Rogue Expectations: An Ethical Intervention for Political Philosophy of Race

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ABSTRACT

Contemporary political philosophers studying the effects of race approach it as being fundamentally a force of differentiation and oppression, taking a thoroughly Rousseauian approach to inequality as based in society rather than basic social interaction. This situation arises from the starting point of the debate, past a discussion on human perceptual and evaluative capabilities. One is left with promises of potential freedom should the structures of society that enforce race fall, leading only to another politics that understands humanity as inherently free from immediate evaluation. When thinkers do take questions of identity formation and association into account, such as Kwame Anthony Appiah’s Ethics of Identity, they simply reiterate the Rousseauian form for a liberal reformation. A critical eye must once again be turned upon the construction of the human and its perceptual capabilities when creating a political model. J. Reid Miller proposes an ethical model that denies a gap between the perception of a person or action and an ethical judgment regarding it. He notes the necessity for race and embodied characteristics to hold evaluative weight as a method of determining the value of a phenomenon. In tying human perception to racial expectations, Miller rejects both any potential value-neutral observation and any promise of equal judgment, as the action of a white person will not be defined as the same action when performed by a black person. From these expectations arises the possibility to challenge those bodies of knowledge perpetuated by political structures in favor of subversive “rogue expectations”.

Keywords: race, political philosophy, inequality, liberalism
The Problem of Political Accounts:

Philosophy of race is dominated by the question of racism and how to best perform antiracism in a racist state. The field looks mainly to understand and combat various forms of racial oppression and marginalization, with an un/stated end goal of racism’s mitigation or complete destruction. Comparatively less attention is paid to the question of race itself outside of the prescriptive against racism. Even outside of this discussion and in a more thorough definition of the phenomena of race, attempts at comprehension again focus on how to best remove oneself or a population from the ills of racism which, in this context, is often collapsed into race. Contemporary writers such as David Cochran, Falguni Sheth, and George Yancy focus their analyses of race not on a race-erasing colorblindness, but some form of racial equality moving forward. In disparate approaches to the contemporary liberal government of the US these thinkers look to position race and racialized people within the government and then enact the first steps of resistance to such a positioning. Even as these three consider the question from wildly different viewpoints on the current system, from reformatory liberalism to complete anti-liberalism, they share two critical features; they all believe in at least the potential of successful resistance, and yet they never conceptualize an understanding of race beyond such resistance. I contend that this absence is due to the necessity of inequality in understanding racial differences, as the existence of the latter is dependent upon the former; the inequality itself is not inherently one of political marginalization, but one of qualitative value judgements based on embodied racial characteristics. In understanding race and racial inequality as simply racism, one neglects the productive aspects created by race that goes beyond one’s cultural or national identity.

What is of most importance in these three writers is less their dissimilar diagnoses, but rather their shared starting position and narrative. Cochran, Sheth, and Yancy center their work
on the question “what political force is subjugating a racial group?” These three solely discuss what is taken from humanity through contemporary political structures; little, if any, attention is paid as to what humanity had before it being taken away. When Yancy discusses the distorted “imago of blackness”, what is assumed then to be taken from humanity is the inability to correctly perceive a black person. Sheth pronounces the start of race’s “infused meaning” as within the liberal system of government; therefore, there was then some prior period where one did not find any meaning in another’s race. Cochran’s argument presumes that political and economic imbalances lead to racial oppression; without that differentiation, the effects of racism should then dissolve. Through these writers and their implicit constructions comes the conclusion that race-based judgements are products of the liberal state alone.

Such assumptions of the ability to surpass racial inequality reflect an issue with the human figure these writers take up. Throughout the analysis of Cochran, Sheth, and Yancy, it will be made clear that they all maintain an understanding of humanity that has roots in the theory of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, even as Sheth and Yancy directly work against such a classical liberal figure in their anti-liberal pieces. The consequences of this assumed position of humanity are felt less in the three’s analysis of the political status of racial groups and more in their prescriptive accounts of “what one ought to do” and general positive accounts of what a proper politics should be. Taking mainly from Rousseau’s *Discourse on Inequality*, these three take up only the issues Rousseau puts forth following the entrance of the human into society; instead of taking up what qualities the human has, they only speak on what constrictions a society places upon humanity and human capabilities. In doing so, Rousseau’s human form returns as a negative societal being, one that has been only placed under greater chains following the shift from Nature into Society with no physical or mental growth to speak of. It is this being that
Cochran, Sheth, and Yancy hope to cleanse of the perceptual stains society has placed upon it. In their incisive critiques of Rousseauian liberalism these writers disprove the human form Rousseau fits his theory around; but by not extending their critique to the human figure, the three doom any positive political constructions by implicitly reconstituting the figure. Human autonomy and perceptual power then remain rooted in the theories of the Enlightenment, an era whose politics have now come into question while their human remains uncritiqued.

Following this analysis, I will turn to a scholar that does create a theory of racial formation and perception in relation to the political situation of marginalized people. Kwame Anthony Appiah’s *The Ethics of Identity* takes up the two questions of how one comes to be associated with a race and what to do following this association on an individual and political level. Through a comparison of his work to that of the previous three, one can easily pinpoint how the political question of race requires a nuanced conception of how we come into race and the functioning of racial judgement. Appiah’s explanation is not free from critique, as his conclusions regarding human perception remain stuck in the Rousseauian system. The *Discourse on Inequality* will be shown to provide a stronger theoretical framework to respond to than a purely political text. Appiah follows with an analysis on the construction of identities and the capacities of human judgement. His discussion of the proper political understanding for race and marginalized racial groups will both confirm the necessity of the discussion of human evaluation and judgement for political discussions (especially positive discussions of political theories) and how the pseudo-Rousseauian human is an incorrect model for discussion of a proper politics for humanity. Although he eschews the shared point of entry made by the previous three, Appiah’s conclusion of a soft pluralistic liberalism explicitly reconstructs the classical liberal human subject. In terms of form *The Ethics of Identity* succeeds in gathering the necessary pieces of
discussion for a politically oriented philosophy of race, but his analysis misses the mark in a way that makes explicit the similar implicit assumptions made by Cochran, Sheth, and Yancy.

One last intervention is needed in this discussion, one that directly challenges the neo-Rousseauian narrative that these thinkers ex/implicitly take up. J. Reid Miller takes up race as an ethical subject in terms of its function in evaluating, a function he takes to be necessary for human perception and distinction amongst people. Taking all perceptions to require an evaluation of a scene and the players in said scene, Miller understands race as formulations of perceived knowledge that work to define whatever action one makes based on expectations regarding this knowledge. Evaluative distinctions amongst races are then decided not through either the internal structure of the polity nor any unnecessary supplement, but in the perceptual functioning of the polity’s subjects. Our correction does not start at what we must do politically, because we cannot understand the proper relationship between humanity and politics with a faulty understanding of humanity. We must first concern ourselves with how humans can distinguish and judge amongst themselves. From this new comprehension comes a reformulation of the goals of a proper politics, one that recognizes as necessary appeals to racial judgements. This act of directly confronting racial evaluation instead of skirting around it allows for an actual challenge of various expectations, reformulating those that might be enforced by a state structure in favor of a rogue body of knowledge surrounding an embodied characteristic. To reject the ability to tear down racial evaluation does not preclude the ability to contest the evaluations that arise.

**Cochran, Sheth, and Yancy:**

*The Color of Freedom* begins with the claim that “[the] essential link between race and the ideal of freedom shows how questions of race are inescapably moral ones”¹, morality here
being a normative morality in the contemporary (1999) US context. This “ideal of freedom” refers directly back to the classic American liberal promise of individual freedom, the autonomy that allows people to be “authors of their own lives, who develop and pursue projects that are authentically their own”\(^2\). Autonomy for Cochran means both the freedom from extrinsic barriers to flourishing and the internal ability to create and engage in self-reflection without outside coercion regarding their life plans. It is then the theoretical formation of American liberalism that best allows for this autonomy to rise on a national scale, with a necessary tuning for those who have always been removed from it. In relating the two requirements of autonomy to the experiences of black Americans post-World War 2, Cochran finds the government to have failed the population in providing either part of this autonomy. His solution, in turn, draws upon both colorblind liberalism and black nationalism to form a synthesis that will provide internal and external autonomy going forward. External autonomy is a straightforward discussion for Cochran, where governmental structures must work through public policy that both supports black communities and puts black individuals in positions to create such policies.

For the internal factor of autonomy, Cochran expands the discussion of creation as necessarily arising from moral standards. These standards are not totalizing national ideals, but rather “standards from their social relationships, their communities, their participation within a cultural dialogue”\(^3\). It is through specific cultural groups that grant the means of thinking about oneself and one’s actions; it is the grounding for the narrative one creates and refers to when faced with a dilemma. Cochran states that the black population in the US has succeeded in providing themselves with such a narrative through institutions like black churches and black-owned businesses creating a unique civil society:

It is through the distinct institutions, practices, and meanings of black civil society, then, that African Americans are able to develop the cultural and social resources that group
members draw upon for autonomy, resources that help provide both the internal and external conditions that the meaningful exercise of autonomy requires. As black civil society is of a more fragile nature than white institutions, Cochran looks to rectify this situation in his liberalism. In doing so there is a hope that black populations could experience the same sense of security that liberalism provides for the white US population. The loss that Cochran then seeks to rectify is one of a forgotten promise of racial equality; a promise that can be solved simply through an improvement in political-economic standing.

What Cochran takes for granted in his work is both the presumption that the white American experience represents the ideal of self-fulfillment and that the experience of the white population can exist without the current status of the black population. In bringing the black population to the same status of whiteness presumes that a creation of economic equality and equal political representation is the same act as creating an equal social position between the two populations. This move rejects any distinction based on historical conditions as to how each party made it to such a position; should the black population reach a point of political equilibrium under the proposed method, the current denigrating calls against affirmative action “handouts” would only grow louder to distinguish between the two groups. Furthermore, Cochran’s presumptive construction of liberalism claims that the correct position for all people under a liberal system of government is the current position of whiteness in the US. This understanding then misses the necessary relationship that allows for white autonomy. Should a white population be in a position of autonomy, it necessarily requires the black population to be in its current position in the hierarchy to make the economic and social security possible.

As Cochran accepts the ideal liberal promise of autonomous action at face value, Falguni Sheth instead takes a critical eye to the function of liberal juridical-political functioning and in turn the function of race in such a setting. *Toward a Political Philosophy of Race* looks to
examine just how public policies work to not simply promote or attack racial groups but create races altogether. Seeing liberal theorists taking race as a given “rather than asking how race is instantiated through the state”\textsuperscript{6}, Sheth takes up how race acts in a tripartite manner that categorizes, naturalizes the category, and finally subjugates the category under sovereign power. In this process these groups are placed in dialogue with the protected race in the population, portrayed not as “citizen” but as “criminal”.

Sheth states that state categorization is an act of “locating that which is potentially pernicious to sovereign power and managing it through the technology of race”\textsuperscript{7}. In racialization, governmental systems create a motive to distinguish a group as threatening which then allows for legislation that directly or indirectly targets their status in the nation, leading into marginalization and exclusion. The managerial role of race in a liberal government is then “to seek out uncategorized (raw) material and transform it to produce certain categories of identification. These categories can be biological, political, or legal”\textsuperscript{8}. The shared characteristic then designates the group as distinct from other portions of the population. Unlike Cochran’s claim that a proper liberalism includes all, Sheth states that liberal systems necessitate a type of hierarchical system to exist. When discussing how the only legitimation of a liberal governmental law is the potential violence it can inflict upon a population, she notes that there then must be a segment of the population at risk of that violence:

The promise of universal protection of the law can only maintain its value when it is prevented from truly being extended to everyone. But the \textit{sheer value} of the liberal promise is that it cannot shirk its obligation to all who fall within its purview. The only method by which to circumvent this fundamental tension, then, is to create categories of those whom universal protection of the law will apply—selectively, that is, \textit{in such a way as to justify the exclusion of some while reiterating the importance of the law’s protection for ‘everyone’—that is, for everyone who counts}.\textsuperscript{9}
The protection of a single population through the rejection of others is then required for the liberal process to continue; without such a gradation there would be no fear of revoked rights and no fear of governmental action. The pledge of full autonomy then necessitates a retraction of external autonomy for a population; it could be the case that one racial group could improve in standing, but it must always maintain a relationship to another threatened racial group.

What is at issue here for Sheth’s work is less the analysis of the function and enforcement of race, as it provides a far more nuanced understanding of the structure of liberalism than Cochran, but rather its creation. By placing the creation of race in the hands of liberal governmental processes leaves open again the conclusion that there is a point where one can be removed from race or that humanity can perceive without such a category. The claim that political racialization takes up “raw material” and then creates race without any other referent assumes that the historical narrative or shared features had no evaluative worth prior to the event of racialization. This issue is reflected in her conclusion, where Sheth discusses the most promising provisional mode of resistance: the return of treatment under the same law, if not necessarily equal. Seeing immigration as a major space of racialization that places populations under a unique legal system as opposed to Constitutional law, Sheth proposes as a first step the “insistence that immigration law be integrated with Constitutional law, that immigrants be granted Constitutional protections.” While this move may declaw this specific racializing institution, her previous arguments suggest that the continued destruction of such institutions would then eliminate the racialization process. With the machine destroyed, would not race then fall along with it? When there is no tool to locate the unruly, what would then work to differentiate populations from each other? Through Sheth’s model, a post-liberal government would then potentially exist as post-racial.
Instead of focusing upon the economic or legal situation of the black population, George Yancy intends to establish how the black body is seen by a white observer and the consequences that follow from the perception. It is the political power held by the white population that then supersedes black self-understanding and replaces it with their own. Yancy begins with the claim that race acts as a necessary relation between two or more disparate instantiations. In taking on Fanon’s phrase of being black “in relation to the white man”, he states that “the meaning of my Blackness is constituted and configured (relationally) within a semiotic field of axiological difference, one that is structured vis-à-vis the construction of whiteness as the transcendental norm.”

It is only insofar as the white person becomes seen as virtuous that the black person must be then seen as sinful; without this evaluative distinction the racial distinction would be void of meaning. Similar to Sheth’s white population not considering the disenfranchisement of the black population as necessary for their position, Yancy’s white perceiver does not understand that the conception of blackness is a semiotic one that defines both itself and whiteness, creating its position as the transcendental norm. Whiteness in the Western context then takes up the role as the universal referent in Yancy’s vision; in the model of definition in relation to another, all these identities and characteristics are defined in how they are not white. Yancy classifies this as being representative of the transcendental norm, where Western society treats the white body as being without reference to another figure, but also that which all other bodies are defined against. Whiteness takes on the value of normalcy and neutrality, while the black population becomes the suspicious party.

The consequence of this relationship lies in the political imbalance between the two races, where the seemingly “neutral” perception of another overthrows any attempt to state their own position. Instead one simply becomes the stated definition of the white perceiver, not
necessarily through a verbal utterance, but a movement of the eyes, tensing of shoulders, or shifting of a purse. Yancy returns to Fanon through an analysis of his experience of such an event, where a young child clings to his mother in fear of the “cannibal Negro” Fanon:

My body was returned to me spread-eagled, disjointed, redone, draped in mourning on this white winter’s day…the lovely little boy is trembling because he thinks the Negro is trembling with rage, the little white boy runs to his mother’s arms: ‘Maman, the Negro’s going to eat me’.

Yancy determines that while one may claim that the child was only “seeing as if” Fanon was a cannibal, “the ‘seeing as if’, however, was collapsed into a ‘seeing as is’”15. There is no ability for Fanon to respond to the accusation or dissuade the interpretation, as every act performed is performed not as the intellectual Fanon, but as the cannibalistic figure the child sees16. In what Yancy defines as the “phenomenological return of the black body”, the black population has no say in what they are understood as, as the white perceiver utilizes a form of evaluative sovereignty that “leaves [the black body] distorted and fixed as a pre-existing essence”17. This distorted image is the black imago, the perception one has of blackness through the evaluative forces that cause suspicion. It is through this veil that blackness becomes utterly criminal and whiteness in turn becomes beyond reproach.

Lacking the ability to even define themselves, the black population is seemingly at a loss at what to do to prevent such marginalization in the eyes of the white population. However, Yancy does state that there have been events in the past where the black population has asserted itself as not simply under white definition. Describing instances of black agency mainly from antebellum slavery and the Jim Crow South, he insists that moments of tool destruction and other forms of transgression acted to subvert the black imago that decided that the population was weak-willed and meek: “Hence, to recognize the historical reality of Black resistance is to affirm dynamic forms of Black embodiment that belie the historical legacy of white lies and the Black
imago in the white imaginary.” In directly confronting what one takes the black race to be, there must then be a reformulation of the values expected of the race. This disassociation and revaluation would be the first step in revealing and perhaps even tearing away at the veil between white perceivers and black actors.

It is unclear how Yancy’s resistance model can happen against the workings of the black imago. If a white perceiver witnesses an event that directly contrasts with the imago, would not the expectations merely shift, not dissipate? Expectations of blackness by the white imaginary have shifted quite often over time while still maintaining an air of criminality. So long if the imago merely shifts, then the veil is in no threat of destruction, meaning whiteness maintains its sole position as the trustworthy, neutral perceiver. Yancy himself is concerned about the path he previously stated, as he heavily edited the black agency section in the second edition of Black Bodies, White Gazes, including a warning to those seeking full liberation:

Even as I believe in Black resistance, what if it will never free us politically? What if on the other side of resistance, as it were, is more resistance—resistance ad nauseum? What if full citizenship is like a carrot that is forever dangled before Black people, but just used to keep them hoping? In setting aside the hope of post-racial era in the future, Yancy instead looks to maintain practical forms of resistance to antiblack measures and laws while understanding that the “veil” is potentially untouchable. In his realization he becomes one of the few within the discussion to question the often-unsaid teleology of works in philosophy of race: the ending of the pernicious features of the phenomenon. Yancy’s distancing from his previous claims sets the stage for a necessary departure from the critiques these three thinkers make regarding racial injustice under liberal government.

The Shortcomings of the Current Debate:
This examination brings into question a great deal regarding the positive accounts of political theory these thinkers hold. When discussing what a specific political structure removes from one’s control, the positive account will likely look to see how one can reclaim it. In Yancy’s case, should the freedom of correct perception be bound up in the current neo/liberal political structure, then it would simply be an act of destroying the structure to regain this lost ability. What happens, then, if humanity never had such an ability? Why should we strive to achieve a type of perception we have never been proven to have? There is no discussion in any of the three works as to why we should assign to humanity these abilities of perception and judgement. Cochran assumes a sort of internal autonomy that racial oppression then revokes, while Sheth and Yancy understand a perception that can precede race or evaluations based on race, respectively. It is simply presumed that these capacities have been chained away, presumed since the formative thought of the very political structure these three look to either revise or destroy.

The fear of a positive political theory leading to a false recovering of human subjectivity lies in a previous site of such an occurrence: Jean-Jacques Rousseau and classical liberalism. Political philosophy during the Enlightenment paid closer attention to the position of the human in the world than the contemporary discussion, as republican thinkers sought to redefine the human as requiring equal treatment under the law. Their construction, however, has been proven faulty by the incisive critiques made by the three writers and many others. A positive theory of building a politics works only insofar as it can fit with the subject within the polity; since Sheth’s and Yancy’s respective analyses challenge the usefulness of liberal government, the human figure must then be reevaluated. Instead, Rousseau’s narrative of the progression of the Natural Human maintains its structural integrity in a modified light. Since the era of classical liberalism
was the last major shift in the understanding of humanity in political philosophy, the current
discussion takes on the basics of Rousseau’s model. The *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality*
charts a new genealogy of humanity from Nature to Society, decrying the past position of human
inequality in Old Regime society. What this narrative concludes on, the injustice felt by the
societal human, will then be removed from context and cast as a completely negative process.

Rousseau marks the distinction between the Natural and Societal human as a one of
dependence; while the solitary Natural human need not rely on any tool nor person, the Societal
human relies on both figures to maintain itself. The moment of societal shift occurs in the
scenario of closely positioned individuals committing themselves to a form of interrelated labor.
In this proto-society there is a level of tool making that has removed them partially from the
purely Natural to a position “between the indolence of the primitive state and the petulant
activity of our amour prope”20. Rousseau considers this level of society to be one of harmony,
where people could live in a state of contentment and happy equality. While he acknowledges
distinctions made between people in terms of physical characteristics, they hold no evaluative
difference in such a state21. The turning point in human history, the start of inequality amongst
people, is not then in such communities, but when people began to need each other:

But the moment one man needed the help of another, as soon as it was found to be useful
for one to have provisions for two, equality disappeared, work became necessary, and the
vast forests changed into smiling Fields that had to be watered by the swat of men, and
where slavery and misery were soon to sprout and grow together with the harvests.22

From communal struggles comes division of goods, leading to imbalances of goods based on the
now value-laden physical differentiations that allowed some to grow more than others, and
eventually the rise of land ownership and feudal exploitation. This rise coincides with the full
development of human capabilities of reason and other faculties: “Here, then, are all our faculties
developed, memory and imagination brought into play, amour prope interested, reason became
active, and the mind almost at the limit of the perfection of which it is capable”\textsuperscript{23}. The path

towards society is one that forever removes humanity from the position of content individualism, while also acting to enhance one’s mental faculties\textsuperscript{24}.

What is of importance here is Rousseau’s positioning of this shift as not simply one of lost freedom, but the accompanied growth of intellectual capabilities. In \textit{The Social Contract}, he explains that through the irretrievable loss of personal autonomy that the Natural state provides comes the arrival of the civilized, Societal human: “What man loses by the social contract is his natural freedom and an unlimited right to everything that tempts him and he can reach; what he gains is civil freedom and property in everything he possesses”\textsuperscript{25}. Despite the period of injustice and distress that led humanity to such a situation, there is a politics that is better suited to this new state of humanity. Through a proper system of governance that recognizes the true capacities that society has established for humanity, one can then “recover” their freedom that a politics that refuses to account for\textsuperscript{26}. Here Rousseau’s narrative reaches its conclusion, where a new breed of humanity looks to better itself through the removal of unjust shackles that also led them to such a rational state.

Instead of stating what has led humans to be placed under restrictive chains, the previous three thinkers focus simply on how to recover them, initiating a reactionary process that even Rousseau may not agree with: that the best government can be one apart from the conceptual shifts made in this sort of society. In jumping ahead to the restorative portion of the political argument, Cochran, Sheth, and Yancy all take the approach that the societal shift is permeable. Without their own understanding of what human capacities and capabilities are in relation to race, they simply defend an amorphous model of humanity that goes uncriticized and undefined; creating a politics for this imaginary subject provides no help to humanity. Having proven that
the Rousseauian models of humanity and politics are flawed, these writers continue to use a version of the former to reformulate the latter. Should the politics fail to accommodate humanity, the figure used in the theory is faulty; to implicitly reuse the discredited figure is to undermine the following political construction. To fully examine how this oversight undermines the necessary conversation to be had on a proper politics regarding race, I will turn to Appiah, a contemporary figure who does work to understand how people come into racial identity and by what means they understand both themselves and others as raced, before moving into current racial situations and how to deal with them.

**Appiah’s Construction:**

Leading into his discussion as how to properly understand the recognition of identity groups’ autonomy while still attempting to enforce a regulation surrounding multiple groups, Kwame Anthony Appiah in *The Ethics of Identity* charts his view of the formation and association of one with an identity. He describes the process of identification as arising from three distinct sources: the existence of an understood identity group (which also involves various associated dispositions and tendencies), the association and internalization of one as within an identity group, and the acknowledgement of oneself as being in some identity group by others. The existence is not simply a one-word descriptive about what people fall under such an identity, however, but a system of knowledge about the identity and how such people tend to act: “Let us call a typical label for a group ‘L’. This consensus is usually organized around a set of stereotypes (which may be true or false) concerning Ls, belief about what typical Ls are like, how they behave, how they must be detected”\(^{27}\). One does not simply become tied to an identity through a similar appearance with others who are a part of it; they also take on the various expectations that people have regarding what people of such an identity do. It is not enough for
one to claim a tie to an identity, as being a member must involve being “treated as” a member by the greater population of members and non-members. Without such treatment—as one is left with a failed identifying link, akin to Rachel Dolezal’s claims to blackness that have been utterly rejected by all parties. At the same time, it is not enough for one to be fully an identity only through being identified as such by others. The second factor of identification with an identity involves a framing of one’s own life trajectory through what is expected of such an identity: “By way of my identity I fit my life story into certain patterns—confirmation at puberty for a religious identity, tenure in your mid-thirties for a professional one—and I also fit that story into larger stories; for example, of a people, a religious tradition, or a race.” To associate oneself with an identity is to believe that one’s life experiences fit into a greater narrative that long precedes them, where they are an extension of a much longer play. The second factor then involves a taking up of the role as such an inheritor, what Appiah elsewhere describes as scripts, where one attaches oneself to an already-defined character that provides a general track of their life narrative. It is not enough for an outside force to make a claim on one’s identity (one can take up the elementary school “you’re gay!” insult as an example), but one must also internalize an identity as applying to them and their situation.

This tripartite formulation denotes the requirement of accepting an association and a general acceptance by others of said association. Identification then involves a necessary enactment of one’s associated identity in relation to outside statements that one is indeed part of such an identity. From Appiah’s construction comes a hardier ground for his political arguments for what to do with race and other identity categories that result in oppression and marginalization; in understanding just how one comes to be an L one can then follow how one must work to solve the problems that Ls face in society, as well as evaluate these solutions.
through a critique of the formative theory. Rather than leaving the construction of human identity formation and perception up to conjecture that fits the theory, Appiah’s direct discussion allows for a proper critique to begin, as his claims of association with an identity frames his politics of rooted cosmopolitanism, where it is a shared upbringing and culture that one takes up, not a race that is thrust upon oneself, that allows for both a unity of groups and an ability to interact with other groups in good faith and with equal treatment.

The Maintenance of the Veil:

What is at issue with Appiah’s claim to identification is the assumed agency one has in embodying it, due to the time at which one is understood to be a part of their identity group. Regarding the second factor of identification, his claim that the internalization may occur only through a “thinking of yourself as an L” invokes a requirement of personal action, a “taking up” of the identity. His usage of active acceptance of one’s identity presumes a period of infancy into adolescence that denies at least the full association of someone with an identity group. While one may understand a child as not seeing a nuanced viewpoint of their association, it is a misunderstanding to state that a child requires a recognition of oneself as being in that identity group to be classified as part of it. Identity, foremost, determines one’s reaction to another, which then in turn works to define oneself. A subject’s parents have far more influence in determining one’s racial identity, as such a conceptualization occurs even prior to one’s birth. Yet Appiah looks to cast the process of identification as one of accepting one’s relation to the group with an association to others who place one into the group. Under his construction, one comes to know a racial/cultural identity before identifying oneself with it. This period between knowing of and identifying with grants a subject two major abilities. First, the subject is able to not be defined through such an identity at some point in their life; as they have not directly
accepted the association with the group, the subject is, for a period of time, outside of any related history. Secondly, the subject has the agency to then identify oneself with such a group; while they are coerced by outside forces into accepting one identity, a subject still must enact their own agential powers for a successful identification. This process needs a stronger chronological discussion, as it will better reveal how the actual process of identity formation is less relatable to identification than it is to conscription; there is no implication of choice nor ability to refuse the identification with a racial identity. There is a great difference between coming to know one’s racial identity by looking at one’s skin and matching it to others and being told that one matches another’s skin color.

A more faithful chronological order of Appiah’s three factors would be one of the knowledge of identity leading to outside identification leading to self-identification, where the application of the identity onto a person far precedes one’s ability to associate oneself with it. Outside definition of someone as being a specific race begins far before one becomes aware of the concept of the identity. This definition is also not limited to that of individuals, but of social institutions. Louis Althusser’s theory of interpellation works to understand how people become identified as subjects under a state. He explains his understanding of ideological construction through the typical understanding one has of a fetus prior to birth:

…it is certain in advance that it will bear its Father’s Name, and will therefore have an identity and will always be irreplaceable. Before its birth, the child is therefore always-already a subject, appointed as a subject in and by the specific familial ideological configuration in which it is ‘expected’ once it has been conceived.31

Taking ideological apparatuses as the mechanism for definition of subjects, he denies the ability of self-definition outside of the already-defined boundaries. Even prior to existing as a separate person this subject is already identifiable with a name, race, and social status. Instead of a strictly negative legal enforcement or a removable imago, ideology provides the identity categories that
one must be defined through to be properly understood. Much like Rousseau, there exists for Appiah a certain temporal moment where one can be in communication with others yet defined outside of inequality. In Rousseau’s case it is the historical moment before the advent of intercommunal work; for Appiah it is the period prior to the taking up of one’s identity script. For Althusser, there is no space for one to actively take up any racial role, only to refer to it as a necessary part of oneself. An understanding of oneself as conscripted into a racial identity refutes this sense of autonomous choice Appiah maintains in taking on a guiding narrative.

The idea of having some sort of say in how one defines oneself as a part of an identity lends itself to a claim that judgements based upon such identities are necessarily incorrect, as Appiah does in his article “Racisms”. In the piece he discusses various forms of racism and racialism in general, including occasions where people of a marginalized race evaluate members of the same race as different than others in performing the same action. In this scenario Appiah still defines this action as a moral error, stating “if two people share all the properties morally relevant to some action we want to do, it will be an error—a failure to apply the Kantian injunction to universalize our moral judgements—to use the bare facts of race as the basis for treating them differently”\(^{32}\). Rather than a showing of support or a necessity of human judgement, this form of intrinsic racialism is a “[distortion] of rationality characteristic of racial prejudice”\(^{33}\). Should one have agency not only in one’s decisions as related to themselves as a member of a group but also in being associated with said group, there is room then to negotiate what one is identified as. Should there be room for negotiation, then there is an ability for one to forcefully hold an identity at bay from oneself; if this is so, why should one not be able to do so with others? The theme of potential disassociation remains strong in Appiah’s work; while he addresses questions as to the formation of identity and how one can come to be understood as X
(unlike writers such as Cochran who take up a presumed Rousseauian approach), his conclusion remains devoted to the belief of potential separation.

Finally, the question arises as to the possibility of such disparate identities to not be in a position of domination/submission. Appiah emphasizes that communication between two groups should never be coercive or involve an imbalance in power dynamics: “And it is conversation, not mere conversion, that we should seek; we must be open to the prospect of gaining insight from our interlocutors”\(^34\). The “conversation” requires an ability for each party to come to a shared starting ground of what is happening in a situation and how to address it. As each group has a different understanding or shaping of the world, the conversation must begin with a consensus of what is going on. Especially when considering questions of power imbalances between identities, a pure synthesis regarding the situation seems impossible; one converser and their position will supersede another. Within Appiah’s discussion of equal conversation between identity groups, the question still lies as how one can confirm the equal treatment of such multivariant understandings of the world.

**Miller’s Human:**

When Appiah discusses a conversation between identities, he takes identity to mean something greater than shared embodied characteristics. Judgements should only be based upon one’s cultural inheritance, as such characteristics as race will only provide false and distorted knowledge. J. Reid Miller, in contrast, understands race and similar characteristics as holding not only useful evaluative weight, but also allows one to be identifiably human. Returning to the conclusion that a proper political philosophy fully defines the subject in question, I will conclude with a politicizing of the human whose judgement Miller describes as being necessarily evaluative regarding bodily perceptions. Stating that differentiation in kind also requires
differentiation in value, any perception then requires an immediate judgement of worth; in the case of perceiving a person, their racial makeup is then always immediately available. In *Stain Removal*, Miller defines race as a part of the function of ethics regarding the judgement of another, where differentiation among humans inherently requires evaluative differences to already exist.

Miller’s explanation of ethics and valuation does not apply simply to determining what things are “‘good’ and ‘bad’ but rather allocates and denominates things as they ‘are’”\(^35\). Starting from the basics of perception, he explains just how inconceivable it is to have purely descriptive account of a person without recognition of their embodied features. In asking how one comes to recognize a figure as human, Miller questions just what such an unlinked perception would look like: “How does one configure a subject who is not disfigured by the stains of associative embodied relations? ...whether the self enters the perceptual field through marks whose differential identity is secured through associative qualities and thus, concurrently, differential worth”\(^36\). Perception, and in turn, judgement, require a semiotic understanding of the various categories we define objects and people through; the meaning of these categories is not found in whatever inheres within them, but insofar as they are considered different from another. Should we then be able to distinguish between races, race must provide some essential knowledge for understanding human actions. Without such knowledge the phenomenon of race would not even be perceivable, as it would either exist in the impossible descriptive space outside of ethics.

What makes up the body of knowledge surrounding one’s body? Miller takes such perceptual expectations as constantly framing and defining what an action is at all times. Taking on Fanon’s train anecdote, Miller examines just how perception requires the action of racial expectations: “…the stark power of the scene comes not from Fanon’s deed being misrecognized
but from the impossibility of recognizing any of his deeds outside of a racial history of responsibility”\textsuperscript{37}. In contrast to Yancy’s position of the imago veiling Fanon’s actual intent from the child, Miller determines that it is only because of the violent expectation the child had of the black man that such an interaction had any meaning at all. To take another example, one person walking down a street sees another person outside a storefront. How do they determine what action this person is performing outside the storefront? How do they distinguish between the possibilities of standing, waiting, loitering, or casing? It is through these embodied characteristics that include race that one determines what has occurred. The consequences of such divergent possibilities should be immediately apparent, as a race that one expects criminal intent from will be accused of committing crimes more often; that statistical data, without acknowledging just how actions come to be defined, can have dangerous implications for judicial and political responses. Should one expect to enter a society where such divergences can be rectified, they will only reappear in more hidden, insidious areas.

Through an understanding of a human that necessitates evaluative judgements based on race, it is obvious that the previously mentioned positive political accounts and methods of resistance will not do for Miller’s human. The goals that Appiah seeks out to fulfill must fail at the stage of judgement, as they either require a point of neutral judgement of an actor or a positioning of multiple racial groups in the same point in a semiotic relationship: an impossibility that would make the two groups indistinct from each other. Under semiotics, no one thing X has inherent meaning, but instead through the relationship to it being not-Y, not-Z, etc. Translating semiotics into understanding value judgements regarding race, one then cannot position two or more races as having the same expectations, as one could not differentiate between them. The idea of “treating all people equally” in the style of Martin Luther King, or “coming into equal
conversation” for Appiah, would require not differentiating between any people, as their various characteristics all carry different evaluative weight.

To be distinct individuals with perceptible actions, there must be already an ethical subject with certain expectations that no increased awareness can dismiss or suspend: “If the perception and representation of phenomena do not precede evaluation but presume it, the ‘stain’ [or ‘distortion’] of value is neither epiphenomenal nor extraneous but intrinsic and formative.”

Should all appearing phenomena necessarily be qualitative and based on a body of knowledge surrounding one’s race, the idea of having a value-neutral experience followed by a distortion is precluded. To assume so grants humanity a false perceptual power with major implications. The definition of one’s actions always arise not from an autonomous subject performing an act, but an audience observing an act in relation to the embodied characteristics of the performer.

To directly contrast this picture with Appiah, what Miller proposes is not a case of one actively taking up a role from a point of undefined racial identity. One does not come into being with an understanding of a multitude of identity narratives one then attaches to, as that would presume a point before embodied judgement and evaluation. Taking directly from Althusser, Miller translates the ideological universality of existence where nothing can be understood outside of it to a universality of ethical judgements:

The preethical diegesis would accordingly be a preideological one, free of institutions and state apparatuses; thus to stage the scene as the coming to consciousness of an ‘innocent’ individual would affirm ideology as brainwashing or staining in the manner against which Althusserian theory is directed.

To imagine a scene of perception where one is not yet fully a part of a racial group is to be speaking to some undefined human; one cannot cognize an unraced human. In the contemporary US construction of a human, it is necessary for one to have an inherited link to a larger racial
group, which presumes a series of expectations and tendencies apart from any claims that this knowledge lies instead in “ethnicity” or “culture”.

Miller’s analysis also allows for the discussion of the equality of dialogue that should take place in the liberal cosmopolitan view. Taking the example of the person outside the storefront, say another perceiver, a person of a different ideological upbringing is sitting on a nearby bench, is also seeing the person near the storefront. Drawing from their understanding of the person’s skin color and the understood knowledge surrounding it, one person concludes that they are loitering and proceeds to confront them. The person on the bench does not come to the same conclusion, having different expectations of the person at the storefront. In Appiah’s terms, the identity one bases their narrative on also determines how one perceives every action another performs. In this scene, then, the two perceivers should enter into a conversation on equal footing. When they disagree on what the basic action was that the two perceived, however, it is impossible to create a stable starting point. Before coming to determine whether the person outside the storefront was in the right or not, they must first agree upon what the action itself was. In communication across identities, to have a “starting point” is to capitulate to the one group’s perception or have to irreconcilable judgements of a phenomenon. If the contemporary discussion focuses upon why loitering is good or bad instead of whether this act is loitering, one has already supplicated to a specific perception. Should two perceivers communicate with the premise that a greater truth to their perceptions would come into focus, what will occur instead is the supplanting of both conclusions with some new unequal evaluative perception at best.

So, then, what does the proper politics under the evaluative human look like? In this reformulation that discredits any claims to equal footing, what is the corrective direction going forward that does not involve a tearing away or an equal reconciliation? One may imagine that
such definitions cannot be actively fought against, as they are constituted by the very systems that allow for any form of identification. It is within these values, however, that the potential for rearrangement exists. I will argue that there is a potential for a correct form of evaluative expectations that begins first with such a recognition of this always-existing factor and leading into an understanding as to how they come to be formed.

**A Roguish Revolution:**

What cannot be said about contemporary liberal governments is that they create and fully manage the production of race and evaluative distinctions amongst races; what can be said is that they manage and enforce a set of expectations through various apparatuses. These expectations can be defined as ideological expectations, which work to propagate and reproduce an understanding of racial tendencies to best maintain the status quo. In a fusion of Sheth and Althusser’s understandings of juridico-political and state apparatuses, one can understand a government attempting to maintain the current relation of evaluative expectations between races and have the means to enforce such trends through educative processes, the naturalization of legal differentiation, etc. There is then no “stripping away” occurring on the level of perception and evaluative judgements as Sheth might claim. A state can instead enforce a specific set of expectations that reify the power dynamics between races in a nation. This enforcement can be countered through a direct confrontation and a cultivation of an already-existing body of knowledge in competition with the body the liberal governmental structure perpetuates.

Should the focus of a work of justice then be on these processes that enforce such expectations and tendencies, what must first be confronted is the bare existence of these perceptual necessities. Shannon Sullivan’s focus on white antiracist performance in *Good White People* allows for a reading of a path to take in raising a white child in a white household. Stating
that “it is inevitable that in a racist world, a white child will learn racist habits from her parents (and others)”\textsuperscript{41}, she takes the position that such a household will be beholden to white supremacy simply by existing in a period of white supremacy. There is no possible isolation from interacting with these expectations; to believe so is to allow for their necessary and now unmonitored continuation. To take a direct approach, to learn how to “most productively deal with…racist habits and beliefs that [parents] and their children have”\textsuperscript{42}, is the proper position to hold discussions, where it is never presumed that the absence of such expectations are possible or that the erasure of expectations in general are the goal.

In confronting these unjust expectations, one may wish pinpoint the historical moment where these tendencies became known as such and necessarily tying the black population to criminality. However, this case can never be made under Miller’s construction. These expectations of criminality do not arise from any moment of crime, but rather from a simple understanding of eternal criminality. Miller draws a relation to the understanding of blackness as criminal to that of the unknown and unknowable Hamitic crime, where the undefined act Ham performs before Noah is still evidence for the cursed inheritors of his blood:

Thus the difficulty of identifying the substance of Ham’s crimes lies not in the discovery of a content that could be made present but in the impossibility of the emergence of any nameable crime outside an inheritable language of comparative worth. What can be said to open up in this moment instead would be a semiotics of value; in other words, “criminality” rather than “crime”.\textsuperscript{43}

There is no historical crime that one can point to that leads to the contemporary expectation, only that a confluence of untraceable notions and fragmentary tropes have been maintained by various state apparatuses that understand the black population as more likely to be performing a criminal act. This search for some sort of starting point also leads to an understanding of these expectations that crystalize them as always connoting the same type of criminality or virtue.
Again, Miller disputes this claim entirely; these expectations are in fact constantly rewritten:

“One might, that is, recognize one’s ethical configuration as an executor of a fortune whose worth is continually revalued”\textsuperscript{44}. It is far from the case that blackness is a constant signifier of criminal activity, it is due to the aforementioned structures that such understandings have been maintained. Here lies the potential for a political revolution that can enact feasible change in perceptions of racial criminality; instead of tearing away an imagined barrier between true and false, a focus must lie instead on reformulating the evaluative perception that is always in flux.

Should one wonder just where these alternative bodies of knowledge arrive from, the answer would be that they are already here. While ideological expectations may universally permeate the US, they do not hold a full monopoly on the available bodies of knowledge people hold. As seen before in the example of the person outside the storefront, no set of expectations will be universally agreed to. There are people who will perceive the actions performed by a black person with an expectation of virtue, sometimes in a corrective act against ideological expectations and sometimes because they grew up understanding racial expectations in a wildly different manner than what state apparatuses project. Not existing as a corrective moment after the first perception of an action but instead at the very moment of perception, these expectations work to upset the common ground put forward by ideological expectations.

To hold differing expectations is not to state that they exist without reference to ideological expectations. Much of the formulations involved in such expectations are in fact reformulations based on ideological expectations. In understanding the ideological expectation of criminality in blackness, other expectations form to combat what is seen as an unjust body of knowledge. Black criminality, then, can be reconfigured as corrective black virtue, or perhaps reevaluated as black roguishness and rebellion. One seeing an act of loitering conflicts with
seeing an act of waiting, just as an act of vandalism and graffiti can also be understood as one of artistry and picaresque disobedience. By rejecting a state-sponsored body of knowledge, a holder of these expectations allows for a destabilization of the naturalized grounds state apparatuses attempt to maintain. As these bodies of knowledge are deemed unofficial and work directly against ideological expectations, a set of expectations that defy those that perpetuate the status quo can be defined as rogue expectations.

These rogue expectations have a similar formative procedure to ideological expectations in that they arrive to a person prior to birth. While no one is free from the Althusserian entry into subjecthood prior to birth, the way one enters can radically change one’s grounds. For example, a household that maintains a set of ideological expectations may plan to introduce children to law enforcement procedures with recruitment-style PSAs and media that hold police officers in a virtuous position. On the other hand, there exist many households that shun such a figure, instead educating children to doubt and question the actions officers perform. For example, take one of the many children-police workshop events put on by Jack and Jill of America, where the focus of the civilian-law enforcement relationship is not of idolization, but of survival:

From Baltimore to Ferguson, Charlotte to Atlanta, Houston to Oakland, there are now organized workshops about race and policing hosted by black churches, fraternities and sororities, and civic organizations. They carry names such as “The Law and Your Community” and “Surviving the Stop”. These events both reflect and perpetuate a thoroughly unique knowledge surrounding what actions a police officer is likely to perform. Should a police officer then be expected to act in a manner that requires such programs like “Surviving the Stop”, this indicates that rogue expectations are already existing, and people may be introduced to them long before birth.

One may come to question why rogue expectations are more valuable to follow than ideological ones. If both sets share both the same pre-birth arrival and work as a subjective
evaluative force, why should one hold more merit than another? The distinction arises through how such expectations arise, as the ideological expectation of criminality arrives from an ahistorical moment and a convergence of tropes. It is similarly the case that the rogue expectations are not ties to a singular crime, but they do claim a multiplicity of historically-pinpointed events in recent history. “Surviving the Stop” was not created out of one individual event of police brutality, but a consistent pattern of violent actions committed upon a black population. Instead of pointing solely to some unnameable prehistoric moment where black criminality arose, a holder of rogue expectations creates their body of knowledge through both long past and recent phenomena. Should one ask why such a holder understood a stop-and-frisk procedure as a violent action, they would be able to point directly to scores of supporting evidence of police brutality and discrimination against marginalized populations. In a larger sense, when such a holder is then asked what leads them to understanding US governmental processes as violent, they simply need to point towards Sheth’s previous analyses of rescinded rights or Yancy’s discussion of black non-agency in the face of white definition.

It is then through rogue expectations that the primary issue of contemporary political philosophy of race can be addressed. Returning to the question of what race can exist as outside of racism and antiracism, an understanding of the phenomenon as a play of expectations and tendencies about a group captures just how productive and necessary such expectations are. Race does not only require evaluative differences, it works to create the possibility for understanding action through such differences. Just as one cannot cognize an unraced human, any action performed by a figure outside of race would be impossible to perceive and evaluate. Through Miller’s analysis of the productive aspect of race, its political involvement should not be understood as necessitating a flight from it, but rather understanding it as a constituent part of
humanity’s ability to perceive one another. A flight from race or a destruction of racial evaluations simply delays a necessary reformulation of humanity’s perceptual limits and, by extension, political action.

**Conclusion: A Matter of Education**

Where, then, do these rogue expectations grow and enter in communication with each other? This work discusses how such holders are formed within a household and may be inherited in a small family setting, but not quite how it could grow into a greater revolutionary movement. I would argue that it is through a process of education: not as classroom lectures but as gatherings of households who maintain similar rogue expectations that allow for a cultivation of such bodies of knowledge and a preparation for practical movements. The fostering of a pocket of such expectations will, while not preventing the entry of ideological expectations into the space, allows for holders to reshape these expectations and train younger generations how to reshape them, as well. Communal education can also work as a vector of synthesis and communication moving from the household setting into larger group dynamics. While there is necessarily a multiplicity of families that hold rogue expectations, there is no reason to say that these expectations are identical, especially if they arise from personal experience or experiences of another family member. The actions that such a group should take on may be one of demonstrations or they can take a more hardline revolutionary tack. Whatever the action turns out to be, what matters most is the goal of expectation propagation, not elimination.

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2 Cochran 68
3 Cochran 85-86
4 Cochran 112-113
5 Cochran 114: “As a historically marginalized and subordinated minority, black Americans often find the institutions of black civil society fragile and vulnerable within a larger and often hostile American society”.
By “evaluative worth” I mean the placing of any value upon such racial characteristics in defining what one’s abilities or tendencies are, that, according to Sheth, prior to the event of governmental racial creation these elements are simply descriptive and carry no positive or negative connotations.


Fanon 93: “…the Negro is trembling, the Negro is trembling because he is cold…the lovely little boy is trembling because he thinks the Negro is trembling with rage.”


Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. *Social Contract*, p. 41: “I would say; as long as a People is compelled to obey and does obey, it does well; as soon as it can shake off the yoke and does shake it off, it does even better; for in recovering its freedom by the same right as the right to which it was robbed of it, either the people is well founded to take it back, or it was deprived of it without foundation”.


Appiah 68; “To treat someone as an L is to do something to her in part, at least, because she is an L (where ‘because she is an L’ figures in the agent’s specification of her reasons for the act)”.

Appiah 68

Appiah, Kwame Anthony. “Identity Against Culture: Understandings of Multiculturalism”. *UC Berkeley Occasional Papers*, edited by Christina M. Gillis, 1994. p. 24; “…it is not that there is one way that gay people or blacks should behave, but that there are gay and black modes of behavior. These notions provide loose norms or models, which play a role in shaping the life-plans of those who make these collective identities central to their individual identities. Collective identities, in short, provide what we might call scripts: narratives that people can use in shaping their life plans and in telling their life stories”.


Appiah in *Anatomy of Racism*, 16
Quite often the action’s definition will be determined by the material inequalities and political power dynamics at play between the two perceivers.

Sullivan, Shannon. *Good White People: The Problem with Middle-Class White Anti-Racism*. SUNY Press, 2014. p. 113

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