PREJUDICE AND PATRIOTISM:
FREDERICK STOCK, ANTI-GERMANISM, AND AMERICAN MUSIC IN WORLD WAR I

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ABSTRACT

In this thesis, I am examining the anti-German sentiment that swept through American society during World War I, with a focus on its impact on the classical music community. When the United States entered the fighting in 1917, the government had to create a sense of purpose, unity, and national identity among the public in order to organize an effective war effort and overcome the country’s lack of both preparation and compelling reasons to be involved in the conflict at all. To achieve this, the new Committee on Public Information organized a large-scale propaganda campaign to encourage a combination of unwavering nationalism and fear of the enemy, specifically the Germans. The propaganda was effective to the point where extreme paranoia took over the nation, and people began to stigmatize anything that was even remotely connected with Germany. In addition, the government and its propaganda created such a conformist environment that dissenters of any kind, German or otherwise, faced persecution and incarceration. Laws passed during that time took away many basic civil liberties such as freedom of speech and right to privacy, so it was even easier to identify and catch anybody who was even remotely critical of the war or the United States in general.

At the same time, music had become intertwined with wartime politics and could not escape the irrational prejudice that had pervaded the nation. Germany had traditionally provided the greatest influence of any country on the development of a musical identity in the United States, but in the war, many Americans chose to link its artistic identity with its politics and militarism. It was part of a larger, ongoing debate about whether music should even be politicized at all, or simply valued for its trans-national, emotional, aesthetic qualities; in this case, however, American music was connected too closely with nationalism to be treated as separate from the war. As a result, some cities and communities banned music by German composers, and many enemy alien performers and conductors were suspected of working against the United States.

I am specifically looking at Frederick Stock, conductor of the Chicago Symphony Orchestra, as a case study of these larger issues in the war. Because he was born in Germany, he faced attacks and accusations of disloyalty by the press and public, and eventually had to resign until he could attain American citizenship. In reality, however, he had lived in the United States for over twenty years and was considered patriotic and trustworthy by the people who knew and worked with him. It is his nationalist record that makes him a compelling case study of issues such as conformity, propaganda, civil liberties, prejudice, and the role of music in the war. On the one hand, the fact that he faced persecution at all demonstrates the irrational extremes that anti-Germanism had reached. Even an official investigation had concluded that he was innocent, but that verdict did not stop newspapers from continuing to question his loyalty. On the other hand, it is important to note that Stock was luckier than many of his German-born contemporaries, who were arrested and interned. In a time when people’s statements could be used against them easily and nationalism was more important than aesthetics, Stock’s supporters succeeded in defending him as a patriotic American, not just a talented conductor. As a result, his story demonstrates the many complexities of life on the World War I home front.
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INTRODUCTION

During World War I, the United States was caught up in a wave of nationalism and anti-German sentiment that affected all aspects of society from legal rights to basic, everyday life. Anybody who was originally from Germany or dissented against popular opinion, or both, was especially vulnerable to discrimination by the government, its wartime propaganda, and the general public. In addition, anything with a German influence was stigmatized as part of the general paranoia throughout the nation. The American classical music community, which had developed in the past century under German leadership and traditions, was especially vulnerable. People in orchestras across the country were affected not only because they had to defend many of the standard works they performed, but also because so many members were classified as alien enemies in the war and were persecuted accordingly. In a society that had become so prejudiced, people’s personal loyalties were not always sufficient against an overwhelming suspicion of Germany and anything even remotely connected to it.

One victim of the hysteria was Frederick Stock, conductor of the Chicago Symphony Orchestra. He had lived in the United States for over two decades and was highly respected for his work and encouragement of American music, yet once the nation entered the war, what mattered to most newspapers was that he was originally born in Germany. Due to an oversight, he had never completed the naturalization process; the fact that he was still technically a German citizen was reason enough for many reporters and their readers to suspect him of disloyalty. As attacks and accusations heightened, he was eventually forced to resign from his position until he could return with proper American citizenship.

Stock’s story stands out among the many instances of German-born musicians, and to a lesser degree Austro-Hungarian as well, because it has certain unique complexities that relate to
the importance of patriotism at the time. When other prominent alien musicians were being
arrested, interned, and deported, he was more fortunate because he merely had to step aside for
several months. In addition, he consistently maintained a strong group of supporters. It is the
fact that he was so lucky, comparatively speaking, that raises questions about politics and culture
in the United States during the war.

The Field: An Interdisciplinary Perspective

Historians have traditionally kept their own work separate from cultural fields such as
musicology, and vice versa. Most World War I studies therefore focus on the military, political,
and social issues, only citing music history occasionally if it provided relevant anecdotes or
supporting details. The main reason for that separation is usually unfamiliarity; most historians
have not seen themselves as qualified to analyze music itself and detect its abstract meanings.
They therefore prefer to leave it to musicologists and avoid having to examine its links to their
studies themselves, even when it is, in fact, extremely relevant.1 Similarly, decades of American
musicology barely looked at World War I history except as a transition period that affected what
had previously been such a German-dominated musical identity. The majority of musicologists
otherwise used the equivalent argument that history was not their field so they were therefore not
equipped to study it. As a result, most studies of music and World War I have remained in
separate categories, with very little overlap.

Recently, more musicologists have begun to recognize the importance of examining the
general history behind music, to better understand the performers, styles, and composers they

1 Scott Denham, Irene Kacandes, Jonathan Petropoulos, ed., A User’s Guide to German Cultural Studies (Ann
study. After all, the performing arts are often interconnected with the political climate and social issues of the day. Most historical studies still do not look at that connection closely enough, however. An important reason is that World War I is often an overlooked period in United States history in the first place. It had been so unexpectedly traumatic that most Americans had wanted to move past it as quickly as possible starting in the 1920s; subsequently, it was overshadowed by the Great Depression and World War II. Many twentieth-century historians have therefore studied it primarily as a catalyst for the events that followed. In addition, it took decades for most of the World War I studies that were conducted to move past military and political history and examine the cultural side at all. More recently, writings such as Glenn Watkin’s *Proof Through the Night: Music and the Great War* finally began to examine the relationships that could exist between musicology and World War I. Watkins examines the role of music in most of the major countries involved in the war and presents a solid case for music as one of the most important categories of cultural history. Most importantly, Watkins demonstrates time and again how music was related to the political and social issues during the war, from its usefulness as a propaganda tool to underlying cultural competitions that had helped fuel resentments between the conflicting nations in the first place. Meanwhile, Joseph Horowitz has incorporated considerably more history than most of his predecessors into a wide variety of studies on American music in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In his books, notably *Classical Music in America: A History of its Rise and Fall*, he recognizes and analyzes the close links between music and the surrounding social and political climate.

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2 Ibid.
With this work, I am following the example set by Watkins and Horowitz, but am applying it more specifically than the former, focusing primarily on American orchestral music. By focusing on World War I, I am also bringing greater depth to what has largely remained overlooked by Horowitz, except as a transition between the music of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. As I bring the subject forward, I study the World War I home front by looking at performers and their concert programs, finding a variety of important connections with broader historic issues in the process. Stock himself has usually been overlooked by World War I historians and musicologists alike, because his experience was significantly less dramatic than that of many German-born musicians and other civilians, many of whom were actually arrested, interned, and in some cases deported. However, analyzing him in-depth has brought up many links with life and society on the home front in general, including news reporting, people’s lack of privacy, and the uniform national identity that was being imposed upon Americans. His story also exemplifies how interconnected music and politics had inevitably become in the war. Such links are more subtle but still very important.

Along with my musical case study, I am also incorporating other topics within the World War I field in order to examine those links. Most important, I have found ways of relating it to the subjects of propaganda and civil liberties. Studies of both issues, especially the latter, gained momentum in the mid-twentieth century, thanks in large part to heightened awareness of the public conformity created by both the first and second world wars and the extent to which people had been deprived of some of their most basic constitutional rights. To some extent it took a combination of the aftermath of Joseph McCarthy’s infamous campaign against Communism, the activism of the Civil Rights Movement, and anti-Vietnam War protests to make historians

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more sensitive to such issues. In addition, federal records from World War I only became accessible to researchers in the 1950s, providing a new wealth of information about official activities that had been previously unknown.\(^6\) Enough work has now been done to the point where I can take those topics and link them with my own in ways that give all of them added depth.

**Sources**

The majority of my primary source material focuses specifically on Stock, as my case study. Most important are the wartime files from the Rosenthal Archives at the Chicago Symphony Orchestra. They had preserved Stock’s correspondence, public statements, naturalization application papers, newspaper clippings, and biographical information, providing a rich documentation of his World War I experiences. The files also contained various letters to and from the managers and trustees, discussing specific controversies related to Stock and the concert programs he conducted. In addition, I have accumulated a wide variety of newspaper articles as part of my study of war propaganda. Many are from Chicago papers, especially *The Chicago Tribune*’s archives, but others are from an assortment of other publications across the country, including journals for the music community such as *Musical America* and also major national newspapers such as *The New York Times* and *The Boston Globe*. I accessed most of the articles by browsing online databases and archives, but others come from quotations and citations in secondary sources. They provided my study with a wider nationwide context that extended it far beyond Stock’s experience in Chicago alone. Finally, I found examples of official propaganda released during the war and records of major speeches from published

collections in order to further research the broader issues of anti-Germanism and nationalism during the war.

In this thesis, I will be using my sources to address what made Stock’s position different, why he maintained as much support as he did, and how that was interconnected with the nationalistic fervor that had taken over both the government and the general public. I am also examining Stock’s experience as a case study of larger issues on the American home front, namely propaganda, conformity, prejudice, civil liberties, and the role of musical culture. These are themes that can be found over and over throughout history, but the conditions of wartime in general, and especially World War I, made them more extreme than in most ordinary times of peace. It was a complicated, traumatic war for everybody involved, and the United States had a hard time defining its reasons for fighting at all. It therefore felt an increased pressure to compensate by bringing the country together in a solid war effort. The strategy that proved most effective was the manufacturing of fear, hatred of the enemy, and a uniform definition of how to be a loyal American. As a result, the war brought the largest-scale official propaganda campaign to have been organized in the United States up to that time. It was also a time when constitutional rights such as freedom of speech and privacy were largely ignored, as people could be arrested and imprisoned for any comment or action deemed even remotely unpatriotic. With Germany being cast as a threat to humanity that must be defeated at all costs, not only enemy aliens but dissenters of any race or nationality could be targeted under the accusation that they were supporting the enemy and its campaign to conquer the entire world.

Adhering to those strict levels of conformity that the government and its propaganda teams imposed meant that people were judged first and foremost for their patriotism. That, in turn, made its way into the ongoing debate about whether music should be regarded as connected
with or separate from politics. The subject had been raised years earlier and, since then, has continued to be discussed up through today. Supporting German music and musicians just for the sake of aesthetics was much harder in wartime. After all, the performing arts were being politicized along with nearly everything else in society. I am therefore looking at the ways patriotism influenced that debate and could, in turn, help the cause of somebody like Stock more than others who faced similar dilemmas.

I will be organizing my study into four main sections. First, I am examining the general background in the years leading up to the Americans’ entry into the war. My main themes in that section are the buildup of anti-German sentiment and propaganda, both in the United States and Western Europe, and the connections with musical culture. The second section focuses on the time period from 1917 to 1919, when the United States had joined the conflict. I will discuss the official propaganda campaigns, links between music and general prejudice against Germany, limitations on civil liberties, and life on the home front for enemy aliens, dissenters, and the American public in general. My third section focuses on Stock specifically, examining his wartime experience and the reasons for the opposing kinds of treatment he received, both attack and support. Fourth, I will connect his case study to the larger national and international contexts; on a national level I analyze how Stock fared in comparison to other enemy alien musicians, and internationally, I look at how the other Allies regarded anti-Germanism in American music and how that reflected the United States’ overall position in the war.
SECTION I: WORLD WAR I BACKGROUND, PRE-1917

Germany’s reputation in the United States became increasingly complicated and multidimensional during the years leading up to the war. Traditionally, it was admired for its cultural heritage, which had influenced many Americans for decades. It had been considered one of the most influential centers of music, philosophy, literature, and education for most of the nineteenth century. The German-American population was one of the largest, most prosperous ethnicities in the United States, second only to the Anglo-Americans. While its members usually adapted well to American life and society, they also remained one of the most vocal immigrant groups of the time. Until the United States entered the war, they were noted for their pride in their culture’s accomplishments and for their confidence in its superiority.

Germans in Chicago

As a young nation, the United States’ music community was still developing at the end of the nineteenth century, and Germany extended the greatest influence. German conductors and musicians dominated most American orchestras, and concert programs contained a majority of works by German composers. Chicago was no exception; it had a large ethnic population that contributed heavily to its artistic identity. Less than twenty years after it was founded in 1833, it had developed a strong enough reputation as a growing industrial and transportation hub to start attracting a wave of immigrants from Europe, especially Germany. Many were radicals, forced to flee after the failed revolutions of 1848. They established a strong ethnic identity in the city and applied their radicalism to industrial and political issues over the following decades,

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8 Frederick C. Luebke, Bonds of Loyalty: German-Americans and World War I (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 1974), 47.
initiating and organizing much of the labor unrest that took place in the latter half of the century. The most notable example was the deadly Haymarket riots for better work conditions in May 1886; of the eight men who were subsequently arrested and tried, six were either German immigrants or of German descent. As the nineteenth century came to a close, however, a split was forming in Chicago’s ethnic German population with the growth of a new middle class alongside the labor organizers and anarchists. Members of this new sector preferred to be identified with bourgeois American values and distanced themselves from their fellow Germans in the radical working class. They took pride in their heritage for cultural reasons, but otherwise preferred to assimilate into Anglo-American society.\(^9\)

It was this growing German-American bourgeoisie that spurred Chicago’s artistic development. Their most notable contributions could be found in the Chicago Symphony Orchestra, created in 1891 by the German-born Theodore Thomas. The majority of its early musicians were from Germany as well, and Stock was regarded as a natural choice to succeed Thomas as the director in 1905, based on his musical training, standards, and conducting style. Even the rehearsals were conducted in German until 1914, because it was the most commonly-understood language among the members.\(^10\) However, the orchestra had a class-based identity as much as an ethnic one. The audience it aimed to attract included only a portion of Chicago’s total German population, because radicals and laborers did not have the social standing its members and managers wanted. Rather, the orchestra and other new cultural institutions helped make the German contribution to the city look more respectable, improving their image as they entered the twentieth century.\(^11\)

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\(^10\) Ibid, 101.

\(^11\) Ibid, 102.
Changing German-American Relations

However, other prejudices had already begun developing since the late nineteenth century, even as Germany’s artistic and intellectual reputation remained high in the years before American involvement in World War I. Admiration for the German music and intellect had not been enough to create the same close bond with Germany that the United States had established with other European nations, particularly Great Britain. Many Americans still had a strong sense of English heritage, which influenced their sympathies as they witnessed tensions arise between different European powers. Meanwhile, the American government and newspapers were beginning to describe Germany itself as a potential threat by the early twentieth century. During the 1880s, both Germany and the United States had sought to expand their economic and imperial power, after most other world powers of the time had already established their empires. The two newcomer nations therefore became rivals for any remaining trade opportunities and colonies they could find, and by the late 1890s, their competition turned confrontational.

For instance, Germany’s imperial aims in the Pacific became clear during the Spanish-American War in 1898, after the American fleet under Commodore George Dewey destroyed the Spanish fleet in the Philippines and set up a blockade around the port of Manila. Warships from France, Britain, Japan, and Germany soon appeared, and while the first three observed blockade protocol and did not intrude, the latter did not always recognize American authority; rather, the Germans anchored where they wanted and even interfered in a Philippine rebel operation against the Spanish. At the end of the war on December 10, 1898, one of the justifications Americans used for keeping the islands as a colony was that otherwise they would fall prey to another

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13 Ibid, 135.
empire, specifically Germany. Subsequently, the Germans reinforced their presence in the Pacific in February 1899, when the Kaiser purchased all of Spain’s remaining Pacific colonies except for Guam, which the United States had already seized.15

An even more controversial incident occurred in Venezuela in 1902, which both worsened American relations with Germany and strengthened its ties with Britain. Venezuela, under dictator Cipriano Castro, was unable to repay large foreign debts, and in December 1902, Britain and Germany finally sent ships to collect their debts. After they blockaded La Guaira, the port of Caracas, seized several Venezuelan gunboats, and fired on forts at Puerto Cabello, Castro capitulated and requested American arbitration to find a resolution. The blockade continued during negotiations, but while the British cooperated and tried to work toward a settlement, the Germans did not; they refused to yield from their original position and even destroyed a Venezuelan fort at San Carlos on January 21. While the Manila Bay incident had only been reported minimally in the United States, the attacks on Venezuela caused widespread outrage; what angered Americans most was that the Germans had pushed the limits of the Monroe Doctrine. One long-term result of the Venezuelan incident was that Anglo-American ties improved when the British cooperated with the United States and Venezuela.16 At the same time, Americans increasingly saw Germany as more of a military threat than a cultural icon.17

Germany’s reputation also suffered due to instances that did not directly involve the United States, but which Americans read about nonetheless. One of the most controversial was during the Boxer Rebellion in China in 1900. Shortly before the army departed to help fight the uprising, Kaiser Wilhelm II gave instructions that inspired even more stereotypes among the

15 Ibid, 318.
16 William N Tilchin, 31-35.
17 Barclay and Glaser-Schmidt, Transatlantic Images and Perceptions, 135.
international press: “Be as terrible as Attila’s Huns.”\textsuperscript{18} German troops were subsequently criticized for their intensity in that campaign, more than the other nations involved. Reporters capitalized on the kaiser’s speech and adopted the term “Hun,” foreshadowing the days when it would become one of the Allies’ most popular nicknames for them in World War I.\textsuperscript{19}

Another new stereotype that would later be used in the war was the concept of \textit{Kultur}. A traditional German word that refers to any part of life in that country, its similarity to “culture” prompted many misunderstandings among most English speakers, who automatically assumed that the two words were synonymous. Since the latter word mainly refers to artistic and intellectual tradition, rather than total identity, \textit{kultur} was a confusing concept. English translations of German writings and speeches usually recognized its difference from “culture” and kept it in its original form, but many American readers still had difficulty understanding it; when they assumed that the word referred to the arts and intellect, they wondered how the Germans had managed to connect it with military power.\textsuperscript{20} People recognized and agreed that “culture” as they knew it was different from the German \textit{kultur}, but it was harder for them to define what the specific difference was. Although associating militarism with music, art, and thought did not necessarily make sense, many people went on to use that interpretation to an extreme once they became caught up in wartime prejudices.

\textbf{Prewar Europe}

Meanwhile, music began to inspire resentment and competition when it was viewed in relation to the balance of international power, which grew increasingly precarious in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Germany’s cultural dominance became increasingly

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid, 147.\textsuperscript{19} Ibid, 136.\textsuperscript{20} Ibid, 147.
threatening to its major European rivals in the process, particularly Britain and France. Several decades earlier, the German Empire had officially unified following its victory in the Franco-Prussian War from 1870 to 1871, simultaneously setting itself up as the leading industrial and military power of continental Europe. Its competitors therefore found subtle new reasons to resent the traditional German superiority in fields such as music, which it had established long before and reinforced throughout the Romantic Period. France in particular became motivated to assert itself as a legitimate alternative to the complexities and heaviness that had developed in German music under the Wagnerian influence. It developed a purer, simpler style that became known as its national tradition by the turn of the twentieth century but was, in reality, a recent nationalist creation. Both Germany and France also tried to argue that they were the heirs to the musical standards that Beethoven had set at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The Franco-Prussian War had coincided with the hundred-year anniversary of Beethoven’s birth, so for their own nationalist aims, the two competitors seized upon his enduring image as the quintessential great artist. In other words, music was already being utilized for political purposes many decades before World War I.

Well into the 1910s, Germany’s musical reputation remained one of the strongest in the world. The British may have controlled the largest empire of the time but aside from the rise of Edward Elgar, they had not contributed very many major works. Meanwhile, the French had finally begun to produce a significant group of composers at the turn of the century, such as Maurice Ravel, Claude Debussy, and transplanted Belgian native César Franck, to set themselves

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up as a new creative musical force.\textsuperscript{25} German cultural dominance took on even greater symbolic meaning as political and military tensions with Germany worsened. Britain and France felt increasingly threatened as they watched the Germans surpass them in other fields by the twentieth century, such as science and industry. The more Germany developed, the more its rivals realized how precarious their own positions were. As Watkins analyzes their complex relationship,

> The admiration of the French and British for German philosophy, science, and literature...could be counterbalanced by Germany’s recognition of Anglo-French political stability and, among other things, France’s dominance in the world of taste. Yet it was understood that under the appropriate sponsorship each of these positives could be transformed into a negative. Especially unsettling was the recognition that if the equivalent of Kultur in these countries were reduced to the prevailing state of music, the balance of power would shift dramatically.\textsuperscript{26}

In other words, Germany’s rivals could appreciate its musical contributions more easily when they had clear advantages of their own, as opposed to when it began competing with them in those other areas as well. Music turned into an indicator of the world dominance that the Germans appeared to be striving for on military and economic levels.

**The Early War Years, 1914-1917**

When World War I began in Europe in August of 1914, the basis for anti-German sentiment was already in place in American society after decades of competition. The Allies capitalized on that almost immediately. Both sides recognized the importance the United States could play in the conflict, with its resources and industrial power, so they began what has been

\textsuperscript{25} Van Vechten, *Music After the Great War*, 12.
\textsuperscript{26} Watkins, *Proof Through the Night*, 4-5.
called “the first modern propaganda war” to win the support of the American government and public. In fact, the British army’s very first act in the entire war was to cut Germany’s international cable lines; they therefore had more control over the information that was sent across the Atlantic Ocean. The Germans countered by setting up an Information Bureau and various other organizations in the United States to distribute their own propaganda. Each side used the same general themes of claiming a stronger bond with Americans, blaming the other for the war, and describing the atrocities the other had committed. However, it soon became clear that the British had developed the art of propaganda much better than the Germans. The latter did not fully understand how to appeal to the American public; as Count Johann Heinrich von Bernstorff, German ambassador to Washington, complained, “He [the American] is not interested in learning the ‘truth,’ which the German press news and written clarifications tried to bring across to him. The American wants to come to his own judgment and, therefore, wants facts only.” German propaganda glorified its purpose in the war and criticized the Allies, but in a style that most Americans did not relate to as naturally as that of the British.

More important, the British were publicizing stories of German atrocities in Belgium and France. They had already developed an extensive propaganda campaign to convince their own public of their purpose in the war, and they sent the same messages across the Atlantic. The turn-of-the-century “Hun” nickname was renewed, portraying the army as a group of inhuman brutes who tortured and killed innocent civilians without mercy. Newspaper articles, pamphlets, and posters throughout the United States depicted children being mutilated, nuns raped, babies

29 Epstein, “German and English Propaganda.”
30 Ibid.
bayoneted, and homes pillaged and burned. Hearing so many lurid stories, it was easy for people to overlook the fact that the German army was actually one of the most disciplined in the world, and that most of the supposedly eyewitness accounts were unsubstantiated rumors. Germany attempted to counter the accusations in 1915 with a “White Book” that detailed actions against its troops by Allied soldiers and civilians; however, it seemed defensive and unconvincing in comparison. The British had cast them as the brutal invaders first, and the Germans did not have a sufficient comeback. In addition, British propaganda had some basis in fact, which Germany itself could not entirely deny. Even though the German invasions were not actually as horrific as they were said to be, they were still more brutal than any of the other countries’ campaigns.

Over the following years, the German army and government did not help their own cause. They steadily antagonized the United States with actions such as the sinking of the *Lusitania* in 1915 and general submarine warfare against American ships. As a result, their propaganda usually focused on trying to justify their actions, which made it seem weak and ineffective next to the horrific stories Britain continued to popularize. Finally, British spies intercepted the Zimmermann telegram in 1917, in which Germany requested an alliance with Mexico. If the Mexican government agreed, Germany promised that it could regain its former territories that it had lost to the United States in the nineteenth century. Once they passed the information to the United States government and news of the telegram was released to the American public, it sparked an outrage beyond what attacks at sea had ever caused. It was the most blatantly hostile

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32 Ibid, 61.
34 Epstein, “German and English Propaganda.”
move Germany had made against the United States, making it clear that their neutrality was
gone.\textsuperscript{35}

Even though the United States remained neutral until 1917, German supporters and
pacifist groups had recognized much earlier that a growing majority in the public and
government already sympathized with the Allies. In addition to the propaganda supplied by
Britain, private American groups organized their own “preparedness” campaign to get ready to
join the war against Germany. Big business circles capitalized on the war by funding the
campaign and linking it with patriotism. They also profited from private shipments of supplies
overseas to Allied countries.\textsuperscript{36} In addition, a growing majority in American society identified
with the British as a way of embracing its own descent. For several decades, rising immigration
from non-Western European nations had triggered a rise in xenophobia and nativism, as “old-
stock Americans”\textsuperscript{37} feared their national identity would fall apart. Their Anglo-European
heritage therefore had even more significance when the war began, and a central part of the
preparedness movement was the belief that the nation had to become as uniformly “American”
as possible. Germans had fit in to the racist identity originally, when the prejudice was race-
based and aimed at non-Northwestern Europeans; however, it then transformed in the war into a
different sort of identity. Then, a new fear of Germany’s influence developed based on the
tensions that had been building with Germany since the end of the nineteenth century. The racist
element of xenophobia went away and was replaced by the demand that people identify
themselves unwaveringly as Americans. Former president Theodore Roosevelt, who had
become vehemently anti-German in recent years, popularized a campaign for “one hundred

\textsuperscript{36} Stewart Halsey Ross, \textit{Propaganda for War: How the United States was Conditioned to Fight the Great War of
\textsuperscript{37} David M. Kennedy, \textit{Over Here: The First World War and American Society} (New York: Oxford University Press,
percent Americanism,” declaring that people could not be true citizens unless they turned away from their previous ethnicities entirely and defined themselves solely as American; his campaign specifically targeted the Germans in the United States. They had become the “evil enemies of America, the hyphenated Americans.”

In the government, meanwhile, President Woodrow Wilson also sympathized with the Allies from the very beginning. Despite spending nearly three years proclaiming neutrality and winning reelection in 1916 under a campaign slogan of “With honor, he kept us out of war,” he was simply waiting for a strong enough majority of Americans to support entering the conflict before taking official action. Publicly, he declared in August 1914 that “We must be impartial in thought as well as in action, must put a curb upon our sentiments as well as upon every transaction that might be constructed as a preference of one part to the struggle before another.” Privately, however, he expressed his actual fears that same month in a private letter to his close friend and chief of foreign policy, Edward Mandell House: “If Germany won, it would change the course of our civilization and make the United States a military nation.”

Most Americans did not consciously realize how biased their government’s position actually was, and took their neutrality for granted. As more people absorbed the propaganda around them, however, they helped reinforce those fears of what German victory would mean for the nation and the world in general.

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39 Ross, Propaganda for War, 146.
40 Ibid, 145.
41 Ibid.
SECTION II: THE UNITED STATES AT WAR, 1917-1919

On April 6, 1917, the United States officially declared war on Germany. Over the next nineteen months until the Armistice, the German-dominated world of American music found itself caught in the middle of the conflict as anti-German wartime fervor spread through the home front. The United States’ position was unlike that in any other war they had ever experienced, mainly because the fighting was so far removed; unlike the Europeans whose home countries had become battlefields, America’s borders had not been attacked or invaded. Torpedoed ships, British sympathies, and the Zimmermann Telegram notwithstanding, the United States had a hard time explaining why it needed to join the war at all. The majority of Americans therefore would not see any urgent need to contribute to the war until the government found a way to persuade them otherwise. Although sympathy for the Allies and dislike of Germany had been building, the United States was accustomed to being neutral onlookers in the war; therefore, some of the population was still vocally opposed to entering what was regarded as a European conflict. Moreover, most of the people who supported it naively failed to consider that the Allies would need them to send a substantial army overseas. Actually being expected to fight was a matter that many Americans, citizens and government alike, had never fully appreciated. The American army was small and inadequately trained, not enough people would enlist to enlarge it without heavy persuasion, and Congress vehemently opposed the idea of a draft when Wilson first proposed it. Some members were old enough to remember the horrors of the Civil War, and others simply did not believe that conscription was either appropriate or necessary. The Wilson administration therefore realized it had to work harder to

42 Kennedy, Over Here, 20.
43 Harries and Harries, The Last Days of Innocence: America at War, 164.
get the public support it would need to help win the war. Throughout his career, Wilson had never been comfortable with the usual American technique of manipulating the political system by establishing support networks within one’s party or Congress. Much of Wilson’s political success had instead come from his abilities to shape and appeal to public opinion.46 Even though he was confident that enough people supported American involvement by the time he declared war, he knew that he would need more than just casual popular support. He therefore sought to create a sense of purpose and a need to fight, especially so that the government could encourage people to volunteer and justify potentially-controversial actions such as conscription as part of a larger, noble cause.47

CPI Propaganda

For that purpose, Wilson organized the Committee on Public Information (CPI) under the leadership of journalist and long-time ally George Creel. The CPI had two main responsibilities, managing the press and encouraging public support. British and German propaganda had sent conflicting messages for three years, and even though the former had been more effective, Creel still feared that not enough Americans had been persuaded to support the Allies. He was therefore determined to instill a uniform sense of purpose and patriotism in the population.48 In his own words, the country could not just have “mere surface unity, but a passionate belief in the justice of America’s cause that should weld the people of the United States into one white-hot mass instinct with fraternity, devotion, courage, and deathless determination.”49 Creel and the

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48 Ibid.
CPI worked to create that “passionate belief” through heavy propaganda and careful monitoring of the war news released to the public. They issued books, pamphlets, posters, and films; they organized rallies and speeches; and they advertised constantly for donations and volunteers.

Wilson and Creel developed a two-part propaganda system to compensate for not having the usual incentives to fight, such as invasion, a nearby enemy, or even any concrete goals to motivate them toward victory. One part inspired fervent patriotism, with tools such as patriotic songs, stories of the country’s history, and glorification of the flag. The other part instilled a sense of fear on the home front,50 because Americans were more likely to feel a personal connection to the war if they believed Germany posed a legitimate threat to their nation if it won. Creel also realized that hatred was one of the easiest feelings to create among the masses because it required so little analysis: “There is a simplicity about hate that makes it peculiarly attractive to a certain type of mind. It makes no demand on the mental processes, it does not require reading or thinking…and by reason of its instant removal of every doubt it gives an effect of decision, a sense of well-being.”51 Therefore, much of the CPI’s propaganda reinforced the image of the barbaric “Hun,” established Germany as the antithesis of the United States in every way, and convinced people that spies and conspiracies were already infiltrating the nation. One of their most important techniques was bringing the British and French stigmatization of kultur to a new level, making it part of a larger German plot to take over the entire world. In the process, German culture and traditions, which had been so influential in the United States, became synonymous with war and invasion.

Included in the CPI’s anti-kultur propaganda was its “Red, White, and Blue” series of small, pamphlet-style books, distributed among millions of Americans until the end of the war.

50 Harries and Harries, The Last Days of Innocence, 293.
51 Creel, How We Advertised America, 169.
Their main purpose, according to Creel, was to “tear the mask of civilization and modernity from the medievally minded, medievally organized Prussian militaristic state that was dominating Germany and Central Europe and threatening the world.”\textsuperscript{52} One prominent example was \textit{Conquest and Kultur: Aims of the Germans in Their Own Words}, a collection of quotes from various speeches, sermons, writings, etc. from recent decades which demonstrated to the public how and why German culture should be feared. It was designed to portray Germany as a bloodthirsty, power-obsessed nation that was using its perceived cultural superiority as the first step toward military, political, and racial dominance across the world, including in the United States. The book was compiled by Wallace Notestein and Elmer E. Stoll, respectively professors of English at the University of Michigan and Harvard University. Both had German backgrounds as well, and Stoll, who had studied in Berlin and Munich at the turn of the century, did the majority of the translations.\textsuperscript{53} Not only did they carefully select statements that would reinforce that image, but the setup of the book and their frequent editorializing made it easy for readers to understand. First, the foreword introduces the main idea that the United States and Germany had fundamental differences that had driven them to war: “America knows what it is defending. Does it as clearly understand what it is fighting against?”\textsuperscript{54} The conflict, which nobody could truly define, is simplified into “…a war between ideals and thus between the peoples who uphold them.”\textsuperscript{55}

Notestein and Stoll then organized the quotes into chapters about different aspects of Germany’s scheme for world power, including its self-image as a superior culture, love of war, and plans for taking over different regions and peoples. With headings such as “The Worship of

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{52} Ibid, 106.
  \item \textsuperscript{53} Barclay and Glaser-Schmidt, ed., \textit{Trans-Atlantic Images and Perceptions}, 141.
  \item \textsuperscript{54} Wallace Notestein and Elmer E. Stoll, \textit{Conquest and Kultur: Aims of the Germans in Their Own Words} (Washington, DC: The Committee on Public Information, 1918), 6.
  \item \textsuperscript{55} Ibid, 5.
\end{itemize}
Power,” “Germany the Ruler of Middle Europe,” “Dispossessing the Conquered,” and “Pan-Germanism and America,” the book showed people how they should automatically expect to interpret the quotes as they read them. The publishers also put certain strategic words and phrases in bold letters to draw readers’ attention to them. For instance, the “Pan-Germanism and America” section highlights a particularly fear-inducing quote by German scholar Klaus Wagner in his 1906 study of German expansion, translated as War, Investigation into a History of Political Development: “Not only North America, but the whole of America must become a bulwark of Germanic Kultur, perhaps the strongest fortress of the Germanic races.” Wagner’s book encouraged the expansion of Germany’s empire and detailed how to best deport undesirable races, among other issues. Some other quotes also included commentary to ensure that the public would appreciate them accordingly. Midway through the “Mission of Germany” collection, Notestein and Stoll note,

Since the time of Fichte the Germans have clung with growing pride to this notion that they are an original, uncontaminated race. This conception readily united with their philosophical and mystical conception of the State—or rather the Prussian or German State—not as a piece of machinery (after the American fashion, say, or the English) but as something living, almost divine. From this point of view it was only a step to the conception that they were a chosen people. They were chosen to create a new type of culture, they think, and impose it even on an unwilling world.

The quotes before and after that commentary represent Germany’s pride in its accomplishments and its belief that it was entitled, even obliged, to lead the rest of humanity. Subsequent chapters then went on to describe the German obsession with war and power. In total, the book sent an overt message that Germany’s cultural identity had become corrupted and dangerous.

An equally important but more subtle technique was the book’s use of translation. While

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56 Ibid, 29, 52, 81, 95.
58 Ibid, 14.
converting the quotes from German to English, the writers kept the word “*kultur*” in its original form. By that time, it had become so widespread in Allied propaganda it did not even require translating, but its meaning was still usually misinterpreted. *Kultur* as the German identity helped the Allied press, government, and public define who they were fighting. On the one hand, British, French, and most recently American propaganda had made it synonymous with Germany’s ruthless mission for world dominance, but it was still assumed to be synonymous with “culture” as it was defined in English. The CPI could therefore portray Germany’s long-standing contributions to the United States’ culture as part of a plot to infiltrate the nation. Notestein and Stoll were able to increase people’s fears with racist quotes from various proposals of how Germany should use the Americas after adding them to its empire. In an excerpt from Klaus Wagner’s work: “The lands will be settled upon by people of Germanic blood, the non-Germanic inhabitants being driven into reservations or at best to Africa (Morocco, Algiers, Tunis, Egypt).”60 The United States itself traditionally had problems with prejudice against non-Western Europeans, but with its changed focus during the war it was easy to ignore its own faults and judge Germany on those same grounds. It had become more important for writings like *Conquest and Kultur* to persuade Americans that accepting Germany’s influence meant acknowledging its superiority and inviting invasion.

Music soon became part of the larger fear of the enemy because of that campaign against *kultur*; after all, it was a crucial aspect of German heritage and one of its greatest sources of pride. During the nineteenth century, music had helped create and promote a sense of national identity as Germany first united as one empire.61 As Pamela Potter examines that development, “The idea of a German nation-state had to overcome a long history of political fragmentation and

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60 Ibid, 101.
regional differences, but music represented a mode of artistic expression in which all Germans could share.\textsuperscript{62} A collective pride in their heritage of great German-speaking musicians transcended state and regional boundaries.\textsuperscript{63} Iconic composers such as Beethoven, Brahms, and Wagner had become synonymous with German culture, so when that overall sense of identity became an issue in the war, music inevitably became involved.\textsuperscript{64} It was also part of the German justification for believing so strongly in its own superiority, a self-pride that the Allied press had already been attacking for years.

Americans also had to evaluate their own attitudes toward music during that time, as they faced the question of whether they should separate the arts from war. That was not a new debate; rather, people have argued it throughout the history of music. On the one hand, some people believe that instrumental music transcends political boundaries and conflicts. They contend that it is a timeless, universal language that appeals to human emotions that will inevitably inspire a different reaction for every listener but can also bind. Leon Botstein, a leading contemporary proponent of listening to music only for its aesthetic qualities, has argued, “Its seemingly abstract and self-referential logic and character permitted it to remain above the everyday and therefore the issues that ordinarily bring people into conflict.”\textsuperscript{65} Others, however, have countered that music and any other art form can be tainted by national and political origins.\textsuperscript{66} That side has been embraced for political means time and again, but naturally becomes even more dominant in wartime. As the CPI’s anti-	extit{kultur} propaganda stirred paranoia and intolerance among the general population, it could create the idea that Germany’s influence

\textsuperscript{62} Pamela Potter, \textit{Most German of the Arts: Musicology and Society from the Weimar Republic to the End of Hitler’s Reich} (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), ix.
\textsuperscript{64} Ibid, 213.
\textsuperscript{66} Ibid.
was something to be feared and avoided at all costs unless the United States wanted to become its imperial outpost for the Western Hemisphere. Germany’s music, like the rest of its culture, was assumed to be part of its overwhelmingly militaristic kultur. In the process, German music turned into the direct opposite of all American ideals, both subtly and blatantly, as the two nations themselves were cast as polar opposites in every possible way.

**The Spread of Anti-Germanism**

The CPI had early problems with some of its propaganda; for instance, they were criticized for publishing grossly-exaggerated reports of American successes in battle which had never actually taken place. However, their spread of anti-Germanism quickly proved to be their most effective tool, prompting a blind, irrational suspicion that the nation was being infiltrated with spies in preparation for an invasion. The main goal of Creel and the CPI was to inspire just enough fear of Germany to persuade Americans to support their nation and help defeat such a dangerous enemy. However, it soon became obvious that patriotism had devolved into nationwide hysteria and intolerance. Although the fighting was still distant, anti-Germanism became a way for people on the home front to make their own contribution to the war effort.

Anything and anybody of German origin became suspect, encountering prejudices on all levels of American society. Within everyday life, the paranoia ranged from the subtle to the ridiculous. Schools could no longer teach German, and various towns and cities renamed streets and buildings with suspicious names. In addition, German words and titles were replaced with “liberty”: sauerkraut became “liberty cabbage,” German measles became “liberty measles,” and

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68 Fleming, *The Illusion of Victory*, 119-120.
even German shepherds and dachshunds became Alsatians and “liberty dogs,” respectively, and were abandoned and abused at higher rates than before the war. People were also contacting the police and government regularly with unfounded fears and accusations. Most often it was because a neighbor seemed suspicious, or an outbreak of disease or accident at work inspired conspiracy theories. In the most extreme cases, some German-Americans were attacked by mobs, tarred and feathered, forced to kiss the American flag, or even lynched.

Despite the CPI’s promises “to win the struggle with facts, not hate,” it did nothing to discourage the intolerance because it was unwilling to sacrifice the fervent war support that accompanied it. James R. Mock and Cedric Larson later analyzed the hysteria in 1939, when the United States was starting to face similar issues again with the coming of the Second World War: “All of this was socially unwholesome. It was also dangerous…But the CPI was caught in a dilemma. It was forced to return again and again to the methods of arousing opinion which brought the very atmosphere of hate and fear…” For Creel and the other members, prejudice and even violence had become a price they were willing to pay for inspiring the national fervor they needed.

The Wilson administration and most of Congress also supported anti-Germanism and paranoia on the home front. Although Wilson sometimes issued statements calling for tolerance, he was more often one of the United States’ most eloquent war propagandists himself. Most of his speeches stigmatized Germans and anybody else who did not fit the proper “American” definition, encouraging even more narrow-minded conformity. He had recognized from the very

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start that the uniform public support he wanted would almost inevitably lead to overpowering discrimination, which he never made more than a weak effort to publicly denounce.\textsuperscript{74} In his Flag Day address on June 14, 1917, for instance, he blamed Germany for the entire conflict and depicted it as a menace that had “…filled our unsuspecting communities with vicious spies and conspirators and sought to corrupt the opinion of our people on their own behalf.”\textsuperscript{75} His attitude strengthened as the war continued, commenting at one point that people who would “inject the poison of disloyalty into our own most critical affairs”\textsuperscript{76} deserved no tolerance; rather, the nation ought to “teach these gentlemen once and for all that loyalty to this flag is the first test of tolerance.”\textsuperscript{77} At times when mob violence rose, he was encouraged to publicly denounce it but did not.\textsuperscript{78} By attacking the German government so vehemently, the president encouraged even more prejudice against the general German-American population.

**Legal Repressions**

The government also tightened national security and limited civil liberties. All enemy aliens faced new regulations, such as not being allowed to publish any statements against the government and being barred from living in or entering certain areas designated by the president.\textsuperscript{79} While “enemy aliens” included Austro-Hungarians as well, it was clear that Germans were the primary targets. They were regarded as the masterminds behind the entire conflict, while all other opponents were simply tools for their plan. In Wilson’s words, “Austria-Hungary was to become part of the central German Empire, absorbed and dominated by the same

\textsuperscript{74} Fleming, *The Illusion of Victory*, 135.
\textsuperscript{75} Oliver Marble Gale, ed., *Americanism: Woodrow Wilson’s Speeches on the War—Why he Made Them—and—What They Have Done* (Chicago: The Baldwin Syndicate Publishers, 1918), 56.
\textsuperscript{76} Paul L. Murphy, *World War I and the Origin of Civil Liberties in the United States* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1979), 54.
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{78} Jensen, *Price of Vigilance*, 158.
\textsuperscript{79} Panayi, *Minorities in Wartime*, 197.
forces and influences that had originally cemented the German states themselves. The dream had its heart at Berlin. It could have had a heart nowhere else!" 80 Ethnic Germans therefore faced the most restrictions and dominated federal investigations and arrests. They also made up the vast majority of detainees at the four main internment camps under the War Department. Of the 6,300 people who were confined there, approximately 4,000 were prisoners of war captured from German ships, but another 2,300 were civilians classified as “dangerous enemy aliens.” 81 Some were prominent public figures who represented Kultur, such as musicians, and whose arrest was seen as setting a public example; others were German radicals who had been accused of speaking out too forcefully against the United States. Most of them were sent to camps in Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia and Fort Douglas, Utah, where they encountered harsh discipline and continued monitoring for any disloyal comments. 82

However, new wartime legislation affected not only the ethnic German-Americans but also radicals and dissenters of any nationality. Anybody who failed to conform and threatened the United States’ uniform purpose and war effort was assumed to have been corrupted by Germany in its plots to take over the nation. 83 Pacifists, anarchists, unionists from the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), and socialists were some of the main victims; big business and conservatives embraced the chance to silence them in the name of patriotism. Anybody who supported German-Americans was also targeted. For instance, American women who had married enemy aliens were seen as proving their disloyalty and lost their rights as citizens. 84 Even intellectuals such as Randolph Bourne or Eugene Debs who analyzed the war critically were accused of disloyalty; according to one professor, “I have heard other people called pro-

80 Gale, Americanism, 58.
81 Panayi, Minorities in Wartime, 211.
82 Ibid, 211-214.
83 Panayi, Minorities in Wartime, 194.
84 Ibid, 199-200.
Germans just because they expressed the hope that the war would not last forever…” With the Espionage Act of June 1917, the government limited free speech by forbidding not only the usual release of military information to the enemy but also any general criticisms of World War I or any other war at all. Its amendment, the Sedition Act of April 1918, further expanded the definition of espionage to include any statements against the government. The wording even included “individual casual or impulsive disloyal utterance,” so that even the slightest comments could be interpreted as federal crimes.

Very soon, the Justice Department’s Bureau of Investigation (BI) was overwhelmed by the amount of work involved in intense surveillance and legislation enforcement. Its leaders realized they would either need to expand their team of trained agents or rely increasingly on civilian volunteer organizations. The latter proved easiest, leading to the formation of the American Protective League (APL). Throughout the nation, applicants who were selected were responsible for investigating any suspicious people or activities in their communities. As Joan Jensen characterizes it, “…One cannot help but feel that many APL operatives were like little boys who simply wanted to wear a tin badge and play detective.” The APL never actually caught any legitimate spies, but its members made life even more repressive for their fellow civilians. For instance, they were notorious for reporting to the police on activities that were technically legal under federal law but could be prosecuted locally. They also violated people’s privacy rights, often conducting secret house searches without warrants, which they justified by pointing out certain loopholes in their Constitutional protection. Anybody under

85 Mock and Larson, *Words That Won the War*, 16-17.
87 Ibid.
88 Jensen, *Price of Vigilance*, 144.
89 Ibid, 135.
90 Ibid, 148.
even the slightest suspicion of being in league with Germany could be detained or arrested
easily, then turned over to the War Department for an actual trial. As a result, life on the home
front had become extremely restrictive with virtually no civil liberties.

Those were the conditions in which Stock, the rest of the music community, German-
Americans, and the population in general had to live for the rest of the war, whether they
conformed willingly or not.
SECTION III: THE WARTIME EXPERIENCES OF FREDERICK STOCK

Because he was a German-born immigrant who had never been properly naturalized as an American citizen, Stock was automatically at a disadvantage in the wartime environment. He had first come to Chicago from Cologne in 1895 and joined the Symphony Orchestra’s viola section under Thomas’s leadership. After becoming director in 1905, an appointment which surprised some critics because he was still a relative unknown, he established a name for himself as one of nation’s best conductors over the following decade.91 He traveled internationally to perform and study other methods, and his own compositions and orchestrations were well-received. In addition, he became known for his support of the nation’s own music community, premiering many major American works of the time by composers such as George W. Chadwick, Ernest Bloch, and Edward MacDowell.92 However, legal technicalities ended up causing trouble for him during the war. He had applied for and received his first citizenship papers almost as soon as he arrived in 1895, then assumed he was fully naturalized; he therefore began identifying himself as American, not German, and even altered his name from “Friedrich” to the Americanized “Frederick.” It was only in 1916 that he discovered that he had been required to get second papers as well. His first ones had expired, and he had to start his application from the beginning again. It had not been a problem before the war, because he had made it very public that he wanted to spend the rest of his life in the United States. Official naturalization would have been a simple formality, not a necessity.93 He had even voted several times before the war, without being questioned.94 The paranoia that swept the nation during the

war made formalities essential, however. What mattered to federal officials was that Stock was German-born and never naturalized; he therefore classified as an enemy alien.

Because he was already so well-known in Chicago, Stock’s alien status drew even more attention than it might have received otherwise. It was easy for the press and public to focus on prominent German-born people in the area, whose names were already recognized, and subject them to greater scrutiny. In that sense, Stock’s experience was part of a larger phenomenon across the country, in which public figures were often automatically the first German-Americans to attract local and even national notice. Even when they did not stir up controversy themselves, they were easy to identify as Germans. For instance, *The Chicago Tribune*’s coverage of the registration of all female enemy aliens in the area mentions only a few women by name, mostly based on reputation and connections. Stock’s wife was one of them, identified as “Mrs. Frederick A. Stock of 5477 Hyde Park boulevard, wife of the conductor of the Chicago Symphony orchestra…” Her only distinctions that day were following the rules, supplying the necessary information about herself, and being the first to register at her local police station. It was primarily her position as Stock’s wife, and the corresponding name recognition, that put her in the article alongside problems at other stations and celebrity controversies.

Stock himself faced even more scrutiny on a regular basis, despite making a point of expressing his loyalty to the United States and complying with all laws and restrictions. In many people’s eyes, his German roots took precedence over his professional record from more than two decades in the United States. He was an easy target both because he was already widely known and because some people began associating him with German music and kultur. In a

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97 Ibid.
time when kultur was being advertised as the antithesis to true American values, being connected with it was dangerous for anybody’s reputation. The most nationalist Chicago newspapers accused him of disloyalty and even spying, although they were never able to assemble any plausible evidence against him. When his case was examined by Assistant District Attorney Francis Borelli, who was in charge of investigating other German musicians in the Chicago Symphony Orchestra as well, it quickly became clear that Stock was not guilty of anything beyond a legal oversight in the naturalization process. The Justice Department therefore did not pursue his case any farther. The fact that they dismissed his case says a great deal about how obvious his innocence must have been during a time when other people were being arrested for the slightest, most paranoid reasons. Nevertheless, that decision did not stop those same newspapers from continuing to attack Stock. Among other issues, they questioned his patriotism and accused him of knowing about and tolerating pro-German conversation among other members of the orchestra. He was also criticized for not being a citizen yet, as summarized by the Chicago Herald: “…he is an enemy alien and has lived in this country nearly a quarter of a century without becoming a citizen.” Such articles did not take into account his actual circumstances or successful career, but simply categorized him as part of the detested kultur and judged him accordingly.

Another problem Stock encountered during the war was that some audiences took offense when the orchestra performed works by German composers. While many simply enjoyed the music and did not mind, others were very vocal in their outrage. Music had become a sensitive issue in the first place, as Americans questioned whether past composers such as Beethoven or

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98 Panayi, Minorities in Wartime, 211-212.
100 “Symphony Seeks to Retain Stock: Clyne, However, Tells Trustees Director Knew of Disloyalty Talk Among Members,” Chicago Herald (21 Aug. 1918), from “Stock” folder, Rosenthal Archives, Chicago.
Wagner should transcend international conflict when Germany embraced them as such important contributors to its culture and identity. Stock’s concert programs were not even just a local Chicago issue but were sometimes even more controversial when the orchestra toured, depending on where they went. For instance, a guest concert in Milwaukee, Wisconsin included a song by Wagner, performed in German. Both the Chicago Symphony Orchestra and the Milwaukee Orchestral Association, who had organized the event, assumed that it would not be a problem, because the same program had been performed elsewhere with no objections. In this case, however, many prominent patrons were shocked at the perceived lack of patriotism. They began sending complaints to the Milwaukee Orchestra Association within a day of the concert. In the words of one listener, identified only as Mrs. Henry Van Brunt, “The programme…was a characteristically stupid German-cold blooded affront to American patrons.” She and many others withdrew their subscriptions to any future concerts the Chicago Symphony Orchestra was under contract to perform there. The Milwaukee Journal then published its own accusations against Stock, helping to spread the disloyalty rumors beyond Chicago.

By late summer of 1918, the orchestra felt the effects of the rising anti-Germanism everywhere. Although Borelli had decided he did not need to examine the accusations against Stock seriously, rumors and press attacks remained undeterred. In addition, other German orchestra members were accused of disloyalty and under investigation. Some had allegedly made unpatriotic statements, while others were questioned for disrespectful behavior during

102 “Milwaukee Orchestral Association to Frederick J. Wessels, 20 Feb. 1918,” in Managers: Wessels; “Milwaukee, Anti-German Sentiment” folder, Rosenthal Archives, Chicago, IL.
103 “Catherine Pannill Mead to Frederick J. Wessels, 8 April 1918,” in Managers: Wessels; “Milwaukee, Anti-German Sentiment” folder, Rosenthal Archives, Chicago, IL.
performances of “The Star-Spangled Banner.”  

The orchestra’s problems then worsened on August 14, when the Chicago Federation of Musicians announced a new “Americanization” plan in which all enemy aliens would be forced out of the union. The proposed rule also stipulated that any musician who was still a member could not play under a non-union member for longer than two weeks; they would be required to walk out after that deadline. That stipulation was aimed directly at Stock, who was poised to begin another season shortly and suddenly risked losing most of the ensemble within two weeks. As one supporter of the new rule justified, “It would be a regrettable extremity to disorganize the orchestra and deprive Chicago of the musical wealth it represents, but, if it is proven to be pro-German, by all means sacrifice it.” The orchestra’s managers and trustees, however, were horrified by the thought of how much chaos that new rule would create. They were also still unwilling to force Stock to leave, so they quickly began negotiating with the union. In addition, the Federation’s executive committee learned from the central chapter in New York that membership could not be revoked for enemy alien status alone, without evidence of any outright disloyalty. It therefore overruled the decision two days later and allowed Stock and the others to remain. However, it did not completely give up its Americanization mission; instead, it filed disloyalty charges against the seven musicians who were already being investigated.

Although Stock’s position was secure for the time being, the latest investigations had attracted both local and federal attention. United States District Attorney Charles F. Clyne met with the orchestra’s trustees to warn them, as reported by the Chicago Herald, that “Disloyalty

105 “Union to Drop Aliens as Blow at Symphony: American Orchestra is Aim; Stock May Go Also,” The Chicago Daily Tribune (15 Aug. 1918).
under the guise of artistic temperament will not be tolerated by the government,”107 and that all
signs of pro-German sentiment “must be purged.”108 He specifically criticized their continued
support of Stock, accusing him of knowing about and tolerating unpatriotic comments among the
musicians.109 In addition, some patrons began writing letters threatening to stop donating money
to the orchestra unless it changed entirely and became “100 per cent. patriotic.”110 Stock still led
the orchestra for the beginning of the 1918-1919 season, but suspicions and prejudices remained.
During the union membership controversy in August, he had already offered to quit his post until
he could become a citizen; in the words of his letter of resignation, “I firmly believe that my
withdrawal will afford a solution to the problems now confronting you, and will tend to relieve a
delicate and vexing situation.”111 The trustees encouraged him to remain as long as possible, but
they finally decided they had no alternative and accepted his withdrawal reluctantly on October 1.
They made it clear that he would only be gone temporarily, however. His replacement, Eric
DeLamarter, was only appointed assistant conductor,112 and they provided support and
references to try to move Stock’s citizenship application process faster. Meanwhile, the fighting
ended with the signing of the armistice on November 11, 1918, so Stock no longer faced the
legal restrictions that had delayed enemy alien naturalization during the war. As soon as he
completed his application and had been given a definite date when he would be naturalized (May
22, 1919), they voted to allow him to return on February 19, 1919.113

107 "Symphony Seeks to Retain Stock."
108 Ibid.
109 Ibid.
110 "Assail Frederick A. Stock: Musicians May Force Chicago’s German Director to Resign,” The New York Times
(15 August 1918).
111 "Mr. Stock Quits Orchestra Till Made a Citizen: Trustees Meet Conductor’s Views and Name Eric DeLamarter,”
The Chicago Daily Tribune (2 Oct. 1918), 17.
112 Ibid.
Suspicion v. Support of Stock

Stock’s experience was made more complex and unique by the strong support he received alongside the prejudice. Even as many paranoid newspapers and readers attacked his German nationality, others defended his record as undoubtedly loyal. The people who were most likely to trust him were primarily members of the music community and certain reporters who had made the effort to learn more about him. They were the ones with whom he had worked closely over the years, such as the Chicago Symphony Orchestra trustees, other musicians, and fellow conductors. In addition, they did not automatically judge him for being German because they knew about his background and the reasons why he was not yet a citizen. Stock’s treatment by various newspapers, both Chicago-area and nationwide, reflected how caught up they each were in the patriotic, anti-German fervor of the war years. Of the Chicago periodicals, for instance, *The Chicago Daily Tribune* was the most supportive. It provided the most objective coverage of the controversies leading up to Stock’s resignation and did not include accusations against him. Later, during his leave of absence, it published an editorial by Frederick Donaghey praising his contributions to the orchestra and commenting,

> The fact persists that Mr. Stock had done nothing against the United States...Under Stock, (the orchestra) caught up to, it went along with, and it passed in sheer musical efficiency, skill, versatility, and art all the older orchestras, including Boston’s and the best in Europe. This, of itself, were not a reason for putting Mr. Stock back, if he had moved, or even talked, against the nation. He has done nothing.¹¹⁴

The *Daily Tribune* also maintained one of the more thoughtful attitudes toward the war and anti-Germanism among American newspapers at the time. While never putting itself at risk of being called disloyal, it sometimes subtly questioned the blind intolerance and hysteria that had swept the nation. In 1916, it had even ridiculed the attacks on German culture and intellect, implying

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that taking Americans’ hatred of *kultur* to such extremes was unnecessary and harmful: “We think the German state is a menace to our safety or its policy to our interests…Therefore we are to penalize ourselves by refusing to take advantage of the vast wealth of thought and feeling and beauty the genius of a race has produced.”115 Other Chicago papers had a very different attitude, however, including the *Chicago Post* and the *Herald*. They provided many of the articles that vilified Stock and the other German musicians of the area.

The treatment Stock received on the national scale depended greatly on the politics and position of each publication. During the Milwaukee controversy earlier in 1918, for instance, the *Journal*’s statement against Stock soon after the concert prompted a defense by *Musical America*, one of the nation’s leading music periodicals. It was very anti-German during the war, frequently publishing articles and even entire special editions about the danger of Germany’s influence on American music, but it still supported Stock. In fact, the defense was written by the same columnist who, a little over a month later, advocated one-hundred-percent Americanism when dealing with German-born artists in the United States: “The Germans, as such, represent autocracy. The Americans, as such, represent democracy. There can be no hyphenation between them, as we know in this war they cannot live on the earth together, for that is the issue which must be decided.”116 The columnist was aware of Stock’s strong record, especially his contributions to the American music community, so it was easy to defend him on patriotic grounds.117 However, that view of Stock required a musical awareness that most Milwaukee residents would not have had. According to music critic Catherine Pannill Mead of the *Milwaukee Sentinel*, the *Journal*’s rival newspaper, the article in *Musical America* was effective for the artistic community but would not have much impact among most of the Milwaukee residents.

115 Luebke, *Bonds of Loyalty: German Americans and World War I*, 250.
public, because “…unfortunately most Milwaukeeans read the Journal, where few read Musical America.”118

Another important example, The New York Times, had a decidedly nationalist, anti-German tone before, during, and even after the war, but was not as extreme as others who would publish even the most outrageous rumors of spy plots, including one of the most infamous, The Providence Journal.119 When the controversy with Stock heightened, The New York Times’s coverage reflected an initial bias against him but was also willing to endorse him as long as it could do it in patriotic terms. Its article on August 15 about the union’s threat to revoke his membership, for instance, is written in a style that automatically assumes Stock was disloyal:

“Frederick A. Stock, Director of the Chicago Symphony Orchestra, a German by birth and still a subject of the Kaiser, is expected to step out and permit a loyal American citizen to take his place…”120 Only ten days later, however, it published an interview with Berthold Neuer of piano manufacturing company William Knabe & Co., in which he defends Stock against the assumptions made in the previous article:

It occurred to me that…those in Chicago who are directly interested, and especially the Chicago musical public, would see the injustice to themselves of abandoning the orchestra or leaving it to some conductor unfit to succeed to its leadership. Mr. Stock…is commonly rated an American, he will be legally so within the coming season, and his attitude now is one of humility and willingness to abide by whatever decision the public shall reach regarding him.121

The article acknowledged that this case was different from that of other Germans, because Neuer had convinced the writer that Stock was in fact a loyal, trustworthy American, regardless of his original nationality. If he had not been able to cast Stock as a patriotic martyr to the nation’s

118 “Catherine Pannill Mead to Frederick J. Wessels, 8 April 1918,” in Managers: Wessels; “Milwaukee, Anti-German Sentiment” folder, Rosenthal Archives, Chicago, Il.
119 Fleming, The Illusion of Victory, 249.
120 “Assail Frederick A. Stock.”
cause, however, the writer most likely would not have been able or willing to publicly defend him, considering the paper’s usual biases.

The most consistent trend among Stock’s supporters was the overtly nationalist justifications they included when they wrote about him. For instance, the Chicago Symphony Orchestra trustees created an entire special file of statements demonstrating Stock’s patriotism, contributions to American music, and criticisms of how Germany had developed in recent decades. Echoing intellectual prejudices that had been growing since the late nineteenth century, they quoted Stock as disliking the Prussian cultural identity that had taken over the rest of Germany and destroyed its progressive movements. With those materials, they could be prepared with a response each time anybody questioned Stock’s patriotism. Such evidence was also important for anybody to know, from newspaper reporters to friends and colleagues, before defending him against disloyalty charges. Articles and letters about him made a clear point of expressing his love of the United States and support of the war, both financial and emotional, in order to justify defending an enemy alien.

Similarly, people who believed he should continue performing German music had to incorporate patriotic reasons, or at least excuses in which they emphasized their own loyalty. Many of the writings from that time list the offences committed by Germany that they were fighting, such as extreme militarism, an autocratic government, and atrocities committed by the army; they then go on to explain why music had no connection with those issues. The writings that defended past composers also sometimes tried to cast them as people who would have identified with the United States’ side if they lived had lived during that time. For instance, in Milwaukee Orchestral Association president William C. White’s response to a patron’s protests...
against the program Stock led, he writes, “It may not be amiss to call attention to the fact that one of the most bitter opponents of militarism and Prussianism was Wagner…Shall we then fight the medium through which Wagner spoke to the hearts of the people, or shall we fight simply the evil which he also fought?” In other words, White tried to make the argument that composers such as Wagner should not be judged for their German identities, but for whether or not they would probably have supported Germany if they were alive during the war. It was not enough to simply support music for its own apolitical sake; people constantly needed to be careful what they said or wrote under the Espionage and Sedition Acts. After all, federal officials and the APL were constantly on the alert, and privacy was nonexistent. Criticizing the treatment of a German or even people’s prejudices toward art was one of the easiest ways for non-enemy aliens to get in trouble during the war. As a result, people found ways to defend Stock that emphasized both his patriotism and their own. Those methods were an important reflection of the general repression that Americans faced in their lives on the home front on a regular basis.

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SECTION IV: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

Stock’s experience was far from a local Chicago issue. Rather, it fit directly into the larger question of the role musical culture should play in the war. Americans had to decide if it should be connected with the politics and militarism that the United States, and the Allies in general, were officially fighting. That issue was more prevalent in some areas than others, but it affected musicians such as Stock throughout the nation. The nationalism and conformity encouraged among Americans impacted artistic communities in many ways, from orchestras determining what constituted an appropriate concert program to audiences reacting to what was performed and who performed it. In addition, musicians at Stock’s level had national and international reputations and professional networks, so they faced much more propaganda than from their home cities. Finally, Stock’s situation was linked with the broader question among the Allies of how far the United States should take its cultural anti-Germanism. That, in turn, brought up the even deeper issue of how the American role in the conflict was regarded in the first place.

National Contexts

The controversy in Milwaukee following the Chicago Symphony Orchestra’s guest concert was a telling example of how the music-versus-politics debate influenced Stock’s treatment during the war. It also reflected various levels of anti-German sentiment, which depended on the community, state, etc. Therefore, it demonstrated how important it is not to make generalizations about the home front environment, a crucial factor to remember when analyzing the country as a whole. According to statements sent out by the trustees to Milwaukee as soon as problems began, the orchestra had performed the same Wagner song and similar
“questionable” works in other cities without any noteworthy complaints. Prejudices against Germany were extremely strong in Milwaukee, however. The city itself, and Wisconsin as a whole, traditionally had a large ethnic German population which had established a substantial presence long before the war. When Milwaukeeans were drawn into the hysteria just like the rest of the nation, the non-German, American-born portion of the community appeared even more anxious to demonstrate the strength of its patriotism. It felt a need to prove itself in comparison with areas that never had as many German newspapers, cultural institutions, street names, schools, or restaurants. As Herbert F. Margulies examines Wisconsin’s war years,

Excesses in the name of patriotism were not unusual in wartime, and they occurred in all parts of the United States. But Wisconsin probably exceeded other states in this regard because of certain special circumstances. To many, it seemed that the ‘unpatriotic element’ was so large and menacing as to require the strongest countermeasures.

Musical intolerance was one extreme people could use to prove their own support of the United States. As a result, they could distance themselves from the other ethnic influences around them and present their community in keeping with the model they were expected to conform to during the war.

A major lesson learned in Milwaukee, which reflected a broader national trend, was that performing songs with German lyrics inspired the most controversy. Instrumental works by German composers was open to debate in many areas, by nature of the often-abstract meaning and aesthetic appeal of music in general. Those were qualities people could feel as they listened to any piece, regardless of who originally wrote it. Many still chose to associate such music with the politics and militarism of their country of origin, but others felt no need to give up what they

127 Ibid.
had always listened to and enjoyed before the war. Singing in the German language, on the other hand, was a more explicit form of expression and easier to attack. Most Milwaukeeans, and most of the American public, echoed a letter from Mead to manager Frederick J. Wessels of Chicago: “I may state that personally, I find the German language as a medium for song, entirely distasteful to me at present. This is not alone for sentimental reasons, but also as a matter of policy.”

Eventually, although a minority believed that German music as a whole should still be acceptable, whether sung or played, it became clear that if something must be compromised, it was lyrics. As William C. White of the Milwaukee Orchestral Association mentioned to Wessels,

> Then I have also watched the sentiment, with which I do not in the least little bit agree, that there should be no German songs sung, and on the part of some that there be no modern German music played, during the war. It is my impression that as to songs it would be wise to yield, as to music certainly not to the extent of excluding Wagner.

That proved to be a common consensus in other cities as well. For instance, New York was usually open to the same traditional orchestral music as before the war, but it banned the Metropolitan Opera from performing German productions.

In a music community with such a strong tradition of German dominance, Stock was not the only conductor in the United States who suffered because of his nationality or program selections. In fact, he was one of the more fortunate ones, because his strong patriotic record gave him better grounds to defend himself. That ability, in turn, marked a divide between the newspapers and audiences who only judged him based his background and those who knew more

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128 “Catherine Pannill Mead to Frederick J. Wessels, 8 April 1918,” Managers: Wessels; “Milwaukee, Anti-German Sentiment” folder, Rosenthal Archives, Chicago.
about him than that. It was thus easy to support him, because people could use nationalist terms to do so. They had examples to cite such as his 1914 decree that English would be the required language in rehearsals, or his support of American composers and his encouragements that they should assert themselves during the war and prove their ability internationally.\textsuperscript{131} Stock’s supporters thereby dodged suspicion themselves by arguing that their defense of Stock was strictly in keeping with the nation’s wartime values. The Chicago Symphony Orchestra even described his absence as an act of patriotism, because he had chosen to leave until he could ensure that he would be the best American possible to lead the ensemble. Local concert attendance rates dropped while he was gone,\textsuperscript{132} and he was welcomed back as quickly as he could complete the naturalization process and submit his required paperwork. Anti-German sentiment had not ended with the armistice back in November, especially as Wilson and Creel worked to maintain public support during the peace negotiation process; therefore, it still would have been too controversial for Stock to return without getting his citizenship. However, enough people identified him as American both before and after it was official, so that his resignation and the controversies in which he was involved did not have a lasting effect on his career in the United States.

Others were not nearly as lucky, however. For instance, conductors Karl Muck of the Boston Symphony Orchestra and Ernst Kunwald of Cincinnati were still associated with their birthplaces more than Stock had ever been after he moved to Chicago. Although Muck was officially a Swiss citizen, he was born in Bavaria and had worked under the German government at the Royal Opera House in Berlin before coming to Boston. He then worked there from 1906
to 1908, was summoned back to Germany for several more years, and returned to Boston again in 1912. Before 1917, he was respected widely for how much he had improved the orchestra’s sound and style, but his image suffered almost as soon as the United States entered the war. Combined with his record as an employee of the Kaiser, his reputation as a perfectionist and rigid disciplinarian became evidence of the hated German identity. Newspapers and public figures began to attack him, not only in New England but throughout the eastern United States. The Boston Symphony Orchestra found itself surrounded by controversy by late October 1917, when lead patron Henry Lee Higginson and manager Charles Ellis chose not to include “The Star-Spangled Banner” in a guest concert in Providence. They cited artistic reasons, but that proved a dangerous decision in the home of the Providence Journal. Although it had not been Muck’s responsibility, he was the most visible figure, and his German background made him easiest to blame. His own public statements did not help matters: “Why will people be so silly? Art is a thing by itself and not related to a particular nation or group. It would be a gross mistake, in violation of artistic tastes and principles, for an organization such as ours to play patriotic airs.” He was merely summarizing what many musicians believed in saying that compositions with less artistic value, such as “The Star-Spangled Banner,” had no place in the concert repertoire. However, his statement only prompted further accusations against him, since he was already under suspicion due to his nationality. As Theodore Roosevelt opined, “Any man who refuses to play the ‘Star-Spangled Banner,’ in this time of national crisis, should be forced to pack up and return to the country he came from.”

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134 See Section III, 38 for information about The Providence Journal.
135 Ibid, 168.
Muck quickly became known as an “enemy alien conductor” who refused to perform “The Star-Spangled Banner.” That reputation went on to haunt him for the rest of the war. Less than a week after the Providence incident, when he was supposed to conduct a guest performance in Baltimore, former Maryland governor Edwin Warfield led such a strong opposition that the city police persuaded the orchestra to cancel or risk causing a riot. As Warfield threatened, “I told the Police Board members that this man would not be allowed to insult the people of the birthplace of ‘The Star-Spangled Banner.’ I told them that mob violence would prevent it, if necessary, and that I would gladly lead the mob to prevent the insult to my country and my flag.”

New York, meanwhile, had a strong enough appreciation of art music for its own apolitical sake that the Boston Symphony Orchestra was still well-received there; however, it still had its share of anti-Germanism. The director of the New York Philharmonic Society, Mrs. William Jay, had already helped ban the Metropolitan Opera from performing anything German and went on to launch her own attack against Muck, questioning why “…if Dr. Muck is a dangerous alien in Washington should he be considered a harmless alien in New York, the great American port and centre of all but Federal activities?”

Although Muck still led several very successful guest performances at Carnegie Hall and the Brooklyn Institute of Arts and Sciences, Jay’s comments helped prompt a new wave of prejudice against him.

Meanwhile, federal officials had been investigating him secretly for months, and on March 25, 1918, he was arrested without any formal charges. His arrest was later justified by a pro-German letter he allegedly wrote. He officially resigned from his job in Boston and was

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interned at Fort Oglethorpe. After the war ended, he was eventually deported on August 21, 1919, resentful about the treatment he had received.140

Kunwald, meanwhile, was an Austrian subject who had only come to Cincinnati five years before 1917. He not only had been in the country for less time, but he had not assimilated into American society as quickly or successfully as Stock. On the night when they learned that Wilson had declared war, he had the Cincinnati Symphony Orchestra play “The Star-Spangled Banner,” but also reportedly told the audience, in tears, “But my heart is on the other side.”141 He then spent the rest of 1917 facing accusations that he was a reservist in the Austrian army and was sending it money.142 In addition, he was criticized just like Muck when the orchestra did not perform “The Star-Spangled Banner” at every concert. Cincinnati’s music community supported him as long as it could and would not accept his offer to resign, for fear of the effect on the orchestra’s quality if it lost his leadership. According to a statement by the Cincinnati Orchestra Association, “His musical genius and his unswerving loyalty to the city during the five years he has been with us have made our orchestra one of the best in the country. Its decline from its present high standing would affect injuriously every educational interest in the city, both public and private.”143

Unlike Stock, however, Kunwald had not been in the United States long enough, nor had he actively demonstrated much more than tactful neutrality, to get the same patriotic defense; his was primarily music-based. Such arguments proved insufficient in a time when politics had taken over the arts, just like everything else in society. Kunwald’s supporters in Cincinnati would have needed more than their concerns about the quality of their orchestra in order to

141 Fleming, The Illusion of Victory, 25.
143 Ibid.
effectively protect his position. Other cities proved less tolerant, lacking even the artistic motives for the orchestra that Cincinnati naturally had for it, concerned about how it would reflect the city’s artistic status. Most notably, a planned guest concert in Pittsburgh proved disastrous. Pittsburgh itself had some of the highest prejudice against enemy aliens in the nation, and was one of the strongest examples of a city that treated culture and kultur synonymously; for instance, it banned all performances of Beethoven’s works during the war.\(^{144}\) The local chapter of the Daughters of the American Revolution persuaded city authorities to ban the performance in November 1917 unless Kunwald did not appear and no German music was included. The orchestra did not have time to arrange for a substitute conductor, so the performance was canceled. By that point, Kunwald had faced enough suspicion and controversy to prompt a federal investigation. Although he and the Cincinnati Orchestra Association argued repeatedly that stories of his involvement in the Austrian army were unfounded,\(^{145}\) he was arrested on January 12, 1918. He, like Muck and so many other enemy aliens, then spent nearly a year and a half interned at Fort Oglethorpe.\(^{146}\) After the war, he was released on June 4, 1919 and returned to Austria.\(^{147}\)

Cases such as Muck and Kunwald illustrate how closely Stock’s treatment fit in with larger nationwide issues. How badly the conductors fared depended a lot on the support that each of them could count on in such a nationalist climate, and how patriotic its tone was. Neither Muck nor Kunwald had distanced themselves sufficiently from their respective German and Austrian roots, unlike Stock. Their defense relied on people’s willingness to distinguish music and war, specifically culture and kultur. Therefore, they could not save themselves in a time

\(^{144}\) Murphy, *World War I and the Origin of Civil Liberties*, 128.
\(^{145}\) “Pittsburgh Bars Kunwald Concert,” 1.
when the law permitted the internment of anybody who was even remotely out of line with the rest of the nation. In addition, the reception they encountered from city to city was indicative of how intense anti-Germanism had become in various parts of the country. They could have found willing audiences nearly anywhere; even in Pittsburgh and Baltimore, many people had already purchased tickets and were disappointed when the concerts were canceled.\footnote{“Pittsburgh Bars Kunwald Concert,” 1. “Baltimore Forbids Dr. Muck’s Concert: Boston Symphony is Barred for Leader’s Antipathy to Our National Anthem,” \textit{The New York Times}, 6 Nov. 1917.} However, newspaper attacks, petitions, and threats of violence posed much greater problems in certain areas, and won out over individual people’s disappointment at not being able to attend the concerts.

\section*{International Contexts}

Other Allied countries’ attitudes toward German music, and toward American prejudices, were part of a larger issue involving their respective roles in the war. Even though anti-\textit{kultur} propaganda had originated in Europe before the United States entered, the British and French tended to treat music differently than the Americans. According to research by \textit{Musical America}’s overseas correspondents in late 1917, the classic works of long-dead German composers were still performed almost as often as ever. As director Pierri Gheusi of the Opéra Comique told the Paris correspondent, “There is no bitterness toward the old German music masters, and I believe in our admiration for Handel, Bach, Beethoven our subconscious mind does not confuse their work with the monstrosities of the war. These composers belong to every country and to all epochs.”\footnote{“No Ban on German Masters in Either France or England,” \textit{Musical America}, 6 Jan. 1918, 2.} Contemporary writers such as Richard Strauss disappeared from their programs, but most saw no need to discriminate against pieces that had been a stable part of international repertoire for decades. One Scottish concertgoer summarized that attitude, shared
by both Britain and France, in an interview in London: “Use all the best that Germany can give, but do not encourage the modern Hun.” Wagner’s music, which was both recent enough and linked so closely with Germany’s image, also did not appear as often in concert. It was shunned almost entirely in France. On the other hand, although it was less popular in Britain than before the war it was still played frequently and often requested by soldiers. In short, most of the British and French public saw no need to stop listening to what they had always traditionally enjoyed. They did not completely embrace the idea of separating culture and kultur, but they did it much more than most Americans.

Only when language was involved were more restrictions imposed. Songs with German lyrics were avoided; France banned them from its opera outright, and Britain translated them into English. However, even the French criticized Americans for making similar rules, particularly the Metropolitan Opera. They justified their own ban by pointing out how much the war had devastated their country, whereas Germany’s army had not come anywhere near the United States border. According to an American who had settled in Paris years ago,

Germans are trying to become fixtures on [French] soil, and have laid waste some of their state. Also the British have suffered from the neighbor who is too near for comfort. But for our vast country to adopt such measures, it is unreasonable and childish, and has carried us back to the Middle Ages.

The idea that the United States was not affected directly by the fighting as much as the other Allies was not limited to music, but was increasingly important in the war in general as it drew to a close. Britain and France in particular did not forget how long the United States had remained neutral. They considered themselves the primary actors in the conflict, especially since they had been involved the longest. Once the war ended, their attitude was even more obvious when

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150 Ibid, .
151 Ibid, 1.
152 Ibid, 2.
Wilson went over to Europe for the peace conference.\textsuperscript{153} He quickly discovered that although American support had helped the Allies considerably, the British already seemed reluctant to give the United States much credit.\textsuperscript{154} In addition, he found that he would not have much political power in the creation of the Treaty of Versailles.\textsuperscript{155} Overall, the feeling that the United States had gone too far in their prejudice against German music was part of a much larger issue that ended with the other major Allies not wanting to credit American involvement or contributions as much as their own in the politics of the postwar settlement.

\textsuperscript{153} Fleming, \textit{The Illusion of Victory}, 321.
\textsuperscript{154} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{155} Ibid, 326.
CONCLUSION

Following his return to the orchestra in February, Stock officially became an American citizen on May 22, 1919. It certainly helped that the fighting had already ended several months earlier and peace negotiations were in progress over in Europe, because his naturalization process sped up considerably. However, it is also important to note that while other leading musicians such as Muck and Kunwald had to leave the country after the war, Stock remained in Chicago and spent the following twenty-three years bringing his career to greater heights with every season. For the rest of his life, he enjoyed consistently high reviews by the critics, received major national and international awards, and was credited with transforming the Chicago Symphony into one of the nation’s top ensembles. Rejecting prestigious job offers from New York, Philadelphia, and even Northwestern University in nearby Evanston, he grew increasingly popular for his steadfast loyalty to the city and its orchestra. He was still working as hard as ever at the end of his life and died on October 20, 1942, in the early weeks of his record-setting thirty-eighth season.

By that time, his experience during World War I was nearly forgotten. Newspaper writers, the music community, and the public as a whole barely even thought about the controversies or suspicions that had surrounded him when they evaluated his overall legacy and contributions. As demonstrated in the obituary by Claudia Cassidy for The Chicago Tribune, by then his absence in World War I was mainly remembered as a minor glitch, or “one brief hiatus,” in his entire career; “But that period passed and was forgotten.” He had already developed a strong enough reputation as an asset to the American musical identity in the prewar

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156 Epstein, “Frederick Stock,” 21.
157 Cassidy, “Chicago’s Music Circles Mourn Frederick Stock.”
158 Ibid.
years, so he was easier for supporters to defend during the war and then became even more popular than ever afterward.

With the overwhelming volume of war propaganda and the campaign to create a uniform, dissension-free American identity, it was practically inevitable that a person in Stock’s position would suffer to some extent. A majority of the population had become programmed to treat any enemy alien as a threat to the nation’s safety, and most newspapers were not in the habit of seeking out reasons to make exceptions for individual cases. Stock’s friends and fellow musicians were therefore his primary supporters. They were the ones who made his war years comparatively easier, because they had the nationalist grounds that they needed to defend him effectively. In a time when the APL could monitor their every action and any remotely controversial statement could be used against them under the Espionage Act, they had to use their knowledge of his patriotic contributions both for his benefit and their own safety. This indicated how music had become intertwined with World War I politics. Regardless of aesthetics or whether it is right or wrong, music is susceptible to being taken over for national purposes at any time, but even more so during a war. Muck, Kunwald, and other contemporaries of Stock who did not have his same patriotic record were much harder to defend in that kind of environment. Arguing in their favor revolved around the idea that music should have no connection with politics or international conflicts, but that side of the debate was virtually hopeless during the war. Stock’s relative success at avoiding worse consequences demonstrated the importance of extra-musical factors when anti-Germanism had taken over the nation.

American society as a whole did not recover as easily or quickly, however. The propaganda, conformity, and prejudices of World War I set precedents that would continue taking over the country during the following years. Most Americans were shaken by how
traumatic the conflict had turned out to be, more than they had ever imagined. In addition, their conceptions of how the war would transform the world fell apart. This became especially obvious when the Treaty of Versailles turned into revenge for the other Allies against Germany and largely ignored the idealistic goals Wilson had been publicizing prior to the peace conference. Americans themselves barely supported Wilson’s agenda, in part because the people who may have been most likely to agree with him were, ironically, the progressives who had been persecuted in the war. Even Creel recognized what their repression had caused, in a letter on November 8, 1918: “All the radical, or liberal friends of your anti-imperialist war policy were either silenced or intimidated. The Department of Justice and the Post Office were allowed to silence and intimidate them. There was no voice left to argue for your sort of peace.”159 Most Americans instead sought to return to the prewar normalcy they had known, and chose to do so by entering into a period of isolationism. They retreated from the international stage and preferred to focus more on their everyday lives within their own country.160

In the process, though, they failed to examine the major damages of the war and the issues behind the repression that had taken over their lives.161 As a result, the nation retained its antipathy to new beliefs and any significant political opposition or debate, even reform movements. Americans were still expected to conform to a specific “American” identity, except that anti-Germanism switched to anti-Bolshevik hysteria immediately after the war.162 The Red Scare from 1919 to 1920, for example, incorporated many of the same principles of inspiring fear for the nation’s safety, investigating dissenters and tracking their actions, accusing the

160 Harries and Harries, The Last Days of Innocence, 7.
161 Ibid, 8.
people who sympathized with them of being communists or anarchists themselves, and rounding up suspects, often without formal charges. Although the targets had changed, the conspiracy theories and emphasis on uniting against an internal enemy remained the same. In addition, the people who had been targeted for opposing the war still faced harsh publicity. When President Calvin Coolidge pardoned thirty-one pacifists who were still in jail partway through the 1920s, he was criticized for releasing “criminals,” including by The New York Times and the American Legion. The “one hundred percent Americanism” movement did not end with the Armistice, but continued to set standards for how the entire population should think and act, and shut out those who did not measure up accordingly. That in turn silenced many potential dissidents in the 1920s, as most people purposefully censored themselves or had become too complacent to even think about alternatives to the status quo. As a result, the restrictions that Stock and his supporters had to be so careful to follow during the war did not go away for years to come.

World War I also had a lasting effect on the German-Americans. It had been a sobering change from the prestige they used to enjoy, to suddenly encounter discrimination on a regular basis and see everything connected with their heritage vilified. After the war ended, they retreated into silence, having determined that the best way to avoid any more attacks would be to remain as invisible as possible. The little that remained of the German-language press no longer asserted itself as a major presence in the American media, nor did it attempt to reclaim its

163 Jensen, Price of Vigilance, 299.
165 Goldstein, Political Repression, 167.
166 Ibid, 557.
former influence in social and government issues.\textsuperscript{168} German-Americans slowly tried to recover some of their ethnic pride over the following decades; however, although they gained momentum in the 1930s, they retreated again with the start of World War II. In Chicago specifically, the repercussions of World War I are still present today. German-Americans have remained the least visible of all of the city’s ethnic groups, especially in proportion to how many still live there.\textsuperscript{169}

In the music world, meanwhile, classical German compositions made an easy comeback in most orchestras once the war ended and they were no longer considered taboo, in part because the music community had never stopped loving them and people in the general public no longer cared. However, Germany’s prewar dominance was gone. American orchestras began looking more to the French and Russians for conductors, musicians, and compositions,\textsuperscript{170} as well as for the latest avant-garde trends.\textsuperscript{171} Similarly, Paris became the new destination for composers to go and refine their styles and techniques; since France had been presenting itself as the alternative to Germany’s school of music for half a century, it was the automatic choice for the postwar generation of Americans, from George Gershwin to Aaron Copland. The prior generation of composers from the German tradition, notably Chadwick, Macdowell, and Amy Beach, faded into obscurity.\textsuperscript{172} In many ways, the war years were a key transition point for American music, as it began moving in new directions by the 1920s.

Through all of this, Stock’s story reflected many sides of World War I and its implications for the United States’ future. He was not only a key participant in the changing

\textsuperscript{169} Holli and Jones, \textit{Ethnic Chicago}, 93.
\textsuperscript{170} Horowitz, \textit{Classical Music in America}, 267.
\textsuperscript{172} Horowitz, \textit{Classical Music in America}, 268-270.
music world, but was also directly affected by the political and social events of the time. Although he was one individual out of many who suffered to some degree during the war, his experiences connected with a wide variety of issues at stake on the home front, from the performing arts to the ethnic German community to American society at large. It was these factors that make him for me such a representative case study about the complexities of the United States’ involvement in the war.
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**Secondary Sources (Articles)**


Secondary Sources (Books)


