

#RenunciaYa: A Case Study of Social Mobilization in Guatemala

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Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to people of Guatemala whose lives have been taken by the government and to the citizens with the courage to stand up against corruption with their lives on the line.

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Introduction

Academics have spent a long time trying to find ways to articulate and measure causes and effectiveness of social movements. Thus, there is an ever-expanding literature on social movements attempting to provide adequate theories to explain how social movements are able to effect change. An important question to consider regarding social movement organization is how people are able to organize against instances of corruption. On the topic of corruption, scholars have looked at how corruption has corrosive effects on democracy (Weyland 1998), and how the topic of Grand Corruption, corruption by high ranking officials has been generally perceived as an unpunishable act in Latin America (Bailey 2009). Recently, there has been an anti-corruption campaign worldwide has galvanized civil society against corrupt practices including in Latin America (Vogl 2016, 96). Under these conditions, social movements have gathered under a collective anti-corruption banner challenging corrupt behavioral patterns. The success of the mobilization efforts vary widely and scholars have attempted to study what combination of factors have led to success of movements. I posit that in social movement theory, contentious politics provides a substantive review of what makes a social movement successful but that there must be greater attention given to the precise mechanisms within these social movements rather than the institutions which within they exist. The case of Guatemala provides insight into how social movement mechanisms have proven to be effective in advancing change. This thesis aims to answer the central question, “Which mechanisms were used in the Guatemalan citizen mobilizations that led to President Otto Perez Molina’s resignation?”

Before moving forward, it is important to create a definition of social movements that

Social movement literature presents key organizational and advertising tools used by social movements to advance their interests. The social movement framework I use here is that presented by Charles Tilly in which social movements are the collective claims on others by ordinary people using contentious performances, displays, and campaigns (Tilly 2004). Scholars have focused on why people organize coming up with a few key working theories that I outline below.

One of the earliest scholars to present a theory on social movements was Mancur Olson with his theory of collective action, which is how people come together through a value of a shared interest (Olson 1965). Olson argues that people engage in collective action only when there are adequate incentives to do so and when barriers to participation are low (Olson 1965). Olson describes the difficulties in organizing people around topics especially when there is an incentive to free ride off the work of others. Though this may apply to social movement literature, it is difficult to understand how social movements that aim to achieve political goals would offer economic incentives. Similarly, there have been studies showing that people join in movements because they perceive that they will benefit economically from the transaction (Brennan 2004; Lichbach 1996). Burstein presents a more collaborative approach arguing that a specialized interest in a topic, particularly when talking about public interest groups and political parties will lead to people organizing around an issue (Burstein and Linton 2002) Such involvement is predicated by people's self-interest in the issue and expands from the traditional conceptions of collective action claims focusing on the economic element of it.

Framing theory posits a different approach to understanding social movements looking at the way that social movements frame their relative importance and position the way that their movement relates to other people's interest. Goffman and Berger present a useful analysis for

framing as a political tool presenting it as the interpretations that individuals use to identify and label the events and world around them (Goffman and Berger 1974). Tilly and Tarrow define framing as the “adopting and broadcasting [of] a shared definition of an issue or performance (Tilly and Tarrow 2007, 216). In framing, people who are collectively organizing around an issue are presenting that issue to a broader public in the hopes that it will allow others to share that definition for that issue. Using this method of representation, framing becomes useful for social movements because it allows them to be critical of the world around them in a way that makes other people receptive to the claims they are making. Schön and Rein (1994) provide a similar definition of framing arguing that to understand social mobilization people must first consider the mobilization using a “frame-critical” approach.

Framing manifests itself and expands to also consider conditions across race, national, and social lines. Dominguez looks at the role that social movements have on framing a local issue as one that has importance nationally and therefore receive proper recognition of the effort (Domínguez 2015). The role of framing public policy preferences by elite members of society have also been given particular attention showing that people are more likely to support an issue that elite members support and advertise (Brooks and Manza 2006). Framing also comes into play when a prime political opportunity strikes with movements taking advantage of the effort to frame the political opportunity presented to them as one that would allow for adequate reform or change (Gamson and Meyer 1996). Beyond this, we must not forget the role of media in nations as being of the primary influencers of public opinion and therefore having a significant impact of outcomes of movements (Pan and Kosicki 1993; Scheufele 1999). There has also been scholarship on how policy framing and public opinion specifically has affected resulting policy

formation (Triandafyllidou 1998; Burstein 1998; Agnone 2007). The issue of framing is important to understand given that this is often how people first interact with an issue.

It is important to note that scholars have criticized the social movement frameworks presented here specifically because they have failed to take into consideration political contexts, (McCann 2006; Benford and Snow 2000; Burstein 1998; Klandermans 1987). Because of this, it has been argued that social movement protests may help raise awareness about an issue and mobilize citizens around an issue but not result in corresponsive policy change (Tarrow 1993; Giugni 1998, 2004). This point of view gives greater weight to the role of institutions in making policy change than those who are not already “institutionalized.” The political success in this view is given more to those in control of institutions than on those who actively seek to make change. Interestingly, in this same field, the role of elite mobilizers has been studied as one of the leading indicators of social movements’ political success (Piven and Cloward 1979; Meyer 1993b, 1993a). The role of elites and the corresponding political backing they bring makes a social movement more successful, presenting a problematic view about who in society is making substantive change.

I prefer to take the position presented by Deborah Yashar pointing to an increasingly problematic trend in social movement theory that creates an increasing focus on governing institutions instead of the mechanisms that make social movements successful (Yashar 1999). If we instead look at how rising organization is tied to the democratization of institutions, we would better understand the extent by which citizen organization could influence public policy. Without providing this understanding for social movement policy change, there is a lacking ability to connect how mobilization efforts and framing efforts would result in an institutionalization of movements.

McCarthy and Zald outline their theory of resource mobilization arguing that social movements exist within a framework that requires them to be effective within structures to best advance their goals (McCarthy 1977). Such a point of view provides greater insight into mechanism approaches of social movements. Others have focused on how dynamics of relationships in social movement sectors create different outcomes. Piven and Cloward (1979) have focused on the role of social mobilization among the working poor and how the lack of organization around their goals has led to their failure. Such efforts prove that resource mobilization theories and access to elite allies has a significant contribution to the success of social movements. For example Amenta, Dunleavy, and Bernstein (1994) focus on how the support of elite and the institutionalization of this movement led to the success of the Second New Deal.

The theory of contentious politics is one of the theories that approaches as a potential explanatory factor for not only the political relationships but also the social dynamics at play. Tilly (2015) argues that social movement theory and the conception of “contentious politics” can be differentiated on the fact that contentious politics studies the competing role of two interests when it specifically involves a claim on a government entity. Building on the theory set out by Tilly and Tarrow (2007), Tilly makes a claim that contention is a continuous part of social movements, given that it exists at any time two forces are in competition with each other. Contentious politics uses many of the same frameworks presented by social movement theories including the mechanisms and repertoires of protest that make social movements more competitive in the long run.

Tilly (2015) argues that social movement theory and the conception of “contentious politics” can be differentiated on the fact that contentious politics studies the competing role of

two interests when it specifically involves a claim on a government entity. The role of contentious politics in this moment of Guatemala's history is important because people mobilized around an issue that both the state and citizens had a stake in. Building on the theory set out by Tilly and Tarrow (2007), Tilly makes a claim that contention is a continuous part of social movement theory, given that at any time there are two forces in direct opposition of each other in a social movement. Tilly borrows heavily from the existing mechanisms on social movements to show that the existing social movement theory is very closely related to contentious politics. Contentious politics is useful when trying to understand when social movements are making a claim on a governing institution and how they use the existing mechanisms and repertoires to their advantage to advance their interest in a state policy framework. It is within this framework that I will now turn, pointing out which features allow a social movement to have greater success.

Contentious political theory presents an important and necessary feature of social movement success which are adequate political opportunity structures. Political opportunity structures are defined as the "features of regimes and institutions that facilitate or inhibit a political actor's collective action" (Tilly and Tarrow 2015: 238). Political opportunity structures therefore allow social movements to be analyzed through the political context that allows them access to make their collective claim or suppresses them. Some authors have studied just this phenomenon looking at how regime types and actions have allowed for different ways social movements could make an effective claim.(Almeida 2003). Scholars may also be aligned ideologically with this claim because of their focus lies in the local and institutional conditions that exist that allow for a social movement to participate in effective claim-making (McAdam 1982; Meyer 1993b). Social movements in this lens have been proven successful because of the

opportunities available to them (Andrews 2001; Almeida 2003). It is important to note that not all political opportunities provide opportunities for success. In fact, political opportunity constraints could also be a contributing factor to a failure of a social movement. Scholars have taken this view to credit the failure of social movements to the existing regime times within a country (Davis 1994; Allan and Scruggs 2004; Skrede Gleditsch 2010). Overall it is important to consider how political opportunity structures provide social movements with the needed tools for success.

Legitimization of social movements within existing frameworks have also been given particular attention within contentious politics. It is believed that the institutional welcoming of a movement through certification, that is the authoritative acceptance of social movements give movements a political capital that help advance their aims. Trumbull (2012) looks at the same issues arguing that success of social movements is based on the legitimization of the movement within existing power structures. Though this may be a secondary topic of social movements within contentious politics theory, it is necessary to consider how these play a role in advancing an actors claims

As one of the primary features of contentious politics, brokerage is defined as the establishment of connection between two previously unconnected sites (Tilly and Tarrow 2015). Such a feature of social movements come in many forms and could be seen in the way that people have previously gathered around social movements from diverse sectors of society for the common goal of a succeeding social movement. We see the effectiveness of brokerage when elite members of society have an important policy interest that coincides with non-elite members of society thus resulting on a success of joining forces (Meyer 1993a). Understanding brokerage as a topic of convergence of interests presents a clear picture as to why some social movements

who engage in the act are more successful in achieving their goals than those who stick merely to protest (Giugni 2004). Brokerage, though is not the only feature of contentious politics that makes a movement successful. There are the topics of diffusion and coordinated action as well that go hand in hand with brokerage.

The relationship between brokerage, diffusion (spreading of issue from one site to another), and coordinated action (where two or more actors engage in mutual signaling and parallel making of claims on the same subject) provide important pieces to contentious politics theory (Tilly and Tarrow 2015). It is argued that social movements who engage in all three are the most successful in achieving their claim-making status. Through a deeper understanding of how these three work together there could be a deeper understanding of how social movements expand beyond their initial points of entry.

Guatemala

In April 2015, key officials in the Guatemalan customs agency (SAT) were arrested for fraud and embezzlement of import taxes of the imports coming into the country as discovered by the CICIG (Independent Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala) (Coloma 2015; Contreras and Orozco 2015). The Vice President's private secretary was arrested for his part in the scandal, and by association it was believed that the Vice President and other members of the cabinet were involved. Immediately following the release of the CICIG's investigations, an organization named #RenunciaYa organized a group to protest the government and ask for the resignation of the Vice-President (Wer 2016; Ixchu 2016). The movement also organized protests of the officials who were tied to the corruption calling for a corruption-free government. In the following months, every Saturday there would be a protest in the central square (Orozco 2015; Wer 2016; Ixchu 2016). Eventually, the pressure from this organization, and the pressure levied

by supporting organizations, led to the resignation, arrest, and prosecution of the Vice President and the President of Guatemala (Contreras 2015b; Solano 2015).

There are a few ways people have pointed to corruption as being one of the leading factors to citizen organization in the region. Corruption has generally been criticized for its destructive effects to democracy, including the right of the people to a responsive government (Weyland 1998). Grand corruption among high-ranking officials, specifically has been a subject of study as people perceived that it goes unpunished in Latin America (Bailey 2009). However, there has been an anti-corruption campaign worldwide that has galvanized civil society against corrupt practices including in Latin America (Vogl 2016, 96). Across Latin America there is a hope that anti-corruption campaigns are headed in the right direction (*The Economist* 2015). Under this guise, my research focuses on how the campaign made by #RenunciaYa used corruption as a motivator for mobilizing and building alliances to bring the president to resign.

Returning for a moment to the main question of this research, “Which mechanisms were used in the Guatemalan citizen mobilizations that led to President Otto Perez Molina’s resignation?” Out of various potential outcomes of this question, I have decided to focus on the role of social movement activities specifically and on issues that are part of “contentious politics.” In conducting this research, I looked at primary and secondary sources of the events of 2015 to track how the conversation of corruption in the country and protest movements developed during the corruption scandal. Furthermore, I conducted field research in Guatemala interviewing over 15 interviewees and engaging in casual conversations with various people familiar with the events ranging from lead organizers of #RenunciaYa to representatives of Guatemala’s economic elite. I analyzed Guatemalan newspaper coverage and the first-hand interviews to develop theories on how these social mobilizations related to the RenunciaYa

movement. These theories provide insight to the human elements behind the theoretical and institutional frameworks and so go into the relationships and sentiments of those involved.

The case of Guatemala is unique. The CICIG funded by the United Nations played an important role in the outcome of the social movement and as Latin America is trying to rid itself of corruption and impunity the Guatemala's case holds important lessons. Some have looked at how social movements holding demonstrations against corruption have contributed their part in effecting change, and yet others have given credit to the effects of governing institutions for the resignation of the Vice-President and President of Guatemala (Contreras 2015; Contreras and Escobar 2015). However, corruption remains persistent appearing to be an institutional problem that requires institutional reform (*La Prensa* 2016). Regardless the role of social movements could be better developed to understand how people come to influence the institutional outcomes.

This research presents three important developments in Guatemala's history through these existing sections of social movement literature which I have divided into three separate chapters.

The first chapter covers how the historical context of Guatemala and corruption served as a prime motivator for many to mobilize against corruption and the social movement used this to capitalize on a political opportunity to change a previously repressive system. I spend a considerable amount of time on the repressive tactics used by government that disincentivized mobilizations through fear. Social movement literature finds that historical contexts play a role in mobilizing people towards political and social goals (Olson 1965; Marwell 1993; Zolberg 1972). This was the case in Guatemala, but to advance this point further, Guatemalan organizers used the historical context during their claim-making endeavors to develop an improved political

opportunity structure for future social movements (Tilly and Tarrow 2007; McAdam 1982; Gamson and Meyer 1996).

The second chapter covers how framing was used by both people organizing in social movement and those who were actively attempting to quell organization. Using primarily the “frame-critical” approach to social movements I draw a distinction between how elite members of society have traditionally held access to framing but by using non-traditional social media outlets #RenunciaYa obtained support for their movement. Furthermore, the change in support from those with differing perspectives on corruption provided a ripe opportunity to further a message of anti-corruption used by #RenunciaYa. This chapter provides insight into the ability of #RenunciaYa to create an effective framing campaign that led to a nationwide call for anti-corruption measures.

The third chapter veers slightly away from the traditional #RenunciaYa analysis, considering the relationships that were built among students. With private and public schools coming together for one of the first times, the social movement gained legitimacy, but also proved to be effective at creating alliances across sectors. Beyond alliances, they established a new organization that would legitimize and institutionalize their efforts. This action allowed the newly allied group to focus on political reforms that they believed would be beneficial to improve the political climate.

Finally, I end the work with a short conclusion on the current social movement organization in Guatemala and questions for future research. Noting that this mobilization success moment was temporary there is further important research to be done on the topic.

Chapter 1: Mobilizing for Better Political Opportunity

Guatemala's history created the findings in 2015 to be an opportune moment for social organization. The fear of governing institutions was something shared by every interviewee throughout my research (Field Notes). Many pointed this exact fear to have been one of the main reasons why people have lacked organization in the past. Under these circumstances, the growth of #RenunciaYa needed to address this point or create a new culture to avoid so. The political opportunity framework presents that "activists' prospects for advancing particular claims, mobilizing supporters, and affecting influence are context-dependent" (Meyer 2004). Context-dependency in Guatemala is particularly salient because there was a historical fear to organize because of repressive tactics government forces used on Guatemalan Citizens in the history of the country. Guatemala has a particularly segregated history, beginning with the Spanish-era inquisition and subsequent marginalization of indigenous communities to the beginnings of the country's civil war that disproportionately affected indigenous communities.

In this chapter I analyze how the Guatemalan historical and political context shaped the conditions that forced people to mobilize to establish better political contexts. To illustrate this point, I begin by showing how fear has been a deterrent to organization in Guatemala for years since the dirty war. This fear caused people to keep away from protesting on the streets, instead holding their indignation to themselves. This fear was so great that the initial reasoning behind mobilization was simply to change the culture of fear and promote citizen participation. Although this was the case, what resulted was greater and in fact helped influence broader political opportunity structures for future social movements. Anti-corruption efforts became institutionalized and ultimately held standing on a national level.

I. The Paradoxical Fear of Governing Institutions

The scorched earth policies of Guatemalan leader Efraín Ríos Montt in 1982, building on the dirty war that raged in Guatemala from 1960 to 1996 led to the destruction of 300 villages and to the death or disappearance of more than 200,000 Guatemalans (CJA 2009). A U.N. Truth Commission established in Guatemala to clarify and prosecute the human rights abuses during the dirty war wrote a culminating report, stating that the Guatemalan government committed acts of genocide against their population, especially the Mayan people with over 93% of human rights violations caused by state forces and paramilitary groups against the indigenous groups (Truth Commission 1999). This gave rise to popular distrust of government forces especially among indigenous communities, and what's more a fear of organizing around any political issue.

Though this dirty war disproportionately affected indigenous communities, it also affected the student population in Guatemala, specifically at USAC, with 492 documented cases of disappeared or extra-judicially killed by military forces, most of them occurring in the 1980's during Ríos Montt's presidency (Kobrak 1999). Although the government accused those killed of being involved in guerrillas against government, none were ever convicted of wrongdoing by a court and many in fact were simply political opponents (Kobrak 1999). One case in particular involved Oliverio Castañeda de León the President for the University Students Association (AEU) from USAC who on the day of his murder gave a speech against the actions made against the poor and rural populations only to be shot dead by men coming from multiple vehicles including some with official government plates as he walked home from the protest (Kobrak 1999; Sánchez 2016). Oliverio ended his speech by saying "They can kill our leaders, but as long as there is a people there will be a revolution," which became (Kobrak 1999). This history has created a culture of fear within the Guatemalan psyche that has deterred people from actively

engaging in protest movement against the government.

The acts carried out by the government of Guatemala during these times could be interpreted as an attempt by government forces to forcibly end political opposition in the country which was an organized effort to end political dissent through fear. The government focused heavily during this time period to eliminate leaders of social movements and potential leaders of opposition parties (Amnesty International 1979; Levenson-Estrada 1994). Mynor Alonso is one of the organizers behind the protests movements that called for the resignation of the president. He believes that the culture of fear caused by the government's repression that began with the dirty war started in 1960 has been one of the main contributors to the failure of people to go to the streets and march against their government. He tells a story, proposing what may be one of the main dissuaders for engaging in political protest:

“I bet if you go around and ask everyone who began protesting, and I mean everyone. If you go and ask them ‘What did your parents say to you when you first began to join in the movement?’ I bet everyone, and I mean everyone would say, ‘They told me not to get involved.’ ‘They said they would kill me.’ My own parents fought with me because they said they were going to assassinate me, that they would make me disappear. To not get involved in political problems... We would see the injustice, we would see that they were making everyone angry with their actions, but we couldn't do anything. Why? Because the first point of repression, the first person that would shush you so that you wouldn't achieve political change was your parents. For fear that they would murder you. Under these circumstances how can you say ‘let's do something to change society.’ No. your parents would say, shush up they're going to kill you, and not just you but all of us! And with

hysteria and a horror in their eyes that is truly ugly. It's ugly that your father would say, "look I know it's unfair but stay quiet, because for your shit and your imprudence, they're going to kill you, your mother, and everyone, so keep your mouth shut!" As a young person hearing this, and living through this it's unfair to hear your parents say this and it's really ugly. But that's how we were raised and the culture we had to abide by, keeping quiet but still harboring the anger of repression." (Field Notes)

Mynor describes an awareness that has been passed down for generations that has instilled a fear, as a result of this dirty war and political retribution carried out during the Dirty War that plagued Guatemala for 36 years from 1960 to 1996 with over 200,000 people dying or disappearing (Luhnnow 2015; Truth Commission 1999; Miller 2011). Political activism has been traditionally repressed and engaging in anti-government marches have led to death and disappearances. As it relates to efforts of political opportunity theory, the repression tactics used in Guatemala historically have been focused heavily on ending political mobilizations limiting the political opportunities to create broad based mobilization efforts.

It is important to acknowledge that Mynor's family is from Guatemala City, an area that, although plagued by disappearances, was not similarly affected as the indigenous communities who had their villages raided by paramilitary forces. The historical repression has led to many people to fear their governing institutions and equally brought people to fear protesting in public spaces, so one of the things that influenced public opinion and failed them from intervening is that they didn't want to be involved in any type of protests because of the fear that was ingrained in the culture. From these stories, it seems like no one would have involved themselves in the active protests about governance out of fear of repression.

The history of public repression and the resulting fear limited Guatemalan citizen organization, and political organizing would be difficult to achieve considering the damage done to rural indigenous communities and for students. Hannah Arendt writes about the political impacts that such violent repression have especially in totalitarian regimes noting that the “climax of terror is reached when the police state begins to devour its own children” (Arendt 1970). While there may be some argument to the extent that the Guatemalan regime exerted totalitarianism, the repressive tactics used to maintain domination based on terror and violence still fit within these lines.

Why were people interested and prompted to organize during this point at such large numbers? One factor that may have contributed to it would be the motivation to open government political opportunities for people to mobilize against corruption.

II. Addressing Corruption in Governance

In 1996, with the final signing of the Peace Accords in Guatemala, many people believed that it provided an opportunity for people to reunite Guatemala. Though there has been an advancement of human rights protections since the end of the war, with lower levels of human rights abuses, there remains a major concern from threats against journalists and human rights defenders. Although the Peace Accords were expected to be a moment that would change the direction of the country to make a more peaceful transition, there has been a sharp criticism that the Peace Accords have done nothing but establish a path to democratic governance that will continue to be incomplete as corporate interests continue to have power over governance (Torrez-Rivas 2006). Helen Mack, a key human rights activist in Guatemala, believes that even

though human rights have been more respected, the country continues to be plagued by poverty and a fight against a structural impunity that requires people to hold people responsible

To hold people responsible, many like Helen Mack and the indigenous population believed, the Guatemalan government had to lead the charge against impunity especially against the military elite that had led the genocides during the dirty war. General Efraín Ríos Montt, President post-coup in Guatemala and during the most bloody era of the dirty war, was one of many generals that would eventually face prosecution for war crimes committed that had been officially denied by the Guatemalan government (Doyle 2012). In 2013 Ríos Montt was found guilty of genocide and sentenced to 80 years in prison, a life sentence for a man his age (Human Rights Watch 2016). This was a victory for human rights advocates who have long criticized the aggressive tactics used by state forces, but the ruling was overruled by the Constitutional Court on procedural grounds, and the case was reheard in 2015 only to have Ríos Montt declared mentally unfit for trial, lengthening the prosecution of the militant leader (Human Rights Watch 2016).

The fear caused by the complete impunity that seemed to absolve wrongdoers of their crimes plagued Guatemala's institutions. Those within institutions who dared involve themselves in anti-corruption efforts were threatened with death through gross intimidation tactics (Whiteman 2009). These blatant threats and the inability of the government to pass effective legislative reform damage citizen's ability to bring around reform especially since corruption and judicial inefficiency would not lead to favorable outcomes for those bringing their complaints forward (Sieder 2003). Under these conditions of impunity towards generals and government officials and history of blatant repression, people became dissatisfied with the existing political system and rising indignation as government failure was one of the motivating factors for people

to organize against corruption, specifically the issues of rising indignation against corruption.

There are limited sources that deal directly with citizen political dissatisfaction in Guatemala, and even less so that deal with explicit trends of corruption. Guatemala is one of the many countries that continues to be absent from corruption and quality of life surveys done throughout the globe including the Global Corruption Barometer published by Transparency International and the World Values Survey. However, there remain other measures by which we could quantify and understand Guatemala's relationship to governance and corruption.

According to Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index Guatemala ranked as one of the worst countries in the world in corruption, with a score of 32 out of 100 in 2014 and a score of 28 out of 100 in 2015 (Transparency International 2017). Furthermore trust in institutions according to a 2012 Latin American Public Opinions Report in collaboration with USAID found that people's sense of representation from government were much lower than the rest of the region along with lower participation rates of protest than other areas in the region (Azpuru and Seligson 2012, 90).

Negative public opinions of government are not limited to corruption. In a 2015 Latin America Public Opinion Report, it was found that Guatemala had one of the largest losses in political tolerance since 2012 in Latin America with 29.5 units (Azpuru and Zechmeister 2015 121). These figures point to a rise in political dissatisfaction in Guatemala in the leading up to 2015 that contributed to high levels of citizen indignation. Some in Guatemala noted that the report's results show a decreased in political institutions specifically (Juárez 2013; Hernández 2013). While political tolerance is not the end all be all of public perceptions behind corruption, it provides the ability to study how public perceptions and increased intolerance of governing institutions led to an increase in citizen dissatisfaction.

Along with a rise in citizen dissatisfaction there were still conditions within government institutions and characters of protests that made it difficult for people to effectively organize. For the organizations to create the necessary conditions to rise in the protest movement conditions for effective protest had to be met before moving their movements forward.

III. The Political Context that Needed Change

The fear and dissatisfaction felt by citizens of Guatemala were not without reason. Government responses to mobilization in general in Guatemala has been one that was limiting to political organization and therefore resulted in a limiting of political opportunity for mobilizers. Government action to disincentivizes the population to organize on a massive scale occurred leading up to the events of 2015 when in 2014, a local indigenous community was stripped of their constitutional right to mobilize after a cement company's plans to create a cement plant in an indigenous community faced resistance and 11 townspeople were killed in a skirmish (AFP 2014). Furthermore, Guatemala's congress passed a law in 2014 that sought to limit mobilization of a population in regards to blocking public roads, affecting as many as 15 to 20 protests daily (Patzan, Rojas, and Hernandez 2014). These efforts on the part of government regimes are consistent with the narrowing of political opportunity in countries presented by Tilly and Tarrow (Tilly and Tarrow 2015 60-69). These government-sponsored restrictions are a manifestation of the fear-based restrictions that were placed on the populous during the dirty war only that these "legal" actions were made through democratic means. Under these circumstances, the political opportunity structures present prior to 2015 were limiting to social movement organizers because they created a stifling environment.

The Guatemalan government's practices were a limiting factor to mobilization given that many of the changes sought before rarely made progress through traditional means (CJA 2009; Yashar 1999; Whiteman 2009). These government conditions under contentious political theory could be described as opportunity structures. Opportunity structures are the means by which a government's regime type limits or promotes contention (Tilly and Tarrow 2015: 59). Given Guatemala's historic repressive tactics and the difficulty in achieving claims, many believed Guatemala required change in order to better address these grievances, or as Tilly and Tarrow would describe, a need to re-structure the political fabric to create "changes in those features [to] produce changes in the character of contention," (Tilly and Tarrow 2015: 59). By analyzing organization in this way, the social movement that rose against corruption served a dual purpose to 1) address corrupt practices that were going on in government and hold accountable those responsible to 2) promote a new character of contention that would provide a new political opportunity structure for future organizers. This meant that people organizing would not only address their grievances, but change the government's ability to respond to protest and, thus, change the character of the political culture and mass mobilization techniques used in the past. To better understand the way that corruption practices were challenged, I want to turn to an example showing how citizen organization and addressing corruption existed before the social protests that organized against corruption and how this character changed after the fact.

IV. A Case of Corruption Before, A Brief Example

In 2014 the Guatemalan government under Otto Perez Molina's administration hired the Israeli company M. Taric Engineering LTD. through the government agency Authority for Sustainable Development (Autoridad para el Manejo Sustentable) or AMSA to bring a

contaminated lake, Amatitlán, in an underdeveloped area at the outskirts of Guatemala, into compliance with environmental standards (Escalon 2015a; Batres 2016). M. Taric Engineering argued the technology to be used to clean the lake was some sort of “magic potion” that would clean the contaminated lake in a short period of time with a new formula that provided (Chumil 2016; Publinews 2015a).

Key government officials, including Roxanna Baldetti and Otto Perez Molina, were strong supporters of the project and were later found to be tied with the financing for the project by the CICIG and MP by pressuring the hand of AMSA to approve M. Taric’s proposal (Chumil 2016; Soy502 2016). Furthermore, it was found that AMSA failed to abide by certain environmental regulations before conducting the project having less regulation than usual (Rodriguez 2015; Batres 2016). Although the suspicious financing conditions were not known until after the CICIG and MP released information about the project, many were concerned with the actions to be taken by AMSA because of their record and environmental concerns.

AMSA’s Amatitlán project gained criticisms from an organized group that sought to actively end the program under environmental concerns. Early in 2009 AMSA attempted a separate clean-up effort of Amatitlán that cost the Guatemalan people almost 10 million dollars to have only 8 of 40 cleaning kits in working condition in 2015, one thing many consider to be mismanagement of public money (Rodriguez 2015). When the AMSA came forward in 2014 again with the second project, it made sense some were skeptical. Soon after, in March of 2015 85 students and scientists came together and asked the government to end the chemical treatment project in Amatitlán via an open letter, citing concerns about the time frame of the project and chemicals used even before the report was released questioning the project’s financing (Creswell 2015). Although an investigation was made into the financing of the project, at the time no clear

government action was taken in response. Citizen Action, a group from Guatemala seeking to bring an end to corruption, filed a lawsuit against Baldetti in March of 2015 for influencing the financing of the Amatitlán M. Taric Engineering project before the “magic water” was proven to be ineffective (Publinews 2015a; Pitán and Ramos 2015). Like the open letter created by the 85 students, nothing came out of this lawsuit immediately following its presentation.

The actions made by the 85 students and scientists and the lawsuit by Citizen Action provide a context by which we could measure how government responded to corruption before and after the public was informed of the 2015 “La Linea” scam and before mass mobilization around issues placed pressure for government accountability. In this way, the follow-up responses by government could be seen as changes directly related to the pressure of the social movements. Although there were numerous causes citizens organized around to address grievances created by ineffective governance, here I want to focus on how results of anti-corruption measures changed before and after the mass protests of 2015. Furthermore, I aim to present the opportunity that social movement organizers capitalized on during the political opportunity after “La Linea” was released.

V. How Protest Movements Capitalized on the Political Opportunity

With a historically-rooted memory as the one presented by Mynor and the fear of repression, no one in Guatemala would challenge corruption without understanding the political retribution that could result based on historical context. There had to be a motivating force to push people to organize without fearing that they too would become part of the disappeared group or have a reason to fear for their life. While people were willing to engage in claim-making behaviors

against government, like that shown by the group of 85 writing the open letter, much of it lacked a united response from a broad population base.

Before the revelation of the CICIG's investigation into the Vice-President, many of the protests were focused on single issues like protections for teachers, health care reform, protests against mining, and against the monopolization of seeds (Pitán 2015; EFE 2014a, 2014b). This created an environment without clear focus and without clear unifying goals. Although these manifestations were in fact citizen mobilization efforts, they presented a less threatening role to reform a political system because of a general lack of numbers and effective seizing of political opportunities. I wish not to minimize the importance of the smaller movements as they have helped achieve changes for their respective causes and beyond. However, the simple fact that mass mobilization across-movements that focused specifically on social movements helped shape a new political opportunity

The rising indignation motivated over one-million citizens to organize across Guatemala with over one hundred thousand people organizing in the central square on the culminating protest in August 27 (Contreras 2016). Businesses around the country also decided to close their business so that their workers could also participate (Contreras 2015b). The manifestation was a way for residents who have felt victimized by recent government actions to voice their discontent. It also provided a route for citizens to participate in political processes. The logistical preparation and challenges to reach a protest and mobilization with such large numbers of participation was a challenge. People came from across sectors of society to organize and work together in a way which Guatemalan citizens were not accustomed. Although the challenges of organization presented by the movement are important, the question that I will attempt to address here is how the mobilizations and claim-making mechanisms help create a new culture for

political opportunity. Returning to the dual-purpose of the organization movements, people organized to 1) address corrupt practices that were going on in government and hold accountable those responsible to 2) promote a new character of contention that would provide a new political opportunity structure for future organizers.

1) Addressing and Protesting Corruption

First, addressing corrupt practices and holding people responsible required people to unify behind a common goal to succeed in holding people accountable, fitting into traditional forms of social movement theory to advance their claims. Doug McAdam presents three requisites for an effective mobilization effort, which could be broken down as inter-group organization, a group understanding of their organization effectiveness, and political opportunities (McAdam 1982, 40-41). While the previous mobilizations provided groups the ability to be effective through intra-group organization in the sense of numbers and mobilization, pushing single-issue advocacy would result only in single-issue progress. If movements were to expand beyond their own organization and establish connections, there needed to be a strong unifying factor that would move people behind a single-issue across organization lines. Tilly and Tarrow suggests that beyond political group dynamics, unity, numbers, and sustained commitment to a claim are all important factors in ensuring that an advocated policy comes to fruition (Tilly and Tarrow 2007). In the case of Guatemala, unifying under #RenunciaYa and against corruption specifically allowed multiple groups to maintain a sustained commitment on a tangible policy proposal.

While previous protests have often been focused on issue-advocacy, the protests of 2015 focused on inciting collective action to push forward an agenda of cultural and social change, with the Vice-President and President as the as the people needed to be held responsible.

#RenunciaYa in 2015 provided ample opportunity and reason for people to take to the streets and engage their government with demands to bring an end to the corruption that have plagued Guatemalan institutions for decades (Barreto 2015; Fonseca 2015). People were already upset about previous scandals and citizens were no longer willing to accept the government's response to impunity and corruption (Castillo 2015). Mass mobilizations were an effort to limit government's ability to be immune from prosecution and an effort to hold the heads of state responsible for their actions.

I must admit that in explaining the success of the movement there are a few nuances that must be cleared up before continuing. Not everyone who attended the marches could be essentialized as having a singular objective for attending. The multiple topics people mobilized to address their grievances around included reforming the judicial sector, rural for reform of agrarian laws of Guatemala, and reform to political parties among other issues (Sieder 2003; HispanTV 2015; Asamblea Social y Popular 2015; Pitán 2015; Wirtz 2015). In the case of Guatemala, the many issues that affected the population created a multi-faceted interest in ending corruption to root out the problems that to many were the cause of the grievances in the first place (Orozco 2015; Contreras 2015b). Many saw issue with governing institutions and their leaders in the blatant grand corruption scams that affected governance (Blake and Morris 2009). This was an issue that helped unify people against corruption in its many forms, and especially against the two top heads of state (Pitán and Ramos 2015; Contreras and Orozco 2015; Contreras 2015b). The issue of corruption was rooted deeper within the system because of the historic repressive tactics used by Guatemala's government that disincentivizes organizing.

Organizing against corruption would not have achieved the change required to make substantial progress in rooting out corruption in its many forms alone. But it presented a popular

will to promote changes to the existing government that would discourage corruption activities. The mass mobilization helped focus the conversation on the existence of corruption and hold accountable the people responsible for corruption. Although there were multi-faceted interests each having their own vested interests in different projects, a common understanding was that existing corruption damaged reform in either limiting access to government officials or through the impunity that existed towards government officials responsible for wrongdoings.

Voicing that concern in a public and explicit way helped reshape a conversation for many to focus on how to hold responsible parties accountable (Contreras 2016; Chamale 2016; Wer 2016). Thus, many of the people were out in the streets week after week chanting anti-corruption slogans against Roxanna Baldetti and Otto Perez Molina. As Pamela from La Batucada, a group that organized many of the chants during the summer's week of protests, said "We would chant really mean things about these corrupt officials, saying things like 'Otto piece of crap you're going to jail' and also 'let's see, let's see who has the baton, if citizens organize the government is a son of a whore'" (Field Notes).¹ These chants provide some insight into the culture of the protests along with the reasons so many people organized together in Guatemala's central square and across the country. Voicing popular indignation was in line with the theories set out by Tilly and Tarrow suggesting unity, numbers, and sustained commitment to a claim are all important factors in ensuring that an advocated policy comes to fruition (Tilly and Tarrow 2007). The ability to chant and organize against the President provided the opportunity maintain the sustained commitment and mobilization under a unified goal of presidential resignation.

¹ I must admit that in the original Spanish, "Otto cerote te vas a ir al bote" is much more poetic than its' English counterpart and at the risk of not doing these expressive forms justice I have added their translations in this footnote. Similarly the rhyming pattern of "Aver aver, quien tiene la batuta, si el pueblo organizado el gobierno hijo de puta," is smoother in Spanish. For those offended by the use of expletives, I attempt merely to represent the events.

2) Capitalizing on Changing Political Opportunity

Although corruption was a topic on everyone's mind, the attribution of it to only two heads of state is dangerous, as mentioned earlier, because it lacks a fundamental shift needed in institutions to sustain change. Public indignation against corruption scandals that swept the nation have been one the driving forces behind the mass mobilizations and in these mobilizations people were asking heavily for the resignations of the top leaders (Lee 2015). To the movement and Guatemalan citizens, the leaders responsible had to be ousted to make way for better reform. However, simply because of the resignation of Baldetti and Perez Molina, both found to be corrupt individuals in their official capacities, it did not necessarily mean that there would be an end to all corruption because of, as Gustavo Bergenza put it, "the network of impunity that they built in the courts would only have the choice of letting them free" (Núñez 2015). There needed to be a sustained social movement that would move into rooting out corruption from the core, and to some this movement provided an opportunity to create that change.

The organizers of the movement were aware that the CICIG's investigations and focused on mobilizing much of the student population to capitalize on the political opportunity. Gabriela Carrera, Professor of Political Movements and Organizations at Guatemala's private University Rafael Landivar spoke about a conversation with Mynor Alonso, another key organizer:

"Mynor said something to me and it's something I will never forget because I believe it to be central to 2015...Before our meeting started he said, 'Listen Gabby, we're not going to get the president to resign. No. We're not going to make a revolution, we're not going to change the country, but it is the situation that we've been waiting for to organize ourselves.' Why? Because of all the biggest successes of the power of the conservative military leaders and elite class in the internal

conflict was the fear to go out into the streets and organize...there is no possible transformation without organization. And he said ‘This is the moment to organize, so that people can have experience on the street.’ We never thought about if OPM would resign. It was a great success when Roxanna Baldetti resigned and when Otto Perez Molina resigned, but that wasn’t going to change the country. It wasn’t even the plan, even if people thought it was.” (Field Notes 2017)

The motivation behind organizing, and ensuring that people would be out on the streets, through Mynor’s perspective was to change the Guatemalan residents psyche of being repressed by political institutions through fear and through disruptive laws. The developments and historical context of Guatemala, primarily how the government had treated its’ people, was the reason for these leaders to mobilize and challenge that existing narrative. Mynor and Gabriela both mentioned that the organization efforts were to change the tradition of the country from being one in fear of repression to one that is willing to mobilize on issues that they felt were pertinent. Mynor’s comment that the motivation to organize was not to have OPM resign, but to change system, was counterintuitive to most the reasons many protesters actually had to go out and participate in the protest as a vast majority were asking for resignation (Contreras 2016, 2015b). Professor Carrera expands on Mynor’s thoughts explaining that the role of organization was to change the climate of protest. As organizers, they were interested in people attending the protests in large numbers against an ex-military leader in Guatemala who was previously thought to be untouchable. As Tilly and Tarrow draw out, it is necessary for individuals to become focused on achieving some form of change in order to achieve a policy change (Tilly and Tarrow 2007). While the need to unify behind corruption served the primary purpose of getting people out on the street, for Mynor and Carrera the focus was on creating a change to the character of contention.

Changing the character of contention is, like many other features of social movements, a daunting task but could be achieved under certain circumstances. It is difficult to measure most types of social movement impacts on public policy, participation and culture, and especially changes in contention (Tilly and Tarrow 2015, 158). Nonetheless, a change in contention may still occur. When Mynor and Professor Carrera believed the moment to be a fundamentally important point in organizing history, their thought process followed this idea of changing the process of contention itself. What would allow a social movement impact on future contention? There are limited studies that point to the specific point of future contention, with an over-emphasis on how influential political opportunities and regime types specifically affect outcomes of social movements (McAdam 1982; Meyer 1993b, 2004). There are some that give particular attention to the outcome of public policy when organized civil society ask for such changes (Aldrich 2008). In these cases, it was clear that the organization of society greatly impacted outcomes of public policy.

In changing the contention, the claim to be made by the social movement has important implications. We must be careful not to completely equate social movements' use of claim-making repertoires like engaging in protests in the streets to voice their concerns as a disruptive act without relation to a desired outcome, as many of these are organized by advantaged individuals of society with a peaceful approach (McAdam et al. 2005). The peaceful protest that ensued in Guatemala follows the model set out here. The relatively advantaged student population as well as those active in civil society welcomed an approach that would institutionalize their movement into Guatemalan society. In doing so, they capitalized on the mass mobilizations that were protesting corruption to shift contention and created an opportunity for a more welcoming system. While previously, the Guatemalan government followed a system

that would act in repression of organized resistance, whether it be by passing laws that limited organization or failing to prosecute military leaders, the ability to make a movement massive enough was one that could not be dismissed as a movement that was disruptive in its nature.

Institutions also helped advance political opportunity for organizers in an important way. The CICIG's chief investigator Iván Velásquez, in response to the importance of protest pressure on the resignation argued citizen intervention in promoting peaceful protests against corruption is important for countries around Latin America because it would promote a change in the respect for rights (Paullier 2015). In this case, the protest movement support for the CICIG, along with the YoAmoCICIG bumper stickers that circulated around Guatemala during the time may have contributed to the President's decision to extend the mandate of the CICIG which was scheduled to expire soon (Arrazola 2015). The CICIG and international community's role in helping advance the cause for social movement and for advancing the establishing improved governing structures have been invaluable (Univision 2015). They have helped advance much of the political opportunity for protest forward and without the investigations they have carried out the organization and political dissatisfaction that resulted may have never occurred. However, to study the effects of these institutions in depth would be impractical under time constraints and is out of the scope of this paper. Instead, I focus on the social movement's interaction with these institutions in their many forms.

As mentioned before, it is difficult to analyze just how much change there is to the political opportunities allotted to any given party. Partly being that the political opportunity focuses on regime types in general. Guatemala has a democratic system with democratically elected leaders. But by looking at moments of contention that resulted after the mass demonstrations, including the acts carried out by the movement of #RenunciaYa, there is a

noticeable change in the response and involvement from governing officials in their support or collaboration with the anti-corruption movement.

VI. Changes for the Case of Amatitlán and Beyond

With the mass mobilizations created by #RenunciaYa the citizen concern for cases of corruption were clear and there was a deep effect on government's institutional responses. Before the protests, it was difficult to say the least, to obtain a governmental response to accusations of corruption. The pressure exerted by the population during the mass mobilizations allowed for some of these organizations to obtain a government response.

Let us return for a moment to Citizen Action, the group that filed a lawsuit against Baldetti in March of 2015 for influencing the financing of the Amatitlán M. Taric Engineering project before the “magic water” was proven to be ineffective (Publinews 2015a; Pitán and Ramos 2015). This lawsuit was filed early in March of 2015 cited Vice-President Baldetti's directives towards a staffer to hire M. Taric Engineering directly rather than any other company. The claims made by the law-suit was that the financing constituted corruption and should be halted. The reason this matters is that the government gave no direct response to the action and Roxanna Baldetti continued to be before there was mobilization but after there were wide-spread manifestations the governing body made a response.

An organization of scientists and community leaders against the project attended the meeting in April 2015 where they discussed a cancellation of the project due to its' ineffective clean up rate (Batres 2015). Many saw the \$18 million price tag as the complete government's lack of accountability and blatant corruption even then (Batres 2015; Escalon 2015a; Plaza Pública 2015). Still, the only outcome of these meetings were that the project was canceled

pending an environmental review (Batres 2015). It had been a full month after Citizen Action had filed the law-suit claiming that the financing of the project was influenced by Vice-President Baldetti and the conversation remained on the scientific merits of the project. Instead of focusing on the structural corruption that led to an ineffective implementation of a public policy proposal, the governing response was to criticize that the project.

This all changed in mid-June when the Attorney General of Guatemala filed to close the accounts of M. Taric Engineering citing their uncompleted project and failure to pass environmental standards (BBC Mundo 2016). Though their involvement to halt the project was citing the failure to prove environmental safety, without the mass mobilizations that were inherently anti-corruption, such a move would have been lacking. Alvaro Montenegro mentioned that “indignation manifested itself as a response to corruption, and the case of Amatitlán had a lot to do with it. The deception faced by people and the revelation that Baldetti influenced the financing for a failed project only added fuel to the fire “(Field Notes). The subpar government response in the beginning of the manifestations only further incited citizen protest, and as protests increased in size and support for anti-corruption the project of Amatitlán could not just be left alone, there had to be a suitable response to the blatant corruption that would respond to citizen indignation. The Attorney General’s order to close the accounts provided that opportunity. It was one way the political opportunities for social movements became more welcoming of these mass mobilizations.

Looking closer at corruption as a motivator, people who organized against it did so to face Guatemala’s history of repression and impunity to create a new political climate. Given the history of repression and impunity of Guatemala, the resounding message of the citizens

organizing against the government at a massive scale was one saying “we won’t stand for this any more.”

As the movement progressed, more allies came to the side of anti-corruption mobilizations which only further improved these political opportunities for protestors. The height of this came when congressional support for resignation increased during the final weeks, after the National Halt. Alvaro Montenegro, one of the organizers behind the #RenunciaYa movement attended the protest held by congresswoman Montenegro in the congressional offices (Field Notes; Soy502 2015). For many, the fact that a congressional representative was asking for resignation was a key step in ensuring that the president would step down. It was also a sign that the anti-corruption movement was becoming part of the main-stream political system, not just a sign of singular protest. These signs proved true, as in less than a week later, the congress voted to strip the president from his impunity and soon after the Public Ministry ordered his arrest (Solano 2015; BBC Mundo 2015; Contreras and Escobar 2015). Such acts provided not only a morale boost for those who wished to improve the political situation in Guatemala, it also provided proof that there were changes to the future of contention that Mynor Alonzo and Professor Carrera hoped to challenge.

VII. Closing Thoughts

The factors that I dedicated this chapter to studying were the historical repression tactics used by military in the genocides which has prompted fear of mobilizing, the corruption history that caused popular unrest, and the perception of the political moment by organizers to challenge people’s historically rooted conceptions about government, and the ultimate change in government responses to protestors who organized against corruption. The political opportunities

created by the chance to unseat a government through a peaceful protest tactic, challenging the traditional conception of fear caused by the historic repression of political activism should not be overlooked. The opportunity that presented itself with the instability of the government, and the availability for people to protest made it that much easier to join in the movement. Though the political opportunity was heavily rooted in the instability of the governing institution and the belief that the fear should be ended, it is important to note that there were many other sectors of society that contributed to the movement.

Chapter 2: Framing of Different Interests

I. Framing Organization Against Corruption

During the initial protests when the country's indignation began to show and coming together in support of anti-corruption measures, there were many who were skeptical about the ideas that many in the movement had and how they would actually succeed in leading to the president's resignation. Mynor Alonso's conversation to Professor Carrera highlighted this sentiment when he mentioned "we won't get the president to resign. No." (Field Notes). Even if this was the case, following the night of the revelation of Roxanna Baldetti's involvement in the corruption scandal "La Linea" over 10,000 attendees signed up for a FB event to a protest asking for Roxanna Baldetti's resignation scheduled for April 25th (Wer 2016). The mass support for anti-corruption was prevalent, and social media was playing a huge role in keeping people informed.

The support for resignation, however, did not come without its opponents. Many during the time believed that the mass mobilizations taken by many during the time were a distraction, and damaging to economic output (Gamarro and Orozco 2015). There was a strong focus for many on the disruptive tactics being used by protestors and thus many argued the protest tactics used during the protests were illegitimate. Both sides of the issue, those who supported anti-corruption through mass mobilizations and those who were reluctant to support mobilizations are exemplified by these two small examples. How exactly did the dynamics of these contrasting points of view play out during the 2015 summer mobilizations? To look deeper into this, we look at the issue of "framing" and how it was applied to bring support for anti-corruption mobilizations.

Social movements engage in framing to maximize the message their audience and those who choose to participate. Tilly and Tarrow define framing as the “adopting and broadcasting [of] a shared definition of an issue or performance” (Tilly and Tarrow 2007, 216). This process of framing is most relevant in the political moment in Guatemala because of the way that the social movement #RenunciaYa framed their messaging around the topics of corruption and legislative reform. From the beginning of the social movement, it was clear that the goal of the movement was to incite citizen participation that would promote an outcome of progressive reform. Although this was the original cause of the #RenunciaYa movement, in the beginning it was difficult for the social movement to create a messaging campaign without avoiding the criticisms coming from conservative outlets that argued it would be damaging to the constitutional procedures of the country.

In this chapter I cover how framing dynamics played out during the 2015 summer protests. First, it is important to cover the different perspectives held throughout multiple sectors of society ranging from the conservative elite members who were critical of protests to those who wanted to reform the system with more than resignation. Second, I will outline the ways that both sectors opposed each other on issues and attempted to make their issue more prevalent than the other. Third I will analyze the way the framing used by protest movements ultimately prevailed with the support of Guatemalan and international institutions that came to support some of the issues.

II. The Different Frames of the Actors and Influence

The manifestations brought a coincidence of three main perspectives about institutional reform to Guatemala that at times seemed contrary to each other (Fonseca 2015). Fonseca

describes the three different perspectives on the topic of corruption primarily as either conservative, liberal, or extremist ideologies (Fonseca 2015). The first conservative perspective consisted of the conservative wing that understood that corruption was damaging to the country's stability but nonetheless believed that protesting the president could lead to a cooptation of the state due to the lack of institutionality. This group consists of people that primarily showed an interest in reform only through Congress and supported the president because without a head of state there was a fear of a coup. These conservatives were critical of protestors who asked for resignation and reforms, arguing that there needed to be "less protests and more proposals" minimizing protest movements as anti-intellectual to the change needed (Field Notes).²

The second perspective consisted of liberal thinkers who were interested in ending corruption but believed that doing so by passing progressive legislative reform through existing institutions without bringing any changes to the Constitution. This included members of society who were supportive of the protests and in favor of the resignation of the President, but believed the best way to do so were through conventional institutional methods instead of through drastic unconstitutional measures. This presented a balance between those who were critical of protestors asking for resignation and those who were seeking more substantial changes through a constitutional convention.

The third ideology consists people who are interested in bringing about a re-foundation of the political system that would re-establish a new government with a new constitution. This was

² The translation in the paragraph above comes from "menos protesta, mas propuesta" a chant used by many anti-protest conservatives as a way to criticize the movements. According to various sources throughout the field work, it was used by various media pundits on radio and television as a way to criticize protest movements as inefficient. Pamela from La Batucada, a liberal activist, was one person who heard this critique often reproduced from people when they asked her why they were protesting. Similarly, it was a sentiment expressed by a high ranking official in FUNDESA, a business organization.

the group who was asking for a Constitutional Convention (Asamblea Popular) that would come to stop the elections that were upcoming in the country. According to Pamela Saravia from La Batucada, this group of people was a minority but gained ground after the resignation of the president, yelling “In these conditions, we do not want elections.”³ Though still a popular sentiment, the movement gained less support from those who were also asking for the resignation of the President.

Although the last ideological group mentioned is an extreme form of political reform, conservative elite of Guatemala marketed the extremist perspective as the #RenunciaYa perspective, using media sources to their advantage (Fonseca 2015). It is important to note that the liberal wing’s ideology consists of the re-foundation believers and those who believe in progressive legislative reform, which was an easy target for the conservative wing who often attempted to draw attention to the procedurally unconstitutional re-foundation liberal ideology. Using the most extreme perspectives of the liberal perspectives against liberals, conservatives were successful in deterring progressive reforms, and continuing to argue for “less protests, more proposals.” Thus, in this chapter I analyze the interactions between the conservative wing and the liberal wing. While liberal activists frame the importance of their protests as necessary for anticorruption, allowing more people to join into the movement, the effort to counter-frame by conservative elite.

If we analyze the social mobilizations and counter-mobilization efforts through the “frame critical” approach first articulated by Schön and Rein (1994), we are provided with the ability to analyze the intentions behind each of these movements and the intended public policy

³ Like in previous footnotes, the poetic justice is lacking in my translation. Originally “En estas condiciones, no queremos elecciones,” gave more power to the wishes of the population and considering there were.

outcomes, including how the dynamics can play together. While the conservative wing and liberal wing of the spectrum may equally influence policy, there are some realities in the process of framing a national conversation that may have affected the outcome, most notably the access to media outlets. In Guatemala, the access to country-wide media outlets benefited the conservative elite.

The advantage of elite members of society in having greater access to widely used resources is apparent in the case of Guatemala. Brooks and Manza argued that public policy preferences of the mass population are often more likely to be supported (Brooks and Manza 2006). One of the primary goals of social movements in this conversation of framing is the ability to gain broad-based support. Social movements will often attempt to gain attention from mass media because “[t]he media spotlight validates the movement as an important player”(Gamson and Meyer 1996). Movements, in this way, often compete for media attention creating a site of contention.

How exactly did #RenunciaYa and its allies gain this media attention amidst the hostile framework that advantaged elites? I will now turn to the framing of issues used by both conservative and liberal sources.

III. Framing in Direct Opposition

It is instrumental to understand the Guatemalan political movement in two moments. The first political moment is marked by the reluctance by the citizenry to unify amidst criticisms from conservative leaning organizations that criticized the protest movements asking for the resignation of Otto Perez Molina as damaging to the institutionality of the country. The second

political moment is marked by the support of both conservative and progressive citizen organizations that supported anti-corruption campaigns and resignation. These two moments provide a good understanding for how each actor used framing to their advantage. Primarily I will look at the way that conservative leaders expressed messages of support as compared to how liberal activists framed their request to bring changes.

In trying to consider how social movements organized and how conservative forces resisted it is important to understand how each disseminated their messages to Guatemala's population. In an interview with CMI, a group of journalists covering political situations in Guatemala with what they described as a particular focus on rural Guatemala, an argument was made that most of the information that enters many of those areas are primarily those covered by the big box television networks like TV Azteca and Guatevision (Field Notes). In the same interview, the group described that the power of Guatemalan elite over media outlets are particularly influential for the outcome of media coverage in the country.

Guatemalan national traditional media outlets have been criticized for being influenced by the conservative viewpoint. Enrique Castellanos (general manager of the largest telephone, internet, and television provider) and Alba Lorenzana (Wife of the most powerful media corporate executive and whose name is honored in the group Albavision which consists of channel 3, 7, 11, and 13 along with the radio station Radio Sonora) have both been charged with an order of arrest which some have contributed to the political participation with the Patriotic Party (Partido Patriota), the president's political party (Field Notes; Pellecer and Woltke 2016). The powerful influence of these organizations helped influence the framed conversations to diminish the power of the organizers. Enrique Naveda, executive director of the center of analysis Plaza Pública, argued "traditional media outlets like Radio Sonora, Guatevision, and TV

Azteca in the beginning tried to calm down the coverage of the protests. If someone were to watch one of these during the beginnings of the protests there would be no way to find out what was going on in Guatemala, no way to hear about the protests” (Field Notes). Giving this first-hand account of the events during the first manifestations by the social movement show the indifference of the traditional media coverage during the first events that were attempting to make light of an important situation.

The organizers of the social movement, however, realized that there was another important way to brand their message of anti-corruption and distribute it through social media allowing their message to spread wide. So instead of focusing on trying to broadcast their message on a hostile media outlet, they attempted to focus on social media sources like Facebook and Twitter to organize and get their message out there (Arce 2016). The first protest on April 25th which resulted in over 15,000 people attending in the central plaza was organized almost entirely on social media, with #RenunciaYa releasing their plans the day following the release of the CICIG investigations into the Vice President (Wer 2016; Barreto 2015). La Nacion, a 70 year old newspaper in Guatemala, attempted to discredit the protest finding that only 4,000 people were in attendance, with many using extra tarps to fill up empty space (Perez 2015). The importance of #RenunciaYa organization was critical for the #RenunciaYa movement given the hostile nature of conservative media outlets who had an interest in maintaining the status quo.

It is also instrumental to understand the two main actors that participated in the social movements. Although there are a variety of groupings of which could be made to characterize the two groups, here I organize them effectively into a conservative wing that protected the president’s constitutional mandate and attempted to minimize the goals of popular protests and

the liberal wing who believed the government needed a resignation of the president and subsequent political reforms.

In the conservative wing, I group many of those within the political class who would prefer to maintain the status quo and dispel mass protests through framing. These including the PP, the president's party at the time, the CACIF, the biggest chamber of commerce in Guatemala, the major media organizations that I describe above, and the U.S. Embassy. In the liberal wing, I group people who organized under #RenunciaYa to ask for the resignation of the president and political reform including political allies like the CICIG and those who actively engaged in the reform as described below. These two main sides often opposed each other throughout the social movement until the point that each side opposed keeping Otto Perez Molina in the presidency.

The framing used by these two parties are evident in two stages 1) in the beginning there was a split in framing along conservative and progressive perspectives with some asking for resignation and others for maintaining constitutionality but eventually 2) both conservative and progressive perspectives appeared to come together and share a common goal of ending corruption.

IV. Pleading Resignation vs. Protecting Constitutionality

When the protests began, it was clear that members who organized the protests wanted to avoid becoming associated with any particular political affiliation, instead asking for the president's resignation because of the indignation felt by the perceived impunity of his office among the corruption scandal that was so closely associated to the Vice President (Barreto

2015). A post by #RenunciaYa states simply “To the indifference: If it’s not today, when. If we don’t do it. Who. April 25 3 PM Central Park” (Rojas 2015). Such clear organizing missions, and framing of the chance to root out corruption as a pertinent, time-sensitive, and national issue made the message clear and easily understood across its’ mediums. It also allowed it to be a sharable message. The outcome of the efforts were clear on April 25 when over 15,000 people showed up to voice their concerns (Wer 2016; Barreto 2015).

The reasoning behind organizing during this exact moment, as exhibited by Gabriela Carrera’s conversation with Mynor Alonso on the need to change the organizing culture to promote popular protests and voicing of concerns previously unvoiced. The ripe opportunity behind the political instability and moment created by corruption allowed the movement to focus their organization around an anti-corruption frame. Furthermore, it was a frame that would promote citizen organization around an issue of national importance with a clear message and clear goals.

The conservative wing of political ideology was interested on the surface on bringing an end to corruption but vocal in ensuring that the constitutional system was protected including an ardent defense of the president, contrary to the opinions of the protest movements. CONIC, the National Coordinator of the Indigenous and Peasant (Coordinadora Nacional Indígena y Campesina), sent out a communique that argued that corruption existed in every government and every administration that Guatemala has had and that if people wanted to bring a regime overthrow, that hundreds of men and women in the indigenous populations would enter the city with a sharpened machete in hand to defend the constitutionality, law, and order (CMI Guatemala 2015) CONIC has benefitted greatly from the president’s policies, at one point receiving Q16 million to repay debts of its’ members. It was clear that this organization benefitted

greatly from the president's policy and it would make sense that they would aim to protect him, however, it was in their messaging that they, perhaps unintentionally, argued that corruption was a trend that plagued the governing institutions and was a status quo, perhaps invoking messages that it was ok for this government to enjoy immunity. Regardless, the ardent defense of the president by this conservative group who invoked constitutionality was an effective tool for Otto Perez Molina to remain in the presidency.

In mid-May, two weeks after the resignation of his Vice President, Otto Perez Molina himself assured the population that he would not resign because of his "constitutional mandate" that motivated him to continue until the 14th of January and that this legitimacy was given by the laws and Constitution of the country (Contreras 2015a). Instead the president argued that he would support changes that were done legitimately through the legislative system like electoral reform, civil service, and property. Such a statement was made with the support granted to him by the CONIC, the elite members of the conservative movement CACIF, and the U.S. Embassy.⁴

CACIF, the Guatemalan Coordinating Committee of Agricultural, Commercial, Industrial, and Financial Associations (Comité Coordinador de Asociaciones Agrícolas, Comerciales, Industriales y Financieras), is the most powerful chamber of commerce in Guatemala that aimed their dissent at protecting the constitutional rights of Guatemala (Gamarro and Orozco 2015). In a communique sent out mid-June of 2015, CACIF criticized the actions by many of the protestors who protested in a violent fashion and those who decided to close down roads across the country arguing that such protests were antithetical to the cause of reform as it only results in polarization (CACIF 2015). Perhaps the most interesting part of the communique was that

⁴ It is important to note that each of these organizations supported the president for various reasons, the scope of which going into falls outside this study. The point I wish to stress is that by providing the support for the institutionality, the president was able to frame his non-resignation as a matter of national importance as well.

CACIF argued that the extremist wing of protestors limited the rights of those peacefully assembling. It was a noteworthy communication by the biggest lobby of Guatemala because they continued to support the constitution without making any explicit reference to asking Otto Perez to leave office. Their interests in the president's office were closely related to their interest in the president's party. In 2012 a report made by Plaza Pública into CACIF's influence in congress found that the Patriotic Party was the primary point of influence for CACIF, making the need for mutual support between each other likely (Herrarte 2012). The support from CACIF's lobbying group provided a framed conversation around issues of constitutionality rather than framing the importance of protest movements.

Although CACIF did not directly argue the president should be protected, their arguments were framed to protect the presidential office. Arguments made in favor of upholding constitutionality allowed the president's action to be judged outside the realm of protests, limiting the effects that mass demonstrations had on influencing policies. Primarily this occurred with CACIF's criticisms of protests which minimized the efforts made to root out corruption. Although the two are not in exact contradiction to each other, the critiquing of political protests, particularly those that blocked roads allowed CACIF to strategically define protests as "antithetical to reform" causing damaging points of view to influence public opinion. This smear-campaign against protestors went beyond labeling peaceful protests and attempted to incite fear among citizens.

During the first protest organization movements, a fabricated letter was sent out promoting a "#PlanB" that asked people to organize in violent protest against their government (Cabanas 2015a). Various sources find that this move was made by none other than Julio Ligorria Carballido, the ambassador of Guatemala to the United States and member of the

president's party, who was in Guatemala as an advisor to the president during this corruption scandal (Cabanas 2015a). If true, the message would serve as a political tool for the Otto Perez Molina administration and further serve to discredit social movements that were attempting to organize in a peaceful fashion.

This same ambassador wrote an open letter arguing that President Perez Molina was dedicated to reform and that the manifestations represented a Guatemalan spring that could best move forward with the sympathetic Otto Perez Molina at the helms (Ligorria Carballido 2015). This is a perspective held by many of those who wanted to continue to guard the constitutional mandate of the president of the country. In this case, Ligorria Carballido's move as a high-ranking diplomat to defend the president promoted the conservative frame of constitutionality and advertised a message of peace.

Similarly, the U.S. Embassy in early May sent a press release in response to the resignation of Vice-President that supported the president's efforts to curb corruption without criticizing the president's perceived involvement (U.S. Embassy 2015a). Amidst a joint U.S. Embassy-Otto Perez press conference early May, many criticized the U.S. Government decision to uphold the conservative viewpoint leaders that allowed Otto Perez Molina to keep the presidency as a move that supported corruption and impunity which was exactly what Guatemala was rallying against (Slowing 2015). Although the reputation of the United States in Guatemala has been tarnished according to various interviewees, the protection the U.S. offered allowed Otto Perez Molina to maintain power and only extended his protected status. Amidst these circumstances it appeared that changes would be minimal at best.

V. Country United Against Corruption

Although early throughout the summer of protests conservative forces attempted to forcefully discredit social movement claims and actively framed that as an issue, towards the end of 2015 the mood began to change. The issue of corruption stuck on to the Guatemalan citizenry and the protests were not easily quelled.

The conservative wing was the most reluctant to ask for the president's resignation. On August 21, 2015, CAFIC held a press conference where the CACIF President, Jorge Briz, asked for the immediate resignation of the president (Prensa Libre 2015). This move came a mere two weeks before his official resignation and one week prior to the Paro Nacional. It was an important move for the anti-corruption movement who organized the Paro Nacional and had been organizing the massive event as they actively advertised on social media sites as #A27 (Semana 2015). CACIF's decision to diminish their alliance to President Otto Perez Molina could have been caused for a variety of reasons. As it relates to the anti-corruption movement, there was a clear importance in distinguishing their organization away from a corrupt president. If this would be the case, the frame organized by social movements to ask the president to resign would have been the prevailing form influencing public opinion instead of that presented by conservative members of society.

Although the CACIF did not participate in the National Halt (Paro Nacional) out of respect for the system of government, the move to ask for Otto Perez Molina's resignation as an institution was an influential part to advance the messaging begun by social movement (Solano 2015).⁵ For organizers, CACIF's decision allowed mass mobilizations to gain legitimacy and

⁵ Please note, that while CACIF asked for the resignation of the president, they were still actively arguing against protest tactics used by protestors. In a letter released by CACIF, they still argue that blocking roads and other protest tactics are damaging to the country, and there should be limits to the ability for "all sectors of society to express their incomformity, including in roads" (Centro de Medios Independientes 2015)

have their policy proposals followed through. Though the decision of CACIF may have been caused by a variety of reasons, the messaging that was exerted by the move was beneficial for those who had been asking for resignation from the beginning. The framing advanced calls for reform in a beneficial way for social movements.

Otto Perez Molina refused to resign in a national address on August 23, 2015, two days after the request for his resignation by CACIF (Lenhoff 2015). The president made various claims urging the nation's interior to rise in protest to protect democracy, arguing that the businesses that benefitted from corruption are beyond the surface and are yet to be uncovered, and that the intervention by foreign entities in the government of Guatemala was a dangerous precedent that would be detrimental to the nation (Lehnhoff 2015). Otto Perez Molina attempted to frame the conversation in a way that made him a representative to the anti-corruption movement. However, the CACIF's decision to ask for Otto Perez Molina's resignation stripped much of his legitimacy and allowed the framing of resignation to become *more* than a social movement. CACIF itself, once one of Otto Perez's biggest allies had turned its back to the leader and no longer participated in protecting his frame perspective.

In August, during the Paro Nacional, the U.S. Embassy released a statement that asked existing political parties to allow Guatemalan citizens to exercise free elections in a peaceful fashion as part of the Guatemalan constitutional process without making any reference to the resignation of President Otto Perez Molina (U.S. Embassy 2015b). This final statement before the election is uncharacteristically different to the statements made by the embassy that supported the president and his fight against impunity and corruption. However, how did the U.S. come to change their conversation? The change, I argue, comes from the constant criticisms of the Guatemalan public who was united against corruption and used effective framing

mechanisms to attract more people from both sides of the ideological spectrum to unite against corruption.

In mid-June, the Guatemalan Supreme Court accepted a charge initiated by Congressman Amilcar Pop of the WINAQ Movement against President Otto Perez Molina that would strip him of his immunity (Jose 2015). Amilcar Pop's accusation included four counts against the president, one of which was failing to keep working knowledge of his members (Canal Antigua 2015). It was an important moment for Guatemalan citizens who were part of the liberal wing because this moment invoked the political progress championed by this ideological group to change the existing political situation without re-founding the country's constitution or other existing institutions. The process of having the Guatemalan Supreme Court and Congress follow the constitutional procedures gave further legitimized the frame presented by social movements. This changed the dynamic of the conversations in national media outlets that brought the opposing forces together against corruption.

Similarly, congressional support for resignation increased during the final weeks, after the National Halt. Alvaro Montenegro, one of the organizers behind the #RenunciaYa movement attended the protest held by congresswoman Montenegro in the congressional offices (Field Notes; Soy502 2015). For many, the fact that a congressional representative was asking for resignation was a key step in ensuring that the president would step down. It was also a sign that the anti-corruption movement was becoming part of the main-stream political system, not just a sign of singular protest. These signs proved true, as in less than a week later, the congress voted to strip the president from his impunity and soon after the Public Ministry ordered his arrest (Solano 2015; BBC Mundo 2015; Contreras and Escobar 2015).

VI. Conclusion

In this chapter I have attempted to draw a distinction between the framing that both the conservative and liberal wings of Guatemalan society engaged in. I began by defining some of the perspectives of the varied Guatemalan citizenry primarily split along conservative and liberal perspectives. During the 2015 summer of protests each of these perspectives engaged in framing promoting their own perspectives. The conservative perspective had better access to resources and better framed a national conversation using traditional media outlets but #RenunciaYa's use of non-traditional media sources allowed to maintain a resistance. Although the beginning was primarily made up of conservative groups attempting to frame a conversation and spread fear, the support for anti-corruption proved to be effective in maintaining public support. While conservatives were implying social movements were detrimental, the sustained framing of importance of anti-corruption eventually changed the tide of popular opinion that created a united front against corruption. Although some of the criticisms among conservative forces remained towards social movements, the lack of support for the president provided social movements greater influence over the national conversation and framing of their efforts as integral for anti-corruption efforts.

Chapter 3: On Building Alliances

I. Brokerage and Coordinated Action

To build a successful protest-movement and achieve an end to corruption practices and institutional reforms, protest movements built connections within their sector and across-sectors to establish alliances to bring an end to corruption in a multi-faceted way that would not have occurred otherwise. Organizers of the anti-corruption campaign engaged in a contentious political tactic that Tilly and Tarrow term brokerage. Brokerage is defined as “production of a new connection between previously unconnected sites” (Tilly and Tarrow 2015, 31). Brokerage is one of many mechanisms that Tilly and Tarrow attempt to use to define social movement behavior in contentious politics. After brokerage takes place, Tilly and Tarrow argue, diffusion could take place which may result in new coordination which are marked by new alliances and friendships. Taking it one step further, brokerage as a mechanism and the resulting points of coordination could result in upward scale shift, which is a point of coordination among multiple sources working together. In Guatemalan student organization against corruption in 2015 actively engaged in brokerage and the resulting processes playing a pivotal role in creating new alliances amongst unconnected sites to help bolster their movement.

It is important to outline the applications of brokerage as it relates to Guatemala’s #RenunciaYa movement and explain in general terms how it takes place. Domestic and international actors both engaged in brokerage in Guatemala benefitting the active struggle against corruption. Domestic actors like students from multiple universities, members from #RenunciaYa and other social movements, and members from the elite business class each engaged in some form of brokerage to help advance the anti-corruption movement. Likewise, international organizations working in Guatemala like the UN sponsored CICIG, the U.S.

Embassy, and other organizations participated in anti-corruption campaigns at different points, leading to a strategic union of these organizations for the benefit of the public. However, studying each point of coordination between these groups of people is a difficult process and out of the scope of this paper. In this chapter I focus on the direct organization in relation to student movements.

In this paper, I outline three developments in student organization beginning with the conversations among student organizers immediately after the release of the investigations by the CICIG into the Vice-President, the subsequent organization and overcoming hurdles across both private and public universities, and the ultimate result of student organization including their cross-sectional organization efforts.

II. Stark Differences in Private and Public Schools

People throughout Guatemala were shocked in 2015 to find that students from the state-sponsored university, Universidad San Carlos, and from various other private universities, notably Universidad Rafael Landivar, were participating together in political protests. Private and public universities have traditionally had a non-existent relationship given that public perceptions of the two were split among class assumptions deeply rooted in, and exacerbating, the inequalities between public and private universities.

Mynor Alonzo, a student at the public university USAC explains his perceptions on attending the country's only public university that is deeply rooted in the ability to help establish a social movement and give back to the people:

“In the mind of the people, then, students were the only one’s perceived to be in support of the populous. It is crazy to think that in the middle of all the violence [of the Dirty War], students from USAC were the ones getting on public busses with masks and asking people for donations for the cause to – and many donated. And so it became that if you ask anyone what they think of students from San Carlos, they respond by saying they’re protectors of the people, the heroes of the people, the brave ones who puts their chest to the oppressor and stands for the people.”

Mynor continued to explain that the public financing of the university created an incentive and responsibility within his own mind as it related to giving back to his community, arguing that it was his duty to stand up against injustices faced by the population whenever anyone brought a complaint forward to him. Mynor’s enrollment fees at USAC are Q101 yearly, about 12USD, with the Guatemalan taxpayer paying most of the enrollment fees. This allows for many people who would otherwise be unable to obtain a prestigious college education at the affordable public university USAC. It is something that is continually on his mind and serves to provide him a sense of indebtedness to public service.

Private university students have gained negative stereotypes based on their perceived class social status. Jose Angel, a student at Universidad Rafael Landivar, a prominent private university in Guatemala offered his own perspective on students at USAC and the relationship between the students saying, “student’s at USAC always saw us as daddy’s boy’s, kids of privilege.” Jose Angel finds that this sentiment affected communication between the two groups since it presented pre-empted prejudices against private school students. The assumption of entitlement and privilege students from USAC held of students at Universidad Rafael Landivar are based on economic realities between the two-school’s cost of attendance.

Economic realities have an impact on the way students participate and move through their education system. The cost of enrollment at USAC, the public university, comes in at a flat annual rate of Q101 while private universities enrollment could cost as much as Q6,696 (Duriez Gonzalez and Obregon 2016). Obtaining a professional degree is even more costly with an estimated tuition cost of Q53,881 without including transportation and school expenses (“Maestrias: Facultad de Ciencias Economicas Y Empresariales” 2015). The tuition costs associated with education for students can act as a barrier, with the national minimum wage at Q2,644 with arguments made that for an average family the minimum wage only covers a quarter of the cost of living expenses (Wirtz 2015). The cost differential between the schools provide evidence to how extensive the economical difference between the two universities could lead to a lack of union in organization between the two.

One may wonder, rightfully so, why the perception of USAC students towards private school students at Universidad Rafael Landivar is important to the use of brokerage mechanisms by the social movement organization. The specifics of perceptions, some may argue, are unimportant to the brokerage mechanisms. However, the student history in the lack of brokerage is important because it shows how challenging it would be for both private universities and USAC to come together to promote a unified agenda. In this case, the political will to unify against corruption was what brought the universities together. Jose Angel, the student at Universidad Rafael Landivar spoke on the relationship between the students saying, “student’s at USAC always saw us as daddy’s boy’s, kids of privilege. And so there was no coordination between these two groups. So it was something quite memorable that there was a union between the universities.” (Field Notes) So, what exactly led to joint coordination between the two?

III. Social Barriers to Organization

I want to draw attention to one important relationship that would lead to organization between students at USAC and students at Landivar. USAC's Mynor Alonzo and Landivar's Carrera's working relationship was fundamental in advancing the process of brokering between the two universities. In 2011, Gabriella Carrera herself noted that there was a striking difference in social thought between USAC and Landivar which made it difficult for the two to work together on institutional reforms and called for the two to come together (Carrera 2011).

To bring private and public universities together, students had to become politically active at both universities. Both private and public students argued activism at private universities was lacking because of the lack of activism between the two schools. Mynor, the student from USAC argued that "USAC has been the center of political activism throughout history," (Field Notes) and his historical account of the pride taken in that activism seems to support the idea that USAC is an organizational leader. It was no surprise that USAC would be a leader in the anti-corruption movement in Guatemala.

Meanwhile, at Universidad Rafael Landivar, the private university it was uncommon for students to become involved in social movements. Gabriela Carrera, Professor of Political Movements and Organization at Universidad Rafael Landivar, a key organizing professor in connecting the two sites remarked on just this point, pointing out that "students at Landivar have traditionally been uninvolved in political activism, and I really wanted to help change that." (Field Notes) Changing the extent of political activism took place through an activation of the brokerage mechanism between the unconnected sites between USAC and private universities.

It was difficult, to say the least for students to come together as a matter of principle, but nonetheless the overriding force was the dedication to bring an end to corruption. Mynor Alonzo's snickering remarks about wealth at URL at one of these early organizing meetings with ally trainers in Mexico held an important lesson when one of the organizers from Mexico responded "We weren't able to do shit without first ridding ourselves of our prejudices" (Cabria 2015). It was a lesson that Mynor took to heart and moving forward he also attempted to bring down these prejudices.

In 2009, Gabriella Carrera was a student from Landivar when she first met Mynor Alonzo a student from USAC during an organizational meeting at USAC (Cabria 2015) During the meeting that brought the two under the same roof, some noted Carrera's presence during the meeting was not her scene. Mynor defended her presence as a showing of the left-wing and even communist wing of the URL which was something that proved to be a showing of good faith (Cabria 2015). Although good faith showings between the two universities continued in the form of participation in each other's meetings, there were no significant changes to overall structure in their organizations.

The simple working friendship between Alonso and Carrera established the premise for future collaboration that made a successful coordination effort during the 2015 anti-corruption campaigns. As mentioned in the previous chapter on political opportunity, student activists had a clear idea that they aimed to challenge existing political norms by drawing attention to the organizing potential of the political moment. Regardless the student organizations at separate campuses had to engage in establishing new connections to engage in cross-activism coordination. Carrera's and Alonso's working friendship and participation with one another's meetings presented the ideal circumstances to establish a new site of coordination among the

universities. With corruption as the motivating factor stirring unrest with student populations, the two just needed to join in organization.

IV. Organizing First Protests

Early on, when the CICIG first released information about the investigation into corruption of the Vice-President Roxanna Baldetti, the comment Mynor Alonso made to Gabriella Carrera about the need to capitalize on the political moment showed Mynor's eagerness to provide a political environment of citizen organization (Field Notes, see Chapter 1). The search for engaged citizen participation for students, however, was challenging because students at Universidad Rafael Landivar have been previously disconnected from organizing in national events according to the students themselves and Professor Carrera (Carrera 2011). During the organization movement, Carrera argued that while students at USAC were re-establishing their identity in political protest, students from URL were merely establishing that political identity for the first time (Cabria 2015).

In a sense, both students from URL and USAC were still learning to become politically active when compared to national organizations who were already well-established in the mainstream (Chamale 2016). Although USAC had its' historical significance, large-scale student protests of this nature had not been organized in years beyond those made during the political protests of "Huelga de Dolores" (Redress of Grievances) a political protest in which students at USAC march on the square criticize the government and end the night in festivities (PuntoGuate 2014). Although organization is limited to students at USAC meaning that a cross-campus connection required substantial coordination. However, the enthusiasm and organization output during the social movement proved them to be a formidable ally of anti-corruption.

The night following the news of corruption mid-April, students and organizers within #RenunciaYa organized a protest for April 25 and within two hours obtained 2000 attendees on Facebook while obtaining 10,000 by the end of the night (Wer 2016). The use of social media for obtaining people was critical and helped obtain many students of the university. Student committees that organized for the “Huelga de Dolores” brought their experience to the table during the April 25 protests leading to increase the size of the expected mobilization from 500 people to eight and ten thousand students under #UsacEsPueblo (Ixchu 2016). Many also criticized the approach and attempted to discredit students who were organizing, but nevertheless they persisted (Ixchu 2016). The mobilizing experience from the “Huelga de Dolores” definitely brought experience to USAC, but beyond that there was a culture of student politics that gave them authority, especially because of student’s representation experience working directly with the University Superior Counsel, CSU, the steering committee and Guatemala’s education representative in government (Ixchu 2016; USAC 2017). The experience USAC had in organizing gave them a competitive edge but there was still the need for them to organize beyond their universities.

It is important to note that most of the organization efforts that occurred in USAC were not necessarily replicated at other universities, and while USAC showed in large numbers to the first protest, the presence of other universities were bleak with only well-known friends and others across universities being in attendance (Chamale 2016). Although Mynor Alonzo made a showing to URL the Thursday after the first protest to try to spark student organization, there was no united political response during the first protest on April 25th, with only students from USAC making an organized showing (Field Notes). In fact, the URL did not formally organize a student group until late April with the help from Professor Carrera under the banner

Landivarianos (Brújula 2015). Landivarianos, the term was used to make an indirect reference to the private university as it was a contentious issue the university wished not to take an official stand on. Nonetheless, Landivarianos organized and attended their first protest May 1st, Labor Day, as Landivarianos.

On the march on Labor Day in Guatemala, although there had been no previous coordination students from USAC and Landivarianos met each other with welcoming arms. Although they did not know each other, they still felt the resentment for the corruption practices of the government and joined together against the government. In the words of Bernardo Silva, a protester, “We only knew we had something in common: our hearts yelled, Guatemala’s had enough!” (Silva 2016, 45) Beyond student organization some even chained themselves to the central palace for days without even thinking beforehand contacting a reporter from a human rights non-governmental organization and a reporter from Guatelevision to ensure rights were protected and a message was spread (Silva 2016). These tactics were an extreme showing of citizen dissatisfaction but nonetheless provide a measure for dissatisfaction from which we could explain a motivation for further organization. April 25 was an opportunity for mobilization of youth and allowed people to continue in May 1 and May 2 to find a political identity (Cabanas 2015b). This provided the perfect chance for both private and public school students to rethink their relationship and dedication and reorganize a new political movement.

V. Organizing a Student Social Movement

Leaders of #RenunciaYa decided to coordinate again on May 16 under the banner #16M (Silva 2016). By the time they did, student organization was strengthened and students were much better able to provide cross-campus and cross-sector support. On May 16, there was a

showing of over 10,000 students marching against corruption from private schools like URL, Del Valle, and the most conservative Francisco Marroquin (Cabria 2015). The numbers alone provide an amazing result, much more impressive considering that the students represented private schools traditionally underrepresented in social movements. Accounting for this drastic change was the amount of organization made by students beforehand.

On May 6th, students from three universities met at the “Casa Roja” in the historic district of Guatemala to discuss how students could better organize to address their political grievances (Cabria 2015). In attendance were both Professor Carrera from URL and Mynor Alonzo from USAC, along with key representatives from the other private schools (Cabria 2015: Field Notes). Issues discussed were how best to bring Guatemalan institutions to change for a better society, and a key result of this meeting was the establishment of the CEUG, the Student University Coordinator of Guatemala.

CEUG was founded as part of cross-campus coordination and action, sparking a formal organization for which members from different schools to engage in meaningful reform movement. Their mission is to “foment citizen participation of students through interuniversity dialogue” by bringing people together under the #SOMOSPUEBLO, we are the people (CEUG 2015). Covering some semantics #SOMOSPUEBLO, it’s important to note, stems from #UsacEsPueblo because of the respect for USAC’s historic standing with struggles on behalf of the people and wanting to provide acknowledgment to it. Introducing SOMOS ease some of the perceptions that other universities were not part of the social movement, therefore making students from private universities specifically more likely to participate in the organized protests (Cabria 2015).

Nonetheless the foundation of the CEUG established a working relationship beyond Landivarianos and USAC and helped establish a larger university showing especially among private universities that were known to be less prone to attend protests. The CEUG's presence helped invite people to the protests and further sparked a sense of citizen responsibility. Part of that is due to the mission statement of CEUG and the political messaging students engaged. Another large part was the topic of corruption itself that resulted in a populous more likely to stand up against perceived injustice. One protest attendee describes, "I went to the majority of marches between 16M and 27A, not because I liked it but because it was my responsibility" (Neftalí Coronado Flores 2016). Students knew that the establishment of the CEUG would help students canalize their dissatisfaction and would therefore paint the responsibility of securing a better future on the students themselves. Regardless, the presence of the CEUG, an unlikely unified force between schools previously un-unified helped bring legitimacy, most notably during the final month of the social movement.

The CEUG, throughout the protest movements, worked actively to engage other social forces to unify behind their cause. In May of 2015 their goal was to call for judicial and electoral reform to the laws in place (Cabria 2015; CEUG 2015). Having capitalized on the investigation by the MP and CICIG to organize, they worked to bring a cross-sector approach to these changes, working steadily to establish deep-rooted relationships with various sectors of society (Neftalí Coronado Flores 2016). Students were key in persuading a small market in closing down shop for the day with the knowledge that it was economically unsound to close business for the Paro Nacional (Gutierrez 2016). The marketplace decided to close and join the student organizers after conversing with each other to ensure it was the right choice. Students, in this form, helped establish a connection to bring groups like these into the anti-corruption movement.

Students also attempted to bridge gaps between people who have traditionally been marginalized and the strong business organizations. Students participated in progressive meetings with the Social and Popular Assembly which included other groups like Semilla, Prensa Comunitaria, etc. sparking a new process of organization that would allow for initial broad-based organization (Mauricio Jose 2016, 117). This organization was another way in which these leaders organized in a new site of coordination. A coordinator of the ASP had a deep relationship with students from CEUG, remarking that it was important for them to help each other organize and communicate towards a common goal and that the organizing experience gained was excellent for the future (Chamale 2016). Students attempted to create a new site of coordination between the ASP and Jorge Briz, a businessman representative of private sector of Guatemala as President of CACIF, which was refused but nonetheless showing how student organizers were working to coordinate among groups that have previously been disconnected (Chamale 2016 149).

Before going forward, I want to ensure to clarify the limits of student organization. Though students organized themselves well, working with other groups to focus on similar issues, one must not ignore the importance that the other parties had on mobilization by building connections. Many, including Emilio Mendez, a successful business man and son of Saul Mendez, a large restaurant chain owner, argued that without the help from the CICIG CEUG would not have achieved what they did because it was also political dissatisfaction that brought people to the protests (Mendez 2016). He also mentioned that he personally reached out to other businesses like MegaPaca and McDonald's to ask if they would support the movement (Mendez 2016). The ASP also played a big role, giving a press conference in late August before the Paro Nacional to call for the resignation of the president once again (Coronado 2015). The social

movement was not exclusively of students and it was truly a national effort. However, one of the biggest stories as an outcome of student organization is the new site of coordination between private and public schools never before seen.

VI. August 27 Student Representation and Outcome

On the 27th of August the outcome planning for organization came with multiple sectors like large businesses, peasants, and students coming together to bring over 75,000 people to the central square, a number without precedent (Villagrán 2015; Ixchu 2016). The largest groups come from the universities, with over 15,000 students and citizens marching from USAC alone (Escalon 2015b). It was clear that these points of reunion were important to the citizenry given that they spanned out towards multiple edges of the city. At the end of the day even noticing that students from both public and private universities had come together “leaving behind their differences, their reciprocal laughter, and their distrust for a bigger objective: to change the political system” (Escalon 2015). As students walked down the main streets from their respective universities, and as they waited at the designated rendezvous point it was clear that there was an excitement in the air (Fernández 2015). However it was the moment they linked arms and walked together that struck excitement and hope for the future from onlookers making some speechless at the gesture that brought together people from different sectors (Fernández 2015). Someone who experienced this says, “I marched alongside a hundred people from URL and UVG, and never before have I heard about something like this happening” (Neftalí Coronado Flores 2016). Another describes her thoughts “without a doubt, thinking of the historic 27th of August, I remember how, for the first time, students from the distinct private universities, Rafael

Landivar, Francisco Marroquin, and Universidad del Valle marched together, marking a precedent in these universities on that historic day. (Ixchu 2016, 29)”

The historic nature of the event in symbol and actual hope for the future is difficult to bring to words. The political nature of the event nonetheless provided students from both private and public universities legitimacy in bringing their political grievances (Estrada 2016).

They came together under the common goal of asking for the resignation of the president and many other requests (Urizar 2016, 71). Though student mobilization around corruption was best seen during the summer protests, students continued to have an influence after resignation by providing an outlet in national politics through various activities and conversations. In one of these activities Thelma Aldana, Attorney General of Guatemala during the time and public face of the Public Ministry received an award from CEUG for her support of investigations into corruption to which she responded that she grew up during the period of corruption and it was no longer something she wanted for the next generations. (Melendez 2015). She maintained that people in the government should take responsibility and be charged for their actions (Melendez 2015). The need for an end to political immunity was felt and there was a positive response. It is this type of change that Mynor Alonzo and Professor Carrera hope would be available in the future.

VII. Conclusion

Though students may not have been the only organizing force in helping people come out, with groups like PNRE, Semilla, ASP, and others also joining, they nonetheless provide an average citizen the ability to join in their march towards the central square because of the

braveness they portrayed (Estrada 2016, 188). A result of these actions during the Paro Nacional was that CACIF withdrew their support for the president and the United States Embassy requested congress to expedite the prosecutorial process to remove immunity (Estrada 2016).

Iván Velásquez, heading the CICIG, during a speech at USAC remarked that “protest is an affirmation of what could affect citizens” (Publinews 2015b). In an interview post Otto Perez’ resignation went on to explain that the investigations of the CICIG and protest movements were different movements but nonetheless ran parallel to each other in bringing down the president (Paullier 2015). Iván Velásquez, argues that the CICIG is not a foreign entity and should not be seen as such, instead it should be seen as “a group of people interested in contributing and supporting national institutions and with society construct and strengthen [Guatemala’s] institutions” (Arrazola 2015). The student and citizen organization represented that same sentiment with a support for institutional reform for the foundation of a better country.

Regardless, the student mobilization efforts and ability to create alliances with each other in a symbolic way that produced large numbers of student activists shows the ability for them to have a say in political outcomes. Many others have argued that the establishment of CEUG and student summer protests is only the beginning for student organization and that the best is yet to come (Guillermo Velasquez 2016). Whether the union of the students would affect the political climate to the extent they wished remains to be a difficult thing to measure. What is sure is that the organization among students helped provide an outlet for further organization.

Conclusion: What's in the Future?

This research study's central question remains, "Which mechanisms were used in the Guatemalan citizen mobilizations that led to President Otto Perez Molina's resignation?" In my research I have found three distinguishing social movement features that made the mobilizations during the summer of 2015 in Guatemala successful. First, the use of Guatemala's history created an opportune moment to capitalize on creating a new political culture more open to social mobilizations like the ones seen in 2015 (Azpuru and Seligson 2012). This model of mobilization shows an intent to promote a new political opportunity structure presented by scholars who believe these structures are beneficial for social movement outcomes (Gamson and Meyer 1996; Meyer 1993b; McAdam 1982). Second, the successful use of anti-corruption "framing" provided a message for people to mobilize behind the social movement at the national level and ultimately led a unified country against corruption (Villagrán 2015; Prensa Libre 2015; Contreras and Escobar 2015). The framing mechanisms used by social movement leaders, and by the elite counter-mobilizers, provide important lessons to how social movements broadcast and sustain their message in a hostile political environment (Benford and Snow 2000; Tilly and Tarrow 2015). Furthermore, the dynamics of mobilizers to use social media instead of traditional means presents an important power dynamic between those with access to national media sources and those without. Third, the successful alliances created between two previously unconnected sites provide valuable insight into how social movement organizers *expand* their networks. These mechanisms from contentious politics theory are often overlooked, most importantly the exact conversations that lead to the establishment of these networks are valuable to how social movements expand beyond a small group.

Each chapter has provided a look *beyond* institutional forces *into* inter-movement dynamics and providing an alternate view for changes looking to the social movement's affects on these. The importance of conducting such research is created by the large institutional focus of social movement theories that fail to acknowledge how people living within these institutions are affected by governing policies (Yashar 1999). In studying the mechanisms by which these movements, and the people that existed within them, engaged in anti-corruption mobilization provides insight to how fruitful extra-institutional mobilization becomes. It also provides insight into how *institutionalized* movements may become to challenge what scholars have pointed out to be an equation to disruption (McAdam et al. 2005). While the conversations in this work seek to bring the human elements back into theoretical frameworks, there remains important work to be done in social movement literature to focus on how people work within their political frameworks to achieve change.⁶ As I wrap up I want to return to the story of Guatemala and what it looks like 2 years later.

A student leader of the CEUG, Luis Ventura, two years after the organization efforts spoke about the events with great admiration, saying “I wasn’t able to attend the first protest, but after seeing it in pictures, seeing so many people in the public square calling for the resignation of Baldetti, I was inspired and I wanted to be at the next one.” The sentiment of admiration for the summer of 2015 is something all Guatemalan’s point to when considering efforts to root out corruption. The nature of the event indeed creates admiration for the people of Guatemala who decided to step in and critique the governing institutions.

⁶ It is important not just to understand this as “political opportunity structures” as narrowly defined regime types as Tilly and Tarrow (2015) find, but also beyond those forces into *how* political contexts respond to protest mobilizations and whether they provide adequate avenues for change.

Some, however, argue that the monumentalism of organizing to bring down Guatemala's president has actually plagued sustained movement beyond the summer of 2015. Many believed people strictly participated in protests because a president's resignation was a "sexy" issue. Pamela Saravia talked about the shift in public participation after Otto Perez Molina's resignation and after the country elected a new President, Jimmy Morales, a literal career clown.

"After the election, things were really quiet. We kept wishing for more people to come out and join our protests, we kept asking for the changes to the constitution, but people were just so much less interested...I think it had to a lot to do with bringing down a president, a president who was the face of corruption, a president was just so much more of a hot issue for people to come out and march against...Eventually we decided that we couldn't come out weekly like before, and so we changed our schedule to twice monthly, sometimes even once a month. But we continued to come out because we thought it was important to come out and remind people of what happened in 2015" (Field Notes).

The issue of monumentalism in bringing down a president helped the mobilizations gain numbers. However, it brings up an important question. Years later, how much change have the institutions undergone? Otto Perez Molina and Roxanna Baldetti, along with various people are currently sitting in jail for their embezzlement schemes. There is no reason to doubt that these are effective changes to a corrupt system. But to what extent has the anti-corruption movement advance into the every day life of a person in Guatemala? Does it remain a salient issue?

Luis Ventura, leader of the CEUG argues things have gone back to normal after the protests, saying "in the CEUG now it's hard to schedule meetings between the schools like we used to during the protests. People are just not interested and it feels like everyone is falling back

into their respective groups, like it used to be” (Field Notes). The difficulty of organizing now, comes from the fact that there is no clear goal that will effectively motivate people to mobilize. This is an issue brought up within collective action perspectives, where mobilization relies on people’s perceived benefits and without that “moment of madness” that inspires creation of new sites of contention, there is no motivation (Olson 1965; Tarrow 1993, 1993, 1999). The “un-sexy” issues, as Alvaro Montenegro once put it, was one thing that brought a problem to Guatemalan organization.

The implications that this has on social movement effectiveness in the case of Guatemala presents a challenge. For now, the efforts of 2015 elections, like those during the Arab spring, many have been an example for the region, but many attribute the successes entirely to the investigations carried out by the CICIG that implicated the President of Guatemala (Luhnow 2015). Though the importance of the CICIG cannot be understated, there was more than simply releasing an investigation. The combined factors of the political context of Guatemala repressive to organization, citizen indignation against corruptio, and the political calculations carried out by social movement organizers played an important role in ensuring a sustained anti-corruption campaign. If future mobilizations in either Guatemala or other parts of the world are to succeed, there must also be a sustainable institutional support that will work together to root out that corruption like the CICIG. But citizen pressure, as exemplified throughout this thesis, and the importance of organization and alliance building and framing issues as nationally important remain central to ensuring institutions follow through with their intended goals.

Future research would benefit greatly from studying the relationship between these existing institutions and the political opportunity structures for social mobilizations, but also the mechanisms used by social movements to engage with those institutions. In more thorough

understanding these dynamics, democratic institutions could benefit greatly and in turn be more responsive to the requests of citizens in maintaining a strong system of governance. If we were to understand what makes people excited about reform, and interested in achieving it, we could gain greater citizen participation and in turn institutional response. This is an important way forward.

Now, back to the case of Guatemala, as it stands today. In March 10, 2017, 37 teenage girls were found dead within a state-run juvenile facility for women (Naveda and Arrazola 2017). Their documented abuse a reminder to the state-sponsored terrorism of the past. Its' continuation into the present is a gross reminder that the work to create substantive change in institutions must continue, along with and beyond that created by the CICIG. With these state-sponsored terror acts, social movements may rise in response. But there is still lacking that institutional prevention and adequate treatment of citizenry at the crux of a functional democracy.

But there's still hope. This time, citizens weren't afraid to speak out. And #UsacEsPueblo and many others held candle-light vigils for the victims and sought answers from state-sponsored violence. The work continues and could benefit greatly from finding sustainable ways to improve the responsiveness from institutions to the social movements that want change for the better. But there's still more to come.

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