

THE KING'S REVOLUTION:
A Prolegomenon On De-Democratization
At The Dawn Of The 21st Century

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Abstract

The 21st century has seen a global resurgence of right-wing populist movements that challenge extant democratic institutions, making the search for a systematic approach to these 'democratic-backsliding' events of ever-increasing importance. This paper defines the phenomenon under examination as revolutionary to employ a general theoretical framework through which de-democratization may be analyzed and proactively addressed: (1) strain, an opportunity structure, an authorizing belief, and precipitating factors constitute the necessary and sufficient conditions for the genesis of intra-state revolutionary activity; (2) an authorizing social movement elects a candidate who then affects a revolution from within along a developmental progression from a redefinition of executive powers, to a reorganization of the political collectivity, then a redefinition of institutionalized norms, and finally a total revolution of the base values that enable a radically different authority structure; (3) the sustainability of the anti-democratic movement is determined by its ability to garner legitimation from the societal community by a set of subterranean values, justification through patrimonial allegiances within a formal bureaucracy, and surplus product from the economy. This scheme is applied to the contemporary United States, where it is argued the 2016 election of Donald Trump and his activity in office manifest latent proto-fascist conditions in the first stages of what might become a more radical revolution within the state. Effective policy targets the variables that constitute the source of popular support.

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



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After reviewing selected aspects of the literature on democracy and fascism, Chapter One defines the phenomenon of de-democratization as revolutionary in concept. Chapter Two presents a general theory of intra-state revolution including its necessary and sufficient generating preconditions, stage-sequential developmental progression, and factors of successful implementation.

Chapter Three applies this scheme to various historical data from the U.S. to demonstrate its facility in application to the 2016 presidential election of Donald Trump and his activity in office. Chapter Four argues that current public and private response to right-wing extremism in the U.S. is insufficient, and effective policy must be guided by equitable values that target the variables constituting the source of popular support.

I. A Sociological Framework

This thesis seeks to accomplish two tasks, the latter an extension of the former. (1) The presentation of a general theoretical framework for intra-state revolution through which “democratic-erosion” events may be characterized, categorized, and placed within a developmental framework to explain their genesis, course, and consequences. (2) The application of this scheme to the contemporary U.S.A., where the 2016 presidential election of Donald Trump and his activity in office manifested latent proto-fascist conditions in the first stages of what might become a more radical anti-democratic movement. From these arguments and observations, further study to arrive at effective policy is advocated.

Theoretical concepts are neither true nor false, but instead useful or not in explaining and predicting observations. Through these perceptual categories of mind, we access phenomena. By introducing variables that transcend historical specificity, we may “abstract” a concept from discrete phenomena to draw meaningful comparisons between distinct events. Through systematization of abstract concepts, we may construct general theoretical frameworks that constitute determinate arguments about various forms of social action at the macro-societal and micro-individual levels. If we approach a political movement, or political act, as revolutionary, then the concept of *revolution* will have been introduced to speak of multiple events under one abstraction. Further, to speak of a sole case analytically involves the same use of abstractions, an implicit set of comparisons, however much situational specificity is used. The concepts employed here will be functional, allowing us to assess the consequences of the initial state of a system using social universals. Systematic organization of these concepts into social facts¹ allows for the formulation of determine arguments for all past and future instances of the event under examination. Knowing the functional properties of a social system, we may employ social equations to determine their probable state in the future.

Causal arguments are (almost) always constructed through counterfactuals, the isolation of discrete conceptual variables in one event with absences in another theoretically-isomorphic event to generate pseudo-experimental conclusions universally applicable to all phenomenological manifestations of that situation. Here, though analyzing a single case, the general theory enunciated may be further applied and falsified to avoid tautologies and construct “comparative” propositions. Implicit will be a strategy known as “cheating,” the modification of definitions not to save one’s argument but to sharpen its coherence and analytical precision (Gould 1987: 65). In the initial development of a general theoretical framework, such processes of refinement and tightening of definitions may only come through the framework’s application.

¹ Social facts are ways of acting “...capable of exerting over the individual an external constraint; which is general over the whole of a given society whilst having an existence of its own, independent of its individual manifestations.” (Durkheim 1895 [1982]: 59). Values, though subject to individual selection, are appropriated and shaped by information from the environment, in turn affecting how we interact with it and what stimuli we present ourselves with. If these values are derived from significant caretakers and teachers, whose decisive minds were themselves shaped by values before them, it is reasonable to approach this concept of social values as a ‘real’ natural force operating beyond the individual.

Democracy and Fascism

The first step is to carefully identify the phenomenon under examination: How should we characterize democratic and fascist regimes? What are indicators of democratic decomposition? By which dimensions will our analysis be framed? In its initial appearances, de-democratization implies a transition from one form of political governance to another, a form of social disorder that disrupts extant institutions and is then followed by reconsolidation within the state. An implicit requirement of its explanation is a characterization of each political type in space and a capacity for transformation in time. Crucial, then, is to begin with a functional definition of the political system applicable to the initial and emergent government to provide a framework that guides our comparison of the two.

The state is an institutionalized subsystem within the larger social system whose function is the specification and implementation of collective goals to establish a satisfactory relationship between the collectivity and its environment (Parsons 1963: 354). The medium of interaction between state agents is political power, the capacity to mobilize collective units and resources, and constitutes a means by which ego pressures alter, constrains their scope of action within a situation, in the attainment of desirable ends. This power has both a symbolic component that generates obligatory commitments and material component in mobilization of the relevant resources to reinforce desirable activity (e.g. mechanisms of state surveillance and coercive force). Power is distributed across roles within the political collectivity that form an interactional structure of differential leadership responsibility, privileges, and mobilization capacity. This flow of power through role-relations constitutes the authority structure, the social device by which the collective goals are placed into implementation.

For any political order to be accepted by the general population, its activities must be consistent with a set of societal values. This value system generates shared commitments in its members with the capacity to *legitimate*² norms and activities. In highly differentiated social systems, values are the maximal ideational component, reaching the highest level of generality such that they do not enunciate any norms or even particular kinds of norms but instead perform a regulatory mechanism by supplying a set of generalized principles that maintain patterns of behavior when activated in particular situations. Only those political orders that are sanctioned by the masses, consistent with shared social values, may be considered legitimate, assuming those values are internalized by most members of society. This system is further elucidated by Durkheim's notion of mechanical solidarity. In Durkheim's terms, Weber is suggesting that an order is legitimized in terms of society's moral obligations, the collective conscience, a shared set of value-orientations that, when internalized by an individual, constitute binding commitments that provide external moral controls over individual discretion (Durkheim 1984 [1893]: 61). These values are not only viewed as obligatory, but desirable. These moral values are internalized, yet "act upon us from the outside" (Durkheim 1982 [1895]: 44). Deriving from shared value commitments, the individual is bound directly to society, and possibly the state.

² Weber tells us that social action may be said to exist within a larger social order if the conduct is oriented towards determinable maxims, or values, where the validity of the order concerns the strength of orientation towards these values (1968 [1922]: 31). This adherence is constituted in individuals as a sense of obligation. Social relationships built on pure expediency are generally understood to be less stable than ones that have the prestige of being considered "binding," i.e. of legitimacy.

As social orders grow in complexity, normative expectations³ may emerge to mitigate problems of double-contingency, the uncertainty that arises between unfamiliar agents who have imperfect information as to how the other will act (Luhmann 1985: 31). When institutionalized, these normative expectations evolve into a set of procedures that supply fixed rules to reinforce commitment to the “desirable” state of the social system. These procedures have the capacity to *justify* the outcomes derived from their due-process application⁴ (Gould 1993: 210-212). Only those procedures that are legitimated by the dominant societal values are able to constitute this mechanism. Weber sees legitimation by long-established values, traditional legitimation, as being replaced by the emergence of rational-legal legitimation by bureaucratic order, and in tandem Durkheim interprets mechanical solidarity as being substituted by organic solidarity, the non-contractual elements of contract, with the division of labor. Both are incorrect, for Weber is in fact characterizing a mechanism of justification by normative procedures rather than legitimation by social values, while Durkheim’s notion of mechanical solidarity does not disappear but instead regulates the procedures that constitute that mechanism. Justification emerges as a function of procedural norms that are legitimated by a redefined egalitarian value system that legitimates both those procedures and their due-process outcomes.

To be accepted as valid, all political orders must receive legitimation by a set of values and justification by a set of normative procedures. It follows that political activity inconsistent with collective values or institutional procedures will be regarded as invalid and rejected by the political and societal communities. The norms instituted by an invalid order will not be accepted as binding, and its activities in violation of procedures will be politically contested. There is an interchange relationship, where a leader’s commitment to common values and activities in pursuit of collective interests are exchanged for legitimation by a set of values and justification through normative procedures, a symbolic acceptance of the polity’s authority.

Conceptualizing one more interchange, with the economic subsystem, constitutes the sufficient functional inputs by which political orders reproduce themselves. The specification of goals by a political collectivity is followed by the mobilization of resources to implement them in domestic and international contexts, and to effectively implement those goals may require the presence of necessary facilities. The economic subsystem’s function is to generate adaptive resources for use by agents within the social system. Surplus product in the form of taxed fiscal skim-off is allocated to the state, providing it the necessary means to achieve desirable end goals. This surplus is exchanged for fiscal and monetary policies that regulate economic activity and define the opportunities for effectiveness within it. The economic sphere operates autonomously to generate adaptive resources for use by the state, while the state affects a steering capacity over it through manipulation of, for example, interest rates, reserve requirements, and credit supplies.

³ While cognitive expectations are constantly adjusted with new information, normative expectations remain fixed in time. Through the implementation of a common normative framework, differentiated units may come into contact, facilitating social cooperation. Just as language paradoxically limits syntax yet expands the creativity of ideas that may be expressed, normative systems constrain social action through providing a set of fixed rules yet expands the possibilities of activities that may be carried out via contractual relationships.

⁴ Hart (1961) distinguishes between primary rules and secondary rules; the former are constituted law, specific rules and their relevant sanctions, while the latter are constitutive law, the measures by which primary rules are made, amended, and nullified. These secondary rules are procedures that justify their due-process outcomes.

These interchanges are not all of the same nature, but embedded within a cybernetic hierarchy where ideational variables high in information “control” political activities and material variables high in energy “condition” them⁵. No determinate relationship can be drawn between a particular economic organization and the nature of its political activity. For example, a capitalist economic formation may occur within the context of statist or laissez-faire governmental orientation; a communist economic formation that abolishes the profit motive may operate under the centralized power of an executive committee or a decentralized parliamentary system. Examinations of the structure of an economy generate no determinate information about its polity, but instead define the outer bounds of political activity that may be carried out successfully by presenting a set of environmental constraints through the upper limitations of its aggregate output. The economy is capable of generating only so many adaptive resources at one time, and thus “conditions” the outer extents of all possible political activity that may be executed successfully. A determinate relationship can be drawn, however, between the particular principles and legal codes of a system and the nature of its polity, thus values and procedures are said to “control” activity within it. As such, our characterizations of democratic and fascistic regimes need not concern the economy at this point of our examination but must focus on the values and norms that regulate radically different authority structures.

Within this context, democracy may be characterized as a bureaucratic authority structure regulated by rational-egalitarian values and rational-legal procedures that afford the societal community the opportunity to participate in the political process. Egalitarianism is defined by equal treatment of equal members within some in-group, and its “rationalism” derives from the belief that humans themselves may cognitively arrive at the proper means to implement these values, as opposed to religious moral codes that would have otherwise been inaccessible had they not emanated from a superhuman source. Implementation of egalitarian values is most often understood as a set of procedures whereby fungible votes are distributed evenly to citizens so they may cast support for a “leader-representative” whose values and interests reflect their own, with the assumption that those demands will be met if the representative is elected into office. In Lasswell’s (1936) sense, democratic procedures provide the common people the participation and enjoyment in influencing the process of deciding “who gets what, when, how,” the right of citizens to petition their government in the hope of achieving some individual or socially-defined goal within a field of fair competition among public interests.

The emergence of democracy is generally understood as a response to the unjust tyranny of monarchies through the abolition of royal absolutism, liberation of markets from the competitive privileges of monopoly, and emancipation of the common people from forces without rational sanction. The development proceeds as (1) a check on arbitrary rulers, (2) replacing arbitrary rules with just and rational ones, and (3) obtaining a share of influence in the making of rules for the underlying population (Moore 1993: 414). The fundamental trend is towards egalitarian values, ones that place equal value between individuals and thus grant them equal privileges in the democratic process.

⁵ The concepts of controlling and conditioning are made explicit through considering the simple interaction between a fox and rabbit population. The foxes eat the rabbits, actively controlling their population numbers, while the rabbits in turn condition the outer limits to which the fox population may grow, generating oscillations in the populations of both. Such oscillations in predator-prey populations due to these cybernetic interactions are observed in nature.

Yet the liberation of free enterprise has led only to a system of capitalist exploitation of the working masses mediated by monetary monopolies, generating new forms of inequality and unjust privileges. The beheading of kings has led to dictatorship of the bourgeoisie by executive committee and, consequentially, various abstractions of an "elite" class have become the new objects of deep animus. This has generated attitudes that view democracy not as a process of finding the common good but instead an authorization mechanism that facilitates acceptance of political domination, first emerging on the argument that an individual's will cannot be fully alienated and represented by another (Rousseau 1762 [2013]: 52). Rather than providing individuals influence over political decision-making, democratic procedures are understood as the rules and regulations by which leader-representatives compete for office and authority (Michels 1911 [2001]: 31; Schumpeter 1942: 252). Like ritual, these procedures draw attention to common social ties and facilitate the symbolic acceptance of the state (Edelman 1964: 1), its social legitimation and rational justification, while also defining the rules of competition for office among elites.

This validation of political domination, alter's consent to ego's authority, is not given but must be manufactured in two ways. First, populist politicians use their charisma, the capacity to embody a particular set of popular values, to garner legitimation from the societal community. Weber describes charismatic authority as when a leader is viewed as legitimate out of their exceptional qualities, as exemplary or divine (Weber 1968 [1922]: 241). This occurs when an individual embodies a particular set of values that legitimate their activities and activate latent commitments within others. Weber treats charisma as its own kind of legitimation, but our discussion embeds it within the framework of traditional and rational values (Weber 1968 [1922]: 244). Charisma is a mechanism by which any value set becomes symbolically-embodied in messages and actions of an individual with the capacity to activate collective commitments and obligations. This charisma may be of two kinds: the embodiment of (1) a preexisting set of values to legitimate activities and (2) a new set of values made culturally-intelligible, i.e. in a way that generates "meaning" for the collectivity and redefines the activities that are legitimate. This constitutes the "love" for one's leader-representative. Second, leader-representatives must be responsive and efficacious to public interest demands to provide the rationale for the extension of political support through democratic procedures. This constitutes the "reason" for endorsing one's leader-representative. Through the combination of charisma and interests that appeal to one's love and reason, the state-citizen relation of representation is upheld and a consenting relationship to populist authority is established.

This consent is in part dependent on state responsiveness and effectiveness to the interest demands of their supporters. A functioning democratic government is not only responsive to the demands of its citizens, but also must act efficaciously upon these demands (Putnam 1994: 73). When responsiveness and effectiveness decrease and governmental policy consistently fails to meet the interests of supporters, either political agents adopt new strategies to alleviate the situations of its citizens or *the relation of representation breaks down* (Przeworski 1985: 164). This is not sufficient to transform the societal system, since its effect is to first reveal the coercive mechanisms that underlie the consenting relationship to authority. De-democratization becomes expressed first as a dysfunction in the relation between the masses and their leader-representatives, with the capacity to generate political disorder.

The fascist movements of the 20th century are the clearest demonstrations of democratic failure and indicate our present-day political orders may not be systematic consolidations of democracy but instead fragile experiments with the looming threat to regress into past forms of

hierarchical authority. Through describing the features of historical fascism, meaningful characterizations of contemporary anti-democratic movements may be derived that encompass not just their present states but the direction of their tendencies as well. Indeed, contemporary authoritarians more often than not wield a fascist “style” of romantic symbolism that legitimates their executive status.

With the possible exception of ‘ideology,’ no term in the social sciences has generated greater ambiguity in its definition than ‘fascism.’ The term has become a pejorative to refer to a group, regime, or individual that is overly-aggressive, controlling, and totalitarian in their orientation to authority. It is selected here out of consideration for the aspects of pseudo-religiosity in the mass mobilization of popular support by leader-representatives who act in ways that undermine the democratic process. Such movements are more than authoritarian, a centralization of executive power in the authority structure. Reconstructing the term with greater specificity will allow for the inclusion of these extra-political features.

The term begins in Italy’s early 20th century when a splinter of the socialist party claimed the title *Fasci d’Azione Rivoluzionaria*, the “unified revolutionary action” group. *Fascio* itself means “bound together,” often symbolized as a tied roll of sticks, the sum being stronger than the units. Their arguments were political and social: through an ultra-national solidarity that unifies the societal community, a centralization of executive powers of office is legitimized so that it may fully operate in commanding economic, political, and social forces in the specification and attainment of collective goals. The values that in part constitute this nationalism are hierarchical, affirming the place of the “common people” through in-group prioritization and out-group discrimination and violence. Their cultural orientations typically, but not always, borrow traditional symbols and embed them within a political context in a “revivalist” movement (e.g. *Shinto*, *Volksggeist*) with the state at its core (Parsons 1942: 222).

When leader-representatives act in ways consistent with hierarchical values made culturally intelligible through nationalist symbols, they activate latent commitments within individuals in the societal community to authorize their totalitarian power. The coercion of fascism is successful if a majority of the population, presumably most but not always the categorized in-group, (1) “loves” their representative out of shared value-orientations, and (2) “reasons” that by extending support they will derive some individual or collective benefit through a redefined state. The methods of using charisma, cultural symbols, and rationalization form the mechanism of garnering political legitimation.

In attempting to characterize the social-cultural nature of these movements, initial approaches of “radicalism on the right” are a fair characterization. Fascism was not old conservatism, though often drawing on traditional values, and was in specific opposition to “left” social movements; “radicalism” entails the intensely motivated, often highly emotional, mobilization of popular support for a cause (Parsons 1942: 138). This negation of extant ideologies and promotion of reconstructed cultural messages becomes a hallmark of fascist movements. In this way fascism is a type of fundamentalism, a traditional reaction to modernity that could not happen without democracy as a precursor to its populist features.

An additional feature of fascism Parsons identifies is the “vested interests” of elites within the polity and economy (1942: 138-9). As power becomes increasingly centralized within a political subsystem, normative orientations to authority become constituted out of binding ties of personal loyalty operating within a formal structure of bureaucracy. This is akin to the properties of patrimonialism, first conceptualized by Weber that he describes as a mode of political

domination, a “patrimonial bureaucracy,” that replicated the patriarchal family-structures of rulers (Weber 1968 [1922]: 231-41; 1006-31). Adams further generalizes this abstraction to transcend its historically-confined context:

In the broadest sense, then, patrimonial political systems become ones in which a ruler (such as a monarch or a lesser lord or stadholder) and corporations that the ruler recognizes or sponsors jointly carry out political tasks and share the prerogatives of sovereignty.

Adams 2005: 16

A sovereign executive typically consolidates and sustains their rule by granting privileges to agents in structural contact with them in the economy and polity. Authority compartmentalizes downward through an extension of that sovereign power to political officials and social elites in the form patron-client relations and personal allegiances with few formal rules (Adams & Charrad 2011: 7). Instead of being bound by rational-legal procedures, the normative obligations between officials in a patrimonial state are ones of loyalty. These social networks may emerge from within role-based bureaucracy, and can move comfortably alongside standardized procedures (Ermakoff 2011: 183). Fascism may be thought of in this context as a form of patrimonialism with a highly centralized executive whose authority structure, while not necessarily familial or patriarchal, replicates the hierarchical flow of powers and privileges in exchange for obligations out of personal loyalty.

In the process of de-democratization from a dysfunction in the leader-community relation of representation, fascism emerges as a potential outcome, a form of political disorder operating under a set of hierarchical values, often made culturally intelligible through a revivalist symbolic movement that prioritize a categorized in-group and legitimates a centralization of state executive power with a structure of patrimonial authority. Information about the economic structure is indeterminate. A fascist executive may emerge from within a democracy of a statist-capitalist or -socialist context. Our task is to explain the paradox of its emergence from within representative bureaucratic democracies regulated by rational-egalitarian values. To account for the important role of the societal community in these movements, rational-choice theories (Ermakoff 2008) will be set aside to allow for voting behavior that is against one's own material interests.

Revolution From Within

The idea that democracies collapse due to internal factors rather than external forces is a familiar concept in the social sciences, and from it has emerged a diverse number of explanations focusing on economic factors, the roles of political parties, the upholding of formal and informal norms, and onward (Linz & Stepan 1996; Acemoglu 2005; Levitsky & Zibblat 2018; Runciman 2018). Yet few have approached these events as revolutionary activity occurring from within a democratic shell, and none satisfying any degree of systematization.

“Radicalism” [in fascism] lies in existence of a popular movement in which large masses of the “common people” have become imbued with a highly emotional, indeed often fanatical, zeal for a cause. These mass movements, which are in an important sense revolutionary movements, are above all what distinguish fascism from ordinary conservatism.

Parsons 1942: 138

If fascism was ‘revolutionary,’ it was so in a special sense, far removed from the word’s meaning, as usually understood from 1789 to 1817, as a profound overturning of the social order and the redistribution of social, political, and economic power.

Paxton 2004; 11

Political revolutions are redefinitions in the nature of a social system’s governing state through the motivated violations of its institutionalized authority codes. The social complex becomes concretely identified in the actions of revolutionary agents, but the events themselves are nominal constructs in a developmental totality. Revolutions incorporate a wide variety of social actions that are characterized in terms of their transformative consequences. It is useful to conceptualize revolution not in singular terms but along a developmental progression as it becomes more radical in its transformations. This is the sociological orientation to most analyses of major revolutions (think Lefebvre’s [1939/2015] analysis of the French Revolution and Gould’s [1987] of the English Revolution), and the same developmental dimension is applied for revolutions affected from within the state.

The king’s revolution was characterized by Gould as the first stage in a major revolution where a monarch engages in actions that abrogate their bounds of authority, creating a country-court split in the societal community and generating conditions relevant to a transformation in the nature of the polity (1987: 95). I expand upon this concept, and contend that each stage in a total revolution may be carried out by actors internal to the state. This does not preclude but instead re-contextualizes the role of the societal community in the revolutionary movement. The major supports of revolutionary action are leader-representatives, but the revolutionary social complex is also manifest in the normative orientations of the general population. Each stage in a revolution may be carried out by a single actor or multiple actors within the state over time.

Not all revolutions from within the state are fascist, but all fascist movements from within formal democracies whose major supports are actors internal to the state are revolutionary in their transformative orientation. In examining de-democratization, we are concerned with a state actor emplaced in the executive position by the societal community who then manifests anti-democratic tendencies that result in a substantive change in the nature of the state. This is not a revolution in the classical sense, where transcendence into a proposed next stage of societal development is manifest, but rather a regression into past forms of political order characterized by hierarchical values that legitimate a centralized totalitarian regime. The benefits to this type of analysis will be the conceptualization of a coherent framework that explains genesis and course of these anti-democratic movements so that we may collectively address them with effect.

II. Toward a Theory of Intra-State Revolution

Presented here is a theory of revolution in the political subsystem by a collective movement whose major supports are agents within the state. What follows is: (1) a specification of the necessary and sufficient conditions for the genesis of revolutionary social action, (2) the presentation of a developmental model that characterizes the stages of a revolution as it becomes more radical in its transformation of the state, and (3) the relevant functional inputs a revolutionary representation must receive to sustain its anti-democratic movement.

Preconditions for Revolutionary Action

Revolutionary social actions are the motivated violations of institutionalized authority codes guided by a belief in an attempt to positively redefine the role-responsibilities, collectivity members, normative procedures, or base values of the state (Gould 1987: 91-2). Revolutions are the culmination of revolutionary actions that produce multiple sovereignties, situations where nonparticipants of the movement begin to follow the directives of revolutionaries as against those of the extant government (Tilly 1975: 530; Gould 1987: 93).

Here we are concerned with a particular type of revolution that involves a leader-representative engaging in revolutionary activity on behalf of individuals and groups in the general population. If the leader-representative is to abrogate institutionalized authority codes successfully without incurring normative sanctions, the political and societal communities must authorize their violation. This connection between the represented and representation must be emphasized. The source of support constitutes not the individuals and their votes but the collective normative orientation adopted by the movement. Identifying the preconditions relevant to the genesis of revolutionary action undertaken by an agent within the state must also be capable of explaining the authorizing orientation adopted by all members of the revolutionary movement.

Adorno et al. (1950) were among the first who attempted to explain the popular rise of fascism in the 1930s, proposing that certain individuals had a predisposed tendency for susceptibility to anti-democratic attitudes, an "authoritarian personality." The psychologists noticed coherent patterns of political, economic, and social attitudes emerging from prejudiced individuals, and argued these derived from attributes of an archetypical personality system. Here we will instead identify the social conditions that generate one's contribution to an anti-democratic movement. The constellation of attitudes Adorno et al. describe are not treated as indicators of individual difference but instead as the manifesting *symptoms* of an underlying social *syndrome* generated by the environment. It is a sociological orientation similar to Merton's explanation of deviance (1957), where he uses the situations of such actors to explain deviant behavior, rather than focusing on their individual attributes. Social action, at our level of analysis, does not emerge from within the atomized vacuum of an individual but instead involves a response to environmental stimuli.

The variables are conceptual, thus examination into descriptive features of the environment that manifest situations generative of particular kinds of social action may over-determine its outcome. Where X, Y, Z constituted the necessary and sufficient conditions for the outcome Q,

various social phenomena x_1 x_2 x_3 may all serve to activate theoretical variable X in the genesis of event Q once Y and Z are present (Gould 1987: 69). Further, they are presented in a value-added order, where subsequent variables in the progression only add value in the genesis of events once prior variables are present (Gould 1987: 69). Z may be present before the other variables, but is only “active” in generating the outcome of Q once X and Y are present. The presence of Z is irrelevant, completely indeterminate of the outcome Q, until the preceding conditions are manifest. Only then does Z “add-value” in the genesis of a particular kind of social action. Marx often noted that it was immaterial whether the ideas of a revolution had appeared a hundred times before in history, but that the material conditions [M] must be present if such ideology [I] is to ever generate revolution [R] with any substance or productivity. The value-added model for this simple interaction is $[M + I \Rightarrow R]$ where the ideas of revolution are only “active” in the generation of substantive revolutions when the material conditions are present.

The following are the necessary and sufficient preconditions for revolutionary social action: strain at the level of one or more components of social action, an opportunity structure, an authorizing belief, and a precipitating factor. If the revolutionary social complex is to routinize these actions, a set of values must be present that legitimate violations and generate popular support. These variables only determine the genesis of revolutionary action, not its successful implementation.

Strain S(X)

Parsons characterizes the emergence of fascist movements as those which could only arise under conditions of strain (1942: 220). A necessary but insufficient precondition is a situation of widespread “anomie” where large groups of individuals are mal-integrated with institutional patterns that provide individual stability and functioning in the social system, with this insecurity making them highly susceptible to emotional appeals (Durkheim 1951 [1897]: 258; Parsons 1942: 220). Parsons elaborates on the different sources of strain: “the same failure may occur with expectations, where the standards for conformity are ambiguous...rendering social interactions unstable” (1942: 138-9); further, “A somewhat different source of strain lies in the instability of the new economy—the exposure to cyclical fluctuations with unemployment and rapid and drastic changes in the standard of living” (1942: 140); elsewhere he discusses the “debunking” of the metaphysical through the exponential expansion of technological and scientific development as destabilizing traditional social-cultural patterns with no comparable substitutes (1942: 140).

While Parsons is somewhat correct that these different environments activate a single variable in the genesis of fascist collective movements, this overgeneralization prohibits the full analytical employment of the situational differences. Gould, following Smelser, systematically re-conceptualizes strain as impairment in the relationships and consequential dysfunction at one or more levels of social action (facilities, goals, norms, and values) (Smelser 1962: 47; Gould 1987: 73-8). While Smelser argues “any kind of strain may be a determinant of any kind of collective behavior” (1962: 49), Gould argues the type of strain delimits the kinds of disorderly action that will occur, assuming the other necessary variables are present (1987: 73). The latter orientation will be adopted to explain the emergence of different kinds of revolutionary activity at the different stages of an intra-state revolution.

SF – The first kind of strain is at the level of facilities, and is the most consistent with the term's original use. "Strain" originates from Merton (1957: 162), who conceptualized it to explain different rates of deviance, using aspects of the situation rather than individual attributes. When confronted with inadequate resources to achieve some socially-defined goals, individuals innovate illegitimate means to achieve their desired ends. This strain is manifest by a disjunction between an agent's goals and their capacity to realize them while acting in accord with institutionalized norms, an uncertainty as to the legitimate attainment of desirable ends (Gould 1987: 75). The inadequate facilities may take the form of insufficient physical capital or constraining role responsibilities.

SG – A second kind of strain occurs at the level of goals, involving impairments in the relation between responsible role performance and the rewards that are derived by agents thereby (Smelser 1962: 54). It can be understood as relative status deprivation, when agents evaluate their position against a comparison group that they perceive as gleaning greater rewards for equivalent performances (Gould 1987: 75). For example, if folks feel entitled to a certain standard of living that they no longer have access to, and no longer expect their children to have access to, they may feel relatively deprived when comparing their situation to a reference group. This strain is exacerbated when reference groups that are seen as less deserving appear successful, even if those successes are atypical in those communities. When this deprivation is socially structured, when members of the same social group feel relatively deprived in comparable situations, strain at the level of goals is manifest as a variable.

SN – Strain at the level of norms is manifest in situations of role ambiguity, those in which agents are confronted with multiple incompatible expectations as well as those in which expectations are unclear or unspecified (Gould 1987: 76-7). These strained situations may be thought of under Durkheim's "anomie," the mal-integration of collectivity members into binding authority norms and their institutions. Destabilization of a common normative framework may occur from a proliferation of expectations, dearth of expectations, or rapid change in the situation that demands new kinds of norms. This normative strain generates "role conflict" and "cross pressures" on agents within the collectivity (Smelser 1962: 59), a confusion that motivates a redefinition of normative expectations to stabilize social interactions.

SV – The final kind of strain occurs at the level of values, a dysfunction in the dissemination of common values that constitute solidarity as to the perceived legitimacy of various societal institutions. It is a kind of ideological alienation in which agents are ambivalent towards or consciously reject the dominant values of the social order (Gould 1987: 77-8). Internalization and actualization of value-commitments that bind the individual to society ideologically are impaired, and consequentially leave such individuals open to other value sets that provide different external controls over behavior. When large groups of individuals in comparable situations feel this strain and begin to adopt alternative value sets, the dominant social patterns latently controlled by the disintegrating value system begin to destabilize and fall out of uniformity.

Opportunity Structure OS

In addition to strain, Parsons notes the certain social structural features of the Weimar Republic that partly accounted for the mobilization of individuals into the popular Nazi movement. Discussions include those on bureaucratic formalism within government and the

militancy of the Kaiser's civic rule. (Parsons 1942: 225). Where strain constitutes conditions that cannot be influenced by the acting agent, the variable described here, an opportunity structure, concerns aspects of the situation that are within the bounds of an agent's manipulation.

Building on Merton's theory of deviance by characterizing the paths by which deviant patterns emerge, Cloward and Ohlin noticed individuals subject to strain with impaired access to legitimate opportunities conformed to illegitimate social structures if they were locally present (1960: 7). They demonstrated an act of deviance is more likely to occur when facilitated by preexisting organizations with the relevant facilities than in atomistic situations where deviance must be individually innovated. These organizations provided illegitimate structural opportunities for such individuals to violate institutionalized norms, thereby enabling deviant activity and contributing to its emergence.

In a situation of strain at one or more levels, revolutionary activity need not result. It is at most the first necessary but insufficient condition, a reaction to environmental conditions that form the motivational base from which the value-added model is put into activation. An opportunity structure must be present that provides the relevant material and social facilities for the implementation of revolutionary activities (Gould 1987: 78). The OS encompasses not only the illegitimate structures characterized by Cloward and Ohlin, but also neutral organizations within which revolutionaries might organize. This can be thought of in terms of resource mobilization theory, which emphasizes the importance of not just physical capital in implementing collective action, but the social resources as well, such as organizational structure, mobilization capacity, and cultural appeals to entrepreneurial preferences (McCarthy & Zald 1977: 1236). Revolutionaries "misuse" the organizational opportunities in the political collectivity to engage in activity that attempts to positively redefine some component of the state.

Authorizing Belief AB

If the revolutionary agent is to successfully garner support from within the political and societal communities, the collective movement must construct a belief that authorizes the actions in violation of institutionalized norms. Authorization is a process of collective decision-making whereby agents in a collectivity, differentiated by role-responsibilities, are given permission to exercise their power in particular situations with reference to particular goals as legitimized by a set of social values (Parsons 1960: 195). This normative orientation to a revolutionary leader-representative is adopted by all committed members of the revolutionary social complex, including those within the state and general population. It is a social function external to the individuals who constitute the movement, a collective mechanism for authorizing activity in violation of institutionalized norms.

Authorizing beliefs may be of two kinds: situational and regularized. The first concerns individuals subject to a particular form of strain who have adopted a calculating attitude towards extant political agents and institutions that generates a neutral attitude towards extant forms of governance. Upon evaluating the behaviors of an alternative leader-representative who manifests disorderly tendencies as against the activities of past administrations, calculating individuals will extend their support to the disorderly leader if believing they will derive some benefit in consequence, and assuming they are provided the opportunity to do so. The second type of belief routinizes support through the internalization of social values that legitimate the disorderly action. Individuals extend support out of a perceived sense of shared value-orientations with their

leader-representative that consistently transcends the regulatory bounds of institutionalized norms.

As revolutions develop, subcultures emerge with the capacity to supply situational and regularized authorizing beliefs to recruit new supporters. Subcultures of support occur where members have adopted a calculating orientation towards the extant regime but have a neutral orientation to the revolutionary leader-representative, thus allowing regularized support to grow and organize from within it. When these localized groups of regularized support become autonomous collectivities, they become supporting subcultures where all members have legitimized their commitment to the revolution. Both the subculture of support and supporting subculture can exist in a system at the same time, where the supporting subculture whose members have adopted a legitimizing belief is embedded within a more-inclusive subculture of support which encompasses those who are neutral to the disorder.

Precipitating Factors PF

Strain, the presence of opportunity structures, and a set of authorizing beliefs place agents in a state of drift, where leader-representatives and their supporters reach a capacity to engage in self-authorized disorder, but a precipitating factor must be present for these variables to be actualized in the form of revolutionary action. Smelser describes these factors as initiating or exacerbating situations of strain, and Gould expands this to include the possible accentuation of all variables in the value-added model, including the opportunities and ideologies, within the context of a concrete situation (Smelser 1962: 17; Gould 1987: 87-88). Unlike the three former conditions, precipitants cannot be clearly identified in the abstract. They are textured through the concrete events that immediately precede intra-state revolutionary action, aspects of the situation that prompt the leader-representatives revolutionary response. Action in the precipitant is always oriented towards (a) the perceived legitimacy by dominant or sub-dominant values, (b) information from the situation with which action is desirable, and (c) the normative sanctions that may be mobilized for and against the acting agent.

These variables constitute the necessary and sufficient generating preconditions for revolutionary action within the state as authorized by the movement's bulwark of political and popular support. Assuming all variables are present, the kind of revolutionary action generated is not totally random. Where strain, structural opportunity, political and popular authorization, and a precipitating factor generate revolutionary action, the location of the strain(s) in the situation, at facilities, goals, norms, and values, delimits the kinds of action that are executed.

Figure 1. Value-Added Model

$$S(X) \quad OS \quad AB \quad PF \quad \Rightarrow \quad REVO(X)$$

Developmental Categories

Conceptualized here is a model through which different kinds of revolutionary action may be hierarchically categorized in space and placed in a stage-sequential development in time by the radicalism in its transformations of the state. Revolutionary actions at each category are characterized by the level of radicalism in their transformation of the state authority structure, i.e. by which structural component of the state is redefined. There exists a tendency in a revolution's development such that higher level revolutions have a greater probability of occurring if revolutionary actions at prior levels have been executed successfully.

Intra-state revolutions occur in two phases: first by a social movement that authorizes the executive position of a leader-representative with disorderly tendencies, then by a revolution affected from within. The movement itself is not revolutionary or necessarily a form of disorder, but to explain transformations of the state from within, one must describe how the radical agent first entered the political collectivity, stressing the importance of the represented-representation relationship. The tendencies of revolutionary transformation in the second phase of events follow a developmental progression up the cybernetic hierarchy of the state's social structure—from facilities, to collectivities, to norms, then values—as derived from Smelser's components of social action (1962: 24).

What follows is characterization of the progression of intra-state revolutions in their totality. In the first phase, a social movement authorizes a leader-representative with disorderly tendencies. In the second phase, actions in violation of institutionalized norms result in a transformation in the nature of the state through: (1) redefining of executive powers and facility-roles in the authority structure, (2) reorganizing of the members who constitute the political collectivity, (3) redefining of the institutionalized norms that regulate political activity, and (4) a total revolution at the level of values that enable radically different patterns of state structure and activities.

SOC(X) – Authorizing Social Movement

After sustained exposure to a particular kind of strain with no indications of alleviation, individuals who adopt a calculating orientation towards the extant administration are likely to support a representative who acts in violation of political norms if (1) convinced the consequences will be within their interests, or (2) if their internalized values align with the value-orientation of the representative, i.e. the values embodied through their charisma. When large segments of the population adopt similar orientations in comparable situations, a precipitating event activates a collective movement that authorizes the executive position of an "alternative" leader-representative. The outcome of this process is defined as a SOC(X) authorizing movement, where X describes the primary strain that activates its members.

The emergence of a social movement and its extension of support in the first phase of intra-state revolutions is not itself a form of revolutionary action, nor is it necessarily a form of social disorder, but it is necessary to characterize as a preceding stage in the developmental progression. Doing so more often than not elucidates the mobilization of support when revolutionary activity is undertaken within the state. An analysis of the prerevolutionary society should reveal strain that affects a significant portion of the societal community, democratic procedures through which members extend political support, a collective authorizing orientation

to the new representation constituted out of common interests and values, and a precipitating election that legitimates and justifies the revolutionary representation's executive position in the authority structure. When applying the theoretical framework, different kinds of strain are expected to be located at different structural positions within the social system.

REVOF – Redefinition of Powers

Revolutionary actions at the level of facilities are the motivated behaviors in violation of political norms that seek to positively redefine the prerogative powers of office. Where facilities constitute the situational means for achieving goals, an attempt is made by the revolutionary to work within the context of the extant political collectivity to transform their responsibilities and privileges, the actual role-facility content of the executive position, in the attainment of their desired ends. The revolutionary representation acts in ways that abrogate their bounds of authority, and when they do not incur sanctions for their behavior, a substantive change in the nature of the executive position has occurred. Revolutionary transformation at the level of facility-roles is defined as a REVOF, a redefinition of executive powers. A common form of such REVOFs in classic revolutions was a monarch's use of absolute power over legislature and the disorderly responses to his abrogation of legitimate authority (Gould 1987: 95), while here the REVOFs are almost always undertaken by the executive. When successful, this redefinition of powers results in a transformation of organizational role-facilities, but not the members of the political collectivity, nor the institutionalized norms or values that regulate state interactions and activities.

REVOFs that result in a redefinition of powers are responses to SF, the ambiguity of situational means to achieve some socially-defined goal. This includes the constrained organizational capacity of the executive by institutionalized authority codes in addition to the presence of insufficient adaptive resources. Revolutionaries are confronted with a situation and organizational structure that hinders their attainment of desired ends, and act in a way that abrogates their bounds of authority to achieve them. When implemented successfully without incurring normative sanctions, it defines "prerogative powers" as authorized within the scope of valid executive (or legislative) powers. SF is a necessary but insufficient condition for a REVOF.

REVOG – Reorganization of Collectivity

Revolutionary actions at the level of collectivities are attempts to reorganize the political representation into a desired state through reorganizing the individuals who embody various roles in the authority structure by an actor from within the state. This entails a redefinition of those in charge of the specification and implementation of collective interests (Gould 1987: 96). A major focus at this stage is ultimate control of executive decisions and military force. This may be substantively identified as an "autogolpe," or self-coup, where the actors in charge of governmental positions are changed, or with the formation of provisional governments that assume executive authority in times of self-declared crisis. REVOG defines such revolutionary actions that seek to redefine the nature of the goals specified by the state, but not the norms or values that regulate those structures of interactions.

Revolutionary acts that result in a reorganization of the political collectivity occur in response to SG. A revolutionary representation's REVOF may generate a supporter-opposition

split in the political and societal community, and sufficient opposition to the revolutionary movement generates strain at the level of goals in the form of executive status deprivation. Revolutionaries feel entitled to presidential powers, and perceive a disjunction between the sanctions received from state officials and privileges of the executive role, motivating them to seize control over the political collectivity and reorganize it to their desired state. Alternatively, autonomous sources of strain at the level of goals may be present if revolutionaries believe only particular individuals, such as aristocrats, should occupy positions in the state, reconstituting those positions as only for such individuals. SG is a necessary but insufficient condition for a REVOG.

REVON – Redefinition of Norms

Revolutionary actions at the level of norms seek to positively redefine the institutionalized norms that provide specific role expectations and procedures for regulating activity. This concerns amendments to the codified rules of the authority structure in a REVON which radically modifies the justifiable rights and duties of office. At this stage of revolution, "...the new constitution will be legitimized in terms of the prior, presumably still acceptable political values." (Gould 1987: 97). The probability that a revolution at the level of norms will be implemented successfully develops in proportion to the success of prior revolutions at the level of collectivities. If the political collectivity is reorganized into a group of supporters through, for example, the purging of opponents in a REVOG, then proposals to amend the constitution are more likely to be justified using extant normative procedures, assuming the amendments align with the redefined goals of the collectivity.

REVONs that redefine institutionalized authority codes are responses to SN. There may be a situation of dual powers between the old regime and the burgeoning revolution that generate conflicting expectations, creating an excess of norms that motivate the institutional securing of one set over the other. Alternatively, the collapse of a government may generate a shortage of expectations for political actors that prompts the construction of a new set of norms to regulate a transformed state. SN is a necessary but insufficient condition for a revolution that redefines the nature of the political regime through a redefinition of its authority codes.

REVOV – Total Revolution

Values are the components of social action that reach the highest level of generality in enunciating desirable end states, such that they do not specify the kinds of norms, collectivities, or facilities required to achieve those ends, but instead provide standards for their regulation. When the values dominant within the state are redefined, a total revolution has occurred (Gould 1987: 97-8). A situation emerges where the institutionalized values of the declining political order no longer legitimate the representation's activities and desirable ends. They undertake a total revolution, positively redefining the institutionalized values that control the state, enabling radically different patterns of political activity. These REVOV events are manifest in symbol-acts by the representation that would have been illegitimate under the prior institutionalized values, but are instead legitimate and successfully authorized under a redefined value set. Successful implementation of redefined state values concerns their ability to be made culturally intelligible to the societal community.

A total revolution aimed at the fundamental values that legitimate the authority structure and its activities occurs in response to SV. Throughout prior revolutionary stages, the revolutionary representation may appeal to an alternative set of values to garner popular support. Strain is manifest when the dominant institutionalized values and sub-dominant values of the revolutionary movement generate incompatible goals in a particular situation. It is an evaluation of the "right" form of governance as defined the revolutionary movement, and always concerns the base values that regulate the political system's norms and activities. SV is a necessary but insufficient condition for a total revolution.

The task of conceptualizing the distinct stages of revolutionary development and thereby a set of categories for evaluating action of differing radicalism in their transformation is accomplished. In the first phase of events, a social movement authorizes the executive position of a leader-representative who then affects a revolution from within. The second phase of events has a tendency to proceed along a developmental progression from redefinition of powers (REVOF), to a reorganization of the political collectivity (REVOG), then a redefinition of political norms (REVON), and finally a total revolution at the level of values (REVOV) that enable radically different patterns of political action. The level at which revolutionary action occurs is determined by the kind of strain that is present in the situation and motivationally relevant in the precipitant. When applying the developmental model, it is expected that not all internal revolutions progress through all stages of revolutionary development.

Figure 2. Value-Added Developmental Model

	<i>S(X)</i>	<i>OS</i>	<i>AB</i>	<i>PF</i>	\Rightarrow	<i>REVO(X)</i>
	--	--	--	--		<i>SOC(X)</i>
F	SF	--	--	--		<i>REVOF</i>
G	SG	--	--	--		<i>REVOG</i>
N	SN	--	--	--		<i>REVON</i>
V	SV	--	--	--		<i>REVOV</i>

Productive Revolution

Thus far we have specified the generating preconditions of distinct stages of revolutionary action and placed them within a categorical model that traces the movement's development. If a theory of revolution is to describe a state of "success," then it must too be in part a theory of social order capable of explaining the achieved state of stability. To analyze the variance in "productivity" of transformation when comparing different situations revolutionary actions requires evaluating its functional performance.

The necessary functional inputs for a polity to remain effective were identified in Chapter One as *legitimation* from a set of social values that generates popular support, *justification* by the due-process outcomes of particular normative interactions, and *surplus product* in the form of fiscal tax from the economy. They are further textured here by their role in sustaining an intra-state revolution. Political legitimation is garnered through the charismatic appeal to what Sykes and Matza call subterranean values. Justification within the context of due-process normative interactions is furnished by binding ties of mutual commitment within the state. The economy's structure presents a set of structurally-specific constraints on political activity, where the revolutionary representation must continue to receive surplus product if it is to continue generating political output and remain efficacious on the demands of their represented. A discussion of the structural constraints of capitalist economic-politico formations that dominate contemporary social orders explains the present-day tendency for disorderly political movements to manifest as forms of right-wing populism.

Legitimation and Subterranean Values

Throughout prior revolutionary actions, and even within the authorizing social movement, the revolutionary representation may appeal to a set of values latent in the general population and beneath the dominant institutionalized values of society to garner popular legitimation. Leader-representatives may use their charisma to embody these values through policy and symbol-acts that legitimate their activities in violation of authority codes, and it is these values they appeal to that become dominant within the state in a situation of total REVOL. The values are what Sykes and Matza call "subterranean" (1961), operating alongside dominant social values, imperfectly yet temporarily compatible with them, thus allowing them to reside beneath the surface of normative interactions.

Attempts have been made in the literature on deviance to identify ideological variables that transcend the material situations Merton specified. Sykes and Matza fall into this category, arguing that delinquent actors are motivated not necessarily by the dominant values of success, but also the sub-dominant messages of those values for leisure (1961: 715). Following Merton, they describe deviance as arising out of similarities to the values of conforming society rather than dissimilarities. Freedom to succeed through equal opportunities enunciates the freedom to engage in leisure derived from that success (and though unmentioned but relevant, the freedom to starve in its absence). Individuals are motivated not out of the values that mandate success, but also the subterranean values of leisure that make success desirable.

Crucial in their argument is that subterranean values "...coexist with other, publicly proclaimed values possessing a more respectable air." (1961: 717). It is the similarity of the subterranean values to dominant institutionalized values that allows for its effective activation by

revolutionary representations, well before a REVOV has occurred. Subterranean values are openly appealed to, but they are enunciated within the context of dominant values to facilitate their acceptance. The successful activation of these latent value-orientations throughout the revolution's development derives from their capacity to "run alongside" those widely accepted in society before wholly replacing them. These values transcend individuals, thus explaining how revolutionary movements may be carried out by multiple agents within the state over time. The individual leader-representatives that form the major supports of the movement are ephemeral when compared to the social values that control the larger revolutionary processes with the capacity to legitimate multiple kinds of representations for the represented.

Successful activation of latent value-commitments is determined by the representation's ability to make them socially and culturally intelligible to the general population through effective use of symbols. Such values that legitimate new kinds of norms and activities must be presented in ways that generate meaning for members of the general population and is capable of reinforcement by cognitive rationalization. Communication of the intelligibility of subterranean values is done through symbols, objects that represent something other than themselves and evoke an attitude, impression of events, or patterns of behavior. Symbols are social, constituting a shared meaning between two agents, where symbolization is irrelevant outside the context of its relationship. There are two kinds mobilized: (a) *referential* symbols that represent "economical" ways of referring to objective elements in a situation (e.g. industrial statistics, equity market charts); and (b) *condensed* symbols that evoke emotions associated with a situation, condensed into one symbolic action or sign (Edelman 1964: 5-15). Utilization of these symbols reaffirms the common values and goals of the revolutionary representation in the eyes of the represented.

Justification and Mutual Commitment

If the revolutionary representation is to successfully engage in revolutionary action that violates authority codes without incurring normative sanctions, they must receive justification in the form of political support from state agents within extant formalized norms, at least until a REVON occurs that redefines them. This support is derived from a binding obligation constituted out of social ties of mutual commitment to the revolution's goals that provide external controls over individual discretion to justify and authorize revolutionary representations and their activities. The repeated justification of violations of institutionalized norms in sum results in a gradual transformation in the substantive nature of the state.

The binding property of mutual commitment is constituted out of either (a) shared value-orientations that generate obligatory commitments to the representation, or (b) personal loyalty derived from contractual obligation through patrimonial exchanges with the representation for status and privileges. The former entail a group of political agents unified by their goals and a common value-set that legitimates revolutionary activity in violation of institutionalized norms. Derived from this mechanical solidarity by shared values, support is extended out of commitment to the representation and larger revolutionary movement. The latter concerns patrimonial exchanges of political support from a state agent for power, status, or privileges from the executive representation. Instead of being bound out of shared values, these loyal allies are obligated to extend support out of the organic solidarity of contractual relationships. The important feature of both forms of personal loyalty is the presence of binding obligations to justify revolutionary activity from within the political collectivity, gradually altering the nature

of the state from within the formalized rules of the game until those normative interactions are themselves redefined.

Surplus Product and Accumulation

Unlike the activation of subterranean value and mobilization of personal loyalty that, through their direct “controls” on political activity, may be used to revolutionize the state from within, the economy presents a set of environmental “conditions” on political activity, defining the outer bounds of achievable ends. For a revolutionary representation to remain efficacious in the attainment of collective goals as desired by the represented, it must receive surplus product from the economy for their implementation. If not, political output must fall, in turn impairing the representation’s future legitimacy in the perceptions of its represented. Where the economy generates only so many adaptive resources from its environment, the upper limitations on the availability of surplus product allocated for the state conditions the scope of activity that may be implemented successfully.

Distinct from these environmental conditions are the structurally-specific constraints of the particular economic-politico formation. The state is not only conditioned through the environment, but also constrained by the social structure of its economy. Through identifying the specific constraints of the capitalist structures that dominate contemporary global economies, the tendency for present-day disorderly political movements to be manifest as forms of right-wing populism is clarified.

Highly-developed capitalist economies constrain the political system to appeal to capitalist interest demands for its reproduction, where policies are successfully implemented only insofar as they aid the accumulation process that crucially determines the stability of the wider social system (Przeworski 1988: 12-3). So long as accumulation is financed out of profits, where private profits are necessary for that accumulation, state agents are constrained to appease propertied individuals who wield large pools of capital available for reinvestment to maintain the economy’s stability. If capitalists do not have their interests met, i.e. do not meet their profit criteria, there will be decreased reinvestments into the economic system as a whole. If profits are insufficient, then eventually wages must fall, or employment, or both (Przeworski 1985: 164). This in turn reduces the material input of surplus product to the polity, thus impairing the state’s ability to generate political output for future effectiveness.

Thus we arrive at an explanation for the current tendency of political disorder to manifest as forms of right-wing populism where fiscal and monetary policies are aligned with the accumulation process. Crises of capitalism are in no one’s short-term material interests, inhibiting the extension of both public and private support for any movements that claim to be “anti-capitalist.” Indeed, more often than not, a majority of the common folks in a capitalist economic formation view their interests as being within the interests of capitalists, i.e. that they can only benefit off the crumbs of their profits. If any “alternative” representation is to be backed by the propertied class and provided with their economic support, it is much more probable to be one whose policies align with their interests, that is, with profit and accumulation. Further, if the revolutionary representation does meet capitalist interests consistently, it will likely produce referential symbols that reinforce the rationale, the “reason,” behind the extension of support (e.g. GDP growth, equity market performance).

When a significant segment of the general population is under strain, has open access to a set of democratic procedures, and has adopted a calculating orientation towards the old regime, a politician who acts in violation of political norms will likely be elected into office if individuals are convinced they or others will benefit some in consequence and are presented the opportunity to do so. Subcultures may emerge which routinize their support through the construction of a legitimizing belief with the capacity to recruit new members.

Once in the executive position, the disorderly politician engages in activity which positively redefines one or more structural components of the state in the presence of the relevant variables. Revolutionary activity is conceptualized on a progressively radical scale, from a redefinition of prerogative powers, to a reorganization of the political collectivity, then a redefinition of institutionalized norms, and finally a total revolution at the level of political values. The success of revolutionary actions and overall reproducibility of the revolutionary movement hinges upon the factor inputs of legitimation by subterranean values, justification by binding loyalties with formalized procedures, and surplus product from the economy. Contemporary capitalist systems present a set of structural specific constraints on political representations that generates a tendency for right-wing populist disorders. With a comprehensive theoretical foundation, this paper proceeds with empirical analysis.

III. Contemporary United States

Since solidifying itself as a global superpower following World War II, the United States has been symbolically upheld as the bastion of liberal democracy in the West, but by the early 21st century, latent macro-societal processes began to manifest with the early-emergence of the relevant variables for social disorder, of which a resultant was the slow erosion of democratic confidence within the country. In 2016 The Economist Intelligence Unit demoted the U.S. from a full to flawed democracy while citing the erosion of the general public's trust of political institutions (2017: 4). This impairment to the relation of representation placed large segments of the general population in a state of calculating drift, fit to extend support to a disorderly representation if believing they will derive some material benefit and or out of shared value-orientations.

In the 2016 Republican primaries, Donald Trump emerged as the unlikely leader from a wide range of candidates with more traditional forms of prestige. Public rhetoric failed to take him seriously due to his blunt verbosity, politically-incorrect attitudes, and unorthodox background in business and media. Ignored was the capacity of Trump's charismatic ability to reestablish the relation of representation where it had been severed. With Indiana governor Michael Pence, Trump defeated the Democratic nominees, former secretary of state Hillary Clinton and U.S. senator from Virginia Timothy Kaine, in the 2016 presidential election.

Trump's activity in office abrogated both conventional norms of the presidency and institutionalized legal codes of the executive, resulting in two impeachments by the House of Representatives. With strong allies in the Republican Party and few abdicating to Democratic interests, both trials in the Senate resulted in acquittal. The outcome was an expansion of executive powers, negating congressional oversight, violating institutionalized norms, and sidelining criminal investigations should a partisan minority of Congress commit to supporting a particular leader. Authorization of this redefinition of powers from the societal community was derived from the presence of the relevant variables for social disorder that constituted a proto-revolutionary mechanism for the mobilization of social legitimation and contracted political justification.

The following is a preliminary application of an ideal type [Weber's *Kategorienlehre*], open-ended historical constructs of concerted action on the other that may fit imperfectly with empirical events, lacking the complete descriptive qualities of the situation, but with the ability to illuminate their underlying processes. Theoretical variables relevant to the genesis of intra-state de-democratization are identified through historical data drawn from economic information, surveys and polls, panel studies, descriptive non-theoretical analyses of specific events, and video footage. The disadvantages of this method are: (1) the accumulation of data from different sources with varied participants diminishes the warrantability of our arguments as compared to a specifically-designed survey that directly operationalizes all variables within a single administered group; and (2) the validity of the studies gathered are themselves uncertain, producing more pseudo-experimental "noise" in our approximation of reality. The advantages will be the freedom to construct a comprehensive impression of a situation of de-democratization to guide future analyses.

There are implicit contentions made when contextualizing the empirical question within our theoretical framework that must be addressed: that fascist politics were not active, at least

formally, in the U.S. before Trump; and that Trump and the social movement he has set into action are somehow different than conventional political activity, that it is in fact a form of internal disorder. Firstly, the values of the U.S. have been egalitarian in concept, at least from the 1830s, but historically hierarchical in its substantive application. Election laws date back to Article I of the Constitution that mandate equal distribution of fungible voting rights to all eligible citizens, but those democratic opportunities were not immediately universal, instead reserved for white men with property. Since ratification, tremendous efforts have been made by common folks to expand those privileges, evolving with the 15th and 19th amendments and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 into a democracy that formally secures voting rights for all citizens, transcending the traditional hierarchical tastes of its governing forefathers. This does not preclude the emergence of anti-democratic patterns through maintained forms of voter suppression, but the normative rules of the game that form the basis of consent to the political representation are formally legitimated by egalitarian values that mandate equal opportunities and justified by democratic procedures that manifest them.

Second, Trump has not fulfilled the *full* capacity of a fascist politician actively seeking to dismantle the democratic structure from within, but the relation of representation, supporting subcultures, and political allegiances all exhibit proto-fascistic qualities. Trump's behavior throughout his career has been that of an entitled and unfettered executive, from private business management to media personality, and his activity in office was no different. This resulted in the abrogation of various conventional and institutionalized norms of the polity in the pursuit of his self-interests, of which a prominent component was the maintenance of executive authority. Trump must be understood as a "tuning fork" that resonated with latent social conditions in the general population, using his charisma and GOP allies to garner legitimation and justification of his activities in office. The loss of the 2020 election demonstrates an insufficiency in legitimation to sustain his role, but the justification of his actions in violation of institutionalized norms through impeachment acquittal has redefined the nature of the executive position in consequence.

SOCG: Make America Great Again

I could stand in the middle of Fifth Avenue and shoot somebody, and I wouldn't lose voters, OK?

Trump, Iowa Rally 2016

A defining feature of the 2016 U.S. presidential election was the infectious nature of Trump's support as he toured throughout the nation on a right-wing populist and nativist platform opposing immigration and free trade under the promise to "Make America Great Again." Latent macro-economic processes began manifesting as new forms of strain for a significant portion of the general population. Trump understood his own charisma well before most others, effectively using it to appeal to latent subterranean values in garnering political support. Extension of voter support at this phase was of two kinds: committed supporters guided by a legitimizing set of subterranean values and calculating individuals in a state of drift.

Trump's alleged racial biases extend back to behavior at his family's real-estate company and have accumulated under his nearly four-decade long career (Graham, Green, Murphy, & Richards 2019). His campaign furthered these prejudices within a political context intelligible to individuals with latent values that legitimate similar attitudes. Individuals who feel a sense of shared value-orientations extend their support with regularity out of a binding commitment to their representation.

Such individuals do not constitute a majority of the population, as demonstrated by Trump's loss in the 2020 election. Crucial for the outcome of the 2016 election was a deflation in the extant administration's authority. Trump benefitted by those who chose to abstain from voting, in addition to those who voted for him as an alternative, out of a calculating orientation to the activities and effectiveness of the Democratic Party and conventional Republican politicians. From situations of strain with no sign of alleviation, democratic procedures act as a pressure release, affording the general population the opportunity to express their discontents with their situation. In these conditions, Trump came across as someone who was able to expose the pre-packaged commodities called politicians and assert himself as an alternative.

Generating variables for the collective action that elected Trump into office are identified as: (1) strain in the form of stagnant real wages disproportionately threatening the status of the lower-middle class; (2) opportunity structures from news network coverage, social media, and the support of conservative funds; (3) the decline in trust in government and charismatic appeal to latent subterranean values; and (4) the exacerbation of strain under Barack Obama's presidency and concrete opportunity presented in the 2016 election to vote for an alternative representation. To describe the conditions for the success of Trump's disorder involve a complex migration process of capital and proletariat, and that is where our analysis must start.

Structural Strain

Trends in income tax data and documented wealth suggest that income inequality topped out by 1930, generally declining into the 1950s (Kuznets 1955; Piketty and Saez 2006; Piketty 2014). This prompted Kuznets to conceptualize an inverted-U curve linking economic growth and inequality, where "the early stage of modern economic growth is fueled by capital accumulation and generates a corresponding rise in inequality, but...as a capitalist economy enters maturity inequality eventually declines." (Kuznets 1955; Morris & Western 1999: 625-9). He ignores, however, the environmental constraints by which capitalist economies must always adapt. Starting in the 1970s, the top decile's share in the U.S. national income has gradually begun to approach the all-time highs of the 1920s (Figure 1. Piketty 2014: 24). Particularly, the top 0.01% began to capture an increasing share of the value produced by labor across capital income, business income, and salaries (Piketty and Saez 2003, 2006). The result is stagnant real wages despite increases to productivity (Morris & Western 1999; Figure 2. Economic Policy Institute 2019). Comparing real wages across the 90th, 50th, and 10th percentiles reveals this stagnation is disproportionately felt by the lower- and middle-class (Figure 3. Economic Policy Institute 2017).

Figure 3. Top Decile's Share in National Income, 1910-2010

Source: Piketty 2014




Figure 4. Productivity and Hourly Real Wages, 1950-2019

Source: Economic Policy Institute





Figure 5. Real Wage Growth by Percentile 1979-2017

Source: Economic Policy Institute



The stagnation of real wages can be explained in Marxian and monetary terms. Foreign industries were left razed after World War II, allowing the U.S. to emerge as the dominant productive power; the post-war period of the 1950s saw huge growth in productivity and wages while remaining in a largely domestic economy. Eventually, global industries rebuilt themselves with equivalently or more productive facilities, like in Europe, and then in places with a more profitable price of labor power, such as the Four Asian Tigers and then China. The advent of the international productive circulation of commodities meant U.S. labor power was highly overvalued in the new global economy. This placed a profit-squeeze on domestic corporations as they tried to remain competitive in the international economy, motivating them to both outsource production to countries with cheaper labor power and enact redistributive policies that transferred wealth from workers to capitalists by devaluing their wages. All of this was dependent upon the growth of a global economy grounded in production relations, where the value of labor power has slowly come to be defined internationally.

These redistributive policies were facilitated by monetary policy. The Nixon Administration terminated the convertibility of U.S. Dollars to gold in 1971, bringing an end to the 1944 Bretton Woods system of monetary management, which pegged all global currencies to the Dollar and fixed its exchange rate at USD \$35 per troy ounce (Federal Reserve History 2013). This radically modified the nature of U.S. currency from “managed money,” currency whose monetary face value symbolically represents more than the necessary and sufficient labor time to reproduce it, but is related to an objective standard of value, to “fiat money,” similarly representative currency that is created and issued by the state with no standard for its value (Keynes 1930: 7-8). This put the U.S. economy in an inherently inflationary environment; the cumulative rate of inflation from 1950 to 1970 was 61%, which increased in 1970 to 1990 to 236.9% (U.S. Consumer Price

Index Inflation Calculator 2020). Americans' paychecks are bigger than 40 years ago, but their purchasing power weakens in an inflationary economy that erodes the value of the dollars they earn.


Many households did not experience the decline in real wages immediately due to the steady rise of women's participation in the labor force, then their retention after marriage, then after having children (Morris & Western 1999: 629-30). In the 21st century, wage stagnation has gotten so severe that the extra worker is not enough to maintain standards of living. In the 1950s, the average worker had a greater portion of the value produced by their labor, but as capital captured an increasing share of income and labor was outsourced to foreign countries, their share of value in the circulation of commodities diminished. Folks feel entitled to certain lifestyles, and when they no longer have them, and it is evident their children will not have them, they feel relatively deprived. SG becomes manifest as a variable most felt by individuals in the lower-middle class whose status is at greatest risk. This strain is exacerbated among white folks who feel as if they are the backbone of American society see immigrants or minority groups succeeding economically, even if those successes are atypical in those communities.

Opportunity Structure

Trump had enough accumulated capital, through his activities and familial wealth, to provide him a majority of funds in the primary campaign to spread his first messages. Here, the structure of media networks in the U.S. helped facilitate this transmission at no cost. Trump's abrogation of social norms and politically-incorrect speech generated lots of attention from news outlets whose primary function is generating viewers. Though critical in their orientation to his actions,

Figure 6. Trump's Share of News Coverage and National Polling Numbers
May-August 2016

Source: *Crimson Hexagon*



this nonetheless aided in spreading his message to the general public. The advent of social media provided another no-cost means of transmission. From June 2015 to November 2016, Trump tweeted at a daily average of fifteen times, either promoting his campaign material or supporting false claims with little to no evidence behind them.

By the general election, support from independent, expenditure-only political action committees (PACs) was acquired. These “Super PACs” engage in unlimited spending in independent isolation of each other on the campaigns of candidates, receiving funds from politicians and public individuals, corporations, unions, and other interest groups. Trump was endorsed by the conservative Great America PAC, the Committee for American Sovereignty, and Rebuilding America Now conglomerates (Ballhaus 2016). By now the campaign team had enough resources to tour the country efficiently. The Trump campaign’s use of polling consultants dates back to 2016, providing the data to target key areas of supporter interests.

Authorizing Belief


Contextualizing the collective authorization of the social movement requires introducing generalized beliefs, validity claims with substantive content that evoke a cognitive and affectual response in individuals but may fit imperfectly with all the details in the specific situation of their commitment. Candidates communicate messages to the represented population containing content whereby alter pressures ego’s consent to its authority. Trump’s campaign and messages through media attempted to communicate generalized beliefs that constitute an authorization of his placement in the executive. There are two interrelated beliefs in 2016 Trump voters that differentiates two sources of support in terms of their dedication: (1) that the extant government does not care about the general population, and (2) that Trump does.

American National Election Studies polls show that Americans’ trust in government has been steadily declining since 2002, demonstrating a deflation of the extant administration’s symbolic power. Individuals in situations of strain with no signs of alleviation adopt a calculating orientation to the political representation, and upon viewing it as ineffective or acting against their interests, withdraw support. In this situation, adherence to institutionalized norms is maintained through surveillance and coercive force. Such individuals will extend temporary support to an alternative representation if believing themselves or others will derive some benefit in consequence.

Trump’s messages within this context have been an intelligibly communicated story of decline and a fighting chance against it. His verbosity favors simple sentences with few independent clauses, expressing messages through language not only familiar to his supporters, but also appealing to latent anti-intellectualist sentiments. He describes the country, its infrastructure, and airports, as all “going to hell” and compared it to that of a third-world country, “or worse.” Patterns in his speeches attack the extant administration; to “drain the swamp” that is Washington D.C. of its corrupt politicians. This is mirrored in his derogation of his democratic opponent; “she’s crooked Hillary, don’t you understand that? This is one of the most crooked politicians in history.” Trump, an entrepreneurial businessman, knows the system like no one else, and he alone can fix it.

Figure 7. Trust in Government Index 1958-2016

Source: American National Election Survey



Here is where subterranean values become important. In all discussions, from immigration to terrorism, Trump supporters feel as if he expresses what they feel and in a politically incorrect way, thus they respect him even when political elites and media outlets put him down. Crucial is the categorization of an in-group and out-group distinction, one that emphasizes not just that persons of color do not deserve the benefits they have, or are perceived to have, but also that White Americans are being intruded upon and deserve better.

When Mexico sends its people, they're not sending their best. They're not sending *you*. They're not sending *you*. They're sending people that have lots of problems, and they're bringing those problems with them.

Trump, Presidential Announcement Speech 2015

Trump appeals to the racist and xenophobic values that have always been present in U.S. society, and in a situation where he acts consistently with them, they legitimate his actions for a significant part of the population. His campaign manifested these values in a variety of ways, from his promise to build a wall bordering Mexico to prevent “drugs” and “rapists” from entering the U.S., surveillance of “certain mosques,” and travel bans on Muslim-majority countries to prevent recruited and trained American Islamic extremists from entry (Miller 2015; Niayesh 2019). These are traditional hierarchical values reanimated in a modern context, one with newly categorized in-groups and out-groups. While its origins lie in 18th century white supremacist ideology, its revived form is accessible to any who consent to Trump’s authority from within a formally rational-egalitarian framework and are committed to “American” values.

Calculating voters extended their support out of temporary interests, and those who were motivated further by these subterranean values did so out of binding commitment. After the election, the former had the capacity to lose interest in Trump and withdraw support upon perceiving his activity as illegitimate while the latter supported with regularity.

Precipitating Factors

In the wake of stagnant real wages that threatened the lifestyles of the middle-class generation that emerged in the 1950s, the 2008 financial crisis was a reminder of their precarious structural position within the cyclical nature of the economy. The monetary policy under Obama that rescued the banks but not the people hurt by them reinforced the perception that politicians were ineffective and not to be trusted, intensifying both strain at the level of goals and the calculating orientation towards government officials. The vilification of Obama by Trump and his supporters is in of itself a revealing phenomenon. Here was a politician who was black and an Ivy League intellectual, one object of scorn to symbolize various hatreds, to embody the many dimensions of SG.

Russian efforts to spread propaganda and misinformation through social media in favor of Trump commenced in March 2016 (Parker, Landay, Walcott 2017). Through the opportunity structure present in the lax verification policy on social networks, accounts and groups were created to regurgitate Trump's messages, receiving a wide audience. The result was an augmentation and amplification of the campaign's authorizing beliefs with the capacity to recruit new members and reinforce the orientations of those already committed.

The 2016 presidential election offered the general population the opportunity to vote for a Trump presidency. For supporters, it was the precipitating factor that actualized their commitments. Trump lost the popular vote by two percentage points, but the Electoral College makes it possible for a candidate to still win the presidency. The U.S. Constitution's Article II, Section 1 allows each state a number of electors equal to its delegated number of senators and representatives in congress. The general public selects a presidential and vice presidential candidate, and state electors are informally pledged to then vote for the majority. There are currently 538 electors, with an absolute majority of 270 or more electoral votes required to attain the presidency⁶. The structure displaces the general population's political power from the formalized procedures that justify the electoral outcomes, making it possible for a candidate to win an election by procedural justification with less than ideal legitimacy.

Preliminary results from a CNN exit poll highlight these variables. Trump garnered the most support among voters whose incomes were \$50,000-\$99,999, followed by \$100k-\$199,999, in addition to half of those earning over \$250,000. The first can be understood as the vote of the middle-class whose lifestyles were under pressure, in addition to the vote of the propertied bourgeois and financial elites who stand to benefit from Trump's economic policies. The evocation of reconstructed white supremacist values as a form of ultra-nationalism, though formally inclusive to all citizens devoted to "American" values, was most receptive to White America, where those values had been historically derived from. Trump earned a majority of the support among white voters across all ages, less than a third of Latinx and Asian voters, and 8%

⁶ If there is a tie, Congress decides with one vote per state congressional delegation.

of black voters. 89% of those who disapproved of Obama's presidency voted for Trump, demonstrating the significance of the period from 2008 to 2016 as aggravating SG.

It is possible that many Trump supporters in 2016 did not expect him fully or successfully to implement their interests once elected, yet nonetheless extended their political support. This is for two reasons; one is symbolized in the fact that his supporters know that industries such as coal will never be revitalized to their former state, but at least Trump cares; the other concerns hegemonic capitalist rhetoric. Trump's implementation of, for example, corporate tax cuts demonstrates that he acts for capitalists and not workers. His supporters, however, believe that they will prosper only when capitalists do, that their relative economic success depends upon the success of capitalists. Trump supporters do not have a sense they can attain their interests against powerful economic forces, but that Trump acts for them when he acts for himself, that is, for the rich.

The outcome of the 2016 election was the result of a long-term value-added process whereby the necessary and sufficient conditions strain, structural opportunity, authorizing beliefs, and precipitating factors generated the election of an oppositional political representation. Support coalesced in the relevant conditions from a disaggregate combination of calculating and committed individuals. It is important to note that Trump gained over 11 million more votes in the subsequent 2020 presidential election, indicating a majority of support in 2016 was legitimate and further recruitment likely took place.

REVOF: Promises Made, Promises Kept

I'm not an impartial juror. This is a political process. There is not anything judicial about it. Impeachment is a political decision.

McConnell 2019

While in office, Trump engaged in a series of action that abrogated informal and institutionalized norms of the presidency. The first kind concern violations of political convention, while the second are infractions of laws governing the executive. Informal normative interactions are not bound by the Constitution, but play a role in sustaining the relation of representation. For example, the presidential release of tax returns became a political norm following Richard Nixon's tax scandal in 1973. Trump's refusal to release his tax returns during his campaign and presidency violated unwritten traditions and expectations, thereby undermining the precedent of full transparency, but did not equate to a violation of law and therefore could not be pursued as a legal offense.

Only the second kind of normative violations, actions that abrogate institutionalized authority codes reinforced by coercive sanctions, may be pursued as a legal offense. A substantive redefinition of executive role-facility entails the procedural justification of clear violations of institutionalized authority codes, expanding prerogative powers of office beyond Congressional accountability. Two important normative violations are reviewed: (1) attempted interference in the 2020 election that resulted in an acquitted impeachment trial for Abuse of Power and Obstruction of Congress; (2) the promotion of media with un-evidenced validity claims,

generating a competing sphere of influence that fed the growth of a persistent supporting subculture.

The first privileged impeachment efforts were made when Trump arrived in office, alleging obstruction of justice with respect to the investigation of a possible collusion with Russia during the 2016 U.S. presidential election. In January 2017, FBI director James Comey testified to Congress confirming Russian interference with a still ongoing investigation, confirming the subject to be possible connections with the Trump campaign in March. Despite repeated clarifications that Trump himself was not under investigation, Comey was formally dismissed by the president in May. Congressperson Brad Sherman (D-CA) filed an official accusation (H.Res. 438), co-sponsored by Al Green (D-TX), citing Trump's conversations with, and subsequent firing of, Comey as constituting Obstruction of Justice.

Trump's comments in August after the events in Charlottesville, Virginia motivated Green to introduce a second privileged resolution. The Unite the Right rally brought together various far-right subcultures, from neo-Confederates to neo-Nazis, under white-nationalist sentiments, with a precipitant in the City Council's decision to remove the public statue of a Confederate General. The heterogeneous gathering of extremist groups unified by the hierarchical nature of their values drew counter-protestors, and their confrontations resulted in the death of a counter-protestor by vehicle-ramming and over 30 non-fatal injuries. Trump's statements in response condemned violence "on many sides" and asserted each contained "very fine people," implicitly legitimating the presence of far-right, white nationalist ideologies, though not necessarily their immediate actions. Green proposed impeachment for "Associating the Presidency with White Nationalism, Neo-Nazism and Hatred" and "Inciting Hatred and Hostility." (H.Res. 646). Green's efforts saw insufficient support from Democratic leaders, and with Republican control over both branches of Congress, all articles of impeachment were tabled in the House.

As Democrats regained control of the House in 2019, impeachment inquiries were remade after a whistleblower report to Congress alleged that Trump and his allies used illegal coercive pressure to solicit foreign intervention in the 2020 U.S. presidential election. The report claims Trump, with the involvement of his personal lawyer Rudolph Giuliani and Attorney General William Barr, withheld USD \$391 million in military aid to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to contract their intelligence agency's investigation into Democratic nominee Joe Biden. The primary evidence of interest was a phone call between Trump and Zelensky on July 2019, of which the whistleblower had been a participant. Following their call, senior White House officials intervened to isolate and withhold all records of the discussion, with special reference to the official word-for-word transcript. In December, the House voted to proceed with impeachment on two articles: Abuse of Power and Obstruction of Congress (Nadler 2019). A two-thirds majority vote of 67 in the Senate was required to convict Trump, and with few Republicans crossing lines, Trump was acquitted 52-48 for the first article and 53-47 for the second. The result was an expansion of prerogative powers beyond Congressional oversight and investigation, should a partisan minority of support for the code violation be present.

Strain on Facilities

Trump remained a polarizing figure for the general population while in office. His Gallup job ratings from 2017 onward had an all-time high of 49% *whole* approval, and by 2019 were consolidating around a macro-bottom of 37%. Considering the narrow victory by specialized

procedures without the majority of popular support, Trump had no evidence to suspect reelection in 2020 was probable without the same kind of direct intervention that occurred in 2016. Federal election rules constrain the presidency from overtly contracting intelligence agencies for personal benefit, constraining the organizational capacity of the executive position and placing limits on the content of its role-facility. SF was manifest in the disjunction between the goals of reelection and Trump's capacity to realize them while acting in accord with institutionalized authority codes, an uncertainty as to the legitimate maintenance of executive powers by electoral politics. This motivated the innovation of illegitimate means when presented the relevant opportunity and equipped with a self-authorizing belief, coercing Zelensky to order investigations on Biden to uncover denigrating information ahead of the 2020 election.

Opportunity Structure

The basis for partnership between the U.S. and Ukraine begins with the Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets (FREEDOM) Support Act (1992) following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Its intent was to provide financial aid to Russia and newly-independent states to foster conditions that would lead to a smooth transition into democracy and encourage the U.S. financial sector to engage in trade and investment. The Ukraine Support Act (2014) maintained the relationship with the addition of military aid. By 2020, the U.S. had provided USD \$1.5 billion in aid to Ukraine through the bill's provisions (Kim 2019). Russia had engaged in an armed invasion into Ukraine, occupying the Crimea peninsula, creating a situation where acquirement of military support was urgent. The steady flow of aid and its necessity for Ukraine's military provided Trump the opportunity to use prerogative powers for coercive pressures to contract Zelensky's assistance.

Authorizing Belief

Trump's general message to the population was that his actions were legitimate, but how it was communicated changed in the time before and during trial, thereby having consequences for the normative framework violated. Prior to impeachment, Trump and his aides repeatedly claimed that he had no investments in other countries and that there were no covert interactions with Russia or Ukraine. During the impeachment trial, however, they admitted that calls with Ukraine did in fact occur, but there was no impeachable offense, no "quid pro quo." The former assertion, that the calls never took place, upholds the law (even though it was false, and would have been perjury); the latter assertion, that the calls were not an impeachable offense, undermines institutionalized authority codes by compromising accountability over presidential activity in violation of them, setting a precedent for executive privilege. The authorizing belief becomes expressed as prerogative powers over Congressional oversight, redefining the capacities of the executive position, the content of its role-facility.

Precipitating Factors

The upcoming 2020 presidential election served as the primary precipitant that motivated Trump to violate institutionalized authority codes in the pursuit of his desired goal of maintaining executive power. Divided public opinion generated for Trump SF through

uncertainty as to the legitimate attainment of reelection, where normative election laws prohibited direct interference by the presidential order. Regular supply of aid to Ukraine and its necessity for confronting Russian occupation provided the opportunity to coerce foreign interference, where the authorizing orientation was that of prerogative powers over Congressional oversight. As Congress was made aware of the relevant evidence implicating Trump's attempts to interfere in the 2020 election and his subsequent firing of Comey, his actions were labeled by the House as violations of authority codes, resulting in impeachment.

Trump's REVOF redefined the executive position's role-facility only through the Senate's acquittal, a justification of his actions in violation of authority codes. Its success was facilitated by further structural opportunities in the ineffectiveness of investigation efforts and the commitment of his GOP allies. Trump officials regularly ignored subpoenas, and Congress did almost nothing to enforce them. The Courts were useless as trial dates were repeatedly delayed, failing to recognize that time was of the essence. The consequence is an expansion of presidential prerogative powers over Congressional accountability and institutionalized norms should a partisan minority of Congress choose to support a fascist leader.

Legitimation of Trump's REVOF was only partially received from the general population, and was strictly partisan-divided. Over 80% of Democrats supported removing Trump from office, compared to over 40% of Independents and just 9% of Republicans (FiveThirtyEight 2020). It is important to note that folks were not aware of what was actually said between Trump and Zelensky, the word-for-word transcripts never being made public. With no factual security base to wholly confirm or deny a violation of authority codes, claims intended to incriminate Trump had little effect on swaying the commitment of his supporters, instead reinforcing the idea that he was under illegitimate scrutiny by the opposition.

An important violation of informal norms contributing to this persistent commitment was Trump's vast network of lies. In his four years as president, Trump made over 30,500 false or misleading claims. By extension he endorsed media outlets that portrayed him positively (such as Fox, and when that failed, One America News Network), no matter the substantial evidence behind the reporting, and attacked news that had any negative comments about his actions. Trump's executive status was used to validate particular media narratives over others, thereby steering the public discourse of his supporters. In consequence, his lies are treated as "truth" by a significant portion of the population, creating a self-reinforcing sphere of influence that competes against mainstream media narratives through manufacturing validity claims tailored his interests⁷.

The interaction between a persistent source of legitimation for Trump's authority and his competing sphere of influence generated a supporting subculture, the MAGA movement, capable of augmenting Trump's messages, reinforcing individual authorization of his disorderly actions, and recruiting new members. Blum and Parker (2020-1) conducted a panel study of 1,431 Facebook users with positive interests in pages related to "Make America Great Again," providing an impression of those most dedicated to Trump up to the final moments of his career. The focus of their analysis is on members of the supporting subculture, though respondents may hold affiliations with more-inclusive subcultures of support. This precludes those who voted for

⁷ Take the example of "Obamagate"; Trump and his aides deny the real story, Russia influencing the 2016 election in favor of Trump, and make up an alternative one pushed with the support of conservative media outlets. Up truly becomes down for tens of millions of people.

Trump in 2016 out of pure calculation, instead isolating those with legitimate commitment to his authority.

Support was found in all fifty states, tending to cluster around major cities. The dominant political affiliations were strong-Republicans and lean-Republican independents, indicating a congealing of heterogeneous cohorts. Over three-quarters were middle-class by income, and almost one-third by educational criteria, suggesting the core sources of support came from those whose lifestyles were most threatened by stagnant real wages. Over three-quarters were white with men overrepresented, the groups within which the traditional hierarchical values Trump reconstructed were historically located. The primary out-group characterized was immigrants; over three-quarters thought immigration had been changing the country for the worse and that immigrants refused to abide by laws. When surveyed about attitudes on race, respondents tended to fall into “culture of poverty” arguments⁸, disagreeing that slavery and discrimination made it difficult for Black Americans to work their way up, that they would be as well off as White Americans if they tried and should emulate the progress of other minorities in the U.S. Roughly 90% of MAGA supporters voted for Trump in 2016, explaining the increase in votes through further recruitment.

The outcomes of Trump’s actions in office by near the end of his presidency were: (1) a redefinition of executive prerogative powers beyond Congressional accountability, successfully implemented by the Senate’s justification of authority code violations; and (2) the formation of a supporting subculture whose commitment to the collective MAGA movement persisted even in the face of Trump’s normative violations, facilitated through the construction of a competing sphere of influence. Ahead of the 2020 election, Trump retained the core sources of support he had found in 2016 through individuals and groups who regularly authorized his actions out of shared value-orientations. The persistent relation of representation between Trump and the MAGA movement, paired with the relevant situational variables, provided him with large groups of committed supporters ready for mobilization to attain Trump’s desired ends of maintaining executive powers. Most Republicans in a January 2020 survey agreed that “the traditional American way of life is disappearing so fast that we may have to use force to save it.” (Bartels 2020). More than 40% agreed that “a time will come when patriotic Americans have to take the law into their own hands.”

⁸ In response to the persistent failures of Black communities to climb the socioeconomic hierarchy ever since the Civil Rights Acts, various social scientists over the decades have replicated “culture of poverty” arguments that attribute those failures to the individual attributes of those communities (Moynihan 1965; Schiller 1976; Duncan 1984; Mead 1992; Patterson 2000, 2006). “Culture” is usually the wrong term used; more often than not, “culture of poverty” arguments understand culture as a set of social values that characterize what folks view as desirable and not, while culture is instead a system of meaning that distinguish sense and nonsense. The racist conclusions of these arguments stem from the presumption of equal opportunity. If all Americans have equal opportunity, than the only way to explain the disproportionate failure of one group over another is through their individual attributes.

REVOG: Stop the Steal

This is a fraud on the American public. This is an embarrassment to our country. We were ready to win this election. Frankly, we did win this election. So, our goal is to ensure the integrity for the good of this nation. This is a very big moment.

Trump, Election Night 2020

On election night, Trump declared victory against the Democratic ticket of former Vice President Joe Biden and U.S. California Senator Kamala Harris despite the fact that millions of votes remained uncounted in key battleground states. Projections were delayed until the morning of November 7th as a result of the high number of mail-in ballots due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Biden and Harris were announced as the president-elect and vice president-elect, but by then Trump and his aides were already engaging in attempts to subvert the election by alleging widespread voter fraud on un-evidenced claims (Parks 2020), pressuring Republican state officials has attempted to solicit help in overturning election results (Brown, Haberman & Viebeck 2020; Gardner 2020), and filing tens of lawsuits in several states (all dismissed or withdrawn). The lack of evidence behind the allegations had little effect on those committed to Trump, who instead accepted his claims as mediated by a competing sphere of influence.

The repeated failures to overturn results culminated on January 6th, the day of the formal electoral vote, when thousands of individuals supporting Trump's "Stop the Steal" campaign travelled to Washington D.C. for the "Save America" rally. Trump publicized the event over Twitter in advance, saying it would be "wild." Following a series of speeches by Trump and his allies, a group of around ten thousand protestors bearing Trump 2020, Gadsden, Confederate, and right-wing militia flags began to enter Capitol grounds.

Police were severely outnumbered, forced to retreat to the Capitol steps and begin using tear gas and physical force. A reciprocal tit-for-tat followed, and the rioters used their overwhelming numbers to break through the East and West entrances, after which about 800-1000 of them breached the building (Pape 2021). Police and Capitol guards held off a steady stream of the insurrectionists while electorates and Senators were informed and escorted to safety. The violence lasted over three hours with five dead, one officer being hit in the head with a fire extinguisher, one insurrectionist shot by Capitol police, and three others from pulmonary causes. By mid-evening, the D.C. National Guard cleared the Capitol of rioters, and the counting of electoral votes resumed, voting in President-elect Biden and Vice President-elect Harris. Trump issued a statement condemning the violence while still maintaining the claims of election fraud (Choi 2021).

The storming of the Capitol was more than a poorly-controlled riot, with groups within the insurrectionists making preparations beforehand and looking to do real harm (Shortell 2021; Perez 2021). Overt intentions to engage in a physical assault were documented across a variety of social media platforms, with the phrase "storm the capitol" supposedly mentioned 100,000 times in the 30 days preceding January 6th (Frenkel 2021; Green 2021; Nguyen & Scott 2021; Lytvynenko 2021; Timber 2021). Chants can be heard calling for the hanging of Mike Pence after he refused to implicate himself with Trump's attempt to overturn the election results. A portion of the insurrectionists wore paramilitary gear; one photo in particular shows a man in camouflage uniform, a Kevlar vest, and masks carrying flex cuffs. The discovery of amateur

explosives found later on Capitol grounds provides further evidence of preparation before the event (Shortell 2021; Paybarah 2021). This was not a case of spurious criminal activity, but a motivated act of political violence, with cells within the insurrectionists having premeditated goals to threaten lawmakers to reinstate Trump's presidency. Doing so would have reorganized who is to assume Presidential authority while violating the due-process outcome of democratic procedures, a REVOG that seizes control of governmental positions but makes no attempts to redefine the institutionalized norms or values that regulate them.

First to acknowledge is the division in the supporting subculture. While MAGA panelists overwhelmingly agreed with Trump's election fraud claims and distrusted the 2020 presidential election results, only about 38% identified with "Stop the Steal." Participants in the attempted REVOG tended to be Trump's most committed and radicalized supporters, in addition to right-wing militias (Proud Boys, Oath Keepers, and Three-Percenter). It is impossible to gather perfect data on all who participated in the Capitol breach, but an impression can be gathered through analyzing those arrested.

Compared to arrests of right-wing extremist for acts of violence from 2015-2020, those charged for January 6th were also a large majority white men, but tended to be older with higher incomes, possibly replicating the demographics of Trump's sources of support from 2016. While the presence of a number of right-wing militias was documented, the notion that this insurrection was solely carried out by extremists is erroneous (Simon & Sidner 2021; Makuch 2021). Militias may have outsized their strategic role in the Capitol breach, but only about 10% of those arrested were found to have ties to such groups, indicating a heterogeneous conglomerate of core members of the MAGA supporting subculture and various right-wing extremist subcultures of support (CPOST 2021; Williams 2021; Pape 2021). Though varied in the descriptive characteristics of their beliefs and levels of radicalism in orientation to authority, the theoretical variables identified here encompass the necessary and sufficient conditions for all individuals who participated in the insurrection.

Strain on Goals

Similar to the authorizing social movement that elected Trump in 2016, both SF and SG were co-present in the moments preceding the REVOG stage of development, the latter being the active variable. In March 2020, U.S. state and local governments began issuing stay-at-home orders in response to the growing COVID-19 pandemic. Non-essential operations were ordered to close, resulting in mass lay-offs at large airline, hotel, and retail industries. Businesses hit particularly hard were small and medium-sized storefronts that simply did not have sufficient reserves for the situation. The economic downturn disproportionately threatened the life standards of the lower-middle and working-class as high-earning individuals remained comparably un-phased, exacerbating the structural strain they were already subject to by the pressures of stagnant real wages in an inflationary economy.

Within this strained context, the primary motivator behind the storming of the Capitol was the claim of election fraud, framed as an attempt by Democrats to deprive Trump supporters of equal opportunity in the democratic process. Trump repeatedly warned his supporters that it would be rigged against him months before election night, the loss only serving as "proof" to reinforce his claims (Beer 2020; Feuer 2020; Rutenberg 2021). An analysis of 377 individuals arrested on January 6th revealed insurrectionists tended to come from comfortably Biden or

battleground counties where the non-Hispanic white populations have been decreasing at a consistent rate over the past five years (Pape 2021). These were individuals under the greatest pressure of SG who felt deprived of their impactful vote, exacerbated by the local presence of comparison groups who were seen as earning an undeserved victory.

Opportunity Structure

SG constituted in the relative deprivation of voting power was at most a necessary but insufficient condition in generating the insurrection. To effectively breach the Capitol required a mobilization capacity to rally and steer a maximal amount of coercive force, with the key interests of bringing in as many participants and as much strategic coordination over the masses as possible. The first barrier to participation for Trump's committed supporters was attendance cost. Only those individuals who had a means of transportation or the money to travel were presumably able to attend, affecting the demographics of participants, skewed towards the middle-class. Numerous individual crowd-funding efforts occurred, and conservative funding behind the "March to Save America" was able to fund bussing operation, slightly reducing this possible misrepresentation and aiding in increasing numbers (Barry, McIntire & Rosenberg 2021; Corey 2021).

Steering capacity over the mass of participants was provided by the existing structure of right-wing extremist groups and further facilitated through online networks. Militias were able to organize with the strategic aid of ex-military members and disseminate their plans on various alt-tech platforms weeks before the insurrection, with a high volume of violent threats documented on pro-Trump forums just days before (Timber 2021). Gab and Parler were used to communicate beforehand, suggesting tools to bring for prying open doors, and live on-the-ground, suggesting which streets to travel for avoiding police. The mobilization capacity of right-wing networks through existing organizations and online communication, paired with the conservative fund to bring participants, forms the OS in the attempted REVOG.

Authorizing Belief

The primary active belief was the acceptance of Trump's stolen election narrative, that he was the legitimate president, despite the absence of substantive evidence. A poll in November showed Trump's open defiance of Biden's victory in the popular vote and Electoral College seemed to have resonated with a significant portion of Republicans, with about 52% listing Trump as having "rightfully won" and only 29% listing Biden (Kahn 2020). The lies in Trump's sphere of influence were regularly constituted as truths for his supporters throughout his presidency, and the allegations of election fraud were no different. This was a gathering of individuals who truly believed the election had been stolen from them, with insurrectionists shouting "treason" upon entering the House chamber.

The variability in authorizing beliefs comes from the textured features of each individual's belief and differing levels of radicalism in orientation to authority. In addition to those motivated solely by the relative deprivation effects of perceived election fraud, leaders and adherents of the QAnon movement were present, who have far more depth to their conspiratorial beliefs behind Trump's legitimacy as president and the illegitimacy of extant authorities (Harwell, Stanley-Becker, & Nakhlawi 2021). Religious motivations are identified in the mixture of Christian

symbolism amongst nationalist and racist emblems during the insurrection, further substantiated when observing the activity of Catholic leaders and Independent Network Evangelicals in the weeks preceding January 6th, who emphasized that ensuring Trump's reelection was not only politically significant but also a religious imperative (Christerson 2021; Jenkins 2021; Martin 2021). It is not the sense that Trump himself is the supreme authority, but that God is king and he is the only politician who acts in the name of God, a legitimization of Trump's executive position mediated by a love for God's Supreme Being. Though varied in their descriptive features and depths of validity claims, all authorizing beliefs were unified in their orientation towards the 2020 election results and Trump's legitimacy as president. The distribution and comorbidity of beliefs remain uncertain.

Precipitating Factors

The January 6th counting of electoral votes served as the precipitant for Trump and his supporters, intensifying SG in the final moments before the formal justification of Biden's presidency. At the "Save America" rally, Trump and his allies made a series of aggressive comments, Rudy Giuliani calling for a "trial by combat" and Trump stating, "We fight like hell and if you don't fight like hell, you're not going to have a country anymore" (01:12:00). For individuals in a state of drift, the message suggested an official authorization of political violence, reinforcing their beliefs through approval by Trump's executive status. An insurrectionist can be heard shouting at police, "Our president wants us here. We wait and take orders from our president." (Barry 2021).

The insurrection ultimately had insufficient coercive force to reach Congressional lawmakers in time to physically impose a REVOG, but was successful in its breach of the Capitol building by the simultaneous deficiency in policing. Capitol guards were severely outnumbered, with repeated requests for the National Guard delayed (Leonnig 2021; Sumner 2021). A small group of police will use different methods of riot control than a large military force, thus the question is not why police treated Trump's rioters different than others, but why police presence was lacking to begin with.

There are two possible reasons: ignorance or collusion. Officials may have believed the pro-police tendencies of Trump's supporter base would prevent an assault on officers, deciding to station less as a result. White nationalist organizations do, however, have a long history of working with law enforcement (Levin 2021), and investigations into white supremacist invasion of local law enforcement by the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Counterterrorism Division date back to 2006. Enrique Tarrío, leader of the Proud Boys, has openly admitted to a history of communicating back and forth with police, leaving collaboration between cells of insurrectionists and law enforcement an open possibility (Callaghan 2020).

Congress disapproved of Trump's role in the attempted REVOG, resulting in a second article of impeachment by the House on the charges of Incitement of Insurrection. A majority of Republican senators remained committed to justifying Trump's actions and he was acquitted 57-43. Comparable to the first impeachment trial, the consequence is an expansion of prerogative powers, an active and routinized justification of the violation of executive political norms, thereby redefining them into the future by precedent. A majority of GOP voters did not see Trump as responsible, nor did MAGA panelists who instead blamed the Anti-Fascist (ANTIFA) movement (PRC 2021; Blum & Parker 2021). Through the active justification of Trump's role in

the attempted REVOG and substantive legitimation in the perception of his supporters, the OS of the executive position has been opened such that a similar mob may be summoned again by a leader like Trump without incurring legal sanctions.

A Taste for Fascism

This election was rigged and the supreme courts and other courts didn't want to do anything about it. Who knows? I may even decide to beat them for a third time.

Trump, CPAC 2021

In the early 21st century, latent macro-economic processes began to manifest their effects in the U.S. as one material condition relevant to the genesis of social disorder, structural strain in the form of stagnant real wages, with the 2008 financial crisis and Obama's presidency exacerbated these financial pressures and feelings of relative deprivation. In the 2016 election cycle, Trump presented himself as an alternative to extant political administrations, taking advantage of the growing distrust of conventional politicians and evoking traditional hierarchical values within a nationalist context, emerging victorious through the specialized procedures of the Electoral College while losing the popular vote. While in office, Trump engaged in a series of actions in violation of institutionalized authority codes in the attainment of his desired goal of maintaining powers of office in the 2020 presidential election, soliciting foreign interference, pressuring state lawmakers, and eluding investigation efforts.

After repeated failed efforts to overturn the election and motivated by the unsubstantiated claims of election fraud, the collective disorderly movement engaged in motivated political violence in an attempted REVOG to reestablish Trump's administration the day of formal electoral votes, further authorized by his suggestive messaging at the "Save America" rally. Trump's actions abrogating the bounds of presidential authority and role in the storming of the Capitol resulted in two impeachments by the House on the charges of Abuse of Power, Obstruction of Congress, and Incitement of Insurrection, with both trials acquitted by the Senate by minority partisan support. The justification of Trump's various misuses of the executive position effectively expanded prerogative powers of office, a successful REVOF that redefined the content of the presidential position's role-facility.

Factors relevant to the sustainability of the disorderly movement Trump manifested in the state still remain. Subterranean traditional hierarchical values persist in a significant portion of the population, reconstituted by Trump as a form of ultra-nationalism, where the commitments of individuals who have internalized these values may be activated to garner legitimation by a politician who, like Trump, embodies those values. The mostly unconditional Republican support to acquit Trump's abrogation of executive authority in both impeachment trials demonstrated the susceptibility of U.S. democracy to patrimonial allegiances, where contracted ties of personal loyalty perform a mechanism of garnering justification through normative procedures within a superficial bureaucracy. Adaptive resources to fund such patrimonial contracts are received from capitalist whales whose interest in profit accumulation aligns with the fiscal and monetary policies of the Republican Party.

Figure 8. Applied Value-Added Developmental Model

	$S(X)$	OS	AB	PF	\Rightarrow	$REVO(X)$
	O	O	O	O		<i>SOCG</i>
F	O	O	O	O		<i>REVOF</i>
G	O	∅	O	O		<i>REVOG</i> <i>attempt</i>
N	X	∅	∅	X		--
V	X	X	X	X		--

O = present (dominant) X = absent ∅ = present (recessive)

The subterranean traditional values originate from the Antebellum South in the late 18th century as a Christian White supremacy that legitimated its enslavement of Africans and their descendants in a largely agricultural economy. Pro-slavery intellectual discourse prior to the South's secession shared the same hierarchical and palingenetic qualities of *Völkisch* intellectualism that preceded and was used by the Nazi Party, both entailing mythical conceptions of societal rebirth through prioritization of a categorized in-group degradation of an out-group (Griffin 1993; Reyes 2019). These hierarchical values persisted in the U.S., taking various forms while still retaining its prejudiced and discriminatory biases, moving subterranean to the dominant institutionalized rational-egalitarian values.

Trump evoked these subterranean values in a modern context as a kind of ultra-nationalism that, while formally inclusive to all citizens who were committed to "American" values, was most receptive to White America, where those values had been historically present and for. Traditional hierarchical values, when interpenetrated within an economic structure that produces strain for a majority of the population, manifest as anxieties of a decline in the social status and political significance of White folks by minority groups through a "great replacement." A significant portion of the population still has these subterranean values internalized, providing a source of popular support for leader-representative that evokes the hierarchical nature of those values in a political context.

The structure of Congress, its roles and procedures, provide the opportunity for a partisan minority to consistently justify anti-democratic activity when representatives are bound to the executive and each other by personal loyalty, allowing patrimonial allegiances to grow from

within a democratic bureaucracy. Republican congresspersons were most receptive to making informal contracts with Trump, not just because of his right-wing platform but also out of the necessity to access the popular support he garnered. The legitimacy of the GOP had been waning in the public conscience prior to 2016. Since 1988 after the Reagan Era, three out of the four Republican presidential election victories lost the popular vote, only justly won by the Electoral College. GOP officials tend to be in favor of voter restrictions (Peter 2021) that more often than not help their election victories (Weinger 2012; Smith 2021), demonstrating their fervent desire to maintain power in the face of popular decline, with Republican control of states dramatically reducing their democratic performance from 2000-2016 (Grumbach 2021). The patrimonial contract becomes expressed as access to Trump's source of popular legitimation in exchange for unconditional alignment with his interests.

There is still the question of legislative-executive confrontation. The courts treated Trump's political violations as if they were an everyday occurrence, taking forever to adjudicate them while Trump continually delayed court processes. There is still reason to expect that the Courts would have, in the end, supported Trump and justified his disorder. When U.S. Supreme Court justices function as the instruments of political parties rather than autonomous agents of accountability, there is the consequence that they will act subservient to the president when their political orientations align. The subordination of not just Congress but also the Judiciary to the executive creates an organizational capacity inherent in the U.S. democratic structure to justify political activity that under all other circumstances is considered disorderly, affecting a substantive change in the nature of the state toward de-democratization.

Adaptive resources to foster patrimonial allegiances within the state are provided by capitalist elites whose interests in profit accumulation align with the Republican Party's fiscal and monetary policy. After the second impeachment trial, conservative funding at the state level moved to support challengers to Republican Senators who voted in favor of conviction. Trump and the Club for Growth PAC, for example, began endorsing multiple opponents against senators Liz Cheney (R-WY) and Anthony Gonzalez (R-OH) within weeks of the acquittal, both having voted for impeachment (Chait 2021; Kelly 2021; Arkin 2021). The structure of the economy, its necessary requirement of profit growth, motivates a disproportionate extension of financial support by the propertied class to politicians whose policies aid the accumulation process. When paired with the relevant conditions and factors for social disorder, this produces a tendency for intra-state revolutionary movements to manifest as forms of right-wing populism.

The threat of Trump's presidency was not isolated in his individual actions, but necessarily involved the sources of legitimation and justification. Though out of office, he remains a powerful condensed symbol. A 2021 Suffolk University poll found over half of Trump voters felt more loyalty to Trump (54%) than to the Republican Party (34%), and that he should play a major role in the party moving forward. About 70% of MAGA panelists surveyed in 2020 said they would have agreed to three-terms of a Trump presidency despite its violation of term limits (Blum & Parker 2021). The persistent commitment of Trump's supporters, paired with the redefined facilities of the executive position, provide capacities for garnering legitimation and justification when abrogating the bounds of authority for anti-democratic ends that may be used by another politician who embodies those subterranean hierarchical values. The real threat to U.S. democracy is the proto-fascist movement that Trump placed into acceleration, and the next goal-oriented populist who mobilizes it to actively redefine the structural component of the state towards de-democratization.

IV. Future Course and Consequences

Indicators of de-democratization in the 21st century are not unique to the U.S., but are instead an increasingly global phenomenon. Descriptive accounts of democratic decline produce important data for analysis, but only by comparing cases through a single theoretical framework can a meaningful causal explanation be derived. Further comparative analyses must be conducted and systematized, confirming or amending the theory, to arrive at policy decisions that combat burgeoning intra-state fascist revolutions.

Effective policy may be approached through Smelser's conceptualization of social control. Where strain, an opportunity structure, an authorizing belief, and precipitating factors constitute the necessary and sufficient determinants for the genesis of revolutionary action, social control constitutes counter-determinants that prevent, interrupt, or inhibit the accumulation of those variables (Smelser 1962: 17). Social controls are of two broad types: (1) proactive counter-determinants that minimize or remove variables relevant to the genesis of social disorder and the formation of disorderly subcultures and subcultures of disorder; and (2) reactive counter-determinants that are mobilized only after the occurrence of disorderly action. To address developing anti-democratic movements effectively necessitates the use of proactive social controls that deactivate the variables determinant of revolutionary action before the disorder can grow to uncontrollable limits within the social system and redefine the structural components of the state. The remainder of this chapter focuses on U.S. policy and social control.

Public and private response to Trump's disorder was almost exclusively that of reactive social control, and it is detrimentally insufficient. After the insurrection, efforts were made to counter the opportunity structures that had facilitated it, eliminating Trump's social media presence, removing mobile phone applications that were used to coordinate during the event, and censoring right-wing pages that had previously been spewing misinformation to its followers. Yet there still remain various encrypted messaging platforms and far-right forums for extremists to communicate propaganda, organize events, raise funds, coordinate training, and recruit new members. Though functioning as a counter-determinant for the OS, censorship efforts have the added effect increasing pressures of relative deprivation. Insufficient attempts to reduce the available OS combined with a heightening of SG by censorship generate a low net effect on countering the conditions for social disorder.

Effective policy must instead target variables relevant to the disorderly movement's source of popular support. Fascist revolutionaries within the state are only successful in redefining structural components of the polity insofar as they receive authorization from the societal community. Successful counter-determinants to variables relevant for generating states of drift in the general population diminish this source of authorization. Attempts must be made to specifically remove one or more of those conditions. The following preliminary recommendations focus on: (1) removing the pseudo-democratic opportunity structure of presidential electoral procedures; and (2) reducing structural strain in the general population, thereby removing the situations within which subterranean hierarchical values are activated.

Trump's authorizing social movement in 2016 was only successful through a precipitating opportunity structure, the specialized procedures of U.S. presidential elections. The Electoral College not only displaces the general population from direct participation in the democratic

process, but also nullifies the significance of its majority vote. The first proposal is a redefinition of presidential election procedures, removing the Electoral College, such that the executive is directly authorized by popular majority. Digital voting using encrypted blockchain technology is recommended to combat election interference and voter suppression by increasing security, accessibility, and speed of results.

The value-added model implies subterranean hierarchical values are only active in generating fascist disorder in the presence of strained conditions. The values themselves are impossible to eliminate in the short-term, but targeting the situations of their activation reduces the motivational mechanisms behind the extension of support or participation in revolutionary actions. This implies alleviating the economic positions of those disproportionately affected by stagnant real wages, the working- and lower middle-class, either through fiscal policy that redistributes the share of value produced by workers through increased taxation on the highest-earning capitalists to expand social services, or monetary policy that prints money by fiat to provide a temporary basic income that completes the earning requirements to comfortably sustain a household, before a more radical transformation of the economy may occur that successfully reduces inequality of outcomes.

Such policies must necessarily be guided by equitable values. Whereas egalitarian values mandate equal treatment of equal individuals, equity necessitates differential treatment of certain individuals over others according to their circumstances to realize equality of outcomes⁹. If individuals in a state of drift feel disproportionately benefitted by policy that alleviates their financial situations, it is likely to decrease the pressures of relative deprivation. If the proto-fascist movement Trump has set into motion is insufficiently addressed, if policy does not effectively counter and eliminate one or more of the variables that generate revolutionary action, it is reasonable to expect further development in the king's revolution and more politically-oriented violence on the right. While the subterranean hierarchical values internalized by a significant portion of the population are themselves enduring, policies may be implemented that target the situations of their activation, reducing the probabilities of anti-democratic revolutionary action, before reintegration into an equitable society may commence.

⁹ The Supreme Court case *Griggs v. Duke Power Co.* (1971) ruled that a cognitive metric test issued by Duke Power in their employment process had violated civil rights due to the disparate performance scores between White and Black Americans. Crucial is the notion that facially-neutral procedures that process individuals as equals have the capacity to produce disparate outcomes. This is the paradox of equity, that to achieve equality of outcomes one must treat individuals un-equally according to their circumstances.

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Figures

Figure 1. Value-Added Model

$$S(X) \quad OS \quad AB \quad PF \quad \Rightarrow \quad REVO(X)$$

Figure 2. Value-Added Developmental Model

	$S(X)$	OS	AB	PF	\Rightarrow	$REVO(X)$
	--	--	--	--		$SOC(X)$
F	SF	--	--	--		$REVOF$
G	SG	--	--	--		$REVOG$
N	SN	--	--	--		$REVON$
V	SV	--	--	--		$REVOV$

Figure 3. Top Decile's Share in National Income, 1910-2010

Source: Piketty 2014




Figure 4. Productivity and Hourly Real Wages, 1950-2019

Source: Economic Policy Institute




Figure 5. Real Wage Growth by Percentile 1979-2017

Source: Economic Policy Institute




Figure 6. Trump's Share of News Coverage and National Polling Numbers May-August 2016

Source: *Crimson Hexagon*




Figure 7. Trust in Government Index 1958-2016

Source: *American National Election Survey*




Figure 8. Applied Value-Added Developmental Model

	$S(X)$	OS	AB	PF	\Rightarrow	$REVO(X)$
	O	O	O	O		<i>SOCG</i>
F	O	O	O	O		<i>REVOF</i>
G	O	\emptyset	O	O		<i>REVOG attempt</i>
N	X	\emptyset	\emptyset	X		--
V	X	X	X	X		--

O = present (dominant) X = absent \emptyset = present (recessive)