

*WHAT EXPLAINS THE
VARIATION IN SEXUAL
EXPLOITATION AND
ABUSE ALLEGATIONS
IN UN PEACEKEEPING
MISSIONS?*

A Case Study on Mali and the Central African Republic

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Acknowledgements

First and foremost, I would like to thank my parents for all the opportunities that they have given me throughout my life. Without you always supporting me allowing me to explore my interests, I would not have ended up at Haverford. I would also like to thank my thesis advisor, Susanna Wing, for all the support she has given me not only with the thesis process but all throughout college with job applications, course selections and anything else I needed. Thank you to my thesis group, who not only helped me choose and refine my topic but who were also always there to let me bounce ideas off of them and answered any questions I needed. Thank you to all my friends (especially my roommates) who listened to me talk about my thesis all the time. Lastly, I would like to thank Margaret Schaus for all the help she provided me, and every other thesis student, throughout this process.

Chapter One: Introduction and Literature Review

Introduction

The problem of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) by United Nations (UN) Peacekeepers was first brought to the attention of the international community with the abuses documented in the UN Peacekeeping Operations in Cambodia and Somalia in the early 1990s. Since then, the majority of peacekeeping missions have faced allegations of SEA by peacekeepers.¹ The issue made international headlines again in 2004 during the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), spurring international scrutiny of peacekeeping.² This mission tallied a total of 192 allegations of SEA in just two and a half years.³

The legal basis for UN peacekeeping was established in Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the UN Charter which allows the UN to settle disputes, take action with respect to international peace and utilize regional arrangements to ensure international security, respectively.⁴ The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is the UN branch that is tasked with implementing and overseeing all UN Peacekeeping Operations around the world. Although the DPKO is under the UN Secretariat and run by the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, it is the UN Security Council that makes the decision to authorize a peacekeeping operation. The General Assembly, on the other hand, is tasked both with financing peacekeeping missions and providing the Security Council with regular reviews of issues related to peacekeeping.⁵ It is also

¹ Burke, *Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN Military Contingents: Moving Beyond the Current Status Quo and Responsibility Under International Law*.

² Martin, "Must Boys Be Boys?: Ending Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN Peacekeeping Missions."

³ Kovatach, "Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN Peacekeeping Missions: A Case Study on MONUC and MONUSCO."

⁴ "Mandates and the Legal Basis for Peacekeeping."

⁵ "Department of Peacekeeping Operations."

important to note that the UN does not have a military force of its own, but rather it relies on member states to contribute military and police contingents for each mission.⁶

Over the years, the size and scope of peacekeeping operations have expanded. The term "traditional peacekeeping" refers to peacekeeping as it was used during the Cold War: which entailed "a one-dimensional military deployment operation in support of political negotiations."⁷ Today, peacekeeping operations are often referred to as "multi-dimensional" which "refers to a broader multilateral conflict intervention strategy that integrates comprehensive non-military missions with traditional military centered peacekeeping operations."⁸ In the present day, peacekeeping missions are expected to not only provide military support but also to provide development and humanitarian assistance.

Rósín Sarah Burke argues that the "SEA of women and children by UN Peacekeepers is not only morally reprehensible but it violates the relationship of trust between peacekeepers and the civilian populations they have been sent to protect."⁹ This is significant because, of the 14 current peacekeeping operations, seven have the protection of civilians or the protection of human rights as a top priority mandate.¹⁰ Further, there is evidence that peacekeeping operations are more successful when they can rely on the population that they are serving because the population is more likely to provide the operation with intelligence.¹¹ Thus, the breakdown of trust between peacekeepers and the local population that is caused by SEA may actually undermine the success of the mission as the local population becomes less willing to engage with

⁶ "Deployment and Reimbursement."

⁷ Koko and Essoh, *Determinants of Success in UN Peacekeeping Operations*, 21.

⁸ Koko and Essoh, 22.

⁹ Burke, *Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN Military Contingents: Moving Beyond the Current Status Quo and Responsibility Under International Law*, 2.

¹⁰ "United Nations Peacekeeping."

¹¹ Bigio and Vogelstein, "How Women's Participation in Conflict Prevention and Resolution Advances U.S. Interests."

the operation. Additionally, allegations of SEA threaten to undermine the moral standing of the UN in the eyes of the international community and raise questions about the legitimacy of the security council.¹² As Athena R. Kolbe describes, when the UN does not address the issue of SEA by peacekeepers “it can send a message that the implementation of human rights is both optional and low priority in the post-conflict setting.”¹³

SEA by peacekeepers is also a threat to the long-term stability of post-conflict settings. Paul Higate states that “while some peacekeepers might argue that local women are made more secure because they received ‘donated’ food, resources or money, this view is problematic. The longer-term picture for the local people involved is of insecurity.”¹⁴ The presence of international peacekeepers has been linked to the development of sex economies in post-conflict settings. These sex economies are aimed at catering to the comparatively wealthy expat peacekeepers. Although in the short term, the presence of peacekeepers may provide some women with a steady income through transactional sex with peacekeepers, when the peacekeepers leave the local women also experience a loss of livelihood.¹⁵ SEA by peacekeepers has also been linked to the birth of thousands of “peacekeeper babies” in addition to the proliferation of HIV/AIDS in post-conflict settings.¹⁶

The United Nations claims that the promotion and the protection of human rights is a key founding and guiding principle of the organization.¹⁷ Thus, it is the responsibility of the UN, and by extension, the international community, to ensure that the organization is not responsible for

¹² Whalan, “Dealing with Disgrace: Addressing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN Peacekeeping.”

¹³ Kolbe, “‘It’s Not a Gift When It Comes with Price,’” 10.

¹⁴ Higate, “Peacekeepers, Masculinities, and Sexual Exploitation,” 100.

¹⁵ Kathleen Jennings and Ristanović, “Un Peacekeeping Economies and Local Sex Industries: Connections and Implications.”

¹⁶ Pisik, “AIDS Being Spread by Its Peacekeepers.”

¹⁷ “United Nations: What We Do.”

human rights abuses around the world. If the UN is truly committed to the protection and promotion of human rights, it should start by an internal examination of its own practices. Additionally, in order to ensure the success of peacekeeping operations, it is in the best interest of the UN to address the root causes of SEA by peacekeepers. In my thesis, I will use a comparative case study of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) to examine potential risk factors for SEA by peacekeepers and to develop policy recommendations to combat the issue.

The results of my study indicate that there are two important factors involved in SEA by peacekeepers. First, peacekeepers from troop-contributing countries (TCCs) that have a history of human rights abuses at home are likely to perpetrate SEA within peacekeeping operations. Second, peacekeeping operations in which the peacekeepers are in close contact with vulnerable populations, most notably internally displaced persons (IDPs), are likely to produce a high number of allegations of SEA. In the following parts of this chapter, I will provide an overview of the literature regarding SEA by UN Peacekeepers. I will then discuss my case selection of MINUSMA and MINUSCA and present an overview of my methodology.

Literature Review

UN Peacekeepers are classified as either military, police or civilian personnel who aid in the implementation of a peacekeeping mandate as determined by the UN Security Council. Military and police personnel are provided by the UN Member-States.¹⁸ The UN defines sexual exploitation as “any actual or attempted abuse of a position of vulnerability, differential power, or trust, for sexual purposes, including, but not limited to profiting monetarily, socially or

¹⁸ Vandenberg, “Peacekeeping, Human Trafficking, and Sexual Abuse and Exploitation.”

politically from the sexual exploitation of another.”¹⁹ The UN defines sexual abuse as “actual or threatened physical intrusion of a sexual nature, whether by force or under unequal coercive conditions.”²⁰ Thus, instances of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) include but are not limited to “rape, transactional sex, exploitative relationships, and sexual abuse.”²¹ The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) counts allegations of SEA by peacekeepers by reports received. One report can implicate one peacekeeper or multiple and can also involve multiple victims.²² It is important to note here that while transactional sex is common in UN Peacekeeping Missions, it is largely not accounted for in my analysis as it is often very underreported.²³

There are three major theories regarding SEA by UN Peacekeepers. These are: “those that emphasize the legal difficulty of holding peacekeepers accountable for sexual violence, those that focus on the destructive consequences of ‘military masculinity’ and those that focus on various situational factors particular to the mission.”²⁴ In this chapter, I will outline the major schools of thought regarding SEA by UN Peacekeepers.

Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in War

Instances of SEA by peacekeepers are often studied as part of the larger literature regarding wartime sexual violence. However, it is important to understand that SEA by peacekeepers is a phenomenon that is influenced by, but unique from wartime sexual violence. Here, I will outline the major theories of wartime sexual violence and discuss their relevance to SEA by peacekeepers.

¹⁹ UN Secretary-General, “Bulletin: Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse.”

²⁰ UN Secretary-General, 1.

²¹ Vandenberg, “Peacekeeping, Human Trafficking, and Sexual Abuse and Exploitation,” 407.

²² “Sexual Exploitation and Abuse: Introduction.”

²³ Kolbe, “‘It’s Not a Gift When It Comes with Price.’”

²⁴ Moncrief, “Military Socialization, Disciplinary Culture and Sexual Violence in UN Peacekeeping Operations,” 717.

The dominant discourse regarding wartime sexual violence is “Rape as a Weapon of War”, where rape is understood as a strategic tactic used by combatants “to control the territory, to instill fear [and] to terrorize the population.”²⁵ In this discourse, scholars argue that wartime sexual violence serves to demoralize the victim’s ethnic/religious/political group and create a power dynamic between the perpetrator and the victim.²⁶ This discourse has dominated both popular and official descriptions of sexual violence in conflict zones, from newspaper headlines like “Rape is still being used as a weapon of war. Right now. Today” to Amnesty International campaigns aimed at eradicating the usage of sexual violence as a weapon of war.^{27 28} Further, in the 2008 UN Resolution on Women, Peace, and Security, sexual violence was described as “a tactic of war [used] to humiliate, dominate, instill fear in, disperse and/or forcibly relocate civilian members of a community or ethnic group.”²⁹

However, the “Rape as a Weapon of War” discourse does not adequately explain SEA by UN Peacekeepers. First, UN Peacekeepers should not have any particular strategy or use any tactics; they are not trying to win a war. Second, UN Peacekeepers do not have any inherent interest in “controlling” the population they are interacting with as this does not serve to advance the aims of UN Peacekeeping missions which often include the maintenance of peace, economic/social development and humanitarian assistance.³⁰ Thus, the dominant discourse that is used to study wartime sexual violence should not be extended to the study of SEA by UN Peacekeepers.

²⁵ Baaz and Stern, *Sexual Violence as a Weapon of War?: Perceptions, Prescriptions, Problems in the Congo and Beyond*, 46.

²⁶ Baaz and Stern, *Sexual Violence as a Weapon of War?: Perceptions, Prescriptions, Problems in the Congo and Beyond*.

²⁷ “Opinion | Rape Is Still Being Used as a Weapon of War. Right Now. Today.”

²⁸ “Tackling Rape as a Weapon of War.”

²⁹ “OHCHR | Rape: Weapon of War.”

³⁰ Guéhenno, “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines.”

Another dominant discourse, the “Biological Urge Theory” purports that rape is “integral to warring because war is (supposedly) enacted by men and men are subject to their biologically driven heterosexual needs; hence men rape.”³¹ In this discourse, it is understood that men must address their natural libido and that this biological urge interacts with military settings to produce sexual violence. The military thus provides the “atmosphere conducive for biology to reach its full potential.”³²

It is important to note that by and large, the biological urge theory is rejected in academic fields. However, it is worth mentioning because this discourse dominated discussions of SEA by UN Peacekeepers for many years. For example, when news broke of SEA by UN Peacekeepers in Cambodia between 1991 and 1993, “the head of the UN Mission to Cambodia (UNTAC) responded ‘boys will be boys, eighteen-year-old hot-blooded soldiers have the right to chase young beautiful beings of the opposite sex.’”³³ Further, the head of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) office in Bosnia and Herzegovina once wrote of UN peacekeeping missions that, “there is this whole boys-will-be-boys attitude about men visiting brothels. There is a culture in the UN where you can’t criticize it. That goes all the way to the top.”³⁴ Additionally, there are reports that the US Assistant Secretary of State and chief negotiator in the Balkans, Richard Holbrooke, once said “human nature is human nature. Where peacekeepers go they attract prostitutes.”³⁵ Although public comments such as these are not as common today, this viewpoint has not been eradicated. Despite the fact that Biological Urge Theory has been largely discredited in academia, a recent report by Refugees International notes

³¹ Baaz and Stern, *Sexual Violence as a Weapon of War?: Perceptions, Prescriptions, Problems in the Congo and Beyond*, 17.

³² Stern and Zalewski, “Feminist Fatigue(s): Reflections on Feminism and Familiar Fables of Militarisation.”

³³ Essa, “Do UN Peacekeepers Do More Harm than Good?”

³⁴ Duncanson, “Forces for Good? British Military Masculinities on Peace Support Operations,” 21.

³⁵ Duncanson, 23.

that the notion of “boys will be boys” continues to persist in dialogue regarding SEA by Peacekeepers.³⁶

Perhaps the most relevant framework through which we can understand SEA by peacekeepers is the “military masculinity” framework. Sabrina Karim and Kyle Beardsley argue that “SEA in the context of security forces may be a major symptom of militarized masculinity” which is defined as “an aggressive form of masculinity needed for warrior culture to flourish.”³⁷ Paul Higate argues that there exists a form of hegemonic masculinity to which all men and boys aspire which values stoicism, phallogentricity and the domination of weaker individuals. He argues that there is a strong reciprocal relationship between this hegemonic form of masculinity and militarism, both because military service is often viewed as the physical culmination of these masculine ideals and because the military itself “feeds into ideologies of masculinity through the eroticization of stoicism, risk-taking and even lethal violence.”³⁸ As Sandra Whitworth notes,

Basic military training helps to nurture the exaggerated ideals of manhood and masculinity demanded by national militaries. But this transformation is most effectively accomplished by the denigration of everything marked by difference, whether that be women, people of color, or homosexuality. It is not a coincidence that the insults that most new recruits face are gendered.³⁹

This “othering” of these identities that are marked by difference from hegemonic masculinity, such as femininity, increases the likelihood of violence against those representing these identities, such as women. While military masculinity depicts men as violent and powerful, women are depicted as peaceful and submissive, which makes the fragile concept of the hegemonic military masculinity “particularly vulnerable to the logic of rape in conflict and

³⁶ Martin, “Must Boys Be Boys?: Ending Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN Peacekeeping Missions.”

³⁷ Karim and Beardsley, “Explaining Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Peacekeeping Missions: The Role of Female Peacekeepers and Gender Equality in Contributing Countries,” 102.

³⁸ Higate and Hopton, “War, Militarism and Masculinities,” 434.

³⁹ Whitworth, *Men, Militarism and UN Peacekeeping: A Gendered Analysis*, 242.

post-conflict settings."⁴⁰ Further, Cynthia Enloe has argued that there is an inherent link between military masculinity and sexual misconduct which is evidenced by the pervasive levels of sexual misconduct, particularly the use of prostitution, by security forces both in combat and peacetime.⁴¹

Despite the fact that UN Peacekeeping Missions do not have the same objectives as traditional military missions, such as defeating an enemy, they are inherently militarized in nature. Elisabeth Heinman argues that "peaceful but militarized settings, such as military bases outside conflict zones and military academies, are also important to understanding the phenomenon of "military sexual violence."⁴² It is clear that UN Peacekeeping missions fit into this category of "peaceful but militarized settings." In the context of peacekeeping, this is evidenced by the outsized proportion of the military contingent of peacekeeping forces compared to the police and civilian personnel and the fact that the military contingents are trained in combat by their home countries.

Further, Cynthia Enloe argues that even a peaceful but militarized setting "is a place where certain forms of masculinity are nurtured and rewarded." She explains that "there is nothing inherent in international peacekeeping operations as currently structured that makes their soldiers immune from the sort of sexism that has fueled military prostitution in wartime and peacetime."⁴³ It is easy to see the connection between UN Peacekeeping Missions and prostitution in military bases particularly when one considers that a large number of the

⁴⁰ Baaz and Stern, *Sexual Violence as a Weapon of War?: Perceptions, Prescriptions, Problems in the Congo and Beyond*, 21.

⁴¹ Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches, and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics*.

⁴² Heinman, *Sexual Violence in Conflict Zones*, 2.

⁴³ Enloe, *Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women's Lives*, 101.

allegations of SEA by UN Peacekeepers involve allegations of “transactional sex”, defined as the “exchange of sex for money, favors or gifts.”⁴⁴

Other scholars have questioned the efficacy of using troops trained in traditional military settings for peacekeeping because traditional military training may be antithetical to peacebuilding. This is because the characteristics needed for peacebuilding such as restraint, sensitivity, and communication, are some of the very characteristics that are rejected by military masculinity.⁴⁵ Liora Sinon explains that tasks such as humanitarian assistance and the promotion of human rights are perceived as feminine by peacekeepers because combat is so closely intertwined with military masculinity and thus, peacekeepers tend to view these non-combat duties as unmasculine and counter to their training as soldiers. Additionally, the very title “peacekeeper” brings about notions of femininity as women are typically viewed as more inherently peaceful than men.⁴⁶ Sandra Whitworth notes that in some cases, the seemingly “feminine” tasks that peacekeepers are often asked to perform may lead to an identity crisis within the militarized peacekeepers which presents itself in sexual violence.⁴⁷

However, it is important to note that not all scholars see SEA by peacekeepers as a clear example of military masculinity. Paul Higate argues that there is a tendency in the literature to assume that the forces of military masculinity are so strong that the individual agency of the peacekeepers is eliminated.⁴⁸ Further, many scholars tend to simplify the role of the soldier as one relegated to a life of violent combat. He uses the following quote from A.B. Fetherson as an example to demonstrate this tendency in the literature:

⁴⁴ Beber, “Peacekeeping, Compliance with International Norms, and Transactional Sex in Monrovia, Liberia,” 2.

⁴⁵ Streat, “Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN Peacekeeping Operations: Does the Presence of Female Troops Provide a Solution?”

⁴⁶ Sion, “Peacekeeping and the Gender Regime: Dutch Female Peacekeepers in Bosnia and Kosovo.”

⁴⁷ Whitworth, *Men, Militarism and UN Peacekeeping: A Gendered Analysis*.

⁴⁸ Higate, “Peacekeepers, Masculinities, and Sexual Exploitation.”

There is no switch inside a blue helmet that automatically turns a soldier trained for war-fighting into an individual prepared to work non-violently and with cultural sensitivity in a highly militarized environment.⁴⁹

Here, Fetherston offers a clear binary between the warring soldier and the sensitive peacebuilder, completely ignoring the very real possibility that these two identities could co-exist. Higate notes that the unquestioned position of military masculinity among peacekeepers in the literature makes it “difficult for these commentators to then engage with the broader structural context of sexual exploitation and its complexity.”⁵⁰ In particular, the literature largely fails to consider other lenses through which SEA by peacekeepers can be understood.

To begin with, it is not only the military contingents in UN Peacekeeping Missions that commit instances of SEA against civilians. In fact, in the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), the civilian staff of UN Peacekeeping Missions was the largest perpetrators of abuse.⁵¹ A study done by UNHCR and Save the Children-UK into the SEA of children in UN Refugee camps in Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone found that in all three countries, humanitarian agency workers associated both with NGOs and with the UN were the largest perpetrators of SEA against refugee children. The report states that this abuse most commonly took the form in the “trading of humanitarian commodities and services” such as wheat, ration cards, education services skills training in exchange for sex with minors.⁵² Although the report did also find reports that military-peacekeepers also sexually exploited children at the camps, the incidence was much higher among humanitarian workers.⁵³

⁴⁹ Fetherston, “UN Peacekeepers and Cultures of Violence,” 22.

⁵⁰ Higate, “Peacekeepers, Masculinities, and Sexual Exploitation,” 102.

⁵¹ Moncrief, “Military Socialization, Disciplinary Culture and Sexual Violence in UN Peacekeeping Operations.”

⁵² “Sexual Violence & Exploitation: The Experience of Refugee Children in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone,” 4.

⁵³ “Sexual Violence & Exploitation: The Experience of Refugee Children in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone,” 6.

In his study on SEA by peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sierra Leone, which involved interviews with military contingents, police officers, civil staff the local populations, Paul Higate identified a similar pattern of SEA between UN Peacekeepers and humanitarian workers. Specifically, he points out that instances of transactional sex are particularly high in both humanitarian organizations and UN Peacekeeping Missions.⁵⁴ This finding is reinforced through the UNHCR/Save the Children-UK report which found that the children interviewed often identified that it was difficult to “challenge the behavior of agency staff firstly because of their dependence upon the goods and services for survival and secondly because of the power held by these staff.”⁵⁵ This points to another similarity between SEA by UN Peacekeepers and humanitarian workers: the significant power dynamic involved. Both peacekeepers and humanitarian workers are expected to provide humanitarian services to the community, including food, goods, and services. Often, it is “the very humanitarian aid and services intended to benefit the refugee population” that is used as a tool of exploitation.⁵⁶

Higate also found that SEA by peacekeepers bears many resemblances to sex tourism. He notes that “given the diversity of cultural contexts from which the peacekeepers, humanitarian workers, and sex tourists originate, it is interesting to note that their framing of sexually exploitative activities draw on and reinforces a common pattern of legitimation serving to obscure their responsibilities for such activities.”⁵⁷ Interviews with male peacekeepers showed that, instead of viewing themselves as the hyper-masculine warrior that the military masculinity framework might suggest, peacekeepers tended to frame their sexual interactions

⁵⁴ Higate, “Peacekeepers, Masculinities, and Sexual Exploitation.”

⁵⁵ “Sexual Violence & Exploitation: The Experience of Refugee Children in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone,” 5.

⁵⁶ “Sexual Violence & Exploitation: The Experience of Refugee Children in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone.”

⁵⁷ Higate, “Peacekeepers, Masculinities, and Sexual Exploitation,” 110.

with women in two ways. First, they pointed to the biological sex drive of men and second, they pointed to the enthusiasm of the local women. Higate notes that this type of discourse is also common in sex tourism. Further, in both instances, there is an understanding of women gaining control through sex with wealthy and generous businessmen/workers. This understanding provides the nuance of an economic relationship between the peacekeeper and local women that the military masculinity framework does not.⁵⁸

While military masculinity is no doubt an important lens through which we can study SEA by peacekeepers, it is by no means the only lens. As Higate points out, given the large degree of overlap between patterns of SEA by UN Peacekeepers and distinctively non-militarized entities like humanitarian organizations and sex tourism, it is unlikely that militarized masculinity is the sole force driving SEA by UN Peacekeepers but rather that there is a confluence of factors at play.

Lack of legal clarity and a high degree of impunity

The second branch of theories is concerned with the lack of legal clarity regarding what legal entity has jurisdiction over instances of SEA committed by UN Peacekeepers as well as the high degree of impunity regarding SEA allegations.

Here, it is important to note that the UN does not have definite jurisdiction over its peacekeepers. Human Rights Watch explains the complexity of jurisdiction over instances of SEA by police Peacekeepers.

The United Nations does not have the legal authority to take punitive measures against civilian police monitors provided by the Member States for United Nations peacekeeping operations, and the disciplinary follow up to their misconduct is the responsibility of the contributing countries. The options available to the United Nations in such instances are limited, therefore, to the administrative action of repatriation with

⁵⁸ Higate, "Peacekeepers, Masculinities, and Sexual Exploitation."

the recommendation to the national authorities concerned to take the appropriate action against the individual in question.⁵⁹

The legal authority of the UN over the military contingents mirrors that of its legal authority over the civilian police monitors. The central issue here is that the UN technically cannot do anything other than repatriate police monitors and troops. The UN can investigate the claims of SEA, but it is then up to the troop-contributing-country to take punitive measures.⁶⁰ However, Martina E. Vandenberg explains that “as a rule, member states are unresponsive”⁶¹ to these investigations. Alternatively, the host-country can take actions against peacekeepers that have committed SEA against civilians, but the host country often “may lack the appropriate policing and judicial infrastructures for the deterrence of sexual violence and the punishment of its perpetrators.”⁶² It is also important to note is that UN personnel are immune to the laws of the host country and only the Secretary-General himself can waive this immunity.⁶³

Instances in which the UN has used its power of repatriation have been scarce. In an op-ed with the New York Times, the United Nations Assistant Secretary-General for Field Support explained that one of the key reasons he resigned from his post was due to the UN's failure to repatriate troops from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of the Congo in a timely manner despite the fact that there was ample evidence that contingents from these countries were involved in SEA against civilians in outsized proportions.⁶⁴

⁵⁹ "Hopes Betrayed: Trafficking of Women and Girls to Postconflict Bosnia and Herzegovina for Forced Prostitution."

⁶⁰ Vandenberg, "Peacekeeping, Human Trafficking, and Sexual Abuse and Exploitation."

⁶¹ Vandenberg, 410.

⁶² Moncrief, "Military Socialization, Disciplinary Culture and Sexual Violence in UN Peacekeeping Operations," 717.

⁶³ Defeis F., "U.N. Peacekeepers and Sexual Abuse and Exploitation: An End to Impunity."

⁶⁴ Defeis F., "U.N. Peacekeepers and Sexual Abuse and Exploitation: An End to Impunity."

Troop-contributing countries (TCCs) have also largely failed to punish troops that have been found guilty of SEA in UN Peacekeeping Missions. Cases in which TCCs have punished offending military and police contingents have been sporadic. These instances include two South African soldiers being punished by the South African government for abuses that occurred in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), a the French government prosecuting a civilian staffer for child pornography and a military tribunal in Pakistan regarding several Pakistani military contingents raping a child in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH).⁶⁵ However, aside from these few cases, impunity has been the norm.

Impunity in UN Peacekeeping Missions is a recurrent theme in the literature, particularly in policy recommendations. The Zeid Report, a comprehensive policy recommendation made by the United Nations Jordanian Representative Prince Zeid to the UN Secretary-General, pointed to a lack of accountability as the key factor underlying the issue of SEA by Peacekeepers.⁶⁶ Since the Zeid Report, reports by Refugees International, the International Bar Association and CARE have all pointed to impunity as a key factor in the phenomenon of SEA by peacekeepers.^{67 68 69}

Variance in SEA Allegations by Peacekeepers

Although theories of “military masculinity” and “impunity” are dominant in the literature regarding SEA by UN Peacekeepers, it is important to note that none of these theories adequately

⁶⁵ Vandenberg, “Peacekeeping, Human Trafficking, and Sexual Abuse and Exploitation.”

⁶⁶ UN Secretary-General, “A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations.”

⁶⁷ Askin, “Ending Impunity for Crimes Committed by United Nations Peacekeepers.”

⁶⁸ Martin, “Must Boys Be Boys?: Ending Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN Peacekeeping Missions.”

⁶⁹ Frogh, Abdela, and Okumu-Alya, “From Resolution to Reality: Lessons Learned from Afghanistan, Nepal and Uganda on Women’s Participation and Peacebuilding in Post-Conflict Governance.”

accounts for the *variation* in allegations in SEA by peacekeepers. The degree of variation in SEA allegations varies greatly by mission, with some missions facing zero allegations of abuse and others face more than 100.⁷⁰ Elisabeth Jean Wood notes that even in war, there is a large degree of variation in both prevalence and type of sexual violence. For example, sexual violence was widespread in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the war in the former Yugoslavia but limited in Sri Lanka despite the fact that both were secessionist ethnic conflicts.⁷¹

The same phenomenon is observed in UN Peacekeeping Missions- even missions of similar sizes and mandates. This is the case in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). Despite the fact that both missions are nearly equal in size, MINUSCA has nearly ten times the amount of SEA allegations that MINUSMA does, numbering 110 and 12 respectively.

Thus, while the "military masculinity" and "impunity" theories may be useful in understanding SEA by UN Peacekeepers, it does not fully explain the phenomenon. There does not appear to be a reason that military masculinity would have an outsized influence on some missions compared to others, and the UN has the same degree of jurisdiction over all military, police and civilian personnel in all missions. Thus, there must be other explanations for what causes high numbers of SEA allegations in certain peacekeeping missions compared to others.

It is important to note, however, that one aspect of the "impunity" theory may lead to variation in SEA by Peacekeepers: the fact that troop-contributing-countries are largely responsible for punishing their own contingents. If certain troop-contributing-countries have stronger punishment mechanisms in place than others, contingents from these countries may be

⁷⁰ "Data | Conduct in UN Field Missions."

⁷¹ Jean Wood, "Variation in Sexual Violence During War."

deterred from committing acts of SEA. However, there are very few cases of peacekeepers actually being punished by their TCCs for abuses committed during peacekeeping missions. Aside from the few cases I mentioned in the section titled *Lack of Legal Clarity and a High Degree of Impunity*, impunity has been the norm across all TCCs and missions. Thus, due to time constraints, I will not examine the role that impunity from TCCs may play in the mission.

Situational Factors Particular to the Mission

The following section will deal with findings in the literature that are situational to particular missions and thus may contribute to the variance in SEA by peacekeepers.

Troop Contributing Countries

One of the primary causes of variation in SEA by UN Peacekeepers identified in the literature is that of variation in TCCs by mission. Sabrina Karim and Kyle Beardsley conducted an analysis of all UN Peacekeeping Missions active from 2009-2013 and found that missions that have a high representation of TCCs with low levels of gender equality are more likely to have more instances of SEA. To measure gender equality in TCCs, Karim and Beardsley used two indicators. First, they measured the visible presence of women in the TCC society by using female labor force participation and the ratio of boys to girls attending school. Second, to measure the degree to which the government's legal institutions protect women, they used a female physical security index.⁷² The researchers found “strong and consistent support for the argument that contingents from countries with better records of gender equality – especially when defined in terms of visibility – experience lower levels of military SEA allegations.”⁷³ The pair later issued an errata explaining that the female physical security index was calculated

⁷² Karim and Beardsley, “Explaining Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Peacekeeping Missions: The Role of Female Peacekeepers and Gender Equality in Contributing Countries.”

⁷³ Karim and Beardsley, 109.

incorrectly and when it was calculated correctly, it no longer yielded significant results.

However, the findings regarding the visible presence of women in society remained significant and thus the researchers maintained their assertion that TCCs with better records of gender equality produce fewer SEA allegations in peacekeeping missions.⁷⁴

Bonnie Kovatach echoes the argument that contingents comprised of personnel from TCCs with high levels of gender equality are more likely to have lower levels of SEA allegations in UN Peacekeeping Missions. Kovatach used a case study of the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) and the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) to investigate if the TCCs to the missions had any impact on the extremely high numbers of SEA allegations in those missions. She found that in these missions, the TCCs, particularly Pakistan, Morocco, Uruguay, Tunisia, Nepal, and South Africa, had low levels of gender equality and high levels of impunity for sexual violence which likely contributed to the high levels of SEA in the DRC missions.⁷⁵

Female Peacekeepers

There is also evidence that the presence of female peacekeepers may reduce instances of SEA by peacekeepers. Using data from the UN, Karim and Beardsley found that missions with higher proportions of female peacekeepers are likely to have lower levels of SEA allegations- although it is important to note that not all models yielded this result.⁷⁶⁷⁷ The researchers found that “increasing the proportion of women from 0% to 5% in military components reduces the

⁷⁴ Karim and Beardsley, “Errata for Sabrina Karim and Kyle Beardsley (2016): Explaining Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Peacekeeping Missions: The Role of Female Peacekeepers and Gender Equality in Contributing Countries.”

⁷⁵ Kovatach, “Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN Peacekeeping Missions: A Case Study on MONUC and MONUSCO.”

⁷⁶ This finding was not affected by the errata

⁷⁷ Karim and Beardsley, “Explaining Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Peacekeeping Missions: The Role of Female Peacekeepers and Gender Equality in Contributing Countries.”

expected counts of SEA allegations by more than half.”⁷⁸ However, it is important to note that as of 2014, women only constituted 3% of military contingents.⁷⁹ The idea that female peacekeepers may contribute to lower levels of sexual violence is popular among UN officials. In 2003, the UN Secretary-General himself "called for more female peacekeepers to help counter the 'abdominal practice of sexual violence' resulting from armed conflicts."⁸⁰

However, there has been pushback on the idea that female peacekeepers will have a substantial impact on SEA in peacekeeping missions. First, there is the concern that the idea that women will reduce SEA in peacekeeping reinforces the stereotype of women as best-suited to traditionally “feminine roles” like “helping to empower local women.”⁸¹ Additionally, some studies have found that when women are in combat roles, they shape their gender identity and expression to more closely mirror that of hegemonic masculinity and thus they will not serve the protector role that is assumed of them.⁸²

Further, it is often assumed that women will be more comfortable reporting instances of SEA to other women precisely because they are women. In other words: it is assumed that local women will have an easier time connecting with and trusting the female peacekeepers. However, “class, race religion, education, language, ethnicity, national, North/South” are also axes of identity that can affect the ability of peacekeepers to connect with the local population.⁸³ However, rarely does the UN claim that peacekeepers from the same ethnicity or religion as the local population are crucial for ensuring that women are comfortable in reporting SEA. There is

⁷⁸ Karim and Beardsley, 109.

⁷⁹ “Women in Peacekeeping.”

⁸⁰ Karim and Henry, “Gender and Peacekeeping,” 398.

⁸¹ Karim and Henry, 399.

⁸² Duncanson, “Forces for Good? British Military Masculinities on Peace Support Operations.”

⁸³ Karim and Henry, “Gender and Peacekeeping,” 399.

no reason in particular that gender should be the focal point. Still, this remains a popular policy recommendation for improving the issue of SEA by peacekeepers.

UN Empowerment Campaigns

Some evidence suggests that UN empowerment campaigns may play a role in limiting SEA by peacekeepers. Kelly Neudorfer used case studies of UN Missions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia and Israel/Syria to study instances of SEA. She found anecdotal evidence to support the claim that UN SEA awareness campaigns play a role in mitigating the prevalence of SEA. Neudorfer explains that these campaigns work in two dimensions to combat SEA by peacekeepers. First, “if the population is more educated on how to report SEAs, then they will be more likely to report them and, due to deterrence, the numbers of SEAs will decrease.”⁸⁴ Second, awareness campaigns can help to inform the community of their rights, which may include access to food, goods, and services, which are often offered in exchange for sex with peacekeepers. This limits the power that peacekeepers have over the local population.⁸⁵

In coordination with the government of Liberia, the United Nations implemented an awareness campaign regarding SEA in the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). The campaign involved public radio announcements, cartoons relating to SEA, materials distributed to schools and anti-SEA messages in newspapers. Neudorfer found that “the nationwide, concentrated campaign to raise awareness of SEAs and the reporting mechanisms, launched late in 2006 and continuing throughout 2007, coincides with the marked decrease in SEAs between 2006 and 2007.”⁸⁶ She attributes the effectiveness of the campaigns to the fact that they

⁸⁴ Neudorfer, *Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN Peacekeeping: An Analysis of Risk and Prevention Factors*, 135.

⁸⁵ Neudorfer, *Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN Peacekeeping: An Analysis of Risk and Prevention Factors*.

⁸⁶ Neudorfer, 137.

informed the local population of their rights – particularly with respect to food rations – which showed women that they did not need to exchange sex for goods, food, and services.

On the other hand, Neudorfer explains that there were virtually no UN awareness campaigns launched in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Interviews with women in the DRC conducted in 2010 indicated that they did not have any knowledge of the fact that the UN prohibited SEA by peacekeepers. Thus, she explains that in the DRC, “it is implausible that the few programs contributed to the decline in SEA allegations.”⁸⁷

Proximity to the local population

Rational choice theory is a theory used in political science to explain choices made by individuals. The theory asserts that given a set of constrained choices, an actor will weigh the costs and benefits of each choice before taking action. The rational choice theory of crime states that criminals, like other actors, are self-interested and weigh their choices before taking action that best benefits themselves.⁸⁸ Eric Beauregard and Benoît Leclerc expanded upon the rational choice theory of crime by asserting that sex offenders turn to exploitation and abuse because it offers the quickest means of achieving the desired benefit of sexual gratification. The pair also found that a suitable target is a key component to sex offending. Specifically, they found that “offenders were motivated to offend as a result of the chance discovery of an attractive or vulnerable target.”⁸⁹ Thus, when presented with the opportunity to do so, rational sex offenders will choose to offend.⁹⁰ Central to these findings is the role that proximity and opportunity play

⁸⁷ Neudorfer, 122.

⁸⁸ Hug, “Further Twenty Years of Pathologies? Is Rational Choice Better than It Used to Be?”

⁸⁹ Beauregard and Leclerc, “An Application of the Rational Choice Approach to the Offending Process of Sex Offenders: A Closer Look at the Decision-Making,” 127.

⁹⁰ Beauregard and Leclerc, “An Application of the Rational Choice Approach to the Offending Process of Sex Offenders: A Closer Look at the Decision-Making.”

in violent crime. When perpetrators are close to a target this creates the opportunity for crime and thus, it is likely that it will occur.

There has been little research into the role that rational choice theory may play in SEA by UN Peacekeeping personnel. However, Musa Yerro Gassama, the Chief of the Human Rights Division in MINUSCA, used rational choice theory to explain SEA by peacekeepers in the CAR in his study. He found that the routine activities of MINUSCA peacekeepers frequently converged with those of the local populations, which created the opportunity for abuse. This occurred when, for example, local women would go to fetch water and firewood from collection points under the supervision of MINUSCA. Internally displaced persons (IDPs) also relied on peacekeepers for humanitarian assistance, which necessitated contact between the peacekeepers and the local population. The dominant position of the peacekeepers relative to the local population further exacerbated the opportunity for abuse because peacekeepers had the means by which to lure potential targets into exploitative relationships. Additionally, the unequal power dynamics and the high degree of impunity in peacekeeping missions meant that peacekeepers were unlikely to be caught. Central to Gassama's findings and to the rational choice theory of crime is the idea of proximity: because peacekeepers were so proximate to the local populations and in a relative position of power, there was ample opportunity for abuse to occur⁹¹ Similarly, Kelly Neudorfer found that peacekeeping missions in which peacekeepers had frequent and unsupervised interactions with the local populations, SEA was more likely to occur. Simply put, "if the peacekeepers do not come into contact with the locals, then they cannot sexually exploit or abuse them"⁹²

⁹¹ Gassama, "Opportunity and Sex Offending by International Peacekeepers in the Central African Republic."

⁹² Neudorfer, *Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN Peacekeeping: An Analysis of Risk and Prevention Factors*, 147.

There have been several studies that have linked the presence of IDPs to sexual exploitation by those in power. For example, a study done by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre and the Norwegian Refugee Council found that IDPs in Eastern Chad were frequently the victims of sexual violence which was facilitated by their vulnerable position relative to the local population.⁹³ Further, a study by UNHCR and Save the Children UK found that children in refugee camps in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone frequently reported suffering sexual abuse at the hands of humanitarian workers and UN peacekeepers.⁹⁴ Thus, in my study I aim to combine these two findings and examine the role that the proximity of peacekeepers to vulnerable populations, such as IDPs, may have played in producing SEA allegations against MINUSCA.

Factors within the host country

There is also evidence that host-country specific factors play an important role in the prevalence of SEA by peacekeepers. In a study of 36 UN, ECOWAS, AU and NATO peacekeeping missions from 1999-2010, Ragnhild Nordås and Siri C.A. Rustad identify three factors that contribute to high levels of SEA in peacekeeping missions. First, they find that peacekeeping missions employed in host countries that experienced a conflict with high levels of sexual violence are more likely to have a high number of SEA allegations. Second, they find that peacekeeping missions employed in host countries that experienced a conflict with low levels of battlefield deaths are more likely to have a high number of SEA allegations. Finally, they find that peacekeeping missions employed in less developed host countries are more likely to have a high number of SEA allegations.⁹⁵

⁹³ Perez, “National Outrage: Violence against Internally Displaced Women and Girls in Eastern Chad.”

⁹⁴ “Sexual Violence & Exploitation: The Experience of Refugee Children in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone.”

⁹⁵ Nordås and Rustad, “Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by Peacekeepers: Understanding Variation.”

In her case study of MONUC/MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Bonnie Kovatach found that the local culture regarding SEA in the DRC likely played a role in the disproportionately high number of SEA allegations in MONUC and MONUSCO. She points to a “spillover effect”, where SEA committed by combat troops (as was frequently the case in the DRC) causes an increase in sexual violence perpetrated by the civilian population.⁹⁶ One particularly jarring study found that between 2004 and 2008, rape in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo was seventeen times higher than average, which Kovatach attributes to this spillover effect.^{97 98}

Similarly, Kelly Neudorfer found that the local prevalence of SEA likely influenced the levels of allegations of SEA against UN Peacekeepers in the UN Missions in Liberia, The Democratic Republic of the Congo and Syria/Israel. She finds that in both Liberia and the DRC, the prevalence of sexual violence was widespread before the arrival of the UN Peacekeeping Missions, which likely contributed to a high level of SEA by peacekeepers. However, in the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in Israel/Syria, she finds that the levels of sexual violence preceding the arrival of the UN Peacekeeping force low, which likely contributed to the zero SEA allegations levied against the mission.

In the next section of my thesis, I will outline my choice in case selection of Mali and the Central African Republic. I will then briefly explain my hypotheses and methodology, which has largely drawn upon the research from my literature review.

⁹⁶ Kovatach, “Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN Peacekeeping Missions: A Case Study on MONUC and MONUSCO.”

⁹⁷ Bartels, “Now the World Is Without Me: An Investigation of Sexual Violence in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.”

⁹⁸ Kovatach, “Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN Peacekeeping Missions: A Case Study on MONUC and MONUSCO.”

Case Selection

In order to examine the underlying factors that lead to a variation in the level of SEA by UN Peacekeepers, I have chosen to do a comparative analysis of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). The primary reason I have chosen these two cases is that over the same time period, they have a vastly different number of SEA allegations. From 2015-2018, there were 12 total SEA allegations levied against MINUSMA. Over the same time period, there were 110 total SEA allegations levied against MINUSCA.

Further, there are many aspects of control between the two studies. Studies have shown that the largest predictor for levels of SEA is the size of the peacekeeping operation, with larger operations correlating to higher levels of SEA.⁹⁹ However, MINUSMA is actually slightly larger in size than MINUSCA with 15,476 total personnel compared to 14,613 personnel, respectively.¹⁰⁰ ¹⁰¹ The level of development of the host country has also been found to be a significant indicator of SEA, with host countries with lower levels of development being correlated with higher levels of SEA in the mission.¹⁰² Both countries have very similar levels of development. The Human Development Index (HDI) ranks both countries as having “low human development” with Mali ranking 182/188 and the Central African Republic ranking 188/189. Thus, using these two cases allows me to ensure that there is a reasonable amount of control.

⁹⁹ Nordås and Rustad, “Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by Peacekeepers: Understanding Variation.”

¹⁰⁰ “MINUSMA.”

¹⁰¹ “MINUSCA.”

¹⁰² Nordås and Rustad, “Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by Peacekeepers: Understanding Variation.”

This leads to the central question I will be examining in my thesis which is: why did MINUSCA have nearly 10 times the amount of sexual assault allegations as MINUSMA over the same period of time?

Methodology

In my study, I examine three hypotheses. Below, I detail my hypothesis and how I will go about testing each in both cases.

Hypothesis #1: The level of SEA by peacekeepers was higher in MINUSCA because MINUSCA had a higher number of peacekeepers from troop-contributing countries (TCCs) with low levels of gender equality than MINUSMA

In order to test this hypothesis, I first used the Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI) to construct a weighted-mean average for each TCC. This allowed me to determine if, on average, the level of gender equality in MINUSCA was higher than MINUSMA. Then, I examine the legal frameworks and cultural attitudes towards violence against women in the TCCs that comprise 50% of each mission. For this part of the analysis, I relied on the Global Gender Gap Index to determine the visible presence of women in society. I also examined the TCCs laws relating to issues such as domestic violence, marital rape and sexual harassment in the workplace. To determine the cultural attitudes of each TCC, I used national surveys and second-hand literature. Together, these sources painted a picture of gender equality in each TCC. Using this data, I made a prediction regarding the likelihood that each TCC will produce allegations of SEA in their respective missions based on the central assumption in this hypothesis: that countries with higher levels of gender equality produce fewer SEA allegations than those with low levels of gender equality.

In the second part of my analysis, I examined the role that human rights abuses by the national military forces of TCCs in their home countries may have had in producing SEA allegations against the missions. For this analysis, I used data from the US Department of State Country Profiles for the top 10 TCCs to each mission and compared allegations of human rights abuses by a TCCs national military force to the number of allegations levied against that TCC in its respective mission to determine if there was a relationship between the two measures.

Hypothesis #2 The level of SEA by peacekeepers was higher in MINUSCA because MINUSMA better-prioritized gender mainstreaming than in MINUSCA.

I examined gender mainstreaming in three ways. First, by the presence of female peacekeepers in each mission. Second, by the presence of a gender advisor to the mission, and third, by the activities of the Gender Unit. All information regarding these three measures, such as statistics on female peacekeepers, information about gender advisors and information about the activities of the Gender Unit, is readily available on the UN's website.

Hypothesis #3: The level of SEA by peacekeepers was higher in MINUSCA because the peacekeepers in MINUSCA were in closer proximity to large populations of IDPs than the peacekeepers in MINUSMA.

In order to test this hypothesis, I examined the IDP situation in both the CAR and Mali. I examined both the number of IDPs in each country and the distribution of IDPs. For this part of my analysis, I primarily relied on information from the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) and the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR).

I then examined the interactions of the peacekeepers with the IDP population both through the mandate of the mission and anecdotal reports published by agencies such as the Office of

Internal Oversight Services (OSIS) and news outlets. This information will allow me to determine the level of interaction between peacekeepers and IDPs.

Conclusion

There is a wide variety of literature regarding sexual exploitation and abuse by UN Peacekeepers. There exist three dominant camps of theories: first, that military masculinity plays a key role in SEA by peacekeepers. Second, a large degree of impunity and lack of legal clarity regarding the jurisdiction over peacekeepers plays a key role in high levels of SEA by peacekeepers. Third, that situational factors in the mission and/or host country contribute to high levels of SEA by peacekeepers. While the first two camps of theories may be important in understanding the phenomenon of SEA by UN Peacekeepers, they do not account for the fact that there is a large degree of variation in instances of SEA by peacekeepers by mission.

Explanations that point to situational factors in the mission and/or host country do a better job at explaining the variation in SEA allegations across missions. Important situational factors include the presence of female peacekeepers, the composition of troop-contributing countries to the military, police and civilian contingents, UN empowerment campaigns, and factors within the country such as the prevalence of sexual violence and development.

In my thesis, I aim to build upon the existing literature relating to SEA by UN peacekeepers. I plan to do this by examining the factors that contributed to a drastically higher number of sexual assaults in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) compared to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). After reviewing the existing literature, I have identified three possible causes of the variation in SEA allegations: gender equality in troop-contributing countries, the proximity of peacekeepers to IDP

populations and the extent of gender mainstreaming in the mission. I hope that my study can contribute to the larger literature on the causes of SEA in UN Peacekeeping Missions.

Chapter Two: Background

Figure 2.1: Map of Africa



The Conflict in Mali

In 2012, a Tuareg separatist group, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) started a rebellion in Northern Mali. The Tuareg people are an Amazigh, semi-nomadic ethnic group that lives in Northern Mali, as well as other regions of the Sahel and North

Africa.¹⁰³¹⁰⁴ In the early stages of the rebellion, the MNLA garnered support from multiple radical Islamist groups, such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The conflict also brought both arms and foreign fighters from destabilized Libya.¹⁰⁵ ¹⁰⁶

In March 2012, the Malian military responded to the destabilization of the North by overthrowing the President Amadou Toumani Touré, in a coup d'état. The military largely blamed the military losses in Northern Mali on the President.¹⁰⁷ Unsurprisingly, the coup further destabilized the Malian state and by April 2012, the coalition between the Tuaregs, AQIM, and the other Islamic militant groups controlled the vast majority of the North of the country and declared independence.¹⁰⁸

In June 2012, the leaders of the MNLA announced that they would no longer ally with AQIM and the other Islamic militant groups that had helped them win large swaths of territory in the North of the country. A senior leader of the MNLA stated that “The political wing, the executive wing of the MNLA, faced with the intransigence of Ansar Dine [the leader of AQIM] on applying sharia in Azawad and in line with its resolutely secular stance, denounce the accord with this organization and declare all its dispositions null and void.”¹⁰⁹

Following the breakdown of the alliance between the MNLA and AQIM, Islamic militant groups began to seize control of large parts of the North of the country. During this time period, the Islamist groups imposed a harsh interpretation of sharia law in the territory. Women were forced to wear the veil in public at all times, all cigarettes and alcohol were banned, and forced

¹⁰³ “Tuaregs.”

¹⁰⁴ “Destabilization of Mali.”

¹⁰⁵ “Conflict in Mali.”

¹⁰⁶ Nossiter, “Soldiers Overthrow Mali Government.”

¹⁰⁷ Nossiter.

¹⁰⁸ “Destabilization of Mali.”

¹⁰⁹ “UPDATE 1-Mali Tuareg Leaders Call off Islamist Pact.”

marriages were rampant.¹¹⁰ In 2012 and 2013, the conflict generated around 230,000 IDPs and 14,000 refugees.¹¹¹

To assist the Malian government in combating terrorism, France launched Operation Serval in 2013. France was largely driven by fears that the destabilization of the Sahel would bring drug and human trafficking to European countries.¹¹² Serval was largely backed by France's European allies such as the Netherlands, Germany, and Sweden.¹¹³ In 2014, Operation Serval was replaced with Operation Barkhane. The main goal of the latter operation was to establish a more permanent presence in Mali primarily aimed at combating terrorism.¹¹⁴ However, unlike Serval which was primarily concentrated in Mali, Barkhane is aimed at combating terrorism in the entire Sahel region.¹¹⁵ This operation expanded largely due to France's fear that Mali would become a safe-haven for terrorism which could, in turn, lead to attacks in mainland France.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁰ "In Timbuktu, Mali Rebels and Islamists Impose Harsh Rule - The New York Times."

¹¹¹ "Mali | IDMC."

¹¹² Smith, "Inside Mali's Trafficking Underworld."

¹¹³ "Conflict at the EU's Southern Borders."


¹¹⁴ "Au Sahel, l'opération «Barkhane» remplace «Serval»."

¹¹⁵ "France Sets up Anti-Islamist Force."

¹¹⁶ Chibarirwe, "The Future of Europe's Counterterrorism Operations in Africa | TheTrumpet.Com."

MINUSMA

Figure 2.2: Deployment of MINUSMA as of 2018



Source: MINUSMA Mission Website

In early 2013, the UN Security Council approved the deployment of a peacekeeping operation, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in Northern Mali. The mission took over for the French Operation Serval as well and the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA). The mission was approved to be a size of 11,200 military personnel and 1,440 police, although this number has grown over time.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁷ “History.”

The primary mandate of MINUSMA included “supporting the implementation of political and institutional reforms provided by the Agreement — notably to restore and extend State authority and the rule of law throughout the national territory — and supporting defense and security measures, as well as reconciliation and justice measures.”¹¹⁸ Other “priority tasks” have been approved by the Security Council, such as the protection of civilians (POC) against asymmetric threats, the promotion of human rights, the provision of humanitarian assistance and the management of arms.¹¹⁹ In June 2018, the Security Council unanimously approved extending the mandate of MINUSMA an additional year, now with a larger troop size of 13,289 and police force size of 1,920.¹²⁰

The Conflict in the Central African Republic

In 2012, Selka fighters, a coalition of Islamic militant groups, launched an offensive against the Central African government. The group aimed to overthrow the government because they felt that the President at the time, Francois Bozize, did not follow the terms of the 2007 peace agreement that promised rebels jobs and money in return for disarmament.¹²¹ In 2013, the group seized control of the capital, Bangui. Following the Selka’s capture of the capital, the city was rampant with looting and violent crime.¹²²

In response to the aggressions of the Selka fighters, another insurgency group, the anti-balaka, formed in 2013. Anti-balaka roughly translates to "invincible" and many former military members joined the group following the Selka's siege of the capital. After 2013, violence broke out between these two warring factions all over the country. Additionally, because the Selka is

¹¹⁸ “Mandate.”

¹¹⁹ “Mandate.”

¹²⁰ “Mandate.”

¹²¹ “Central African Republic Signs Peace Deal with Rebels.”

¹²² “CAR President Seeks Refuge in Cameroon.”

an Islamist group, the anti-balaka has responded by carrying out targeted attacks on the country's minority Muslim population. A Human Rights Watch report stated:

Whether the anti-balaka leaders are pursuing a deliberate policy of ethnic cleansing or exacting abusive collective punishment against the Muslim population [in response to the Seleka's atrocities], the end result is clear: the disappearance of longstanding Muslim communities¹²³

The conflict has been extremely violent and destabilizing. Since the outbreak of violence in 2013, thousands of deaths have been recorded. Further, one in five Central Africans have been displaced- either internally or by seeking refuge in a neighboring country- since 2013.¹²⁴

In 2013, France deployed a Security Council approved peacekeeping mission, Operation Sangaris, in the CAR to end violence between Christians and Muslims in the country. In 2016, France officially closed Operation Sangaris but left around 300 peacekeepers behind to support the MINUSCA troops. In 2016, the French Defense Minister explained that the country would be pulling out of the CAR, announcing "I am very pleased to note that we are closing the Sangaris operation. We are closing the operation because it has been a success"¹²⁵

In the Spring of 2016, the CAR elected a new President, Faustin Archange Touadera, and implemented a territorial partition which led to a brief halt in Muslim-Christian fighting. However, fighting by warring factions has continued to grow. The UN and several other international agencies such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have claimed that abuses both by the Selka and anti-balaka amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity.¹²⁶

¹²³" Who Are the Anti-Balaka of CAR?"

¹²⁴ "Dozens Killed in Attack on Refugee Base in Central African Republic."

¹²⁵ AfricaNews, "Sangaris Mission in CAR Officially Ends on October 30."

¹²⁶ "Violence in the Central African Republic."

MINUSCA

Figure 2.3: Deployment of MINUSCA as of 2018



Source: MINUSCA Mission Website

In April 2014, the UN Security Council unanimously approved a resolution to deploy a peacekeeping force in the CAR in response to the growing instability in the country. The mission absorbed the African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA). The initial deployment of MINUSCA was set at a maximum of 10,000 military troops and 1,800 police personnel although, as is also the case in MINUSMA, this number has grown since the initial Security Council Resolution.

The mission was established with the mandate of:

protecting civilians; supporting for transition process; facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance; protecting United Nations personnel and properties; promoting and protecting human rights; supporting national and international justice and the rule of law; and ensuring the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and repatriation of former combatants.¹²⁷

In 2019, the Security Council approved the MINUSCA mandate to be further extended.

The military troop deployment was set at 11,650 and the police personnel was set at 1,680.¹²⁸

¹²⁷“Security Council Authorizes United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Central African Republic | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases.”

¹²⁸ “MINUSCA Mandate.”

Chapter Three: The Impact of Troop-Contributing Countries on SEA Allegations

Background

The troop-contributing country hypothesis is among the most commonly cited reasons for the high number of SEA allegations in UN Peacekeeping. The hypothesis claims that UN Peacekeeping Missions should "prioritize the recruitment of individuals with strong values for gender equality. When more individuals believe in gender equality, patriarchal and hyper-masculine norms within the mission may be mitigated."¹²⁹ Because it is difficult to measure the level of commitment to gender equality for individual peacekeepers, studies often examine the level of aggregate gender equality in troop-contributing countries.^{130 131} In this study, I will take the same approach.

Part 1: Cultural attitudes and legal institutions of TCCs

Part 1: The SIGI Index

Methodology

First, I compiled data regarding the troop-contributing countries to each mission. This data was taken from the UN's website and provides the following information broken down by contributing country and by male and female: number of individual police, number of contingent troops, number of formed police units (FPUs) and number of experts on mission.¹³² Using this data, I was able to sort the contributing countries based on total contributions to the mission.

¹²⁹ Karim and Beardsley, "Explaining Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Peacekeeping Missions: The Role of Female Peacekeepers and Gender Equality in Contributing Countries," 104.

¹³⁰ Karim and Beardsley, "Explaining Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Peacekeeping Missions: The Role of Female Peacekeepers and Gender Equality in Contributing Countries."

¹³¹ Kovatach, "Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN Peacekeeping Missions: A Case Study on MONUC and MONUSCO."

¹³² "Troop and Police Contributors."

In order to determine if the troop-contributing countries that constitute MINUSMA had higher levels of gender equality than those that constitute MINUSCA, I conducted three different types of analysis. First, I used a weighted-mean with the SIGI to determine the overall level of gender equality in the mission. To do so, I used the SIGI “restricted physical integrity” index. This index combines measures of violence against women (by evaluating laws on violence against women as well as attitudes towards domestic violence and prevalence of domestic violence), female genital mutilation (FGM) (by evaluating attitudes towards FGM as well as the prevalence of FGM), missing women and reproductive autonomy (by evaluating laws on reproductive autonomy as well as access to family planning). I chose to focus on this particular index because it provides information on gender-based violence (GBV), compared to the other indices which provide information on civil liberties, access to resources and assets and family codes. Because SEA falls under GBV, I found this to be the most appropriate measure.

Due to time restrictions on the study, I chose to focus my analysis on one year. As a result, I focused on TCC’s for 2015. This was primarily because of the 113 allegations of SEA levied against MINUSCA between 2015 and 2018, 51 of these allegations occurred in 2015.¹³³ This is also the year that the difference between the two missions is the starkest: while MINUSCA had 51 allegations of SEA in occur in 2015, MINUSMA had only four. The SIGI Index has data available for 2014 and 2019 and I chose to use the data from 2014 because it is closer to my year of analysis. It is important to note that in 2015, MINUSCA was slightly larger than MINUSMA- with 12,361 total personnel compared to 11,654 personnel, respectively. However, I have already demonstrated that the size of the missions was not the determining

¹³³ “Data | Conduct in UN Field Missions.”

factor in the number of SEA allegations because for most of the time period in this study, MINUSMA was larger than MINUSCA and still had a significantly lower of allegations. Thus, found 2015 to be the best year of analysis due to the extremely high levels of SEA observed in MINUSCA that year.

A weighted mean was used to ensure that the size of the TCC's contributions was considered when determining the overall level of gender equality in the mission. It is important to note that some changes needed to be made to the SIGI Index. First, the SIGI index does not conduct research in Djibouti, so the country had to be excluded from my analysis. However, the country only contributed a total of three personnel to MINUSCA and one person to MINUSMA, so it is unlikely that its SIGI Index would have had a significant impact on the weighted mean. Second, in the cases of the Netherlands, Sweden, Germany, Norway, Denmark, Finland and Switzerland, I used the SIGI Index from 2019 because data was not available for 2014.

Findings

On the surface, it appears that MINUSMA did have more individuals from TCC's with high levels of gender equality. In 2015, MINUSMA was comprised of 16 TCC's that ranked "very low" on the SIGI "restricted physical integrity index", indicating that these countries had very low levels of gender-based violence and little restrictions on reproductive autonomy.¹³⁴ Further, one of these countries, The Netherlands, ranked in the top ten of TCC's for 2015. Comparatively, MINUSCA was comprised of only eight countries which ranked "very low" on the index, and none of these were in the top ten of TCC's.

Throughout the entire mission, MINUSMA has had significant contributions from Western and Northern European countries- in 2017, 10% of the TCC's to MINUSMA were from

¹³⁴ "Information about Variables and Data Sources for the SIGI 2019 |."

European countries, compared to just 2% in MINUSCA. This is likely due to France's continued engagement in the Sahel region as a counter-terrorism tactic. In fact, in 2016, following the Paris terror attacks, Germany pledged to increase its contributions to MINUSMA in order to publicly support its ally, France, and is currently one of the top ten TCC's to the mission.¹³⁵ Additionally, news reports from Sweden and the Netherlands both indicate that supporting France is a primary motivation for sending troops to MINUSMA while government reports from Belgium and Denmark claim that the Sahel, specifically Mali, is a top foreign policy concern.^{136 137 138 139} Further, Norway, Portugal, Denmark, Sweden, and Belgium currently have an agreement in which each country is part of a six-month rotation during which they send a transport aircraft to assist MINUSMA. This further indicates that the mission holds strategic importance in the region.¹⁴⁰ Of the aforementioned countries, only France and Portugal also make significant contributions to MINUSCA.

However, the weighted means of the SIGI indices for the two missions indicates that, despite the strong presence of European troops, MINUSMA does not necessarily have a stronger culture of gender equality than MINUSCA. The weighted SIGI score for MINUSMA was 0.558, while the weighted SIGI score for MINUSCA was 0.484 (this index is measured from 0 to 1-zero indicating low levels of violence against women and 1 indicating high levels of violence against women). This indicates that MINUSMA may not have actually had TCC's coming from countries with higher levels of gender equality than MINUSCA.

¹³⁵ Welle (www.dw.com), "Germany's Bundeswehr Mission in Mali | DW | 30.07.2017."

¹³⁶ "Sweden Proposes Joining UN Peacekeeping Mission in Mali."

¹³⁷ "Dutch to Shift Troop Deployment from Mali to Afghanistan."


¹³⁸ "Belgium Increases Its Support for Peace and Security in Mali."

¹³⁹ "The Danish Effort in Mali."


¹⁴⁰ "The Danish Effort in Mali."

Upon a closer examination, it is clear that while MINUSMA did have more troops from countries with very high levels of gender equality, the mission also featured more TCC's from countries with very high levels of gender *inequality*. Conversely, while MINUSCA did not feature many TCCs from countries with very high levels of gender equality, the mission was not comprised of many TCC's with rampant gender *inequality*. **Graphs 1.1 and 1.2** below demonstrate this point.

Graph 3.1: Gender Equality of TCC's to MINUSMA



Graph 3.2: Gender Equality of TCC's to MINUSCA



These graphs show that while it may be true that MINUSMA was comprised of more TCC's with positive records on gender equality, it is also true that it was comprised of more TCC's with negative records on gender equality. While the expectation in the literature is often that personnel from TCC's with higher levels of gender equality will positively impact the culture towards women in the entire mission, it is highly plausible that personnel from TCC's with low levels of gender equality will do the same. It is impossible to consider the impact that personnel from TCC's with high levels of gender equality had on MINUSMA without also considering the impact that personnel with low levels of TCC's may have had. Thus, it is difficult to tease out the impact that TCC's from countries with high levels of gender equality may have had on the mission.

Legal Frameworks and Culture of Troop Contributing Countries

Methodology:

For this part of my analysis, I examined the legal frameworks and cultures of the top TCC's to each mission. I chose to focus on the TCC's in each mission that together comprised 50% of the mission in 2015. In the case of MINUSMA, these TCC's were Burkina Faso, Bangladesh, Chad, Togo, and Senegal. In the case of MINUSCA, these TCC's were Rwanda, Cameroon, Pakistan, Burundi, Egypt, and Bangladesh.

To analyze the visible presence of women in society, I use the Global Gender Gap Index. I have chosen this index because it provides an effective overall picture of the presence of women in society. This index provides a composite of economic participation and opportunity, educational attainment, health and survival and political empowerment for women.¹⁴¹ Because my year of analysis is 2015, I have decided to collect this data for that year.

To analyze the relevant legal frameworks, I consulted the UN Women Global Database on Violence Against Women and examined any relevant laws or constitutional provisions that occurred before 2015. I chose to mainly focus on domestic violence laws, both because they are often the most accessible and because they provide a strong indication of the importance of combating violence against women in society. I also consulted the World Bank Open Data Portal which records the presence of laws relating to domestic violence in each country.¹⁴² After examining the laws for each country, I used secondary sources to determine the culture of each country surrounding gender-based violence.

In each instance, I hypothesize whether or not troops from the country would be likely to be involved in allegations of SEA by the mission based upon the central assumption in this

¹⁴¹ “The Global Gender Gap Index Results in 2015.”

¹⁴² “The Global Gender Gap Index Results in 2015.”

hypothesis: that the gender equality of the TCCs is important in determining if peacekeepers from that country will be likely to perpetrate SEA in UN Peacekeeping Missions. In the next section, titled *Table of Allegations*, I will return to these hypotheses.

Troop-Contributing-Countries to MINUSMA

Burkina Faso

In 2015, Burkina Faso ranked 114/145 on the Global Gender Gap Index.¹⁴³ Overall, the visible presence of females in the country was determined to be low. For example, the country has only 13% of women in parliament and a female literacy rate of 29% (compared to 43 for males.)¹⁴⁴

Burkina Faso does not have any specific laws addressing domestic violence. However, a 2015 law titled “*Portant Prevention, Repression et Reparation des Violences à l’Egard des Femmes et des Filles et Prise en Charge des Victimes*” was put in place to address violence against women, specifically physical, moral, psychological, sexual, economic, patrimonial and cultural violence.¹⁴⁵ The law features several punishments for any act of violence against women, including forced marriage, sexual harassment, psychological violence, and rape. For example, any instance of forced marriage is punishable by a fine of up to 1,000,000 CFA Francs. Any instance of sexual harassment of a repeated nature is punishable by up to three months' imprisonment and a fine of up to 500,000 CFA Franc while any instance of rape is punishable by up to ten years in prison.¹⁴⁶ Thus, despite the fact that domestic violence is not specifically addressed in the legal code, there are strong laws in place to combat violence against women.

¹⁴³ “The Global Gender Gap Index Results in 2015.”

¹⁴⁴ “Economies.”

¹⁴⁵ *Portant Prevention, Repression et Reparation des Violences a l’Egard des Femmes et des Filles et Prise en Charge des Victimes.*

¹⁴⁶ *Portant Prevention, Repression et Reparation des Violences a l’Egard des Femmes et des Filles et Prise en Charge des Victimes.*

However, there is a large disconnect between the legal frameworks and the reality experienced by many women. Marion Pomper et. al explain that despite the fact that laws addressing GBV in Burkina Faso are stronger than those in most other sub-Saharan African countries, "a gap remains between law and reality, the latter being more controlled by customs, religious rules and social relations, often to the detriment of women. Laws are restricted and often perceived by the population as non-legitimate."¹⁴⁷ Sexual relations between men and women are strongly patriarchal; it is expected that men initiate sexual contact and that women always accept their husband's sexual advances. Further, there is a strong acceptance of wife-beating which shows the strength of gender norms in the country.¹⁴⁸

A study conducted by the National Institute of Statistics and Demographics revealed that 44% of Burkinabe women believe that a man has the right to hit his wife or partner. Conversely, 34% of men believe the same. Further, 11% of women claim to have been the victims of domestic violence, with only 1.5% claiming to have suffered from sexual violence at the hands of their partner.¹⁴⁹ Comparatively, domestic violence is lower in Burkina Faso than in any other country in the sample. However, the high numbers of both women and men who view wife beating as an acceptable practice indicate that these statistics may not be accurate as the definition of domestic violence may vary. For example, a retrospective study of violence against girls in Burkina Faso found that 81% of girls reported being spoken to in a sexual manner during adolescence. Additionally, 52% of respondents reported being touched in an inappropriate manner while 40% reported having experienced rape. Of the five countries in the study (Burkina

¹⁴⁷ Pomper et al., "Women's View on Sexual Intercourse and Physical Abuse. Results from a Cross-Sectional Survey in Villages Surrounding Bobo-Dioulasso, Burkina Faso."

¹⁴⁸ Pomper et al.

¹⁴⁹ Monsieur Ahmed Lahlimi Alami, "Enquête Nationale Sur La Prévalence de La Violence à l'égard Des Femmes."

Faso, Nigeria, Senegal, Cameroon and the Democratic Republic of the Congo), respondents from Burkina Faso reported sexual abuse at the highest frequency across the board.¹⁵⁰

The visible presence of females in Burkinabe society is low. Although the laws in Burkina Faso regarding GBV are strong, it does not appear that the laws have yet taken hold in the culture. Thus, I would hypothesize that troops from Burkina Faso would be likely to commit instances of SEA in MINUSMA.

Bangladesh

In 2015, Bangladesh ranked 64/145 countries on the Global Gender Gap Index. This is significantly higher than Burkina Faso, although it is not the highest in this study (both Rwanda and Burundi rank higher). The country had a mixed performance regarding the visible presence of females in society. For example, while more females than males are enrolled in secondary education (51% compared to 44%) and 22 of the last 28 years featured female heads of state, the rate of female participation in the labor force is 27 points lower than the percentage for men, (60 percent compared to 87 percent).¹⁵¹

Unlike some other countries in this study, such as Chad and Burkina Faso, Bangladesh has specific domestic violence legislation. As a signatory to the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Violence Against Women Act and the Convention on the Rights of the Child Act, Bangladesh specifically outlaws domestic violence and provides legal punishments for perpetrators. The definition of domestic violence, in this case, is broad: it is defined as any "physical abuse, psychological abuse, sexual abuse or economic abuse against a woman or a child of a family by any other person of that family with whom the victim is, or has

¹⁵⁰ "Childhood Scars in Africa: A Retrospective Study on Violence Against Girls in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria and Senegal."

¹⁵¹ "Economies."

been, in a family relationship."¹⁵² Under the law, women are entitled to a protection order from their abuser, custody of the child and compensation for any experienced harm. If a protection order is breached, the perpetrator can be punished by up to six months in prison¹⁵³ and/or payment of ten thousand takas or about 120 USD. Bangladeshi law also prohibits sexual harassment in the workplace but does not provide any legal repercussions for perpetrators of sexual harassment.¹⁵⁴

While there exist strong laws in Bangladesh regarding domestic violence, it is important to note that the punishment for a false accusation of domestic violence is actually stronger than for breaching a protection order issued to an abuser in response to a substantiated domestic violence claim. While perpetrators risk a maximum of six months of imprisonment for breaching a protection order, a woman may risk a maximum of one-year imprisonment if a judge determines that her claim of domestic violence is false.¹⁵⁵ Research indicates that 72% of Bangladeshi women have experienced some form of violence from their husband at least once.¹⁵⁶ There are no publicly available statistics regarding the prevalence of false domestic violence claims, however, the fact that the judges may punish false accusations of domestic violence more harshly than domestic violence itself may act as a deterrence for women to report.

Compared to other countries in this sample, such as Chad, Cameroon and Burkina Faso, Bangladesh has a relatively strong presence of women in society. Despite the country's strong laws on violence against women, it does seem that GBV is widespread and culturally acceptable.

¹⁵² Government of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh, Ministry of Women and Children Affairs, English Version of the Domestic Violence (Prevention and Protection) Act.

¹⁵³ Government of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh, Ministry of Women and Children Affairs, English Version of the Domestic Violence (Prevention and Protection) Act.

¹⁵⁴ "Women, Business and the Law 2019: A Decade of Reform."

¹⁵⁵ Government of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh, Ministry of Women and Children Affairs.

¹⁵⁶ Sadar Hoque, "Report on Violence Against Women (VAW) Survey 2015."

It is thus difficult to clearly determine if troops from Bangladesh would be likely to be perpetrators of SEA in MINUSMA.

Chad

In 2015, Chad ranked 142/145 countries on the Global Gender Gap Index. This was lower than every country in this sample with the exception of Pakistan. Overall, the visible presence of women in society was very low. For example, the country featured only 15% of women in parliament and had a large gap in the rate of female participation in the labor force (65% compared to 79%).¹⁵⁷ The data from the World Bank claims that Chad does not have any legislation regarding domestic violence.¹⁵⁸ While, an act implemented in 2002 does prohibit domestic violence and sexual abuse, it does not provide punishments for perpetrators.¹⁵⁹ Here, it is important to note that the World Bank does not consider a country to have domestic violence legislation if the law does not provide sanctions.¹⁶⁰ Thus, Chad effectively does not have a law prohibiting domestic violence.

Further, on the UN Database on Violence Against Women, I did not find many laws specifically designed to protect women from GBV. The few laws seemingly aimed at protecting women from GBV are as follows: Article 20 of the Constitution outlaws slavery, Article 18 of the Constitution outlaws cruelty and humiliating treatment, female genital mutilation, and early marriage are prohibited by a 2002 law and child marriage (below the age of 13) is outlawed.¹⁶¹ However, these laws are fairly commonplace among the other countries in this sample and constitute the bare minimum.

¹⁵⁷ “Global Gender Gap Index Chad 2015.”

¹⁵⁸ “Women, Business and the Law 2019: A Decade of Reform.”

¹⁵⁹ Loi Portant Promotion de la Santé de Reproduction.

¹⁶⁰ “Methodology.”

¹⁶¹ “Chad.”

This institutional failure to protect women has a real impact on the lives of Chadian women. Chadian culture is strongly patriarchal. A UN Special Report on Human Rights in Chad estimated that about 30% of women were forced into marriage.¹⁶² Nearly 35% of non-single women have reported being the victim of physical, psychological or sexual violence in their lifetime.¹⁶³ However, this number is almost certainly higher because, in the country, women rarely report rape "primarily because of fear of stigma, including from their own family members, and also because of trauma."¹⁶⁴ As a result, "the perpetrators of rape and other violence against women and girls enjoy near total impunity."¹⁶⁵

Further, the SEA of refugees in Chad remains a large issue. Chad is the host to 280,000 Sudanese Refugees as well as 72,000 Central Africans. From 2007 to 2009, IDPs in refugee camps in Chad frequently were targets of sexual violence when leaving IDP camps to collect firewood. Often, the perpetrators of this sexual violence were the Chadian army. A report from the Norwegian Refugee Council explains of the perpetrators of this violence that "not all of these groups used rape as a weapon of war, but all were taking advantage of the prevailing impunity."¹⁶⁶ The report goes on to explain that in Chad,

the government's most egregious abrogation of its responsibility has been its failure to investigate allegations of sexual violence by members of state security forces and prosecute and punish those responsible, and its unwillingness to provide security in areas of displacement and much needed services for survivors of sexual violence.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶² Kahl, "Revisiting Gender Equality in Millennium Development Goal 3: Establishing Education for Women as a Human Right."

¹⁶³ La Masson et al., "Les Violences Contre Les Femmes et Les Filles et La Résilience."

¹⁶⁴ Moszynski, "Darfuri Refugees in Chad Have No Escape from Sexual Violence."

¹⁶⁵ Moszynski, 1.

¹⁶⁶ "National Outrage: Violence against Internally Displaced Women and Girls in Eastern Chad," 6.

¹⁶⁷ Perez, "National Outrage: Violence against Internally Displaced Women and Girls in Eastern Chad," 7.

Overall, the level of gender equality in Chad is extremely low. Due to the lack of laws aimed at protecting violence against women, and the prevalence of sexual violence in Chadian society, it is hypothesized that troops from Chad would be likely to be perpetrators of SEA in MINUSMA.

Togo

The Global Gender Gap Index did not include Togo in its analyses until 2018. Thus, I have decided to use the index from 2018 in lieu of that from 2015. In 2018, Togo ranked 134/149 countries included in the Global Gender Gap Index. Compared to other countries in this study, such as Bangladesh, Rwanda and Burundi, this ranking is low. Overall, the country did not have a strong visible presence of women. For example, the country features only 17% of women in parliament and has a female literacy rate of 51.2% (compared to 77.3% for men).¹⁶⁸ Togo is one of the few countries in this sample that does not have any specific law sanctioning domestic violence. The country has been working on a preliminary law to address rape, domestic violence, and sexual harassment as separate offenses since 2012, however, this law has yet to be implemented.¹⁶⁹ Rape is criminalized in the country but the law does not specifically address spousal rape.¹⁷⁰ Despite this, there are a plethora of laws aimed at providing protection for women against violence. For example, rape is punishable by up to five years in prison and sexual harassment in the workplace is outlawed.¹⁷¹

Despite concerted efforts to enforce laws to protect women, Togolese society remains largely patriarchal. Domestic violence is widespread and accepted. In 2010, a study conducted by UNICEF found that 43% of Togolese women believe that a man has the right to hit a woman

¹⁶⁸ “Global Gender Gap Report Togo 2018.”

¹⁶⁹ “Information about Variables and Data Sources for the SIGI 2019 |.”

¹⁷⁰ “Togo 2014 Human Rights Report.”

¹⁷¹ “Togo.”

in certain situations. This statistics is on par with many of the other countries in this study. For example, 44% of Rwandan women believe the same. This belief was higher both among women who in rural communities and who are uneducated.¹⁷² These numbers are particularly significant because in 2010, 62% of the country lived in rural areas and only 49.73% of women were literate.¹⁷³

A report released by the U.S. Department of State in 2014 stated that “although neither the government nor any other group compiled statistics on rape or rape arrests, some observers claimed rape was a widespread problem throughout the country.”¹⁷⁴ Further, the report alleges that while police in the country were often persistent in their investigations of rape reports, it is uncommon for victims of rape to report due to a widespread stigma attached to being raped. The report also claims that “police generally did not intervene in abusive situations, and many women were not aware of the formal judicial mechanisms designed to protect them.”¹⁷⁵

Women do not have a strong visible presence in Togolese society. Further, given the prevalence of GBV in Togolese society as well as the weak legal system in place to combat GBV, it is hypothesized that troops from Togo would be likely to be perpetrators of SEA in MINUSMA.

Senegal

In 2015, Senegal ranked 72/145 countries on the Global Gender Gap Index. This was higher than most countries in the study, with the exception of Rwanda, Burundi and Bangladesh. Like Bangladesh, the country had a mixed performance relating to the visible presence of women

¹⁷² Response of the Government of Togo to the Questionnaire on the Global Database on Violence Against Women 2017.

¹⁷³ Response of the Government of Togo to the Questionnaire on the Global Database on Violence Against Women 2017.

¹⁷⁴ “Togo 2014 Human Rights Report,” 11.

¹⁷⁵ “Togo 2014 Human Rights Report,” 11.

in society. For example, more girls than boys are enrolled in primary education (77% compared to 70%) and the country's parliament is composed of 43% women¹⁷⁶ However, the percentage of females in the labor force is significantly below that of males (67% compared to 90%) and the female literacy rate lags that of the male literacy rate (47% compared to 70%).¹⁷⁷

Domestic violence is illegal in Senegal and is punishable by up to five years in prison, with a sentence that increases to twenty if the abuse causes lasting damage.¹⁷⁸ The law also prohibits sexual harassment, which is punishable by three to five years in prison and a fine of 50,000 to 500,000 CFA Francs. Rape is punishable by a prison sentence of five to ten years. However, a report by the US Department of State explains that "the government rarely enforced the law and rape was widespread. The law does not address spousal rape. The law allows the common practice of using a woman's sexual history to defend men accused of rape."¹⁷⁹ This latter claim shows that while the law may appear to protect women on a surface level, in reality, women continue to experience a disproportionately unfair legal system in addressing abuse.

Attitudes towards domestic violence in Senegal are highly patriarchal. A national study found that 60% of women believe that there are some grounds upon which it is acceptable for a man to beat a woman for one of the following reasons: burning the food, arguing with him, going out without telling him, neglecting the children and refusing to have sexual intercourse with him. Interestingly, men are less likely than women to believe that domestic violence is justifiable, with only 25% of men surveyed approving the practice.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁶ "Global Gender Gap Index Senegal 2015."

¹⁷⁷ "Global Gender Gap Index Senegal 2015."

¹⁷⁸ "Global Gender Gap Index Senegal 2015."

¹⁷⁹ "Senegal 2014 Human Rights Report," 4.

¹⁸⁰ "Global Gender Gap Index Senegal 2015."

Compared to other countries in this study, Senegal had a relatively high visible presence of females in society. It also had relatively strong laws to address GBV. However, it appears that cultural attitudes regarding the status of women remain highly patriarchal. Thus, as was the case with Bangladesh, it is difficult to use the troop-contributing country hypothesis to determine the likelihood that troops from Bangladesh would be perpetrators of SEA in MINUSMA.

Table 3.1: *Summary of Results for MINUSMA*

Country	Likelihood of perpetrating SEA in MINUSMA
Burkina Faso	High
Bangladesh	Inconclusive
Chad	High
Togo	High
Senegal	Inconclusive

Troop-Contributing Countries to MINUSCA

Rwanda

In 2015, Rwanda ranked 6/145 countries on the Global Gender Gap Index. This was the highest of any country in this sample. The country had a very strong visible presence of women in society. For example, the country had the highest percentage of women in parliament in the world.¹⁸¹ Further, it had a nearly equal labor force participation rate for women and men (88% compared to 86%) and a nearly equal enrollment rate in primary education for girls and boys (95% compared to 92%).¹⁸²

Rwanda also has robust laws aimed at preventing GBV. For example, in 2009, Rwanda implemented a law specifically aimed at addressing GBV. This law outlawed domestic violence

¹⁸¹ “Which Countries Have the Most Women in Parliament?”

¹⁸² “Global Gender Gap Index Rwanda 2015.”

and prohibited harassing one's spouse with a punishment of six months to two years. It also outlaws marital rape, providing a punishment of six months to two years. Sexual harassment in the workplace is also prohibited and punished by two to five years in prison and a fine ranging between 100,000 Rwandan francs and 200,000 Rwandan francs.¹⁸³

Similar to many other countries in this study, 44% of Rwandan women believe there are instances in which a man is justified in beating his wife. Additionally, 35% of women report having experienced sexual violence at some point during their lives. This number is likely so high due to the large-mass systemic rape that occurred during the Rwandan genocide.¹⁸⁴

However, the country has made significant strides in recent years in the realm of GBV. A report from the World Bank noted that "the country is known to be a pacesetter in the fight against this epidemic [GBV]. Innovative national strategies and policies have been initiated by the government to eliminate GBV and promote gender equality at all levels."¹⁸⁵ For example, the government has been working closely with religious and community leaders to help combat cultural stigmas that discourage survivors of abuse from reporting. Additionally, the government has opened comprehensive health centers around the country that are aimed at supporting victims of GBV. These health centers include medical, psychological and legal services.¹⁸⁶

The presence of women in Rwandan society is stronger than in any other country in this sample. Additionally, Rwanda has strong legal protections to protect women from GBV. Unlike most other countries in the study, the government appears to have a deep commitment to ensuring that the laws are not just empty promises and has developed innovative strategies to

¹⁸³ Law on Prevention and Punishment of Gender-Based Violence.

¹⁸⁴ "Rwanda: Demographic and Health Survey."

¹⁸⁵ Therese, "Gender-Based Violence in Rwanda."

¹⁸⁶ Therese, "Gender-Based Violence in Rwanda."

combat GBV in the country. Thus, I would conclude that peacekeepers from Rwanda would not be likely to perpetrate SEA in MINUSCA.

Cameroon

In 2015, Cameroon ranked 90/145 countries on the Global Gender Gap Index. The visible presence of women in Cameroonian society was better than in some other countries in the study, such as Chad and Togo, but was overall low. For example, the percentage of women in parliament was 31% (compared to 69% for men) and the labor force participation rate for women and men was 65% and 77%, respectively.¹⁸⁷ The only measure on which women performed close or equal to men in Cameroon was in health life expectancy (age 49 for women and age 48 for men).¹⁸⁸ Further, a demographic survey of Cameroonian society conducted in 2011 found that 60% of women stated that they did not have control over decisions relating to their own health.¹⁸⁹ This statistic points to the lack of agency that women have in Cameroon.

There are no laws that exist in Cameroon relating to domestic violence. In fact, there are a limited amount of laws overall aimed at protecting women from domestic violence. While the Penal Code prohibits rape and provides a punishment from five to ten years, Section 297 of the Penal Code "prevents the prosecution of rape when marriage is freely consented to by the parties involved."¹⁹⁰ This type of law commonly referred to as a "marry your rapist law" is highly discriminatory towards women. An article in the New York Times covering the repeal of such laws in the Middle East explained that "the laws were built around patriarchal attitudes that link a family's honor directly to a woman's chastity; the marriage option is aimed at shielding the

¹⁸⁷ "Global Gender Gap Index Cameroon 2015."

¹⁸⁸ "Global Gender Gap Index Cameroon 2015."

¹⁸⁹ Monsieur Ahmed Lahlimi Alami, "Enquête Nationale Sur La Prévalence de La Violence à l'égard Des Femmes."

¹⁹⁰ "Cameroon: Domestic Violence, Including Legislation, Availability of State Protection and Support Services for Victims," 2.

victim's family from the 'scandal'.¹⁹¹ Further, there are no stipulations in the law regarding sexual harassment.¹⁹²

A report by the US Department of State indicated that women's rights in the country were heavily restricted. The report stated that

“the law allows a husband to deny his wife the ability to work outside the home, and a husband may also end his wife's ability to engage in commercial activity by notifying the clerk of the commerce tribunal. Customary law imposes further strictures on women since in many regions a woman is regarded as the property of her husband. Because of custom and tradition, civil laws protecting women often were not respected.”¹⁹³

The report also stated that impunity was the norm in rape cases. Further, 30% of women reported having been a victim of sexual abuse before the age of 13.¹⁹⁴ Like multiple other countries in this study, around half of women reported that it was sometimes acceptable for a man to beat his wife.¹⁹⁵

Female's in Cameroonian society occupy a low social status and there is not a strong presence of women in Cameroonian society. Further, not only does Cameroon does lack strong laws aimed at protecting it's female population, but it has laws that directly put them in harm's way, such as the marry-your-rapist law. For this reason, I would predict that troops from Cameroon would be likely to be perpetrators of SEA in MINUSCA.

Pakistan

In 2015, Pakistan ranked 144/145 countries on the Global Gender Gap Index. Only Yemen was ranked below the country. The labor force participation rate of females significantly

¹⁹¹ Sengupta, “One by One, Marry-Your-Rapist Laws Are Falling in the Middle East.”

¹⁹² “Cameroon 2014 Human Rights Report.”

¹⁹³ “Cameroon 2014 Human Rights Report,” 6.

¹⁹⁴ “Cameroon 2014 Human Rights Report.”

¹⁹⁵ Monsieur Ahmed Lahlimi Alami, “Enquête Nationale Sur La Prévalence de La Violence à l'égard Des Femmes.”

lagged that of males (26% compared to 86%). Further, only 21% of parliament was comprised of females and the literacy rate of females was significantly lower than that of males (46% compared to 70%).¹⁹⁶

Domestic violence is illegal in Pakistan and punishable by a sentence of a minimum of six months. A 2010 law requires all organizations to have an “Inquiry Committee” to investigate allegations of sexual harassment in the workplace.¹⁹⁷ Compared to other countries in this study, this is a strong and proactive policy aimed at combatting domestic violence. Rape is also illegal and carries with it the harsh punishment of death or imprisonment for a period between 10 and 20 years. However, women may be dissuaded from reporting rape cases as if the court finds the accused innocent, the woman's complaint can be used as a confession of Zina (sex outside of marriage). Zina is illegal in Pakistan and carries a punishment of public lashes and a fine.¹⁹⁸

A study of violence against women in Pakistan claimed that “high profile cases and the staggering statistics of violence against women present a bleak picture for women.”¹⁹⁹ The study found that while fidelity and chastity are viewed as extremely important qualities for women, the same expectations are not extended to men. Further, the study found gender-based violence to be pervasive throughout Pakistani society, with estimates that between 80% and 90% of Pakistani households have experienced GBV. Despite this, the study found that “in Pakistan, the cases of violence against women are frequent and go unpunished. Pakistan’s police officers are known to exploit and rape victims of violence in their custody. Furthermore, women also face illegal detention and torture in police stations so women victims of violence hesitate to go to

¹⁹⁶ “Global Gender Gap Index Pakistan 2015.”

¹⁹⁷ The Protection Against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act 2010.

¹⁹⁸ Tarar and Safdar, “Violence against Women in Pakistan: Prevalence, Legislation, Interventions & Realities.”

¹⁹⁹ Tarar and Safdar, “Violence against Women in Pakistan: Prevalence, Legislation, Interventions & Realities.”

all male police stations.”²⁰⁰ This is consistent with other studies that have found that 43% of women believe that domestic violence is justified under certain circumstances.²⁰¹

Overall, women do not have a strong visible presence in Pakistani society. Further, while laws exist to protect women it appears that a patriarchal and oppressive culture prevails. Thus, I predict it would be likely that troops from Pakistan would be likely to be perpetrators of SEA in MINUSCA.

Burundi

In 2015, Burundi ranked 23 out of 149 countries on the Global Gender Gap Index. The labor force participation rate of females was higher than that of men, at 81.5% and 77.9%, respectively. Additionally, females were enrolled in primary, secondary and tertiary education at similar rates to men. Additionally, while the average percent of women in parliament globally is 24.3%, in Burundi the percent of women in parliament was 36.4%.²⁰² In addition to the strong visible presence of women in Burundian society, laws protecting violence against women in Burundi are strong. The Burundian constitution stipulates that men and women are viewed as equal before the law and outlaws any gender-based discrimination. Sexual harassment in the workplace is similarly illegal in the country.²⁰³ Domestic violence is outlawed in Burundi as is spousal rape.²⁰⁴

However, it appears that despite strong legal protections against GBV, violence against women remains prevalent. Unlike most of the other countries in this survey, which have conducted nationwide studies that explore the topic of GBV, no national study of GBV has been

²⁰⁰ Tarar and Safdar, 67.

²⁰¹ “Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey.”

²⁰² “Global Gender Gap Index Burundi 2015.”

²⁰³ “Women, Business and the Law: Starting a Job.”

²⁰⁴ “Burundi Country Profile.”

conducted in Burundi and thus, there are limited statistics available on the topics of domestic violence, rape, and sexual assault. Additionally, because of the Burundian genocide and the recent political instability in the country, most studies of GBV have focused on mass-rape and other forms of systemic violence as opposed to intimate partner violence, which has so far been the focus of this study. However, anecdotal reports seem to indicate that domestic violence is a serious problem in the country. In 2015, Freedom House reported that in Burundi, "Sexual and domestic violence are serious problems but are rarely reported to law enforcement agencies."²⁰⁵ A report from the African Development Bank Group estimated that 50% of women in Burundi experience domestic violence. The report continued that the actual statistic may be even higher because there is a lack of reporting regarding the issue. A separate report from the US Department of State explained that while domestic violence and other forms of intimate partner violence such as spousal rape were believed to be widespread in Burundi, they are often severely underreported due to a strong cultural stigma that blames victims and discourages women to report abuse.²⁰⁶

Overall, the visible status of women in Burundian society is high. However, it appears that GBV is prevalent throughout society. Thus, as was the case with Bangladesh and Senegal, I am not able to concurrently conclude if troops from Burundi would be likely to commit SEA in MINUSCA.

Egypt

In 2015, Egypt ranked 136/145 countries on the Global Gender Gap Index. Overall, women do not have a strong visible presence in Egyptian society. The labor force participation rate for females is significantly behind that of males (26% compared to 79%) and in 2012 (the

²⁰⁵ "Freedom in the World 2015: Burundi."

²⁰⁶ "Burundi: Protection and Resources for Women Victims of Spousal Abuse (2010-June 2013)."

last time the World Bank recorded this measure for Egypt) only 2% of seats in parliament were held by women.²⁰⁷

While most countries in this sample at least had implemented laws outlawing domestic violence by 2015, Egypt had not. The law also does not sanction marital rape or sexual harassment in the workplace. Despite the fact that rape is outlawed in the country, a report by the US Department of State claimed that:

“Civil society organizations reported police pressure not to pursue charges and fear of societal reprisal actively discouraged women from going to police stations to report crimes, resulting in a very small number of cases being investigated or effectively prosecuted. NGOs estimated the prevalence of rape was several times higher than the rate reported by the government”²⁰⁸

Acceptance of wife-beating was somewhat lower than most other countries in the sample, with only 36% of female respondents agreeing that there are grounds upon which it is acceptable for a husband to beat his wife.²⁰⁹ However, it is unclear how reliable this data is as the US Department of State reported that 45% of Egyptian women were victims of domestic violence. Further, while there is no law specifically outlawing domestic violence, it may be possible for women to bring forth cases of domestic violence under the general premise of assault. However, to do so, women need to produce four eye-witnesses-- an extremely difficult task for abuse that primarily occurs within the home.²¹⁰

Overall, the status of women in Egyptian society is extremely low. Women do not have a strong visible presence in society, laws are not crafted to protect women and GBV appears to be

²⁰⁷ “Global Gender Gap Index Egypt 2015.”

²⁰⁸ “Egypt 2014 Human Rights Report.”

²⁰⁹ “Egypt Demographic and Health Survey 2014.”

²¹⁰ “Egypt 2014 Human Rights Report.”

prevalent. Thus, I predict that troops from Egypt would be likely to perpetrate SEA in MINUSCA.

Bangladesh

One can find the prior analysis used for Bangladesh, listed under the subheading “Troop Contributing Countries to MINUSMA.”

Table 3.2: *Summary of Results for MINUSCA*

Country	Likelihood of perpetrating SEA in MINUSMA
Rwanda	Low
Cameroon	High
Pakistan	High
Burundi	Inconclusive
Egypt	High
Bangladesh	Inconclusive

Table of Allegations

In this section, I will apply the hypotheses above to the actual outcome regarding SEA in each mission. The troop-contributing country hypothesis claims that troops from countries with lower levels of gender equality may be more likely to perpetrate SEA in UN Peacekeeping Missions. Thus, for a country such as Chad, which has overall very low levels of gender equality, I hypothesized that Chadian troops would be likely to perpetrate SEA in MINUSMA. In this part of the analysis, I will apply this hypothesis to the actual recorded cases of SEA in both MINUSMA and MINUSCA. I will do this for each country. The results are recorded in the table below.

Table 3.3: Troop Contributing Countries to MINUSMA and SEA Allegations

Country	Likelihood of perpetrating SEA in MINUSMA	Actual number of allegations levied against the country in MINUSMA
Burkina Faso	High	1
Bangladesh	Inconclusive	0
Chad	High	2
Togo	High	0
Senegal	Inconclusive	0

Table 3.4: Troop Contributing Countries to MINUSCA and SEA Allegations

Country	Likelihood of perpetrating SEA in MINUSCA	Actual number of allegations levied against the country in MINUSCA
Rwanda	Low	0
Cameroon	High	16
Pakistan	High	2
Burundi	Inconclusive	11
Egypt	High	1
Bangladesh	High	1

The above tables demonstrate that there is no clear and distinct relationship between the level of gender equality in a country and the number of allegations levied against troops from that country in UN Peacekeeping Missions. For example, I found both Chad and Cameroon to have extremely low levels of gender equality. In fact, Chad ranked significantly below Cameroon on the Global Gender Gap Index (142 compared to 90). Both countries had weak laws aimed at protecting woman and a patriarchal society that perpetuates GBV. The two

countries also had similar contributions to their respective missions (Chad contributed 1,142 total personnel to MINUSMA in 2015 while Cameroon contributed 1,262 total personnel to MINUSCA in 2015). Despite the high level of control between the two cases, troops from Cameroon were involved in 16 different cases of SEA in MINUSCA while troops from Chad were only involved in two cases of SEA in MINUSCA. If the troop-contributing hypothesis was strong in explaining the variation of levels in SEA between MINUSCA and MINUSMA, we would not expect to see such a large variation between the two cases.

In fact, moving beyond the two cases of MINUSMA and MINUSCA, we see there is a relatively weak correlation between the gender equality of a TCC and the number of allegations levied against that country in any mission. For example, the country with the most allegations of SEA in any mission is South Africa with 29. This is despite the fact that South Africa ranked 17/145 countries on the Global Gender Gap Index in 2015. Further, countries with low levels of gender equality, such as Pakistan, had very low numbers of SEA allegations levied against them in any mission. This is despite the fact that Pakistan ranks 6th in overall contributions to peacekeeping missions.²¹¹

The example of the French peacekeeping operation in the Central African Republic, Operation Sangaris, also acts as a counterpoint to the troop-contributing country hypothesis. In 2013, the UN Security Council authorized a French military intervention in the Central African Republic.²¹² This mission was marred by accusations of sexual assault. In a report leaked by a UN humanitarian worker, the French troops were accused of perpetrating SEA throughout the CAR. These abuses were particularly egregious and included instances of forced bestiality with

²¹¹ “Troop and Police Contributors.”

²¹² “Le Conseil de Sécurité Autorise Une Intervention Militaire de La France En République Centrafricaine.”

children.²¹³ Although the number of allegations levied against the Sangaris forces have not yet been publicized, the initial UN report included four allegations. A study by *Zero Impunity* states that:

“Since April 2015, when the Guardian first made public a UN internal report detailing accusations that French soldiers had abused four children (which the victims said took the form of a trade of money or food for oral sex), the list of complaints has only grown. The Paris prosecutor’s office doesn’t want to “make a formal declaration” of the number of accusations, preferring to “think in terms of the number of investigations closed, and not to forecast”

After the first wave of accusations from children in the Mpoko IDP camp in Bangui, the judicial system received (in 2016) a report from UNICEF documenting about a hundred rapes committed in the Dékoa region, in the center of the country. The report focused primarily on abuse allegedly carried out by UN peacekeepers from Gabon and Burundi, but also mentioned French forces”²¹⁴

The allegations of SEA against Sangaris provide an interesting counter-argument the troop-contributing country hypothesis. Few would disagree that France is a country with relatively high levels of gender equality. In 2016, the year that allegations were first levied against Sangaris, France ranked 14/144 countries on the Global Gender Gap Index, which is higher than every country in this sample with the exception of Rwanda.²¹⁵ Yet, the mission was embroiled in allegations of SEA.

Part 2: Abuses by military forces

By and large, the research relating to the TCC hypothesis focuses on the cultural attitudes in the TCCs. For example, Karim and Beardsley found a positive relationship between the low visible presence of women in the society of a TCC and a high number of SEA allegations levied against that TCC.^{216 217} Similarly, Mattsson found a positive correlation between TCCs with

²¹³ Avenue, York, and t 1.212.290.4700, “Central African Republic.”

²¹⁴ “ZERO IMPUNITY - THE DNA OF SANGARIS.”

²¹⁵ “Global Gender Gap Index France 2016.”

²¹⁶ Note: this finding stands despite the erata

²¹⁷ Karim and Beardsley, “Explaining Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Peacekeeping Missions: The Role of Female Peacekeepers and Gender Equality in Contributing Countries.”

oppressive and patriarchal cultural attitudes and a high number of allegations against the TCC.²¹⁸ In the first part of my analysis, I did not find the cultural attitudes and legal institutions to be a significant contributing factor to the level of SEA in MINUSCA.

One often overlooked factor in the research is the role that human rights abuses in the national military forces may play. Because the UN does not have its own troops, it must rely on UN member states to contribute to peacekeeping missions either financially or with troop contributions.²¹⁹ Before putting on a UN blue helmet, those troops are trained (and perhaps even engage in combat) in their TCCs. Thus, if the national military of a TCC has a history of engaging and tolerating human rights abuses, particularly relating to SEA, it is not unreasonable to assume that those peacekeepers may continue along the same path of abuse when deployed as part of a UN military contingent.

To test the role that human rights abuses by national military forces play in SEA allegations in UN peacekeeping missions, I consulted the 2018 Country Reports on Human Rights distributed by the US Department of State. These reports include any recent human rights abuses by a country's national military force.²²⁰ For the top 10 TCCs to both MINUSCA and MINUSMA, I recorded if there were reports that the national military of the TCC had used sexual violence within the TCC itself. Below, **Table 3.5** and **Table 3.6** summarize the findings from the human rights reports, paired with the number of allegations levied against the TCC in each mission.^{221 222}

²¹⁸ Mattsson, "UNravelling the Causes of SEA in Peacekeeping: Examining Cultural Attitudes within Troop-Contributing Countries and Its Effect on the Level of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN Peacekeeping Missions."

²¹⁹ "Deployment and Reimbursement."

²²⁰ "US Department of State Human Rights Reports."

²²¹ "US Department of State Human Rights Reports."

²²² "Sexual Exploitation and Abuse: Alleged Perpetrators."

Table 3.5: Summary of human rights abuses among top 10 TCCs to MINUSCA

Country	SEA by national military?	# of SEA Abuses
Rwanda	no	0
Cameroon	yes	16
Pakistan	no	2
Burundi	yes	11
Egypt	no	1
Bangladesh	yes	1
DR Congo	yes	27
Rep. Congo	yes	19
Zambia	no	1
Morocco	no	11

Table 3.6: Summary of human rights abuses among top 10 TCCs to MINUSMA

Country	SEA by national military?	# of SEA abuses
Burkina Faso	no	1
Bangladesh	yes	0
Chad	no	2
Togo	no	0
Senegal	no	0
Niger	yes	0
Guinea	yes	0
Netherlands	no	0
Benin	no	1
China	no	1

The above tables indicate a strong relationship between SEA by a TCC's national military in its own country and a high number of SEA allegations in a UN Peacekeeping mission. Of the 19 countries included in my analysis above, there are only 4 outliers to this trend: Niger, Guinea, Bangladesh, and Morocco. In the cases of Niger, Guinea, and Bangladesh, there were reported instances of SEA by the national military, yet, these countries did not have a high number of allegations of SEA in their respective missions. In the case of Morocco, there was no reported instance of SEA by the national military, yet, the country did have a high number of allegations of SEA in MINUSCA.

However, in the case of Niger, the abuses by the national military forces were not widespread but were rather contained in isolated instances. Further, the Nigerien government publicly acknowledged and claimed to investigate the abuses.²²³ Similarly, in the case of Bangladesh, SEA at the hands of national military forces did occur but it did not appear to be widespread or systematic.²²⁴ Thus, in a sample size of 19 countries, there were only 2 true outliers. It is also of course important to note that the French Operation in the CAR, Operation Sangaris, is an outlier to this finding. However, given the small number of outliers I conclude that there is a strong and positive relationship between SEA by a TCC's national military force in its home country and a high number of SEA abuses committed by that TCC in MINUSCA.

Discussion and Conclusion

One of the most important conclusions from the above analyses is that there does not seem to be a clear relationship between the level of gender equality among TCCs and the prevalence of SEA in the mission. This does not necessarily mean that this is not an important factor in combating SEA in peacekeeping, but it does mean that it did not play an important role

²²³ "Niger 2018 Human Rights Report."

²²⁴ "Bangladesh 2018 Human Rights Report."

in these two cases. This is significant because the gender equality of TCCs and its relationship to SEA is among the most commonly cited in the literature on SEA in peacekeeping, yet, it does not explain the high number of SEA allegations in MINUSCA.

It is important to note that two countries did account for a large number of allegations of SEA in MINUSCA: The Democratic Republic of the Congo and The Republic of the Congo. These countries were not included in the analysis in Part 1 of this chapter because they were not among the top TCCs that comprised 50% of the mission. However, their impact on the level of SEA in MINUSCA should not be overlooked: throughout the duration of the mission, there have been 27 total allegations levied against troops from the DRC and 14 total allegations levied against troops from the Congo.²²⁵ Together, these comprise of 41 of the 113 total allegations, or 36% of all levied against MINUSCA from 2015-2018.

However, this does not necessarily give weight to the idea that SEA in peacekeeping missions is more commonly committed by troops coming from countries with low levels of gender equality. Chad, a country which had only 2 allegations of SEA levied against its troops in MINUSMA, ranks only one spot above the DRC on the most recent Global Gender Gap Index (before 2018, The DRC was not included in the report).²²⁶ While intimate partner violence is extremely prevalent in the DRC, with 51% of women reporting having experienced physical and/or sexual violence in their lifetime, 53% of women reported the same in Bangladesh.^{227 228} Despite this, there were zero allegations of SEA levied against troops from the country in MINUSMA and there was only one allegation levied against troops from the country in

²²⁵ “Sexual Exploitation and Abuse.”

²²⁶ “The Global Gender Gap Report 2018.”

²²⁷ “Democratic Republic of the Congo.”

²²⁸ “Bangladesh.”

MINUSCA.²²⁹ While it is true that the DRC has a low level of gender equality and a high level of GBV, this is not uncommon for countries in this sample.

However, I did find a positive relationship between human rights abuses committed by a TCC's national military forces in its own country and SEA by the TCC's peacekeepers in the missions. This finding helps to explain the Chad/DRC example. While both countries have similarly poor records on gender equality, the Chadian military has not been accused of human rights abuses in Chad, whereas the DRC Congolese troops have been accused of extensive and systemic human rights abuses in the DRC.^{230 231} This pattern is consistent in almost all of the 20 TCC's studied.

The findings from this analysis provide an important conclusion: human rights abuses by national military forces of a TCC are a stronger indicator of SEA by peacekeepers from the TCC than a TCC's record on gender equality. This finding will be discussed further at length in the final chapter of this thesis.

²²⁹ "Sexual Exploitation and Abuse."

²³⁰ "Chad 2018 Human Rights Report."

²³¹ "Democratic Republic of the Congo 2018 Human Rights Report."

Chapter Four: Gender Mainstreaming in UN Peacekeeping Missions

Background

One set of theories relating to SEA in UN Peacekeeping Missions is related to gender mainstreaming. Gender mainstreaming, as defined by UN Women, entails “ensuring that gender perspectives and attention to the goal of gender equality are central to all activities - policy development, research, advocacy/ dialogue, legislation, resource allocation, and planning, implementation and monitoring of programmes and projects.”²³²

In relation to UN Peacekeeping Missions, gender mainstreaming of the missions themselves is often discussed as a method by which to reduce SEA by peacekeepers. The most commonly discussed method of gender mainstreaming involves increasing the number of females serving in UN Peacekeeping Missions. This method of reducing SEA has been recommended both by academics and the UN itself. In 2002, a report by UN Women stated that:

Women’s presence [in peacekeeping missions] improves access and support for local women; it makes male peacekeepers more reflective and responsible; and it broadens the repertoire of skills and styles available within the mission, often with the effect of reducing conflict and confrontation. Gender mainstreaming is not just fair, it is beneficial²³³

Similarly, Comfort Lamptey, the Senior Gender Advisor to the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) once stated that “the presence of more women can actually help dilute a macho presence in peacekeeping.”²³⁴ Academic studies have indicated that increasing the

²³² “OSAGI Gender Mainstreaming.”

²³³ Sirleaf and Rehn, “Women, War, Peace: The Independent Expert’s Assessment on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Women and Women’s Role in Peace-Building,” 63.

²³⁴ Karim and Beardsley, “Explaining Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Peacekeeping Missions: The Role of Female Peacekeepers and Gender Equality in Contributing Countries,” 104.

number of women in peacekeeping may decrease SEA because women can act as a watchdog for the men in the mission and help to mitigate “inappropriate behavior during UN peacekeeping missions.”²³⁵

Other less-discussed methods of gender-mainstreaming in UN Peacekeeping Missions involve having a gender unit, a gender advisor and women in leadership roles. In this chapter, I will examine the extent to which gender mainstreaming may have affected the level of SEA in both MINUSMA and MINUSCA.

Presence of Gender Mainstreaming in MINUSMA and MINUSCA

Data regarding the presence of female peacekeepers is readily available on the UN’s website. In order to determine the presence of female peacekeepers in both MINUSMA and MINUSCA, I collected data on the number of female peacekeepers in both missions from 2015-2018. The table below shows the proportion of females in each peacekeeping mission from 2014-2018.

Table 4.1: The Percent of Female Peacekeepers in MINUSMA and MINUSCA

	MINUSMA (percent)	MINUSCA (percent)
2018	3.82	4.19
2017	2.99	3.56
2016	2.43	2.45
2015	2.08	2.35
2014	1.89	1.47

Source: United Nations Peacekeeping

²³⁵ Bridges and Horsfall, “Increasing Operational Effectiveness in UN Peacekeeping: Toward a Gender-Balanced Force,” 125.

Table 4.1 shows that both missions have extremely low numbers of female peacekeepers. In their study of SEA by UN Peacekeepers, Karim and Beardsley found that an increase in female peacekeepers from 0% to 5% reduced the expected SEA count by more than half.²³⁶ However, neither mission in this study reaches 5% of female peacekeepers throughout the five years observed. Further, if female peacekeepers played an integral role in keeping SEA allegations at bay in MINUSMA, we would expect MINUSMA to have a higher proportion of female peacekeepers than MINUSCA. However, this is not the case. In fact, in each year studied, with the exception of 2014, MINUSCA had a slightly higher proportion of female peacekeepers than MINUSMA.

It appears unlikely that any other method of gender mainstreaming played a large role in the low number of allegations of SEA levied against MINUSMA. Gender advisors were created in UN Peacekeeping to provide gender expertise to senior leadership in the missions and ensure that gender is taken into account in every aspect of the mission.²³⁷ Despite this, there is no gender advisor to MINUSMA.²³⁸ Conversely, MINUSCA instituted a gender advisor in response to the allegations of SEA levied against its troops. In fact, Lieutenant Commander Marcia Andrade Braga, the military gender advisor in MINUSCA, was awarded the “UN Gender Advocate of the Year” in late March 2019 for her community outreach efforts in the CAR.²³⁹

While both missions have Gender Units, it does not appear that the Gender Unit in MINUSMA is any stronger than in MINUSCA. Both Gender Units have similar mandates: to ensure that women are included in all parts of the peace process. The Gender Unit in MINUSCA

²³⁶ Karim and Beardsley, “Explaining Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Peacekeeping Missions: The Role of Female Peacekeepers and Gender Equality in Contributing Countries.”

²³⁷ Athie and Taylor, “UN Peacekeeping.”

²³⁸ Athie and Taylor.

²³⁹ “Brazilian Woman Peacekeeper Wins the United Nations Military Gender Advocate of the Year Award.”

is slightly more explicit in its aims to increase the presence of female peacekeepers and combat GBV.²⁴⁰ However, there were no significant observable differences in the two Gender Units.

Conclusion

By and large, it does not appear that gender mainstreaming played a significant role in the different levels of SEA allegations in MINUSMA and MINUSCA. Neither mission had a particularly high proportion of female peacekeepers and for most of the years observed, MINUSCA actually had a slightly higher proportion of female peacekeepers than MINUSMA. While MINUSCA appointed a gender advisor to the mission in 2015, the post remains unfilled in MINUSMA. Finally, while both missions have Gender Unit's, it does not appear that the Gender Unit in MINUSMA is any stronger than the Gender Unit in MINUSCA.

It is thus unlikely that gender mainstreaming played a significant role in keeping allegations of SEA against MINUSMA at bay. This finding does not mean that gender mainstreaming is not important, nor does it mean that it is not an effective measure by which to reduce SEA in peacekeeping missions. It does, however, mean that in the cases of MINUSMA and MINUSCA, gender mainstreaming did not play an important role in the variation in the levels of SEA between the two cases.

²⁴⁰ "Mandate of the Gender Unit."
"Women Peace and Security."

Chapter Five: The Proximity of Peacekeepers to the Local Population

Background:

One possible cause for the high level of SEA in MINUSCA is that MINUSCA peacekeepers were frequently in close contact with vulnerable members of the local population, whereas MINUSMA peacekeepers were not. This hypothesis largely draws upon the rational choice theory of crime which emphasizes the importance of opportunity in crime. In the context of peacekeeping, opportunity is presented when peacekeepers daily routines converge with those of the local population. Theoretically, if MINUSCA troops were in closer contact with the local population in the CAR than MINUSCA troops were in Mali, there would be more opportunity for abuse. Kelly Neudorfer explains that:

peacekeepers who regularly mix with the local population will be able to better discover when, where, and how SEA crimes could be committed. If they feel secure enough about the situation to believe there is little chance of being caught and sent home, then it is possible they will engage in SEAs.²⁴¹

The vulnerability of the local population is a key component of this hypothesis. In this context, I define vulnerable populations as those at greater risk of being a victim of SEA by a peacekeeper due to their socioeconomic status. Typically, this is for one of two reasons. First, the population may not have access to resources to protect themselves from SEA. Second, the population may actually rely on sexually exploitative relationships with peacekeepers for survival. In this thesis, I will primarily focus on IDPs because I found a strong relationship between the presence of IDPs around MINUSCA camps and a high level of SEA. IDPs may be vulnerable to SEA by peacekeepers for a variety of reasons, which will be explored at greater length in the next section of this chapter.

²⁴¹ Neudorfer, *Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN Peacekeeping: An Analysis of Risk and Prevention Factors*, 84.

The Relationship Between IDPs and SEA in UN Peacekeeping Missions

The UN defines an IDP as:

people or groups of individuals who have been forced to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of, or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural- or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an international border²⁴²

An IDP differs from a refugee in that they have not crossed an internationally-recognized border and thus, are not afforded the same international privileges that are made available to refugees. The issue of IDPs is inherently linked to state-sovereignty. The international community's reluctance to intervene in state affairs without the state's explicit permission makes it difficult for organizations like UNHCR to claim jurisdiction over the rights of IDPs.²⁴³ While all signatories to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees are legally bound to provide assistance to refugees residing in their borders, there is no such legal obligation to provide assistance to IDPs. This is important because this liminal status of IDPs further exacerbates their vulnerable position: without explicit legal protections, they are less likely to receive assistance.²⁴⁴

IDPs may be particularly vulnerable to SEA at the hands of peacekeepers. Kelly Neudorfer explains that IDPs are less protected against abuses than the general population, which increases the opportunity for SEA by peacekeepers. As has been previously discussed, they are not explicitly entitled to humanitarian assistance under international law. Additionally, during the process of displacement, familial and social ties are often destroyed and thus, IDPs often lack a social support network which would otherwise help act as a watchdog to deter SEA and other

²⁴² Refugees, "Internally Displaced People."

²⁴³ Cohen, "New Challenges for Refugee Policy."

²⁴⁴ "Refugee, Migrant, IDP."

crimes. IDPs are also often severely economically disadvantaged and "will be more often dependent than other citizens on the peacekeepers and aid workers to provide shelter, clothing, food, and water."²⁴⁵ IDPs have often lost all that they have in conflict and may feel that they have no other choice but to enter into an exploitative relationship with a peacekeeper in order to gain access to basic necessities.²⁴⁶ These issues may be exacerbated for IDPs living in spontaneous settlements or informal camps. While those living formal IDP camps may receive assistance from humanitarian organizations such as the UNHCR, those living in informal camps often do not. As a result, those living in IDP camps are often believed to be even more at risk for SEA.²⁴⁷ A study of spontaneous IDP camps in Port-au-Prince, Haiti found that transactional sex was widespread. The report drew a clear connection between transactional sex in informal IDP camps and NGO supplies, explaining:

The women repeated certain trends and themes, including giving sexual favors - engaging in transactional sex - to receive benefits, coupons or access to direct distributions, Cash for Work schemes or money (cash grants and others mechanisms); the existence of sexual violence in the environments in which these women were living; food insecurity in the form of basic hunger; overt corruption in the IDP committees through which NGOs and humanitarian actors were channeling resources.²⁴⁸

IDPs are not typically in a position to protect themselves from abuse from actors such as peacekeepers. Further, they may feel the need to enter into exploitative relationships with peacekeepers as a means for survival. Thus, IDPs may be particularly vulnerable to SEA by peacekeepers.

Anecdotally, there appears to be a great deal of evidence that supports this claim. A study by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre and the Norwegian Refugee Council interviewed women living in seven IDP camps across Eastern Chad. The study found that

²⁴⁵ Neudorfer, *Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN Peacekeeping: An Analysis of Risk and Prevention Factors*, 82.

²⁴⁶ Neudorfer, *Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN Peacekeeping: An Analysis of Risk and Prevention Factors*.

²⁴⁷ "Sudan: Darfur: Rape as a Weapon of War: Sexual Violence and Its Consequences."

²⁴⁸ "Driven by Desperation: Transactional Sex as a Survival Strategy in Port-Au-Prince IDP Camps," 5.

women living in IDP camps frequently experienced sexual violence because of their position as IDPs. Notably, the women were often subject to SEA at the hands the local populations in which the camps were located when they were leaving the camps to gather firewood and other basic necessities. This highlights the “strong link between lack of livelihoods and sexual violence during displacement.”²⁴⁹ Another study in Haiti found that women in IDP camps often engaged in transactional sex with UN Peacekeepers to pay for school fees. One woman interviewed for the report stated “A woman who [engages in transactional sex] can get money for professional school. She can pay for education. She can have opportunities. In a[n Internally Displaced Persons] camp, there are no opportunities. She is foolish not to accept.”²⁵⁰ These reports are evidence of two different causal mechanisms of SEA of IDPs. First, IDP women in Chad were subject to SEA when they left the camp and came in contact with locals. This highlights the importance of proximity in SEA. Second, IDP women in Haiti felt that engaging in transactional sex was their only hope. This highlights the importance of vulnerability in SEA.

Although the report regarding IDP women in Chad did not explicitly mention abuse by humanitarian workers or other members of the international community, other studies have drawn a link between SEA, humanitarian workers, and vulnerable populations. For example, a study conducted jointly by UNHCR and Save the Children UK interviewed 1,500 adults and children living in refugee camps in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone and found 67 allegations of sexual misconduct by agencies tasked with providing relief and support for the refugee populations, including UN Peacekeeping forces. The report found that in relation to SEA by peacekeepers “the position of power, wealth and status enjoyed by peacekeeping personnel gives

²⁴⁹ “National Outrage: Violence against Internally Displaced Women and Girls in Eastern Chad,” 15.

²⁵⁰ Kolbe: “It’s Not A Gift When it Comes With a Price,” 14


them the ability to do as they wish.”²⁵¹ Similarly, in 2016, a report by Human Rights Watch claimed to have documented 43 allegations of SEA perpetrated by camp leaders, policemen and soldiers in IDP camps in Nigeria. A similar report found interviewed 400 IDPs in three regions across Nigeria and found that 66% of respondents confirmed that camp officials were involved in sexual misconduct against women and girls in the camps.²⁵²

Overall, there appears to be a relationship between the vulnerable position of IDPs and SEA committed by those in power. In the following parts of this chapter, I will determine if the presence of IDPs played a role in the variation of SEA in MINUSMA and MINUSCA.

Case Studies: MINUSMA and MINUSCA

IDP Situations in the Central African Republic and Mali

Image 4.1: Annual IDP Statistics in the CAR




Source: *Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre*²⁵³

²⁵¹ “Sexual Violence & Exploitation: The Experience of Refugee Children in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone,” 7.

²⁵² “Nigeria: Officials Abusing Displaced Women, Girls: Displaced by Boko Haram and Victims Twice Over.”

²⁵³ “Central African Republic | IDMC.”

Image 4.1: Annual IDP Statistics in Mali



Source: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre²⁵⁴

The Central African Republic has one of the highest IDP populations in the world, with 866,948 total persons of concern and 689,000 IDPs as of late 2017.²⁵⁵ According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, the majority of internal displacements in the country are driven by the internal conflict in the country.²⁵⁶ Large displacements occurred after the violence between the Selka and anti-balaka broke out in 2013 when the country saw a spike in internal displacements to an all-time high of 935,000. Although the number of internal displacements dipped in 2014, it has since been steadily increasing.²⁵⁷ Since the outbreak of violence in 2013, about one-fifth of Central Africans have been displaced, either internally or to neighboring countries.²⁵⁸ Further, in 2018, UNHCR reported that “the humanitarian response to the IDP and refugee situation in CAR is among the least funded emergencies in the world. In 2017, UNHCR appealed for US\$209.2 million for the CAR situation of which only 12 percent was received.”²⁵⁹

²⁵⁴ “Mali | IDMC.”

²⁵⁵ “Central African Republic | IDMC.”

²⁵⁶ “Central African Republic | IDMC.”

²⁵⁷ “Central African Republic | IDMC.”

²⁵⁸ “Submission by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees for the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights’ s Compilation Report.”

²⁵⁹ “Central African Republic Situation,” 2.

This indicates that the Central African population does not receive humanitarian assistance on the scale that is necessary, further evidencing the fact that the population is likely to be extremely impoverished and thus, potentially vulnerable to exploitation and abuse.

Compared to the CAR, Mali has a significantly smaller IDP population. This is even starker when looking at IDPs as a percentage of the total population. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Center found that as of December 2017, the IDP population in Mali was 38,000.²⁶⁰ Mali has a significantly higher population size than the CAR thus, while IDPs comprised 15% of the population in the CAR, in Mali they make up only 0.2% of the population.^{261 262} Since the initial wave of violence in 2013, which produced a high of 230,000 IDPs, the IDP population has remained relatively low. However, it is important to note that more up to date UNHCR statistics indicate that this number has risen sharply within the past four months to about 123,574.²⁶³ However, I have largely excluded 2019 from my analyses for two reasons. First, it is highly unlikely that any extremely recent changes, such as the recent spike in IDPs, would already have an effect on SEA in UN Peacekeeping Missions. Second, data collection regarding SEA by UN Peacekeepers for 2019 is not yet completely publically available.

While civilians have consistently been the targets of violence in the CAR, this has not been the case to the same extent in Mali. A report from the International Peace Institute found that “although the conflict displaced civilians, most internally displaced persons (IDPs) returned in the aftermath of the 2015 peace agreements and attacks on civilians were not large-scale or systemic.”²⁶⁴ Although civilian deaths have risen in the past three years, attacks have largely not

²⁶⁰ “Mali | IDMC.”

²⁶¹ “Mali | IDMC.”


²⁶² “Central African Republic | IDMC.”

²⁶³ “Situation Mali Situation.”

²⁶⁴ Di Razza, “Protecting Civilians in the Context of Violent Extremism: The Dilemmas of UN Peacekeeping in Mali,” 3.

been directly targeted towards civilians. Instead, civilians have suffered as a result of collateral damage.²⁶⁵ Additionally, many of the displaced people have returned to their region of origin since the signing of the 2015 peace agreements.²⁶⁶ The chart below shows the extent to which civilians have been the target of violence in both the CAR and Mali. Although my analysis in this thesis focuses on 2012-2018, data from 2018 is not yet publicly available and is thus not reflected in the chart below.

Chart 4.1: Conflict-Related Deaths in CAR and Mali²⁶⁷



Source: GeoQuery: Integrating HPC Systems and Public Web-Based Geospatial Data Tools, UCDP Conflict-Related Deaths

²⁶⁵ Di Razza, “Protecting Civilians in the Context of Violent Extremism: The Dilemmas of UN Peacekeeping in Mali.”

²⁶⁶ Di Razza.

²⁶⁷ Goodman et al., “GeoQuery: Integrating HPC Systems and Public Web-Based Geospatial Data Tools.”

Throughout both conflicts, civilians in CAR have consistently been more vulnerable to attacks from armed groups. Thus, it is unsurprising that the conflict in the CAR has produced more IDPs than that in Mali.

In May 2015, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre reported that 52.7% of Central African IDPs were living with host families, 39.4% were living in IDP camps and other spontaneous settlements such as schools and churches and 8.0% were living in the bush. The report noted that before the crisis, IDP camps were virtually non-existent and by 2015, the country hosted 114. Further, most IDP settlements are in Ouaka, Nana-Gribizi, Ouham and around Bangui. It is also important to note that not all of the IDPs recorded are living in formal IDP camps; many are living in informal or spontaneous settlements but are still included in this figure.²⁶⁸ As I previously mentioned, these IDPs may be particularly susceptible to SEA by peacekeepers as they are even less likely to be supported by civil society organizations than those living in formal camps.

Although specific statistics regarding the distribution of IDPs in Mali do not exist, it appears that the majority of IDPs in Mali are in host families rather than in IDP camps. For example, in 2013, when the Mali migration crisis was at its height, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) reported that “most of the IDPs that fled the North to the South had been living in host families or rented housing... which explains the absence of IDP camps.”²⁶⁹ In 2018, from the United Nations found that 10% all of individuals in the Gao, Tombouctou, Mopti, and Ségou regions were host families for IDPs.²⁷⁰

²⁶⁸ “Central African Republic: IDPs Face Significant Challenges as Instability and Political Transition Continue.”

²⁶⁹ “The Mali Migration Crisis at a Glance,” 6.

²⁷⁰ “Aperçu Des Besions Humanitaires: Mali.”

Overall, the CAR has a significantly higher population of IDPs than Mali.²⁷¹ This has likely been because of the different nature of the conflicts: by and large, civilians have been more vulnerable to attacks from armed groups in the CAR than in Mali. Further, the distribution of IDPs in each country appears to differ. While in both countries, it is most common for IDPs to live with host families, it appears that in the CAR IDP camps are more common than they are in Mali. It is interesting to note that even this may play a role in the vulnerability of IDPs for abuse. One of the reasons that IDPs may be vulnerable to SEA is that they often lack social support networks that can bring about stability in the lives of IDPs. UNHCR has explained that “generally, staying with host families is the preferred alternative for displaced populations, as it builds on their own coping mechanisms and enables them to live in more dignified conditions, surrounded by extended family or friends”²⁷² Thus, Malian IDPs may be less vulnerable to SEA than Central African IDPs by the very nature of their displacement.

The Structure of the Missions

While it is true that Mali has not experienced internal-displacements on the same scale that the Central African Republic has, this is not in and of itself a sufficient explanation for the high incidence of SEA in MINUSCA. If MINUSCA peacekeepers were not located near to large populations of IDPs and thus had little interactions with IDPs, according to the rational choice theory of crime, it is unlikely that the opportunity for abuse would have been created. Conversely, the IDP population in Mali was about 38,000 in 2017.²⁷³ If the peacekeepers in MINUSMA were in close contact with the IDP population, there would still be ample opportunity for abuse. Thus, in the next section, I will analyze the structure of each mission to

²⁷¹ “Central African Republic | IDMC”; “Mali | IDMC.”

²⁷² “Handbook for the Protection of Internally Displaced Persons,” 269

²⁷³ “Mali | IDMC.”

determine if it had an effect on the interactions between peacekeepers and the IDPs in each country.

In MINUSMA, the top priority of the mandate is “to support the political process in that country and to carry out a number of security-related tasks.”²⁷⁴ The protection of civilians (POC) is mentioned, but under “other priority tasks.” Conversely, in MINUSCA, the central priority of the mandate is the protection of civilians.²⁷⁵ A report by the International Peace Institute found that “unlike the peace operations in the DRC and CAR, the UN Mission in Mali was not designed with POC as a central priority.”²⁷⁶

This is clear when investigating the activities of each mission. For example, on the MINUSCA Mission website, visits to IDP camps are explicitly mentioned as a routine activity of the mission. The website states that monitoring human rights abuses in the country is a top priority for the mission and, as a result: “elle surveille puis enregistre permanemment les violations et abus des droits de l’homme sur toute l’étendue du territoire y compris à travers des visites de routine des prisons et autres lieux de détention, des visites des camps des déplacés internes, des missions de vérification des faits et des missions conjointes de protection des civils.”²⁷⁷ Conversely, there is no mention of visits to IDP camps on the MINUSMA website. This indicates that while peacekeepers in MINUSCA routinely come in contact with IDPs by design of the mission, this is likely not the case in MINUSMA.

This is again confirmed upon further investigation into the efforts of MINUSCA to reach IDP populations. On the MINUSCA website, there are multiple articles which mention either

²⁷⁴ “MINUSMA Fact Sheet: United Nations Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali.”

²⁷⁵ “MINUSCA Mandate.”

²⁷⁶ Di Razza, “Protecting Civilians in the Context of Violent Extremism: The Dilemmas of UN Peacekeeping in Mali,” 16.

²⁷⁷ “Droits de l’homme.”

IDPs or IDP camps. For example, one article is a notice of the UN High Commissioner’s visit to MINUSCA and explicitly mentions that he will spend the majority of his time in IDP camps.²⁷⁸ Another summarizes the address given by the Special-Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) in the CAR in which he highlights the need for the mission to continue patrolling IDP camps.²⁷⁹ Yet another states MINUSCA’s commitment to strengthening the security in an IDP camp when individuals living in the IDP camp were the victims of targeted violence.²⁸⁰ Conversely, there is not a single mention of IDPs on any part of the MINUSMA mission website. This stark contrast demonstrates two important facts. First, the POC and, by extension, IDPs, is not of primary concern for MINUSMA. Second, it is highly likely that MINUSCA troops come into contact with IDPs at a much higher frequency than MINUSMA troops do.

This fact is further reinforced by looking at the distribution of the deployment of troops in the respective missions. In MINUSMA, troops have primarily been concentrated in the North as this is where the peace process has occurred. However, as of date, the majority of the country’s IDPs reside in the central region, specifically in the Mopti region.²⁸¹ In an interview for a report published by the International Peace Institute, a UN interlocutor stated that “the focus is on the North, so there is no vision for the protection of civilians in the center.”²⁸² The report continues:

There has also been a persistent presumption among the mission’s personnel that “the center is not the mandate.” UN funds and agencies and civil society representatives also tend to regret that “MINUSMA does not have a mandate for the center,” even though the mission’s POC mandate does not set geographic limits for this task.²⁸³

²⁷⁸ “High Commissioner’s Visit to Highlight Worsening Humanitarian Crisis in the Central African Republic.”

²⁷⁹ “The Blue Beret or the Blue Helmet You Wear Represents Hope for the Vulnerable Population of the CAR,” SRSG Says.”

²⁸⁰ “MINUSCA CONDEMNS KILLING OF CIVILIANS AND REINFORCE SECURITY OF IDP CAMP IN BRIA.”

²⁸¹ “DTM Internal Displacement Dashboard: Burundi, CAR, Cameroon, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Nigeria.”

²⁸² Di Razza, “Protecting Civilians in the Context of Violent Extremism: The Dilemmas of UN Peacekeeping in Mali,” 23.

²⁸³ Di Razza, 23.

Conversely, in MINUSCA, it appears that troops are deployed in areas with high levels of internal displacement. For example, MINUSCA troops are largely deployed in and around Bangui, the capital. Also in Bangui is one of the country's largest IDP camps, located around Bangui airport. This IDP camp was not an official camp, but rather a spontaneous settlement that arose after the outbreak of violence in 2013.²⁸⁴ This IDP camp is where the allegations against operation Sangaris occurred, which will be discussed in depth later. Further, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre notes that “[IDP] camps are usually set up in empty buildings, churches, mosques and near MINUSCA (UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission-CAR) bases, such as the one in Bambari. IDPs seek places that will provide them further protection from armed attacks”²⁸⁵ Thus, it is not necessarily the case that MINUSCA camps are purposely located near official IDP camps. Instead, it appears that spontaneous settlements of IDPs often occur around MINUSCA camps as the IDPs believe this to be a safe location.

MINUSMA soldiers often have to put their own safety above the POC. The mission has been referred to as “the world's deadliest active peacekeeping mission”, with 195 fatalities to date.²⁸⁶ UN Peacekeepers have frequently been the specific target of attacks from extremist groups, with 63% of all fatalities in the mission the result of a malicious act. Conversely, MINUSCA has far fewer deaths at 81 total and only 43% of fatalities in the mission were a result of a malicious act.²⁸⁷ Di Razza noted that in her interviews with UN officials in Mali, she found that “self-protection took over the mission's attention. While acknowledging that [protection of civilians] was part of the mandate, several interviewees admitted that it became of lesser concern

²⁸⁴ Lazareva, “‘Now We’re Back It’s Even Worse.’”

²⁸⁵ “Central African Republic | IDMC.”

²⁸⁶ Sieff, “The U.N.’s Deadliest Mission.”

²⁸⁷ “Fatalities by Mission and Incident Type.”

than their own security: ‘Protecting ourselves quickly became the priority... and we shifted to a passive presence.’²⁸⁸

Thus, by nature of the respective missions, it is highly likely that MINUSCA soldiers have come into contact with IDPs more regularly than MINUSMA soldiers have, which created the opportunity for abuse to occur. This is for several reasons. First, the CAR has historically had a higher number of IDPs than Mali has, even in times of crisis. While in both countries it has been common for IDPs to stay in host families, it appears that there are far more IDP camps in the CAR than in Mali which would precipitate contact between IDPs and the MINUSCA soldiers patrolling those camps. Second, the nature of the missions vary greatly and appear to have an impact on the interactions between the peacekeepers and IDPs. The central mandate of MINUSCA is the POC, which culminates in various activities that bring the MINUSCA peacekeepers close to the IDP population such as reinforcing camps and visiting camps for humanitarian efforts. Conversely, the central mandate of MINUSMA is supporting the political process which necessarily leads to fewer interactions with the IDP population. MINUSMA peacekeepers routinely have to prioritize their own safety over the POC, which limits their ability to interact with vulnerable populations such as IDPs. Thus, the routine activities of MINUSCA peacekeepers frequently converge with IDPs.

SEA and IDPs in MINUSCA and MINUSMA

There is anecdotal evidence to support the claim that instances of SEA by peacekeepers are common in IDP camps and settlements in the CAR. For example, the accusations against the French Peacekeeping operation, Operation Sangaris, claimed that the abuse took place in the Mpoko IDP camp located outside of Bangui. In this instance, a large Sangaris camp was located

²⁸⁸ Di Razza, “Protecting Civilians in the Context of Violent Extremism: The Dilemmas of UN Peacekeeping in Mali,” 23.

near to the Mpoko IDP camp, which was a spontaneous settlement. In a leaked report that documented the abuse perpetrated by Sangaris soldiers in the CAR, one colonel of the French army claimed that “the refugee camp should be better secured because it is the cause of numerous problems including refugees who ask the soldiers for their rations. It also makes it easy for a prostitution ring to infiltrate the camp late at night.”²⁸⁹ In the same report, another colonel added: “the proximity with the locals has contributed to the development of easy access to alcohol, drugs, and prostitution.”²⁹⁰ One Sangaris soldier interviewed by Zero Impunity, a collaborative project between 11 investigative journalists aiming to address impunity towards sexual violence, claimed that the sexual exploitation of IDPs by Sangaris soldiers was extremely common, citing instances of one of his supervisors “having his penis sucked through a fence” and a woman in the IDP camp selling sexual favors from her daughter to the soldiers.²⁹¹

Although Sangaris is not the peacekeeping mission used in my analysis, it is important to our understanding of the potential causes of SEA in MINUSCA. Operation Sangaris, MISCA (the African-Union peacekeeping operation that preceded MINUSCA) and MINUSCA all faced allegations of SEA. Thus, understanding how SEA operated in these other missions may shed light on the phenomenon of SEA in MINUSCA.

There are many anecdotal reports that confirm that soldiers deployed in MINUSCA perpetrated SEA in IDP camps. In his study of SEA perpetrated by international actors in the CAR, Musa Yerro Gassama, the director of the Human Rights Division of the UN Peacekeeping Operation in the Central African Republic, found the proximity of the IDP camps to military camps to be a significant contributing factor to the incidence of SEA in the country. An excerpt

²⁸⁹ZERO IMPUNITY - THE DNA OF SANGARIS."

²⁹⁰“ZERO IMPUNITY - THE DNA OF SANGARIS.”

²⁹¹“ZERO IMPUNITY - THE DNA OF SANGARIS.”

from one of his interviews below explains the relationship between peacekeepers and the local population.

It has been a relation of rich and poor, of unequal parties. The arrival of the peacekeepers with money, infrastructure of material amenities changed the lives of many poor civilians, unskilled workers, including the internally displaced persons who were not in the camps. Poor people maintained a dependency relationship with the peacekeepers.²⁹²

A report by Human Rights Watch released in 2016 documented at least six cases of SEA perpetrated by MINUSCA soldiers. Every single case occurred within an IDP camp in Bambari²⁹³ Similarly, a leaked UN report detailing SEA committed by the Burundian and Gabonese troops constituting MINUSCA found nearly 150 allegations of SEA in Dekoa, a small town in the middle of the CAR. The town was host to a large displaced population living inside a Catholic Church, which appears to have facilitated the abuse. One woman interviewed by The New Humanitarian explained that she met a peacekeeper at a checkpoint to the IDP camp and entered into an exploitative relationship with him that ended in pregnancy. She explains that by entering into a relationship with a peacekeeper, she was guaranteed access to food and water daily, which disappeared upon his return to Gabon.²⁹⁴ Another woman explained that she frequently visited the IDP camp to sell cassava to the displaced population there. En route, she was raped by a Burundian peacekeeper while another watched.²⁹⁵ These women's stories exemplify the unequal power relationship between peacekeepers and IDPs which provides ample opportunity for SEA.

While there are a plethora of reports detailing SEA by MINUSCA peacekeepers in IDP camps throughout the CAR, there are no public allegations of SEA against MINUSMA peacekeepers in IDP camps in Mali.

²⁹²Gassama, "Opportunity and Sex Offending by International Peacekeepers in the Central African Republic," 125.

²⁹³Avenue, York, and t 1.212.290.4700, "Central African Republic."

²⁹⁴ "Central African Republic, Part 3."

²⁹⁵ "Central African Republic, Part 3."

Overall, these anecdotal reports point to the relationship between the volatility of the IDP population in the Central African Republic and the prevalence of SEA by MINUSCA peacekeepers. In both Sangaris and MINUSCA, IDPs were victims of SEA by peacekeepers in large numbers. With little resources and support, it appears that many IDPs in the CAR were vulnerable to exploitation and abuse.

Conclusion

The Central African Republic has one of the highest IDP populations in the world. Although the majority of IDPs reside in host families and communities, the country also has a large population of IDPs in IDP camps with 39.4% of all IDPs in camps.²⁹⁶ Conversely, the conflict in Mali has produced far fewer refugees and IDP camps appear to be rare throughout the country.

The two missions vary greatly in their mandates and in their nature. While the priority mandate of MINUSCA is the POC, the priority mandate in MINUSMA is to support the political process in Northern Mali. This has resulted in the majority of MINUSMA peacekeepers being concentrated in Northern Mali which is an area with an extremely sparse population density. This is despite the fact that the majority of Malian IDPs reside in Central Mali. Conversely, most MINUSCA peacekeepers are concentrated in areas with high population density and IDP populations such as Bangui and Bambari. Malian peacekeepers routinely have to prioritize their own safety over the POC which has not been the case to the same extent in the CAR. All of these factors have combined to create a situation in which MINUSCA peacekeepers are in close and frequent contact with Central African civilians and IDPs. Evidence from Operation

²⁹⁶ “Central African Republic: IDPs Face Significant Challenges as Instability and Political Transition Continue.”

Sangaris, the IDP camp in Bambari and the IDP camp in Dekoa show that the proximity of the peacekeepers to the local population may have facilitated the abuse that took place.


Chapter Six: The Proximity of Peacekeepers to the Local Population: MONUC and UNMIL

Background

Through the case studies, it became clear that in MINUSCA, the peacekeepers are frequently in close contact with vulnerable populations, notably IDPs. This close contact between the peacekeepers and large populations of vulnerable individuals created the opportunity for exploitation and abuse to occur. This finding largely draws upon rational choice theory which claims that opportunity is central to crime. Opportunity for crime relies on proximity: if the peacekeepers are in close proximity with populations vulnerable to abuse, it is likely that the abuse will occur. Populations may be vulnerable in one of two ways. First, the vulnerable position of individuals, such as IDPs, relative to that of the peacekeepers created a large power dynamic that put the power in the hands of the peacekeepers. Second, the vulnerable populations often looked to relationships with peacekeepers as a way to improve upon their economic and social situations.

While it is clear that the close contact between peacekeepers and vulnerable populations played a significant role in exacerbating SEA in MINUSCA, the mission is not the only one that has suffered from a large number of official allegations of SEA. **Chart 5.1** below depicts the number of allegations of SEA levied against each UN mission since 2007 when the UN first began collecting data on the issue.

Chart 5.1: Allegations Levied Against UN Peacekeeping Missions Since 2007



Since 2007, five missions have had above 100 allegations of SEA by UN Peacekeepers: MINUSCA, MINUSTAH, MONUC, MONUSCO, and UNMIL. For the purposes of this chapter, I am going to examine if the proximity between peacekeepers and vulnerable populations played a role in the high number of SEA allegations in the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) and the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). I have chosen these two cases for two reasons. First, these missions have extremely high numbers of SEA allegations: UNMIL had 110 allegations of SEA while MONUC had 152 allegations. Second, both cases occurred on the African continent, which allowed for more control with the original cases of MINUSCA and MINUMSA. This analysis will allow me to determine if the proximity of peacekeepers to vulnerable populations is an important dynamic that drives SEA in UN Peacekeeping missions outside of MINUSCA and will further allow me to extrapolate the results of my study.

Case Study: MONUC

In 1999, the Security Council voted to implement MONUC in the DRC. The peacekeeping force was created to address the instability in the country following the civil war that broke out in 1994 in response to the influx of ethnic Hutu's into the eastern region of the country. MONUC was originally deployed to oversee the successful implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement which was signed between the DRC, Angola, Chad, Namibia and Zimbabwe. However, subsequent violence and instability in the country necessitated for the mission to stay in the country past the successful implementation of the agreement. In 2010, the Security Council voted to replace MONUC with MONUSCO and expand the size and scope of the mission.²⁹⁷

The IDP population in the DRC is among the highest in the world. By 2018, it was estimated that over 1.5 Congolese had lost their homes due to conflict.²⁹⁸ In total, 1.7 million of the country's 77 million have experienced internal displacement in 2018 alone almost half a million fled the country as refugees.²⁹⁹ However, unlike in the CAR, which had large numbers of IDPs living within IDP camps (39.4% of the total IDP population), only 13% of IDPs in the DRC are located within IDP camps.³⁰⁰ This is interesting to note because, in the CAR most of the SEA by peacekeepers occurred within IDP camps. However, despite the fact that the DRC has a lower percentage of IDPs living in camps, there are still around 230,000 IDPs living in camps or spontaneous settlements throughout the country. For comparison, in the CAR, about

²⁹⁷ "MONUC Background - United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo."

²⁹⁸ "More than 1.5 Million Congolese Lose Homes in Conflict."

²⁹⁹ "DRC."

³⁰⁰ "Democratic Republic of the Congo: Internally Displaced People and Returnees (as of June 2017)."

268,710 IDPs lived in camps or spontaneous settlements.³⁰¹ This number is still extremely high and thus, it is still relevant to test the hypothesis.

In her case study on SEA in MONUC/MONUSCO, Bonnie Kovatach notes that while the average salary of a UN Peacekeeper is \$1,028 per month, the average salary of a Congolese citizen is less than \$16 a month.³⁰² She further finds that this highly unequal power relationship between the peacekeepers and the local population facilitated the SEA by peacekeepers that that occurred, particularly because many women in the regions that were “most heavily affected by war see ‘prostitution’ with peacekeepers as the only way to survive, and have been known to trade sex with peacekeepers for as little as one dollar or simply food.”³⁰³

Overall, the DRC is a country with extreme levels of poverty across the board. In fact, the DRC is believed to have the highest rate of extreme poverty rate in the world.³⁰⁴ The war has caused a wide scale breakdown in infrastructure, which has led to the development of large slums in urban centers such as Kinshasa. The USAID Mission Director to the DRC explains:

The face of extreme poverty is most visible in the numerous slums scattered across urban areas. In the capital city of Kinshasa, households without resources live in appalling conditions in cardboard huts along streams polluted with household or industrial wastes. Many of these families are single-parent households headed by women. These female heads have no access to economic opportunities and rely on meager resources drawn from activities that increase their exposure to health hazards and violence. They can neither afford to send their children to school nor provide them decent health care. Almost every day, they have to make the hard decision of choosing which one of their children will get one meal.³⁰⁵

Like MINUSCA, the priority mandate of both MONUC and MONUSCO has been the protection of civilians.³⁰⁶ Thus, it is highly likely that throughout the duration of the mission,

³⁰¹ “Central African Republic: IDPs Face Significant Challenges as Instability and Political Transition Continue.”

³⁰² Kovatach, “Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN Peacekeeping Missions: A Case Study on MONUC and MONUSCO.”

³⁰³ Kovatach, 168.

³⁰⁴ Putman, Nardi-Darrouzet, and Victor, “Q&A.”

³⁰⁵ Putman, Nardi-Darrouzet, and Victor.

³⁰⁶ “MONUSCO Mandate.”

peacekeepers have been in close contact with vulnerable populations such as IDPs. In 2004, the UN Office of Internal Oversight (OIOS) launched a study into the 72 allegations levied against MONUC in Bunia in the Eastern DRC. The mission found that there was rampant and uncontrolled contact between the peacekeeping force stationed in the town and the local population, which helped to the opportunity for abuse to occur. The report states:

As a result of the ethnic conflict that broke out in the Ituri District in May 2003, many area residents were displaced and impoverished. The internally displaced persons camp, sheltering 10,000 people, is located inside the boundary of Bunia town, adjacent to the MONUC logistics base. The military camps are also located in close proximity to the local population. Although this provides the necessary security buffer against the militias, it also allows for informal interaction between peacekeepers and the local population, creating an environment for exploitation and abuse to occur.³⁰⁷

Consistent with the findings in the case of MINUSCA, during the time that the SEA took place, Bunia was home to a large IDP camp as well as a large refugee camp. The report from the OIOS found that the IDPs within Bunia were particularly vulnerable to abuses by peacekeepers. Specifically, the investigation found that the breakdown in family structures caused by the mass displacements in the region. This has led to large masses of young people living on their own without much support.³⁰⁸ Another report found that the proximity of the MONUC base to the IDP camp in Bunia led to the development of an “extensive survival sex economy” in the region.³⁰⁹

Attempts to limit interactions between peacekeepers and the local population were ineffective. Although peacekeepers were not officially allowed to leave the base when off-duty, the investigation by the OIOS revealed that peacekeepers were frequently found in plainclothes among the civilian population. The report also found that the fencing that surrounded the

³⁰⁷ “Investigation by the Office of Internal Oversight Services into Allegations of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” 9.

³⁰⁸ “Investigation by the Office of Internal Oversight Services into Allegations of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.”

³⁰⁹ Westendorf and Searle, “Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Peace Operations: Trends, Policy Responses and Future Directions,” 371.

MONUC camp was insecure which allowed for peacekeepers to leave the camp and local women to enter.³¹⁰ Thus, interactions between MONUC peacekeepers and the local population were frequent and uncontrolled.

Overall, it appears that the vulnerability of the Congolese population and the close proximity of the UN peacekeepers to the local population facilitated the abuse that occurred in MONUC. This is particularly interesting because during the time period that MONUC was operating in the DRC, there was not a large percentage of civilians in IDP camps but rather, they tended to live within host communities and families. Despite this, those living in IDP camps were *still* particularly vulnerable to abuse, as is evidenced by the abuse that occurred in Bunia. These findings are consistent with the finding in MINUSCA, that the combination of close proximity between the peacekeepers and local population and a vulnerable local population facilitated the abuse that occurred.

Case Study: UNMIL

UNMIL was implemented in Liberia following the Liberian civil war, which broke out in 1989. In 1993, the Security Council voted to deploy the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) which was tasked with overseeing the proposed peace agreement between the warring factions. UNOMIL's mandate ended in 1997 with the election of Charles Taylor. Despite this, violence continued. In 2003, the warring factions signed a peace agreement which included a request to the United Nations to implement the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). On March 30, 2018, UNMIL finished its mandate in Liberia.

The Liberian Civil War generated a large flow of both IDPs and refugees throughout the country. It is estimated that throughout the 14 year conflict, 2.8 million Liberians were forced to

³¹⁰ "Investigation by the Office of Internal Oversight Services into Allegations of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo."

leave their homes.³¹¹ Prior to the IDP return process in the beginning of 2004, there were an estimated 314,095 IDPs in the country. Of those, 261,000 lived in IDP camps.³¹² Thus, the IDP situation in Liberia greatly mirrors that in the CAR- with large numbers of individuals living in IDP camps or settlements.

Like MINUSCA and MONUC, the priority mandate of UNMIL was the POC. Part of the mandate of the mission has been:

to assist the National Transitional Government in extending State authority throughout Liberia; to provide security at key government installations, in particular, ports, airports and other vital infrastructure; to ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel; to facilitate the free movement of people, humanitarian assistance and goods; to support the safe and sustainable return of refugees and internally displaced persons; and to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence in the areas of immediate deployment of United Nations formed military units.³¹³

Although the OSIS did not publish a study regarding the SEA allegations levied against UNMIL as it did in MONUC, there is a considerable amount of anecdotal evidence from the study done by UNHCR and Save the Children UK that sheds light on the SEA of Liberian women by international aid workers that I will rely on in my analysis. The report includes a significant amount of anecdotal evidence that directly implicated UN Peacekeepers, as well as other international humanitarian staff, in engaging in SEA in Liberia.

The report found that, as was the case in MINUSCA and MONUSCO, there was little supervision of NGO staff and peacekeepers, which facilitated the SEA to occur. The report states “the lack of senior and international staff presence in the camps was reportedly allowing junior agency staff to behave with impunity.”³¹⁴ Further, a report by the UN Secretary-General found that in Liberia, there were little to no efforts made to restrict interactions between

³¹¹ “Profile of Internal Displacement in Liberia.”

³¹² “LIBERIA: Key Challenge Is Ensuring Sustainability of IDP Return.”

³¹³ “UNMIL Background.”

³¹⁴ “Sexual Violence & Exploitation: The Experience of Refugee Children in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone,” 5.

peacekeepers and the local population and further, that these interactions occurred with no supervision. After 2010, UNMIL attempted to better control the interactions between its peacekeepers and the local populations, however, these attempts did not appear to work. In an interview, one aid worker working for UNMIL explained that “UNMIL sends out an email every Friday about which places are off limits, but no one can check whether people still go there. Besides that, the prostitutes just rotate to the establishments which aren’t off-limits that week, and UNMIL can’t prevent that, either.”³¹⁵ Thus, in the case of UNMIL, it appears that unregulated interaction between peacekeepers and the local community may have played a role in creating the opportunity for SEA by peacekeepers in the mission.

There is also ample evidence to support the hypothesis that IDPs were particularly vulnerable to SEA by UN Peacekeepers in Liberia. The report by UNHCR and Save the Children UK found that “the level of sexual violence experienced by abducted girls and in IDP situations is much higher than those in refugee camps.” The study found there were two important causal mechanisms that contributed to SEA by peacekeepers/other international humanitarian staff and IDPs. First, IDPs typically lack a support system that can help make them less vulnerable to SEA. Specifically, in Liberian, Guinea and Sierra Leonean IDP camps, “the children most vulnerable to sexual exploitation were those without the care of their parents, children in child headed households, orphaned children, children in foster care, children living with extended family members and children living with just one parent.”³¹⁶ This finding is consistent with my findings relating to the vulnerability of IDPs to SEA due to the breakdown in social-support systems.

³¹⁵ Neudorfer, *Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN Peacekeeping: An Analysis of Risk and Prevention Factors*, 130.

³¹⁶ “Sexual Violence & Exploitation: The Experience of Refugee Children in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone,” 4.

The second important causal mechanism was the dependency between the IDP children and the international staff. Among international staff, peacekeepers were reported as the highest payers for sex with children. Many children interviewed reported feeling reliant on the income provided by engaging in sex with international humanitarian staff in order to survive. The report found that in Liberia and Guinea particularly, it was common for international aid staff to withhold goods such as water, food and medicine for sex.³¹⁷ This finding is also consistent with the finding in MINUSCA that dependency made the IDP women vulnerable to abuse by peacekeepers.

Overall, there is evidence to support the claim that a close proximity between peacekeepers and the vulnerable local population created the opportunity for abuse to occur. As was the case in MINUSCA and MONUSCO, the peacekeeping force in UNMIL interacted extensively with the local population and without supervision. Further, IDPs were particularly vulnerable to abuse.

Conclusion

The findings in this chapter support the claim that a close proximity between peacekeepers and a vulnerable local population is a contributing factor to SEA in UN Peacekeeping Missions. In most countries with peacekeeping missions, the economic status of the peacekeepers is above that of the local population, which, is often reeling from the effects of violent conflict. When peacekeepers are able to interact freely with the vulnerable local population, the opportunity for abuse presents itself. This was the case in MINUSCA, MONUSCO and UNMIL, which all featured comparatively well off peacekeepers interacting freely with local, vulnerable populations. In all three cases, there was evidence to support the

³¹⁷ “Sexual Violence & Exploitation: The Experience of Refugee Children in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone.”

claim that those living in IDP camps close to UN Peacekeeping bases are particularly vulnerable to SEA.

It is important that this pattern of SEA was found to be consistent across three missions with extremely high levels of SEA: MINUSCA, MONUSCO and UNMIL. This indicates that this pattern of SEA is not unique to the context of MINUSCA, but rather, that the finding may be able to explain SEA in other peacekeeping missions as well. This allows for me to be able to apply the findings in this study to SEA in peacekeeping as a whole.

Chapter Seven: Results, Implications, Recommendations and Future Research

Summary of Results

The central aim of this thesis was to determine the reason that MINUSCA had a higher level of SEA allegations than MINUSMA. Through this study, I hoped to contribute to the larger literature on SEA in peacekeeping missions and identify any important patterns that contributed to SEA in MINUSCA. The results of my analyses are below in **Table 7.1** below

Table 7.1: Results from hypothesis testing

Hypothesis	Result
MINUSCA had more allegations of SEA than MINUSMA because MINUSCA was comprised of troop-contributing countries with lower levels of gender equality than MINUSMA	No correlation. MINUSCA was not comprised of troop-contributing countries with lower levels of gender equality than MINUSMA.
MINUSCA had more allegations of SEA than MINUSMA because MINUSCA was comprised of troop-contributing countries with records of human rights abuses in their home country's	Positive correlation. MINUSCA was comprised of troop-contributing countries that had records of human rights abuses in their home countries while MINUSMA was not. ³¹⁸
MINUSCA had more allegations of SEA than MINUSMA because, in MINUSCA, peacekeepers were frequently in contact with vulnerable populations	Positive correlation. In MINUSCA, peacekeepers were frequently in close contact with IDP populations which created the opportunity for abuse
MINUSCA had more allegations of SEA than MINUSMA because MINUSMA had more effective gender mainstreaming policies.	No correlation. Neither mission has comprehensive gender mainstreaming policies.

There were two findings to this study. The first finding is that TCCs with records of SEA within their home countries are more likely to perpetrate SEA in UN Peacekeeping Missions.

³¹⁸ This was not a separate hypothesis and was addressed along with the first hypothesis listed in Chapter 3. However, it is separated here for clarity.

MINUSCA was comprised of multiple TCCs that had records of widespread and systemic allegations of SEA by national security forces within the TCC, while MINUSMA was not. Of a sample size of 19, there were only two countries that served as outliers to this finding. By and large, if a TCCs national security forces were known to perpetrate SEA at home, they also perpetrated SEA in peacekeeping missions.

The second finding is that in MINUSCA, peacekeepers were frequently in contact with vulnerable populations, particularly IDPs, which created the opportunity for abuse. This occurred for a couple of reasons. First, the IDP population in the CAR was significantly higher for the duration of this study than in Mali. In 2017, IDPs made up 15% of the Central African population and only 0.2% of the Malian population.³¹⁹ Second, the peacekeepers in MINUSCA had much more contact with vulnerable populations (most notably IDPs) than peacekeepers in MINUSMA did. This is not simply because the CAR had more IDPs than Mali, but also because the structure of MINUSCA precipitated more contact with IDPs. In MINUSCA, the priority of the mandate was the POC, while in MINUSMA, the priority mandate was overseeing the peace process in the North. This made it so MINUSCA peacekeepers purposefully interacted with vulnerable populations such as IDPs, while MINUSMA peacekeepers primarily focused on the political process. Additionally, peacekeepers in Mali had to worry about their own safety more frequently than peacekeepers in the CAR, which created more distance between the peacekeepers and the local populations as the peacekeepers prioritized their own safety over that of civilians. These factors converged to make the MINUSCA peacekeepers more proximate to the local population and thus created the opportunity for abuse to occur.

³¹⁹ “Central African Republic | IDMC”; “Mali | IDMC.”

I found no support for the hypothesis that MINUSMA was comprised of troops with better records on gender equality than MINUSCA. Although MINUSMA did have more TCC's that ranked "very high" on the SIGI Index, it also had more TCC's that ranked "very low" on the index. Conversely, MINUSCA had more troops that ranked "high" and "medium" on the index and less that ranked "low" or "very low." Overall, when looking at the missions as a whole, MINUSCA actually had a slightly higher composite SIGI score than MINUSMA. A legal analysis of the top five TCC's to each mission showed no correlation between policies that support gender equality and the number of SEA allegations levied against the TCC. Overall, it was determined that in the cases of MINUSCA and MINUSMA, the gender equality of the TCC's did not play a role in the variation of SEA between the two missions. Rather, a TCC's past history relating to SEA by national security forces within the TCC was a much stronger predictor of SEA by the TCC's peacekeepers than gender equality.

I also did not find any support for the hypothesis that gender-mainstreaming policies played a role in mitigating SEA in MINUSMA. This is primarily because the degree of gender mainstreaming in each mission was weak. Neither mission had a particularly high percentage of female troops, in fact, from 2014-2018, MINUSCA had a slightly higher percentage of female peacekeepers than MINUSMA in every year besides 2014. Further, MINUSCA had a gender advisor specifically assigned to the mission while MINUSMA did not. Overall, neither mission had made particularly robust efforts in terms of gender mainstreaming and thus, it could not have contributed to the level of SEA in MINUSCA.

Implications

While the gender equality of TCC's and gender mainstreaming did not play a role in the variation of SEA allegations between MINUSCA and MINUSMA, it is important to note that

this does not mean that they do not play a role in other peacekeeping missions. Rather, they did not play a role in this specific context. However, these are two of the most prominent hypotheses in the field and it is thus noteworthy that they are not explanatory factors in MINUSCA, which is one of the missions with the highest level of SEA allegations.

The failure of the gender mainstreaming hypothesis has important implications. In recent years, the UN has been increasingly concerned with increasing the presence of women in peacekeeping missions. However, the main finding of this study was not that gender mainstreaming practices in peacekeeping have no effect on SEA, but rather that both missions had inadequate gender mainstreaming practices and thus, this was not the explanatory variable. The fact that neither mission had strong gender mainstreaming practices is notable, particularly because MINUSMA and MINUSCA currently constitute the 3rd and 4th largest peacekeeping forces, respectively. This finding indicates that the UN may not be prioritizing gender mainstreaming practices to the extent that they claim to be.

Additionally, I want to be clear in that I am not claiming that gender mainstreaming is not important. We do not know the extent to which the level of SEA allegations in either mission would have been lower had the missions had more robust gender mainstreaming practices. However, we do know that gender mainstreaming could not have played a role in mitigating the SEA allegations in MINUSMA because the mission had weak gender mainstreaming practices. Thus, there we know there must be another explanatory factor at play.

The fact that it is not a TCC's record on gender equality but rather its record on human rights that is important in determining if the TCC will produce a high number of SEA in peacekeeping allegations is significant for several reasons. First, the literature largely ignores the role that human rights abuses by national security forces plays in SEA by peacekeepers and

thus, this study identifies a new perspective on the impact of TCCs on SEA. Additionally, the findings of this study have important implications for which troops the UN should prioritize in its recruitment of troops for UN Peacekeeping Missions. My analyses indicate that in order for the UN to limit allegations of SEA in peacekeeping missions, it need not prioritize the recruitment of troops from TCCs with positive records on gender equality, but rather that it must prioritize the recruitment of troops from TCCs with positive records on human rights within their host countries. This will be discussed at length in the policy recommendations.

The other main finding of this study, that a combination of a close proximity between UN Peacekeepers and a vulnerable population created the opportunity for abuse, has several implications. Other studies have shown that peacekeeping missions are more successful in terms of achieving their mandates when they can rely on intelligence from the local communities which, necessitates a close relationship between the peacekeepers and the local community. For example, engagement between MONUC forces and the local community was deemed a necessity for the successful completion of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of combatants (DDR).³²⁰ Since then, “strengthening and deepening engagement with communities in the United Nations (UN) peace operations has emerged as a key priority among high-level reviews of the UN system.”³²¹

In fact, the very factors that I found contributed to the low levels of SEA in MINUSMA- including the fact that the mandate does not prioritize the POC, the concentration of the mission in the sparsely populated Northern portion of the country and the distrust peacekeepers have towards the local population, has brought MINUSMA criticism. Specifically, the mission has been criticized for failing to protect civilians in a context where civilians could benefit from

³²⁰ Murphy, “UN Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Protection of Civilians.”

³²¹ Rupesinghe, “Strengthening Community Engagement in United Nations Peace Operations.”

protection from peacekeepers.³²² In March 2019 over 160 civilians were killed in the center of the country. This was the deadliest massacre the country has ever seen and it occurred despite the fact that UN Peacekeepers are currently deployed in Mali. In response to the massacre, Secretary-General Antonio Guterres claimed that the UN would need to undertake a re-examination of the mission which “should factor the dire security situation, including in Central Mali [...] and evaluate the current prioritization of MINUSMA’s objectives.”³²³ A report from the International Peace Institute explained that this almost certainly means restructuring the mission to better prioritize the protection of civilians which, may increase the frequency and intensity of contact between the peacekeepers and the local population.³²⁴

However, the findings of my study problematize a close relationship between peacekeepers and the local population, particularly when the local population is vulnerable to SEA, as was the case with IDPs in MINUSCA. Although Mali does not have a large IDP population, it is one of the least developed countries in the world- in 2018, Mali ranked 182 out of 189 countries on the Human Development Index (HDI).³²⁵ Although I did not find many instances of SEA outside of IDP camps or settlements, it is not inconceivable that Malian civilians could be at risk for SEA by peacekeepers if there is close contact between the peacekeepers and the local population. I found that IDPs often felt they were dependent on exploitative relationships with peacekeepers for survival. This situation could replicate itself in parts of the country that are particularly destabilized or impoverished.

³²² Di Razza, “Protecting Civilians in the Context of Violent Extremism: The Dilemmas of UN Peacekeeping in Mali.”

³²³ Di Razza, “Massacre in Mali Demonstrates Need to Prioritize Protection of Civilians in MINUSMA’s Mandate.”

³²⁴ Di Razza.

³²⁵ “Mali Human Development Report.”

The findings of my study indicate that the UN should be proactive in ensuring that a close relationship between the peacekeepers and local population does not turn into a familiar pattern of SEA. It does not necessarily imply that peacekeepers should not be in close contact with local populations, as this has been deemed a necessary component of successful peacekeeping missions. Rather, my findings indicate that the UN should implement policies specifically aimed at ensuring that this close contact does not create the opportunity for SEA. In the next section of this chapter, I will discuss several policy recommendations for preventing SEA in peacekeeping missions.

Policy Recommendations

Prioritize the recruitment of TCCs with positive records on human rights in their home countries

In order to mitigate the risks of SEA in UN Peacekeeping Missions, the UN must prioritize the recruitment of TCCs from member states whose national security forces have a positive record on human rights enforcement, particularly in relation to SEA, within their own country. As of date, the UN has repeatedly failed to do so. For example, the Burundian military has been accused of systemically using sexual violence to intimidate opponents to the presidents regime.³²⁶ In 2015, the UN launched the United Nations Independent Investigation on Burundi (UNIIB) which founds human rights abuses by security forces to be rampant and recommended that “The United Nations and the African Union phase out the use of Burundian troops in peacekeeping operations while the crisis continues.”³²⁷ Burundian peacekeepers are among the highest perpetrators of SEA in MINUSCA, yet, the UN continues to use them in the mission.

³²⁶ Cumming-Bruce, “Burundi’s Forces Are Engaging in Gang Rape, U.N. Official Says - The New York Times.”

³²⁷ “Report of the United Nations Independent Investigation on Burundi (UNIIB) Established Pursuant to Human Rights Council Resolutions S-24/1*,” 22.

Any nation, such as Burundi, whose national security forces are known to perpetrate SEA within their home country should not be used in UN Peacekeeping Operations. This may pose a problem for the UN, which has repeatedly acknowledged that it has difficulty recruiting and maintaining a large peacekeeping forces.³²⁸ However, the UN has claimed that “protecting civilians is a focus of modern peacekeeping” and SEA perpetrated against civilians by its own peacekeepers is inherently contradictory to this focus.³²⁹ Thus, the UN should *truly* prioritize the protection of civilians and refuse to accept troops from any country whose security forces have poor records on human rights enforcement at home, such as Burundi. If the UN cannot ensure that civilians will not be put into increased danger of SEA by deployment of a peacekeeping force, that force should not be deployed.

Limit unsupervised interactions between peacekeepers and the local population

The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) report in 2005 into SEA in MONUC pointed to unregulated interactions between MONUC peacekeepers and the local population as a contributor to the high levels of SEA in the mission. These interactions were unregulated for several reasons: first, the IDP camp was located directly next to a MONUC base. Second, the security perimeter around the MONUC camp was ill-enforced, which allowed peacekeepers to bring women in and out of the camps. Third, although the peacekeepers were officially prohibited from exiting the MONUC camp while off duty, this rule was not strictly enforced and the OIOS found multiple instances of peacekeepers fraternizing among the local population. This led the OIOS to give the official recommendation that the peacekeeping operation “ should identify and implement measures that ensure that all military compounds are adequately secured

³²⁸ “Overburdened, Underfunded, Overstretched Peacekeeping Operations Create ‘Yawning Gap’ between Expectations, Performance, Fourth Committee Told at Close of Debate | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases.”

³²⁹ “Protecting Civilians.”

to prevent unauthorized entry and egress as well as ad hoc trading between troops and the local population.”³³⁰

In 2007, another report from the OIOS investigated allegations of SEA in Bunia in the eastern region of the DRC. The report found that there was one contingent in Bunia that had successfully implemented measures to address SEA by peacekeepers. The report states the following:

The Member State 3 Commander installed mesh within the military camp’s perimeter fencing to prevent direct contact between the peacekeepers and the local population. Not only were basketball, football, volleyball, a running track and miniature golf facilities constructed within the camp, but mandatory games and tournaments, including a contest to see which unit could construct the best garden in front of its designated barrack, were also organized. Peacekeepers had access to Member State 3 television programs and were provided with free telephone calls home.³³¹

The report also notes that “Member State 3” received the lowest number of allegations of SEA and concluded that the actions taken by “Member State 3” should be used as a model for all contingents in MONUC. In my analysis, I found that the pattern of SEA in MONUC closely mirrors that in MINUSCA and UNMIL. Thus, I recommend that the actions taken by “Member State 3” in MONUC should serve as a model for all peacekeeping operations in which the peacekeepers are in close contact with local populations. Specifically, camp officials should ensure that the peacekeeping camp’s perimeters are truly secured so peacekeepers cannot exit the camp while off-duty. Additionally, peacekeepers that do break mission rules and exit the camp while off-duty should receive appropriate punishments. Camp officials should also provide adequate recreational activities within the borders of the peacekeeping camp to limit the incentive for peacekeepers to exit the camp. Together, these recommendations should limit unsupervised interactions between peacekeepers and the local populations.

³³⁰ “Investigation by the Office of Internal Oversight Services into Allegations of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” 5.

³³¹ “Office of Internal Oversight Services Investigations Division: Redacted Report of Investigation,” 11.

Prioritize the self-sufficiency of the local population

One of the central themes to this thesis is that of vulnerability. In countless reports of SEA by peacekeepers, victims report relying on sex with peacekeepers in order to live. In the CAR, one woman explained “I had regular breakfast and food everyday thanks to him [a UN peacekeeper].”³³² Another claimed that she repeatedly had sex with a Gabonese peacekeeper because she needed the money he gave her to survive. She explains “If I had more money it would help me forget and it would mean I would not have to consider trading sex for money.”³³³ This pattern is recurrent: for women and children living around MINUSCA bases, sex with peacekeepers was often one of the surest ways to make much needed money.

Thus, in order to limit SEA, the UN should prioritize the self-sufficiency of the local population. When MINUSCA bases are close to IDP camps or settlements, UNHCR should work together with MINUSCA experts to coordinate care for the IDPs so that they do not need to turn to sex with peacekeepers as a means for survival. Food, water and medical supplies should be freely and regularly distributed to those living in the camps. A report from UNHCR and Save the Children UK claimed that aid workers (including UN peacekeepers) distributing food to IDPs frequently withheld services otherwise entitled to the population until sex was offered in exchange.³³⁴ Any employee found guilty of engaging in such behavior should be immediately removed from the operation. While I acknowledge the time and resources needed to fulfill this request, ensuring that the local population is self-sufficient and does not feel it is necessary to engage in survival sex should be an absolute priority for the mission. To reiterate a previous point: if the actual priority of UN Peacekeeping Missions is the POC, ensuring that civilians have

³³² “Central African Republic, Part 3.”

³³³ “Central African Republic, Part 3.”

³³⁴ “Sexual Violence & Exploitation: The Experience of Refugee Children in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone.”

any and all necessary means for survival should be a top priority and should be funded before other aspects of the mission.

Further, the populations that surround UN peacekeeping bases should be adequately educated on their rights. Specifically, they should be aware of their entitlements to food, water and other supplies necessary for survival. UNHCR and Save the Children UK found that “[t]he level of sexual violence experienced by abducted girls and in IDP situations is much higher than those in refugee camps, especially where awareness campaign [sic] have been conducted as part of the sexual and genderbased violence program.”³³⁵ This finding indicates that where awareness campaigns were conducted (in the refugee camps) they were successful. Additionally, after UNMIL was accused of SEA, the mission undertook a widespread education campaign which included anti-SEA radio broadcasts, anti-SEA cartoons in newspapers, and the distribution of anti-SEA materials to schools. The “anti-SEA” messaging largely focused on informing the local population of their entitlements and the process for reporting SEA.³³⁶ After the empowerment campaigns conducted by UNMIL, allegations of SEA by peacekeepers in UNMIL dropped. Kelly Neudorfer explains that this was likely for two reasons. She describes:

Once they [the local population] were informed by the “No Help for Sex” campaign that they did not have to bow to the peacekeepers’ demands for sex in exchange for food or other material assistance, it is plausible to believe that either the beneficiaries were less willing to give in to these demands or that those handing out aid were less willing to make such demands, knowing that the population had been informed that it was not allowed.³³⁷

The success of the empowerment campaigns in UNMIL is promising and should be replicated in every UN Peacekeeping mission. These campaigns should be relatively low cost and can be carried out by the civilian staff already employed by the UN Peacekeeping Mission. I found some evidence that MINUSCA already in some educational campaigns, however, the

³³⁵ “Sexual Violence & Exploitation: The Experience of Refugee Children in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone,” 13.

³³⁶ Neudorfer, *Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN Peacekeeping: An Analysis of Risk and Prevention Factors*.

³³⁷ Neudorfer, 137.

findings of this thesis indicate that these campaigns are not entirely successful and thus, they should be reviewed for efficacy.^{338 339}

Future Research

One of the major drawbacks of this study was that it relied primarily on second hand interviews and anecdotal evidence as I was unable to travel to either the CAR or Mali to conduct first-hand research due to security reasons. Because SEA by UN Peacekeepers is an extremely sensitive topic, a more victim-centered approach in which victims were able to share their experiences with SEA by peacekeepers, would have been preferred. This approach will ensure that victims voices are being highlighted in the process of developing strategies and policies to combat SEA. Field research may yield additional insights overlooked in this study.

Due to time constraints, I chose to focus my study specifically on MINUSMA and MINUSCA. However, this study can and should be replicated by applying the findings to other UN Peacekeeping Missions to develop a broader understanding of SEA by peacekeepers around the globe. Overall, I would like to emphasize the continued need for research on this topic. SEA by UN Peacekeepers amounts to a grave failure of the international community to protect the most vulnerable among us, and must be addressed strongly and swiftly.

³³⁸ “MINUSCA.”

³³⁹ The anecdotal evidence I am referring to is primarily in Chapter 4 of this thesis.

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