Imagined Communities, Reimagined From Beyond The West:
Towards a Theoretical Formulation of the Ideological Structure of Nationalisms

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For Shivani,
to whom I belong above all others --

For my grandma Carol, my grandpa Angelo, my sister Ericka, and my uncle Pedro,
who shared with me those undying stories of my roots in the soil --

And for my mentors: Professors Paulina Ochoa Espejo, Thomas Donahue, and Nathaniel Shils,
without whom I would have never known even where to begin.

To my family and friends, I owe everything --
Without all those before me and beside me, I am nothing:
It is for those I love that I carry the lives of all who have made me who I am.
A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Two things which, properly speaking, are really one and the same constitute this soul, this spiritual principle. One is the past, the other is the present. One is the possession in common of a rich legacy of memories; the other is present consent, the desire to live together, the desire to continue to invest in the heritage that we have jointly received. ... The nation, like the individual, is the outcome of a long past of efforts, sacrifices, and devotions. Of all cults, that of the ancestors is the most legitimate: our ancestors have made us what we are. A heroic past with great men and glory ... is the social capital upon which the national idea rests. These are the essential conditions of being a people: having common glories in the past and a will to continue them in the present; having made great things together and wishing to make them again. One loves in proportion to the sacrifices that one has committed and the troubles that one has suffered. One loves the house that one has built and that one passes on.

Written originally in French in 1882

Ernest Renan (1823 - 1892)

There is no more miserable person than the one who can be said to be a man without a country.

Timothy Thomas Fortune (1856 - 1928)

I’ll find a new place to be from.

I Know the End from Punisher

Phoebe Bridgers (1994 - present)

Thou art the ruler of the minds of all people
Dispenser of India’s destiny
Thy name rouses the hearts of the Panjaub, Sind, Gujarat and Maratha
Of the Dravida and Orissa and Bengal
It echoes in the hills of the Vindhyas and Himalayas
Mingles in the music of the Jamuna and Ganges
And is chanted by the waves of the Indian Sea
They pray for thy blessings and sing thy praise
The saving of all people waits in thy hand
Thou dispenser of India’s destiny
Victory, victory, victory to thee

Jana Gana Mana, the Indian national anthem
Adopted by the Constituent Assembly of India on January 24th, 1950
Written originally in Bengali in 1911

Rabindranath Tagore (1861-1941)


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0.) Abstract

Nationalism carries with it a strong political and emotional gravity. In Western popular discourse, nationalism is conventionally seen either as synonymous with patriotism in a supposedly objective, very positive light, or as some uniformly backward political outlook that incites chaos across the Global South. Both of these views make the fatal mistake that nationalism is a single, discrete thing at all: which brings me to an insightful historical moment.

The 1946-1950 Constituent Assembly of India debates witnessed ideological competition between exclusionary and inclusionary national imaginings of the new India -- primarily Hindu nationalists and liberal nationalists, respectively. These two camps of ideological forces vary from one another in the very substance of their respective imaginings of Indian national identity. This variation in a nation’s root identity, among other forms of diversity, is important because it is not captured in the canonical explanatory theoretical texts of nationalism studies, as the field still views non-Western nationalisms merely as deviations from the less varied cases of nationalisms from the West in which the canon has historically been rooted (Anderson 2016 [2006, 1991, 1983]; Breuilly, 1983; Brubaker, 1996; Gellner, 1983; Greenfeld, 1992). The question that follows is clear: Why does the canon on nationalism neglect the critical phenomenon of variation among nationalisms?

Only in about the last three decades (Billig, 1995; Chatterjee, 1991 & 1993; Dawson, 2001; Jayawardena, 1986), and particularly in the last several years (Devji, 2013; Getachew, 2019; Malešević, 1993; Mylonas, 2013; Tudor, 2013), have accounts truly focused on postcolonial and other non-Western contexts. Still, these accounts have overwhelmingly been limited by region-specificity, hampering their broader theoretical potential. In response to the shortcomings of the canon, I ask: In what ways are nationalisms ideologically structured in common so as to allow for their structural variation? I argue in this thesis that a nationalism is structured in three imagined, interconnected parts -- the prenational root identity, the national identity, and the national community -- and furthermore that structural variation operates within the root identity along spectra of uniformity and viscosity, within the national identity via intersection with other ideological forces, and within the national community on a substructural spectrum of peculiarity.

In defending my account, I build upon more recent contributions -- particularly the theoretical links from Chatterjee (1993) and Dawson (2001) -- by revising canonical theorizations in light of understudied cases of nationalisms from contexts (peripheral to those) studied by these two scholars: pre-Partition Pakistan, 20th century American Black communities, pre-Independence India, late 20th century Pan-Africanists, and mid-to-late 20th century Hindu nationalists. I analyze these cases both as individual or collective counterexamples and in comparative complexes. My aim is to reformulate a theoretical schema that accounts for the internal logics of nationalisms, which I term their shared ideological structure, inviting others to revise the model in light of further neglected cases. My core audience are thus contemporary scholars of nationalism such as Harris Mylonas, Maya Tudor, and Siniša Malešević.
1.) Introduction

1a.) The Problem, My Solution, and Why You Should Care

Nationalism as a term and concept carries with it a particularly strong political gravity, evoking all kinds of images and emotions. In popular discourse, nationalism is conventionally assumed to have one of two meanings, corresponding roughly to the political left and right in the West. For those on the right, nationalism tends to be synonymous with patriotism, which members of this group tend to view in a supposedly objective, very positive light of national pride. For those on the left, nationalism connotes some uniformly backward political outlook that plagues the alien world beyond the West, inciting exclusion and chaos across the Global South.

As is to be demonstrated in the present thesis, both of these views are radically false. For all the fundamentally vast differences between the two perspectives, they make the very same fatal mistake: the assumption that nationalism is a single thing at all. Indeed, even though the former view sees nationalism as beautifully patriotic and the latter as the barbarism of the foreigner, both imagine nationalism as being like one whole discrete substance, with no diversity in and of itself in how it manifests in the world. Even scholars of nationalism themselves did not recognize variation within nationalism to any significant extent until postcolonial contributions started to gain influence in the 1990s. Furthermore, to this day, there has been no targeted theory offered among nationalism scholars to explain this variation in its own right. That is, until the present thesis: which brings me to a historical moment that sheds light on the important problem I aim to solve.
In anticipation of national independence from the British Empire on August 15th, 1947, the Constituent Assembly of India was established on December 9th, 1946. The Assembly was charged with a herculean responsibility: to frame a Constitution of India. In essence, the task of the Assembly was to debate and decide on how to put into words what India was to be as a united, independent nation. Inevitably, as the Assembly was composed of representatives from across the immensely diverse subcontinent, the most contentious subject of debate was the very definitions of Indian national identity and community. In this way, the transcripts of the Assembly debates serve as an incredible historical record of an enormously impactful instance of ideological competition among the nationalisms that eventually came to form the foundational nationalism of India.

At center stage in the debates were the places of religions and languages in the formulation of Indian national identity and community. The question of a national language stirred particularly fierce debate.¹ Due to growing competition among national imaginings of Pakistan in parallel to those of India, the Urdu language became associated all the more strictly with Muslim identity, and for that reason was removed from consideration for the national language of India. As the debates over language grew increasingly polarized, two oppositional camps formed: the representatives from northern Hindi-speaking states, who overwhelmingly advocated for Hindi and/or Hindustani as the sole national language(s) of India, and those from non-Hindi-speaking southern states, who demanded that English be retained as the official language of the nation.

The debates over language and other matters to be addressed in the Constitution of India continued until the formal adoption of the Constitution on January 26th, 1950. In the end, no national language was identified: Rather, Hindi in Devanagari script was designated the Official

¹ A positive consequence for the present thesis of the particular contention over language is that the Assembly debates were conducted entirely in English -- the language of the colonizer -- and thus I can analyze transcripts of the debates without translation.
Language of the Union, as a means to facilitate interstate communication and national unity. Even this stunted designation was further qualified (primarily with promises that Sanskrit was to be the primary source of new Hindi vocabulary) to quell the demands of pro-Hindustani politicians and proponents of Sanskritized Hindi. Furthermore, in order to appease the southern states, the Constitution also stipulated that English was to become a temporary Official Language of the Union for the fifteen years it was then expected to take Hindi to be phased in as the sole official language of India. However, alongside Hindi, English remains an Official Language of the Union today (Gusain 2012, pp. 43-46).

The debates over language and religion in Indian national identity and community thus provide a penetrating view into the predominant ideological competition among national imaginings of India at the time. The rivalry between exclusionary and inclusionary nationalisms is especially clear in the rhetoric of the debates that took place in September 1949. On the one hand, representatives like Raghunath Vinayak Dhulekar demanded not only that Hindi be both the official and national language of India, but also that India be an exclusively Hindu nation (“13th September 1949: Constituent Assembly Of India Debates (Proceedings) - Volume IX”). On the other hand, politicians like Shankarrao Deo echoed Jawaharlal Nehru in asserting that India is defined by ‘unity in diversity’ (Parekh 1991, pp. 35-36). In this view, Indian national identity and community entails a diverse subset of ethnolinguistic identities, and thus national unity is not hindered by, but predicated upon, the immense cultural and linguistic diversity of India (“14th September 1949: Constituent Assembly Of India Debates (Proceedings) - Volume IX”).

What is remarkable about the ideological competition between the nationalisms of these two camps of politicians is that the variation between the two ideological forces is in the very
substance of imagined Indian national identity. That is, while the former exclusionary camp defines Indian national identity as aligned with linguistic Hindi and religious Hindu identities, the latter inclusionary camp defines Indian national identity as composed of various ethnolinguistic identities. This variation in the root identity of a nation, among other forms of variation to be discussed in the present thesis, is not captured in the canonical texts of the field of nationalism studies, because non-Western nationalisms are seen merely as deviations from the less varied nationalisms of the West. Indeed, the very existence of nationalisms like that of Shankarrao Deo, which are simultaneously ethnic and inclusionary, confounds the canonical theoretical dichotomy between ethnic and civic nationalisms being exclusionary and inclusionary, respectively.

As a clarification, I employ the phrases the West, Eurocentrism, and their derived terms all in interchangeable reference to a particular portion of the world, in such a way that is critically distinct from convention. That is, I take these terms as having both geographical and social significance, but to a greater extent in the social dimension than do most others. For context, the traditional understanding is that the West denotes Europe and the Americas. This denotation has by now to some degree been replaced by the more socioeconomically than geographically rooted conception of Global North (as opposed to Global South). In fact, the North-South distinction was intended to supplant the outdated term the First World (as opposed to the Third World).

In a word, I simply take the socioeconomically-focused intention behind the coining of the term Global North to the next level: I recycle the term the West to denote the socioeconomically privileged residents of the geographical Global North (the United States, Canada, greater Europe, Australia, New Zealand, and some countries in East Asia). More to the point, when I employ the term the non-West and its derivatives, I am referring collectively to both (1) all those outside the

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2 This dimension of variation is to be explored in Part I of my argument.
geographical Global North and (2) all those socioeconomically disadvantaged, principally due to race, within the geographical Global North. Thus, under my definition (as is to be significant in my argument), Black communities in the United States fall in the category of the non-West. While others may find this break from convention unusual, I think it is important to acknowledge -- in this case through terminology -- that the fundamental distinction of world inequality is in the colonization and/or oppression to which many communities have historically been subject.

Regarding potential disagreements, for some my indication of a deficiency in the canonical explanatory theory of nationalism studies is bound to provoke the objection that the canon actually accounts very well for the nationalisms that had by its time existed in order to be observed. Those of this view would in turn argue that nationalisms which deviate from the canonical norm are simply products of a nationalist framework that has itself changed since the canon was written. As is to be demonstrated throughout the present thesis, this view is nonsense. In fact, there are numerous counterexamples to the theorizations of the Eurocentric canon from cases that occurred several decades before nationalism studies even emerged as a distinct field after World War II.

Similarly, some would argue that Benedict Anderson -- perhaps the greatest figure in the nationalism studies canon -- constitutes an outstanding counterexample to my assessment of the field as historically Eurocentric. Indeed, in his renowned book *Imagined Communities*, he considers cases from Southeast Asia. My rebuttal to this claim of his exception, upon which I elaborate in my literature review, is simply that his analysis of non-Western cases is not truly at the root of his theoretical assumptions and conclusions. Rather, his theory is derived from the history of the West, and alongside this derivation is a limited consideration of nationalism in Southeast Asia, which serves only to confirm the theorizations already developed from European and

To be clear, my problematization of the canon is not an argument against the widely accepted claim that a nationalism characteristically requires a single, defined identity upon which to imagine a cohesive nation. Rather, as I argue in this thesis, it is with the assumption that such an identity is necessarily defined as homogeneous that I take issue. Those who subscribe to this hypothesis reason further that there exist in the world cohesive nations and plurinational states: a dichotomy which implies the non-existence of nations imagined as both heterogeneous and cohesive. However, to return to my example, Shankarrao Deo’s vision of the Indian nation as simultaneously inclusionary and rooted in ethnic identity situates ethnolinguistic heterogeneity and national cohesion not only as compatible, but as fundamentally interdependent -- as conveyed in Jawaharlal Nehru’s famous phrase unity in diversity (Parekh 1991, pp. 35-36). Thus, Shankarrao Deo imagines a single, defined Indian national identity upon which to found the then-newly independent state: defined not as a homogenous nation, but as a national community whose very union is predicated upon its heterogeneity, all under the encompassing name of India.

Altogether, the question begged by this deficiency in the literature is clear: Why does the canon neglect the critical phenomenon of variation among nationalisms? Evidently, the canon itself is in need of revision. Contemporary scholars with whom I am to engage through this thesis, such as Harris Mylonas, Maya Tudor, and Siniša Malešević, clearly acknowledge this historical Eurocentrism of nationalism studies and call for further research into the facets of nationalism left undiscovered as a result of the field’s bias (Csergő 2021). Therefore, the present inquiry into variation among nationalisms constitutes my answer to the call.
In response to the shortcomings of the canon and to the calls for their resolution, the present thesis asks: In what ways are nationalisms ideologically structured in common so as to allow for their structural variation? In pursuit of an answer to this question, the thesis aims to formulate and defend a social constructivist theoretical model, derived from political rhetoric primarily from South Asian and Black American contexts, that captures in a schema the internal logic common to nationalisms. This logic, which I term the ideological structure of nationalisms, governs the variation among those nationalisms as ideological forces in competition.

In sum, I propose in this thesis a new theoretical model of the ideological structure of nationalisms. In its breadth and versatility, the model accounts for both Western cases and those neglected by Eurocentric theorizations, while maintaining parsimony: I argue that a nationalism is ideologically structured in three imagined, interconnected parts -- (1) the prenational root identity, (2) the national identity, and (3) the national community -- and furthermore that structural variation operates (1) within the root identity along spectra of uniformity and viscosity, (2) within the national identity through intersection with other identity-based ideological forces, and (3) within the national community along a substructural spectrum of peculiarity. (I explain these terms in the summary of my proposed theoretical schema.)

Unlike canonical theories of nationalism like Anderson’s *Imagined Communities*, this study is not concerned with the historical origins and development of nationalism at large (Anderson 2016 [2006, 1991, 1983], pp. 5-7). Rather, this inquiry takes particular nationalisms for what they are, analyzing each at a particular historical point in time and space, as they are captured

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3 See Tudor & Slater (2020) for recent work on structural variation among exclusionary and inclusionary nationalisms and its political consequences in South and Southeast Asia.
in recorded political rhetorical speech. By this means, I characterize the ideological structure that allows for the significant observable variation among those nationalisms.

Moreover, while nationalism studies has historically been a Eurocentric field, I reach my proposed theory by drawing from peripheral scholars and understudied cultural contexts in order to rethink canonical theorizations. In defending my account, I analyze pre-Partition Pakistani nationalisms, 20th century Black nationalisms, Independence-era Indian nationalisms, late 20th century Pan-Africanisms, mid-to-late 20th century Hindu nationalisms, and for contrast, Donald Trump’s American nationalism.

My rationale for selecting this particular set of cases is that these are (related to) the examples of the nationalisms analyzed by Partha Chatterjee and Michael Dawson, who lay out the quasitheoretical basis in which this thesis is rooted. What I mean by the term quasitheoretical here is that Chatterjee (1993) and Dawson (2001) derive conclusions from empirical data which serve as generalizations that are theoretically relevant to the formulation of my model. However, because such generalizations are not complete theoretical alternatives to my schema of the ideological structure of a nationalism, the generalizations specifically in relation to my model are of a theoretical nature but not whole theorizations. That is, assuming my aim to describe ideological structure, the conclusions of Chatterjee (1993) and Dawson (2001) are quasitheoretical.

This distinction is significant because, if I were to consider other cases not already analyzed by such scholars, I would need to construct generalizable theory from those cases alone, which is far beyond the scope of this thesis. Rather, I am to build upon case studies in conjunction with this existing quasitheoretical scholarship in order to arrive at a complete answer to my research.

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4 This mode of theoretical derivation follows from the identification of “constitutive stories” by Smith (2001) as rhetorics of insight into “the politics of people-building” (p. 73).
question. In turn, this answer thus invites more advanced scholars to revise theory not only through pre-existing quasitheoretical contributions -- as I do -- but also directly from empirical evidence to theoretical generalization to systematic theory.

Above all, the goal of my theory is not to conclude a conversation, but to rekindle one. By this I mean that my theoretical contribution is not so much a conclusion but rather an invitation for others to revise my schema of the ideological structure of nationalism in light of further unconsidered cases. My hope also is that my framing of the thesis as an invitation will encourage those inclined to care little about a theoretical contribution from an undergraduate student to recognize the value for the field of nationalism studies that I know my model brings.

Indeed, my theoretical schema and its supporting arguments aimed at capturing variation among nationalism are important due to four ways in which — alongside their comparative, theory-building nature — the work fulfills the demands of nationalism studies, as articulated primarily by the three aforementioned contemporary scholars.

First, the inquiry helps us understand politics by illuminating questions such as: Why do some nationalisms achieve inclusion while others are violently exclusionary? And how do nationalisms intersect with other identity-based ideological forces, such as those of race and gender, to produce equality or discrimination legitimized by national identity? These questions are critical because they demand solutions to identity conflict and discrimination.

Second, this line of inquiry is predicated upon an ontological reformulation of the units in which to analyze nationalism. Indeed, understanding structural variation among nationalisms necessitates a lucid definition to distinguish one nationalism from another. Because there is no one ontology upon which nationalism studies has agreed, my ontological conceptualizations -- which
are to be proposed as foundational to the theoretical schema that I defend -- offer the field a novel option as to how we ought to think about the presence of nationalism in the world.

Third, the investigation of variation among nationalisms participates in rectifying the historical Eurocentrism of nationalism studies, as this inquiry is inextricably linked to the task of revising canonical theories in light of understudied cases. This link exists because the canon -- as established by late 20th century constructivists such as Benedict Anderson and Eric Hobsbawm and modernists such as Ernest Gellner and Liah Greenfeld -- focuses disproportionately on the West, and thus neglects dimensions of variation more evident elsewhere.

On the one hand, over recent centuries in Europe, instances of stateless nations are exceptional. Since the rise of nationalism as an ideological framework of political organization, just over two hundred years ago around the start of the 19th century, only two significant European polities have contained stateless nations: the Ottoman Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Both of these empires fell with the end of World War I, about a century after the advent of nationalism and more than a century before today. On the other hand, ideological competition among the many imagined, then-stateless nations of India and Pakistan occurred as recently as Partition in 1947 -- not to mention the independence of Bangladesh in 1971, barely fifty years ago.

In short, nationalism in Europe took about a century after its origin to achieve hegemony, and nationhood has maintained that dominance for another hundred years up to today. However, nationalism in postcolonial contexts beyond Europe only achieved a similar hegemony -- if ever -- several decades later, scarcely half a century ago. Thus a legacy of Eurocentrism explains why the canon holds little account of nationalisms that envision non-state nations.
Similarly, in trying to make sense of how a national identity is imagined, some scholars such as Liah Greenfeld and Ernest Gellner cling to an ethnic-civic dichotomy among nationalisms in order to explain how nationalism can be exclusionary or inclusionary. As a counterexample, the ethnic inclusionary nationalism of politician Shankarrao Deo from the Constituent Assembly demonstrates that the canon inadequately accounts for nationalisms that break the strict alignments set by the ethnic-civic dichotomy (as similarly argued in Tinsley (2018)).

In these ways, my inquiry is aimed directly at correcting the skew in canonical explanatory theories of nationalism precisely because it investigates variation among nationalisms. Thus I echo the critique of Anderson (2016 [2006, 1991, 1983]) in Chatterjee (1991), which distinguishes between material and spiritual nationhood:

Anti-colonial nationalism creates its own domain of sovereignty within colonial society well before it begins its political battle with the imperial power ... by dividing the world of social institutions and practices into two domains: the material and the spiritual. The material is the domain of the ‘outside’, of the economy and of statecraft, of science and technology -- a domain where the West had proved its superiority and the East had succumbed. ... The spiritual, on the other hand, was an ‘inner’ domain bearing the ‘essential’ marks of cultural identity (pp. 521-522).

Here Chatterjee (1991) argues that it is peculiar to postcolonial contexts as opposed to the West that many nations continue to exist in the ‘spiritual’ form without a ‘material’ state. He goes on to critique Anderson (2016 [2006, 1991, 1983]) with the assertion that it is because postcolonial cases are overlooked that types of variation such as spiritual, non-state national forms do not enjoy the privilege of account in explanatory theories of nationalism. In this way, I concur with Chatterjee (1991) particularly by investigating variation among nationalisms as a targeted means of working towards correcting the field’s Eurocentrism.
Fourth, my research harnesses work on families of nationalisms. Though explanatory nationalism studies is growing, generalizable conclusions have remained scant since Billig (1995). In defiance, Chatterjee (1993) and Dawson (2001), which describe (post)colonial and Black nationalisms, respectively, target with broader theoretical implications the canon’s Eurocentric shortcomings. However, while Dawson references Chatterjee in acknowledging structural parallels between (post)colonial and Black nationalisms, the two scholars do not provide generalizable theorizations on nationalisms as a genus of ideological forces. Thus my research aims to revise the canon not only by deriving these generalizable theorizations directly from comparative analysis of understudied cases, but also through the broader theoretical implications from scholars like Chatterjee and Dawson.
1b.) **Theoretical Foundations**

1ba.) **Justifying the social constructivist framework**

In formulating my theory, I decided to take a social constructivist theoretical framework through which to analyze my cases of nationalisms. First and foremost, this decision reflects the consensus among scholars in the field that nationalisms, and thereby also nations and national identity, are social constructs. Beyond this consensus, I also take constructivism as the theoretical framework through which I not only develop units of analysis for my argument, but also presuppose that there is an ideological structure that nationalisms share at all. Both my units of analysis and my conception of ideological structure are to be explained in depth in the next section of this summary.

Though constructivist theoretical principles enjoy a general consensus within nationalism studies, I am compelled to justify my adoption of constructivism for the many scholars across political science who view constructivism in a less positive light, for whom the study of nationalism is also relevant. Indeed, constructivist theories are often criticized for lacking meaningful explanatory power. These criticisms are rooted in the notion that all constructivist theories, by their very nature, make the same fundamental claim, which at first glance appears vacuous: that everything in the social world is simply what it is made to be. And yet, no matter how frustrating it may be, this approach is disarmingly accurate. The social world is enormously complicated and ever-changing, and constructivism, unlike many other theoretical frameworks, at least attempts to acknowledge that fact. Thus, to echo Hobsbawm & Ranger (1983) in their conceptualization of
the ‘invented tradition,’ even a constructivist theory lacking in explanatory power is bound to capture a social reality more closely than an overly rigid, technical theory that tries to define in intrinsic or even mathematical terms an aspect of something as elusive as the social world (pp. 12-14). In short, through constructivism, we can make sense of the internal logics of ideological forces like nationalisms as imagined, variation-governing structures.

Still, due to their explanatory ambition, constructivist theories are indeed particularly prone to turning out vacuous, especially when attempting to explain too much at the same time. For this reason, in order to maximize the power of a constructivist theory, one must limit one’s scope, significantly and precisely. The theory proposed in the present thesis avoids this potential pitfall of constructivism by explaining only the ideological structure of nationalisms as they are. Thus, just as I demonstrated earlier in interrogating the conventional distinction between ethnic and civic nationalisms in light of the ideological competition that occurred in the Constituent Assembly debates in September 1949, my theory succeeds in offering meaningful explanatory power that not only fills a gap in the field of nationalism studies, but also advances fortified challenges against the arbitrary dichotomies, claims of intrinsicness, and unnecessary, fanciful declarations that plague other theories of nationalism.⁵

1bb.) My ontology and its interdisciplinary roots and implications

The ontological basis for my inquiry consists of two components. The first is what exactly we are talking about when we discuss the ideological structure of a nationalism. This is important in

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⁵ Perhaps foremost among such theories is that of Gellner (1983), as shown in his definition of nationalism too narrow to account for non-ethnic varieties (pp. 6-7).
light of the lack of account for variation among nationalisms because, as aforementioned in the previous justification of my constructivist framework, defining what is meant by the structure of a nationalism allows us to understand the internal logics of nationalisms as imagined, variation-governing structures. The second component of my ontology are the units of analysis in which we are to understand nationalism. This is critical because, also as aforementioned, questions of variation require a definition to distinguish one nationalism from another. Put simply, there is no variation if there is nothing for the variation to be between. Altogether, this foundation is informed by the conclusions I have made through the investigation for this thesis, and so in explaining my ontology here, I will touch on some of those conclusions yet to be defended with evidence. For this reason it is important to revisit and interrogate the following bases after understanding my argument.

As a preface to my explanation of these bases, the title of Harold Lasswell’s landmark 1936 work *Politics: Who Gets What, When, How*, which has since become a common layman’s definition of politics, serves as an instructive medium through which to clarify the place of nationalism in the world of ideology. Broadly speaking, political ideology exists because different ideologies provide answers to various types of fundamental political questions. These questions may be divided into the *who* questions and the *what, when, how* questions: Whereas the latter are concerned with how a political community handles distribution (of anything from ownership of the means of production, to access to sanitation, to individual voting rights), the former questions ask who belongs in that community in the first place.6 Put simply, nationalism is a genus of ideological forces that answer *who* questions in a particular way which defines that genus as

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6 Using the terms *prepolitical* and *postpolitical*, Yack (2001) adopts a very similar ontology for his argument that popular sovereignty gives rise to nationalism, as a *what, when, how* ideological force like popular sovereignty presupposes and thus necessitates a *who* ideological force such as nationalism (pp. 522-523).
nationalism -- that way being not only in terms of sovereignty and limitedness, per Anderson’s canonical definition, but also governed by the ideological structure I characterize in this thesis (Anderson 2016 [2006, 1991, 1983], p. 6; Lasswell 1936).7

Thus, in the present thesis, I treat nationalism not as an ideology in and of itself, but as an ideological framework. By this I mean that nationalism at large -- in the mass form of the word -- refers to a skeleton to which further ideological substance is added, thereby forming unique ideological forces that I call nationalisms -- in the count form of the word. Put simply, the term nationalism here refers to a genus of individual ideological forces termed nationalisms, whose members are (1) united by their common skeleton, which consists of the ideological dimensions which define all nationalisms as nationalisms, but (2) made distinct, often drastically, by the various kinds of flesh that different individuals in the social world attach to the skeleton.

On the one hand, the ideological dimensions (or skeleton) that allow variation among nationalisms is best understood as the internal logic common to all nationalisms, which is precisely what this thesis terms the ideological structure of a nationalism. On the other hand, the substance (or flesh) of a nationalism is essentially an individual’s answers to the ideological questions posed by the framework. If the skeleton we call nationalism, i.e. the shared ideological structure of nationalisms, asks, ‘Who belongs in your nation?’, ‘What does it mean to be a member of your nation?’, and ‘What shape does your nation take?’, one’s answers to these questions constitute a particular kind of ideological flesh that is added to the skeleton and differentiates the nationalism in which they believe from all others. Thus, as argued by Malešević (2019), the ideological framework

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7 Much of the inspiration for my ontological understanding of ideology is owed to the analyses of political ideologies from Ball, Dagger, & O’Neill (2019).
of nationalism, now hegemonic in the world, is able to be communicated to and repurposed by individuals into new ideological forces called nationalisms.  

So it follows that the units of analysis in which we are to understand nationalism are nationalisms. Still, the question remains as to what in the social world we are actually referring to when we talk of distinct nationalisms. Following from the previous discussion, as evidenced clearly by my repeated use of the term individual, I posit that inevitably, the only possible unit to which we may reduce nationalism is the national imagining of an individual, i.e. how a human being imagines a nation, particularly the nation to which that person belongs. However, it is equally inevitable and immediately obvious that the endeavor even to begin accounting in theory for all the nationalisms of all the individuals in the world is convoluted beyond feasibility.

For this reason, this thesis takes one further position in order to conceptualize nationalism in units that are manageable for analysis but do not compromise the reality of the vast number of nationalisms actually in the world: Rather than treating each individual’s nationalism as unique, I group together those nationalisms held by individuals that are overwhelmingly similar and are thus unable to generate mutual ideological competition -- likely as a result of being disseminated from the same ideological source(s), e.g. political leaders or organizations, from the same historical moment in time and space -- and use the terms a nationalism and nationalisms to refer to these groupings as my units of analysis for the present thesis.

For example, I call Garveyism a nationalism, though in reality the term Garveyism denotes a set of minimally varying individuals’ nationalisms, all disseminated from Marcus Garvey⁹ and later

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⁸ A clear example of a mode of such communicating and repurposing is the “invented tradition” as conceived by Hobsbawm & Ranger (1983) (pp. 1-2).

⁹ See my background information on Marcus Garvey and Garveyism at the start of the section entitled “Gender and sexuality ideology in 20th century Black nationalisms” in Part II.
each made ever so slightly one’s own. Following from this reasoning, and in line with explanatory accounts of nationalist thought in the literature,¹⁰ I posit that a set of individual-held nationalisms that come from the same ideological source necessarily are sufficiently similar to one another to be grouped as a single unit of analysis unless there exists a historical example of ideological competition anywhere among them. Altogether, my units of analysis for this thesis are nationalisms, each defined as a grouping of some set of individuals’ ideological national imaginings that are overwhelmingly similar to one another.

This ontological simplification is closely analogous to how linguists distinguish among languages. The common understanding is that the world is generally a one-to-one constellation of distinct cultures and tongues in which each culture has its one language, and perhaps some dialects therein. In rejection of this belief, linguistics has responded with the quip that ‘a language is a dialect with an army and a navy,’ meaning that in practice all that makes a language different from a dialect is the arbitrary political matter of its being bestowed with national (or another form of) legitimacy. From the perspective of linguists, however, the generally accepted point of distinction between languages and between languages and dialects has to do with mutual intelligibility (Lippi-Green 2012, pp. 6-7). That is, a tongue is truly different from another if a typical speaker of one cannot understand a typical speaker of the other (i.e. not mutually intelligible), whereas dialects exhibit grammatical differences but remain mutually intelligible. Moreover, the distinction between the political and linguistic definitions of language is important in application: For instance, Danish and Swedish are politically different languages but linguistically are almost completely mutually intelligible, while Chinese is often politically treated as one language despite linguistically entailing several mutually unintelligible languages.

¹⁰ See Bajpai (2017), Dawson (2001), and particularly Singh (2017) as examples.
Thus, in recognizing the fact that every individual speaks ever so slightly in their own way, linguists acknowledge in parallel with my ontology that their fundamental unit of analysis is the individual’s idiolect in theory, but in practice is the group of individuals who share a community of practice that makes their common tongue internally intelligible and externally unintelligible. Put simply, just as linguists speak of Mandarin Chinese and Zapotec rather than any one idiolect, I speak not of any one individual’s nationalist convictions but of Garveyism and Hindu nationalism (see the ontological foundations of Lakoff & Johnson (1980) (pp. 3-6); Lippi-Green 2012, pp. 6-7).

Consequently, in this thesis, when I speak of a nation I am referring to an imagining of a nationhood. I am not concerned with the institutions -- social or physical -- born out of the realization of such imaginings through nation-building. Even as I discuss the nation envisioned as a consciousness, community, state, or something in between, I am referring to a nation imagined this way rather than necessarily a nation made real this way. Indeed, while some of the cases I analyze are nationalisms that in some historical moment gave rise to a realized nation in some form, many other nationalisms relevant to my inquiry never did so. To return to the example just mentioned, Garvey’s unrealized vision of Black people in the West migrating ‘back’ to Africa to establish a state spanning the entire continent (which he shared with many others, including the Rastafari movement) is a clear instance of the latter.

Therefore, adapting the words of Lippi-Green (2012) as she asserts the sharp distinction between spoken and written language, the imagined nation and the realized nation “are historically, structurally and functionally fundamentally different creatures” (p. 7). In these terms, here I focus not on the written language of nationalism -- that is, the marks of nationalist ideological forces on

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11 In this regard, my thinking is akin to Yack (2001)’s strictly conceptual approach to defining ‘the nation’ versus ‘the people’ (p. 520).
the social-physical landscape -- but rather the spoken language of nationalism: the ideological structure that governs not just variation among nationalisms, but also their operation and competition on the ideological landscape.

Due to the Eurocentrism of Anderson’s *Imagined Communities* -- in light of the difference between variation among nationalisms in the West versus postcolonial contexts, as previously exemplified by the relative prevalence of postcolonial non-state nations -- he neglects the significance of variation among nationalisms. As a result, he identifies three paradoxes of nationalism that he claims have long confounded theorists, unaware that considering variation ‘resolves’ all three. By ‘resolution,’ I mean that my account shows the paradoxes as conceptual conundra are not theoretically meaningful. The first is that nationalism is objectively modern in origin yet often subjectively primordial to nationalists themselves. The second is that the concept of nationality is universal yet real-world manifestations of nationalism are particularistic. The third is that nationalism may be politically potent yet philosophically incoherent as it has had no thinkers of its own, like Jeremy Bentham is to utilitarianism, for example (Anderson 2016 [2006, 1991, 1983], p. 5).

First, while nationalism as a framework is an invention of modern history, the nationalisms formed from the framework each imagine their respective nations in a particular way, including the age of the nation itself. In this way, it is clear how nationalism is at once objectively modern and subjectively primordial. Second, nationalism as a framework is merely skeletal, while particular nationalisms come into being by taking root in a particular identity, or rather, following from the metaphor, by adding flesh to the skeleton. Indeed, the inclusion of the word *framework* in my terminology is meant to convey Anderson’s observation that nationalism is an ‘empty’ type of
ideology. Hence the coexistence of nationality as a universal concept and manifestations of nationalism as particularistic. Third, there is no reason to expect nationalism as a framework to have a philosophical basis. Like racism and sexism, nationalism was born of social constructs developed in particular historical circumstances, rather than through any individual’s formulations. That being said, nationalisms are formed from the framework both intentionally by individuals and intersubjectively within groups -- as a nationalism developed by the individual thinker Marcus Garvey (alongside his fellow ideologues), Garveyism once again here serves as an instructive example. Thus, no matter how one approaches them, Anderson’s paradoxes in light of my account do not offer much in the way of theoretical utility.
1c.) Summary of Proposed Theoretical Schema

Below is a schema that provides a visual representation of the theoretical model of the ideological structure of nationalisms proposed in this thesis.
Schema of a Nationalism

Root Identity
Spectra of Variation in Structure:
- Uniformity
  - Homogeneous ⇔ Heterogeneous
- Viscosity
  - Static ⇔ Fluid

Spectra of Variation in Realization:
- Distribution
  - Exclusionary ⇔ Inclusionary

National Identity
Variation in Structure:
- Intersection with Other Identity-Based Ideology

Spectrum of Variation in Realization:
- Freedom
  - Discriminatory ⇔ Non-Discriminatory

National Community
Spectrum of Variation in Substructure:
- Peculiarity
  - Distinct ⇔ Intertwined

Spectrum of Variation in Superstructure:
- Sovereignty
  - State ⇔ Community ⇔ Consciousness

Nationalization
As shown in the schema, a nationalism essentially consists of three parts: the root identity, the national identity, and the national community. First, a nationalism is based on one particularly imagined root identity. The character of the prenational root identity varies along the structural spectra of uniformity, which ranges between homogeneous and heterogeneous, and of viscosity, which ranges between static and fluid. By viscosity, I mean the degree to which the root identity of a nationalism is imagined by its believers as able versus unable to change over time. Put simply, for a particular nationalism, one imagines an identity that defines who belongs in the envisioned nation. The content of this root identity may be of any blend of any types of identity, whether ethnic, religious, racial, civic, etc. However, what remains consistent is that some root identities are imagined as more homogeneous or heterogeneous and more static or fluid than others. This is important because the more homogeneous and/or static a root identity is imagined, the more exclusionary is its realized nation, and the more heterogeneous and/or fluid a root identity is imagined, the more inclusionary is its realized nation. From the nationalization of the root identity -- to build from Yack (2001)’s theorization of the nationalization of politics (pp. 523-524) -- come the mutually constitutive national identity and community.

Second, a national identity intersects structurally with other identity-based ideological forces, such as sexisms. Different national identities intersect with different ideological forces, hence the structural variation among those identities. To revisit the instance of sexisms, a national identity intersected with a misogynistic ideological force frames the female members of its nation as of a lower status than its male members specifically in nationalist terms, while a national identity intersected with a gender-egalitarian ideological force frames all of its members as being of equal status regardless of gender specifically in nationalist terms. Put simply as an example, an adherent of
an American nationalism that intersects with some form of misogyny would not believe just that women are inferior to men, but rather that it is *un-American* for women not to remain in their position of inferiority to men. As is already quite evident, this is important because national identities intersected with discriminatory ideologies give rise to discriminatory realized nations, while national identities intersected with non-discriminatory ideologies give rise to non-discriminatory realized nations.

Third, the character of the imagined national community varies along a substructural spectrum of peculiarity that ranges between the nation being imagined as interwoven with and as distinct from other political communities. This is important because this spectrum determines in the superstructural spectrum of sovereignty whether the nation is envisioned as a consciousness, community, or full state. This superstructural spectrum, unlike other spectra in the schema, is hierarchical rather than horizontal: There cannot be a national community without national consciousness nor can there be a nation-state without both national consciousness and community. In this sense, the community form entails the consciousness form as well as its own, and the state form encompasses all three forms. Moreover, the more interwoven a nation is imagined, the closer the nation falls to the consciousness end of the spectrum, and the more distinct, the closer to the full-state end.

To be clear, my understanding of sovereignty here as a spectrum diverges from the conventional conception of sovereignty as binary: either present or not, with no middle ground. I derive my spectral definition of sovereignty from Philpott (2011), which states that sovereignty is “supreme authority within a territory” (p. 562). Akin to the multidimensional nature of my

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12 Though of course, while the nation-state form encompasses the community and consciousness forms, a state form can be assumed by a non-national polity. Indeed, it is not the state but rather specifically the nation-state that entails the other two national forms.
schema, which was indeed inspired by Philpott (2011), he presents the model that sovereignty varies along three spectra: (1) the holder(s) of the sovereign authority, (2) the absoluteness of that sovereignty, and (3) the distribution of internal versus external sovereignty (p. 562).

First, the bearer of sovereignty has been identified in various ways: as a deity, a monarchy, and primarily as a demos or a constitutionally legitimized representative body by democracies, among others. Second, sovereignty may in fact be non-absolute: not in the sense that sovereignty can be anything short of supreme, but rather that sovereignty need not encompass all sorts of affairs. For instance, a state whose territory is entered by an international body without the state’s permission because that state government is committing genocide constitutes a case of a state with non-absolute sovereignty. Similarly, some polities may have non-absolute sovereignty in that it is over cultural but not political affairs, as is the case (at least officially) with many Native American reservations in the United States. Third, there remains the distinction between (1) a polity’s external sovereignty over relations with other polities and in the right to non-interference, and (2) internal sovereignty as authority over the polity’s territory and its members (Philpott 2011, pp. 561-563).

Altogether, I fully adopt the definition of sovereignty from Philpott (2011), plus one additional component to his tridimensional formulation. This added dimension is necessary because I define sovereignty as supreme authority, but not necessarily within a territory. Indeed, I assert that sovereignty varies along the three spectra outlined by Philpott (2011) as well as another spectrum of national form: among the territorial nation-state, semi-territorial national community, and non-territorial national consciousness. It is this dimension that (1) replaces the position that
sovereignty presupposes territory, and in the present thesis, that (2) I term the spectrum of sovereignty in my schema of the ideological structure of a nationalism.

The reason that I opt for the broader terminology (i.e., sovereignty rather than national form) is that this spectrum is closely intertwined with the other three. That is, whether the nation takes the form of the state, community, or consciousness influences (1) who holds sovereign authority (2) over what sort(s) of affairs sovereignty is exercised, and (3) how internal versus external sovereignty is distributed. To provide instances in corresponding order: (1) The sovereign is more likely to be collective in a community or consciousness than in a state, (2) sovereignty in a consciousness is more likely to be exercised over only cultural affairs, and (3) the state is more likely than the community or consciousness forms to have any exercised external sovereignty at all. Altogether, my schema comprehensively captures the ideological structure of nationalisms that allows for their significant variation.
1d.) *Methodology*

In order to derive grounded theoretical generalizations regarding the ideological structure of nationalisms from sets of cases of particular nationalisms, the present thesis adopts a comparative methodology rooted in a form of direct method of agreement from Dawson (2001). Put simply, I employ the principle that if a set of similar nationalisms with one significant type of difference are each distinct from one another in a way that means they can engage in ideological competition, the structural difference between them must be meaningful, and thus that set of nationalisms must vary along a spectrum upon which the points of those different structures fall. (As is yet to be seen in my argument, Part II strays somewhat from this methodology, as the facet of the schema described therein is not of a spectral nature.) Therefore, the constitutive claims of my theoretical model are falsifiable and thereby subject to revision from nationalism scholars in that it can be demonstrated under this same principle that there is in fact an additional degree on one of my dimensions of variation, or even an entirely unrecognized dimension.

Regarding the data themselves, because nationalism studies as a field has historically dwelled disproportionately on cases of nationalisms from the West, the present thesis employs evidence overwhelmingly from the postcolonial world and other understudied contexts: primarily South Asia, and secondarily Black communities of the United States. Moreover, following from my units of analysis, I gather data that provide a window into ideological structures from the written and transcribed spoken word of nationalist thinkers. As aforementioned, I define a distinct nationalism as a group of nationalisms held by individuals which are united by their overwhelming structural similarity such that they cannot compete ideologically with each other, and historically
such a grouping has its origins in a common nationalist ideologue, such as Marcus Garvey. Thus I treat the nationalist internal logic conveyed through rhetoric from such a political leader as a proxy for the ideological structure of a distinct nationalism, which is my basic unit of analysis.

A final point worth making here is that the ideologues whose rhetoric is to be analyzed by no means necessarily retain the same ideological substance throughout their respective political careers. In fact, as we will see, the nationalisms of Mohammad Ali Jinnah before versus after 1937 could hardly be more different. In this way, it is quite likely that a purveyor of political rhetoric at some point contradicts their own ideology. This significant possibility of inconsistency is not an issue for my argument because the point I aim to make is about the ideology itself: as it is structured according to the logic of the rhetoric delivered in the given historical instance. Indeed, as I have stated before, the thesis understands these purveyors of political rhetoric to be but ideological vessels of nationalisms -- and it is in the patterns of variation among those nationalisms that I am to characterize their shared ideological structure.

Altogether, the logical path that I follow in the first and third of my three subarguments in order to arrive at the corresponding components of my theoretical schema is as follows:

I. I put forward the argument to be made and explain its place in my proposed theory.
II. I identify the set of similar nationalisms to be discussed in the argument and introduce their relevance to the investigation at hand.
III. I qualify these nationalisms as structurally distinct in one particular way by explaining at least one historical instance of their ideological competition over that particular difference, thereby also situating each nationalism in its respective time and place.
IV. I conduct a comparative analysis as described above on the qualified set of nationalisms in order to derive from them a strong theoretical generalization to explain the observed structural variation.
V. I explain the rationale behind this generalization before demonstrating its explanatory supremacy over and accordance with other theoretical explanations.
My disagreement is largely with the canonical theorists of the field while my argument is more in line with the theories rooted in postcolonial contexts and the experiences of other oppressed groups, so it is in this stage that I revise the relevant canonical theory or theories in order to reach my own model.

VI. I conclude with a reiteration of what component of my proposed theory has been defended by the preceding argument, and thereby demonstrate the explanatory power of each constituent of the ultimate claim of my thesis.
1e.) **Roadmap for the Thesis**

In order to apply and defend the proposed theory, the argument of the present thesis is divided into three parts. Following a review of the literature, the first part, *The Root Identity of a Nationalism*, argues that a nationalism is rooted in a particularly imagined identity, and therein that these root identities vary along the spectra of ideological uniformity and viscosity. This first part concludes with a discussion of implications as to what makes a nationalism exclusionary versus inclusionary. The second part, *The Structural Intersection of a Nationalism with Other Ideological Forces*, argues that a nationalism intersects structurally with other ideological forces, primarily those also identity-based, such as sexisms. This second part concludes with a discussion of implications as to what makes a nationalism internally discriminatory versus non-discriminatory. The third part, *The Structural Capacity of Nationalisms to Ground Different Forms of the Nation*, first argues that a nationalism varies along a substructural spectrum of peculiarity that ranges between the nation being imagined as interwoven with and as distinct from other political communities. Moreover, this spectrum in turn determines on a superstructural spectrum of sovereignty whether the nation is envisioned as a consciousness, community, full state, or some other political entity that falls on the spectrum between two of these three. In these three ways, I defend my theory of the ideological structure of nationalisms.
2.) Literature Review

2a.) Roadmap for the Literature Review

In this literature review, I first provide a very brief introduction to the history of nationalism studies. Second, I discuss the core families of canonical explanatory theories of nationalism, which persisted through the mid-1990s. Third, I review significant peripheral and contemporary contributions to the theoretical understanding of nationalism, which span the entire lifetime of the field to the present day. In doing so, I focus on those works that represent the shift towards case-specific explanatory research over the last couple decades, which serves to frame the significance of my contribution to a field which continues to lack more generalized explanatory theoretical contributions drawn from non-Western cases of nationalisms. Lastly, following from this review, I explain my audiences and how I frame my contribution to the field.
2b.) *Introduction to the History of Nationalism Studies*

Over the last fifty to sixty years since its inception, the field of nationalism studies has undergone significant transformations. By this I am referring not only to the wavering fervor with which scholars have approached the subject due to changes in the perceived relevance of the field to the political world, but also to the very nature of the questions asked by scholars, about both the enigma of nationalism and the place of the field itself in political science.

The explanatory theoretical academic debate on nationalism first gained prominence in political science in the wake of decolonization and the wave of newly established states in Asia and Africa. Prior to this era existed only a small number of seminal works which provided the foundation for the then-nascent field, such as those from political scientists like Karl W. Deutsch and historians like Hans Kohn, Carleton Hayes, and E. H. Carr. The fact that the field of nationalism studies is a relatively new undertaking in political science is striking in light of the fact that the existence of nations has long been taken for granted across the social sciences.

The wavering intensity and evolution of inquiry in the explanatory theoretical portion of the field is exhibited through the core, peripheral, and contemporary theories that have ebbed and flowed within nationalism studies over time. The first core theoretical family of the field was primordialism, which gained prominence in the 1960s, primarily through Geertz (1963). The late 1970s and early 1980s witnessed the rise of ethnosymbolists, modernists, and constructivists in opposition to the primordialists, and thus primordialism lost its dominance in the field, with its only other major contribution being Shils (1995).
Thereafter and into the early-mid 1990s, the debate between constructivists such as Anderson (2016 [2006, 1991, 1983]) and modernists like Greenfeld (1992) became the core theoretical activity, with ethnosymbolists such as Armstrong (1982) falling further from the center of the field. Through a number of very impactful works in the early-mid 1980s, including Anderson (2016 [2006, 1991, 1983]) as well as Gellner (1983) and Hobsbawn (1983), the constructivists obtained primacy in nationalism studies, while modernists remained their primary opposition into the early 1990s.

Around the same time in the early 1990s, ethnosymbolism lost independent support, leaving room for the constructivists to adopt ideological narratives and symbols as subjects of study for understanding how nations are constructed and reproduced. Soon after, by the mid-1990s, the field of explanatory nationalism studies lost fervor, and did not return to the same intensity until around 2010.

In the interim, the postcolonial strand of the explanatory portion of the field gained influence in the wake of Chatterjee (1993), in which he expands significantly upon his aforementioned conception of material versus spiritual nationhood. Later, constructivism was developed and found new explanatory power in Billig (1995), which introduced the concept of banal nationalism. Adjacent to this contribution were a number of less major works in political theory and the study of ideology at large that consider nationalism, the most significant among them being Calhoun (1997) and Yack (2001).

The eventual revival of the field around 2010 emerged largely from a reconsideration of Billig (1995) and its roots in nationalism studies, among other works of narrower focus, and so came to be the contemporary growing constructivist consensus.
As aforementioned, peripheral explanatory theoretical work that draws from postcolonial contexts and other experiences of oppressed groups gained significant influence with the publication of Chatterjee (1993). Prior even to this contribution was Jayawardena (1986), which was not strictly an explanatory theoretical work on nationalism, but rather offered implications pertinent to this work that were drawn specifically from postcolonial contexts, which was groundbreaking at the time. Leading up to Chatterjee (1993) came Chatterjee (1991), which epitomized the postcolonial critique of the canonical theories of nationalism with a rebuttal to the modular character of nationalism as described in Anderson (2016 [2006, 1991, 1983], p. 4). In a similar vein, Dawson (2001) contributed an unprecedentedly comprehensive account of the ideological history of Black nationalisms in the United States, which had previously been completely missing from theories in the field. Most recently, the last decade or so has seen contemporary explanatory works, the most significant among them being Mylonas (2013), Tudor (2013), Balcels (2017), Sambanis & O’Leary (2018), Weeden (2018), Malešević (2019), Mamdani (2020), and Darden (forthcoming), which emerged from the roots of Billig (1995) and the peripheral strands of the field.
2c.) Core Families of Canonical Nationalism Theories

The core families of canonical explanatory theories of nationalism since WWII are identified here as follows: field-originating theorists, ethnosymbolists, primordialists, modernist constructivists, modernists, as well as the theorists of the mid-late 1990s and early 2000s who developed new approaches to nationalism studies in the interim between the theoretical activity of the 1980s and contemporary work.

Field-originating theorists: The earliest true inquiries into nationalism as a social phenomenon were Herder (2002 [1772]) and Renan (1992 [1882]), which sowed the seeds of the modernist and constructivist approaches to the study of nationalism, respectively. However, nationalism studies did not become a field in its own right until after WWII, with the primary pioneering works of Kohn (1944), Carr (1945), and Deutsch (1953). Due to this historical context, their work was driven by questions not only of the role of nationalism as a powerful political force in the war, i.e. asking under what conditions nationalism flourishes, but also of what other (non-national) forms of political organization might prevent a similar war from occurring again, such as internationalism and globalism. As these questions received plenty of answers in the decades following WWII, they have become less relevant, but the importance of these works as seminal in the field remains undeniable.

Ethnosymbolists: Armstrong (1982) and Smith (1991) make up a secondary explanatory theoretical opposition to the constructivists of the 1980s and 90s. As with the constructivists, the themes discussed and questions asked by these scholars were largely in terms of the historical origin and development of nationalism at large. However, these scholars emphasize the importance of
myths and symbols in the development of nations. Amidst the contemporary general consensus on fundamental constructivist principles, the persisting relevance of these foremost ethnoscopists comes from their contributions in establishing constitutive ideological narratives as a core component of how nationalisms are constructed and reproduced.

**Primordialists:** As the foremost primordialist works, Geertz (1963) and Shils (1995), like other explanatory theories of nationalism, ask how nations and national identities come about. The central claim of these contributions is that nations are necessarily rooted in once-real, primordial communities carried into modernity. Primordialism is now overwhelmingly rejected by scholars of nationalism, but the influence of the body of theory on the field in the past is not to be discounted, as the contemporary constructivist consensus came about primarily in opposition to the earlier dominance of primordialism in the field.

**Modernist constructivists:** Anderson (2016 [2006, 1991, 1983]), Gellner (1983), Hobsbawm (1983), and Hroch (1985), particularly the former two, constitute the core of the hugely active and influential period of explanatory theoretical nationalism studies that ran from 1983 into the early 1990s. Theorists like these are the reason why the decade following 1983 is, perhaps until very recently, considered the greatest decade in the history of nationalism studies, emerging from the historical contexts of the ongoing Cold War and the post-decolonization establishment of many new nations primarily in Africa and Asia. Above all, this period marked the shift in the field towards the general contemporary consensus on constructivist theoretical understandings of nationalism, which emphasize nations as a particular type of imagined community developed intersubjectively.
Still, the evidence used in these works was overwhelmingly from European contexts. The only major potential exception comes from Anderson (2016 [2006, 1991, 1983]), who considered some non-Western cases, however the degree to which evidence not from Europe directly impacted his theoretical formulation remains quite limited. As a result, the themes discussed and questions asked by these scholars were largely in terms of the historical origin and development of nationalism at large (Anderson 2016 [2006, 1991, 1983], pp. 5, 166-185). There was not yet much concern about variation among nationalisms in different cultural contexts, but rather about nationalism as a framework originating in Europe and being disseminated by means such as industry and language standardization, then further spread from there through the rest of the world over time.

Altogether, the work of these scholars is still very relevant today because -- with the exception of Billig (1995), to be discussed in the section after next, whose major contribution was recognized only years after its publication -- new explanatory theoretical understandings of nationalism grounded in the accepted fundamental constructivist principles have since been largely unsatisfying to the greatest questions of the field.

**Modernists:** Nairn (1977), Breuilly (1983), Brass (1991), Greenfeld (1992), and Hechter (1999), particularly the penultimate, constitute the primary explanatory theoretical opposition to constructivists working at the same time, around the decade following 1983. As with the constructivists, the themes discussed and questions asked by these five scholars were largely in terms of the historical origin and development of nationalism at large through Western modernity. These modernist accounts are even more strictly limited to Western contexts than those of the constructivists.
Greenfeld (1992) in particular deals with themes and questions of the relationship between the origin and development of nationalism and the modern economic industrialization and cultural unitization of Europe and the United States from the sixteenth century on. She also developed modernist understandings of nationhood particularly in advancing a typology of ethnic and civic nationalisms, which tied nationalism specifically to variation across individualistic and collectivistic understandings of community. Despite the general constructivist consensus in the contemporary field, modernists remain relevant in that work such as Greenfeld (1992) developed the strictly modernist understanding of nationalism through links with other political forces, such as democracy, which played a significant part in generating the anti-modernist constructivist opposition that in turn gave rise to the contemporary consensus.

**Interim theorists:** Chatterjee (1993), Billig (1995), Brubaker (1996), Calhoun (1997), Nagel (1998), Smith (2001), and Yack (2001), particularly the foremost two, are responsible for some of the significant stepping-stone explanatory theoretical developments in the field that filled the interim between the 1980s surge of scholarship and the contemporary revival. I call these works members of an ‘interim’ period because they were largely disregarded at the time of their publishing but later became the primary basis of contemporary constructivist and constructivist-derived theoretical understandings of nationalism.\(^{13}\)

These works remain very relevant today due to the inventive ways in which they began to develop the constructivist theoretical leaps of the 1980s for more contemporary contexts, in which there was no longer a major ongoing war (as the Cold War had been over for at least a few years) to explain with understandings of nationalism. The interim period witnessed the full emergence of

\(^{13}\) A notable point that may constitute an exception to this is that Dawson (2001) adopted the theoretical framework for his investigation into Black nationalisms from Calhoun (1997), which is only a gap of four years. Still, the fact remains that these ‘interim’ works were largely neglected until several years later.
the postcolonial study of nationalism, and for Western scholars, this new historical context drew
the focus of the field towards nationalism at home rather than in conflict abroad.

The development of the concept of banal nationalism in Billig (1995) stands out as the
most significant interim development in nationalism studies. Focusing on the ways in which
nationalism is constructed and reproduced in non-extreme, everyday contexts, Billig redefined how
nationalism is understood today: as the ideological basis for the international world order, largely
evident in banal contexts, such as a national flag at an American post office, as opposed to the types
of extreme cases which previously dominated evidence used in the field, such as ethnic cleansing.

Brubaker (1996) reframed theoretical understandings of nationalism by accounting for
post-Cold War cases of new nations emerging in Europe, which marked a new and previously
unconsidered manifestation of nationhood. Still, apart from Chatterjee, the eventual expansion of
nationalism studies beyond European cases was yet to happen after Brubaker.

Calhoun (1997), Nagel (1998), Smith (2001), and Yack (2001) represent two other ways in
which the field of nationalism studies shifted in the interim: theoretical understandings of
ideological synthesis and of the construction of national identity and community. Nagel expands
theory to account for how nationalism at large is structurally intertwined with particular
ideological conceptions of masculinity, while Calhoun, Smith, and Yack explain the structural
dynamic relationship among the people, the nation, and the state.

Most relevant to this thesis, however, is the shift initiated by Chatterjee (1993). By deriving
broader explanatory theoretical claims specifically from South Asian cases of nationalisms, this
book emerged as the first major contribution that brought a significant thread of explanatory
theoretical nationalism studies beyond the study of Europe. This work succeeded in characterizing
nationalist thought from postcolonial contexts, and thereby offered insight into how nationalism as a framework came about in South Asia, how nationalism has taken forms in South Asia not seen in Europe, and what characterizes these forms, particularly in terms of how they blend differently with other ideologies such as feminism.

Still other shifts in the field were initiated by case-specific scholars working around the same time as Chatterjee. Of these scholars, the most relevant to this thesis is Michael Dawson, to be discussed in the next section, who accounted for how nationalisms vary in different visions of national community through cases of Black nationalisms in the United States.
2d.) Other Significant Theoretical Contributions in Nationalism Studies

The non-canonical explanatory theoretical contributions in nationalism studies that are particularly relevant to this thesis are identified here as follows: work by experts on nationalisms in South Asia, work by experts on nationalisms from Black and Pan-African contexts, and of course, work by contemporary scholars of nationalism, plus a collection of miscellaneous peripheral contributions that pertain to my argument in particular ways.

Works by experts on nationalisms in South Asia: Jayawardena (1986), Chatterjee (1991), Parekh (1991), Katju (2011), Devji (2013), Singh (2017), Bajpai (2017), and Malji (2018) all draw particularly from South Asian cases of nationalisms. Chatterjee (1993) is of course a critical contribution to include here, but because the impact of that book on postcolonial study and the field at large is so significant, it was already discussed earlier as a canonical work. The first point to notice about this collection of works is that all emerged either in the post-1983 decade in response to that surge of explanatory theoretical scholarship which neglected non-European nationalisms, or in the last decade as contemporary work gained traction and emphasized the importance of considering such nationalisms.

The eight works listed above may be broadly divided into two types of explanatory work. First, Parekh (1991), Katju (2011), Singh (2017), Bajpai (2017), and Malji (2018) provide detailed accounts of the internal logics of particular nationalisms. Some of these accounts also discuss the respective political origins, consequences, and implications of the individual nationalisms.

Here I briefly summarize each of these accounts. Parekh (1991) frames Jawaharlal Nehru’s ideological vision for the nation of India to be, and in doing so explains Nehru’s Western-style,
strictly civic conception of Indian national identity. Katju (2011) delves into the ideological inner workings of Hindu nationalism as a broad case through which to investigate conceptions of freedom in exclusionary national ideology. Singh (2017) traces the progression of Mohammed Ali Jinnah’s ideological national visions for the Indian subcontinent from the early twentieth century through Partition in 1947, employing primarily rhetoric as evidence to portray the distinct ways that Jinnah conceived particularly of Indian and Pakistani national identities over time. In order to develop detailed recommendations for India to become more pluralist, Bajpai (2017) characterizes the historical ideological competition among the two foremost nationalisms in India, which together represent the country’s long-lasting struggle between Hindu ideological dominance and religious pluralism. Malji (2018) provides a concise account of the political processes by which Hindu nationalism has moved towards ideological hegemony in India since the 1980s, with a focus on Narendra Modi’s time as Prime Minister.

Altogether, these works are pertinent to my thesis in that they use my same units of analysis in order to describe the ideological structures of particular understudied nationalisms, in context of ideological competition among nationalisms. My response to these works, therefore, is a theoretical account of the ideological structure of nationalisms that is drawn from many of their same cases, and developed in light of their particular analyses, because more general explanatory theories rooted in such cases have been remarkably rare.

Second, Jayawardena (1986), Chatterjee (1991), and Devji (2013), in response to the existing theories of nationalism rooted overwhelmingly in European contexts, employ cases from South Asia specifically in order to propose theoretical revisions for the field. Their theoretical contributions address in particular questions of how nationalism as a framework came about in
South Asia, how nationalism has taken forms in South Asia not seen in Europe, and what characterizes these forms, particularly in terms of how they blend differently with other ideologies such as feminism.

Here I briefly summarize each of these theoretical contributions. Jayawardena (1986) develops a uniquely anti-colonial conception of feminism through a detailed historical account of the roles of women in various nationalist movements across Asia and the Middle East in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In analyzing these movements, she describes the myriad of ways in which anti-colonial feminisms intersect ideologically with different nationalisms of the same historical moment.

Chatterjee (1991) offers an incredibly concise rebuttal to the claim from Anderson (2016 [2006, 1991, 1983]) that nationalisms beyond Europe and the Americas are imagined strictly from a modular ideological framework disseminated originally from the West (p. 4). Rather, Chatterjee (1991) argues that this assertion entails that even the national imaginations of postcolonial communities are colonized, which does not leave room to account, to give one example of many, for the anti-colonial nationalisms of British India. Chatterjee (1991) concludes with the theoretical claim in opposition to Anderson that accounts of nationalism limited to the West fail to account for nationalisms that have not realized the nations that they imagined, as these unrealized nationalisms are found overwhelmingly in the postcolonial world, where borders were drawn by colonial powers and the legacies of fractured sovereignties persist.

Devji (2013) investigates the unique case of the ideological national grounding of the state of Pakistan. He argues that unlike the vast majority of states, in the context of Western settler states, the nation of Pakistan is not at all rooted in historical associations between lands and peoples. In
this way, the ideological foundation of Pakistan is very similar to that of the state of Israel, namely Zionism, such that Pakistani nationalism is in many ways the Muslim counterpart to Zionism’s Jewish conception of Israel. Through this investigation, Devji (2013) employs cases of nations emerging from a migration of a persecuted minority in order to develop a rudimentary theoretical account of the ideological structure of nationalisms with little to no grounding apart from the imagined belonging itself.

Altogether, these three major explanatory theoretical contributions are pertinent to my thesis for a number of reasons. Like the case-specific accounts above, these works use my same units of analysis and characterize the ideological structures of particular understudied nationalisms, in context of their ideological competition. However, these contributions go further in that they offer broader theoretical accounts of ideological intersection with nationalisms and of different forms in which the nation is imagined, with a focus on unrealized nations envisioned by postcolonial communities, which highlights the deeply constructed nature of nationalism at large. Thus my response to these works is a more generalized theoretical account that is rooted in many of their same cases and developed in line with their theoretical contributions, as this sort of general theory of the ideological structure of nationalisms is currently missing from the field.

**Work by experts on nationalisms from Black and Pan-African contexts:** Wilson (1970), Dorsey (1991), Dawson (2001), and Biney (2018) all draw from cases of nationalisms imagined in Black and/or Pan-African contexts. In parallel to the works rooted in South Asian cases of nationalisms, these four contributions account for the ideological structures of particular nationalisms. On the one hand, Wilson (1970), Dorsey (1991), and Biney (2018) explain the internal logics of Black American revolutionary versus cultural nationalism, Garveyism, and
Pan-Africanism, respectively. Biney (2018) also traces the ideological history of Pan-Africanism as a foundation for the investigation into its structure as a family of nationalisms. In these ways, these works are relevant to my thesis simply in that they use my same units of analysis in order to describe particular understudied nationalisms in much the same way that I do in my argument.

On the other hand, Dawson (2001) embarks upon a project of unparalleled ambition, as he delves into the ideological histories and structures of Black nationalisms in the United States dating as far back as the American Civil War, with a focus on those from the Civil Rights Movement to the 1990s. What really sets Dawson (2001) apart from other scholars of Black nationalisms is not even so much the scale and depth of his description, but rather the explanatory theoretical conclusions he draws from his accounts, which he frames with explicit acknowledgment of the ideas on postcolonial nationalisms at large from Chatterjee (1993). Though these conclusions are only rudimentary, as they are not the focus of his descriptive analysis, they succeed in defining him as one of the very few scholars, along with Chatterjee (1993), to draw broader theoretical claims on the ideological structure of nationalisms specifically from the context of an oppressed group.

Therefore, Dawson (2001) is particularly pertinent to my thesis in a number of ways. Even more explicitly than all other works with which I engage through this thesis, Dawson (2001) defines and employs my same units of analysis in order to describe the ideological structures of individual understudied nationalisms in relation to their ideological competition. In addition, as with Chatterjee (1993), Dawson (2001) offers theoretical insight into the particular types of variation among nationalisms from postcolonial and other oppressed communities, which do not appear much at all in the West, hence the lack of a more general explanatory theoretical account for these dimensions of variation in a field dominated by Western cases. Dawson (2001) discusses in
particular depth how Black nationalisms vary in the form in which the nation is imagined, namely between national consciousness, national community, and the full nation-state, which directly informs my account of such variation. Altogether, much like before, my response to these works is a much-needed, more generalized theoretical account that is rooted in many of their same cases and developed closely in conjunction with the theoretical contributions from Dawson (2001).

**Works by contemporary theorists of nationalism:** Mylonas (2013), Tudor (2013), Balcells (2017), Tudor & Slater (2017), Mylonas (2017), Sambanis & O’Leary (2018), Weeden (2018), Malešević (2019), Mamdani (2020), Tudor & Slater (2020), Mylonas & Tudor (2021), and Darden (forthcoming) are the major central contemporary explanatory scholarly works of the field of nationalism studies, whose authors are my core audience for the present thesis.

The work of these scholars spans a broad range of study. First, research from Mylonas characterizes the competitive ideological processes behind nation-building. Second, Malešević (2019) employs sociological methodologies to develop theoretical conclusions akin to those of Billig (1995) to explain the ideological hegemony of everyday nationalism. Third, both Tudor and Slater in all the works listed above investigate the relationships between nationalisms and forms of government, highlighting the roots of the dichotomy between inclusionary democracy and exclusionary autocracy in South and Southeast Asia. Additionally, Balcells (2017), Sambanis & O’Leary (2018), Weeden (2018), Mamdani (2020), and Darden (forthcoming) detail the theoretical relationships between nationalism and civil war, international security, authoritarianism, colonial statehood, and standardized mass education, respectively.

Mylonas & Tudor (2021) offers a cutting-edge survey of recent developments in the field, which concludes that contemporary scholarship consists of “(a) comparative historical research
that treats nationalism as a macropolitical force and excavates the relationships between nations, states, constitutive stories, and political conflict; (b) behavioral research that uses survey data and experiments to gauge the causes and effects of attachment to nations; and (c) ethnographic scholarship that illuminates the everyday processes and practices that perpetuate national belonging.” I detail the current goals for the field according to these scholars and how my thesis fulfills them in the next section on my audiences and contribution to nationalism studies.

**Other miscellaneous contributions:** There remain some scholarly works that do not fall into any of the above categories, but are each pertinent to my thesis in a particular way. First, Fanon (1963) and Getachew (2019) contribute concurrent and retrospective analyses, respectively, of nationalism and nation-building in the postcolonial context. These analyses are critical for my theoretical formulation to engage with, as a core goal of my thesis is to develop theory rooted in postcolonial contexts and other experiences of oppressed groups. Second, Kymlicka (1996) details the ideological inner workings that undergird multinational states, and in doing so offers insight that informs my conception of the root identity of a nation. Third, Nagle and Clancy (2011) investigate the process of transition from one hegemonic nationalism to another with a different root identity within the same state, which is an ideological phenomenon for which my theory must account. Fourth, Özkirimli (2017) provides a comprehensive and widely renowned survey of theories of nationalism and the field of nationalism studies through history, which provides the bigger picture of the constellation of conversations into which I am entering with my thesis beyond what is directly relevant to have discussed in this literature review.
2e.) Situating the Present Inquiry within the Literature

The place of my inquiry in the literature is (1) as a critique of the nationalism studies canon, (2) in light of the contemporary theoretical consensus and (3) rooted in quasitheoretical contributions drawn from understudied cases. Here, to represent and make more concrete these three relationships of my inquiry to the literature, respectively, I first problematize Anderson (2016 [2006, 1991, 1983]), then illuminate Billig (1995) as the primary basis for contemporary theoretical understanding of nationalism, and finally explain how I am to build upon the theoretical contributions of Chatterjee (1993) and Dawson (2001).

First, as aforementioned, variation in ideological structure among nationalisms is not accounted for in the canon because non-Western nationalisms have historically been seen -- by Gellner (1983) and Greenfeld (1992), to name two especially influential works -- as deviations from the less varied nationalisms of the West. Even Anderson (2016 [2006, 1991, 1983]), which in the chapter ‘Census, Map, Museum’ considers cases from Southeast Asia, fails to break from this historical Eurocentrism. Indeed, his seminal work is not exceptional to the Eurocentric canon because his data from Southeast Asia are overwhelmingly about the direct nationalist influences of the European colonial presence in the region, with brief acknowledgement of Siam (now Thailand), which is the only Southeast Asian country never colonized by a European power (Anderson 2016 [2006, 1991, 1983], pp. 166-185).¹⁴

Anderson begins this chapter with the admission that his “shortsighted assumption [in the original edition of Imagined Communities] was that official nationalism in the colonized worlds of

¹⁴ While Brass (1991) deals with cases from South Asia in greater depth than does Anderson, the former’s investigation is into the origin of modern nationalism, which as aforementioned is of no concern to this thesis.
Asia and Africa was modelled [sic] directly on that of the dynastic states of nineteenth-century Europe. Subsequent reflection ... persuaded [him] that this view was hasty and superficial...” (Anderson 2016 [2006, 1991, 1983], p. 163). Yet, rather than attempting to describe any nationalism from beyond the West, he dedicates the vast majority of the chapter deriving characterizations of ideology from the three colonial institutions for which the chapter is named: the census, the map, and the museum. In his own words, he aims to explain how, through these institutions, “the colonial state imagined its dominion -- the nature of the human beings it ruled, the geography of its domain, and the legitimacy of its ancestry” (Anderson 2016 [2006, 1991, 1983], pp. 163-164). At no point in his investigation does he consider nationalisms of the colonized peoples: only the nationalist imaginings imposed by the colonizers.

Furthermore, while Anderson does consider Siam, citing Winichakul (1988), he states that the borders of the never-colonized country that formed between 1850 and 1910 were nonetheless “coloniaally determined” (Anderson 2016 [2006, 1991, 1983], p. 171). Moreover, he praises Winichakul’s account for its focus on Siam: Anderson states that this particular case offers a unique example because Siam developed a national consciousness within its traditional political structures rather than those of a colonizer (Anderson 2016 [2006, 1991, 1983], pp. 170-178). However, in the remainder of the chapter, Anderson neglects to discuss any facet of nationalism in Siam apart from its borders, which he himself called a product of the surrounding colonization. Therefore, despite his recognition that Siamese nationalisms may very well have had an influence on the ideological landscape of the moment, even in the case of a never-colonized non-Western country, Anderson fails to escape the field’s Eurocentrism. Thus, his analysis of non-Western cases is not truly at the root of his theoretical assumptions and conclusions. Rather, his theory is derived from Europe and
Euro-America, and alongside rather than at the foundation of this derivation is his consideration of Southeast Asia.

Second, even after more than 25 years since its release, Billig (1995) remains the primary basis for contemporary theoretical understanding of nationalism. Advancing a significant challenge to the nationalism studies field of the time, Billig proposes that while theories on nationalism have been drawn overwhelmingly from extreme cases foreign to the theorist, it is critical to engage with "the ideological means by which nation-states are reproduced" (1995), which he terms banal nationalism. He argues that understanding banal nationalism is very important because these nationalist forces constitute the ideological foundation of the contemporary world -- as the "endemic condition" (Billig 1995) -- yet are for that very reason the most familiar form of nationalism, and therefore so often overlooked, even when at the root of conflict.

Though Billig (1995) initially fell on deaf ears, as nationalism studies underwent its renaissance around 2010, scholars in the field adopted his theorizations as the foundation of contemporary explanatory inquiry on nationalism. This adoption is the reason not only that the study of nationalism still today engages primarily (as aforementioned) with (1) nations and nationalist conflict as products of ideological narrative, (2) the behavioral causes and effects of nationalist sentiment, and (3) ethnography on the everyday ideological (re)production of national belonging, but also that the present thesis investigates the ways in which the day-to-day nationalisms at the root of political life are structured so as to allow for their variation.

Third, Chatterjee (1993) and Dawson (2001) provide the quasitheoretical basis upon which my inquiry is built. In his chapter “Visions of a Black Nation: Black Nationalism and
African-American Political Thought,” Dawson cites Chatterjee (1993) in his brief yet critical theoretical statement:

Nationalism in all of its various forms has developed over the decades among African Americans partly as a response to blacks’ strict exclusion from the benefits of American liberalism, and partly as a way for blacks to distance themselves politically, socially, and culturally from what were seen as the hegemonic, racist narratives and practices of a corrupt system of white supremacy. This persistent perspective of black nationalists resembles that of the anticolonial nationalists in India and elsewhere ... A common characteristic of anticolonial and antiracist nationalism is the tendency to substitute a new hegemonic narrative that assigns precise roles to members of their nations and denies that differences exist between members of the nation (Dawson 2001).

Here Dawson links anticolonial and antiracist nationalisms through their shared tendency to emerge from the objective to subvert the ideological dominion of the oppressor. This link not only recognizes parallels between anticolonial and antiracist nationalisms, but also strongly implies that these nationalisms as objects of study offer distinct insight that is not obtainable from research on Western cases.

Dawson also states here that these anti-oppression nationalisms tend not to acknowledge differences among members of the nation. While this assessment holds true, as is to be demonstrated in this thesis, it is not to be confused with the claim that all such nationalisms are the same in this way -- or in any way apart from the defining characteristics of limitedness and sovereignty, for that matter. On the contrary, Dawson opens the passage above recognizing outright “nationalism in all of its various forms” in American Black communities. Moreover, his statement on this tendency of anti-oppression nationalisms clearly presupposes that the formulation of a nationalism entails choices for -- and therefore variation in -- how the roles of the nation’s members are assigned.15 Indeed, Dawson dedicates the entirety of this chapter to characterizing in deeply

15 This dimension of variation is to be explored in Part II of my argument.
detailed historical context the web of various Black nationalisms (differentiated primarily by their imagination of the form of the Black nation\textsuperscript{16}) that have held ground on the ideological landscape of the United States across decades.

Altogether, by demonstrating that cases of both anticolonial and antiracist nationalisms offer unique, crucial insight particularly into the remarkably understudied phenomenon of variation among nationalisms, Chatterjee (1993) and Dawson (2001) provide the theoretical roots of this thesis. So it follows that my contribution is directly relevant to contemporary nationalism scholars, who seek to rectify the field’s historical Eurocentrism.

\textsuperscript{16} This dimension of variation is to be explored in Part III of my argument.
2f.) My Audiences and Contribution to the Field

As aforementioned, my core audience is contemporary scholars of nationalism continuing to work towards a revival of nationalism studies, such as Harris Mylonas, Maya Tudor, Siniša Malešević, Laia Balcells, Keith Darden, Mahmood Mamdani, Nicholas Sambanis, Brendan O’Leary, and Lisa Weeden. As can be attested particularly by the first three of these scholars, the field is now entering a time of revitalization. However, regarding explanatory theory as opposed to normative work, nationalism studies has seen only in recent years the first new, influential ideas since the canonical texts of the 1980s and 1990s -- particularly Billig (1995) with his conception of banal nationalism. The significance of my contribution is evident in how the present fulfills the pressing demands of the field, in an effort to take part in a revitalization of explanatory theoretical inquiry in nationalism studies. The three contemporary scholars listed foremost above agree that the foremost goals for the field at large are:

I. to temper methodological diversity and resist the siloing of subfields in order to integrate interdisciplinary work on nationalism into a holistic field,
II. to move towards comparative research as the dominant methodology to determine that an observed pattern among nationalisms is intrinsic to nationalism,
III. to develop new units of analysis for the field in order to produce research engaged less with the origins of nationalism at large and more with the effects of individual nationalisms, as defined by the researcher,
IV. to identify the underlying conditions that produce variation among nationalisms, particularly regarding what makes a nationalism exclusionary versus inclusionary, as this illuminates why some nationalisms incite violence while others promote peace,
V. to combat the skew of theoretical conclusions historically rooted solely in Western cases by bringing greater regional diversity to scholarly discussions and the data used in research, and
VI. to expand the study of nationalism further beyond basic constructivist frameworks (Mylonas and Tudor 2021).
Following from these goals, the consolidated core demand of the contemporary field is for comparative theory-building work that develops new units of analysis and draws from peripheral scholars and contexts in order to rethink canonical theorizations and formulate a constructivist theoretical conception of nationalisms that captures the roots of their ideological variation, with the expressed aim to generate implications for the origins of exclusion versus inclusion. This is the very demand my thesis aims to fulfill, hence my framing of current scholars as my core audience, the relevance of contemporary work to my thesis, and the significance of my work for the field.

More broadly, my contribution to nationalism studies is a new answer to an old, general explanatory theoretical question, wondered about for several decades but largely abandoned after Billig (1995), about the elusive phenomena that are the internal logics of nationalisms. Over the last decade or so, nationalism studies at large has consisted primarily of communitarian normative work in defense of nationalism, such as Miller (2016) and Tamir (2019), and of case-specific explanatory research whose conclusions seldom aim towards broadly generalizable theoretical contributions. The present thesis aims to rectify the lack of broader theoretical claims by utilizing cases of nationalisms as data in conversation with case-specific contemporary explanatory works, all in order to revise canonical explanatory theories and develop a new explanatory theory particularly for the ideological structure of nationalisms.
3.) Argument by Application of Theory

3a.) Introduction to the Argument

To reiterate, this thesis asks: In what ways are nationalisms ideologically structured in common so as to allow for their structural variation? In order to demonstrate the explanatory power of the schema that answers this question by capturing the internal logic common to nationalisms, I fully explain, apply, and defend its three intertwined parts in turn: first the prenational root identity, then the national identity, and lastly the national community. Throughout my argument, I briefly refer to scholars already addressed in the literature review, in order to clarify how each facet of my argument agrees or disagrees with others’ work.

Each of the sections of my argument consider a unique set of cases. For Part I on root identity, I look at the Independence-era Indian nationalisms of the 1946-1950 Constituent Assembly as well as the pre-Partition religious inclusionary Pakistani nationalism of Mohammad Ali Jinnah, in contrast with Donald Trump’s American nationalism. For Part II on national identity, I consider 20th century Black nationalisms linked by their intersection with gender and sexuality ideology as well as the mid-to-late 20th century Hindu nationalisms that led to the rise of current Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. For Part III on national community, I draw from various pre-Partition Pakistani nationalisms, 20th century Black nationalisms, and late 20th century Pan-Africanisms, all in relation to 1990s Black community nationalisms situated between the community and consciousness forms.
3b.) *Part I: The Root Identity of a Nationalism*

3ba.) *Introduction to Part I*

In Part I, I argue that a nationalism is based on one particularly imagined root identity, which falls on two spectra of variation: uniformity, which ranges between homogeneous and heterogeneous, and viscosity, which ranges between static and fluid. Under this definition, a single nation cannot be of multiple national identities, but very well may be by a national identity constituted of multiple sub-identities. Furthermore, the more homogeneous and static a nation’s root identity is imagined, the more exclusionary is that nation, and correspondingly, the more heterogeneous and fluid a nation’s root identity is imagined, the more inclusionary is that nation. It is through this claim, to be substantiated in the following argument, that I challenge the ethnic-civic dichotomy, as well as the two associations between ethnic nationalism and exclusion and between civic nationalism and inclusion.

Per the conventional understanding within nationalism studies, the civic substance of a nationalism is characterized by its identification of citizenship and/or a shared commitment to liberal values and institutions as the criteria for national membership. On the other hand, a nationalism’s ethnic substance takes a particularly defined ethnic identity as necessary for such membership. As aforementioned, by the term *ethnic* I mean to include not only strictly ethnic identity but also identity of a linguistic, religious, racial, etc. nature.

Furthermore, as is to be shown, I argue that the root identity of a nationalism may consist of primarily civic or ethnic substance, or be a hybrid of both. So it follows that this ethnic
component may involve any blend of linguistic, religious, racial, etc., and/or strictly ethnic substance. In any case, I posit that it is unlikely and perhaps even impossible in practice for a nation’s root identity to be purely ethnic or civic.

Altogether, as derived from Yack (2001)’s distinction between the prepolitical and postpolitical, I hold that not only ethnic substance but also civic substance are prepolitical in that both the ethnic identity and/or the civic liberal values and social institutions which become the substance of a root identity necessarily precede the nation in order to be nationalized into a national identity, as represented in my schema (p. 523). Put simply, there cannot be a nation with ethnic substance if that ethnicity was not imagined before, and there cannot be a nation with civic substance if those liberal values and/or social institutions did not previously exist -- though of course, a root identity’s substance and a national identity continue to exert mutual influence both before and after the process of nationalization.

Thus this first argument challenges accepted typologies of nationalisms and offers significant implications as to what makes a nationalism exclusionary versus inclusionary. For evidence, I look at the Independence-era Indian nationalisms of the 1946-1950 Constituent Assembly as well as the pre-Partition religious inclusionary Pakistani nationalism of Mohammad Ali Jinnah, in contrast with Donald Trump’s American nationalism.

To clarify, for the purposes of this section, these opposing terms exclusionary and inclusionary must not be mistaken for the similar terms exclusive and inclusive. Indeed, each of these two pairs of terms refers to a particular kind of distinction. On the one hand, the distinction denoted by the terms exclusive and inclusive is effectively meaningless in discussions of nationalism, as all nationalisms are by definition exclusive. As stated by Anderson (2016 [2006, 1991, 1983]),
the two characteristics that define all nationalisms are sovereignty and limitedness (p. 6). This quality of limitedness means that a nation, even if only imagined, is finite. Whether or not the limits of a nation are marked by borders, every nation has a root identity, and when it comes to belonging in a national community, it is that identity that designates who is in and who is out. The imagined line between the in-group and the out-group is the limit of a nation. Therefore, since every nation necessarily has some form of an out-group, all nations are by definition exclusive -- so an ‘inclusive nation’ is a contradiction in terms.

On the other hand, the terms exclusionary and inclusionary describe a subtly yet critically different distinction. In light of the nuanced definitions of these terms as I introduced earlier in the summary of my proposed theory, while every nation is by definition exclusive, a given nation is exclusionary only if its out-group includes those of one or more identity communities with an imagined national belonging to a root identity and national place that overlap (regardless of the form assumed by that national place, i.e. territory or less clearly defined area) with those of the given nation. For instance, given that Hindu nationalism envisions the Indian nation as a purely Hindu one: What makes Hindu nationalism exclusionary by definition is not that its out-group includes Christians in Europe or some other foreign religious group, but rather that its out-group includes Muslims (among other communities) who live in India and who identify as Indian -- but under a very different understanding of Indianness.

It is in this way that Hindu nationalism is exclusionary towards Muslim residents of the Indian nation: Both Hindu nationalism and liberal secular Indian nationalism (as an example of a nationhood more inclusionary towards Muslims) overlap in that they assume the same national belonging (‘Indian’) and imagined territory (‘India’), but differ drastically as to who deserves that
demonym and belongs on that land. Correspondingly, under this definition it is not exclusionary for Pakistan as a Muslim nation, for example, to excludes members of another Muslim nation such as Indonesia, as the national territorial claims of Pakistan and Indonesia do not overlap at all.

So it follows that the out-group of an inclusionary nationalism, by definition, includes only those of communities with non-overlapping root identities and national places. Indeed, these Muslims, under the more inclusionary liberal secular Indian nationalism just mentioned, are identified as legitimate members of the Indian nation.¹⁷,¹⁸

3bb.) Dhulekar and Deo’s Indian nationalisms from the 1946-1950 Constituent Assembly

As referenced earlier, Raghunath Vinayak Dhulekar and Shankarrao Deo of the 1946-1950 Constituent Assembly of India represent the exclusionary and inclusionary camps, respectively, of the independence-era debate over the substance of Indian national identity (Bajpai 2017, pp. 3-6; Parekh 1991, pp. 35-36). The full statement from Dhulekar reads:

I say [Hindi] is the official language and it is the national language. …You may belong to another nation but I belong to the Indian nation, the Hindi nation, the Hindu nation, the Hindustani nation. …I am the only man in this House who can love the Hindi language… I am the only man who can express the Indian thought. (“13th September 1949: Constituent Assembly Of India Debates (Proceedings) - Volume IX”)

Here Dhulekar makes clear his vision for the root identity of the newly realized Indian nation. He imagines the national identity as a very particular alignment of being Indian with being

¹⁷ For a formulation of multicultural citizenship in terms of minority rights that qualifies as an inclusionary liberal secular form of political organization, see the core theoretical proposal of Kymlicka (1996).
¹⁸ For an example of such an inclusionary nationalism, see Jawaharlal Nehru’s plan for creating Indian national unity in Parekh (1991) (pp. 35-36).
Hindustani: Hindu by religion and of Hindi by language. Thus Dhulekar’s nationalism is simultaneously religious and linguistic, in that its imagined root identity contains substance of both types. His nationalism is also firmly exclusionary, as his strict alignment of Indianess with identifying as Hindu and speaking Hindi rejects as non-Indian all those residing within the borders of the then-newly independent Indian state who are of non-Hindu religious groups and/or of non-Hindi-speaking linguistic groups.

Furthermore, Dhulekar’s envisioned Indian national identity is exceedingly homogeneous, in that it limits legitimate Indianess to being Hindu by religion and of Hindi by language. Indeed, this constraint means that India’s root identity in his view is even more uniform than a hypothetical already-homogenous national identity based on being Hindu or speaking Hindi, as his vision includes only those who fall within the intersection of the two. In short, according to Dhulekar, true Indians are all Hindu and all speak Hindi, making his imagined India very homogeneous. Thus these two identities are not sub-identities that add to the heterogeneity of his imagined India, but rather intersecting identities that further restrict and homogenize what it means to be Indian.

So it follows that Dhulekar’s imagined root identity for India is also quite static, in that in his view the only way to become Indian is to convert to Hinduism and learn to speak Hindi, which is not impossible but by no means easy, not to mention easily a violation of identity for those in the Indian state who are not Hindu and/or do not speak Hindi. Even then, one might not be seen as ‘genuinely’ Indian, as they did not begin as a Hindu and/or speaker of Hindi.

Therefore, my model for the root identity of a nation correctly illustrates that Dhulekar’s nationalism is exclusionary in that it is very homogeneous and quite static. Moreover, my schema also models Dhulekar’s nationalism in that it is clearly due to the homogeneity and staticity of his
envisioned India that so few residents of the then-newly independent Indian state (can) actually fall into his narrow definition of legitimate Indian national identity. Still, Dhulekar’s exclusionary linguistic-religious nationalism falls on the ethnic side of the ethnic-civic dichotomy, which does not challenge the association between ethnic nationalism and exclusion.

Shankarrao Deo’s inclusionary nationalism, however, clearly constitutes a counterexample to this association. His full statement from the 1946-1950 Constituent Assembly of India reads:

As I have tried to understand Indian culture, ...it is not uniformity but *unity in diversity*. It is Vividhata [diversity] that India stands for. ...I would like to maintain the variety of cultures, the different languages, each without obstructing, hindering or killing the unity of the country. ...If you mean by national language one language for the whole country, then I am against it. ...India is a nation and I am an Indian but my language is Marathi. (“14th September 1949: Constituent Assembly Of India Debates (Proceedings) - Volume IX,” emphasis added)

Here Deo outlines his imagining of the root identity of the Indian nation. He envisions Indian national identity as a composite identity under which all of the various ethnolinguistic sub-identities present within the borders of the Indian state are subsumed.\(^{19}\) Indeed, his formulation of Indian national identity is particularly clear in his citing of his own ethnolinguistic Marathi identity as an example of a legitimate Indian sub-identity.

In Deo’s view, therefore, Indianness is *defined* as the ethnolinguistic diversity of the country, so echoed in his use of Jawaharlal Nehru’s famous phrase ‘unity in diversity’ (Parekh 1991, pp. 35-36). Thus, in stark contrast to Dhulekar, Deo sees the diversity of the subcontinent and a

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\(^{19}\) In this way, his imagining of Indian root identity closely resembles the identity denoted by the term *desi*, which is still used widely today in reference to the mosaic of peoples from the formerly colonized Indian subcontinent, i.e. today’s India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh.
united Indian national identity not just as compatible, but deeply intertwined with one another. For Deo, in short, the nation of India is its diversity (Embree 1973; Nanda 2006).  

Thus I hold that Deo’s vision of Indian root identity is of decidedly ethnic substance. However, some may argue that while his formulation contains ethnic components, those components are united only by an Indian civic national framework. In such a case, the root identity is thus more fundamentally civic than ethnic in substance, and furthermore it is the civic substance that explains the inclusionary nature of the nationalism, in accordance with the ethnic-civic dichotomy. While I agree that nationalisms of this blended composition have existed and very well may exist today, I maintain that ethnic inclusionary nationalisms exist, and of them, Deo’s is a prime example. That is, Deo’s envisioned Indian root identity is defined as a mosaic of ethnolinguistic identities from across the Indian subcontinent, and it is the diversity of that mosaic rather than a civic national framework that unites these identities under one national identity.

Deo makes no mention of liberal values or citizenship status as necessary for national cohesion, because for him, it is not liberal social institutions that hold the vastly diverse nation together. On the one hand, the imagining of a civic framework assumes that in diversity lies the threat of discord, and thus such a framework must be constructed to keep that diversity in check. On the other hand, Deo’s philosophy is fundamentally different: His vision is of an India united by a common commitment to the beauty that the country bears because of — not despite — its diversity. This mode of thought is exactly what is meant by ‘unity in diversity.’ In sum, the crucial difference between a nation of a civic framework filled with various ethnic sub-identities and a nation of an ethnolinguistic mosaic like Deo’s is: While the former is held together through common citizenship

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20 Hemat & Heng (2012) offers a theoretical analysis of the interplay between language policy and ethnolinguistic national identity, which mirrors much of Deo’s rationale and vision in favor of his nationalism.
and/or shared liberal social institutions in resistance against diversity’s potential for chaos, the latter is united solely by the common cherishing of the nation’s ethnolinguistic diversity itself.

Furthermore, Deo’s nationalism is evidently also inclusionary, as his open-ended definition of the national identity accepts as legitimately Indian all resident ethnolinguistic identities within the borders of the then-newly independent state of India (Embree 1973; see Nagle & Clancy (2011)’s identification of a path towards the construction of shared public identity in ethnically divided societies which closely resembles the structure of Deo’s nationalism).

Deo additionally makes clear that he imagines Indian national identity as necessarily heterogeneous, as in his view it is the many cultures and languages of the Indian state that make up his unifying Indian national identity. In the same vein, his envisioned root identity for India is certainly more fluid than static, as he states explicitly that all ethnolinguistic groups residing in India have a legitimate claim to membership in the nation -- the only criterion being that one identifies with an ethnic group of the subcontinent. Therefore, though the limit set by this criterion means his vision is not decidedly fluid, his imagining does leave the door to legitimate Indianness open to the overwhelming majority of those who would be present in the state with a desire to claim that membership: This fluidity is evident in his explicit definition of India’s root identity as including all those who belong to a cultural/linguistic group associated with the vast country of the formerly colonized subcontinent.

Therefore, as with Dhulekar’s national vision, my model for the root identity of a nation correctly illustrates that Deo’s nationalism is inclusionary in that it is necessarily heterogeneous and moderately fluid. Moreover, in line with the core claim of Tudor & Slater (2017), my model also explains Deo’s nationalism in that it is clearly due to the heterogeneity and fluidity of his
envisioned India that all residents of the subcontinent fall into his broad ethnolinguistic definition of legitimate Indian national identity. Moreover, it is critical to recognize that despite the vast difference between Dhulekar and Deo’s nationalisms, the root identity for each of their two imagined nations is given the same name: Indian. This commonality exists because the two nationalisms are competing to become the foundation for a hegemonic national identity of the same state, called India (Bharadwaj 2011; Chandhoke 2002). More importantly, however, the commonality between the two otherwise completely different nationalisms suggests that it is a defining characteristic of a nationalism to have a single root identity, even if that identity is itself composed of an intersection of other identities (as with Dhulekar’s imaginings) or of an agglomeration of sub-identities (as with Deo’s visions). This point of each nationalism having one root identity is to be demonstrated later in Part I.

Lastly, unlike Dhulekar’s imaginings, Deo’s inclusionary ethnolinguistic nationalism falls on the ethnic side of the ethnic-civic dichotomy, and thus its inclusionary nature poses a challenge to the association between ethnic nationalism and exclusion. Such is the first hint, to be explored further in the remainder of Part I, that the spectra of variation in uniformity and viscosity bear more fundamental explanatory power than the ethnic-civic dichotomy.

3bc.) Jinnah’s pre-1937 religious inclusionary Pakistani nationalism

Though Mohammad Ali Jinnah is best known for his role in realizing the two-nation theory with the founding of the state of Pakistan at Partition in 1947, prior to the year 1937, his expressed political views were entirely different. Indeed, Jinnah over the decades preceding 1937
repeatedly argued that unity between Hindus and Muslims was to be absolutely essential for the national cohesion of the then-future independent Indian state. Moreover, he not only demanded that there be no communalism to threaten the unity of the subcontinent, but also argued on several occasions for legal guarantees in the yet-to-be-written Constitution of India for the purpose of instilling sentiments of security within the Muslim minority that it would be impossible to see a tyranny of the majority by the Hindus. The core argument of Singh (2017) explains that the substance of Jinnah’s nationalist rhetoric transformed so drastically in 1937 because it was then that supporting the two-nation theory, in Jinnah’s eyes, became the most potent strategy to secure greater political power in the independent India yet to come.

Regardless of Jinnah’s reasons for his rhetorical volte-face, his pre-1937 political speeches exhibit a nationalism for the Pakistan-to-be that is simultaneously religious and inclusionary. His rhetoric delivered at Lucknow’s Muslim League in December 1917 in support of the Congress-League Pact is among the most clear formulations of this nationalism:

It is said that we [Muslims] are going on at tremendous speed, that we are in a minority and the Government of this country might afterwards become a Hindu Government. ... I particularly wish to address my Mahomedan friends on this point. ... Do you think that because the Hindus are in the majority, therefore they could carry on a measure, in the Legislative Assembly, and there is [the] end of it? If seventy millions of Mussalmen do not approve of a measure ... Do you think that the Hindu statesmen, with their intellect, with their past history, would ever think of when they get self-government enforcing a measure by ballot box? Then what is there to fear? ... This is a bogey, which is put before you by your enemies to frighten you, to scare you away from the cooperation with the Hindus which is essential for the establishment of self-government. If this country is not to be governed by the Hindus, let me tell you in the same spirit, it was not to be governed by the Mahomedans either and certainly not by the English. It is to be governed by the people and the sons of this country and I, standing here, I believe that I am voicing the feeling of the whole of India say[ing] that what we demand is the immediate transfer of the substantial power of Government of this country (1917, emphasis added).
Here Jinnah comprehensively outlines his pre-1937 vision for the then-future nation of India. Of particular interest to the present argument is the portion emphasized in italics, where he clearly presents the formulation of his imagined root identity for India. He states that this root identity -- which confers the legitimate authority over India lacked by the British -- is to be borne by “the people and the sons of this country,” namely the then-colonially-governed India to achieve independence from the British Empire thirty years later. In this way, much like Deo, Jinnah not only implicitly designates the root identity of India as Indian, but also defines this identity explicitly as a composite of two other identities: the Hindus and the ‘Mahomedans,’ i.e., Muslims. Thus Jinnah’s imagined root identity differs from Deo’s in that it is a composite of religious rather than ethnolinguistic sub-identities.

Still, just as with Deo’s, Jinnah’s vision of Indian root identity (in the aforementioned broader sense) is unambiguously of ethnic substance. Like Deo imagines this identity as an ethnolinguistic mosaic, Jinnah envisions Indian root identity as an association of Hindu and Muslim identities, united not by a civic national framework but by the commitment to overcome religious difference, in search of self-determination for the subcontinent in the wake of British colonization. Again, as with Deo, Jinnah does not mention any liberal social institutions. Instead, he identifies the shared “country” of the Hindus and Muslims -- along with that country’s shared experience under British rule -- as the nation’s fundamental source of unity. Thus, just like Deo proclaims his vision of unity not despite but because of India’s diversity, Jinnah offers a similarly recursive imagining that defines the root identity of India as a union of the religious identities residing on India’s land, in resistance to the legacy of Hindu-Muslim discord sown by the very same British Empire that demarcated that land.
Moreover, Jinnah’s nationalism is plainly inclusionary, as he explicitly subsumes under the banner of legitimate Indianness both Hindus and Muslims. Because he states that India is “not to be governed by” the Hindus nor the Muslims, rather than that the country is to be ruled by both Hindus and Muslims, his root identity formulation may very well include all other religious groups residing within the colonial Indian borders as well. So it follows that Jinnah’s formulation of the root identity for the Indian nation is very clearly both heterogeneous and fluid: His rhetoric conveys that once independence is attained, every Hindu and Muslim residing in India is to bear an equally legitimate claim to national membership in India -- and furthermore that this door to Indianness is left open to members of other religious groups.

Thus my model for the root identity of a nation correctly illustrates that this nationalism of Jinnah’s is inclusionary in that it is both heterogeneous and fluid. Moreover, my model also explains Jinnah’s nationalism in that it is clearly due to this heterogeneity and fluidity of his envisioned India that residents of all religions of the subcontinent fall into his broad religious definition of legitimate Indian national identity.

Even more importantly, like Dhulekar and Deo’s nationalisms, Jinnah’s root identity is granted, albeit implicitly, the same name: Indian. Due to its religious substance, Jinnah’s imagined Indian root identity in its formulation is even more different from Dhulekar and Deo’s visions than these two visions are from each other. Between Deo and Jinnah’s root identities, which are united by their inclusionary nature, the only structural commonality is that both are imagined for all the residents of the then-colonial India (Singh 2017, p. 321). This link not only further solidifies my claim that fluidity is one of two determining factors in producing an inclusionary nationalism, but
also demonstrates that it is indeed a defining characteristic of a nationalism to have a single root identity, no matter how the substance of a nationalism’s root identity is formulated.

Lastly, because it falls on the ethnic side of the ethnic-civic dichotomy much like Deo’s imaginings, Jinnah’s inclusionary religious nationalism also challenges the association between ethnic nationalism and exclusion, providing further evidence that the spectra of variation in uniformity and viscosity bear more fundamental explanatory power than the ethnic-civic dichotomy (as reflected in Chatterjee (1993) (pp. 216-219); as similarly argued in Tinsley (2018)).

This point is to be demonstrated in the following final section of Part I. Furthermore, the mere fact of this nationalism serves as a clear counterexample to Greenfeld’s claim that nationalism is necessarily secular (1992, pp. 111-112, 285-286; 2013, p. 2).

3bd.) Conclusion by contrast: Donald Trump’s American hybrid ethnic-civic nationalism

Former United States President Donald Trump became infamous through his campaign and presidency for inflammatory anti-immigrant rhetoric. In a 2016 campaign speech at the Jeffco Fairgrounds in Golden, Colorado, he stated:

These were people guilty of murder, assault, rape, and all manner of violent crime ... Countless Americans are killed by illegal immigrants ... These include amazing Americans like Sergeant Brandon Mendoza, of Mesa Arizona, who was killed by an illegal immigrant with a criminal record who should have been deported ... (Remarks: Donald Trump at the Jeffco Fairgrounds in Golden CO 2016)

Here, Trump employs a number of metaphors to establish a dehumanizing conceptual association of all immigrants -- and by direct implication, Mexicans and other Hispanics -- with

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21 This point is exemplified by the ethnically heterogeneous and inclusionary Indian nationalism described in Bajpai (2017) (pp. 3-6).
violent criminals. The first statement makes this gross generalization in an overt manner, followed by subtler uses of the phrases *illegal, killed by illegal immigrants, with a criminal record, and who should have been deported*, which – per the definition of metaphors as conceptual associations from Lakoff & Johnson (1980) (p. 5) – attribute inherent illegality to immigrants (Hartelius 2015, p. 167; Quinonez 2018, pp. 50-51; Ross 2002, p. 210). This portrayal of immigrants as criminals is accentuated in contrast not only to the description of Americans as “amazing,” innocent victims, but also to the use of the rank title *sergeant*, which emphasizes the patriotism of ‘true’ Americans, and by opposition, the un-Americanness of immigrants and especially of Hispanic immigrants (Hartelius 2015, p. 167; Quinonez 2018, pp. 26, 48).

Thus, the root identity of Trump’s American nationalism is a hybrid of both civic and ethnoracial substance. The hybridity is evident in that the nationalism is exclusionary to immigrants (i.e. non-American citizens residing or moving to United States territory), marking it as civic, but this out-group of the root identity that Trump calls *immigrants* is simultaneously associated specifically with Hispanics, meaning there is also an ethnoracial component.

While this ethnic component is not explicit, it would be difficult to argue that there is no anti-Hispanic racism implied in this portion of the Jeffco Fairgrounds speech. Correspondingly, some may argue that Trump’s nationalism on the whole is essentially ethnic (namely, an alignment of Americanness with whiteness) under a civic guise, and perhaps furthermore that the overtly civic nature of the above excerpt is the exception rather than the rule. In response, I reiterate that everything we may discern of ideological structure is that which is conveyed in rhetoric: It is significant in and of itself that the terminology employed by Trump is outwardly so clearly civic, as his words thus dehumanize not only non-white immigrants but all those to whom the label *illegal*
immigrant is assigned, even in the abstract with no mention of race (Quinonez 2018, pp. 50-51).

Moreover, the excerpt given here is one of his many rhetorics in civic terms, and in fact he makes such expressions on immigrants at other points in the same speech. In this way, already, the fact of Trump’s nationalism being at once civic and exclusionary as well as the hybridity of its root identity casts significant doubt on the analytical utility of the theoretical ethnic-civic dichotomy.

Put simply, the root identity of Trump’s American nationalism asserts that Americans have the right to membership in the nation of the United States (the outward civic component), but implicitly defines Americaness in such a way that excludes immigrants particularly of Hispanic descent (the inward ethnic component). Furthermore, because immigrants in his rhetoric are imagined as Hispanic, and more generally, as non-white, his nationalism also excludes American citizens of Hispanic and other non-white descent.

Furthermore, Trump’s American root identity is homogeneous not only because it has no sub-identities, but also in that it is in part formulated through a negative definition of Americaness as oppositional to non-white immigrants, which strongly implies a component of the root identity is homogeneously white and not just civically American. Similarly, his root identity for America is thoroughly static in that his essentialist, over-generalized portrayal of immigrants attributes to all (non-white) immigrants to the United States a permanent quality of illegality and violence. In other words, due to the nationalism’s ethnic component, the attainment

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22 Here are some examples:

“When Hillary Clinton was Secretary of State she allowed thousands of the most dangerous criminal aliens in the world to go free inside America because their home countries wouldn’t take them back” (Remarks: Donald Trump at the Jeffco Fairgrounds in Golden CO 2016).

“These were people guilty of murder, assault, rape, and all manner of violent crime” (Remarks: Donald Trump at the Jeffco Fairgrounds in Golden CO 2016).

“We will end illegal immigration, deport every last criminal alien, and save American lives” (Remarks: Donald Trump at the Jeffco Fairgrounds in Golden CO 2016).
of American citizenship does not ‘absolve’ immigrants of their ‘inherent un-Americanness.’ Indeed, from the opposite angle of the nationalism’s civic side, this staticity is also evident in that there is no issue in Trump attributing such a righteous, patriotic American victimhood to a man with a surname signaling Hispanic descent. Thus, in Trump’s American nationalism, civic citizenship does not make one a legitimate American and non-white ethnicity does not disqualify one from being a legitimate American. The only remaining constant is that his root identity for the United States is completely static, in both the ethnic and civic components.

Even if it is not the civic component of Trump’s nationalism that explains the exclusion that nationalism promotes, it is nonetheless important that beyond its ethnic-civic hybridity, his nationalism is at once civic and exclusionary. Thus this nationalism poses a final challenge to the association between ethnic nationalism and exclusion: At the very least, the mere existence of Trump’s nationalism as described here means that the ethnic-civic dichotomy is analytically problematic, as the distinction between ethnic and civic is evidently much more blurred than scholars in nationalism studies tend to assume. In the same vein, this case of Trump also shows that the alignments of ethnic nationalism and exclusion and of civic nationalism and inclusion are meaningless, and thus there must be a more fundamental ideological structural reason for the existence of nationalisms all along the exclusionary-inclusionary continuum. Indeed, as has now been demonstrated here in the homogeneity and staticity of Trump’s root identity for America, my spectra of variation in uniformity and viscosity together bear this more fundamental explanatory power than the ethnic-civic dichotomy.

Altogether, the preceding analysis of Trump’s exclusionary ethnic-civic hybrid American nationalism in contrast with Dhulekar’s exclusionary ethnic Indian nationalism, Deo’s inclusionary
ethnic Indian nationalism, and Jinnah’s inclusionary religious Indian nationalism demonstrates the following four points: (1) the ethnic-civic dichotomy as a theoretical concept has little to no completely verifiable analytical application, (2) the causal links from ethnic nationalism to exclusion and from civic nationalism to inclusion are definitively not reflected in all nationalisms’ ideological structures, (3) the spectra of root identities’ variation in uniformity and viscosity as outlined in my schema both illustrate and model the exclusionary versus inclusionary natures of nationalisms, even where the binary ethnic-civic dichotomy does not, and (4) every nationalism has a single prenational root identity, which may fall at any points on these two spectra, that identifies its national in-group.
3c.) Part II: The Structural Intersection of a Nationalism with Other Ideological Forces

3ca.) Introduction to Part II

In Part II, I argue that a nationalism intersects with other ideological forces, usually others also identity-based. I stress that variation among nationalisms in what other ideological forces with which they intersect is a type of structural variation rather than adjunct to structure. This second argument offers important implications as to what makes a nationalism internally discriminatory versus non-discriminatory. To be absolutely clear, my distinction between discriminatory and non-discriminatory nationalisms is not interchangeable with that between exclusionary and inclusionary nationalisms: While the exclusionary-inclusionary spectrum is concerned with the in-group versus out-group prescribed by a nation’s root identity, the spectrum of discrimination and non-discrimination describes the internal hierarchy (or lack thereof) of the nation, i.e. the social structure only among the members of the in-group. For evidence to substantiate my claim, I consider 20th century Black nationalisms linked by their intersection with gender and sexuality ideology as well as the mid-to-late 20th century Hindu nationalisms that led to the rise of current Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

My earlier explanation of the place of nationalism in the world of ideology is particularly important for this section, to clarify how I conceptualize the intersection of a nationalism with other ideological forces. As aforementioned, fundamental political questions -- and, correspondingly, political ideologies -- may be divided into the who type and the what, when, how type. Nationalisms fall into the former category, along with populisms, global cosmopolitanisms,
and Tianxias, as well as sexisms and racisms, to name a few. The latter category includes genuses of ideological forces more often by convention called political ideologies, such as authoritarianisms, anarcho-communisms, and eco-fascisms.

So it follows that a nationalism intersects with another ideological force in one of two ways: with another who type or with a what, when, how type. (In reality, a nationalism often intersects with various other ideological forces, of both types, but speaking here in individual units is clearer in writing.) On the one hand, when a nationalism intersects with another who type, so comes to form a hybrid ideological force of political belonging. Populist nationalisms are likely the clearest and most prevalent example of such a hybrid. On the other hand, when a nationalism intersects with a what, when, how type, in theory a complete political ideology is formed, as it answers political questions of both belonging and distribution, thus covering the who, what, when, and the how.

Examples of such a complete political ideology include nationalist state socialisms, democratic confederalism, and liberal feminism. Seeing as this thesis is concerned with nationalisms specifically as a family of who-type ideological forces, this section focuses on intersections of nationalisms with other identity-based, who-type forces (Ball, Dagger, & O’Neill 2019; Yack 2001).

In particular, here in Part II, I dissect two forms of ideological intersection with nationalisms. First, I characterize the intersection of Hindu nationalism with an especially burly masculinity ideology, from both before and during Modi’s premiership. Second, I describe the intersection of various Black nationalisms with similar forms of sexism, particularly misogyny, and queerphobia from the 20th century. (I make the distinction between sexism and misogyny because some nationalisms assign strict gender roles that are not necessarily unequal, meaning such a nationalism is sexist but not misogynist.) In both cases, I aim to explain the dynamic in which a
nationalism intersects with an ideological force such that that force is legitimized -- in the eyes of those who subscribe to the nationalism -- by its being predicated upon the national identity constructed by that nationalism. To reiterate my example, an adherent of an American nationalism that intersects with some form of misogyny would not believe just that women are inferior to men, but rather that it is *un-American* for women not to remain in their position of inferiority to men.

As referenced earlier, the explanation of this dynamic in turn illuminates that variation among nationalisms in what other ideological forces with which they intersect is a type of structural variation rather than adjunct to structure. This distinction is important because, for instance, a discriminatory ideological force legitimized by a national identity through their *structural* intersection produces adherents to that identity who hold discriminatory views. Such discrimination, to all those who subscribe to efforts of anti-discrimination, is unpreferable when a structurally non-discriminatory nationalism is equally possible.

My argument here is rooted in the investigations of nationalism and gender and sexuality ideology from Dawson (2001) and particularly Nagel (1998). In the latter, Nagel identifies many of the ways in which nationalisms intersect with sexisms and masculinities in order to legitimize (usually misogynistic) gender roles and the imagined ‘virility’ of the state, respectively. In doing so, Nagel (1998) refers to the five roles of women in the nation identified by Yuval-Davis & Anthias (1989): “(a) as biological producers of members of ethnic collectivities; (b) as reproducers of the (normative) boundaries of ethnic/national groups (by enacting proper feminine behaviour) [sic]; (c) as participating centrally in the ideological reproduction of the collectivity and as transmitters of its culture; (d) as signifiers of ... national differences; and (e) as participants in national, economic, political and military struggles” (pp. 7-8).
Similarly, Dawson (2001) explains the prevalence of misogyny among Black nationalisms:

“Nationalists argue ... that they are rejecting white, Western, culturally imperialist notions of gender equality in order to seek a more ‘natural’ balance between men and women in society” (p. 111). In particular, Dawson (2001) holds that “Black nationalists have argued since the 1960s that concentration on an ‘alien’ philosophy such as feminism detracts from the black [sic] struggle for freedom” (p. 89). Already with these insights from Nagel (1998) and Dawson (2001), it begins to become clear that ideological forces like masculinities and sexisms are legitimized by their being predicated upon a national identity (and consequently, the reverse that national identity is legitimized by other such ideological forces as well). Indeed, this latter point from Dawson (2001) states that Black nationalisms have historically justified the rejection of feminism with the claim that such an ideological force is ‘alien’ to the Black nation.

3cb.) Masculinity in mid-to-late 20th century Hindu nationalisms before Modi

Established in 1925, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh23 (RSS) is the oldest volunteer organization of the Indian subcontinent dedicated completely to the cause of realizing the Hindu nation. To this day, the RSS serves as the head organization of the Sangh Parivar: a Hindu nationalist syndicate which includes other entities such as the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) since 1951, the Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP) since 1964, the Hindu Vivek Kendra (HVK) since 1993, and to some extent Shiv Sena (also known as Shiv Sainik) since 1966. The current Indian Prime Minister Modi is the leader of the BJP, which accumulated political power through the 1980s and 1990s and has acted as the governing party of the Indian state since 2014 (Malji 2018).

23 Translated literally as the National Volunteer Organization.
Madhav Rao Sadashivrao Golwalkar, who served as the leader of the RSS from 1940 to 1973, is one of the most prominent historical figures in the Hindu nationalist movement. Towards the end of his tenure, in the wake of the Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971, in a speech for the RSS he made the following statement:

The foremost task before us, therefore, is the moulding [sic] of ... a ... disciplined and virile national manhood. And verily, this is the one mission to which the RSS is wholly and solely dedicated (Golwalkar 1996 [1966])

Here Golwalkar clearly articulates not simply that he advocates for a collective effort to cultivate a “disciplined and virile” masculinity, but further that this ideology of manhood is integral to the Hindu nationalist mission of the RSS. In this way, he predicates this masculinity upon Hindu national identity and thus, for followers of the RSS, confers faith in the Hindu nation in the form of legitimacy upon his formulation of manhood. Put simply, he intersects Hindu nationalism with this ideology of “disciplined and virile” masculinity such that the adherents of his Hindu nationalism accept as crucial to their shared nationalist project the realization of Golwalkar’s imagination of manhood.

Similarly, Shiv Sena and the VHP promote a masculinity of primal ferocity, represented in images and metaphors of noble battle and of strong, wild animals. Founder and former leader of Shiv Sena Bal Thackeray spoke before his organization in advance of the Hindu nationalist attack on the Babri Masjid, a mosque in the city of Ayodhya, in 1992:

How does our Shiv Sainik appear as he is marching towards Ayodhya? Like the roaring lion spreading terror, with the gait of an intoxicated elephant, like the assault of a rhino which reduces to powder a rocky mountain, like the manoeuvres [sic] of a leopard: Our infinite blessings to these Hindu warriors who are marching towards Ayodhya. (As quoted in Banerjee (2005))
Echoing these words of Bal Thackeray, an excerpt of a statement no longer on the official website of the VHP praises the violence crucial to the organization’s imagining of masculinity. This statement comes in reference to the then-recent Kargil War, which was an armed conflict between India and Pakistan in the summer of 1999, over control of a territory whose ownership was left unresolved after Partition in 1947:

Yet, six months ago, during the battle of Kargil, [the] Indian army proved that when it is given a free hand ... its soldiers and officers are among the best in the world. And for the first time in five hundred years, ... the Kshatriya spirit [warrior spirit] was revived in India. Once again, what the Bhagavad Gita had preached became alive: that violence is sometimes necessary to protect one’s children, women and borders. (as quoted in Banerjee (2005))

In both of these statements from Shiv Sena and the VHP, a violent masculinity is predicated upon a national identity which equates Hinduness and Indianness: namely, Hindu national identity. In this way, that masculinity is legitimized for the adherents of this nationalism. Indeed, Bal Thackeray refers to his organization with a masculine pronoun and likens their collective masculine might to the ferocity of animals. In this case in particular it is clear that this imagination of manhood was legitimized by the Hindu nationalism with which it was intersected, as it was after this speech from Thackeray that his followers participated in the violent demolition of the Babri Masjid -- the mosque then seen as the foremost symbol of Muslim infiltration in their imagined Hindu nation.

In the same vein, the VHP statement praises the then-recent battle performance of the Indian army, recognizing their actions as a remanifestation of the Kshatriya spirit. Drawn from an extremist interpretation of the sacred Hindu text the Bhagavad Gita, this spirit is an identifiably Hindu nationalist ethos that stresses the hypermasculine glory of war waged at the will of God. In this case the image of the Kshatriya spirit was evoked in reverence of a battle fought to maintain
control of a territory which was claimed by Muslim Pakistan but viewed by these nationalists as a rightful land of Hindu India. In this way, very much as with Shiv Sena, the VHP legitimizes a violent masculinity through its intersection with Hindu nationalism.

Furthermore, within its articulation of this manhood, the VHP statement elaborates upon Hindu nationalism’s legitimization of masculine violence by justifying such violence as a means to “protect one’s children, women and borders.” On the one hand, in the word *Borders*, this portion of the statement legitimizes virile masculinity in the same way as the rest: by identifying a particularly masculine violence as the only path to the realization of the Hindu nation.

On the other hand, however, this brief excerpt situates women and children of this Hindu nation as the objects of protection by men, exemplifying an intersection with a different kind of gender and sexuality ideology than masculinity: namely, a sexism that ascribes to women the same vulnerability as of children. In this way, these words from the VHP plainly echo the aforementioned observations from Nagel, which hold that nationalisms often intersect with sexisms that -- legitimized by attachments to national identity -- frame female members of the nation as instruments of the nation’s continued existence. Altogether, this component of the statement is a clear example of the sexisms to be analyzed in the next section of Part II on Black nationalisms.

Lastly, the HVK, as a more scholarly institution of the Sangh Parivar, has provided perhaps the clearest articulation of Hindu nationalist masculinity. The following press release was made in reference to the HVK’s shakhas: public fora which serve as teaching spaces for boys to learn Hindu nationalist ideals of manhood, and thus become ‘true’ patriots. Foremost among these ideals are
discipline, martial skill, and of course, absolute allegiance to the cause of realizing the Hindu
nation, here referred to as Mother India (as argued by Banerjee (2005)):

Today, more than anything else, Mother needs such men: young, intelligent, dedicated and
more than all virile and masculine. When Narayana [eternal knowledge] and Nara [eternal
manliness] combine, victory is ensured. And such are the men who make history: men with
[a] capital ‘M’ (As quoted in (Banerjee 2005))

Here it is made abundantly clear by the HVK that virile manhood is integral to the glory of
the Hindu nation -- and specifically to the realization of that nation, through a combination of
youthful acumen and hypermasculinity that leads to certain ‘victory’ of Hindu nationalist
dominion over India. Thus this intersection of virile manhood with Hindu nationalism by the
HVK serves to legitimize such a potent imagining of masculinity as the one and only path to a
‘purely’ Hindu India. Altogether, these rhetorics from the RSS, VHP, HVK, and Shiv Sena that
exhibit an intersection of virile manhood with Hindu nationalism represent the ideological legacy
upon which Prime Minister Modi has capitalized in order to maintain power, such as through the
symbolism of his self-proclaimed “56-inch chest” (Katju 2011, p. 17; Patwardhan 2018; Srivastava
2015, p. 334).

3cc.) Gender and sexuality ideology in 20th century Black nationalisms

Among the many Black nationalisms of the 20th century intersected by some form of
gender or sexuality ideology, the cases that most clearly exhibit a predication of misogyny and/or
queerphobia upon national identity come from the Nation of Islam as well as the doctrines of
Marcus Garvey and of Maulana Ndabezitha Karenga, previously known as Ron Karenga.
Established in the United States in 1930, the Nation of Islam is a Black nationalist religious organization, which ideologically strays far from mainstream Islam. The fundamental belief of the organization is that Black people are intrinsically divine, having descended from the original humans, while white people were created with no inner divinity, and thus violent by nature.

Garvey, who lived from 1887 to 1940, was the core ideologue for the Pan-Africanist sect of Black nationalism that came to be known as Garveyism. Founder and first President-General of the Universal Negro Improvement Association and African Communities League, Garvey subscribed to a strict racial fundamentalism, and thus believed in racial purity and that each racial community worldwide should act as a discrete entity according to its own interests. In addition, he defended a distinctly Black form of Christianity and advocated for capitalism as an economic means to materially bolster the Black race. Influenced heavily by Edward Wilmot Blyden, he also strongly supported the Pan-Africanist Back-to-Africa movement, but qualified his endorsement with the assertion that only the most ‘purely’ Black people should have the right to establish a Black nation across the African continent (Dorsey 1991, p. 27).

Karenga, born in 1941, is a Pan-African scholar and activist best known for his creation of the holiday Kwanzaa in 1966. Active in the Black Power movement through the 1960s and 1970s, he co-founded the Black nationalist US Organization with fellow activist Hakim Jamal, which engaged in violent skirmishes with the Black Panther Party in 1969. Unlike many other Black nationalists, Karenga advocated for a form of secular humanism, in direct opposition to the more religious philosophies of his ideological peers.
Elijah Muhammad, who led the Nation of Islam from 1934 until his death in 1975, published his foundational work entitled *Message to the Blackman in America* in 1965. It was in this manifesto of his Black nationalism that he proclaimed:

The Woman is man’s field to produce his nation. If he does not keep the enemy out of his field, he won’t produce a good nation. If we love our vegetable crops, we will go out and turn up the leaves on that vegetable stalk and look carefully for worms that are eating and destroying the vegetables. We will kill that worm, right? (Muhammad 1965)

Here Muhammad employs a metaphor of cultivating crops in order to assert that Black women are meant to be protected by Black men, as these women are an inferior complement to the men’s superior role. In this way, he articulates that women are instruments for cultivating a healthy Black nation -- unadulterated by worm-like pests -- and therefore that the success of the Black nation depends on the objectification and subjugation of Black women. Put simply, Muhammad claims that authentic Blackness necessitates misogyny. Thus he predicates the mistreatment of women upon his envisioned Black national identity such that this sexism is legitimized by its intersection with his Black nationalism, as women in his view are nothing more than tools towards the establishment of Black nationhood. Indeed, Muhammad often repeated that ‘a nation can rise no higher than its women.’ This very ideological intersection is captured in the works of Jayawardena (1986) and Enloe (2014 [1990]) in their theorizations of the places of women across various imaginings of nationhood.

These ‘natural’ binary gender roles from the Nation of Islam, which are very much shared by Garveyism, are reflected in the intense queerphobia of both nationalisms: Nation of Islam leaders as well as Garvey refer to same-gender sexual relationships as deviant and immoral. One of Garvey’s earliest articulations of queerphobia comes from as early as 1923:
But not all white men are willing to commit race suicide and to abhor their race for the companionship of another. ... The men of the highest morals, highest character, and noblest pride are to be found among the masses of the Negro race who love their women with as much devotion as white men love theirs (Garvey & Garvey 1986, 17-18)

Here Garvey declares that the act of same-sex relations is not simply immoral, but a violation of one’s own racial purity, white or Black. Moreover, he emphasizes that the most noble are straight Black men “who love their women with as much devotion as white men love theirs” (Garvey & Garvey 1986, pp. 17-18). Thus he promulgates that it is against the Black nation -- that is, un-Black -- for a Black person to be queer,\(^{24}\) or at least that it is un-Black to grant Black queer individuals the same freedom as other Black people in light of queers’ supposed ‘impurity.’ In this sense, Garvey clearly intersects his nationalism with queerphobia in that he legitimizes hatred of Black queer people by predicating that hatred upon his imagined Black national identity.

Nearly an entire century after this statement from Garvey, during Barack Obama’s presidency, the Nation of Islam made two very similar declarations also clearly intersected by the organization’s notorious antisemitism. These two messages come from Louis Farrakhan, who has been the leader of the Nation of Islam since the death of Elijah Muhammad in 1977:

Brother Barack [Obama], under Jewish influence, trying to introduce same-sex marriage to African people, and the Africans say, ‘We don’t have nothing like that in our history. We can’t identify with that.’ Then the Western man says, ‘If you want this money from the World Bank or the IMF, you have to make a law that allows same-sex marriage.’ Look, brothers and sisters, this is satanic (Farrakhan 2018)

Do you know where homosexuality began? Where’s Sodom and Gomorrah? It’s in the Middle East. It happened among the Semitic people ... We, the original people, homosexuality didn’t start with us. We don’t know anything about it (Farrakhan 2018)

\(^{24}\) From hereon I assume the working definition of *queer* as ‘not heterosexual.’ Though the term may also include those who are not cisgender, in this thesis I deal only with cases of ideological hatred of non-heterosexual sexuality and not of non-cisgender gender identity or expression, hence my working definition.
Here, aside from his flagrant antisemitism, Farrakhan very plainly identifies queerness as foreign to the common national identity of the Black race -- not only in the present but back through all history to the ‘primordial’ origin of the race, which allegedly preceded all others as a distinct racial community. Acknowledging then-President Barack Obama as Black with the designation ‘brother,’ Farrakhan states quite straightforwardly that it is un-Black, in history as well as in identity, to be queer, or even to accept the existence of queer Black people. Following from this claim, he then labels ‘satanic’ the pressure from Western powers on African countries to legalize same-sex marriage. Similarly, in the other message, he employs a Biblical reference to Sodom and Gomorrah (which is often invoked to ‘justify’ queerphobia) in order to emphasize that queerness is completely foreign to the Black nation. Thus Farrakhan makes it exceedingly clear that his queerphobia is predicated upon his envisioned Black national identity such that this queerphobia is legitimized by belief in that identity. Indeed, in his eyes and in those of his followers, it is not just sinful to be queer or even to accept that queer people exist, but rather absolutely in violation of one’s Blackness to be or do so.

Echoing Elijah Muhammad’s 1965 portrayal of women as instruments complementary to men’s nation-building role, just two years later in 1967, Karenga makes a statement on his concept of ‘complementarity,’ which very effectively represents the views on women from Black nationalisms intersected with some form of misogyny (as pinpointed by Dawson (2001) (pp. 88-89)):

Equality is false; it’s the devil’s concept. Our concept is complementarity. Complementarity means you ... make perfect that which is imperfect, the man has the right not to destroy the collective needs of his family; the woman has the two rights of consultation and separation if she isn’t getting what she should be getting (Karenga 1967: as quoted in White (1990))
Here, much like Farrakhan refers to queerness as ‘satanic,’ Karenga claims that gender equality is an idea from Satan. Indeed, rather than equality between men and women, Karenga favors complementarity of the genders, regarding this view as “our concept,” i.e. an idea with which his imagining of the Black nation identifies. In his eyes, complementarity dictates essentially that while a man bears the superior right to do anything that does not harm his family’s needs, a woman has only the two rights of “consultation and separation,” given that her inferior role is hindered. In this way, Karenga predicates his deeply misogynistic conception of complementarity specifically upon his envisioned Black national identity, and thus his nationalism intersects with and thereby legitimizes that ideology of complementarity.

Evidently, while Greenfeld (1992) claims that a nationalism necessarily imagines its nation as having an internal social structure that is horizontal, in reality a nationalism may very well intersect with a discriminatory ideological force and thus envision an internally very hierarchical social structure, whether by gender, sexuality, and/or some other type(s) of identity (pp. 10-11).

3cd.) Conclusion by synthesis: Gender and sexuality ideology in 20th century Hindu and Black nationalisms

The preceding cases of 20th century Hindu and Black nationalisms intersected with gender or sexuality ideology demonstrate that it is due to a nationalism’s intersection with a discriminatory or non-discriminatory ideological force that its imagined nation is internally discriminatory or non-discriminatory, respectively. The reason that the nature of the nationalism-intersecting
ideology determines the internal social hierarchy (or lack thereof) of the envisioned nation is that such intersection makes for a type of *structural* variation rather than one adjunct to structure.

The rhetoric from which this conclusion is derived comes specifically from Shiv Sena, the RSS, the VHP, the HVK, Marcus Garvey, Ron Karenga, as well as Elijah Muhammad and Louis Farrakhan of the Nation of Islam. Of these cases, the nationalisms intersected by masculinity versus those intersected by misogyny and/or queerphobia are discriminatory in different ways.

On the one hand, the masculinity-intersected nationalisms from Shiv Sena, the RSS, the VHP, and the HVK are discriminatory in that they situate men -- specifically those who qualify as ‘real’ men through discipline and virility -- as the astute builders and violent defenders of the Hindu nation. Consequently, women and children are left to the passive role of being protected by such men: as expressed explicitly by the VHP, which holds “that violence is sometimes necessary to protect one’s children, women and borders” (as quoted in Banerjee (2005)).

On the other hand, the misogyny/queerphobia-intersected nationalisms from Marcus Garvey, Ron Karenga, as well as Elijah Muhammad and Louis Farrakhan of the Nation of Islam are discriminatory in that each one either (1) identifies women as nothing more than instruments to be used by men towards the building of the family-based nation, or (2) identifies queer individuals, in addition to those who merely acknowledge the existence of queer people, as traitors to the nation, to which queerness itself is completely alien, or (3) both (as echoed in Enloe 2014 [1990]).

In light of all of the preceding analyses -- which link the intersecting force to the resulting discrimination through the very structure of the nationalism, in that it is shown in each case that the intersecting force is predicated upon the national identity -- it is now clear that whether an
envisioned nation is discriminatory versus non-discriminatory depends on whether its nationalism is intersected with a discriminatory versus non-discriminatory ideological force.
3d.) Part III: The Structural Capacity of Nationalisms to Ground Different Forms of the Nation

3da.) Introduction to Part III

In Part III, I argue that a nationalism varies along a spectrum of peculiarity that ranges between the nation being imagined as interwoven with and as distinct from other political communities. This spectrum determines whether the nation is envisioned as a national consciousness, national community, or full nation-state: the more interwoven a nation is imagined, the closer falls the nation to the consciousness end of the spectrum, and the more distinct, the closer to the full-state end. For evidence, I draw from various pre-Partition Pakistani nationalisms, 20th century Black nationalisms, and late 20th century Pan-Africanisms, all in relation to 1990s Black community nationalisms situated between the community and consciousness forms.

The argument of Part III is rooted particularly in the following quasitheoretical contribution from Dawson (2001):

Black nationalists have grappled with three overlapping definitions of "the" black nation. The first is built on state power and land. The second defines African Americans as more than "just another American ethnic group" but as a separate, oppressed people, a nation-within-a-nation, with the right to self-determination. A third, usually less political, conception of "the" black nation defines it as a community with a defined and unique spiritual and cultural identity. All three definitions of the black nation presume that people of African descent within the borders of the United States have at least some common interests based on their race or their common history of racial subjugation (emphases added). (pp. 91-92)

It is through this theorization from Dawson (2001) that I derive the portion of the schema to be defended here in Part III. Indeed, to use Dawson’s terms, these three forms of the Black
nation -- the ‘community with a defined and unique spiritual and cultural identity,’ the ‘nation-within-a-nation,’ and the ‘state [with] power and land’ -- correspond directly to my terms for the three points on the spectrum along which all national forms vary: national consciousness, national community, and the full nation-state, respectively. Furthermore, this facet of my schema is secondarily rooted in Chatterjee (1991) and (1993)’s distinction between material and spiritual nationhood, which recognizes the existence of non-state forms of the nation, in this case specifically in 20th century Indian contexts.25

Moreover, the phrase national consciousness here is derived also from Fanon (1963). His sense of the term is for a nationalism that (1) operates in resistance to a colonizer, and (2) due to that colonial subjugation, remains unable to realize its imagined nation as a political entity at all, let alone a state (Fanon 1963, pp. 97-98). However, while my use of the term national consciousness reflects Fanon’s connection between unrealized nationalisms and nationalist movements under colonialism, I do not adopt the normative component of his concept. That is, I see a nationalism that takes the form of a national consciousness not as an unrealized nation-state, but as an instance of that consciousness form in its own right. To me, what Fanon calls a national consciousness is a nation imagined but not yet realized as a community, state, or something in between.

Altogether, in order to demonstrate that the spectrum of peculiarity determines whether the nation is imagined as a consciousness, community, or state, I dedicate the majority of Part III to analyzing in turn three complexes of nationalisms that each experienced internal competition in a particular historical moment, namely: (1) mutually competing nationalisms that imagined the

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25 One analogous distinction is implied by Getachew (2019) in her inquiry on the ideological consequences of decolonization, and another -- which is even more similar to Dawson (2001)’s formulations, in a large part due to the shared focus on Black American contexts -- is proposed by Wilson (1970) with the terms revolutionary versus cultural as differentiating descriptors for Black nationalisms.
yet-to-be-established Pakistan as a consciousness versus community versus state over the decade preceding Partition in 1947, (2) nationalisms that envisioned the Black nation as a consciousness versus community versus state in mutual, fluctuating competition throughout the 20th century, and (3) nationalisms that imagined the Pan-African nation as a consciousness versus community versus state in mutual competition in the late 20th century. To conclude, I then show how the Black community nationalisms -- as designated by Dawson (2001) (p. 126) -- of the 1990s straddle the area along the spectrum of sovereignty between the community and consciousness forms. In all of these ways together, I demonstrate fully the spectral natures of the variations in peculiarity and in its resulting degree of sovereignty.

3db.) State, community, and consciousness in pre-Partition Pakistani nationalisms

As early as 1941, from observing the incipient competition among pre-Partition imaginings of Pakistan, South Asian historian Beni Prasad recognized in his book The Hindu-Muslim Questions that nationhood does not necessitate the state:

One of the supreme needs of the modern age in the East as well as the West is the dissociation of statehood from nationhood: in a word depoliticization of the whole concept of nationality; a definite renunciation of the idea that those who feel themselves to be a nation should necessarily constitute an independent state of their own (Prasad 1941, p. 86).

Indeed, through the decade before Partition, the nation of Pakistan was imagined as a national consciousness, a national community both with and without borders, and of course a full-nation state: the form it ultimately assumed in 1947. Moreover, as will become evident through
the coming analyses, this difference in the vision for the form of the nation is the only significant
distinction among all of these competing nationalisms.

**National Consciousness:** In his presidential address at the All-India Muslim Educational
Conference in Agra on December 27th, 1945, then-yet-to-be founding father and first Prime
Minister of Pakistan Liaquat Ali Khan articulated his vision for Pakistan as a national
consciousness:

The principle of territorial nationalism is opposed to the Muslim view of nationalism
which is based on *a philosophy of society and outlook on life* rather than allegiance to a
piece of territory (Ali Khan 1945, emphasis added).

Here Ali Khan quite unambiguously rejects the prospect of the establishment of Pakistan
as a state. Instead, he favors a philosophical, purely ideological conception of the Muslim nation
within India’s then-current colonial borders. In order to justify his view, he claims that territorial
nationalism is itself un-Muslim, while a nation in the form of a national consciousness is perfectly
compatible with Islam.

In the context of the conference at which his speech was given, however, the deeper
meaning of Ali Khan’s justification becomes clear. This particular 1945 meeting of the All-India
Muslim Educational Conference, which had convened nearly annually since 1886, was to be the
last. Indeed, the Conference was terminated due to the political instability preceding the rapid
onset of Partition less than two years after. Over its time of nearly six decades, the Conference -- in
addition to producing the Muslim League in 1906 -- promoted liberal education for Muslims
across *All-India*: a pre-Partition term used in reference to the vast territory now occupied by India,
Pakistan, and Bangladesh.
Furthermore, Ali Khan’s above statement at the Conference was made in opposition to other, more separatist Muslim politicians who -- also faced by the very real possibility of Partition -- favored a national form for Pakistan with more state-like sovereignty. With all of this in mind, therefore, he claims that territorial nationalism is un-Muslim rather than just unfavorable for rhetorical purposes: because he is arguing against fellow Muslims who demand a territory for Pakistan. More precisely, he aims to refute the premise that Muslims residing within the territory of All-India are so different from the subcontinent’s other inhabitants that separate land carved out of All-India is required at all. Rather, he claims, that real Muslims are to remain united with the state of India, simply with their own national consciousness: In his eyes, all that differentiates Muslims from people of other religions on the subcontinent is their “philosophy of society and outlook on life” -- and nothing more strictly political than that to provide reason for separate national communities, let alone separate states (as recognized also by Devji (2013) (pp. 22, 26-27)).

National Community: Moving away from the consciousness-end of the sovereignty spectrum to the region of the community form, we return to Muhammad Ali Jinnah -- this time after his drastic shift in political rhetoric in 1937. In his 1944 talks with Mahatma Gandhi, Jinnah clearly articulated his support for Pakistan as a national community without particularly defined territory or borders:

It seems to me that you [Gandhi] are laboring under some misconception of the real meaning of the word ‘self-determination.’ ... Can you not appreciate our point of view that we claim the right of self-determination as a nation and not as a territorial unit, and that we are entitled to exercise our inherent right as a Muslim nation; which is our birthright? Whereas you are laboring under the wrong idea that ‘self-determination’ means only that of ‘a territorial unit,’ which by, the way, is neither demarcated nor defined yet, and here is no Union or Federal constitution of India ... functioning as a sovereign Central Government (Jinnah 1944).
Here Jinnah plainly advocates for Pakistan as an institutionally autonomous nation with no particular territorial boundaries. In this way, he envisions Pakistan as a national community: not a nation-state with designated borders, nor a national consciousness which lacks institutional autonomy, but rather decidedly in between these two forms.

Furthermore, his reasoning for establishing Pakistan in the community form rather than as a state or consciousness is quite complex. While he states that the Muslims of the subcontinent have an ‘inherent right’ to their own collective nationhood, he also asserts that the unrealized nation of Pakistan should not have full territorial sovereignty beside another equally sovereign state made from the rest of India. Rather, he expresses an indifference towards matters of geography, which says that Pakistan is not to be strictly distinct from India by religion -- as there would be, in his imagination, many non-Muslims residing in the area to become Pakistan -- but separate only to the extent that guarantees Muslims of the region have access to their deserved self-determination. An even clearer articulation of this rationale comes four years earlier from the Qaid: a political Islamic organization closely associated with Jinnah. The statement was made in reference to the Lahore Resolution, which formalized plans for a Muslim ‘homeland’ on the subcontinent, at the Bombay Presidency Provincial Muslim League Conference of May 1940:

It is amazing that men like Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Rajagopalachariar should talk about the Lahore Resolution in such terms as ‘vivisection of India’ and ‘cutting the baby into two halves.’ Surely, today India is divided and partitioned by Nature. Muslim India and Hindu India exist on the physical map of India. ... Where is the country which is being divided? Where is the nation which is being denationalised [sic]? India is composed of nationalities, to say nothing about the castes and sub-castes. Where is the Central National Government whose authority is being violated? (The Qaid 1940)

Indeed, with a similar indifference, the Qaid here employs Jinnah’s same legalistic terms to spell out that the national community of Pakistan is to be made separate from India for the
purposes of bureaucratic practicality rather than of strict division along demographic lines of religion. Fundamentally, the focus on autonomy without hard borders for Pakistan makes perfect sense in light of the belief from Jinnah and the Qaid that the nation was to be a self-determining, indistinctly defined homeland for Muslims across the subcontinent, certainly including those residing beyond the area to house the national community of Pakistan (Devji 2013). Thus both Jinnah and the Qaid imagined Pakistan in the community form precisely because they saw the Muslims of the subcontinent as a people separate but not entirely different from the rest of India.

The Nation-State: Moving once again to the state-end of the sovereignty spectrum, we return to the Muslim League, and in particular a statement the organization made in 1943:

The people of Pakistan differ from the rest of India in religion, race, and language, and possess all the necessary essentials which go to form a nation. Among themselves, the Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs have more in common than they have with the people living in the rest of India. In religion, the Sikhs and Arya Samajists have more identical views on the unity of God and belief in a revealed religion than with the Hindus elsewhere. By race, the people belong to the same Aryan stock while Urdu with its Persian script is treated as the court language throughout this area. Untouchability, the caste system, music before the mosque and cow protection do not present such difficult problems as in the rest of India. The creation of a bigger Punjab with natural expansion in the northwest and south, so as to include Kashmir, the Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan, is in reality the regeneration of the old historical kingdom which the Sikhs tried to keep united in their time of glory and which now will be supported by the combined might of Muslims and Sikhs (as quoted in Devji (2013)).

Here, in justifying the establishment of Pakistan as a territorial state, the Muslim League produces one of the relatively few instances in which ideologues of the then-future Pakistan claim that the nation has a ‘natural’ homeland, namely the regions through which the Indus River flows. In order to substantiate this claim, the League appeals to the religious minorities of their envisioned homeland (Sikhs and Arya Samajists), positing that their difference from the remainder of India
outside that homeland proves Pakistan to be truly separate (as acknowledged also by Devji (2013) (pp. 26-28)). The statement concludes with a bestowal of historical legitimacy: a situating of Pakistan within an imagined narrative, out of which the nation is to continue the history of a primordial Sikh kingdom.

In essence, the rationale given here as to why Pakistan should constitute a sovereign nation-state is that the “people of Pakistan differ from the rest of India in religion, race, and language” and thus “possess all the necessary essentials which go to form a nation.” Moreover, the League argues not just that Pakistan is completely different from India, but also that Pakistan is specifically more internally united than it is similar to India: particularly when it comes to “views on the unity of God and belief,” “belong[ing] to the same Aryan stock,” sharing “Urdu with its Persian script ... as the court language,” and bearing a common indifference to “untouchability, the caste system, music before the mosque and cow protection.” Thus the Muslim League provides reason for fully sovereign Pakistani statehood -- with an imagined root identity of both Muslim and Sikh substance, united by spiritual likeness, shared language, and distinctly similar customs -- that is specifically predicated upon the nation’s discrete and absolute distinction from the rest of India.

In much the same vein, Choudhry Rahmat Ali became one of the earliest visionaries for the nation-state of Pakistan with the dissemination of his pamphlet *Now or Never: Are We to Live or Perish Forever?* in 1933. In the following excerpt from the pamphlet, he not only expresses and substantiates his call for the Pakistani state but also coins the term *Pakistan* itself, from the Islamic ‘homeland’ regions of Western India (*Punjab, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Sindh,* and *Balochistan*)26, with the double meaning of ‘land of the pure’:

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26 The letter *i* was not added until later, to ease pronunciation. As is observable in the excerpt of Ali’s pamphlet, the envisioned name for the nation was at the time indeed *Pakistan* with no *i*. 
India, constituted as it is at the present moment, is not the name of one single country; nor
the home of one single nation. It is, in fact, the designation of a State created for the first
time in history, by the British. It includes peoples who have never previously formed part of
India at any period in its history; but who have, on the other hand, from the dawn of
history till the advent of the British, possessed and retained distinct nationalities of their
own. ... In the five Northern Provinces of India, out of a total population of about forty
millions, we, the Muslims, contribute about 30 millions. Our religion, culture, history,
tradition, economic system, laws of inheritance, succession and marriage are basically and
fundamentally different from those of the people living in the rest of India. The ideals
which move our thirty million brethren-in-faith living in these provinces to make the
highest sacrifices are fundamentally different from those which inspire the Hindus. These
differences are not confined to the broad basic principles -- far from it. They extend to the
minutest details of our lives. ... If we, the Muslims of Pakistan [sic], with our distinct marks
of nationality, are deluded into the proposed Indian Federation by friends or foes, we are
reduced to a minority of one to four. It is this which sounds the death-knell of the Muslim
nation in India for ever. To realise [sic] the full magnitude of this impending catastrophe,
let us remind you that we thirty millions constitute about one-tenth of whole Muslim
world. ... These are facts ... which we challenge anybody to contradict. It is on the basis of
these facts that we make bold to assert without the least fear of contradiction that we,
Muslims of PAKISTAN [sic], do possess a separate and distinct nationality from the rest of
India, where the Hindu nation lives and has every right to live. We, therefore, deserve and
must demand the recognition of a separate national status by the grant of a separate Federal
Constitution from the rest of India (Ali 1933).

Here, without a sliver of doubt, Ali comprehensively argues for the establishment of
Pakistan as a sovereign nation-state precisely by framing the nation as utterly separate from India.

First, he delegitimizes the vision of an India that remains united through independence through his
claim that it is only due to oppressive British rule that India was historically ever a united political
community at all. Second, acknowledging the significant population of Muslims in the “five
Northern Provinces of India,” he argues that these Muslims’ “religion, culture, history, tradition,
economic system, [and] laws of inheritance, succession and marriage” are “basically and
fundamentally different” from the Hindus “living in the rest of India,” down to their cherished
ideals and “the minutest details of [their] lives.” Lastly, he plants a seed of fear that without a Pakistani state, the Muslim nation of the subcontinent will perish (as echoed by Devji (2013) (pp. 17, 33, 43)). Altogether, it is now clear that over the years preceding Partition in 1947, Pakistan was imagined as a national consciousness, national community, and nation-state, and furthermore that it is due to the place on the spectrum of peculiarity taken by a Pakistani nationalism that its envisioned nation of Pakistan falls at a particular point along this corresponding spectrum of sovereignty.

3dc.) State, community, and consciousness in 20th century Black nationalisms

As aforementioned in reference to Dawson (2001), the evolution of the various imaginings of Black nationhood over the 20th century was driven fundamentally by competition among nationalisms that envision the Black nation as a state versus a community versus a consciousness. While all three of these national forms persisted in the imaginings of the Black nation throughout the century, ebbing and flowing in their relative influence, the community and consciousness forms in the latter portion of this period became markedly more influential than the state.

The Nation-State: The seed for the vision of the Black nation as a state was sown by Martin Robison Delany in his landmark 1852 book The Condition, Elevation, Emigration, and Destiny of the Colored People of the United States. Written in the wake of the Fugitive Slave Act’s passing in 1850, the book comprehensively outlines the Black nation-state as the escape from oppression in the United States:

We can have no rights here as citizens, not recognised in our common country ... These provisions then do not include the colored people of the United States; since there is no
power left in them, whereby they may protect us as their own citizens. Our descent, by the laws of the country, stamps us with inferiority—upon us has this law worked corruption of blood. We are in the hands of the General Government, and no State can rescue us. The Army and Navy stand at the service of our enslavers ... What then shall we do?—what is the remedy—is the important question to be answered. ... We should ... like other free and independent nations, take our chance, and risk consequences. Talk not of consequences; we are now in chains; shall we shake them off and go to a land of liberty? ... In going, let us have but one object—to become elevated men and women, worthy of freedom—the worthy citizens of an adopted country. What to us will be adopted—to our children will be legitimate. Go not with an anxiety of political aspirations; but go with the fixed intention—as Europeans come to the United States—of cultivating the soil, entering into the mechanical operations, keeping of shops, carrying on merchandise, trading on land and water, improving property—in a word, to become the producers of the country, instead of the consumers (Delany 1852).

Here Delany presents his argument for a “free and independent” Black nation-state, with a degree of sovereignty parallel to that established by the “Europeans [who came] to the United States.” In doing so, he makes a direct link from the racial oppression faced by Black people in America -- specifically their being deprived of the rights of citizenship by the federal government -- to the need for a separate, sovereign Black state, which he frames as synonymous with liberty. In essence, his rationale for a Black state over a national form of a lower degree of sovereignty is that the Black and white people are so fundamentally different that remaining in the white man’s state is an acceptance of life without freedom. Indeed, he calls for Black sovereignty over the hallmarks of statehood, in his view: “cultivating the soil, entering into the mechanical operations, keeping of shops, carrying on merchandise, trading on land and water, [and] improving property.” These Delany identifies as the images of a triumphant liberation of Black people as “the producers of the country, instead of the consumers.”

Furthermore, the vision for a Black nation-state certainly carried on strong, as it gained unprecedented influence in the 20th century. As early as 1917, Cyril Briggs as an editor of major
Black newspaper Amsterdam News called for the carving of an independent Black territorial nation-state -- in his words, a “colored autonomous state” (Kelley & Kelley 1994, p. 106) -- out of the United States (Dawson 2001). One of the most developed articulations in favor of a Black nation-state, however, came from Marcus Garvey in 1923, directly inspired by the work of Delany:

Some Negro leaders have advanced the belief that in another few years the white people will make up their minds to assimilate their black populations, thereby sinking all racial prejudice in the welcoming of the black race into the social companionship of the white. Such leaders further believe that by the amalgamation of black and white, a new type will spring up, and that type will become the American and West Indian of the future. This belief is preposterous. I believe that white men should be white, yellow men should be yellow, and black men should be black in the great panorama of races, until each and every race by its own initiative lifts itself up to the common standard of humanity, so as to compel the respect and appreciation of all, and so make it possible for each one to stretch out the hand of welcome without being able to be prejudiced against the other because of any inferior and unfortunate condition (Garvey & Garvey 1986, p. 26).

I asked, ’Where is the black man’s Government?’ ’Where is his King and kingdom?’ ’Where is his President, his country, and his ambassador, his army, his navy, his men of big affairs?’ I could not find them, and then I declared, ’I will help make them’ (Garvey & Garvey 1986, p. 126)

Here, in articulating his characteristically stringent racial fundamentalism, Garvey advocates for a Black territorial nation-state. His imagined statehood is evident in his use of a cluster of words associated specifically with the state, as opposed to the community and consciousness forms: government, king, president, ambassador, army, navy, and affairs, as well as the territorial terms kingdom and country.

Having identified that his envisioned Black nation has no governing state to realize its own self-determination, Garvey expresses uncompromising moral opposition to racial integration among Black and white people. Instead, he favors a world order wherein each race of humanity as a discrete unit, equal to all others, takes full responsibility and action in uplifting only its own
people. Therefore, perhaps more clearly than any other advocate of the Black state, Garvey reasons that the Black nation deserves its own state precisely because the Black people (as well as all other races) is intrinsically distinct from all other peoples. Indeed, it is from this point that he concludes the Black nation requires self-determination in the form of full state sovereignty. Thus it becomes all the more evident that it is out of the imagining of the Black people as fundamentally separate from other races that emerges the vision of the Black nation-state, as opposed to other national forms with a lower degree of sovereignty.

**National Community:** Established in New York City by Briggs in 1919, the African Blood Brotherhood for African Liberation and Redemption (ABB) was the first Black communist organization of the 20th century. Despite existing formally only until 1924, the group made a significant ideological impact, through both their communist activism and the revolutionary nationalism foundational to their political thought. Their imagined Black nation bears a distinctly community-form character, as they advocated for a nation with formal institutions but without full sovereignty: a nation within a nation. In light of this trait, their originality and influence together mean that the ABB may be considered a primary founder of the community national form among Black nationalisms.

Indeed, in 1920, Briggs himself included in a list of the ABB’s goals to “adopt the policy of race first, without, however, ignoring useful alliances with other groups” (Briggs 1920, p. 36). As is to be demonstrated here, all other major Black nationalisms of the 20th century whose envisioned nation takes the community form not only share this qualified separation from non-Black groups, but assume it as the rationale directly behind their imagining of the Black nation as a community rather than a state or consciousness.
The timeline of such community-form Black nationalisms begins in 1965. In New York City, shortly before his assassination, Malcolm X gave a speech from on the Basic Black Unity Program: the manifesto of the Organization of Afro-American Unity, which was established by X himself a year earlier in 1964. He stated the following in favor of the creation of a Black nation in the community form:

We must face the facts. A 'racial' society does exist in stark reality, and not with equality for black [sic] people; so we who are non-white must meet the problems inherited from centuries of inequalities and deal with the present situations as rationally as we are able. The exclusive ethnic quality of our unity is necessary for self-preservation. We say this because: Our experiences backed up by history show that African culture and Afro-American culture will not be accurately recognized and reported and cannot be respectably expressed nor be secure in its survival if we remain the divided, and therefore the helpless, victims of an oppressive society (X 1965).

Here he justifies the establishment of a Black national community with the rationale that anti-Black racism is deeply ingrained in the United States, such that some degree of political separation for a united Black nation from white people is “necessary for self-preservation.” In doing so, he echoes a perspective characteristic of the nation imagined in the community form: that, in the words of Dawson (2001), Black people “must control the government and economic institutions of the black [sic] community” (p. 99). Indeed, like many other Black nationalists, Malcolm X articulated a vision not strictly to acquire land as would a state, but rather “to gain control of the land and the institutions that flow from that land” (X: as quoted in Dawson (2001) (p. 99)).

Still at this point it remains unclear why X supports the realization of the Black nation as a community rather than a state. On the one hand, from his desire to achieve the Black people’s separation from white America for the sake of the former’s self-preservation, it is quite obvious why
he is not advocating for a national consciousness, as this provides no such separation. On the other hand, however, it seems rather odd that he favors the community form when he speaks of Black and white Americans as so basically different. As a matter of fact, in the very same 1965 speech quoted above, he stated that “we assert that we Afro-Americans have the right to direct and control our lives, our history, and our future rather than have our destinies determined by American racists” (X 1965).27

At yet another point in the same speech, however, X makes clear the rationale for his choice in favor of the Black national community rather than nation-state:

We Afro-Americans feel receptive toward all peoples of goodwill. We are not opposed to multi-ethnic associations in any walk of life. In fact, we have had experiences which enable us to understand how unfortunate it is that human beings have been set apart or aside from each other because of characteristics known as ‘racial’ characteristics. ... We appreciate the fact that when the people involved have real equality and justice, ethnic intermingling can be beneficial to all. We must denounce, however, all people who are oppressive through their policies or actions and who are lacking in justice in their dealings with other people, whether the injustices proceed from power, class, or ‘race.’ We must be unified in order to be protected from abuse or misuse (Van Deburg 1996, pp. 113-114).

In these words it is quite evident that X does not at all share the racial fundamentalism of Marcus Garvey that led to the latter’s support for a Black nation-state. Rather, X believes that the enemy of the Black nation is not so much white people as it is oppression itself, no matter by whom that oppression is imposed. Indeed, X expresses clearly that he is open in principle even to the possibility of non-Black people helping to work towards Black national liberation. Lastly, in his concluding sentence, he calls again for the unity of the Black nation in the community form, explicitly as a means to combat racial “abuse or misuse.” This rationale is crucially not the same as

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27 As a side note, Elijah Muhammad in the same year expresses a very similar sentiment in saying that Black people must “build [their] own homes, schools, hospitals, and factories” (1965, p. 171).
Garvey’s pro-state reasoning to realize the Black nation’s formal racial separation from white people for its own sake. Thus X’s vision for Black unity in the national form of the community emerges directly from his imagining of the Black people as neither fully distinct from nor fully intertwined with white America, just as my schema illustrates and models.

Emerging from Malcolm X’s legacy the year after his death, the Black Panther Party in many respects shared X’s vision of the Black nation in the community form. These similarities are particularly evident in the Black Panthers’ rhetoric over their first two years, between 1966 and 1968. At their most powerful, the Panthers boasted over thirty chapters across the United States as well as a nationwide self-published newspaper with a circulation of around 100,000 people (Hilliard & Cole 1993). As former Chief of Staff of the Black Panther Party, David Hilliard retrospectively explained his reasoning for these programs of the 1960s and 1970s in his 1993 autobiography. Below is that explanation, in conjunction with the first point of the Ten-Point Program of the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense from 1966:

We made the programs our priority. The military was second. All of it was based on an effort at socialism. We were going to show the community how to survive by using socialist ways and thinking and economics. At the same time we went and talked to the merchants and tried to talk them into supporting these programs. We were trying to create a new reality based on independence, self-reliance, self-struggle, and autonomy (Hilliard & Cole 1993, p. 239).

We want freedom. We want power to determine the destiny of our Black Community. We believe that our people will not be free until we are free to determine our own destiny (Newton & Seale 1966).

Here, on behalf of the Panthers, he plainly calls for a Black nation in the community form. His desire for this form over the two others is evident in his vision for “a new reality based on independence” for Black people, achieved through a socialist economy rooted in community-based
programs. Indeed, at no point does he invoke the territoriality of the state, but rather he thoroughly recognizes the importance of institutions for nation-building. In the same vein, the first point of the Ten-Point Program explicitly identifies Black national self-determination -- to the degree of sovereignty of a “Black Community” -- as the core prerequisite to Black liberation.

At this point, just as with the preceding discussion on Malcolm X, it remains undetermined why the nationalism of the Panthers envisions the Black nation as a community rather than a state or consciousness. A 1968 statement from co-founder Bobby Seale, as reproduced below respectively, shed light on this question of the Panthers’ rationale:

We, the Black Panther Party, see ourselves as a nation within a nation, but not for any racist reasons. We see it as a necessity for us to progress as human beings and live on the face of this earth along with other people. We do not fight racism with racism. We fight racism with solidarity (Seale 1968).

Here Seale unambiguously outlines the Panthers’ reasoning for a nation-within-a-nation, community-form Black nation, rather than a state or consciousness. In doing so, he denounces strict racial division for its own sake. Instead, he views the community form of Black nationhood as necessary specifically as a means to build the solidarity of a nation that can coexist meaningfully alongside other individuals. Thus it is abundantly clear that the logic for the Panthers’ choice of community-form over state or consciousness is that the Black nation is not completely separate (as would be a full state) but deserving of self-determination (unlike a mere consciousness) from the rest of the United States -- precisely in line with my schema.

A year after Seale’s statement, in 1969, Roy Innis echoes this rationale from the Panthers. As leader of the Congress of Racial Equality, another organization active in the Civil Rights movement, Innis declares the need for a renewed social contract that grants Black communities
peaceful authority over their own institutions. Speaking on economic self-determination in these communities, such as control over public budgets, he stated that “separation is a more equitable way of organizing society” (Innis 1969, p. 52). Indeed, with much the same spirit as the Panthers, here he identifies separation along racial lines not as intrinsically good but as a decent means to a good end: racial equity. Additionally, he closely echoes the Panthers’ reasoning that racial separation should be realized to the degree necessitated by a semi-sovereign, community-form nation exactly because that separation is to improve equity in the race relations of the United States, rather than only in the Black nation itself. Hence, the schema holds.

Other community-form nationalisms, like those of Malcolm X, the Panthers, and Innis, emphasized a focus on control over political as well as economic institutions. In particular, many proponents of political control favored the establishment of a Black political party -- as was preached at the National Black Political Convention in Gary, Indiana in 1972 -- in opposition to the integrationist and reformist view that racism could be purged from the American electoral system. The year following Innis’ statement, in 1970, activist and author Amiri Baraka expressed support for a Black political party as a means of Black community-form nation-building:

What we are talking about is a national, international, nationalist, Pan-Africanist political party which will be the model for the nation becoming (Baraka 1970).

You must control everything in the community that needs to be controlled. Anything of value: any kind of antipoverty program, politicians, celebrities, anything that brings money, resources into your community, you should control it. You understand that? Anything of value in your community, you have to control it, because if you don’t control it, the white boy controls it (Baraka 1970).

Despite his aggressive tone, like all other community-form Black nationalisms previously discussed, his focus is on obtaining the institutional self-determination of which Black
communities are deprived due to anti-Black oppression through forces of white control. In other words, he advocates for separation from white America not because Blacks and whites are so fundamentally distinct, but rather that it is only through this separation from racism that Black liberation can be realized. Altogether, these imaginings of the Black nation in the form of a national community are fundamentally and directly rooted in the logic that the Black people is neither fully intertwined with nor fully distinct from its surrounding groups in the United States, thus coinciding with my schema.

**National Consciousness:** Being the national form influential among Black nationalisms latest in the 20th century, one of the earliest instances of a consciousness-form imagining of the Black nation comes from Elijah Muhammad, as late as 1965:

First, my people must be taught the knowledge of self. Then and only then will they be able to understand others and that which surrounds them. Anyone who does not have a knowledge of self is considered a victim of amnesia or unconsciousness and is not very competent. The lack of knowledge of self is a prevailing condition among my people here in America. Gaining the knowledge of self, makes us unite in a great unity (Muhammad 1965: as quoted in Farrakhan (1989), p. 1).

Here he justifies his vision for the Black nation specifically in the consciousness form, as evidenced by the significance placed in national awareness but not at all in institutions, let alone territoriality. In doing so, he clearly identifies Black racial self-awareness as absolutely essential for this very realization of Black national unity. Perhaps contrary to expectation, however, he also grounds the rationale for his consciousness-form in bases *beyond* Black communities: namely, in recognizing this same self-awareness as additionally crucial for the ability “to understand others [non-Black people] and that which surrounds them.” In this way it is clear that he favors the consciousness form over others exactly because Black racial unity achieved through collective
national self-consciousness is prerequisite to the secondary critical goal to understand those outside Black communities, with whom those communities are intertwined.

More than two decades later, Muhammad’s eventual successor Louis Farrakhan expressed similar support for the Black nation in the consciousness form in 1989. However, Farrakhan’s imagined nation as articulated here veers towards the community side of the sovereignty spectrum’s consciousness region:

There is both a duty and need to build autonomous black institutions, [and if] we forget that we have a duty and a responsibility to build institutions for ourselves, then we put ourselves more at the mercy of our oppressors (Farrakhan 1989, p. 202: as quoted in Dawson (2001)).

Here Farrakhan makes it clear that the goal of political and economic self-determination, in the face of anti-Black oppression, necessitates the acceptance of the duty to build Black community institutions. While this statement appears to be simply in favor of a community-form Black nation, this envisioned nation of his actually more so takes the form of a consciousness. This is because he predices the Black national escape from white oppression not upon the Black institutions themselves, but the conscious recognition among Black people that there is “a duty and a responsibility” to establish those institutions. Put simply, what Farrakhan sees as the most fundamental obstacle between his vision and its realization is not the lack of Black institutions, as would a community-form nationalism, but rather Black communities’ *forgetting* that these institutions are the only path to freedom, as is typical of a consciousness-form nationhood. Thus this imagining of Farrakhan’s is superstructurally more like a national consciousness than a national community.
From this point, Farrakhan goes on to provide the rationale for his vision of the Black nation as a community-veering consciousness:

[The] Caucasian was a vessel made for dishonor. He’s like a vile olive branch grafted in. He ain’t natural, he’s not a natural branch, he’s grafted among the peaceful people (Farrakhan 1989, p. 247: as quoted in Dawson (2001)).

Here he employs a racially essentialist rhetoric that frames white people as an infiltration of ‘dishonor’ and artificiality into the ‘peaceful’ Black race. Thus he views Black-white relations in the context of building the Black nation in two ways, which at first glance appear mutually contradictory. On the one hand, he explicitly acknowledges that white society is ‘grafted’ through Black society, i.e. that the two races are inevitably intertwined. On the other hand, as explained by Dawson (2001), to Farrakhan, true belonging in the Black nation necessitates the renunciation of all facets of white society in favor of ‘pure’ Blackhood (p. 108). In this way, my schema directly explains Farrakhan’s favor veering towards the Black nation as a community. Indeed, while he accepts the Black nation as necessarily intertwined with its white oppressors -- which leads to support for the consciousness form -- he nonetheless sets the rejection of white society as a criterion for true membership in that very same Black nation. It is this second component that serves to modify his vision specifically into a community-reminding consciousness form of the Black nation.

Also in 1989, Ron Karenga echoes this particular, complex sentiment of Farrakhan’s. In much the same vein, Karenga argues that Black national consciousness requires the rejection of white society in conjunction with love for the Black race. Unlike Farrakhan, however, he elaborates particularly upon the view of ‘traditional’ (i.e., white) Christianity with severe distrust. In this way, he reiterates the widespread perspective in Black communities -- dating back centuries to the role of
Christianity in enslaving Black people -- that the church as an institution is driven by oppressive white figures hidden behind Black street-level representatives:

The slaveholders’ reasons for Christianizing the enslaved Africans began with their perception of Christianity as a way to reinforce and maintain dominance. Thus, in 1743, a white minister prepared a book of dialogue for slaveholders to teach enslaved Africans which stressed contentment and thanks for being enslaved and ended by saying, ‘I can’t help knowing my duty. I am to serve God in that state in which he has placed me. I am to do what my master orders me’ (Karenga 1989, pp. 285-286).

It is from this point that Karenga argues for the importance of Black norms and institutions in grounding a culturally legitimate Blackhood. The most well-known among these institutions he created was the Kwanzaa holiday, designed to be “very relevant to building family, community and culture” (Karenga 1988, p. 31). In this way, he evidently also echoes Farrakhan’s view that true belonging in the Black nation strictly requires allegiance to that nation’s collective will. Thus they see legitimate Blackhood as conditional on ‘truly Black’ political action.

Altogether, the rationale behind both Farrakhan and Karenga’s expressions of support for the Black nation in the form of a community-esque consciousness -- despite their shared sharp rejection of white society -- is most clearly articulated by the former, again in 1989:

We are not racist at all, for it’s better to elect a white man that is just, than to elect a Black man simply because he’s Black if he refuses to apply the principles of justice and equity. So at some point we will grow to look beyond color, but we aren’t at that point yet. We must look at color first, because we have been deprived because of our color, so it is natural that we should want a man who is in there because of our color. (Farrakhan 1989, p. 229)

Here Farrakhan explains even more fundamentally how he reasons the Black nation should take the form of a consciousness with hints of a national community. The crux of his rationale is that Black and white people are essentially not very different after all. Rather, the divide with which he is concerned is not so much between white and Black but between anti-Black oppression and
Black justice, respectively. According to my schema, this reasoning lends itself directly to a consciousness-form nation, as indeed it does. Furthermore, it is from this very point on Black-white relations that he draws the claim that Black communities ought to have institutions run by Black people -- as in a national community -- since Black communities have historically “been deprived because of [their] color” (emphasis added). Again, in line with my schema, this logic engenders support for some of the institutional aspects of a national community. In this way it is clear, as explained by my schema, why both Farrakhan and Karenga, in spite of their matching anti-white sentiments, come to a conclusion in favor of the Black national consciousness form enhanced with community features.

Thus my schema accounts for these visions of the Black nation in the form of a national consciousness in that they are fundamentally and directly rooted in the logic that the Black people is (nearly) fully intertwined with its surrounding groups -- primarily white society -- in the United States (as recognized by Wilson (1970) with his term cultural nationalism). Hence, throughout the 20th century, the Black nation was imagined as a national consciousness, national community, and nation-state, and moreover it is due to the place on the spectrum of peculiarity taken by a Black nationalism that its envisioned Black nation falls at a particular point along the corresponding spectrum of sovereignty.

3dd.) State, community, and consciousness in late 20th century Pan-Africanisms

Through the late 20th century, the Pan-African nation was imagined in all three national forms of the state, community, and consciousness. As the years went on, however, competing
Pan-African visions and movements gravitated from the state and community forms in the 1970s and 1980s towards primarily the consciousness form in the 1990s through to the turn of the millennium in 2000. Altogether, competition among Pan-Africanisms throughout this period was very much dominated by disagreement on the form of the Pan-African nation-to-be.

With that said, Pan-Africanisms have historically also disagreed to a somewhat lesser extent on the meaning of Africanness: specifically whether it should be defined in racial or other terms. The cases analyzed here, however, overwhelmingly agree on a racial alignment of Africanness with Blackness (thereby excluding northern Africans of Arab ethnicity, for example, from concern in Pan-African nation-building). Indeed, despite all of this competition, the motivation behind all Pan-Africanisms has remained constant through the decades: namely, to resist the racial and economic subjugation by the West (Biney 2018, pp. 177-178).

**National Community:** On one side of the dominant competition among Pan-Africanisms through the 1970s and 1980s was the Sixth Pan-African Congress in Tanzania in 1974. The Congress declared:

> [T]he philosophical foundation of our development strategy should be based on self-reliance guided by a progressive ideology; inter-African, Caribbean, and Third World Co-operation [sic]; democratization of international organisation [sic], particularly the financial and monetary institutions, in order to bring about the liberation of our people at home and in the diaspora (Campbell 1975, p. 92).

Here the Congress advocates for a Pan-African nation in the community form. In doing so, the Congress prescribes a racial Pan-African root identity that includes not only the peoples of historically oppressed Africa, but also the Caribbean communities of Black African descent whose ancestors were moved there by force in the transatlantic slave trade. This conclusion in favor of the community-form nation is discerned from the fact that, while this statement assigns no significance
to state borders as a means to the freedom of African people worldwide, there is also clear support for the establishment of a nation more concrete than a mere consciousness. Indeed, the emphasis falls on the construction of institutions, which is the hallmark feature of community-form nations. In this way, the Congress predicates the national self-determination (or, as is stated, “self-reliance”) of the transregional Pan-African people upon the establishment of shared democratic and financial institutions that promote “inter-African, Caribbean, and Third World Co-operation [sic].”

The rationale behind the Congress’ support for a community-form Pan-African nation is embedded in the statement itself. That is, while the nation envisioned therein is to be composed of all members of (Black) African descent worldwide -- who make up the Pan-African people -- the very institutions that are meant to liberate the Pan-African people through nation-building are shared on equal terms with others of the “Third World.” In this sense it is quite clear that the Pan-African nation as articulated here is imagined as at once united under a single ethnoracial identity and in close association with other peoples with similar experiences of oppression (Biney 2018, pp. 184, 186). Thus the Congress advocates for the Pan-African nation in the community form on the sovereignty spectrum precisely because the Pan-African people is imagined very much as simultaneously separate from and intertwined with the other historically oppressed peoples of the world.

The Nation-State: Visions such as this of the Pan-African nation in a community form at the time came into competition primarily with imaginings of a full Pan-African state. For instance, in 1980, at a convention of Black activists from across the United States, a particularly militant Pan-African organization stated that “an independent, revolutionary, Afrikan [sic] national state will be the basis for the liberation of our people from racism and capitalism” (as quoted in Dawson
(2001), p. 94). Here it is made very clear, in the view of this organization, that the Pan-African nation is to take the form of a fully sovereign state, specifically because the state is the only national form capable of guaranteeing freedom from oppression (Biney 2018, pp. 178-179). In this way, this expression of nationhood is a distinctly Pan-African example of a nationalism strongly favoring the national form of the state, precisely due to the imagining that all those of African descent are united by a shared, very stark opposition to the oppressive West.

**National Consciousness:** By the Seventh Pan-African Congress held in Kampala, Uganda in April 1994, however, the vision of the Pan-African nation in the consciousness form became much more prominent. The vision of a Pan-African state had by this point fallen far out of favor, and the imagining of the Pan-African nation in the community form had given way to support for a national consciousness. This shift was due primarily to a radically different global context than in 1974: namely, by this time decades removed from decolonization, international liberal economic institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank gained influence across Africa. Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem, the general secretary of the Seventh Congress in 1994, stated in his Pan-Africanist manifesto:

We held the 7th PAC [Pan-African Congress] at a time when neo-colonialism was threatening to give way to recolonization. More than ever in the past, Pan Africanism [sic] as a counter-force to imperialism is a necessary tool of analysis and organizational format for the whole Pan-African world. ... The legacy of civil wars, wars of liberation, refugeeism and mass displacement of our peoples in the last decades have really proven that there is no such thing as purely national issues (Abdul-Raheem 1996, pp. 2, 19-20).

Here, portraying what is called the new Pan-Africanism, the Congress expresses support explicitly for the Pan-African nation as a “tool of analysis and organizational format.” In this way,
the nation is not imagined with any concrete institutions at all, let alone borders, but rather as a consciousness: a framework of thought.\textsuperscript{28}

Furthermore, this statement justifies the turn towards the consciousness form as opposed to the other two forms in reference to a new era. As opposed to before in the 1970s and 1980s, the Pan-African people in 1994 faces not only damage from conflict among (Black) African colonially delineated nation-states, but also a resurgence of imperialism itself. These two historical factors served to weaken the legitimacy of the traditional bordered nation as a positive form of political organization, respectively because the demarcations left by colonial powers incited violence and the new threat of imperialism called for solidarity among previously colonized (Black) African states.

In this way, it is already evident to an extent that the support for the consciousness form in the new Pan-Africanism is derived specifically from the rejection of the traditional colonial borders in favor of peaceful solidarity in the face of colonialism among all (Black) Africans worldwide. Indeed, this sentiment is reflected clearly in the Congress’ conclusion that the events of the 1970s and 1980s prove “that there is no such thing as purely national issues.”

The rationale for the new Pan-Africanism’s dedication to the consciousness form is articulated very clearly in a publication outlining the goals of the ideology:

The new Pan-Africanism puts some big strategic issues on the agenda. It is concerned with: Reducing poverty; Social development, including addressing HIV/AIDS, unemployment, and illiteracy; Ending wars and conflicts; Promoting peace-building; A new trade regime that is both free and just; Promoting human rights and democratic governance; Fostering regional integration and co-operation [sic]; And seeking a ‘new’ partnership with the outside world, notably the industrialised [sic] powers (Landsberg & McKay 2005).

\textsuperscript{28} Though this vision is particularly abstract, it is still a nationalist imagining in that -- following from the definition of nationhood as sovereign and limited -- the envisioned political entity is (1) \textit{limited} to the peoples of the Pan-African world (as previously defined in racial terms) and (2) demands \textit{sovereignty} over that world’s characteristically Pan-African anti-imperialism. While this diagnosis may still seem tenuous, the nationalist quality of this imagining becomes all the more clear in the following analysis.
Here the statement lists all of the practical objectives to which the new Pan-African national consciousness ought to be committed. Identified explicitly among these aims are “regional integration and co-operation [sic]” as well as “a ‘new’ partnership with the outside world.” In this way, not only does this statement echo the words from the 7th Pan-African Congress in an even more plain manner, it also expands the intertwinedness of the Pan-African people from being only with other oppressed groups to being with Western peoples as well (Biney 2018, p. 185). Thus, the desire for the Pan-African nation as a national consciousness indeed stems directly from the imagined, deep intertwining of the Pan-African people with the rest of the world. Altogether, through the late 20th century, the Pan-African nation was envisioned as a national community, nation-state, and national consciousness. Furthermore, it is because of the place on the spectrum of peculiarity assumed by a Pan-Africanism that its envisioned Pan-African nation falls at a particular point along the corresponding spectrum of sovereignty.

3de.) Conclusion by analysis of amalgamated national form: Between community and consciousness in 1990s Black community nationalisms

While the overtly separatist sects of Black community nationalism in the 1990s fall firmly in the category of nationalisms envisioning a nation in the community form, the majority of Black community nationalisms from this period serve as a particularly instructive case of those nationalisms that fall distinctly between the community and consciousness classifications. On the one hand, the more separatist of these nationalisms express demands of material but not full sovereignty -- as is characteristic of national imaginings of the community form -- namely for
“control of the black [sic] community, electoral actions designed to maximize black [sic] empowerment, support for black [sic] businesses, and the defense of both affirmative action and antidiscrimination programs” (Dawson 2001, p. 122). On the other hand, these nationalisms that straddle the community and consciousness forms envision the Black nation as a globe-spanning constellation of communities. The hybrid vision is articulated clearly by political scientist Robert T. Starks, who wrote the following words as chairman of the committee that formulated *The Manifesto of the Million Man March*:

> Throughout the entire African World Community, ... we are pledged to the establishment of African cultural dominance within individual communities. We are willing to reaffirm the uniqueness of our culture and take the best of its traditions (Starks 1995).

An affirmation of self-determination and unified commitment to self-sufficiency through economic and human development; political empowerment; and international policy and development by African Americans in the interest of people of African descent throughout the African world community, our youth, and future generations (Starks 1995).

In this imagining, each community across the world holds a locally hegemonic Black national culture perpetuated through its own informal institutions and an orientation of thought towards empowerment by and for Black people. First to note is that it is quite evident this vision is not at all of a Black nation-state: There is absolutely no significance assigned to borders, nor to any kind of full, state-like sovereignty, let alone one that requires defined territory in order to delimit its supreme authority.

However, this nationalism contains hallmarks of both the community and consciousness forms. On the one hand, like a community-form nation, this imagining asserts the actual “establishment” of some form of Black national institutional authority, or “dominance” within multiple individual communities. The vision also identifies political and economic
self-determination as a prerequisite to its full nationhood. On the other hand, as with the consciousness form, the imagined nation designates collective Black cultural self-awareness as the core component of its nation-building. Moreover, the foundation of the nation is identified not so much as political institutions (e.g. human development, international policy, etc.), but rather as the “affirmation of self-determination and unified commitment to self-sufficiency” which can be achieved through such institutions.

The rationale behind this intriguingly equal tension in the envisioned Black nation between the community and consciousness forms is actually plainly evident in the former of the two statements already given. That is, Starks roots his hybrid vision most fundamentally in the mission “to reaffirm the uniqueness of our culture and take the best of its traditions.” In this way, this Black nation is imagined as completely unique with regard to culture, but not necessarily in more concretely political ways. Indeed, beyond culture, the Black nation may very well be closely intertwined with other communities. In sum, these non-separatist 1990s Black community nationalisms fall on the spectrum of sovereignty quite evenly between the community and consciousness forms, and on the spectrum of peculiarity closer to the distinct end but only in terms of culture, whereas in other respects the peculiarity is left at a more intertwined point. Thus my schema explains not only the distinctive hybridity in sovereignty of these Black nationalisms, but also why the nation’s sovereignty is articulated -- as in the phrase “African cultural dominance within individual communities” -- completely in cultural terms.

Altogether, from pre-Partition Pakistani nationalisms, to 20th century Black nationalisms, to late 20th century Pan-Africanisms, and finally to the hybrid Black community nationalisms of the 1990s, the nation on the spectrum of sovereignty is imagined as a nation-state, national
community, and national consciousness, and it is due to the nation’s place and nature on the parallel spectrum of peculiarity that it assumes its corresponding degree and type of sovereignty.

This conclusion comes as a refutation to two major claims. First, indirectly in line with the central point of Breuilly (1983), the conclusion challenges the claim that the nation necessitates the territorial state, as defended in works such as Brass (1991). Indeed, as I have demonstrated, the nation comes in many forms: ranging beyond the state to national communities, consciousnesses, and all their in-betweens.

Second, the conclusion refutes a central claim of Gellner (1983). That is, he asserts that the existence of a centralized political unit and its associated norms are necessary conditions for the emergence of a nationalism (Gellner 1983, p. 4). This statement may appear sensible, not only due to the close association of the nation with the state, but also because nationalist separatist movements may be based on the notion of a new state even if that state is otherwise radically different from its parent state. Still, this section has shown that even in the mere imagination of the nation, it may take the form of the nation-state, national community, national consciousness, or anything in between. Therefore, the demonstrated existence of non-state forms of the nation refutes Gellner (1983)’s claim that nationalism requires a centralized politics.

Fundamentally, the difference between my thinking and that of Gellner is that he takes the typical state form of the nation as its characteristic manifestation, whereas I have demonstrated that this form is but one end of a spectrum. To Gellner, furthermore, polities of the community form as I have described it in the context of nationhood are those that prevailed before the rise of nationalism as an ideological framework of political organization at all. He makes this core point using a metaphor of Oskar Kokoschka and Amedeo Modigliani’s distinct styles of painting:
Consider two ethnographic maps, one drawn up before the age of nationalism, and the other after the principle of nationalism had done much of its work. The first map resembles a painting by Kokoschka. The riot of diverse points of colour [sic] is such that no clear pattern can be discerned in any detail, though the picture as a whole does have one. A great diversity and plurality and complexity characterizes all distinct parts of the whole: the minute social groups, which are the atoms of which the picture is composed, have complex and ambiguous and multiple relations to many cultures; some through speech, others through their dominant faith, another still through a variant faith or set of practices, a fourth through administrative loyalty, and so forth. ... Look now instead at the ethnographic and political map of an area of the modern world. It resembles not Kokoschka, but, say, Modigliani. There is very little shading; neat flat surfaces are clearly separated from each other, it is generally plain where one begins and another ends, and there is little if any ambiguity or overlap. Shifting from the map to the reality mapped, we see that an overwhelming part of political authority has been concentrated in the hands of one kind of institution, a reasonably large and well-centralized state (Gellner 1983, pp. 139-140).

Here Gellner’s description of Kokoschka-form polity closely resembles my formulation of community-form nationhood, and his illustration of Modigliani-form polity is synonymous with my understanding of the nation-state. Where we disagree, to use his terminology, is in his point that nationalism -- which characteristically takes the Modigliani form -- usurped hegemony from the previously dominant type(s) of political organization that bore the Kokoschka form.

While I concur that the Kokoschka form was predominant before the rise of nationalism (probably alongside some less common, non-nationalist Modigliani-esque forms as well), I disagree that the Kokoschka form fell victim to this rise. Rather, I have shown that the Kokoschka form has very much persisted through the age of nationhood, along with the Modigliani form, as two different forms of the nation: the community and the state form, respectively. What changed, therefore, is not so much the form of political community, but the ideological framework through which the form is taken. Indeed, within the framework of the nation alone, we have observed forms resembling the paintings of Modigliani in the discrete nation-state, Kokoschka in the national
community somewhat intertwined with other polities, and to follow suit, Joan Mitchell in the deeply interwoven national consciousness.
3e.) *Synthesis: Revisiting the Proposed Theory*

To reiterate, the theoretical schema of the ideological structure of nationalisms -- whose proposal and defense are the objectives of the present thesis -- consists of three parts: the root identity, the national identity, and the national community.

First, a nationalism is based on one prenational, particularly imagined root identity, which (1) identifies who belongs in the nation, (2) may be of one or multiple types of identity substance (e.g. religious, civic, etc.), and (3) whose character varies along the two structural spectra of uniformity and viscosity. These spectra are important as they determine the exclusionary versus inclusionary nature of an imagined nation.

This first point has been demonstrated perhaps most reliably through the example of Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s pre-1937 inclusionary religious Pakistani nationalism. As I argued, Jinnah stated at Lucknow’s Muslim League in December 1917 that India “is not to be governed by the Hindus, ... not to be governed by the Mahomedans either and certainly not by the English. It is to be governed by the people and the sons of this country” (Jinnah 1917).

The simultaneously religious and inclusionary nature of this nationalism lends credence to the view that a root identity, in determining who has national belonging, produces an inclusionary imagined nation not simply when the nationalism is of civic substance, but rather when the root identity itself is more heterogeneous and/or fluid than not: and vice versa, that a nationalism is exclusionary when its root identity is more homogeneous and/or static than not. Thus this point confounds the dichotomy of ethnic nationalisms as exclusionary and civic nationalisms as inclusionary, as confirmed by Donald Trump’s hybrid civic-ethnic American nationalism.
Second, a national identity intersects structurally with other identity-based ideological forces, such as sexisms. The variation licensed by this phenomenon of intersection is important because the discriminatory versus non-discriminatory nature of the intersecting ideological force(s) determine(s) the discriminatory versus non-discriminatory character of the envisioned nation.

This second point has been verified perhaps most definitively through the case of masculinity ideology intersecting the Hindu nationalism of the Hindu Vivek Kendra (HVK). Indeed, the aforementioned press release from the HVK states that “Mother [India] needs such men: young, intelligent, dedicated and more than all virile and masculine. When Narayana [eternal knowledge] and Nara [eternal manliness] combine, victory is ensured” (As quoted in (Banerjee 2005)). This identification of violent, virile manhood as integral to Hindu nationhood first legitimizes that ideology of masculinity, and then in turn produces an imagined Hindu nation characterized by a gender discrimination in which the very validity of men and boys as national members is conditional on their virility.

Cases such as this one -- alongside those involving discrimination in the sense of identity-based oppression, primarily of women and queer individuals, rather than mere gender-specific roles -- affirm the claim that the discriminatory versus non-discriminatory nature of (an) intersecting ideological force(s) determines that same variation in the internal nature of an envisioned nation.

Third, the character of a national community varies along the substructural spectrum of peculiarity. This variation is important because the substructure determines in the hierarchical superstructural spectrum of sovereignty whether the nation is envisioned as a consciousness, community, or full state.
This third point has been substantiated perhaps most fully through the instance of Garveyism’s vision of the Black nation in the form of the state. As has been shown, Marcus Garvey followed in the footsteps of Martin Robison Delany with his 1923 statement of rationale for a Black nation-state that “white men should be white, yellow men should be yellow, and black men should be black in the great panorama of races” (Garvey & Garvey 1986, p. 26). This assertion, which epitomizes Garvey’s extreme racial fundamentalism, very clearly aims to justify full state sovereignty for the Black nation through a recognition that the Black people are fundamentally distinct from all the other peoples of the world.

So it follows from instances such as this one that when a people is imagined substructurally as basically distinct from all others, the envisioned nation of that people takes the form of a nation-state. Correspondingly for the other two national forms, as has already been demonstrated: (1) when a people is imagined substructurally as similarly both distinct from and intertwined with others, the envisioned nation of that people takes the form of a national community, and (2) when a people is imagined substructurally as deeply intertwined with (all) others, the envisioned nation of that people takes the form of a national consciousness.
4.) Conclusion: Nationalism and Nationalisms as Ideology

4a.) Review of the Argument

In demonstrating the explanatory power of my schema of the ideological structure of nationalisms, the present thesis has detailed the ways in which nationalisms are ideologically structured in common so as to allow for their structural variation. Namely, a nationalism is structured in three intertwined parts: the prenational root identity, the national identity, and the national community.

In Part I, I looked at the Independence-era Indian nationalisms of the 1946-1950 Constituent Assembly as well as the pre-Partition religious inclusionary Pakistani nationalism of Mohammad Ali Jinnah, in contrast with Donald Trump’s American nationalism. Here I demonstrated that a nationalism is based on one particularly imagined root identity, which falls on two spectra of variation: uniformity, which ranges between homogeneous and heterogeneous, and viscosity, which ranges between static and fluid.

In Part II, I considered 20th century Black nationalisms linked by their intersection with gender and sexuality ideology as well as the mid-to-late 20th century Hindu nationalisms that led to the rise of current Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Here I showed that a nationalism intersects with other ideological forces, usually others also identity-based, such as sexisms, and furthermore that variation among nationalisms in what other ideological forces with which they intersect is a type of structural variation rather than adjunct to structure.
In Part III, I drew from various pre-Partition Pakistani nationalisms, 20th century Black nationalisms, and late 20th century Pan-Africanisms, all in relation to 1990s Black community nationalisms situated between the community and consciousness forms. Here I established that nationalism varies along a spectrum of peculiarity that ranges between the nation being imagined as interwoven with and as distinct from other political communities. This spectrum determines whether the nation is envisioned as a consciousness, community, or full state; the more interwoven a nation is imagined, the closer falls the nation to the consciousness end of the spectrum, and the more distinct, the closer to the full-state end.

Thus the schema comprehensively captures the ideological structure of nationalisms that allows for their significant variation. Accepting my argument as true, a number of important theoretical and practical implications follow from these conclusions, as well as recommendations for further research -- all of which are to be addressed in the remainder of this conclusion.
4b.) Further Theoretical Implications of the Argument

In addition to all of the contributions this thesis has by this point made to explanatory theory of nationalism, there remain some other, more extraneous theoretical implications offered by my argument. Three of these less directly pertinent implications are to be spelled out very briefly here: namely, (1) the structural relationship between nationalism and expansionism, (2) the capacity of nationalisms to elicit emotion, and (3) the dynamics of ideological competition involving (a) nationalism(s), particularly inter-nationalism competition (i.e., nation-building).

First, my claim that a nationalism which envisions its nation in the state form necessarily imagines a particularly located and demarcated territory sheds light on exactly how nationalism and expansionism structurally coincide. Assuming my understanding, expansionism is defined as the realization of state sovereignty over an envisioned national territory over which that state did not previously exercise supreme authority. This definition is crucially different from colonialism and imperialism, which involve a subsuming of other political territories under the authority of the colonizing state but not an even distribution of sovereignty over the joint territory of the state and its colonies.

Rather, the meaningful point made by the assumption of my understanding of expansionism demonstrates that the line between constructing a national territory and expanding the territory of the state is thoroughly blurred. In other words, the structural similarity between territorial nation-building and expansionism -- since they share the characteristic of expanding rather than only acquiring addenda to the territory of a sovereign -- is actually greater than that between colonialism, imperialism, and expansionism. Indeed, both territorial nation-building and
expansionism are possible symptoms of state-form nationalisms whose imagined territory encompasses land beyond that nation’s established territory.

In effect, therefore, the only difference between territorial nation-building and expansionism is a historical one: that cases of the former involve nation-states that last to today (or at least for a long time), while cases of the latter see national territory grow only to be reduced or returned to its previous borders later. For instance, on the one hand, the Japanese conquest of the Pacific around WWII saw the nation-state of Japan expand its sovereignty over many regions and islands, such as what is now the Philippines. Had all or even just some of these territories been retained as fully Japanese territory after the war and to this day, we would likely label the process by which Japan acquired that land as nation-building rather than expansionism.

On the other hand, the arduous process of Italian unification in the 19th century resulted in the territory of the Italian nation-state that still exists today. While there is no doubt that this unification is now considered a case of nation-building, to the vast majority of the people in the Italian peninsula’s southern Mezzogiorno at the time, unification was in every sense an invasion by the north (D’Elia 1977).

Altogether, in this case, Italy engaged in conquest not unlike Japan in WWII: The difference is that, from the perspective of today in which the territory assumed with Italian Unification still holds, Italy in the 19th century effectively conquered itself, rather than other lands (closely in line with Hechter (1999)’s theory of internal colonialism). Hence the line of differentiation between territorial nation-building and expansionism is very tenuous, whereas colonialism and imperialism are indeed cut from a different cloth. Thus, normatively speaking, this
implication suggests that it may be much less reasonable than usually assumed that one can systematically condemn expansionism but accept territorial national statehood.

Second, my original ontological conceptualization of the structural nature of nationalisms suggests a potential answer to the question of why nationalisms have such enormous capacity to elicit emotion: at this point all the more clearly in light of the evidence presented in the argument. As previously explained, this thesis takes nationalism not as an ideology in its own right, but rather as an ideological framework to which social actors (e.g. groups, individuals, etc.) contribute their own ideological substance to create various nationalisms. Thus the skeleton called nationalism is reproduced and disseminated in such a way that leaves ideological space for actors to add their own unique flesh: occasionally by political thinkers whose ideology spreads thereon through overlapping communities of practice, but primarily unconsciously and intersubjectively among the individuals of such communities.

As already demonstrated in my rejection of Anderson’s third so-called paradox of nationalism, this process of appending ideological substance to the nationalist framework identifies nationalism as analogous more to identity-based ideological forces like sexism or racism than to conventional political ideologies such as anarchism or liberalism. While both identity-based forces and political ideologies may very well bear strong emotional attachments, there is little doubt that the former -- whether sexism, racism, queerphobia, etc. -- are particularly deeply rooted in collective and individual fears, hatreds, and anxieties. Indeed, many if not all of the expressions of nationalism analyzed in this thesis convey a heightened emotionality, from Louis Farrakhan’s enraged denunciation of homosexuality in and around his envisioned Black Islamic nation to Choudhry Rahmat Ali’s fiercely impassioned support for a Pakistani nation-state. Hence seeing nationalism as
a type of ideological answer specifically to the who questions of politics as demonstrated in my argument explains its dramatic capacity to harness and elicit emotion.

Third, my original explanation of the place of nationalism in the world of ideology -- particularly in light of the application of that explanation in distinguishing the who questions and the what, when, how questions of politics in Part II on ideological intersection -- bears important implications for ideological competition involving nationalisms. Indeed, a nationalism is capable of competing with any other ideological force that answers a who question, whether that be another nationalism or some different force of identity-based political organization.

From the opposite angle, a nationalism cannot compete with a what, when, how force such as anarchism, as neither holds any ideological tenet that wholly contradicts any one of the other. The pairing of nationalism and anarchism is particularly insightful, moreover, as understandings of nationalisms’ ideological structure less versatile than mine would argue that anarchist anti-statism is incompatible with nationalism’s demand for the nation-state. However, a nation of the consciousness form is clearly compatible with anarchism. Thus nationalism and anarchism exhibit mutual influences but certainly are not mutually wholly contradictory, as recognized by Ball, Dagger, & O’Neill (2019) (pp. 16-21). In competing with other who forces, a nationalism may clash with other non-nationalist identity-based ideology of political organization by contradiction over the nation’s core characteristics of sovereignty and limitedness, but with another nationalism by contradiction over any one or many variations within the ideological structure of nationalisms.

On the one hand, to provide a few examples of non-nationalist identity-based forces, nationalism may compete with: (1) populism as it centers not ‘the nation’ but ‘the people,’ which is limited but not sovereign in that sovereignty is still shared between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite,’ (2)
Tianxia as it articulates a distinctive form of expansionist imperial sovereignty with no fixed limits of territory, identity, or anything else, and (3) cosmopolitanism as it rejects both state sovereignty and the limitedness of political community, in favor of overlapping, non-supreme authorities.

On the other hand, competition among nationalisms -- which we may call the structural dynamics of nation-building -- occurs with nationalisms contradictory in one or more of the dimensions of variation explored in this thesis (in accord with the core arguments on nation-building from Hroch (1985) and Mylonas (2013)). Competing nationalisms may ebb and flow in relative influence until one achieves hegemony within a political community, from which point that hegemony may be reproduced and maintained through banal nationalist symbolism (Billig 1995; Yack 2001, pp. 520-521).

This understanding is precisely that which Anderson (2016 [2006, 1991, 1983]) neglects and Gellner (1983) misses completely. Indeed, Gellner (1983) claims that nationalism is the political principle that the political and national unit must be congruent in order for the unit to be politically legitimate (p. 1). While this assertion incorporates some specificity that Anderson’s definitions lack, Gellner (1983) still glosses over the critical elements of nationalism’s fundamental subjectivity as well as its ideological nature and global ubiquity in banal form. This neglect on the part of Gellner (1983) is best critiqued by Malešević (2019) (pp. 1-17, 176). With that said, Gellner (1983) posits that two individuals are of the same nation if they share a culture or if they recognize each other as being of the same nation (p. 7). While the second conditional actually begins to grasp the subjectivity of the nation, this assertion still scarcely accounts for any form of nationalism apart from the ethnic variety (Gellner 1983, p. 6). Thus Gellner (1983)’s theorizations are far too limited
4c.) Review of the Practical Implications of the Argument

There are two spheres upon which the argument of this thesis can have a practical impact: the field of nationalism studies and the ideological formulation of imagined nations in the social world. On the one hand, the significance of my contribution to the field has already been articulated fully in my literature review and the references to it peppered throughout my argument, and is also yet to be summarized in my final remarks. On the other hand with regard to nationalist imagining, I agree with Malešević (2019) that taking the worldwide hegemony of nationalism as a framework for political organization as a given, the dimensions of variation I have explored show that nationalism does not necessarily induce chaos as often portrayed.

Put simply, if we must accept the persistence of nationalism, this thesis shows we can make the best of that concession by extracting as much inclusion, equality, and justice out of nationalism as possible. Addressing each of these three abstract goals in the given order, I follow in correspondence with the three sections of my argument: (1) If we want inclusion, we must aim not so much for civic over ethnic national imaginings, but rather for national root identities that are more heterogeneous and fluid than homogeneous and static. (2) If we want equality, we must intersect nationalisms only with explicitly non-discriminatory identity-based ideologies. (3) And if we want justice, we must promote the nation in the form of the state, community, or consciousness on a case-by-case basis, depending on which form offers the best chance at guaranteeing an equitable distribution of goods.

Still, the nation is of course not the only form of political organization. For all the variations among nationalisms described in the present thesis, the models of political organization
that I personally favor lie beyond the realm of the nation. I hold this view because I believe that the
sovereignties legitimized by nationalisms grant to the state (and perhaps other national forms, to a
lesser extent) too much discretion to exploit the authority to exclude -- not to mention at a
significant political distance from the smaller-scale communities that exclusion actually impacts.
Moreover, assuming a need for defined territories, specifically in a nation that strives towards
democratic legitimacy, inclusion becomes all the more incompatible. With much the same spirit,
written by the advisor of this very thesis, Ochoa Espejo (2020) favors a form of territorial political
organization legitimized by its roots in the rights of place rather than of identity.
4d.) Recommendations for Further Research

As previously articulated, by far the most important call for research emerging from my argument is for further application and revision of my proposed theoretical schema in light of new evidence. Indeed, the ultimate purpose of my writing this thesis is to invite scholars to take my schema as a starting point from which to contribute out of their own areas of expertise, all in a collective effort to formulate a more complete and useful theoretical understanding of the ideological structure of nationalisms. I eagerly await what others have to say.

In addition to this primary recommendation for further research, listed below are a number of matters not fully addressed by my work in this thesis, which I hope enjoy the privilege of continued inquiry and development:

I. A more advanced ontology which unites the field of nationalism studies, in terms of both nationalism as an ideological framework with a distinct structure and nationalisms as units of analysis


III. More precise and theoretically grounded formulations of the use of social constructivism as the basic theoretical framework for nationalism studies, further beyond the foundation provided by Billig (1995)

IV. More quasitheoretical contributions drawn from understudied cases, akin to many of the works of Michael Dawson and Partha Chatterjee, in which theorists may firmly root their revisions of my schema

V. The topics outlined in my explanation of the further theoretical implications of my argument: (1) the structural relationship between nationalism and expansionism, (2) the capacity of nationalisms to elicit emotion, and (3) the dynamics of ideological competition involving (a) nationalism(s), particularly inter-nationalism competition (i.e., nation-building)

VI. More methods alongside my own for realizing inclusion, equality, and justice in a world dominated by nationalism, following from revisions of my proposed schema
4e. Final Remarks

In the present thesis, I have identified a problematic shortcoming of the nationalism studies canon and in response proposed and defended a theoretical schema that captures the ideological structure of nationalisms. This structure is what allows the observable variation among nationalisms in the social world. A theoretical account of nationalisms’ ideological structure and of the variation licensed by that structure is important because such an account combats the historical Eurocentrism of the field nationalism studies. Indeed, due to the lack of many types of variation in the West that are observable elsewhere, it is this Eurocentric bias that has produced understandings of nationalism as less varied than it really is. In addition, in grounding my argument, I have proposed a new understanding of nationalism as a structural ideological framework as well as a honed formulation of the units of analysis for the field of nationalism studies. Lastly, in concluding the argument, I have not only outlined its theoretical and practical implications, but also listed its derived recommendations for further research.

Altogether, in the spirit of contributing to a world plagued by misunderstanding and inaction in the face of hugely consequential issues, I hope that this thesis has offered an elucidation of a particular important nuance that was previously not adequately recognized: namely, the incredible ideological structural diversity among nationalisms. Responding to both the popular misconceptions of nationalism and the Eurocentric biases of the nationalism studies canon, my argument has demonstrated that conventional understandings of nationalism are grossly oversimplified, in ignorance of the observable variation among the many nationalisms that to an enormous extent sculpt the ideological landscape of the social world.
Indeed, to return to the historical case through which I opened my inquiry: If there is anything to learn from Raghunath Vinayak Dhulekar and Shankarrao Deo’s competing Indian nationalisms from the 1946-50 Constituent Assembly, it is that even the a mode of thought that one assumes to be backwards or violent may carry with it a fascinating social influence -- perhaps even a positive one -- very much worthy of study, simply by virtue of its impact on political life. As stated previously, normatively speaking, I am by no means a proponent of nationalism as an ideological framework for political organization. Certainly, there are many nationalisms I tolerate as well as many I abhor for their exclusion, discrimination, and injustice. However, I am nonetheless fully invested in the explanatory study of nationalism, for no other reason than that its role in history to this day is undeniably immense.

With that, I call upon you in your everyday life to give your full attention to all ideological perspectives, and especially to those with which you profoundly disagree. I qualify this request in acknowledging that there may very well be some ideological orientations such as misogyny and queerphobia that deny you your humanity simply for who you are, and I fully support delegitimizing and combating those dangerous views. However, there remain many other perspectives that are rejected not because they are clearly unjust, but rather only because they are different from yours. This rejection is precisely that in which I implore you not to partake -- particularly when it comes to views with which you disagree but have had an undeniable influence over the world you live in. After all, there is no making change without first understanding the many ways of thinking that have already made it.
5.) References

5a.) References by Category

Field-originating theorists


Primordialists


Ethnosymbolists


Modernist constructivists

Modernists


Interim theorists


Works by experts on nationalisms in South Asia

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Works by experts on nationalisms from Black and Pan-African contexts

Works by contemporary scholars of nationalism

https://nationalities.org/virtual-asn/the-state-of-nationalism-studies

Additional miscellaneous contributions

For broader theoretical contextualization:


**On gender and sexuality:**


**Of indirect relevance to my argument:**


**Sources of data and foundational analysis**

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