CONSOCIATIONALISM AND THE COMPROMISED PEACE

LESSONS FROM NORTHERN IRELAND

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INTRODUCTION

“CONSOCIATIONAL BIG MAC,”
AN INTRODUCTION

“We have a problem in this society with sectarianism at all levels. It permeates right through all sections of our society. It determines where people live. It determines where people shop. It determines where people socialize. It determines how people engage with each other. All of that is inherent within our society and needs to be dealt with in a root and branch manner if we are to ever move into a society fit for purpose... Because if we don’t, it has the capacity to come back and haunt us in many different ways.”

- Joe O’Donnell of the Belfast Interface Project
  (qtd. in Cochran 2013: 212)

My interest in the politics of Northern Ireland emerged during the Spring of 2016 while studying abroad in Derry/Londonderry.¹ During my time in Ireland I was fortunate to have been able to visit Stormont and observe the Northern Ireland Assembly up close. I also met with representatives from several of the country’s major political parties (Sinn Fein, Ulster Unionist Party, Social Democratic and Labor Party, Alliance

¹ In Northern Ireland, even the names of cities can be a subject of controversy. While Derry/Londonderry is officially known as “Londonderry,” it is more commonly referred to as “Derry” in ordinary conversation. However, after the outbreak of the Troubles in the 1960s, the name of the city became politicized. Nationalists and Catholics tend to prefer the name “Derry,” while many Unionists and Protestants prefer “Londonderry.” I witnessed the contentious nature the city’s name firsthand. One night while bantering with locals at a Pub, a presumably Catholic young man mistakenly referred to the city as “Londonderry.” “WHAT THE FUCK DID YOU JUST SAY?!” his friend cracked. “My bad,” he responded, “It’s Derry, it’ll always be Derry!”
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Party). This experience deepened my understanding of the political process in Northern Ireland, and also peaked my interest in Northern Ireland's unique democratic arrangement.

But it was not in the halls of Stormont when it all really came together for me; it was in the halls of... a McDonald’s. As I stood in line waiting to order my Big Mac I noticed, out of the corner of my eye, an advertisement on the wall that read: “Made with 100% British and Irish beef.” For some reason I became consumed with this message. Why do they claim that my Big Mac will be made with 100% British and Irish beef? Was one patty British and the other Irish? Or perhaps the cows who produced this beef had dual citizenship. No, that does not make sense, cows do not have passports. So then, what is the meaning of this? Perhaps some of the cows came from Britain and the others came from Ireland. Or perhaps all of the cows came from Northern Ireland. But if all of the cows came from Northern Ireland why didn’t the advertisement simply say, “Made with 100% Northern Irish beef”?

In a sense this story captures much of what will be discussed throughout the rest of this thesis. McDonald’s primary objective, plainly stated, is to make as much money as possible by selling as many burgers and fries as possible. However, disrupting the fragile social order in Northern Ireland could obstruct this goal. If they claimed that the burgers were made with 100% British beef, McDonald’s would run the risk of alienating the nationalist communities. And if they claimed that the burgers were made with 100% Irish beef, they would potentially alienate unionist communities. So in the interest of profit, and to be inclusive towards both
"CONSOCIATIONAL BIG MAC"

communities, McDonald’s produced the consociational Big Mac: equal parts Irish and British.

I understand that this is not a perfect analogy, but it gets at something important, something that even McDonald’s understands about Northern Irish society. Consociational democracy was implemented as a compromise that would allow Northern Ireland to move forward after years of violent conflict. And in order for it to function unionist and nationalist parties must work together hand in hand. Colloquially, the First Minister and Deputy First Minister of Northern Ireland are referred to as the “siamese twins” of government because of this necessity. While they represent two different communities, they must come together as one, in the interest of the government for all. I have a deep sense of admiration and respect for this system; and in theory it represent a great hope for democratic governance. However, I am also aware of the complexities of consociationalism in practice such as resolving conflicts over the identity of the state or incorporating ethnic minorities in the political process. Throughout the following chapters I will endeavor to explore these complexities in the hopes that democratic governance could be better implemented in other societies in need of peaceful resolution, or even in Northern Ireland.

Setting the Scene

The conflict in Northern Ireland is best characterized as a political struggle between those who strive for the north of Ireland to be reunified with the south and those who wish for the north to remain within the United Kingdom. Unionists tend
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to be Protestant, identify with England and believe that Northern Ireland should remain within the United Kingdom. While Nationalists tend to be Catholic, identify with Ireland and believe that Northern Ireland should be reunified with the south.

Hundreds of years of competition between these two groups eventually culminated in a three-decade long war known colloquially as “The Troubles,” lasting from the late 1960s until the 1990s, and during which there were tens of thousands of casualties, both civilian and combatant. However, the passage of the 1998 “Belfast” Agreement is usually recognized as the conclusion of this period of sectarian violence. Among other developments, the Agreement established a system of consociational, or “power-sharing,” democracy in Northern Ireland. Prior to consociationalism, Northern Ireland was directly ruled by the United Kingdom from London.

However, while the conflict in Northern Ireland is fundamentally political not religious, the role of religion in shaping dynamics within the society has been significant. Religion is an essential element of the social fabric in Ulster, and is the defining characteristic of the dualistic socio-economic and political strata of the society. It is often one of the first things that unaccustomed individuals seek to identify in one another, and over the years Catholics and Protestants have developed a keen eye to do this effectively. First or last names alone can be enough to disclose the identity of a stranger. Historically, Catholics and Protestants have lived segregated lives with little interaction across sectarian lines, except for those basic

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2 “The Troubles” is a term that originated with locals and is now a broadly adopted euphemism.
functions of civility in professional life. By and large, Catholics and Protestants go to separate churches, send their children to separate schools, join separate social clubs, live in separate communities and drink at separate pubs. (Magee 1974) In Belfast there is even a cemetery with an underground wall separating the Catholic dead from the Protestant. (Shirlow 2006)

Indeed, divisions between Catholics and Protestants are so deep that scholars have elected to define the two groups as *ethno-religious*, meaning that each group is unified by both ethnic heritage and religious background. In Northern Ireland, “intermarriage” is known as the union between a Catholic and a Protestant. These marriages are traditionally frowned upon, and to the extent that one scholar has declared Catholics and Protestants “endogamous societies.” (Magee 1974) Even in the current era of Catholic-Protestant relations, “intermarriage” is still very rare with only five-percent of marriages crossing the republican/unionist communal divide. (Mulholland 2002) Neighborhoods that are integrated with Catholics and Protestants are known as “mixed communities.” However, such communities have also been traditionally frowned upon and thus many landlords have upheld the de facto segregation through discriminatory housing practices. (Magee 1974) Many individuals may also choose to self-segregate. And even to this day over ninety-percent of public housing is segregated along sectarian lines, with the most polarized communities containing over eighty-percent of one group. (Madden 2010) It is not difficult to locate the identity of a community. Protestant neighborhoods frequently fly the union jack and display accentual red, white and blue cornerstones along the
sidewalks while Catholic neighborhoods are often marked with the Irish tricolor flag. Both communities are known for the colorful murals which depict their history, heroes and martyrs. And throughout Northern Ireland Catholic and Protestant neighborhoods are separated by physical barrier walls which were erected by the British military during the Troubles.

Why Northern Ireland?

Northern Ireland’s conflict proffers a recent example of violent sectarianism in the modern and "developed" world, and is the only EU country to have been colonised. This makes it relevant case study for both conflict and democratic resolution in a contemporary context. Furthermore, Northern Ireland is at an important point in its peace process – the power-sharing-government is barely 20 years old. Thus, at this important crossroad in Northern Ireland’s history, there exists a substantial track record from which scholars may reassess the challenges and effectiveness of consociation and the power-sharing arrangement. Yet, the arrangement is still young enough that it is possible to mold and reform for decades to come.

Previous scholars of the ongoing Northern Ireland peace process have focused on the role of grassroots movements, community dynamics and intergroup relationships. However, as a scholar exploring Northern Ireland from the outside-in, I am particularly interested in the role of government in peacebuilding, especially as it relates to the development of a sustainable peace. I believe that approaching Northern Ireland from this perspective lays the foundation for future comparative
analysis, which may eventually allow us to derive generalizable lessons on
democratization broadly, and power-sharing democracy specifically, as prescriptions
to violence and conflict around the globe.

As Richard Bourke suggests, Northern Ireland’s experience reveals that
democracy should not be considered an automatic prescription to divisive conflict,
but rather conflicted societies should be approached holistically and individually. At
the same time, power-sharing democracy has had some positive effects on the region;
it brought democratic governance to Northern Ireland after years of violence. But
democratic governance alone is not enough to address the complexity of deeply
entrenched conflict. I argue that the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive have
failed to sufficiently address challenges regarding both the fundamental identity of
the state, as well as the growing ethnic plurality outside of the Catholic-Protestant
dichotomy. In addition to democratic governance, strategies for conflict resolution
should also consider the identity and role of the state in forming a sustainable and
transcendent peace.

What will be covered?

My discussion of Northern Ireland is based on an understanding that the
conflict from which the society is still struggling to heal does not begin nor end with
the three decade period of violent ethno-nationalist confrontation known as “the
Troubles.” But rather, the Troubles are a product of a long legacy of ethnic and
religious conflict on the island. Therefore, prescriptions for democratic progress
must consider not only this most recent and prominent iteration of sectarian conflict,
but must also consider the antiquity of conflict which precedes it. Consequently, Chapter I is dedicated to presenting a comprehensive albeit intentionally incomplete backstory to the situation in Northern Ireland. After reviewing Ireland’s sectarian history, it becomes clear why power-sharing democracy is the preferred solution to the region’s troubles: it brought a degree of cooperation between historically antagonistic groups, and an end to the levels of direct violence from the era directly preceding its implementation.

In Part A of Chapter II, I explore the character and definition of power-sharing democracy based on consociational theory. In Part B I challenge the effectiveness of the Belfast Agreement. While the Agreement created relative peace and stability, it failed to resolve a fundamental tension at the heart of the conflict – that is, the tension between unionists and nationalists rivaling aspirations for the society.

And finally, in Chapter III, I explore the relationship between consociationalism and racism. I argue that consociational Northern Ireland is racist because it fails to adequately address the concerns of ethnic minorities, such as broader societal racism, and actively excludes and discriminates against ethnic minorities through the political process.
CHAPTER I

A HISTORY OF ULSTER

Untangling the history of Northern Ireland is a task which must be approached with great sensitivity because as John Whyte describes in “Interpretations of the Northern Ireland Conflict,” perspectives on the conflict are often construed through sectarian ideology. And consequently, the same is true regarding the history of the conflict. For example, in the traditional nationalist view the people of Ireland form a unified nation, artificially divided by the exploits of the British. (1990: 117) While in the traditional unionist view, there are two distinct peoples in Ireland, nationalist and unionist or Protestant and Catholic, and unionists should be afforded the same right to self-determination as that claimed by the nationalists. (146) Additionally, the politicized nature of this delicate history is evident within mythological debates over ethnic claims to the land. Nationalists may argue that their Celtic predecessors were the original inhabitants of the island, while unionists may argue that their Cruthin ancestors were actually present before the Celts. (Dixon 2001: 2)

However, both of these historical attitudes reveal a common understanding that divisions between these two communities are deeply rooted in a complicated history spanning over the course of hundreds of years and cannot be solved overnight. I seek to piece together a critical component of this complicated history, by conducting a content analysis, focused on 250 years of Irish history, from 1541 to
1800, and drawing principally from the work of five authors – Thomas Bartlett 2010; Paul Bew 2007; Richard Finnegan 1983; John Magee 1974; and Marc Mulholland 2002 – and from various other scholars writing on the history of Ireland. I blend together their narratives in such a fashion as to allow my own unique voice to emerge. Embracing a sense of the antiquity of sectarianism in Ireland is requisite toward truly understanding the ongoing divisions in the present-day; therefore, before I am able to make any further claims I must investigate the historical events which have cast Ireland in its current predicament. I limit my investigation to the selected time-frame because I believe that it is during these years that the antiquity of sectarianism is best illustrated; and also because during this period my main contention for this chapter is sufficiently proved. From reviewing the conflict-ridden history of Northern Ireland there are two facts that I wish to make clear: (1) there is a very important historical reality regarding power-dynamics between Catholics and Protestants which has taken shape through English imperial antagonism and Catholic persecution in Ireland; and, (2) granted that Catholics and Protestants have been cohabitating yet divided for centuries, it understandable why consociationalism was implemented to bring compromise between the two groups.

Genesis of the Ulster Plantation

The English and Irish have been in conflict for hundreds of years before King Henry VIII’s Protestant Reformation in the sixteenth century, when England broke from the Catholic Church and converted to Protestantism. And in fact some scholars

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1 This is important to take note of in future conversations about the two groups.
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trace problems between the English and Irish as far back as the Anglo-Norman invasion of 1167. However, it was the combination of English imperialism with Protestant evangelism that really exacerbated tensions between the English and Irish, helped to shape Catholic Nationalist identity and most importantly, that led to the formation of the Ulster Plantation. Thus, I will begin the history there.

The historical Ulster region consists of nine counties: Antrim, Down, Tyrone, Armagh, Fermanagh, and Derry/Londonderry (constituting present-day Northern Ireland), Cavan, Monaghan, and Donegal (within the present-day Republic of Ireland). Prior to English intervention and the establishment of the Ulster Plantation this region was culturally unified with Gaelic Ireland. (Mulholland 2002: 2) However, the late English Tudor monarchs of the sixteenth century decided that Ireland was a vulnerability for the expanding English empire because of their lack of control in the region beyond the Pale, along with their lack of influence amongst the Norman rulers across the south.² (Finnegan 1983: 9) They also understood the geopolitical significance of Ireland, located westward, amidst the “discovery” of the New World. (Bartlett 2010: 81) Therefore, they began a campaign to extend English sovereignty across the island. In the mid-sixteenth century King Henry VIII had himself designated king of Ireland by the Irish Parliament through the Kingship Act of 1541 (Finnegan 1983: 10); and in 1542 declared “That the King of England, His

² “In the Leinster area around Dublin, called “the Pale,” the English influence was the greatest, and it was characterized by English law, customs, and administration. The second layer of influence was in the east and the south where the Norman feudal system took hold, but the Norman rulers increasingly adopted the Irish culture. Least influenced were Ulster in the north and areas in the west of Ireland in which the rule remained essentially Gaelic.” (Finnegan 1983: 9)
Heirs, and Successors be Kings of Ireland... for ever... united and knit to the imperial crown and realm of England.” (Mulholland 2002: 2) This formal extension of the English empire may have been meant, in part, to unify Ireland under the crown after the centuries of division on the island which preceded Henry VIII’s declaration. However, in the words of Thomas Bartlett, “These acts may have appeared to mark a decisive shift in the medieval view of Ireland as divided on ethnic grounds... However, hundreds of years of ethnic categorization and discrimination could not be undone by the stroke of a pen and... [thus, the Act] was as much aspirational as descriptive.” (2010: 80) In other words, English rule did not take root right away since, unsurprisingly the Irish resisted their colonial neighbors.

Additionally, England’s Tudor aristocracy committed itself to ensuring that Ireland was not only anglicized, but also evangelized. (Bartlett 2010: 79) English evangelism deepened antagonisms between the Irish and English when it led to discriminatory policies such as the outlawing of Mass under King Edward VI. As a result, Catholicism became more central to Irish identity, “and later [became] one of the pillars of Irish nationalism.” The English responded to Irish resistance and devotion toward Catholicism with a crusade aimed at wiping out what was deemed the inferior practice of “popery.” And eventually, what began as a movement for reform and cultural integration, led way to a war of total conquest by the English. In the words of one English spectator speaking of the Irish, “it must be fire and sword, the rod of God’s vengeance that must make these stubborn and cankered hearts to yield for fear.” (Bartlett 2010: 84/85; Finnegan 1983: 10)
In describing the English colonial project in Ireland, Bartlett notes, “This idea, that a submissive population in a district was vital to security and that, if one did not exist, it ought to be imported and the existing one expelled or pushed aside, was newish at the time; but it took hold, and by the end of the sixteenth century, suitably expanded, elaborated and justified, it was to be the preferred solution to England’s Ireland problem.” (Bartlett 2010: 87) The English began setting up colonies in Ireland despite the understandable hostility from neighboring Gaelic chieftains such as the O’Mores and the O’Connors. And speaking of which, in 1577 forty members of the O’More and O’Connor clans were massacred by the English after being summoned for “discussions” with royal officials. (88)

In 1594, after years of conflict, Gaelic chieftains O’Neill and O’Donnell took up arms in one final act of resistance to British conquest. They persevered for nine years before finally surrendering to the more advanced Royal Army in 1603. At first the defeated Gaelic chieftains “appeared cooperative,” in the words of John Magee; they encouraged their people to anglicize and to tolerate the conquering English. In exchange, they received titles of nobility and accreditation over their estates, which covered most of Ulster and nearly a quarter of the entire island. However, in an event known as the “flight of the earls,” over one-hundred gaelic chieftains who struggled to live in submission under English rule, and who feared a conspiracy against their lives, fled their estates to live in exile in Europe. The English branded the retreated chiefs as traitors and seized control of their estates, cementing English power in Ireland.
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which, for the first time was extended across the entire island. The confiscated territories consisted of Donegal, Coleraine (now Derry/Londonderry), Armagh, Tyrone, Fermanagh and Cavan. (Finnegan 1983: 10; Magee 1974: 30/31) The remaining territories were not confiscated.

With these newly confiscated lands the English established the plantation of Ulster. Plots of confiscated lands were granted to “planters,” loyal to the crown, to farm and settle. Beginning in 1607 English planters were imported into Ulster and by 1641 only one-seventh of the plantation was controlled by Catholics (Finnegan 1983: 10); and by the eighteenth century, protestant colonists occupied ninety-five-percent of the land. (Cairns and Darby 1998: 755) Ulster became a Protestant ruled territory with a lasting and distinct ethnic majority. In the words of T. W. Moody:

“The intention of the state was thus, in general to create all over the escheated counties islands of territory from which the native Irish were to be wholly expelled and which were to be inhabited entirely by British colonists, both as landlords and tenants... This segregation of the incoming settlers from the native population was to ensure that the colony should take firm root, that the islands of British territory would serve as the leaven of ‘civility and religion’ which would leaven the whole lump of native Irish ‘barbarism’ and ‘superstition.’” (qtd. in Magee 1974: 32)

3 “To contemporaries, [the flight of earls], more than anything, marked the completion of the English conquest of Ireland which in their eyes had first been embarked upon in 1169. It also brought down the curtain on a civilization that had existed for well over a millennium, that had created a literature of rare quality and originality, and that had fashioned an artistic output of similarly rare beauty. True, a united kingdom of Ireland, an objective long sought for but equally long despaired of by the Gaelic poets, had finally been achieved. However, it had not come about by succession, election or agreement. It was rather a product of war and its handmaidens, famine, plague and disease.” (Bartlett 2010: 98)
Embattled English Monarchs, Catholic Support and Aftermath

Against the backdrop of the embattled monarchy of King Charles I, Puritan rule in Ireland emerged as a frightening possibility for the native Irish population during the mid-seventeenth century; high among Puritan ideals was a robust anti-Catholicism. As a result, in 1641 Irish Catholics, pledging allegiance to Charles I and seeking to regain their confiscated property, undulated in a bloody revolt against the Protestant settlers. This was possibly the first popular revolt in Irish history. Reports of the rebellion were greatly sensationalized across England. There were stories of Protestants being tortured and massacred by the tens of thousands. (Bartlett 2010: 112-116) One English news report described

“the putting men to the sword, deflowring [sic] of women, and dragging them up and down the streets, and cruelly murdering them, and thrusting their speers [sic] through their little infants before their eyes and carrying them up and down on pike-points in great reproach, and hanging mens’ quarters on their gates in the streets…” (115)

These dramatic reports were used to justify vengeance against the Irish. (115; Mulholland 2002: 3) And in 1650 Oliver Cromwell brutally crushed the rebellion. The ruthlessness with which Cromwell retaliated against the Irish left a painful and lasting legacy. (Finnegan 1983: 10; Magee 1974: 34)

That being said, by 1685, James II, a Catholic, ascended to the English throne and with him, so did the aspirations of the Irish Catholics. However shortly after, the anti-Catholic English parliament deposed him and installed the Protestant William of
Orange in his place. James II sought to restore his throne through Ireland where he recognized his security and support amongst the strong Catholic population. But James II’s efforts failed during the 1690 Siege of Derry and Battle of the Boyne, which not only cemented Protestant control of the throne but also made an enduring contribution to the collective memory under Protestant Unionist ideology.4

Irish Catholics were punished for their support of James II through the further confiscation of their property and by 1703 less than fifteen-percent of Ireland was controlled by Catholics. (Magee 1974: 34) Furthermore, from 1695 to 1727, both the Protestant-controlled British Parliament and Irish Parliament imposed a series of politically exclusionary penal statutes, which targeted Catholic religious practices, civic enfranchisement and land-ownership.5 These statutes, which lasted in various forms until 1829, effectively subjugated the Catholic population while fortifying the position of Protestants. However, for a subsequent time in Irish history, laws that were aimed at persecuting the Catholic population had the unintended consequence

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4 It could be said that Protestant Unionist communities still retain a “siege mentality” in the present-day. During my time in Ireland I explored several such communities in Derry and Belfast where it was not uncommon to encounter slogans such as “Remember 1690” or “Still under Siege.” The Orange Order, an influential Protestant Unionist and chauvinist fraternal organization known for its triumphalism was founded in 1795 and continues to celebrate the victories at Derry and the Battle of the Boyne through parades and religious services. (Magee 1974: 34)

5 “[The penal laws] denied Catholics an education at home or abroad, precluded their admission to the more lucrative professions [and] subjected them to various indignities... they had no right to bear arms and their horses were liable to seizure for a pittance... Catholics were forbidden to purchase land or to inherit it, and they were not allowed in their wills to assign their land as they saw fit. Notoriously, if any son converted to Protestantism, then he inherited the whole estate; otherwise, on the death of the father, the estate had to be broken up amongst all the male children. Catholics were also restricted to shorter leases than Protestants. In general, these laws against the Catholic interest in land were enforced; indeed, they enforced themselves since transactions had to be registered... Not surprisingly, such laws led to a large number of conversions among Catholic landowners (over seven hundred by the 1730s) and concurrent further diminution in the amount of land owned by Catholics.” (Bartlett 2010: 164)
of strengthening Catholic identity amidst oppression. And, in the words of Richard Finnegan, “the penal laws brought the linkage between political dissent and Catholicism even closer.” (Finnegan 1983: 11/12)

The Rebellion of 1798

Many of these laws were also enforced against Presbyterians despite the fact that they significantly aided in the defeat of James II. Although Presbyterians constituted a popular majority throughout parts of Ulster, Anglicans dominated public offices and excluded Presbyterians from full enfranchisement. While Presbyterians and Catholics were traditionally in competition, pitted against each other by the sectarianism of their age, they eventually decided to band together in pursuit of their mutual interest. And in the late-eighteenth century the Society of United Irishmen was founded by Wolfe Tone in Belfast; it's membership consisted largely of Presbyterians and Catholics. They campaigned for a fairer government which incorporated a separation of church and state, through constitutional agitation. And in 1798, inspired by the French Revolution⁶ and frustrated by their previous failures, they decided to take up arms in collaboration with the French. (Magee 1974: 36/37) Tone declared the aims of the movement:

⁶ “The lethargy of Irish political life in the late 1780s was, however, shaken up by the impact of the French revolution; more than that, before the end of the decade the entire life of the island was to be convulsed by it. In Tone’s own words, ‘oppressed, plundered, insulted’ Ireland was transformed politically. The French revolution had a striking impact upon the debate about the status of Catholics in Ireland. Ancien régime peculiarities, for so long tolerated in both Ireland and France, were being destroyed in France. When the French revolutionaries gave Protestants civil and political equality, it both highlighted the injustice of Catholic inequality in Ireland and demonstrated that Catholics in power need not be natural oppressors.” (Bew 2007: 9)
"To subvert the tyranny of our execrable government, to break the connection with England... and to assert the independence of my country - these were my objects. To unite the whole people of Ireland... to substitute the common name of Irishman, in place of the denominations of Protestant, Catholic and Dissenter - these were my means." (37)

Tensions built for years prior to the actual insurrection of 1798. In 1796, tensions were so high that the Irish Parliament instituted an armed Protestant "yeoman" corps. From May to August of 1798, the United Irishmen waged a series of peasant revolts across Wexford, Antrim and Down, and Mayo, but were defeated in each instance. At times, the United Irishmen held out for a month before defeat; and in Mayo they were aided by the French. But nevertheless, they were eventually defeated and rather than face execution, Tone committed suicide after being captured off the coast of Ireland. (Finnegan 1983: 15)

The rebellion of 1798 had serious implications for the future of Ireland, and for the development of sectarian identity and relationships throughout the society. Particularly, in defeat, the United Irishmen not only failed to live up to its goals of promoting the "common name of Irishman," but instead produced an increase in sectarianism. (Bew 2007: 49) In the words of Magee, "the United Irish movement was dictated by expediency as much as by enlightenment, and for many bigotry was laid aside rather than abandoned." In rural Ulster sectarian feeling remained as strong as ever, especially in areas where Catholics and Protestants were evenly divided and in competition for land." (1974: 37) Additionally, a new identity

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7 Meaning that Catholics and Protestants decided to work together in the short term but still carried strong feelings against each other.
discerned by political protestantism\textsuperscript{8} formed between Presbyterians and Anglicans. In the words of one observer: “The word ‘Protestant’ which was becoming obsolete in the north has regained its influence and all of that description seem to be drawing closer together.” (Bartlett 2010: 226)

Furthermore, public interpretations of the rebellion adopted heavily sectarian prejudices. Of course, for the United Irishmen the rebellion was an act of revolution aimed at achieving a more democratic republic. However, the mainstream narrative, established by hardline Protestants such as Sir Richard Musgrave, defined the event as an onslaught by Catholic sectarians and, in his own words, a “revolution of Irish Romanists” which was “suppressed by the Protestants of Ireland.” Under such an interpretation any consideration of Catholic emancipation – an interest at the heart of the rebellion – was out of the question. Catholic emancipation would be considered a reward for “the cruel murders of Irish Protestants.” (Bew 2007: 49/50) Meanwhile, “awkward details about Presbyterian participation and Church of Ireland leaders were not allowed to intrude.” (Bartlett 2010: 227)

Act of Union

Momentously, the rebellion directly led to the passage of the 1800 Act of Union which incorporated Ireland into the United Kingdom and dismantled the Irish

\textsuperscript{8} “The removal of the remaining grievances of Presbyterians, [and] the evangelical movement which was militantly anti-Catholic... blurred the sectarian divisions between Episcopalians and Presbyterians and created the concept of political Protestantism [emphasis added]. The result was that when the agitation for Home Rule got under way in the 1880s, Ulster Protestants, irrespective of denomination, previous politics or social class, flocked to the Orange Order, which provided the framework of what was to become the Unionist Party.” (Magee 1974: 37/39)
Parliament. English elites decided that the demands for Catholic rights as well as the vulnerability of Ireland to revolution and foreign influence were too threatening. In their view, the only way to ensure the internal and external security of Ireland, and therefore of England, was through union. Many Protestant and Catholic elites of Ireland also favored union. Protestants, because they believed that union with Britain, a Protestant majority nation, would ensure the preservation of their power in Ireland. On the other hand, Catholic elites were persuaded that union would lead the English parliament to grant Catholic emancipation. (Finnegan 1983: 15) This turned out not to be true. Moreover, conditions considerably worsened for Catholics after passage of the Act of Union. The nation's official church became the Church of Ireland to which Catholic peasants had to pay a tithe of ten-percent of their land's produce, despite the fact that the church only ministered to ten-percent of the land's population. Catholic peasants were also exploited through unfair tenant statutes and were vulnerable to eviction. (17)

Meanwhile, the Act of Union did not equally integrate Ireland into the United Kingdom; it was instead treated as a subordinate province. (17) And little was done to reform the old system of government. As previously mentioned, it was anticipated that the natural follow-up to passage of the Act of Union would be Catholic political emancipation through the passage of another act enabling Catholics to participate in the new united legislature. However, King George III vehemently opposed Catholic emancipation; and Parliament rejected it twice, in 1805 and later in 1808. Opposition to political emancipation was a popular position across the United
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Kingdom amongst both Irish Protestants, English compatriots, the churches of England and Ireland, and even Irish politicians. The state churches opposed emancipation because they believed that it would lead to the similar enfranchisement of other denominations including Quakers, Jews and Methodists. Irish politicians privately opposed emancipation because they imagined that if Catholics were able to run for office, their positions would be at stake as Catholics would only vote for other Catholics. (Bartlett 2010: 241; Bew 2007: 87) In the words of Finnegan, “This political environment had a deadening effect on Catholic aspirations and activities for two decades after [passage of] the Act of Union.” (1983: 17)

Conclusion

Ireland’s nineteenth century was marked by sectarian violence between Catholics and Protestants from early on. Violence escalated in 1829 over Daniel O’Connell’s campaign for Catholic emancipation (and later for the repeal of the Act of Union). Dozens died in confrontations in counties Armagh and Tyrone. (Mulholland 2002: 7) The city of Belfast was particularly afflicted by the sectarian violence. Between 1835 and 1935 there were eight periods of severe rioting – in 1835, 1857, 1864, 1872, 1886, 1898, 1920-2, and 1935. And in Derry, there were two serious riots in 1869 and 1884. (11) Furthermore, the Act of Union proved to be particularly divisive in nineteenth century politics as it naturally gave rise to the development of Unionism and Nationalism (Magee 1974: 43) – Unionism being the belief that Ireland should remain united with the United Kingdom, and Nationalism being the
belief that it should break away; these competing ideologies remain influential in contemporary Irish politics.

The twentieth century is, perhaps, the most familiar era of Irish History amongst the world. It is during the early part of this century that Republicanism came to prominence. Particularly, Sinn Fein, a still influential Republican political party formed around the turn of the century. The fracture between northern and southern Ireland, the establishment of the Irish Free State (now the Republic of Ireland) and the formation of the modern state of Northern Ireland (minus the consociational institutions) all occurred in the early 1920s. And most notably, the later part of the twentieth century was gripped by “the Troubles,” the three decade long period of armed political struggle between the competing ideologies of Unionism and Nationalism. The Troubles culminated in the signing of the 1998 Belfast Agreement, which established Northern Ireland’s current devolved and consociational government. I will go into more detail about the Belfast Agreement and the current government in Chapter II, where I explain consociational theory and the failure of the Belfast Agreement to address Northern Ireland’s past and present reality of sectarianism.
CHAPTER II

CONSOCIATIONAL THEORY AND AN “AGREEMENT TO DISAGREE”

“A kind of parable is told about Northern Ireland and then offered as a lesson to the world. On the local, provincial level, the story tells how thirty years of war was finally ended, and how a settlement at long last was secured. And in the broader context, regarding politics within an ampler and more cosmopolitan frame, the message reveals how democracy solves the riddle of history and brings about an end to human conflict. But the parable just doesn’t fit the facts.”

- Richard Bourke (2014)

PART A: Defining Consociational Democracy in Theory

Consociational democracy could be defined as a political system that is assembled on the basis of shared power between historically antagonistic groups. The original development of this concept is largely credited to Arend Lijphart. However, Lijphart has declared, “Political scientists merely discovered what political practitioners had repeatedly – and independently of both academic experts and one another – invented years earlier.” (2004: 76) Early implementations of consociationalism can be traced back decades before Lijphart first wrote on the concept in the 1960s. However, the effectiveness of consociationalism is a subject of much debate. John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary

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1 This expression was originally encountered in Feargal Cochrane’s chapter on “The Incomplete Agreement” (2013: 190)
are also prominent scholars in this field and have stated that consociational theory is a critical element of Northern Ireland’s “meta-conflict,” which is “the intellectual conflict about the nature of the [Northern Ireland] conflict and the appropriate prescriptions to tackle it.” (2004: 2) I endeavor to insert myself in this debate. But first, I will present a charitable explanation of how consociationalism is supposed to operate in theory.

The Theory

Consociational democracy is usually formed as a prescription to societies that are embroiled in conflict by deep sectarian divisions (particularly ethnic, religious or linguistic). “Lijphart theorised that stability in divided societies could be achieved through coalescent behavior of its elites, and that elites engage in this type of behavior when they become cognisant of the potential dangers emanating from the high levels of intersubcultural hostility within their borders.” (Clancy 2010: 16/17) Consociationalism is comprised of four elements:

1. Executive power-sharing (EPS). The primary groups in competition share executive power through a representative democratic executive branch.

2. Self-Government. Each group is permitted a degree of autonomy, particularly with respect to cultural concerns.

3. Proportionality. “Each [group] is represented proportionately in key public institutions and is a proportional beneficiary of public resources and expenditures.” (McGarry and O’Leary 2004: 2)
4. **Veto-Rights.** “Each [group] is able to prevent changes that adversely affect their vital interests.” (2)

In the words of Andrew Reynolds, these principles work to ensure that the government is led by “inclusive multiethnic coalition,” which is built into the design of consociational institutions. (2000: 160) For example, the Belfast Agreement explicitly necessitates cross-community support for various political actions such as budget allocations, and the term “cross-community” appears fourteen times across the first thirty-four clauses of the accord. The first clause states:

“This agreement provides for a democratically elected Assembly in Northern Ireland which is inclusive in its membership, capable of exercising executive and legislative authority, and subject to safeguards to protect the rights and interests of all sides of the community.”

In contrast to majoritarian “winner-take-all” systems which promote the “tyranny of the majority,” consociational democracy is fundamentally premised on inclusion and compromise between the competing groups. In his classic 1969 article on “Consociational Democracy,” Lijphart illustrates the benefit of consociational democracy over majoritarian systems. Lijphart writes,

“Consociational democracy violates the principle of majority rule, but it does not deviate very much from normative political theory. Most democratic constitutions prescribe majority rule for the normal transaction of business when the stakes are not too high, but extraordinary majorities or successive majorities for the most important decisions, such as changes in the constitution. In fragmented systems, many other decisions in addition to constituent ones are perceived as involving high stakes, and therefore require more than simple majority rule [emphasis added]. Similarly, majority rule does not suffice in times of grave crisis in even the most homogeneous and consensual of democracies. Great Britain and
Sweden, both highly homogenous countries, resorted to grand coalition cabinets during the Second World War. Julius Nyerere draws the correct lesson from the experience of the Western democracies, in which, he observes, ‘it is an accepted practice in times of emergency for opposition parties to sink their differences and join together in forming a national government.’ And just as the formation of a national unity government is the appropriate response to an external emergency, so the formation of a grand coalition cabinet or an alternative form of elite cartel is the appropriate response to the internal crisis of fragmentation into hostile subcultures [emphasis added].” (Lijphart 1969: 30/31)

Lijphart argues that certain societies exist in a state of “internal crisis” due to social fragmentation and division. In Northern Ireland the state of internal crisis takes the form through widespread sectarianism. However, in such a state, simple majoritarian democracy is not seen as a sufficient model of conflict management because sectarian divisions could be aggravated when the interests of one group are confronted at the expense of the other group. Mary-Alice Clancy states, “Broadly, consociationalists recognize that division of power between various levels and the competition for power are often not enough to manage conflict in deeply divided societies, and may even exacerbated conflict. The competition for power can lead to the underrepresentation of minorities that the division of power alone cannot rectify. Minorities marginalization, of course, contains the potential for their grievances to be articulated via destabilizing and violent means.” (2010: 16) In noting

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2 Grand coalition is a form of unanimous consociation. (McGarry and O’Leary 2004: 15) “The grand coalition cabinet is the most typical and obvious, but not the only possible, consociational solution for a fragmented system. The essential characteristic of consociational democracy is not so much any particular institutional arrangement as the deliberate joint effort by the elites to stabilize the system. Instead of the term ‘grand coalition’ with its rather narrow connotation, one could speak of universal participation, or as Ralf Dahrendorf does, of a ‘cartel of elites.’” (Lijphart 1969: 29)
how the “competition for power” can lead to the marginalization of minorities, Clancy raises an important point about Northern Ireland’s experience when viewed through the lens of history. Protestant unionist communities have formed a historical demographic majority in Northern Ireland and have thus been able to set the terms of inclusion in citizenship and governance for years. (Bourke 2003: 3) However, this majoritarian approach directly led to the articulation of grievances via violent means, as ultimately exemplified by the Troubles.

The necessity for power-sharing in fragmented societies is further illustrated by the “high stakes” nature of certain political debates, which may appear trivial to outside observers but are of great cultural importance to internal parties. For example, consider Northern Ireland’s debates over forms of cultural expression such as the infamous Protestant Orange marches:

“As government policies have moved toward explicit support for cultural diversity, there has been a noticeable increase in sensitivity toward the symbols of cultural expression. These include the use of the Irish language and the display of flags and symbols in the workplace. The most dramatic illustration of this new emphasis on symbols has been confrontations about traditional Orange marches, regarded by their advocates as a legitimate expression of Protestant culture and by their opponents as an intrusion and as an expression of triumphalism. Disputes about the right to march have led to serious threats to public order in the past few years and have threatened both the peace process and political stability [emphasis added].” (Cairns and Darby 1998: 758)

Lijphart makes a distinction between two different types of consociation: “pre-determined” and “self-determined.” Pre-determined consociations are ones in which the constituents groups are predetermined by means of guaranteed representation,
meaning that certain groups are ensured spots in the government. Self-determined consociations were designed as an alternative to pre-determined systems, and do not require ethnic quotas. This idea was later expanded by McGarry and O’Leary who distinguish between “corporate” and “liberal” consociations. Corporate consociations assume that group identities are rigid and homogenous, and require ethnic quotas and sometimes even ethnic voting rolls. (Nagle 2016: 858) On the other hand, McGarry and O’Leary explain that liberal consociationalism “rewards whatever salient political identities emerge in democratic elections, whether these are based on ethnic groups, or on ... trans-group identities.” (qtd. in Nagle 2016) Northern Ireland is a liberal consociation, which means that technically voters may choose to vote for any candidate irrespective of their personal identity, and Catholics and Protestants do not technically have reserved spots in government. However, I would argue that in practice Catholics and Protestants fill de facto ethnic quotas, since the majority of the population still votes along ethnic lines.
PART B: An “Agreement to Disagree”

“We acknowledge the substantial differences between our continuing, and equally legitimate, political aspirations. However, we will endeavor to strive in every practical way towards reconciliation and rapprochement within the framework of democratic and agreed arrangements. We pledge that we will, in good faith, work to ensure the success of each and every one of the arrangements to be established under this agreement.”

- The Belfast Agreement (1998: 2/3)

The Blueprint

“The Agreement Reached in Multi-Party Negotiations” is also known as the Belfast Agreement, after the place where it was signed, and as the April 10th, 1998, “Good Friday” Agreement, after the date on which it was signed; but from here on I will simply refer to it as “the Agreement,” or occasionally as the Belfast Agreement. As its name suggests, the Agreement came as a result of intense multi-party negotiations between eight political parties and the British and Irish governments, and was mediated by United States Senator George Mitchell. The Agreement was then endorsed by citizens of both the north and south of Ireland via referenda. And on December 2, 1999 the Agreement took effect. In the words of British Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Peter Mandelson, it seemed that “After a quarter of a century the curtain [had] finally [come] down on Direct Rule.” (qtd. in Wilford 2001: 1)

However, while in many ways passage of the Belfast Agreement represented a great hope for the peace process, it faced difficulties from its inception. Before the
Agreement passed, negotiations nearly went awry on several occasions. And even after passage, the Agreement experienced delayed implementation, and in October 2002, a temporary suspension of the Northern Ireland Assembly and postponement of new elections.

The Agreement consisted of three “strands” (each covering various aspects of relations between Northern Ireland, the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland), and led to two particularly significant developments: (1) the Republic of Ireland releasing its symbolic constitutional claims to Northern Ireland and (2) the devolution of power from the United Kingdom to Northern Ireland. These developments were significant because, in the words of one scholar, “...[the Agreement] much-improved relationships between the British and Irish governments. The former had developed a more nuanced approach to Northern Ireland, less colonial in tone and no longer merely security-oriented. The latter had divested itself of residual nationalistic impulses.” (Tonge 2014: 116) The Agreement also addressed several other issues, such as:

- **Equality, Human Rights and Reconciliation.** Formation of a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland; The establishment of three commissions: the Human Rights Commission, the Equality Commission and the Northern Ireland Victims Commission

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3 “The chronic Orange Order parade saga at Drumcree, the two temporary exclusions of Sinn Féin and one of the Ulster Democratic Party – the political wing of the largest loyalist paramilitary organization, the Ulster Defense Association (UDA) – the withdrawal of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and the UK Unionists from the process, all threatened to bring the talks to an early demise.” (Wilford 2001: 6)
• **The release of prisoners.** One of the most controversial aspects of the agreement was the negotiated release of paramilitary prisoners from both communities.

• **Decommissioning.** The Agreement was relatively ambiguous about the decommissioning of paramilitary groups, however it stated the following:

  “All participants accordingly reaffirm their commitment to the total disarmament of all paramilitary organisations. They also confirm their intention to continue to work constructively and in good faith with the Independent Commission, and to use any influence they may have, to achieve the decommissioning of all paramilitary arms within two years...”

• And finally, **Police Reform.** The Agreement established an independent commission to review the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), Northern Ireland’s police force. Eventually, the RUC was replaced by the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), whose officers are required by law to be 50% Catholic and 50% Protestant.

  “Strand One” of the Agreement, titled “Democratic Institutions in Northern Ireland,” is especially relevant to the discussion within this chapter because it outlines the structure of Northern Ireland’s consociational government. In terms of infrastructure, the consociational system is established primarily through two

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4 This line is most likely in reference to the Catholic party Sinn Fein, which is well known for its association with the Irish Republican Army (IRA), paramilitary group. Decommissioning, and the ambiguity of the Agreement with respect to decommissioning, would later be a major issue in the post-Agreement political process.

5 See full text of Strand One in Appendix A
CONSOCIATIONALISM AND THE COMPROMISED PEACE

institutions: the Northern Ireland Assembly and the Northern Ireland Executive. The Northern Ireland Assembly is a 108-member body elected by proportional representation using a method called “single transferable vote” (STV).\textsuperscript{6} Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs) must indicate whether they are unionists, nationalists or “other” for the purpose of cross-community voting.\textsuperscript{7} Two different voting procedures are used for important decisions. The first is \textit{parallel consent} which requires the majority of both unionists and nationalists to support a proposal in order for it to pass. The second is \textit{weighted majority} which requires sixty-percent of all MLAs, and forty-percent of both unionists and nationalists, to support a proposal. (Dixon 2001: 269) The Northern Ireland Executive is led by the First Minister and Deputy First Minister who are elected through cross-community support. While the party with a majority is able to secure the First Minister, both the First Minister and Deputy First Minister have equal powers and must work together in order to govern. The other positions in the cabinet are divided amongst the political parties in the Assembly with significant representation, using a method called the “D’Hondt system.”\textsuperscript{8} (270)

\textsuperscript{6} See Appendix B for an explanation of STV
\textsuperscript{7} “At their first meeting, members of the Assembly will register a designation of identity - nationalist, unionist or other - for the purposes of measuring cross-community support in Assembly votes under the relevant provisions above.” (“The Agreement...” 1998)
\textsuperscript{8} See Appendix C for an explanation of the D’Hondt system
Controversy

Scholars disagree about the success of the Agreement. Feargal Cochrane argues that outside of the circles of political actors, the Agreement did not do enough to address the realities of sectarianism in civilian life. He writes,

“Outside, in the real world, the GFA [Good Friday Agreement] meant little, especially to those living in urban interface areas. The uncomfortable truth was that, beyond the level of general rhetoric, the GFA did not connect adequately with communities in a way that would help to encourage integration or reconciliation. Regardless of whether power was or was not devolved to Northern Ireland, the sectarian dynamics of society were as visceral and virulent as ever. Here was the rub: the internal machinations within the UUP [Ulster Unionist Party] and the IRA [Irish Republican Army] made very little difference to the day-to-day lives of the wider community. More worryingly, perhaps, the periodic stop-start-stop-again nature of devolution between 1999 and 2002 seemed incapable of dealing with the experience of sectarian tension at the ground level. This led many to regard the sometimes-functioning Assembly and Executive (and by extension the GFA itself) as an expensive political decoration, rather than as a set of institutions that could provide political stability and augment the quality of their lives. Looked at from this perspective, the GFA had not stopped paramilitary violence; it had not significantly improved community relations; it seemed incapable of mediating the summer ‘marching season’ or the more controversial Orange parades; and finally, it could not arrest communal segregation, as Catholics and Protestants seemed just as anxious to live separately from one another as they did before 1998. In short, when the ambiguous language of the GFA was set against the sectarian reality of what was happening in Northern Ireland, it was found sadly wanting.” (2013: 212/213)

However, Jonathan Tonge insists that the Northern Ireland peace process is a “triumph” of consociationalism. He reasons, “[I]nterculturalists and other anti-consociationalists tend to ignore three realities: firstly, that Northern Ireland is a
divided bi-national identity, in which sincerely held national identities cannot be wished away. Secondly, no peace process globally is reliant upon complete ideological U-turn and entire repudiation of the past. Thirdly, the pessimists ignore the greatly improved security situation in Northern Ireland." (2014: 127) To this argument, Landon Hancock adds, "...Not even the British government's suspension of the Northern Ireland Assembly in October 2002 and the postponement of new elections led to an abrogation of the ceasefire and the resumption of hostilities. This suggests that the peace process in Northern Ireland has acquired a degree of resilience that is conspicuously lacking in other peace processes where post agreement difficulties have led to the resumption of violence." (2005: 67) However, there are several notable exceptions to these claims about the improvement of violence. An October 2015 report commissioned by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland concluded that "Seventeen years after the 1998 Belfast Agreement, paramilitary groups remain a feature of life in Northern Ireland; the UDA, UVF and INLA have continued to recruit and all of the paramilitary groups maintain a relatively public profile in spite of being illegal organizations." ("Paramilitary Groups in Northern Ireland") Furthermore, according to PSNI statistics on paramilitary violence, from 2006 to 2016 there were 599 shooting incidents and 495 bombing incidents.9 Tonge would respond to these statistics by arguing that they reveal an overall decrease in paramilitary violence and that most of these attacks are waged by "dissident republicans." However, while there has been an overall decrease in

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9 See Appendix D for more detailed information on paramilitary related shooting and bombing statistics.
violence since passage of the Agreement, and irrespective of who is responsible for waging these attacks, the statistics indicate a still healthy presence of paramilitary activity. Given this reality, the peace process could hardly be counted as a “triumph” of consociationalism.

At the same time, Tonge makes strong points about the resilience of “sincerely held national identities” and certainly, no one would expect a “complete ideological U-turn and entire repudiation of the past.” In the words of one scholar, “Of course, something has clearly finished in Northern Ireland, and something entirely preferable has begun.” However, the true failure of the Agreement is that it neglected to address the fundamental tension between unionists’ and nationalists’ rivaling aspirations regarding the future of Northern Ireland. In this sense, the Agreement is really just an “agreement to disagree,” in the words of

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10 For comparison, from 1990 to 1998 there was an annual average of 527 shooting and bombing incidents. (Tonge 2014: 123)

11 Not to mention, there was also the Omagh bombing of August 1998, which occurred months after passage of the Agreement. This attack is considered the worst atrocity of the Troubles. (Tonge 2014: 125)

12 And in the words of an anonymous US official speaking on the role of the US in negotiating the Agreement, “Well, I tend personally to think of the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement as a step in a process of ending an insurgency ... and of bringing the two communities together in some broadly defined notion of power-sharing. But the first is more important than the second. And certainly it [the Agreement] was a crucial step along the way of ending the insurgency. I say the insurgency is over...” (Clancy 2010: 64) Several scholars note the importance of exogenous forces in helping to facilitate the Agreement, among which the US was a major player. Yet it is revealing that US priorities emphasized “ending an insurgency” over the successful implementation of power-sharing arrangements. Of course, the current landscape reflects that the violent insurgency is largely over, which is far more preferable than the previous situation. But at least as much emphasis must be placed on facilitating power-sharing arrangements if Northern Ireland is to achieve sustained peace.
Cochran. I join the chorus of scholars who contend that Northern Ireland cannot enjoy a complete and lasting peace until this tension is resolved.

Consociational democracy is predicated on “parity of esteem” which, in a Northern Ireland context, means that the identities and national aspirations of Catholics and Protestants should be afforded equal recognition. (Nagle 2016: 859) This principle is safeguarded through, what has been called “constructive ambiguity.” This means that elements of the Agreement were purposefully left ambiguous so that their meaning could be realized through practice while also contributing to the overall appeal of the Agreement to the various parties by allowing them to interpret their own meaning in its language. Nationalists saw the Agreement as a means of promoting Irish unity through incorporation in the political process. While, unionists saw the Agreement as settling the dispute over the political status of Northern Ireland by reaffirming and reinforcing its position within the United Kingdom. (McAllister et al. 2005) Thus, both unionists and nationalists could support the Agreement as both saw themselves as having something to gain through the newly established political process. However, while this “constructive ambiguity” promoted the overall acceptability of the agreement, it is also one of the Agreement’s major weaknesses: nationalist and unionist interpretations of the Agreement could not both be correct. (Cochrane 2013: 190)

Richard Bourke argues that Northern Ireland’s experience demonstrates that democracy is a fundamental problem for modern politics, not an automatic prescription to conflict. He writes, “A democratic settlement must involve...
consociational theory and an “agreement to disagree”

concurrence about which people are to be equal members of the state, and a consensus on how the government is to represent the people.” (2003: 2) However, while Northern Ireland’s Agreement successfully formed a democratic government (i.e. “consensus on how the government is to represent the people”) it neglected to resolve the terms of the democratic state. To be clear, in my interpretive framework, the government is the mechanism by which political elites interact to administer the state. However, formation of the state involves “...final settlement... on the terms of inclusion in the state.” (2) So, although nationalists and unionists agreed on how they would administer the state (i.e. via consociationalism), they never settled on the exact nature of the state – that is, who is included in the state and the long-term aspirations and identity of the state.

Yet, Bourke notes, under the terms of the Agreement, settlement on the nature of the democratic state can be resolved through procedures of majoritarian democracy. That is, “whichever preference wins the allegiance of the greater number of people will determine whether a Republic or the Union should prevail.” (Bourke 2003: 2) However, the demography in Northern Ireland is unstable. While, unionists are the current and historical demographic majority, long-term trends indicate expansion of the nationalist population. (As recently as March 2017, nationalists gained seats in the Assembly.) Thus, using majoritarian procedures to settle the nature of the democratic state is a risky endeavor: “In proposing to settle the dispute over democratic sovereignty by means of the principle of majority decision, the Agreement is reverting to the problematic principle which provoked the
original crisis in Northern Ireland... full Northern Ireland citizenship, for almost fifty years since its creation in 1920, was the exclusive reward of one part of its population – the Protestant majority – and not the equal privilege of a united populace.” (3)

This discussion also reveals a contradiction in consociational theory. Consociationalism is meant as an alternative to majoritarianism. However, in relying on traditional majoritarian principles to resolve the fundamental question of the make-up democratic state, it undermines its own premise: that deeply divided societies are best governed according to consociational principles (executive power-sharing, self-government, proportionality and veto-rights).

The political cooperation that was facilitated by the Agreement has been relatively successful as far as matters of democratic government are concerned; indeed, Northern Ireland has established political stability through self-governance. But “constructive ambiguity” merely “kicks the can down the road” by deferring discussion of the democratic state. At the macro level, the Agreement did little more than provide a platform for the continuation of the ideological struggle that years of violence failed to resolve; this time the conflict is fought with words and in government halls, rather than with bombs or bullets on the streets. But, one day Northern Ireland will have to settle its political identity, which would require some sort of reform of the current power-sharing arrangement. Even Tonge admits to this need: “The question is left hanging as to when, if ever, Northern Ireland’s political system can switch from enforced mandatory coalition between unionists and
nationalists to one based upon voluntarism and/or a more common form of government and opposition. The hope of consociationalists is that, as ethnic communities feel more secure, their ethnic solidarity will diminish and dilute and the need to stress oppositional identities will dissipate.” (2014: 127) John Nagle puts it more succinctly, “through safeguarding representation, a dilemma arises regarding how to transition to a more flexible system that leads to the depoliticisation of ethnicity.” (2016: 858) Nagle’s comment is interesting because it is rooted in the astute observation that consociation leads to the politicisation of ethnicity, or as other scholars have called it, “the institutionalization of ethnic difference.” In other words, rather than build inclusive coalition by deconstructing divisive sectarian blocs, consociation legitimizes and institutionalizes division by granting special representation to the oppositional identities. This is an inflexible system with little room for growth or imagination beyond the traditional sectarian dichotomy. As I will explain in Chapter III, this system is particularly neglectful of ethnic minorities who are not granted the privilege of special representation in government.

Some scholars such as Donald Horowitz and Benjamin Reilly argue that “by institutionalizing groups as if they were separate and distinctive entities, consociationalism not only tends to treat each group as if it were a monolithic whole, but consequently runs a serious risk of deepening the very divisions it was meant to address.” (O’Flynn and Russell 2005: 5) This analysis is spot on. Consociationalism assumes both: (1) that ethnic communities share monolithic goals and interests and (2) that ethnic communities could be effectively represented by their elite members
CONSOCIATIONALISM AND THE COMPROMISED PEACE

through political election. I question these assumptions. Not only are ethnic communities presumed to have monolithic goals and interests, but those goals and interests are presumed to align closely to the broader sectarian competition. In reality, any ethnic community is diverse and heterogenous. And in Northern Ireland, citizens may perceive their stake in the broader sectarian conflict to varying degrees. Nevertheless, citizens are compelled to make political decisions (such as voting) through very rigid sectarian construals of the issues. This is unfair, and certainly undemocratic. In a truly democratic system, citizens should have the ability to freely and fully vote their conscious. But in a system where there are only but so many political parties, and when the parties with the greatest chance of actually passing legislation are sectarian, voters are naturally inclined to align themselves along sectarian divisions. In other words, consociationalism facilitates and promotes an “us versus them” adversarial system.

As an alternative to this adversarial system, Horowitz and Reilly propose a more inclusive form of power-sharing which emphasizes greater political integration between the members of conflicting communities as well as across society as a whole. They argue that rather than a system through which elected representatives must cooperate after elections have taken place, sustainable democracy is best achieved when electoral incentives reward political parties and leaders who compromise across the political divide, and in the process marginalize uncompromising extremes within their parties. (5) I concur with this reform, however it still does not address the problems of settling the political identity of the
state, or of the institutionalization of division. Although, it is conceivable that through the inclusive coalition that would be achieved through this reformed government, solutions to the aforementioned challenges could emerge.

In conclusion, the Agreement failed to resolve the fundamental tension at the heart of sectarian conflict in Northern Ireland – that is, whether Northern Ireland would remain within the United Kingdom, or would be reunited with the rest of Ireland. And in failing to resolve this tension, politicians left the identity of the democratic state inconclusive, and thus prolonged the broader sectarian conflict by not only allowing, but institutionalizing the ability of nationalists and unionists to play out their rivaling aspirations in the political arena. In Chapter III I will build upon this argument by demonstrating how sectarian politics exclude and discriminate against ethnic minorities, and as such constitute a racist system of governance.
CHAPTER III

IS CONSOCIATIONAL NORTHERN IRELAND RACIST?

"My sons are concerned about the threats against me and want me to go to England, but I love it here. This is my home... [However] I don’t feel things are getting better. It’s just bickering all the time. I’m disillusioned with the current state of politics, which is still mired in the past. It’s tribal politics, us-and-them politics, not politics for all in Ireland."

- Anna Lo, Former MLA for Belfast South and UK’s first parliamentarian of ethnic Chinese descent

While the Belfast Agreement was no “triumph of consociationalism” it did lead to a partial abrogation of hostilities and relative calm. And with that extended sense of safety, Northern Ireland developed a new appeal for migrants and thus experienced waves of immigration, primarily from China, South Asia and Eastern Europe. Additionally, the expansion of the European Union has brought thousands of immigrants to Northern Ireland, many of whom settled in traditionally Protestant working class neighborhoods (Riz Khan 2009). However, in Northern Ireland, a historically homogenous and sectarian society with a proven track record of antagonism towards difference, immigrants have not been met entirely with open arms. In fact, on both a political and social level Northern Ireland seems to struggle to adapt to the new experience of multiculturalism. And since the mid-2000s hate crimes have been on the rise. For example, in 2009, several racist attacks forced over one-hundred Romanians to flee
their homes (*The Sydney Morning Herald*). And in August 2016, Amnesty International released a statement expressing concern at the "worryingly high figures for hate crimes and incidents" in the county. This tumultuous backdrop has caused some to claim that racism is the new sectarianism in Northern Ireland (*Mirror* 2016), while others have dubbed the country, "the race hate capital of Europe."

One sad but illustrative example of the political challenge of racism in Northern Ireland is revealed through the experience of Anna Lo. Anna Lo was a Member of Northern Ireland's Legislative Assembly from the Alliance Party,¹ and was also the first and only ethnic minority to be elected to the Assembly (BBC News 2007) and the first Chinese person to be elected to any legislative parliament in Europe (BBC News 2010). However, in May 2014 she announced that she would not seek reelection because of continued racism and threats against her safety. While Lo had faced threats and abuse since she first ran for office, she was particularly motivated by an incident during which she was followed by a loyalist² mob while shopping at the mall. It is particularly regrettable that, as the first and only ethnic minority in the Northern Ireland Assembly, the abuse reached such a level that Lo felt that she could no longer carry on in politics. However, this anecdote also reveals the compelling need to understand the experience of ethnic minorities in Northern Ireland, who

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¹ The Alliance Party is a liberal, centrist and nonsectarian political party, with a declared policy view of support for ethnic minorities.
² Loyalism is a more extreme and militant form of Unionism.
despite composing a tiny fraction of the overall population, experience social prejudice and are affected by racism on both the institutional and individual level.

Past research debates whether or not consociationalism exacerbates Catholic-Protestant sectarian divisions. However, I argue that consociationalism has consequences for groups “outside the bounds of official inclusion,” such as ethnic minorities (Nagle 2016). Power-sharing is a political institution which, by nature, does not center the interests and concerns of ethnic minorities, rather it promotes the interests and concerns of the Catholic-Protestant majority. Given this, I am suspicious that power-sharing democracy facilitates and environment of exclusion and asymmetric political representation. In this chapter I build on the theoretical foundation that I laid out in Chapter II, coupled with a content analysis of the small body of work on racism and ethnic minority experience in Northern Ireland, as well as data such as police service statistics and national surveys. I argue that Northern Ireland’s consociational system is racist for primarily three reasons: (1) it neglects to prioritize ethnic minority concerns such as broader societal racism and hate crimes; (2) it is discriminatory on the issue of political accommodation; and (3) it promotes sectarianism, which facilitates an environment where ethnic minorities are excluded and alienated from the political process.

Definitions

In his 2002 report, *Race and Racism in Northern Ireland*, Paul Connolly does a brilliant job of defining the terms relevant to his discussion. Moreover, his definitions overlap well with my understanding, coming from an American
context. Thus, I am inspired by Connolly's work and use his definitions as a foundation which inform my own denotations.

- **Ethnic group:** Although, "racial group" is the term that is most commonly used in Northern Irish legislation, Connolly notes the danger of using terms such as "racial group" which carry biological connotations, when really racial differences are cultural and social rather than biological. Thus, he argues, the term "ethnic group" which carries a focus on the social rather than biological, ought to be the preferred term. An ethnic group could be defined as "one whose members consider themselves, and are also regarded by others, as being socially and/or culturally distinctive." He continues, "What makes an ethnic group distinctive will vary from one group to another. It could include a common sense of national identity, a shared set of customs and traditions (e.g. nomadism in the case of Irish Travellers), a shared history of migration and settlement and/or a shared experience of discrimination and exclusion." (Connolly 2002: 6) Additionally, all people are members of ethnic groups, so like Connolly, I distinguish between minority groups and majority groups. The majority ethnic groups, or as I may sometimes refer to them, the "main" or "dominant" groups in Northern Ireland are Catholics and Protestants. These

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3 Such as the 1997 The Race Relations (NI) Order, which outlaws discrimination on the basis of color, race, nationality and ethnic or national origin.
4 Irish Travellers are a traditionally itinerant ethnic group indigenous to Ireland. Since 2017, they have been granted ethnic status by the Republic of Ireland, meaning that they are recognized as a distinct ethnic community which faces disadvantage and discrimination. They are also recognized as ethnic minorities in Northern Ireland.
two groups are dominant in both population size and political accommodation. Minority ethnic groups include Chinese, Indian, Irish Travellers, and Black Africans and Caribbeans among others.\(^5\)

- **Racism:** Racism could be interpreted as “a collective term that refers to all of those ideas, beliefs, actions, customs, practices and policies that have the effect of disadvantaging and/or discriminating against members of particular ethnic groups.” Racism is concerned with the outcomes of activities or actions, rather than merely their intent. (Connolly 2002: 7) Furthermore, racism involves power-dynamics, whereas the individuals and institutions in society who control power have the capacity to promote racism, while the powerless do not. Finally, “individual racism” refers to discriminatory or prejudicial behaviors on the interpersonal level, whereas “institutional racism” refers to a system of practices with racist outcomes.

**Ethnic Demography of Northern Ireland**

At this point, it may be useful for the reader to get a sense of the ethnic landscape of Northern Ireland. Census statistics reveal that non-Whites compose only 1.79% of Northern Ireland’s total population.\(^6\) This figure includes 0.35% of

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\(^5\) In some literature, minority ethnic groups are known by the term “Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic” (BAME). According to the British Institute on Race Relations, “BAME” is the term normally used in the UK to describe non-whites.

\(^6\) Northern Ireland census data uses only general categorizations to indicate the majority population, rather than using specific categories like “White Catholic” or “White Protestant.” Consequently, I assume that the majority of those categorized as “White” by census data would identify with either Catholic or Protestant communities, since Catholics and Protestants combined account for at least 82.32% of the total population (10.11% “No religion,” 0.82% “Other religions,” and 6.75% did not state their religion), while Whites account for 98.21% of the total population. Thus, when interpreting
residents who identify as Chinese, 0.34% who identify as Indian, 0.28% “Other
Asian,” 0.20% Black African, Caribbean or Other and 0.07% Irish Traveller. (NI
Census 2011) See the pie chart below for a more detailed breakdown of Northern
Ireland’s ethnic minority population.

Northern Ireland’s total population is
1,810,863.

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demographic data, I understand the terms “White” and “Christian” interchangeably. However, this
method is flawed since it overlooks the growing Eastern European immigrant population who identify
as white.

Additional ethnic minority demography is available in Appendix E
Societal Racism and Negligence of Ethnic Minority Concerns

“In a society characterized by sectarianism, accompanying violence and mistrust of ‘the other’, racism became a ‘natural’ part of the whole ambit of hate crime to which Northern Ireland is well-accustomed.”

- Colin Knox (2010: 388)

While scholars have studied the subject of racism in Northern Ireland for at least three decades, the field only began to mature within the past ten years, due partly to intense media interest after some noteworthy instances of violence against ethnic minorities. Prior to then, the subject was granted little investment; even today, many are under the notion that racism does not exist in Northern Ireland because the ethnic minority population is so marginal (Hainsworth 1998: 1) or because the society is “caught up in its own sectarian problems.” Despite these misconceptions, scholars have written broadly on the subject, definitively proving that racism does exist in Northern Ireland, at many levels.

I join the several scholars, such as John Nagle, who argue that the merits of consociationalism are not limited to its ability to reduce conflict between “the salient ethnic groups;” Rather, the ability of consociationalism to protect those outside the

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8 Paul Hainsworth calls this a “kind of distorted, numbers game logic [which] tends unfortunately to blame the victims rather than the perpetrators of racism.” (1998: 1) One is led to question what role this “numbers game logic” plays in a society which is governed by a political system which supposedly rejects traditionally majoritarian principles, such as the “tyranny of the majority.”

9 As Deepa Mann-Kler states, “One of the most important effects of the lack of written evidence on the experiences of ethnic minorities in Northern Ireland has been the denial of racism here.” (1997: 13) In fact, I remember that when I first considered studying in Northern Ireland, I consulted several individuals about the culture and society. However, when I asked about racism and how I would be perceived as a black male in Northern Ireland, I was told that it wasn’t really an issue because “we are consumed with our own [sectarian] problems.”
bounds of official inclusion is instrumental to its long-term efficacy. (Nagle 2016: 855) But as the system currently exists, there is no political incentive to address ethnic minority concerns. Not only do ethnic minorities lack a significant voting bloc,\textsuperscript{10} but they also hold no seats in the Assembly or Executive, nor do they have a political party which would represent their interests. And of course, the ethnic minority population is not monolithic, there is a diversity of cultures and traditions represented within that population. But no minority ethnic group, nor the lot of them combined, have any sort of political representation, nor means by which they might ensure political accountability. It is for this very reason that despite Northern Ireland's notorious reputation for hate crime, the Government's prosecution and conviction rates for racial violence are astonishingly low and at least as of 2007, not a single individual has been prosecuted or convicted of a racially motivated assault. (McVeigh and Rolston 2007: 12)

Racism has increased exponentially in the years since the Belfast Agreement and according to Robbie McVeigh and Bill Rolston, the Agreement helped to create this context in which new levels of racism flourish: First, as previously mentioned, the relative levels of peace which followed the Agreement made Northern Ireland a more attractive destination for migration; Second, peace enabled economic growth and labor shortages which were filled by migrants; Third, migrants, refugees and asylum seekers tend to move into the cheapest available housing, which tend to be in

\textsuperscript{10}Despite growing numbers of immigration, ethnic minorities do not have a majority in any electoral district. (Gupta 2015: 79)
Protestant working class neighborhoods; Fourth, the Agreement created a degree of unionist alienation because of the perception that unionists did not gain as much from the settlement as nationalists; and finally, in the aforementioned context there was a political reluctance to address subjects which might further alienate unionists, such as their involvement in perpetuating racism and violence. Thus, ethnic minorities found themselves susceptible to loyalist rage. (McVeigh and Rolston 2007: 12)

Paul Hainsworth’s *Divided Society: Ethnic Minorities and Racism in Northern Ireland* is viewed as the definitive academic text on racism and ethnic minorities in Northern Ireland. (Lentin and McVeigh 2006) In Chapter II Hainsworth discusses the challenges and barriers towards the development of race relations legislation in Northern Ireland during the 1990s. According to Hainsworth, until the late 1990s there was little concern or motivation to pursue legislation addressing racism or the experiences of ethnic minorities, as there has been a traditional preoccupation with sectarian politics. Additionally, ethnic minorities may not have wanted to draw too much attention to their presence through political lobbying, for fear of reprisal. Thus, until the late 1990s, ethnic minority concerns went largely unaddressed by the government, despite evidence that ethnic minorities needed and would benefit from basic protective legislation ensuring their rights to equality and freedom from discrimination. Advocates of protective legislation

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11 Mann-Kler claims that “it was only since the ceasefires in 1994, that matters concerned with ethnic minorities have been deliberated in the wider public arena in Northern Ireland.”
correctly argued that through the absence of legislation, ethnic minorities were essentially classified as *de facto* second class citizens. (36)

On the other hand, detractors questioned the need for protective legislation; however, this denialist attitude is precise why (among other reasons) protective legislation is necessary in Northern Ireland. One politician, Ken Kerr, leader of the Ulster Independence Movement, denied the existence of racism in Northern Ireland and thus dubbed protective legislation “an insult to the people of Ulster.” (Hainsworth 1998: 39) During a debate at the House of Commons, another politician observed that his few ethnic minority constituents “give no trouble to anybody, live their lives and do their own thing... Nobody bothers about them. They are accepted as part of the scenery and I am not aware that they suffer any discrimination.” Hainsworth rightfully notes that this extremely troublesome depiction of ethnic minorities as “giving no trouble,” effectively “conjure[d] up a would be idealisation of them as passive communities.” (39) However, fortunately this assimilationist and denialist view was forcefully challenged by colleagues in parliament: “I have not heard such talk for 30 years... The saddest comment came when people from an ethnic minority were praised for being quiet and not causing trouble... They deserve protection from discrimination not so that they can be quiet, but so that they can speak up and demand their rights.” (40) Nevertheless, the presence of such ignorant ideas in Northern Irish politics speaks volumes about the psyche of the political institution. Although this view that ethnic minorities should be passive was unpopular, it was not so unpopular that it was thought too shameful to
actually verbalize in public. Besides, this politician was not alone in his beliefs. Yet, it seems natural that in a political system which so expressly prioritizes the concerns and needs of the dominant population, ethnic minorities would be seen as just “accepted as part of the scenery,” as opposed to actively integrated in society and invited into the political apparatus. Although the government did eventually pass basic protective legislation for ethnic minorities, beginning in the late 90s, it is troubling that these laws faced so much resistance, especially when several scholars have well noted the presence of racism on both the institutional and individual level.

Institutional Racism

Paul Connolly notes that while there is significant diversity within the ethnic minority population in Northern Ireland “with differing minority ethnic communities having differing needs and facing differing problems,” many ethnic communities face some common struggles which reflect the existence of institutional racism; for example: “difficulties accessing existing services faced by those who speak little or no English; general lack of knowledge and/or awareness of particular services offered; the need for more staff training in relation to issues of ‘race’; the failure to meet the basic cultural needs of minority ethnic people; and the significant levels of racism and racist harassment experienced by minority ethnic people in Northern Ireland.” (2002) Deepa Mann-Kler supports this assessment of institutional racism with her 1997 report, during which she orchestrated focus groups to capture the experience of ethnic minorities using government services in Northern Ireland (such as health, education, social services, housing and policing), and found robust evidence of
institutional racism: ethnic minorities were ignorant of preventative health services due to inaccessible healthcare information; some families faced severe racial harassment; and many women felt that reports of racial attacks were not taken seriously by the police. (Knox 2010: 390)

Individual Racism

While studying abroad in Derry during the spring of 2016, I documented the following reflection about my experience:

“Clancy and Nagle write that in divided societies, ‘social identities are constrained by ethnic and national allegiances, which provides little room for multiple encapsulations crosscutting the cleavages.’ (2012) In other words, when a society is divided along sectarian lines, the complexities and nuances of identity are ignored and individuals are forced to align with linear ethno-national identities. You are either this or you are that, and if you are neither of those then you are an outsider. In Derry, because my skin color I clearly stand out as an outsider. It is obvious that I am not from Northern Ireland and it is obvious where I fit within the sectarian constraints of the society: “other”. And I know that this is obvious because I can feel people observing me curiously when I am out and about in the city. Before I even open my mouth people may already have a sense of who I am. And once I do speak it becomes unmistakable that I am from elsewhere, and for the more discerning ears it is clear that I am an American.”

On the level of individual racism, Northern Ireland has been affected by high rates of hate crime, leading some to dub it “the race hate capital of Europe.” According to Police Service statistics, while “incidents and crimes with a
racist motivation” have decreased overall since 2005/06 when there were 1,701 incidents and 1,469 crimes reported, racist crimes have been on the rise since 2011. In the 2011/12 period, there were 1,344 incidents and 885 crimes, but by 2014/15 incidents rose to 1,517 and crimes to 1,043. During the 2015/16 period there was a slight decrease from the previous year, so it is currently uncertain whether or not this overall trend will continue. Nevertheless, the rates of racist crimes in Northern Ireland are disturbingly high, and in the past it has been noted that Northern Ireland has a high ratio of racist crimes relative to the size of its minority ethnic population compared to England and Wales. (Knox 2010: 391) Finally, there is an interesting correlation between loyalism and racism, with a disproportionate number of racist crimes and incidents occurring in Protestant unionist working class neighborhoods. (391; McVeigh and Rolston 2007: 13) However, despite these unacceptable figures, as previously mentioned, the state’s prosecution and conviction rates for racial violence are astonishingly low. (McVeigh and Rolston 2007: 12)

Consequently, lack of confidence in the police is a recurrent theme in studies of ethnic minority experience in Northern Ireland. Mann-Kler explains that ethnic minorities have been hesitant to approach the police to report racial harassment to because they believe that the police are preoccupied with sectarian concerns. (Hainsworth 1998: 34) Additionally, Greg Irwin and Seamus Dunn conducted a

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12 A racist “incident” is a reported incident of bias against an individual or community, but which “may not be at the level of severity” required to be investigated as a crime. Crimes and incidents with sectarian motivations are recorded separately from racist crimes and are thus not included in these figures.
study which explored ethnic minority relations with the police and found significant dissatisfaction with the police amongst Chinese respondents and low crime reporting rates amongst the Irish Traveller community. (Irwin and Dunn 1997)

Existing Government Policy on Racism

The Belfast Agreement had some implications for racial equality in Northern Ireland; it replaced the Commission for Racial Equality with the “Race Equality Directorate” inside of the new Equality Commission for Northern Ireland, which has generated a lot of research and analysis on equal opportunities and anti-discrimination work. (Lentin and McVeigh 2006) Furthermore, in July 2005 the Government released a policy document, A Racial Equality Strategy for Northern Ireland 2005–10, which aimed to address racism and hate crime, and promote good race relations. The strategy outlined in this document was meant to complement existing legislation such as the Race Relations (Northern Ireland) Order of 1997 and certain statutory duties described in Section 75 of the Northern Ireland Act of 1998. The Race Relations (NI) Order of 1997 provides basic protections for minorities, outlawing discrimination on the basis of color, race, nationality and ethnic or national origin. While Section 75 of the Northern Ireland Act requires government departments and authorities “to promote equality of opportunity between persons of different racial group,” and to “have regard to the desirability of promoting good relations” between people of different racial groups. In these documents, the government acknowledges that it cannot solve racism on its own, but would serve as an ally amongst other stakeholders. And in March 2006, the
government released a follow-up plan on implementing racial equality, which committed government departments and agencies to various actions in that regard. (Knox 2010: 396)

These initiatives are a start to addressing racism in Northern Ireland, however the existing strategies are largely concerned with outlawing racism in theory, as well as research and analysis. Rebecca McKee notes that Northern Ireland has had a weak political response to immigration. For example, the Race Relations (NI) Order, which again ensures basic protections for ethnic minorities, was passed 21 years after similar legislation in Great Britain, and is perceived to be weaker and less strongly enforced. (McKee 2016: 778) Furthermore, McKee argues that the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive had shown little interest in ethnic minority concerns, as a search of official Government proceedings for questions containing the term “race relations” yielded only 109 results between 1998 and 2014. (778)

The Government should follow-up on its initiatives by developing distinctive institutions to investigate and prosecute hate crimes, provide targeted social services to ethnic minorities and campaign for cultural sensitivity, diversity and inclusion. However, it is unlikely that these measures would have any chance of being instituted in the current political climate, due to sectarian gridlock, as well as a lack of political motivation to address ethnic minority concerns. While there are certainly some politicians working towards ensuring ethnic minority interests, I argue that there is a broader environment of apathy towards ethnic minority concerns
which is facilitated by the Government’s natural emphasis on traditional sectarian divisions, which is a product of consociationalism.

**Discriminatory and Exclusive Politics**

Recall from Chapter II that Northern Ireland is classified as a “liberal” consociation, meaning that it technically does not require ethnic quotas. Rather, voters self-identify when they go to vote, and are free to vote for whomever they choose. Nevertheless, census data reflect that the majority of citizens identify as Catholic or Protestant and this is reflected in the continual outcomes of elections whereas Catholic and Protestant parties have controlled the government since the inception of consociationalism in 1998. In this sense, while there are no technical ethnic quotas, there are *de facto* ethnic quotas, meaning that in practice certain seats are reserved for Catholics and certain seats for Protestants in both the Assembly and Executive. The exact number of those seats differs from election to election depending on the outcome, but the consistent consequence has been Catholic and Protestant control.\(^\text{13}\)

I argue that this system of ethnic representation is discriminatory because it effectively boxes out the possibility of ethnic minority representation in the Government. Once elected to the Assembly members must declare their affiliation — Catholic, Protestant or "Other." Ethnic minorities who may wish to participate in ethnic coalition politics (a right which is afforded to Catholics and Protestants) are

\(^{13}\) Four political parties, two Catholic and two Protestant, which now control roughly 85% of the entire Assembly, dominate Northern Ireland’s party system.
forced into this “Other” category, which has never held control of either the Assembly or Executive, and where their unique ethnic interests may be diluted by the various other interests which may choose to identify as “Other.” As Devashree Gupta notes, certain legislative decisions require cross-community support, meaning that a minimum percentage of both Catholics and Protestants must support the agenda in order for it to pass. However, the consent of alternative communities is not necessary, which indicates that the voices or interests of alternative ethnic identities are not valued in the political process. (Gupta 2015: 70)

Conversely, if ethnic minorities should wish that their vote seriously affect the outcome of an election, that is, if they make their electoral decisions not purely based upon ethnic interests, but based upon who is mostly likely to win any given election, then they are forced to participate in divisive sectarian politics, choosing sides between Catholics and Protestants. Indeed, Hainsworth argues that “the nature of politics in Northern Ireland has dissuaded individuals from ethnic minorities from being politically engaged for fear of being seen as taking sides.” (Hainsworth 1998: 3) Moreover, one study found that the sectarian nature of politics in Northern Ireland reinforces outsider feelings amongst ethnic minorities. (2) Thus, it could be said that this system of sectarian politics excludes and alienates ethnic minorities

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14 This is the “lesser of two evils” argument. A voter may reasonably assess that there are only two candidates with a serious chance of winning an election, or only two parties with a serious chance of gaining a majority in the Assembly. While neither of the two options may reflect the voters interests exactly, one may be more desirable than the other. As such, the voter may choose the “lesser of two evils.”
from the political process.¹⁵ Not only is this unfair and undemocratic, but I would also argue that it is racist because it is discriminatory against certain minority members of the population on the basis of their ethnic identity.

Devashree Gupta puts it best: “Public space itself becomes a minefield of oppositional identities that emphasize the otherness of minorities, which in turn can sharply limit minorities’ ability and desire to take part in public life.” (Gupta 2015: 71) Sectarian societies such as Northern Ireland challenge the existence of identities outside of the polarized dichotomy. Gupta argues that this landscape makes “the incorporation of ‘others’ enormously difficult, especially if these others have identities that cannot easily be reconciled to the dominant cleavages that structure society.” (70) I argue that consociational politics reinforces the existence of polarized identity categories, as it both embraces and institutionalizes them.

Moreover, consociational politics limits the possibilities of the society as a whole because there is much to be gained from the incorporation of ethnic minority voices in the political process. In her study on the participation of ethnic minorities in the political process, Gupta found that there is a willingness and ability for ethnic minorities to participate in politics. She argues that the incorporation of ethnic minority voices would broaden the national dialogue beyond traditional sectarian

¹⁵ In fact, I am reminded of a story that I encountered in an article by Devashree Gupta, which excellently illustrates both the sectarian nature of Northern Ireland politics, and also how ethnic minorities are compelled to pick sides: “A Jewish man was walking in the city center when he was stopped by two strangers. ‘Hey, you,’ one stranger said, ‘are you a Catholic or a Protestant?’ ‘Neither,’ said the man. ‘I’m Jewish.’ ‘Yes,’ said the other stranger. ‘But are you a Catholic Jew or a Protestant Jew?’” Variations of this story exist for several ethnic groups in Northern Ireland. (Gupta 2015: 69)
CONSOCIATIONALISM AND THE COMPROMISED PEACE

perspectives. However, both the consociational rules of government, which reinforce sectarian decision-making, as well as politicians' neglect of ethnic minority concerns, bar ethnic minorities from playing a more influential role in politics. (Gupta 2015: 79) I conclude that consociational politics is racist because it has been proven unable to account for Northern Ireland’s emerging multicultural reality by addressing ethnic minority concerns such as broader societal racism on both the individual and institutional level, while actively excluding and devaluing the voices of ethnic minorities in the political sphere.
CONCLUSION

THE COMPROMISED PEACE

In January 2017, Northern Ireland’s power-sharing government collapsed over sectarian gridlock. Deputy First Minister Martin McGuinness of Sinn Fein resigned in protest after a costly green energy scandal which involved First Minister Arlene Foster of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), among other issues. Under terms of the Belfast Agreement, the London-based Northern Ireland Secretary must convene an election for a new assembly if a new Deputy First Minister is not elected within seven days. But in an act of political defiance, Sinn Fein refused not nominate a replacement and thus an election for an entirely new Assembly was held. The new Assembly, once elected, was tasked with forming a new government by appointing ministers to the Executive branch. However, at the time of this writing politicians have failed to reach political settlement and the government remains shutdown. (Duggan 2017; Graham 2017; “NI Election” 2017)

I begin my conclusion by conveying the current dysfunctional nature of Northern Ireland politics because it undergirds much of which I have discussed throughout this thesis: that consociationalism is ultimately set on a course of nonfulfillment. As an outsider to Northern Ireland I am aware that there are limits to my capacity to understand the bitter actuality of sectarian violence and division. Thus, I do not wish to denounce consociationalism entirely. Indeed, power-sharing has been successful to the extent that it diminished the levels of factional
violence that distinguished Ulster throughout the latter half of the twentieth-century. Moreover, sectarian gridlock aside, consociationalism has brought a degree of political cooperation between unionists and nationalists, which certainly indicates progress.

However, as a scholar with global concern there are some realities that I cannot ignore. Primarily, I am convinced that the gains which have been acquired through consociationalism will prove to be evanescent unless Northern Ireland resolves the two challenges which I have explored at length: (1) consensus on the identity of the democratic state and (2) the enfranchisement of ethnic minority interests. Without a settlement on these issues, there perpetually looms the possibility of the resumption of violence, both physical and structural: Physical violence could ensue because with unionist and nationalist aspirations both legitimized, frustrations over the identity of the state could turn into hostilities, especially as shifting demographics stand to shuffle the debate; While structural violence already exists in the form of political discrimination and exclusion against ethnic minorities. Thus, since the Belfast Agreement, Northern Ireland has not truly enjoyed a state of peace, but rather experiences a state of “compromised peace,” which is impermanent and incomplete.

Coincidentally, consociationalism is a compromise, reached through compromise and which aims to achieve peace through compromise as well. Compromise could be defined as a settlement that is reached through mutual concession. The major concession between unionists and nationalists was delayed
settlement on their conflict aspirations for the state. However, drawing from the ideas of scholars such as Johan Galtung, rather than working towards compromise, Northern Ireland should strive towards *transcendence*. Transcendence would require that both parties acknowledge their mutual interest in a shared future and to drop their sectarian aspirations in favor of a united end. Of course, this is easier said than done. However, I contend that a broader implication of this thesis is that consociationalism obstructs the attainment of transcendence. I have demonstrated that consociationalism both legitimates and institutionalizes conflicting aspirations which only enables the continuance of sectarian division, rather than national transcendence and the actualization of a shared future.

Moreover, my work has implications for the perceived distinctions between liberal and corporate consociations. John Nagle explores the impact of consociationalism on sexual minorities and makes a very interesting point about the form of consociation and minority experience. He argues that within Northern Ireland's liberal system, “the discourse of minority rights undergirding power sharing allowed scope for LGBT movements to claim recognition and equality.” (2016: 868) Whereas in Lebanon's corporate system, “A contrasting situation is evident... The corporate consociational structure not only excludes non-salient minorities; it institutionalizes homophobia.” (868) However, one of the broader implications of my work is that while liberal consociations are regarded as more amenable to minority concerns than divergent corporate systems (Nagle 2016), liberal consociations can also be exclusive towards minority groups. As I have demonstrated
in Chapter III, Northern Ireland's liberal system is racist because it fails to adequately address ethnic minority concerns such as broader societal racism, while excluding the interests of ethnic minorities from the political process. Thus, if both forms of consociation (liberal and corporate) institutionalize exclusion, one is lead to question whether consociationalism in general is intractable with regard to the concerns of non-salient minorities, as would certainly appear to be the case. At the very least, it has been proven that both forms of consociation can be unreceptive towards the demands and needs of minorities. This suggests that consociation may not always be the best settlement to ethnic conflict.

Additionally, I support Richard Bourke's assertion that Northern Ireland's consociational experience reveals that democracy should not be considered an automatic prescription to conflict either. Rather, as Bourke argues, democracy can be a challenge for modern societies. Accordingly, politicians and policy-experts should rethink their approach to international conflict, particularly those coming from an American tradition. United States foreign policy has tended to favor the indiscriminate export of democracy as a universal prescription to violence and conflict. And in fact, the United States played a critical role in brokering Northern Ireland's democratic settlement. However, democratic settlement should be individualized on a case by case basis, not mass produced. And clearly, Northern Ireland's settlement requires some adjustment to fit the current and shifting demands of the society.
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APPENDIX A.
Full text of “Strand One” of the Belfast Agreement

STRAND ONE: DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS IN NORTHERN IRELAND

1. This agreement provides for a democratically elected Assembly in Northern Ireland which is inclusive in its membership, capable of exercising executive and legislative authority, and subject to safeguards to protect the rights and interests of all sides of the community.

The Assembly

2. A 108-member Assembly will be elected by PR(STV) from existing Westminster constituencies.

3. The Assembly will exercise full legislative and executive authority in respect of those matters currently within the responsibility of the six Northern Ireland Government Departments, with the possibility of taking on responsibility for other matters as detailed elsewhere in this agreement.

4. The Assembly - operating where appropriate on a cross-community basis - will be the prime source of authority in respect of all devolved responsibilities.

Safeguards

5. There will be safeguards to ensure that all sections of the community can participate and work together successfully in the operation of these institutions and that all sections of the community are protected, including:

(a) allocations of Committee Chairs, Ministers and Committee membership in proportion to party strengths;
(b) the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and any Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland supplementing it, which neither the Assembly nor public bodies can infringe, together with a Human Rights Commission;
(c) arrangements to provide that key decisions and legislation are proofed to ensure that they do not infringe the ECHR and any Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland;
(d) arrangements to ensure key decisions are taken on a cross-community basis;
(i) either parallel consent, i.e. a majority of those members present and voting, including a majority of the unionist and nationalist designations present and voting;
(ii) or a weighted majority (60%) of members present and voting, including at least 40% of each of the nationalist and unionist designations present and voting.

Key decisions requiring cross-community support will be designated in advance, including election of the Chair of the Assembly, the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, standing orders and budget allocations. In other cases such decisions could be triggered by a petition of concern brought by a significant minority of Assembly members (30/108).

(e) an Equality Commission to monitor a statutory obligation to promote equality of opportunity in specified areas and parity of esteem between the two main communities, and to investigate individual complaints against public bodies.

Operation of the Assembly

6. At their first meeting, members of the Assembly will register a designation of identity - nationalist, unionist or other - for the purposes of measuring cross-community support in Assembly votes under the relevant provisions above.

7. The Chair and Deputy Chair of the Assembly will be elected on a cross-community basis, as set out in paragraph 5(d) above.

8. There will be a Committee for each of the main executive functions of the Northern Ireland Administration. The Chairs and Deputy Chairs of the Assembly Committees will be allocated proportionally, using the d’Hondt system. Membership of the Committees will be in broad proportion to party strengths in the Assembly to ensure that the opportunity of Committee places is available to all members.

9. The Committees will have a scrutiny, policy development and consultation role with respect to the Department with which each is associated, and will have a role in initiation of legislation. They will have the power to:

• consider and advise on Departmental budgets and Annual Plans in the context of the overall budget allocation;
• approve relevant secondary legislation and take the Committee stage of relevant primary legislation;
• call for persons and papers;
• initiate enquiries and make reports;
• consider and advise on matters brought to the Committee by its Minister.

10. Standing Committees other than Departmental Committees may be established as may be required from time to time.

11. The Assembly may appoint a special Committee to examine and report on whether a measure or proposal for legislation is in conformity with equality requirements, including the ECHR/Bill of Rights. The Committee shall have the power to call people and papers to assist in its consideration of the matter. The Assembly shall then consider the report of the Committee and can determine the matter in accordance with the cross-community consent procedure.

12. The above special procedure shall be followed when requested by the Executive Committee, or by the relevant Departmental Committee, voting on a cross-community basis.

13. When there is a petition of concern as in 5(d) above, the Assembly shall vote to determine whether the measure may proceed without reference to this special procedure. If this fails to achieve support on a cross-community basis, as in 5(d)(i) above, the special procedure shall be followed.

**Executive Authority**

14. Executive authority to be discharged on behalf of the Assembly by a First Minister and Deputy First Minister and up to ten Ministers with Departmental responsibilities.

15. The First Minister and Deputy First Minister shall be jointly elected into office by the Assembly voting on a cross-community basis, according to 5(d)(i) above.

16. Following the election of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, the posts of Ministers will be allocated to parties on the basis of the d’Hondt system by reference to the number of seats each party has in the Assembly.

17. The Ministers will constitute an Executive Committee, which will be convened, and presided over, by the First Minister and Deputy First Minister.

18. The duties of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister will include, inter alia, dealing with and co-ordinating the work of the Executive Committee and the response of the Northern Ireland administration to external relationships.
19. The Executive Committee will provide a forum for the discussion of, and agreement on, issues which cut across the responsibilities of two or more Ministers, for prioritising executive and legislative proposals and for recommending a common position where necessary (e.g. in dealing with external relationships).

20. The Executive Committee will seek to agree each year, and review as necessary, a programme incorporating an agreed budget linked to policies and programmes, subject to approval by the Assembly, after scrutiny in Assembly Committees, on a cross-community basis.

21. A party may decline the opportunity to nominate a person to serve as a Minister or may subsequently change its nominee.

22. All the Northern Ireland Departments will be headed by a Minister. All Ministers will liaise regularly with their respective Committee.

23. As a condition of appointment, Ministers, including the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, will affirm the terms of a Pledge of Office (Annex A) undertaking to discharge effectively and in good faith all the responsibilities attaching to their office.

24. Ministers will have full executive authority in their respective areas of responsibility, within any broad programme agreed by the Executive Committee and endorsed by the Assembly as a whole.

25. An individual may be removed from office following a decision of the Assembly taken on a cross-community basis, if (s)he loses the confidence of the Assembly, voting on a cross-community basis, for failure to meet his or her responsibilities including, inter alia, those set out in the Pledge of Office. Those who hold office should use only democratic, non-violent means, and those who do not should be excluded or removed from office under these provisions.

Legislation

26. The Assembly will have authority to pass primary legislation for Northern Ireland in devolved areas, subject to:

(a) the ECHR and any Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland supplementing it which, if the courts found to be breached, would render the relevant legislation null and void;
(b) decisions by simple majority of members voting, except when decision on a cross-community basis is required;
(c) detailed scrutiny and approval in the relevant Departmental Committee;
(d) mechanisms, based on arrangements proposed for the Scottish Parliament, to ensure suitable co-ordination, and avoid disputes, between the Assembly and the Westminster Parliament;
(e) option of the Assembly seeking to include Northern Ireland provisions in United Kingdom-wide legislation in the Westminster Parliament, especially on devolved issues where parity is normally maintained (e.g. social security, company law).

27. The Assembly will have authority to legislate in reserved areas with the approval of the Secretary of State and subject to Parliamentary control.
28. Disputes over legislative competence will be decided by the Courts.
29. Legislation could be initiated by an individual, a Committee or a Minister.

Relations with other institutions
30. Arrangements to represent the Assembly as a whole, at Summit level and in dealings with other institutions, will be in accordance with paragraph 18, and will be such as to ensure cross-community involvement.
31. Terms will be agreed between appropriate Assembly representatives and the Government of the United Kingdom to ensure effective coordination and input by Ministers to national policy-making, including on EU issues.
32. Role of Secretary of State:
(a) to remain responsible for NIO matters not devolved to the Assembly, subject to regular consultation with the Assembly and Ministers;
(b) to approve and lay before the Westminster Parliament any Assembly legislation on reserved matters;
(c) to represent Northern Ireland interests in the United Kingdom Cabinet;
(d) to have the right to attend the Assembly at their invitation.
33. The Westminster Parliament (whose power to make legislation for Northern Ireland would remain unaffected) will:
CONSOCIATIONALISM AND THE COMPROMISED PEACE

(a) legislate for non-devolved issues, other than where the Assembly legislates with the approval of the Secretary of State and subject to the control of Parliament;
(b) to legislate as necessary to ensure the United Kingdom’s international obligations are met in respect of Northern Ireland;
(c) scrutinise, including through the Northern Ireland Grand and Select Committees, the responsibilities of the Secretary of State.

34. A consultative Civic Forum will be established. It will comprise representatives of the business, trade union and voluntary sectors, and such other sectors as agreed by the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister. It will act as a consultative mechanism on social, economic and cultural issues. The First Minister and the Deputy First Minister will by agreement provide administrative support for the Civic Forum and establish guidelines for the selection of representatives to the Civic Forum.

Transitional Arrangements

35. The Assembly will meet first for the purpose of organisation, without legislative or executive powers, to resolve its standing orders and working practices and make preparations for the effective functioning of the Assembly, the British-Irish Council and the North/South Ministerial Council and associated implementation bodies. In this transitional period, those members of the Assembly serving as shadow Ministers shall affirm their commitment to non-violence and exclusively peaceful and democratic means and their opposition to any use or threat of force by others for any political purpose; to work in good faith to bring the new arrangements into being; and to observe the spirit of the Pledge of Office applying to appointed Ministers.

Review

36. After a specified period there will be a review of these arrangements, including the details of electoral arrangements and of the Assembly’s procedures, with a view to agreeing any adjustments necessary in the interests of efficiency and fairness.

Annex A: Pledge of Office

To pledge:

(a) to discharge in good faith all the duties of office;
(b) commitment to non-violence and exclusively peaceful and democratic means;
(c) to serve all the people of Northern Ireland equally, and to act in accordance with the general obligations on government to promote equality and prevent discrimination;
(d) to participate with colleagues in the preparation of a programme for government;
(e) to operate within the framework of that programme when agreed within the Executive Committee and endorsed by the Assembly;
(f) to support, and to act in accordance with, all decisions of the Executive Committee and Assembly;
(g) to comply with the Ministerial Code of Conduct.

CODE OF CONDUCT

Ministers must at all times:

• observe the highest standards of propriety and regularity involving impartiality, integrity and objectivity in relationship to the stewardship of public funds;
• be accountable to users of services, the community and, through the Assembly, for the activities within their responsibilities, their stewardship of public funds and the extent to which key performance targets and objectives have been met;
• ensure all reasonable requests for information from the Assembly, users of services and individual citizens are complied with; and that Departments and their staff conduct their dealings with the public in an open and responsible way;
• follow the seven principles of public life set out by the Committee on Standards in Public Life;
• comply with this code and with rules relating to the use of public funds; • operate in a way conducive to promoting good community relations and equality of treatment;
• not use information gained in the course of their service for personal gain; nor seek to use the opportunity of public service to promote their private interests;
• ensure they comply with any rules on the acceptance of gifts and hospitality that might be offered;
• declare any personal or business interests which may conflict with their responsibilities. The Assembly will retain a Register of Interests. Individuals must ensure that any direct or indirect
pecuniary interests which members of the public might reasonably think could influence their judgement are listed in the Register of Interests;
APPENDIX B
Explanation of Single Transferable Vote (STV)


Members of the Northern Ireland Assembly are elected using the Single Transferable Vote system or STV.
There are 90 seats to be filled, a reduction from the 108 seats elected in May 2016.
With STV, candidates are elected according to the share of the vote they receive, the size of the electorate, and the number of seats to be filled.
On ballot papers, voters rank candidates in order of preference, giving each a number. They can choose as many or as few as they like.
When polls close and vote counting begins, the first step is to work out the 'quota', which decides how many votes a candidate needs to be elected.
To calculate the quota, you divide the number of valid voting papers cast by the number of seats to be filled plus one, and then add one.
Candidates who exceed the quota are elected straight away.
Votes are then redistributed among the other candidates in two ways.
1. Some candidates may be elected by many more votes than the quota. These extra votes are called the surplus, and are redistributed in proportion to the total number of preferences for other candidates in an elected candidate's ballots.
2. The lowest ranked candidates are eliminated, and the preferences on their ballot papers are distributed among the other candidates.
The process continues, with votes redistributed in these two ways, until all the seats are filled.
To illustrate how the process can work, consider an election for the three most popular Shakespeare characters.
Here is the result from the first round of voting:

| Stage 1 |
|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| **Candidate** | **Votes** | **Status** |
| Hamlet | 56,768 | Elected |
| Cleopatra | 26,767 | |
| Prospero | 13,012 | |
| Desdemona | 5,878 | |
| Romeo | 4,788 | |
| Lady Macbeth | 2,312 | |

To calculate the quota: There were 109,525 valid votes cast and three seats to be filled.
So, 109,525 divided by (3 seats +1) 4, +1 = 27,382
Hamlet has clearly achieved this, so is elected in round one.
There are 29,406 surplus votes from Hamlet to be redistributed - and all of his ballots are examined to decide the proportion.
Some 23% of Hamlet's total ballots were found to have second preferences for Cleopatra. Therefore, of the 29,406 surplus, 23% is awarded to Cleopatra = 6,763.4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Stage 1 votes</th>
<th>Surplus from Hamlet</th>
<th>Stage 2 votes</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hamlet</td>
<td>56,768</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleopatra</td>
<td>26,767</td>
<td>6,673.4</td>
<td>33,530.4</td>
<td>Elected stage 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prospero</td>
<td>13,012</td>
<td>5,293.1</td>
<td>18,305.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desdemona</td>
<td>5,878</td>
<td>9,998</td>
<td>15,876</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romeo</td>
<td>4,788</td>
<td>4,410.9</td>
<td>9,198.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lady Macbeth</td>
<td>2,312</td>
<td>2,940.6</td>
<td>5,252.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Quota: 27,382
Cleopatra now exceeds the quota and is elected at stage 2.
The other candidates receive proportional transfers from Hamlet's surplus.
There are 6,148 surplus ballots from her new total to redistribute. Again, all of her ballot papers are examined and the new surplus is redistributed in the same way as before.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Stage 2 votes</th>
<th>Surplus from Cleopatra</th>
<th>Stage 3 votes</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hamlet</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>Elected stage 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleopatra</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>Elected stage 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prospero</td>
<td>18,305.1</td>
<td>737.7</td>
<td>19,042.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desdemona</td>
<td>15,876</td>
<td>3,442.8</td>
<td>19,318.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romeo</td>
<td>9198.9</td>
<td>1,229.6</td>
<td>10,428.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lady Macbeth</td>
<td>5,252.6</td>
<td>737.7</td>
<td>5,990.3</td>
<td>Eliminated</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Quota: 27,382
However, no one reaches the quota in stage 3 so the last placed candidate - Lady Macbeth - is eliminated.
Any preferences on her ballots are transferred to the remaining candidates.
Any votes with only one preference - for Lady Macbeth herself - are discarded, and known as 'non-transferable'.

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Quota: 27,382
Stage 4 concludes with no candidate surpassing the quota.
Last-placed Romeo is now eliminated and his preferences transferred to the remaining candidates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Stage 3 votes</th>
<th>Transfers from Lady Macbeth</th>
<th>Stage 4 votes</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hamlet</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Elected stage 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleopatra</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Elected stage 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prospero</td>
<td>19,042.8</td>
<td>1,785.7</td>
<td>20,828.5</td>
<td>Eliminated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desdemona</td>
<td>19,318.8</td>
<td>2,875.3</td>
<td>22,194.1</td>
<td>Eliminated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romeo</td>
<td>10,428.5</td>
<td>479.2</td>
<td>10,907.7</td>
<td>Eliminated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lady Macbeth</td>
<td>5,990.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Elected stage 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Desdemona is elected in the final round when Romeo's second preferences are transferred.

Quota: 27,382
Desdemona is elected in the final round when Romeo's second preferences are transferred.
A candidate can win without meeting the quota when there are no more votes available for transfer.
In this particular scenario, surpluses were only redistributed in the first two stages.
However, in an election where more seats need to be filled, and with more candidates, the process can happen repeatedly through many stages of counting.

[...]

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Dr Sydney Elliott, senior lecturer in politics at Queen's University, Belfast, explains how the d'Hondt system works:

The d'Hondt, or highest average method, is named after a Belgian lawyer from the 1870s. Unlike single transferable vote, it does not use a quota or formula to allocate seats or posts. Instead, these are allocated singularly and one after another. The basic idea is that a party’s vote total is divided by a certain figure which increases as it wins more seats. As the divisor becomes bigger, the party’s total in succeeding rounds gets smaller, allowing parties with lower initial totals to win seats. The divisor in the first round is one (ie it has no effect) and thereafter it is the total number of seats gained plus one. The following is an example of how the system would work when being used to allocate committee chairmen in the Assembly.

Suppose the number of seats won in the Assembly were as in the top line of the following table.

Follow each round horizontally across the table to see which party has the biggest total and therefore wins that round. Follow each party’s total vertically to see it decrease as it wins more seats.

These figures are for illustrative purposes only.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Round</th>
<th>UUP</th>
<th>DUP</th>
<th>PUP</th>
<th>UKUP</th>
<th>All.</th>
<th>SDLP</th>
<th>SF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>9.75</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The UUP has the highest total, 39, so wins the first round. The UUP figure is now divided by 2 (its total seats + 1) to give a new figure of 19.5. The highest total for round two, on the second line, is 23 for the SDLP - which wins the seat and sees its figure reduced to 11.5. Round three goes to the UUP again as its adjusted figure of 19.5 is again the highest. The new UUP figure is 13 - its original total of
39 divided by 3 (2 seats + one). Rounds four and five go to Sinn Fein and the DUP with totals of 17 and 16 respectively. Their adjusted figures are 8.5 and 8. The highest total for the sixth round is 13, giving the UUP its third representative. The party's new figure is 9.75, based on its original total of 39 divided by 4 (3 seats + 1). The final round in this example goes to the SDLP with a total of 11.5. If the table continued, the new SDLP figure would be 7.67. This process would continue until all the posts or seats are filled.
“Trends over the last 10 years by financial year.” Police Service of Northern Ireland. Police Recorded Security Situation Statistics. 10 March 2017

(1) Paramilitary style assaults/shootings that result in death are counted as security-related deaths and are not reflected in the paramilitary-style assault/shooting figures.
**Bombing Incident:** “These include all incidents where a bombing device explodes or is defused. A bombing incident can also relate to more than one device - for example a mortar attack with four devices would be recorded as one bombing incident with four devices. When a device partially explodes (i.e. usually only the detonator or fuse) it is recorded as an explosion. However, if a device is found that is not complete or armed, then it is recorded as a ‘find’ and not as a bombing.”

**Shooting Incident:** “These include any shooting incident relating to the security situation and include shots fired by terrorists, shots fired by the security forces, paramilitary style attacks involving shootings and shots heard (and later confirmed by other sources). They exclude the firing of blank rounds.”

**Paramilitary Style Shooting Incidents:** “Any such paramilitary style shooting incident can have one of more casualties (i.e. two or more persons could be shot in the same incident). The injured party is usually shot in the knees, elbows, feet, ankles or thighs and the motive is supposedly to punish the person for anti-social activities. These paramilitary style shootings are generally conducted by Loyalist or Republican paramilitary groups on members of their own community. The attribution of such shootings is generally recorded as ‘Loyalist’ or ‘Republican’ depending on the investigating officer’s view on which groups had conducted the shooting. Paramilitary style shootings that result in death are counted as security related deaths and are not reflected in the paramilitary style shooting figures.”

**Paramilitary Style Assaults:** “As with the paramilitary style shootings, these assaults are usually carried out by Loyalist or Republican groups on members of their own community as a punishment. The assault will involve major or minor physical injury to the injured party typically involving a group of assailants armed with, for example, iron bars or baseball bats. Multiple casualties may result from a single incident. Confirmation of the paramilitary style assault is generally sought from the investigating officer.”

Consociationalism and the Compromised Peace
Lessons from Northern Ireland

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for graduation with a special major in “Global Peace and Justice”

By

Mosea Esaias

Swarthmore College
Thesis Advisor: Dr. Sa’ed Atshan
Spring Semester 2017

Consociation | kän,sōSHē ’āSHən |
A political system formed by the cooperation of different, especially antagonistic, social groups on the basis of shared power.