The 1968 Municipal Elections

PDC 7%, MLN 27%, PR 66% don't show all that much. Still the PR has increased its control from 47%. Perhaps the most important thing it shows is that people do not vote for political or economic reasons. There are others more important.

He sees the military institution in the midst of change. This had started under the Peralta regime. Look, the Peralta government allowed PR to take power.

The Mano Blanco had its beginning under the Peralta regime. It was started by those elements who did not want the government to turn over power to Mendez Montenegro. They committed some acts of terrorism, but Peralta put them down.

After 2 amnesty offers the army went out after the guerrillas who were concentrated in the Zacapa Izabal regions. The guerrillas were in control of these regions because no other force was there to challenge them. They held sway not by popular support but by the point of a gun.

Arriaga and Arana decided that they had to fight fire with fire so they armed MLN types and also formed small army command groups to fight in extra-legal ways. What these army groups did would be then blamed on the Mano and Crag etc., groups which never really existed with the exception of the Mano.

Then things started to get out of hand. These groups started after non-communists.

On March 28 M. M. took a very important step- he fired Arriaga, Sesa,
and Arana. Most of the paramilitary groups have been disbanded.

Col. Hacker (Military 4).

Col. Peralta thought of the guerrillas as bandits and for that reason did not make any real effort to put them down. With M. M. there has been a complete reshuffling within the military.

Last year military aid to Guatemala ed 1.4 million. But then there were emergencies packages sent also- 3 choppers, armoured troop carriers and communications equipment.

The army can handle insurgency when they find the insurgents. Civic action program at much the same pace as it was in 1966.

Military take about 80 9% of budget. Military are trying to keep it down. If we withdrew military aid, their budget would have to go up, meaning less funds for other government programs.

He was not allowed to go out to the field to be an observer. We have no advisors out there.

At the end of the conversation, we have "had very few complaints with the military. We advised that they cut down on the apparent violence." But Col Arriaga understood that leaving dead bodies on the side of roads made a good warning.
A) 1st months of 1968 beginning of an upturn in economic activities.

The private sector is increasingly confident of the future. Government infrastructure spending (expected to= those of 1567)

This upturn "should make Guatemala an increasingly interesting area for potential private foreign investment".

But trade and current account deficits likely to be problem over next few years.

B) Government authority

Generally improved reg. production and anticipated increases in export earnings.

C) "Forced cuts in the 1968 budget have had a significant impact, at least initially, on the reform program. There have been sharp reductions in personnel and operating funds for the agency charged . . . ." The government appears intent upon carrying out the land distribution, but because of the mechanics that implementation will be at a slow pace."

D) Budget went by abandoning "new taxes in the face of public protest"

E) 1967 public investment expenditures only 32.9 million 1968 be not better through budget $198 million hopped 59.6 million then revised to 178 million of $44.9 to but appears between 35-40.

Most of this goes for highway construction, electrification, port-expansion,
water supply and irrigation.

F) 1967 estimate GNP 3.5 up a fraction ahead of population increases. 1968- GNP be brighter.

G) Country has serious balance of need for import destruction payments problems. See figures.

H) with cabinet changes- more private sector-oriented. Ministers moved quickly to establish close working relations with private sector organizations.

Finance Minister- ex congressional deputy
Economy Minister- Sugarman and past head of National Sugar Association

October 6, 1968 - ZACAPA  - I spent 4 days with Olivano at his finca.

Olivano Custandia is popularly known as the leader of the auto-defense groups in this region. He is a good-looking man with long curly hair somewhere in his early thirties. In a large open garage (beside a new house he is building) we sat on packing crates and talked. He seemed quite open and friendly, never asked to see any identification, and at the end of our conversation invited me to spend a few days with him.

In October of 1966 here, Colonel Carlos Arana, Col Rubio, and a few others organized civilian para-military groups for defensive and offensive purposes. In many towns groups to resist the guerrillas were formed. But their efforts did not stop here. Groups for the purpose of hunting the guerrillas took to the hills armed, as were the auto-defense committees, by the army.

According to Olivano these civilian groups were instrumental in ridding huge areas of the Sierra de las ninas of the guerrillas. Credit for the idea goes to Col. Carlos Arana, who did a lot to change the situation here.
Before June of 1966 the army did not trust anyone. It acted as if everyone in Zacapa was an active member of the guerrillas or a silent accomplice (I think there is something to this).

In June 1966 Col. Arana took over command of Zacapa. He pushed Accien Civila and these paramilitary groupings.

Since March of 1968 the army will no longer supply the groups with arms, Olivano say, "the government misinterprets us". The think of us as right-wing groups out to take over political control. And the government underestimates the guerrillas threat. Too many important civilians do not understand or want to understand the nature of the threat.

We have intelligence that el chino Sosa has 3 training camps near Zacapa. In all there are massed around 800 guerrillas with 34 Cuban advisors. This groups has plans to pull a Castillo Armas-might be coming soon. To help them they have a network of radios all over the place—in this area c 20., (This information came from a guerilla they captured. Gave it before he died).
The big problem is the indecision of the army because of the interplay of political issues. The minister of War is concentrating on pacification and not pushing the fight as he should.

Today supposedly the organization has to depend on its own resources and caubutieno if made with no strings. Olivario says he has sunk $60,000 into the venture. Other men have done the same.

Look, let's face it in P. R. the communist influence is strong. The Vice Ministro of ministero de bob a commie. Pantoja-a commie etc., the secretary of the party. And Mendez is either ignorant and stupid or goes along with all these communists.

Olivario expressed disenchantment with the whole political system. The Xian Democrats are more red than P. R. The pid is just a make-shift organization falling apart (very true). The MLN are anti-communists but it doesn't do anything.

As for la mano Blanca "to me es" una fantasma. " I didn't like corenzana who was out to make hay an explotable situation. Hell, la mano did very little. They were claiming credit for our actions. "We are not gangsters."

The head of the Guerrillas today is Chino yen Sosa, Since the death of Turcios the 2 factions have patched things up. We hit Cesar montes very hard-so hard he went to Cuba via Mexico for a while. In Cuba an agreement between FAR and Chino you was arrived at. The President of the Central Zone was to be yen Sosa. Montes his sub-teniente given major duties in the field of in doctrination. In Cuba they made the plans for a big offensive.
When I asked him about the presence of VJ military advisors-
In all my wandering I visited different military bases. I have only come
across one likely suspect. - A'Sgr. González (a arbara a Puertoricense)
who had come to demonstrate the use of a light to permit snipers to
work at night.

Did you know that in Jutiapa primary school teachers are
indocinating their pupils in communism etc. What we are trying to do
is extend our organization to other parts than Zacapa, Izabal the Nororiente.
We are even thinking that someday we will enter the political realm . . .

Yet it is possible that we might have to resort to an armed take-
over of power to set Guatemala straight. (Is it any wonder the Government
doesn't want the army distributing guns to these boys).

Monday evening will be the start of an interesting week. It is
then I start my hopefully intimate acquaintance with these pistol-packing
teddy boys.

His house has been attacked twice- February and November, 1967.
And when he goes out (I guess it is more or less the same for other-big boys)
they go in 2 cars and the second car carries a machine gun.

He- 3 fencas and intereses in some machinery enterprises in
Guatemala. Says when he goes to Guatemala he goes- in cognito,- afraid
of guerrillas outside police this area.

Names of Guerrilla leaders; Manuel Esitruda
               Cino Varga
               Claxito Ramírez
Monday Night- October 8

At 8:10 P.M. we stopped in front of Oliverio's new house. Two men came down the dark road. One with a pistol in a holster and sub-machine gun- the other with a pistol stuck either in his belt or in a pocket.

In a pick up we went down a back road for several kilometers to Oliverio's place. As we came close to the front gate the driver blinked his lights several times and blew his horn. The guards let us go by.

A group of c 50 (maybe more) were gathered around or in the house. Today was a disaster for the group. The army told Oliverio to deliver the arms the army had given him. So something was up- they were waiting for a commission gone to Guatemala to come back with some politicians to whom they had gone to offer a deal. (Find out more). By midnight all went home resigned to give up the arms because the commission had not returned.

I got the idea if some deal was made the arms would not be surrendered.

The men here tonight were leaders of groups. They say they have 5,000 armed with their own guns. One leader says 80 men another 20, another 274 in which 125 with their own arms. Not all these have arms- switch arms about as they take turns.

Oliverio- one day we could be in a position to oppose and fight with the army.

Look, army officers without their uniforms did their bit. They went out and did a lot of dirty work. They have to take a political stand (note implications).

Guns are all over the place- most old- mauser, enfield, 12 sawed off shot guns, hand guns (22 mostly), Spanish mauser 7 mm army rifle, thompson sub-machine gun, a few stem guns, a 3006 - Tomorrow will reveal much more.
Oliverio says he has had contact with certain Crecks in Honduras who sells guns and the French Secret Army (the ex Algerian rebels):

As we waited we sat on the veranda and listened to a tape recorded - 1st "Radio Patria" díos y Guatemala. It is a clandestine radio calling on the patriotic Guatemalan to repulse the communist threat directed from Cuba (then once they said from Moscow) referring to a different group) the great emphasis on nationalism. It only went on the air for one program. Went on the blink after one show.

Then heard a tape of Carlos Manuel Pellecer who in 1962 after 14 years a communist renounced his affiliation with communism.

During the tapes, one young fellow of about 20 stood opposite me. He had itchy fingers and had an inhuman look about him. I and Pellecar spoke he had something like an inhuman look to him.

Then we got to the last tape. A tape of a captured guerilla confessing but not saying anything. Where is he now, I asked, Oliverio ran his finger across his neck.

How many guerrillas have you boys captured. 2,000 the reply.

Well, who were these people? I have some ideas.

Where are the people now - dead.

It's after midnight and we are talking. The big problem is financing - we have got to get money to buy arms. Also the army can't be informed.

Any more about his. It is possible some type of prosecution. The army has to be kept in the dark. But it would be nice to get them to help us.
October 9, early evening.

So far everything goes well. Even though, I was a little nervous at one point. 1/2 hour ago on the way home-an unidentified van came up fast behind us. Pistols quickly appeared out of holsters and belts. However, nothing happened-the van belonged to a friend.

The 1st word I heard on waking was death (la muerte). In the next phrase the word armas appeared.

We took off early to pick up the weapons which the army had given. One hell of a lot of rifles-!) millimeter Spanish mausers were handed over. Also 10-20 automatic or semi-automatic rifles.

Oliverio commented "In 30 years (Oliverio will be 31 tomorrow) I have had reverses, but this is the worst". From all the talk, it has been a very important supplier of arms. A lot of guns if they have guns have been left .22 cal. pistols. The organ in this zone also has 11 (mostly automatic but some semi-automatic) big guns, also hand grenades hidden. Plus hunting rifles and shotguns. They say they don't have money to buy arms. It seems that way (maybe Oliverio has sources of funds but he delivers it even to his boys) As he said they might have to resort to illegal ways-meaning knocking over banks etc.

Getting back to being scared-I saw one guy really upset. The others predicting guerrilla vengeance in 15 days now they are "disarmed!" These boys have a this phobia that sees a communist in every crack and crany. Those who live by the sword (and these boys do-they seem to me-boys who will blow your head off if provoked) die by it very often.

Speaking with quite a few, something really hit me-they, like the com-
munists, teach violence, hate, fanaticism and incite in lot of disorder
Guatemala does not need. The order to hand over their arms was a
good thing. They are grand anti-communists in the John Butch Society
way. They see subversion all over the place. And it is they who are
the chosen saviors. They decide that Partido Rev. is communist. They
decide this and that - to Oliverio to process of distinguishing guerrillas from
an innocent person is quite easy. I'm gld he thinks so. These anti-commun-
ist are judge, jury and god.

This is not to admit several things - like they did help to a signi-
ficant extent punish the guerrillas to the Senadi la minas. But how many non-gue-
rillas fell in the process? What will be the long range effect? it might not be
the same as the short range one arrived at now.

Many of these guys have grudges - some very real ones - Family
killed and they themselves threatened by the communists under Arberiz. There
has been the guerrilla problem here. The communist play rough. And when
one gets mixed up in some movement here, he is tagged and can only go deeper
into it because the other side will blow his head off. That is what a lot of
the boys are afraid of now - also police harassment.

But their way of solving these grudges - some real and some not-
only creates more. They live by the gun as much as any one else.

Seems Oliverio had some type of connection with Col Arriaga-
maybe very close as he says, He states he had free access to his office when
Arriaga was the Defense Minister. Oliverio was given a card today - a card
from some ex-Capt now in the banana business who was recently in Miami. The note said Oliverio could go to Miami and count on any help the Col. could give him.

One last thing that might be of importance—but again not, this morning Oliverio arrived in one place to pick up arms which should have been ready. There was a delay after a few particular words which he took his magnum 305 (pistol) out of his holster and fired in the air. Then turned around and sort of smiled.

I saw the young man who stood opposite me last night. There is no question—he is trigger happy. These young guys—Tito is Oliverio's body guard is 22 and no doubt a real fighter, but he is not nervous like the 20 year old who gives me the willies.

Look, things are not as bad as they might sound. I am a guest treated well and everybody realizes I take no stand or have any interest in one group or another. So no sweat.

October 10th—evening.

Tonight is my last evening here in an armed camp and the crickets are making one hell of a racket. The television is on, it's an American western dubbed in Spanish. One would think this one very large but normal family if the weapons about were not so obvious.

One thing someone told me yesterday— the S-2 (intelligence of the army) in Zacapa has cooperated with the groups. One example— a "known communist" leaves Zacapa for Izabal—S-2 sends a telegram to Morales, Izabal
to someone. They rub out the communist. Why not do it in Zacapa- problems
might not be able to pin something on him etc. Remember they seem
communist- well, I wonder how many non-communists fall under this heading.

This same guy-works in Suzgado de Paz, Morales, ex- MLN
father shot by cabor, etc. Claims to have been part of the group which
assassinated Victor Manuel Gutierrez and Conard Castillo Flores (both imp.
leaders and communists in the time of Arbenz Flores-peasant unions).

One thing happened in cafe near the Zacapa military base which
could confirm this relationship between the groups and S-2. A man introduced
to me the Secretary of S-2 seemed very friendly with this guy from Morales.
Also they traded a few names- who and for what reason I don't know.

I talked to "Morales" (a good name for guy from Morales) and
Oliverio 22 year old body guard (Tito) about communism. Communism does
not respect God. Its god is the machine gun. Neither does it respect the
family, fathers don't feel like fathers, sons like sons, etc. The end result
is one hell of a lot of incest. Yes incest.

I talked with Oliverio about this- well, a lot of our members don't
understand communism. These are simple people. They think of communism
as taking away their lands and breaking up the family.

Last night I talked with a 17 year old who volunteered his services
as a guard. Why- I am an anti-communist and I also like weapons. (the
aventarero streak).

"One thing bothers me- why did God who put good on earth also
put bad" "No one can explain it".
"I think about death as a very natural thing. When it comes we do nothing else but accept it. "I think this is the attitude of many here to death.

If death comes tomorrow well, they have half accepted the idea today.

This morning "Morales" (we talked quite a lot) said to me. Look, at Oliverio, you know he works for us- this organization. " It seems a lot of people look up to him, yesterday afternoon at the police control- 4 or 5 youths (20 or younger) came around the car and shook hands with Oliverio. Each wanted to say a few words to him. One seemed to idolize Tito and his "glorious" life as a man of arms and body guard.

Watching Oliverio in action- he is a "generous" leaders. His men don't look for a beer or something to serve here. He always has a minute to converse in private with anyone who wants to. He talks to the campesino almost as an equal- still a paternalism is found in this conversation.

It seems that a lot of simple peasants support him. He is a successful farmer, he is not a snob when it comes to dealing with them. He shows action and decision. This is what the campesino respects and wants.

Look, the guerrillas started all this. Such an argument seems to justify anything the organization does.

One gets the impression that a "conspirital frame of mind" flats around here very easily. The communists are brilliant at covering up their infiltration etc.

The big problem- arms continues to be a problem.

Today in a moment of forceful conversation with 3 friends, Oliverio stated very loudly "Ellos son panzestas ( the army etc- panzesta means
one who is concerned only with his stomach, to have enough for himself and not worry about degrading oneself in the process) y nosotros somos hombres".

The others guys in the car think just like him.

The national police are making the boys a little on edge, in the past the boys here have had rather strained relations with the police. Oliverio claims he has lost 2 men (only one body was found) to the police.

I must say they treated me very well. But politically, and personally we would be enemies.

October 11

Gernades, yes, I noticed that Tito carries one about with him. Last night Tito, another guard 20, and officers were talking with me. Hell, Tito and the other younger guards are here to fight— they are looking for a scrap. Tito was in the army and in a few scraps with the guerrillas—seems he fell in love with gun battles. Now he works for Oliverio.

It seems that Oliverio really cooks up to Col. Arana. He would be the candidate for these boys. This morning Oliverio goes to Guatemala to meet with Mrs. Arana. Also I am leaving.
September 29

Ward (Dick) Bullock - 1 calle 1-59

He has a friend in the National Palace - a Lt. -Col. Lotano Nuila - who has said that the military - or at least a lot of officers (younger ones) - are both afraid of the right and left. An extreme left or a gov, leaning to far left could try to destroy the army. But a MLN government with at military man as president and supported by rtist officers could do untold damage to the army. People to the left of the government would find good cause to draw together into a large coalition - powerful enough to impose their will. The army then - because of its identification with the it - would get the axe.

Pde. Felix. (Maryknol) - been here for 25 years)

What was the Department of Huehue tenango like 25 years ago? and now.

1) of c 200,000 population there were three priests. Now there is a population of c. 300,000 people.

2) The lack of roads of 32 communities one could only reach 6 by car. Now there are only 4 which can not be reached by car.


For example 25 years ago the newspapers had c. 20,000 readers. Now the Pressa libre has a circulation of c. 53,000.

4) The lack of schools. Recently 6 full grades in many towns.

5) The extremely low level of people who could understand a Spanish broadcast on the radio. Now c 30% can.

6) In 1945 about 79 priests in all Guatemala.
In Huhue-Dept. most people are small farmers but there is an increase in temporary migrant labor going to coast . . .

Why the Maryknols here "I am my brothers keeper" to minister year 1962.

(A Population estimated 1960- Guate 91,089 Quezaltenango 33,726, Puerto B 19, 268- -, Esaunita 11, 511

B) exports coffee 70%, Bananas 12%, cotton 5%, chicle 2%

1960 leading buyer= U.S 56% West Europe 32%

Year 1964

A) population est. 1962 Guatemala c. 407,401, Quezaltenango 39,009, Puerto B 22,522, Mazatenango 15,932

B) Exports est 1961

coffee 63%, bananas 10%, cotton 10%

1961 export destination US 53%

imports US 48%

Year 1966

A) pop est. 1964 GC. 572,937

B) exports coffee 40%, cotton 15%, bananas 6%

1963 destination U.S. 43%
imports U.S. 48%

Year 1968

A) population est. 1967 GC 652,934

B) exports 1965 coffee, 49%, Cotton 18% to (1965) - U.S. 30% ] from U.S. 42% ]
to people. All a part of a larger plan for MAN.

September 30.

Went with Pde Joe, Maryknol, on the rd., a group of communities (-concepkun Aquakatan Jacaltenang... ) are building. It was started in 1964 and is progressing. The people in at least some of the areas are really interested. They chip in a lot of labour and money. Help also comes from other sources. They make decisions with help from Pde Joe, but he does not force his opinion on them. This is quite something for people who for so many years had either no or very little concept of roads and their worth.

The Highway Dept (Caminos) said it would finish the road if the people handed over their equipment- cats etc. - to caminos. Besides from not trusting the promises of caminos and not wanting to part with their equipment, the people decided to finish it themselves. They had started it and invested in it. They might as well finish it.

At the cumbre the road is c 12 800'. On the road we met people from conception on their way to the coast to work for 2 months.

With Mauno Guzman- Director de la Voz de Huehuetenango.

In the Department of Huehuetenango S Indian languages spoken.

(1) MAM (la maya) 2) Chrij 3) Jacalteca 4) Aguateca

The need of a good cash crop here. Maybe ajo this (it is like Cebada). Very successful with ajo in Jacaltenango)-where Maryknol hospital. The other in San Pedro Necta.

The great work the Maryknol do is in the rural areas.
The fear ("temor") which grips other parts of the nation is also here even though we have had no violence like in the Southern areas of Guatemala. People are fearful to get mixed up in politics.

Migration to coast-interrupts school year of kids. Not here in September, etc. for example to see if he goes to next grade. Also misses a few months of schools. He does not advance and father sees this. So gets very little schooling.

The tremendous increase in primary schools, but lack of training in tecnolical subjects, ag, and professions as carpenter, etc. A tremendous problem must teach more people a useful trade and not just give them the Brs.
Conversation with UPI Correspondent Mario Ribas Monte, Co El Imparcial. I was not impressed with him.

Since last March President Mario Monte has shown "more preoccupation with the violence" we must remember that since then the Archbishop was kidnapped and Ambassador Mein was assassinated.

In the field of social reforms the government has proceeded very slowly. But with all the problems it has, it couldn't have done much more than it has.

The great accomplishment of Mario Monte has been in the area of economic infrastructure - roads, bridges, housing, etc.

The military as an institution is reacionary, but it has made progress in reforming itself. Still, much less in other sectors.

The fuerzas armadas are not all of one mind. Different factions do exist. Ribas remembers once when he sat in on a meeting of a dozen top military men with Peralta. Four wanted Peralta to annul the elections and continue military rule. But the reaction of most officers was very different. Many of the officers in opposition to a reassertion of military rule knew that they would or could lose much personally with a new regime in power.

Military aid from the US to Guatemala - we really do not know much about it.

It is an insult that a US ambassador would want to meterse in our affairs. Disagrees with Goshko.
Conversation with Col. Antonio Vargas - Public Relations

The relations between the U.S. military and the Guatemalan armed forces is very good. A reduction of military aid would make our fight against the communist guerillas much more difficult, because we are especially dependent on equipment to fight insurgency.

Conversation with Lic. Manuel Eduardo Rodríguez - El Imparcial, Con of the Economist

The greatest problem facing Guatemala and the present administration now is an economic one, especially concerning the balance of payments. The government has been concentrating on infrastructure-roads, schools etc.

In the realm of pure social reform the Government has probably done as much as it could.

In the last 25 years of Guatemalan history, we have seen very few real political parties - most have been improvised coalitions to suit a certain situation at one particular moment. PID is no exception. It was an "artificial conglomeration" and it will die. The MLN has staying power because of its never-changing attitude of anti-communism. P.R., the Communist, and a party for the young. Democracia still doesn't have nationally known leaders - a young party 1965 seem to be real parties. Have formulated ideologies on which their program, and thinking are based.

As for the army - they think as Guatemalans within their institutional framework. What they learn from the U.S. or France, etc. isn't going to
change their thinking about politics. Let's face it- they would never allow
a regime to come to power if it constituted a grave threat to their institutional
survival.

One very good thing which has been happening lately is Acción Avica.

As for the U.S. military mission for whatever it does it's presence
a beautiful propaganda piece for the extremists.

My personal opinion about Mendez Montenegro is that he is a very
prepared and capable person, esp in political science. He tends toward the
right in the sense that he emphasizes law, order, and organization. He as
President leaves many things up to a ministry to which it belongs. And
perhaps this is why his government fuddles a little. Beauxocrats here are
used to being told what to do. They don't want to take the responsibility of
making decisions on their own. Mendes' personality clashing with a govern-
mental tradition.

Other problem Mendes has is the lack of really competent men in his
party. Don Carlos- not a real leader.

On election time the masses determine who will be president etc. and many
times they don't vote for the most political or economical reason.

In the more rural setting it is a tradition to vote for the most powerful
group which is usually in power -out of compulsion and/or a fear authority. 1966
saw a reverse of this tradition-why ? well there seemed to be a reaction against
the government in power. Peralta wasn't very efficient in controlling the outcome.
Also a sympathy for P. R. and its tie with the 1944 revolution.
Adopción de Tecnología Agrícola Por los Indígenas de Guatemala - G.M.
Beal D.N. Sibley Iowa University 1962.

Introduction

A) more than 2/3 of the population over 6 years of age dedicate themselves to agriculture in Guatemala.

B) 2 cultures
   El ladino - 40%
   otra - 60%

C) The principal crop = maize
   wheat is also important even though in 1912 1/2 of cultivated lands were in maize production, still had to import corn ($1,785,000) also wheat imports.

D) The Agriculture extension service made of of almost 100% ladinos. "Sin embargo, la mayoría de los ladinos sabe muy poco de los valores y actitudes o castumbres de los indígenas.

E) The multiple problems of adopting new techniques - not all even, social, political and psychological.

Determinación del Problema

(F) Guatemala has abundant agrichies. World Bank "que de todas las republicanas centroamericanas, Guatemala es tal vez la mejor dotado para una agriculture variada."

G) Most populated of the central American Republics

I) Censo 1964- 4, 284, 473 of which 2/3 were classified as rural

J) Tell difference between cadeno and Indian by language, customs, clothes, etc.

One Writer Jones

"... nación dentro de una Nación ... Su cultura ha continuado desde el tiempo de la conquista, ... altamente resistante a las modificaciones y a las influencias externas."

Indian= inferior being
order of society- natural  Seems as if Indians have accepted these concepts.

K) Indian language- estimated c 18 or 17.

L) Cantel- un municipio del altiplano (Guezaltenango)

"la población indígena se identifica firmemente con su municipio. Se creen distintos social y biológicamente de aquellos de otros municipios la gente del municipio del presente estudio, hablo de la gente de otros municipios como extraños que hablan, se visten y conducen en forma diferente.
- can tell by customs, etc. where people from
- Even within a language quiche' get special dialects different enough
to impede understanding.
- Loe and Machete
- corn, wheat and beans
- Education- Cadino menlation. a lot of parents think it has no
relation to their necessities of life.
- acceso to markets.

ATTITUDES

M) "Solta afirma que a pesar de que el indigina Guatemalteco
demuestra relaciones modernas, sociales y ecor, el panarama
de su mundo es premitivo." Spiritis etc. Many feel one cannot
control nature.

N) Attitud toward Government- a algo hostil. Resent the Cadino official
above her a local level. National go (military service or loss of land
because gov't paid it for project).

Extension Ag- a gov. organization

O) "se conoce el indigine guatemalteco por su resistencia al cambio y
por se conducta traditional."

P) "Ellos se ven efectuando los funciones de mencadco relativamente
de las creencias premativeas . . . ."
Ag. Development Attitudes that seem to be related.

1) control over nature - The more belief in this the better one Views the universe).

2) Outlook toward risk

3) Outlook toward government, especially when government services are trying to foster change.

4) Attitudes towards tradition to science

5) Economic motivation

6) Attitudes towards credit

7) Knowledge of the existence of inputs

8) Knowing market system and understanding credit.

9) Personal characteristics

10) influence of past

11) Conduct cosmopolitan- local

12) information

13) characteristics of farm
The example of Cuba where Castro finished off the army is no laughing matter for the military here.

A Man from the MLN
- Denied that the MLN had anything to do with the Rt-wing extremist groups.
- We only proceed in legal ways.
- The Army- Guatemala's mains bay against communism.
- MLN very unhappy about the dismissal of Arriaga, Arana, and Sosa- great anti-communist leaders.

Chichi castenango (Population c 2,500)- September 29.
Conversation with Spanish Priest who has been in Quiche' department (all about) for 8 years.
(A) Quiche' - c 300,000 inhabitants and only one doctor. Also one priest who had studied medicine before entering the priesthood.
(B) a tremendous language problem
(C) Food is the 1st necessity of life. But after that our biggest problem here is education. Here in Guatemala only 2 or 3 Indians who are priests- why the lack of educational opportunities and the lack of appreciation for education.
(D) Here in Chichi- one finds an exaggeration of rites -religious expression. the burning of coals on the steps of the church is a penance for past sins. Rockets during processions are another exaggeration.
(in Dozma- people o.k.)
A very different world and one very full of color. I have not found another Indian community quite like it.
Notes on Guatemala

Matt Smith head (P. O.) of Embassy

The most urgent need of Guatemala and other Latin American nations is political stability. Reform can not be undertaken unless political stability exists. Without political stability no reform program can succeed.

The last 25 years of Guatemalan history have been characterized by the swing to the extreme right or left. Mendez montenegro represents a contrist position. He wants to start a tradition of democratic process. In short his most difficult problem is to stay in power, and he knows it.

Guatemala is a poor country. The government is in a bind that it has so used so much of its limited resources just to stay in power.
Added Information

From Matt Smith

A) When the MANO was formed to prevent Mendez Monteregro from coming to power, Oliverio was one of the smaller fish who emerged as leaders.

B) Seems that quite quickly the guerrillas were mopped up or forced into hiding in the cities or went across the frontier into Honduras. These MLN types used for intelligence purposes.

C) After guerrilla mopped up Oliverio and his boys did not stop here (if they did in fact help the army get the guerrillas). These boys committed excess after excess. Many are Hoodlum types.

   examples - "they so inimidated ear and every official of P.R. that they could no longer hold a meeting of 5 P.R. people."

   Harressed the P.R. mayor of Zacapa into resigning.

   Have hit labor union and threatened into (Ag. reform people).

   In the municipal elections the PR was only inscribed in 3 out of 10 localities. In San Diego their candidate for mayor was dragged out of his house one night and threatened. In another the candidates jailed. In some areas P.R. mem been assassinated.

   ONE thing- how much was army in on all this. They permitted to take place- Groups of army men might be more responsible then Castenedo's boys.

D) In March of this year army told to liquate these paramilitary groups - Arriaga and Arana, Rt wing of military, opposed this. They challenged
the authority of the president. So he sent them into exile. - Sosa sent to Madrid (according to Rossenhouse he helped the President get rid of Arriaga y Arana and then was given his walking papers to a good post in Madrid). There were other changes in the line of command.

E) Smitt knew about Carlos Thompson and told me about one Senor Ordenez Cuque, who was killed about 1 1/2 months ago. It seems this "cat" was in the grain feed business and eliminated his competitors with the help of the organization.

Conversation with Rossenhouse.

A) He seems to think Webber crippled Guatemala. Army in civil accent of special training, necessary equipment, and supported the use of paramilitary groups.

B) Rossenhouse knew Lorenzano personally. He was a romantic nut, maybe with political pretensions. He was also a cold-blooded killer.

C) He told this story in the house of a relative there worked a servant who had participated in anti-guerrilla operations in the Northeast. He and a group of other army enlisted men would go to the mountains and pretend to be guerrillas. He would go to a village, story there and find out who showed any sympathy toward him. If sympathy was shown by someone, he was eliminated some time later.

This method of finding guerrilla sympathizers is ridiculous. Any guerrilla going to a small town in the mountains will find people saying yes, nodding their heads, etc. in the hope he will go away much quicker and not cause any harm. The peasant has a philosophy—say yes to what some
stranger wants to here and then he will go away sooner.

E) Look, the military did the fighting against the guerrillas. Casteneda and his boys tortured and killed people who were tied up, they created a white terror. But now their strength is way down. The army is no longer playing ball and so Cantenedo is stifled.

F) Rossenhouse thinks that the persecution of P. R. in the North east was carried out by both Castaneda group and the army.

G) Also there seems to be proof that in the kidnapping of the Archbishop certain Guatemalan Church-men (extreme rt wingers) were either involved or knew about the plot. The kidnappers knew very well the movements of the Archbishop.

H) Seems as if big business and the big coffee men in the past have contributed to rt-wing movements.

I) Thinks the leadership in P. R. not that dynamic. As for Dem. X cana leadership not that hot but has real hopes for youth in our party.

Found c 2000 bodies.
Notes on Guatemala

With Director of Institute Indenista

Since 1966 their budgets have been cut over 50% percent.
Sure there has been a cut in the budgets of all governmental organizations, but one should realize that Indians constitute approximately 2 million persons.

The government thinks of the Indian question in terms of general economic growth. Such a response to one of Guatemala's most pressing problems is inadequate. To help the Indian a very specific program is needed. People who have experience with Indians are needed.

The situation in Guatemala today is one of "coexistenca sin comprension" between the Indian and non-Indian populations.

A very grave language problem exists. What we have to learn is to Spanish "en funcion de vida." All too often what Spanish the children learn in school is forgotten because they don't use it outside of school.

Father Frank Garby Maryknol (=M)

The M. came to Guatemala 25 years ago and given Huehuetenango, a department with an Indian population of over 90%. Illiteracy was the norm. Many could not speak Spanish. The old traditions were very strong. These people were more pagan than Xian.

Soon the M. got into social work. Clinics administering simple medical remedies and pulling teeth were started. Today the order has two hospitals operating. A 60 bed one with 3 doctors is situated in an area where there are no roads. And it is in these areas that the people are most desperate
for medical aid.

Parroquial schools with a student body of 2 or 3 thousand are scattered all over the department. Priests have also been instrumental in organizing cooperatives. Plus the order has also made improving agricultural techniques and crops its business.

I think we did this social work out of Xian charity. It was the desire to help people in need. Such social works have been an aid to us in furthering our evangelizing.

About 7 or 8 years ago the order extended its to include 3 parroquias in Quetzaltenange, 1 in Guatemala, and have even gone into El Salvador. In all there are approximately 60 priests of the order in Guatemala and El Salvador—most in Guatemala with approximately 30 in Huehuetenango.

Only in the last few years has the Guatemalan part of the Guatemalan Church got active in social projects. Pde. Garby thinks that the M. were helpful in this because of the example they had set.

The Melville brothers and Sister Marion were very dedicated and good workers. Tom did a great job in Quetzaltango with his Indian parish in schools and organizing cooperatives. Yet Tom was impetuous and, as did the others, fall prey to communist propaganda. They became a pawn for the communists. We agreed on what were many of the ills afflicting Guatemala, but not on the way to solve them. Violence is not the way.

The tragedy of the situation was that certain projects concerning "social indoctrination" were sabotaged. One was the series of short courses on
social doctrine. Also youth programs and the effort to get members of the upper classes to work with the poor (something at which Sister Marion was so effective).

Parents pulled their children out of these efforts. The word M. was associated with communist. And only now are we starting to reactivate these programs dealing with the formation of a new social doctrine.

They were taken in by the communists.

In past too much paternalism on our part. Too few have very learned languages. Use interpreters, Now 3 speak fluently.