
Cuzco, along with the city of Sangarará’s nobility and the forces of nearby cacique Don Pedro Sarahuruara Tito Atauchi Ynga. The peasant army then burned the church and killed the largely creole and indigenous noble population that had refused to side with Amaru and taken refuge inside.¹²⁵ One estimate, though likely inflated as it was given by the prosecution at Amaru’s trial, put the number of people killed in the fire or trying to escape it at over 800.¹²⁶ To destroy the church and kill the creoles and indigenous nobility that had sought refuge within it was to attack the religious foundation and racial hierarchy of colonial society. That this attack occurred during the military victory that established Amaru’s army as a real power only made it more symbolically potent.

The Spaniards and loyalists immediately realized the symbolic power of the church burning and massacre that occurred in Sangarará. Bishop Moscoso, previously a friend of Amaru’s and a fellow critic of the corregidor Arriaga, immediately excommunicated Amaru and his followers. In a document that was printed and hung in every church of greater Cuzco, Moscoso wrote that Amaru was excommunicated due to “having set fire to public chapels and the church of Sangarará...for being a rebellious traitor of the King, our Lord, [and] for seditiously working against peace and being a usurper of royal rights.”¹²⁷ News of this battle, the destruction of the church, and Amaru’s excommunication, spread quickly. In his trial, the lawyer prosecuting Amaru pointed out that the burning of the church and murder of those inside in Sangarará was

¹²⁵ Garrett, “His Majesty's Most Loyal Vassals,” 576 and Thomson We Alone Will Rule, 228.
¹²⁶ CDBRE, Tomo 3, 230.
¹²⁷ Bishop Juan Manuel de Moscoso, “Excommunication of Tupac Amaru and his followers” in Anthology of Sources, 74.
"notorious in almost the entire kingdom."\textsuperscript{128} This spread was encouraged by colonial and Loyalist propaganda, which even went so far as to circulate rumors of cannibalism at Sangarará.\textsuperscript{129} As a result, not only did caciques and creoles almost entirely cease to support Amaru, but more and more presented themselves and their armies to the royalist forces.

For example, Jose Unga, a cacique, believed at first that Amaru was acting under orders of the Spanish monarch, but upon hearing of the excommunication and defeat of royalist forces at Sangarará, he wrote, \textit{"It could not have been the King's order, because he would never have allowed such atrocities to happen."}\textsuperscript{130} Unga and his troops consequently joined the Loyalists against Amaru and his followers. Andrés Quispe Cabana and Bernardo Licacagua, the caciques of the threatened Lampa province, each joined the Loyalist army.\textsuperscript{131} As the news of Sangarará spread, these caciques were followed by those of nearly every other province around Cuzco and to the north of Peru.\textsuperscript{132} Sangarará was a turning point not only because it signaled the dangerous power of the Tupamarista movement, but also because it categorized the revolt for the caciques and creoles as a heretical and treasonous revolt against the king, God, and their own authority, despite the traditional structure of Amaru’s army and conservatism of his letters and edicts. Most caciques, in fact, decided that Amaru threatened the order and stability of the region more than the corruption of the colonial actors or the burdens of the Bourbon reforms and responded militarily.

\textsuperscript{128} CDBRE, Tomo 3, 230. Translation mine. In its original Spanish: notorio en casi todo el reino."
\textsuperscript{129} Campbell, "Ideology and Factionalism," 124.
\textsuperscript{130} Quoted in O'Phelan Godoy, \textit{Rebellions and Revolts}, 238.
\textsuperscript{131} CDBRE, Tomo 1, 337.
\textsuperscript{132} For a detailed list, see Garret, "His Majesty's Most Loyal Vassals," 593.
Further evidence of this view of the Tupamarista movement as dangerously radical is found in the participation on the loyalist side of openly reformist caciques that clashed regularly with corregidores or bishops. Such a cacique was Eugenio Sinanyuca of Coporaque, who was involved in a public feud with the exploitative parish priest, Vicente de la Puente. Sinayuca had encouraged his community not to perform voluntary but expected labor on behalf of the church and was involved in several legal proceedings against de la Puente. De la Puente then countered with his own legal proceedings against Sinayuca, challenging the legality of his office. There were several attempts in early 1780 to forcefully remove Sinayuca from office, but the entire community, including creoles and the upper class, met de la Puente’s forces with near universal opposition. The final confrontation resulted in the stoning of two of the priests aides and the expulsion of de la Puente from the community. Sinayuca and others in Coporaque were consequently excommunicated. Amaru’s revolutionary goals, as stated in his early written propaganda, would have been exactly in line with the thinking of someone like Sinayuca, who clearly was not opposed to violence against the colonial apparatus. However, during the rebellion itself, Sinayuca and his followers “remained aloof from Túpac Amaru” and chose to continue fighting their excommunication, the corruption of de la Puente, and legitimize the cacicazgo of Sinayuca through legal channels. Sinayuca was, like many caciques, truly committed to the colonial order and therefore refused to participate in a rebellion that apparently sought to upend it.

It is also worth noting that, though there were occasional riots and small-scale peasant-led revolts in Lower Peru, Amaru generally failed to convince peasants to rise up

133 Stavig, The World of Túpac Amaru, 252-254.
against their *caciques*. Loyalist *caciques* instead brought peasant armies with them into the royalist army. After Sangarará, the aforementioned *caciques* Andrés Quispe Cabana and Bernardo Licacagua brought with them seven and eight hundred peasant Indian soldiers respectively.\textsuperscript{134} It is estimated that 85 percent of Amaru’s forces were peasants from Tinta or Quispicanchis that served under a rebellious *cacique*. The other 15 percent were a mixture of followers of rebel *caciques* from elsewhere in the Cuzco region and peasant rebels that managed to find their way to Amaru’s forces. His forces in total are estimated to have been just over 28,000, while the loyalist *caciques* controlled over 36,000 peasant soldiers.\textsuperscript{135} This means that well less than 6 percent of the peasants in and around Cuzco that were militarily involved in the Great Rebellion revolted against their loyalist *cacique* and fought with Amaru.

Such a low percentage is clear evidence of the Tupamarista failure to mobilize peasants, especially when compared with the Katarista movement in Bolivia. Politics in each region were intensely localized and each region was home to diverse ethnic groups that had their own relationships and histories that often predated colonization. In Peru under Amaru, however, burning churches, killing acculturated indigenous nobles and creoles, and pillaging the rich’s land and property were all discouraged and even prohibited by the leadership so as not to ostracize the nobility. In Bolivia, these manifestations of the radical, indigenous ideology were officially encouraged and instituted as policy. Amaru made a calculated decision to appeal to the conservative nobility, sacrificing the much higher levels of peasant support that occurred in Bolivia

\textsuperscript{134} CDBRE, Tomo 1, 337.  
\textsuperscript{135} Stavig, *The World of Túpac Amaru*, 251.
under Katari. Consequently, many peasants not only did not join Túpac Amaru’s movement, but many followed their loyalist caciques into battle against him.

Amaru was defeated and imprisoned on April 5, 1781, almost exactly five months after Arriaga was executed and the rebellion began. Ancient ethnic rivalries, the economic benefits of the Bourbon reforms for many caciques, and, of course, Spanish military superiority played significant roles that are well documented in the historiography. However, of equal if not surpassing importance, was Amaru’s failed attempt to successfully portray his rebellion as a relatively conservative, reformist venture to the upper class and indigenous nobility. This failure was largely due to the radical actions of Amaru’s peasant supporters, which were incompatible with the conservatism of these groups. Furthermore, Amaru consciously sacrificed widespread peasant support for fear of further ostracizing these powerful segments of Andean society. The chasm between the revolutionary paradigm of the peasants and that of the upper class, and Amaru’s failure to reconcile the two, led to Amaru facing larger armies and unsupportive populations, especially during his siege of Cuzco, and was one of the principal causes for the failure of his movement.

_Ideological Clashes and Revolutionary Failure under Túpac Katari_

Katari, unlike Amaru, made very little effort to court the conservative nobility during his revolutionary movement and consequently led a movement that was almost entirely made up of rebellious peasants. This was undoubtedly partially due to the fact that Katari, as a peasant, did not have the connections, influence, or bicultural fluency of Amaru and therefore did not have the access or the tools to attract the upper class and
nobility. Furthermore, as Katari’s movement truly began shortly before Amaru’s ended, the rebellion had already become widely propagandized as a conflict between radical, bloodthirsty, idolatrous peasants and the entire colonial order and power structure. Rather than fruitlessly try to pursue the support of classes that had already rejected a mestizo, Europeanized cacique, Katari instead appealed directly to other indigenous peasants through the official endorsement of the peasantry’s more radical ideology. This ideology, especially its genocidal aspect, was fundamentally incompatible with the goals and values of the nobility and creole upper class. Consequently, tens of thousands of peasants rebelled against their caciques and fought with Katari, and nearly all caciques and creoles fought with the Spanish forces. The consequent dearth of the caciques’ and creoles’ wealth and technical and military knowledge in the Katarista army was critical in its ultimate failure.136

Before the rebellion broke out in Lower Peru, there was a significant amount of unrest and reformist movement among the nobles in Bolivia. In La Paz, the intensely negative and at times violent response to the reforms brought by Visitador José Antonio de Areche in 1777 spanned ethnicities, classes, and professions. Creole landlords and merchants, mestizo traders and muleteers, caciques from the provinces surrounding La Paz, and Indian traders and artisans were all vocal in their criticism of the Bourbon reforms and changes to the colonial economy.137 Gangs of armed, masked men speaking Spanish roamed the outskirts of La Paz, while hundreds of Indians and mestizos gathered

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136 An interesting theory of another reason for Katari’s failure is that his vision was so millennial that he simply waited for his movement to succeed rather than actually pressing his assault on La Paz. For more on this idea, see Robbins, *Genocide and Millennialism* as well as various essays in Stern’s *Resistance and Rebellion*. 137 Thomson, *We Alone Will Rule*, 135.
around the capital, waiting for “the uprising that there was to be... to remove the customs house.”¹³⁸ Lewin even posits that there was a fairly widespread conspiracy among the creoles of La Paz calling for a revolution that completely rejected Spanish colonial rule.¹³⁹ Cross-class social unrest before the rebellion of 1781 clearly shows that there was, in Bolivia, the potential for a rebellion against the Bourbon reforms and colonial functionaries that enforced them that involved the nobility and upper class.

Despite the clear presence of this rebellious reformism, the nobility and upper classes in Bolivia almost universally fought against the Katarista movement. This rejection and opposition was principally due to the ideological irreconcilability of the peasants and the upper class. In the face of continued and officially sanctioned attacks on churches, landowners, and creoles, only one creole and a scant handful of mestizos fought with Katari, the rest opting to either flee or fight against him with the colonial forces of La Paz.¹⁴⁰ Furthermore, caciques almost universally sided against him and with the Spanish. After the rebellion, Ignacio Flores, who served as the leader of the anti-insurrectionary forces in Upper Peru, called for the widespread awarding of medals to caciques in the province as a reward for their loyalty to the king.¹⁴¹ Their widespread loyalty resulted in the Katarista practice allowing the various communities to select their own military leadership, though always subject to the veto of Katari.¹⁴² Katari’s army consisted of indigenous peasants that saw the world as divided between themselves and the demonic European and Europeanized that required excision and were encouraged in

¹³⁸ Ibid., 136.
¹³⁹ Lewin, La revolución de Túpac Amaru, 152.
¹⁴⁰ O’Phelan, Rebellions and Revolts, 251.
¹⁴¹ Thomson, We Alone Will Rule, 251.
¹⁴² O’Phelan, Rebellions and Revolts, 248.
that view by the leadership.\textsuperscript{143} Though this religious ideology succeeded in attracting peasants throughout the region, its radicalism and high level of banditry and violence not only alienated the more conservative elements of society, such as creoles and Europeanized indigenous leaders, but it also drove them to directly and militarily oppose the Kataristas and nominally fight to maintain the colonial state and power of Spain.

This dearth of noble and creole support proved catastrophic for the Katarista rebellion. These classes were uniquely knowledgeable about military organization and tactics. In his confession, Katari said that when he was leader, “only captains were appointed, but when the two Inca (Miguel Bastidas and Andrés Túpac Amaru) arrived he began to hear of the rank of colonel and captain-colonel, but did not know their exact function.”\textsuperscript{144} Katari swiftly, if somewhat confusedly, implemented these ranks after the arrival of Bastidas. Furthermore, while Amaru had relied on trained, creole gunsmiths during the first phase of the rebellion, Katari had no such resource. Assorted former slaves and mestizos that had managed to learn the maintenance and operation of large guns from Spaniards before the revolt served this role in his army. As the Spanish witness Francisco Básques wrote, “the man who made the cannons was an Indian or a mestizo whose name I can no longer remember...but there were not enough men to use the guns anyway, only around fifty negroes and mulattos and thirty Indians.”\textsuperscript{145} Aside from technical knowledge, the caciques and creoles also possessed the majority of the material

\textsuperscript{143} In fact, even some Tupamarista leaders were strongly averse to the peasant radicalism and violence of Katari’s movement. Túpac Amaru sent Miguel Bastidas, his brother-in-law, to Upper Peru in order to oversee the rebellion. In his letters reporting back to Amaru, Bastidas writes that he lived in “horror and fear” of Katari’s peasant forces. For more, see Thomson, \textit{We Alone Will Rule}, 198.
\textsuperscript{144} Quoted in O’Phelan, \textit{Rebellions and Revolts}, 253.
\textsuperscript{145} Cited in O’Phelan, \textit{Rebellions and Revolts}, 255.
wealth, leaving Katari’s forces to rely on a black market of smuggled coca that left many
hungry. Katari’s army was desperately lacking in technical and martial knowledge as
well as resources, perhaps leading to his reticence in fully assaulting La Paz, and
ultimately leading to his defeat.

Katari was executed in November of 1781, less than a year after his rise to power.
However, the brevity of Katari’s leadership should not belie his incredible achievements.
By embracing the radical peasant ideology and allowing it to guide his movement, Katari
overcame his illiteracy, peasant roots, and severe lack of resources and historical
legitimacy to inspire and lead thousands of poor indigenous peasants in what was
arguably the main theater of the most serious military threat to colonial Spain between
conquest and independence. Paradoxically, however, it was this ideology that caused the
creole, mestizo, and noble classes to align themselves against him in what became a civil
war between the indigenous peasantry and the creoles and Europeanized, loyalist
caciques and mestizo. In a war against an enemy with a practical monopoly on
knowledge, wealth, professionalized forces and advanced weaponry, Katari could not win
despite the size or ideological consistency and dedication of his army. The various
rebellious strands all held the Spanish colonial power as an enemy, a commonality that
allowed for brief unity under Amaru during the first months of the revolution. However,
the military empowering of the peasantry, as occurred first under the decentralized wings
of the Tupamarista movement and then officially under Katari, led to clear and violent
conflict between the irreconcilable aspects of the two principal ideological positions. The
process of a peasantry empowered by rebellion enacting their more radical ideology and

146 Ibid., 256.
subsequently clashing with the rebellious upper class is clearly present in these larger movements, but is perhaps best understood through specific, local analysis. The rebellion in Oruro, which was outside of the control of either of the primary revolutionary leaders, is the clearest manifestation of the irreconcilability of the ideas of an empowered peasantry with those of the upper class.

**Oruro: A Case Study in Ideological Incompatibility**

In 1781, tensions between the European and creole populations in Oruro, a provincial capital to the south of La Paz, had been on the rise for years. Creoles, who were largely mine owners, were increasingly forced to work through European creditors to conduct business. Furthermore, the Spanish *corregidor* of Oruro, Ramón Urrutia y las Casas, had fixed the elections of regional leaders in favor of his European friends and family, largely replacing the creoles, especially the powerful Rodriguez family, that previously held these positions. For weeks, news of the Tupamarista rebellion, actual and falsified edicts stating its relatively conservative, reformist goals, and false rumors of his imminent arrival circulated through Oruro. The creoles of the city organized into an exclusive militia that was nominally created to defend against a peasant revolt, though leaders secretly sent several emissaries to the surrounding indigenous communities that denounced Urrutia and informed the peasantry of a possible rebellion.

After the formation of the creole militia, the city almost immediately was awash with rumors and conspiracies of both a creole rebellion and European military action or arrests of the creole militia. The Spaniards of Oruro grouped themselves and their most

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valuable possessions in the house of the wealthy trader José de Endeiza. On February 9, the creole militia attacked, burned, and looted Endeiza’s house. The majority of the ruling-class Spaniards were killed, fled, sought sanctuary in the church, or were imprisoned during that one night as the creoles took complete control of the city. It is important to note that many Spaniards who were not part of the ruling bureaucracy, such as shopkeepers, were not included among those persecuted. The creole Jacinto de Rodriguez was quickly installed as justicia mayor, replacing Urrutía, who had fled. This first phase of the revolt in Oruro was purely in the ideological vein of the upper class; it was a reformist revolt against specific, corrupt leaders and laws.

Over the course of the next few days, more and more Indians from the surrounding areas gathered in and around the city. By February 11th, over 15,000 Indians had gathered in Oruro, Many of these Indians had heard of the rebellion from emissaries sent by the upper class and were met welcomingly by the rebellious leadership. Such a large indigenous presence in the city led the majority of the creoles and Europeanized mestizos, including Jacinto Rodriguez, to warily adopt indigenous dress and begin chewing coca, a typically indigenous practice in the Andes. These small allowances permitted the creoles and mestizos to maintain leadership of the rebellion and control over the Indian population, which was still partially operating under the influence of Amaru’s policies of racial egalitarianism. Indeed, some Indians even brought captured whites forward to the creole leaders in order to determine if they were creole or European. This tenuous alliance, however, quickly fractured under the strain of

149 Robbins, Genocide and Millennialism, 104.
150 Cornblit, Power and Violence, 153.
151 Thomson, We Alone Will Rule, 173.
increasing political polarization. It could not survive the pressures of enacting actual
reform and the surge in support from the indigenous peasantry, who adhered
progressively closer to the radical indigenous belief structure and ideology.

The first manifestations of the differing ideological positions of the indigenous
and creole population were the genocidal search for Spaniards and significantly more
widespread looting by the indigenous that had come from the countryside. According to a
European chronicler, one of the first acts of a group of Indians arriving in Oruro shortly
after the rebellion, after paying homage to Jacinto de Rodriguez, was to “search the
houses where there was money, in order to loot them, and the places where the
chapetones (Spaniards) were hiding.”\(^{152}\) Another creole diarist writes that the Indians
went to the house of a merchant named Salinas which had within it “500,000 pesos in
bars, gold, and coins, all of which they looted and shared.”\(^{153}\) The next day, a Sunday,

they continued in their robberies and injustices, persecuting and killing all the
poor Spaniards that were the targets of their wrath. That morning they pulled the
unfortunate Pavia from under his bed and clubbed him to death...They looted his
house, not even leaving doors in place.\(^{154}\)

Tales of Indian looting and murder of all Spaniards are common throughout accounts of
this period in Oruro. As one creole wrote, by the time the Indians left Oruro, every
Spaniard had “died, with the exception of those that hid underground.”\(^{155}\)

\(^{152}\) Cornblit, *Power and Violence*, 152.

\(^{153}\) “Relación de los horribles estragos que en el dia 10 de febrero de 1781 hicieron
los cholos e yndios patricios de Oruro” in *La Rebelión de Túpac Amaru*, 504.
Translation mine. In its original Spanish: “500 mil pesos en barras, oro, y monedas,
todo lo cual saquearon y repartieron.”

\(^{154}\) Ibid., 504. Translation mine. In its original Spanish: “prosiguieron en sus robos, e
iniquidades, persiguiendo y matando a los pobres Chapetones que eran el blanco de
sus iras. Aquella manana sacaron al desgraciado Pavia de debajo de la cama, y lo
mataron a garrotazos...le saquearon su Casa sin dexarle ni aun puertas.”

\(^{155}\) Quoted in Robbins, *Genocide and Millennialism*, 106.
In their pursuit of Spaniards and Spanish wealth, the Indians that had come to Oruro grew decreasingly concerned with the power and sanctity of the Church. A European diary describes the attempt by Bishop Menéndez to “preach discipline in the public plaza,” a move that the Indian answered by shooting “at him three times with a slingshot, until they made him come down.”\textsuperscript{156} The priests of several churches in Oruro organized a procession through the city bearing a statue of San Cristo de Burgos, attempting to prevent the looting of several specific Spanish stores. Indians “shouted out that this Image was nothing more than a piece of cactus.”\textsuperscript{157}

Over the next week, as more Indians entered the city, their actions in regard to the Catholic Church grew even more radical. These actions were often directly caused by the fact that Spaniards frequently sought sanctuary and protection in churches. This idea of sanctuary, however, held no resonance within the indigenous belief structure and throughout the city peasants began to invade churches in search of Spaniards. Groups of Indians, in the words of a creole witness, “entered the church with great irreverence, in search of the Chapetones...and killed many right there.”\textsuperscript{158} In another instance, Indians broke into a church “opened the crypt and ...brought out a coffin in which a corpse had been laid, [and] ordered it opened, believing the corregidor to be shut inside it.”\textsuperscript{159} In the words of the Bishop, it was not “possible to contain them, as their insolence grew at every instant, especially that of the women, who in order to separate the vicar from the doors, tore his habit to shreds, knocked him to the ground twice, and kicked and punched

\textsuperscript{156} Cornblit, \textit{Power and Violence}, 152.
\textsuperscript{157} Ibid., 153.
\textsuperscript{158} “Relación de los horribles estragos,” 505. Translation mine. In its original Spanish: “entraron con gran irreverencia a las Yglesias en solicitud de los Chapetones y a muchos mataban allí mismo.”
\textsuperscript{159} Quoted in Cornblit, \textit{Power and Violence}, 154.
him with their hands and feet.” Furthermore, these churches were not simply broken into in order to find Spaniards; they were often looted and partially destroyed, as the stained glass of the main church of the town was burned and the smashed statuary of the various churches was found throughout the streets of the city.

Eventually the alliance between creoles and the indigenous peasantry began to dissolve and targets of indigenous looting and wrath slowly expanded to include the creole and Europeanized indigenous populations. In an important turning point, Sebastián Pegador, one of the creole leaders, killed a peasant that was attempting to forcibly enter and loot a treasury building. Other Indians, demanding justice, brought him before Rodriguez. The newly elected leader, however, ordered only his arrest. The peasants killed Pegador long before he reached the jail. According to Bishop Menéndez’s diary, Indians then soon began “commanding men and women to dress up [like Indians] and chew coca; and the residents were so fainthearted that they did not refuse...only the priests and the monks did not copy them.” According to another European chronicler, the only creoles and mestizos “whose lives were pardoned were those that dressed in Indian clothes.” Indian rebels also took control of many creole-owned stores and homes, demanding food and supplies in the name of the comun, or the indigenous community.

160 Quoted in Cornblit, Power and Violence, 155.
162 Thomson, We Alone Will Rule, 174.
163 Quoted in Cornblit, Power and Violence, 156.
164 “Los horribles estragos” in La Rebelión de Túpac Amaru, 505. Translation mine. In its original Spanish: “criollos...a quienes perdonaban la vida, vistiesen el trage indiano.”
165 Cornblit, Power and Violence, 156.
On the 15th of February, Jacinto de Rodriguez and other creole leaders, recognizing the shift in the balance of power, made several official pronouncements begging the Indians to return to their home communities and responding to the changes demanded by much of the indigenous peasantry. Among these demands that were met by Rodriguez and the upper class were the abolition of the reparto, the diezmo, and tribute to the crown as well as the redistribution of formerly Spanish lands to indigenous communities.\textsuperscript{166} They also offered every Indian one peso to leave and even concocted a complex lie announcing the imminent arrival of Túpac Amaru from Cuzco and encouraged the Indians to go meet him.\textsuperscript{167} Though some Indians took the money and returned home, many groups made further demands that were indicative of their radical ideology, principal of which was the demand for the redistribution of creole-owned land. Several Indian communities sought to vastly extend their holdings while some groups of peasants who worked on creole haciendas demanded that they be turned over to them directly. Creole and mestizo landlords did not agree to these demands, leading to smaller groups of landless indigenous peons, especially those from Rodriguez’s home province of Sillota, to openly rebel against the creole and mestizo upper class that had only a few days earlier enlisted their aid against the Spaniards.\textsuperscript{168} Aside from these openly rebellious groups, Bishop Menéndez wrote that during this time there was widespread “drunkenness, looting of churches, and, since no more Europeans could be found, [the

\textsuperscript{166} Cornblit, \textit{Power and Violence}, 157.
\textsuperscript{167} Thomson, \textit{We Alone Will Rule}, 175.
\textsuperscript{168} Ibid., 174.
Indians that remained in Oruro began to kill Creoles and beat them with whips for utterly ridiculous reasons.\textsuperscript{169}

On the 16\textsuperscript{th} of February, the creoles and mestizos of Oruro, along with the Indian noble Lope Chungara of the nearby community Paria, joined together to militarily expel the Indians who remained.\textsuperscript{170} Within a few days, an indigenous army laid siege to Oruro under the direct leadership of the peasant Santos Mamani. Among his force’s goals, which were admitted during various soldiers’ confessions after Mamani’s defeat, was the decapitation of the statue of the Virgen del Rosario de Santo Domingo, an important icon for the city.\textsuperscript{171} This goal was likely rooted in the indigenous views of the Catholic hierarchy of saints as demons or witches from the underworld that gave the Spanish their power. Indigenous rebels also said that their goals were to “convert the town to ashes’ and ‘finish off even the women’ while killing the priests.”\textsuperscript{172} Conversely, Jacinto de Rodriguez, the original leader of the rebellion against the Spanish forces who had sought aid from the countryside, wrote a letter to the Spanish viceroy asking for aid. He would ultimately become a military leader of Spanish forces in Oruro and help defeat the indigenous peasant army. After the war, however, he was arrested and died in jail while Urrutia, who had successfully escaped Oruro, resumed his post as corregidor.\textsuperscript{173}

Oruro serves as a fantastic microcosm for the entirety of the Great Rebellion, and specifically for the essential conflict between the two revolutionary strands that would ultimately lead to the failure of each. The first phase of the rebellion in Oruro, in which

\textsuperscript{169} Cornblit, \textit{Power and Violence}, 158.
\textsuperscript{170} Robins, \textit{Genocide and Millennialism}, 109.
\textsuperscript{171} Thomson, \textit{We Alone Will Rule}, 176.
\textsuperscript{172} Robins, \textit{Genocide and Millennialism}, 111.
\textsuperscript{173} Ibid., 113.
the creoles and mestizos rebelled against specific corrupt bureaucrats and economic practices, is representative of the reformist, relatively conservative ideological strand of the upper class that was present throughout the colonial Andes. The second phase of the rebellion, in which the European and Europeanized were hunted, the colonial economic power structures were threatened, and churches were attacked and looted, represents the radical peasant ideology that was similarly widespread. In Oruro, these two groups were unable to maintain their alliance for more than a week before collapsing into civil war. The creole and mestizo population in Oruro, like those throughout the Andes, deemed the radical peasant agenda of ethnic and cultural extermination, drastic economic and political reorganization, and implementation of indigenous religious ideology to be far more of a threat to their security and power than the corruption or exploitative nature of the colonial system. Therefore, despite their reformist inclinations, much of the creole and mestizo upper class, as well as the indigenous nobility, in Oruro and throughout the Andes, fought with the Spaniards against the indigenous peasants. The failure to manage the ideological incompatibility between the upper class and the peasantry, and the civil war in which this failure resulted, made military, revolutionary success impossible for the rebels in Oruro, as well as both Amaru and Katari.

Conclusions

The Great Rebellion failed militarily, as both Amaru and Katari were executed and their movements practically defeated within a year after their respective beginnings. This military failure was at least partially and perhaps principally the result of a political failure to keep the various ideological strands found within different ethnicities and
classes in the Andes united against the oppressive Spanish colonial power. There were, in fact, two great rebellions during this time, each with its own distinct ideology, enemies, and goals. These rebellious groups did not simply become disjointed or unorganized as a result of the failure to maintain unity; they instead became fundamentally and violently opposed to each other and the revolutionary movement against colonial Spain became a civil war between the Europeanized upper class and the radical indigenous peasantry. The political failure to preclude this transition from revolution to civil war prevented the various classes and ethnicities oppressed by the corrupt and exploitative Spanish power from achieving military success against their common enemy.

The rebellious Europeans and Europeanized upper classes, including creoles, mestizo traders and indigenous nobility, fought to reform the colonial system. The Bourbon reforms had caused a crisis in the cacicazgo system and radically shifted the balance of power between European and indigenous colonial leaders and bureaucrats. Principal among the reforms sought by these indigenous nobles and caciques was ending the reparto de mercancias and removing corrupt and exploitative corregidores, thereby restoring their economic and political power. Furthermore, newly raised taxes, newly implemented customs, and the division of the Viceroyalty of Peru from the Viceroyalty of La Plata took a severe economic toll on other members of the upper class. The numerous riots and revolts before 1780, as well as Tupamarista propaganda directed toward these Europeanized, upper class groups, show economic reformism as the primary goal for their rebellion against colonial Spain.

The ideology of these reformist revolutionaries is also notable for what it did not seek to accomplish. Though, like all contemporary armies, Amaru’s movement was
multi-ethnic, the leadership consisted almost entirely of members of the acculturated upper classes. The colonial racial hierarchy was wholly maintained in the Tupamarista army. In fact, before the *caciques* of Peru had made their loyalties clear, indigenous Incan nationalism was absent from Amaru's rhetoric, which instead focused on his alleged loyalty to the King of Spain, who had entrusted him with eradicating the corruption of current colonial rule. The Europeanized upper classes that led the Tupamarista movement were not seeking to radically alter the racial hierarchy of the Andes. Similarly, Amaru and Tupamarista leaders did not seek to fundamentally change the orthodox Catholicism of the Andes or the power structures of the Church. Amaru instead sought to expel the heretical and spiritually corrupt colonial functionaries, such as the *corregidores*, and thereby purify the practice of traditional Catholicism. Indeed, Amaru’s movement, as it was led by the upper classes, was so religiously conservative that some Catholic priests even supported Amaru despite his excommunication.

The second principal strand of the rebellion was far more radical and was found almost exclusively within the Andean indigenous peasantry. This group was far less Europeanized and remained largely culturally separate from their colonial rulers. This cultural difference was manifest in the vast ideological divide between the upper class and peasant rebellious groups. Though there was great variance of specific belief, especially between the Quechua and Aymara populations, there was a traceable religious conception of the revolt common throughout both cultures and locations. This religious-historical understanding cast the rebellion as a *pachacuti*: the chaotic, violent pinnacle of a historical cycle that would ultimately purge the land of evil and instate a new era of Inca-led social harmony. In this understanding, the Spaniards were representatives of
Jesus Christ, who had become widely regarded by indigenous peoples as the ruler of the underworld. Due to Spanish exploitation of indigenous labor, widespread violence, and repression, they soon became seen as demons that required expulsion in the *pachacuti*. This ideology was apparent in the independent actions of peasants under Amaru and in the official practice of the Katarista movement.

These two ideologies were not only different, but also fundamentally opposed in several important ways. Firstly, and most importantly, rebellious peasants saw the members of the reformist revolutionary groups as being their enemy, as peasants rarely differentiated between the Europeanized and the European. Similarly, the indigenous peasantry, especially under Katari, often saw simply owning land and being wealthy as a sign of evil or corruption. As many reformist creoles, mestizos, and indigenous nobles were members of the wealthy, landowning class, this radical economic position posed a serious threat to their security and power. Thirdly, the peasantry’s religious views were primarily local and indigenous while those of the upper classes were primarily Catholic in the traditional, European sense. This difference became untenable when indigenous forces began widespread attacks of churches and priests.

These ideological differences led the indigenous peasantry to revolt against the institutions that gave power to Europeanized upper classes. Recognizing this, in both Peru and Bolivia the upper classes almost universally aligned themselves against the rebellious armies and with colonial Spain despite their reformist tendencies. In Oruro, a perfect case study displaying this trend, creoles and mestizos who had already rebelled against the corrupt *corregidor* became decorated leaders of the colonial army against the radical, peasant forces that lay siege to the city. In the face of this loyalty, Amaru soon
abandoned his hope of attracting the more conservative upper class and began truly embracing the Incan nationalism of the peasantry. Similarly, Katari allowed the radicalism of the peasantry, especially its genocidal component, to wholly define his movement. The rebellion, therefore, swiftly became a civil war between the relatively conservative, Europeanized upper classes and the radical indigenous peasantry. Without the material and technical support of these classes, and, indeed, being forced to fight them, the rebellious forces could not hope to succeed.

The Great Rebellion was a complex and layered conflict that is not easily broken down into two easily defined, opposing sides. It was simultaneously a war between the colonized and the colonialists, the countryside and city, and the peasantry and the upper class. Also, and perhaps most importantly, it was a clash between two ancient cultural traditions and understandings, each with roots on opposite sides of the Atlantic that had become inextricably intertwined but in the new Latin American context. These clashes, clearly visible in the Great Rebellion, are some of those that have defined South American and especially Andean history from the first conquests of the Spaniards to the election of Evo Morales in Bolivia. In the case of the Great Rebellion, the original, reformist conflict between the colonized and the colonialists allowed a plethora of other, more radical conflicts to surface. These secondary clashes between indigenous peasant and Europeanized upper class ideologies quickly overwhelmed the original conflict, creating a new war with a new set of belligerents and causing the 1780-82 insurgency against Spain to fail in terms of the military goal of toppling the colonial state. Independence from Spain would ultimately arrive under vastly different circumstances in the nineteenth-century.
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**Primary Source Bibliography**

