Evidentiality and Mirativity in Navajo

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Abstract

This thesis examines the evidentiality and mirativity in Navajo. There are possibly two evidential markers in Navajo, the reportative jini and the quotative “á-+inflected form of dishni...inflected form of dishni”, and there is one mirative lá. Their independent features are compared to the typological features of evidentials and miratives in general, and their relative positions and co-occurrence are also discussed.

The reportative jini and the quotative show a close relationship, and they both affect the person and point of view in discourse complements. The reportative jini can mark secondhand and thirdhand information, while the quotative by itself only marks direct quotations. The mirative lá, on the other hand, does not appear with thirdhand information.
1 Introduction

Evidentials mark the source of information of an utterance while miratives are used when the speaker is surprised by unexpected new information (Aikhenvald 2004: 1, 195). Although mirativity is, cross-linguistically, an independent grammatical category, and the meaning of miratives can be expressed without evidentials, mirativity is often closely related to evidentiality (2004: 195). For example, regardless of the size of the evidentiality system in a language, reportatives might develop a mirative overtone (2004: 195).

This thesis provides a detailed description of the meaning and pragmatic functions of the reportative *jini*, the quotative and the mirative *lā* in Navajo. Navajo is an Athabaskan language with primary word order S-O-V (Speas 1990: 202). The mirative, quotative and reportative have different meanings and pragmatic functions. Their origins, distribution, scopes, positions in sentences as well as their interactions with person and point of view are examined.

Section 2 provides background information and typological facts of evidentials and miratives. Navajo verbs incorporate information about number and person of subject, object and deictic subject in their prefixes (Speas 1990: 206). Thus, the different ways to express person and point of view in Navajo discourse are also introduced because they are crucial to the understanding of these two grammatical categories. Section 3 shows the methods adapted to syntactically represent evidentials, miratives and their relationships with person and point of view. Section 4 discusses the behavior of the reportative evidential *jini* and the quotative, and Section 5 provides a detailed description of the function of the mirative *lā* in Navajo discourse. Section 6 discusses the various possible positions of *jini, lā* and also the quotative. Section 7 gives a conclusion of all the previous sections.
2 Background Information and Typological Facts

2.1 Evidentiality

"Source of information is the semantic core of any evidential" (Aikhenvald 2004: 153). Aikhenvald (2004: 1) defines evidentiality as a grammatical category that specifies the information source of a statement, while De Haan (2008: 69) describes evidentiality as “the grammaticalized marking of the source of the information contained in the sentence”. The following examples from Tibetan show how an evidential implies the source of information:

\[(1)^2\]
\[(a)\] tata phö-la trönpo ‘dug.
now Tibet-LOC warm be:DIR
It is warm in Tibet now (speaker is in Tibet right now).

\[(b)\] *tata phö-la trönpo ‘dug
now Tibet-LOC warm be:DIR
It is warm in Tibet now (speaker is not in Tibet right now but has been to Tibet).

In various Tibetan dialects, evidentiality is expressed by different copulas or auxiliary verbs (Aikhenvald 2004: 69). In (1a), the copula ‘dug can be used because the speaker has direct evidence. In (1b), since the speaker does not have such evidence, a different copula yöre must be used. Sentence (b) is unacceptable.

In many languages, evidentials do not rely on the type of clause, modality, and tense-aspect frame in which they are present (Aikhenvald 2003: 15). However, it is also possible for the choice of an evidential to be affected by type of clause, tense and aspect or “the grammatical person of the subject or experiencer” (2003: 15-17).

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\(^2\) This example comes from class discussions in ALAN P030 Beginning Tibetan I, Spring 2015, Penn Language Center, University of Pennsylvania.
Evidentiality systems in world’s languages vary in size and type (Aikhenvald 2004: 23). The smallest systems consist of two choices, marking either firsthand information and non-firsthand information or reported information and non-reported information (2004: 23). Usually, the terms “quotative”, “hearsay” and “reportative” are interchangeable, but there are several North American Indian languages that distinguish quotatives from reportatives, and develop evidentiality systems with three choices: “reported, quotative, and ‘everything else’” (2004: 25, 50).

Languages have various ways to differentiate reportatives and quotatives. In Dakota, a Siouan language, different particles are used to mark hearsay and quoted statement of someone specific (2004: 51). Tonkawa, on the other hand, is a language that uses different suffixes to mark hearsay and “narrative genre for myths or stories acquired from someone else” (2004: 51). There are also a few languages like Mûky, in which quotative and inferential evidentials are restricted by negation particles, but usually evidentials are not in the scope of any negation particles (2003: 16).

De Haan (2008) presents a survey of evidentials in Athabaskan languages and uses a different categorization. According to De Haan’s dichotomy, the source of information either comes directly from the speaker him/herself or can be obtained through indirect means (2008: 69). It is also possible for evidential categories “to be merged with other categories” (2008: 69). For languages in a 2-level hierarchy that includes only quotative and inferential evidentials, the two levels may be marked by either the same morpheme or distinct morphemes (2008: 71, 72). De Haan (2008: 70, 72) categorizes the evidential systems of various languages according to the number of evidential levels and asserts that Navajo is a language with a 2-level evidential system that contains distinct markers for quotative and
inferential evidentials. De Haan believes that lâ is “most likely an inferential evidential” and
jini is a quotative evidential (2008: 72, 73).

My examples in Section 4 and 5 show that, contrary to part of what De Haan claims, jini is a reportative while lâ is a mirative. The mirative lâ is not an inferential evidential because it does not mark inferred evidence or any other evidence. It is also possible that Navajo has a quotative “â-inflected form of dishni...inflected form of dishni” and thus distinguishes quotatives from reportatives. If this is the case, then Navajo would have an evidentiality system that marks reportative and quotative and leaves other statements unmarked. This quotative is discussed along with the reportative jini.

2.2 Mirativity

Mirativity was first identified in scholarship by DeLancey as an independent semantic and grammatical category closely related to evidentiality (DeLancey 1997: 36; Aikhenvald 2004: 195). DeLancey (1997: 35) asserts that the mirative category marks “both statements based on inference and statements based on direct experience for which the speaker had no psychological preparation, and in some languages hearsay data as well”, and that a proposition marked by a mirative category “is one which is new to the speaker, not yet integrated into his overall picture of the world”. Languages can have many different ways to express surprise, including but not limited to special pronouns, exclamatory tense, and intonation (Aikhenvald 2004: 213, 214).

Some evidentials have mirative overtones, like nu in Tsafiki:

(2) moto jo-nu-e
motorcycle be-INFR:MIR-DECL
"It's a motorcycle."\(^3\) (Dickinson 2000: 411)

The inferential morpheme \textit{nu} in (2) expresses the speaker’s surprise when he or she infers from non-visual evidence that a motorcycle is coming (Aikhenvald 2004: 201). On the other hand, some languages, such as Cupéño, an extinct Uto-Aztecan language, have an independent mirative category:

\begin{equation}
\text{Mu}=\text{k'u'ut} \quad \text{"Isi-ly=am!"} \quad \text{pe}-\text{yax}=\text{k'u'ut}
\end{equation}
\begin{equation}
\text{and}=\text{REP} \quad \text{Coyote-NPN.MIR} \quad \text{3sgS-say}=\text{REP}
\end{equation}

"And it is said, ‘it’s Coyote!’; he (the bird) said it is said."\(^4\) (Hill 2005: 66)

The suffix \textit{am} in (3) indicates that the speaker, which is the bird in this context, is surprised, or emphasizes “the immediacy of evidence” (Hill 2005: 66), but it does not mark any source of information. Therefore Cupéño has an independent mirative category.

I argue that the enclitic \textit{la} in Navajo, like \textit{am} in Cupéño, does not have evidential interpretations.

\subsection*{2.3 Person and Point of View in Navajo}

This section introduces various personal markers in Navajo and generalizes previous discoveries about person and point of view in Navajo discourse.

Navajo has both independent and prefixed pronouns (Young \& Morgan 1980: 22). The independent personal pronoun in Navajo has four persons including the indefinite 4\(^{th}\) person, which is sometimes marked as “3a” person, and gender is not marked (1980: 22-23):

\footnote{The context is that “the speaker heard what he thought was a car approaching. But when he saw it, he realized it was a motorcycle” (Dickinson 2000: 411).}

\footnote{The context is “a traditional story in which Coyote has arrived, uninvited, at a church service conducted by birds (which are, of course, potential prey). One of the birds turns and recognizes him and utters” this sentence (Hill 2005: 66).}
Table 2.3.1: Independent subjective personal pronouns in Navajo (adapt. Young & Morgan 1980: 23)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Person</th>
<th>Singular</th>
<th>Dual Plural</th>
<th>Plural</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>shí</td>
<td>nihí</td>
<td>danihi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>ni</td>
<td>nihí</td>
<td>danihi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>bí</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>daabí</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 (3a)</td>
<td>hó</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>daahó</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Native speakers of languages that only distinguish three persons are unfamiliar with the 4th person in Navajo. A 4th person pronoun, whether independent or prefixed, must refer to a human, or an anthropomorphic animal in myths (Akmajian 1970: 1). In general, it is used to either denote an unspecified person outside the sentence (Akmajian 1970: 1) or politely refer to a definite person who is present at the conversation (Willie 1991: 116). The evidential use of speech verbs in 4th person is discussed in Sections 4.2.3 and 4.3.

Since the pronominal prefixes of verbs often incorporate persons, the presence of independent personal pronouns is usually not obligatory (Young & Morgan 1980: 22). However, these pronouns can emphasize their referents and form other types of constructions with coordinating conjunctions and other words and expressions (1980: 22).

There are two groups of positions for prefixes of Navajo verbs, the disjunct prefixes and conjunct prefixes (Young & Morgan 1980: 100). The disjunct prefixes occupy prefix positions I-III and the conjunct prefixes occupy positions IV-IX (1980: 100). They are further divided based on “their function or role (as derivational, thematic and paradigmatic elements)” and how closely they are attached to the verb stem (1980: 100). Most examples in

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3 Only relevant parts of the original chart are presented.
this paper involve paradigmatic prefixes that denote subjects at “Position V and VIII” and objects at “Position Ib, Ic and IV” (1980: 100):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Disjunct</th>
<th>Conjunct</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Ib</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Function/Role</td>
<td>Object (&amp;Possessive Pronoun)</td>
<td>Indirect Object Pronoun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example</td>
<td>shi- ~ I (1st person singular)</td>
<td>shi- ~ me (1st person singular)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.3.2: Some Paradigmatic Prefixes in Navajo Verbs (adapt. Young & Morgan 1980: 107)

3 Methodology

The study of evidentials in Athabaskan languages by De Haan (2008) set the starting point of this thesis. In order to provide a descriptive analysis of the mirative lá and the reportative jini, multiple previous examples and new sentences are analyzed based on the opinions of native speakers of Navajo.

The quotative “á-+inflected form of dishni...inflected form of dishni” is discussed along with the reportative jini because they are very closely related. These examples are then analyzed based on the typological analysis of evidentials by Aikhenvald (2004). Then the position of the reportative jini, the quotative and the mirative lá are compared, and the relative position of jini and lá is used to check the predictions of mood projections made by Cinque (1999). Some examples in other languages are chosen to support the claims.
the Reportative jini and the Quotative

4.1 the Origin and Distribution of jini

According to De Haan (2008: 72), sometimes jini is used as a quotative marker that consists of two morphemes, ji- “4th person singular” and -ni ‘say’. Willie (1991: 144) asserts that a quotative should not be used when someone is reporting his or her own actions. The possible reason might be that when a quotative is used, the speaker only reports what he or she has heard of and is not responsible for the validity of the statement (Willie 1996: 332). In addition, De Haan (2008: 72) claims that jini is also used when a statement is “outside the speaker’s personal experience”.

It is important to distinguish the reportative jini from the speech verb jini. When jini is a reportative, it does not incorporate a certain subject prefix. Willie (1991: 115) uses two examples to demonstrate their difference:

(4) (a) 'ashkii lá'i 'at'ééd bli joo'aash-go náhodi'i'nil
boy a girl 3sg-with 4sgS-walking when 4sg-picked up-pl
lá jini. EMPH REP

“(I heard) some boy was walking with a girl when they were picked up.”
(Willie 1991: 115)

(b) 'ashkii 'at'ééd yi'l yi'ash-go nábi'dii'nil
boy girl 3sg-with 3duS-walk when 3-picked up-pl
lá jini. EMPH 4sgS-say

“That person told me that a boy and (a) girl were picked up while walking.”

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6 De Haan (2008) uses quotative as an alternative term for reportative and therefore does not distinguish quotatives from reportatives.

7 Willie (1991, 1996) also uses quotative as an alternative term for reportative and does not distinguish quotatives from reportatives.
Willie (1991: 115, 116) states that *jini* in example (4a) above is a reportative that marks indirect information received by the speaker of the sentence, and the source of information is not a specific speaker, but a previous conversation, radio program or even a newspaper. It also indicates that the speaker is not responsible for the validity of the reported event. Thus, the reportative *jini* marks unverified reported speech delivered in various media.

In example (4b), however, *jini* is an inflected form of the speech verb *dishni* and has a clear referent, so it is not a reportative, and using the 4th person rather than the 3rd person pronominal prefix here is a polite way to refer to someone else present at the conversation (1991: 115, 116).

Usually *jini* is translated to “he says” or “someone says” as a speech verb and “they say”, “it is said (that)” or “reportedly” as a reportative.

As a reportative, *jini* marks both hearsays and narrations:

(5)  
(a) mą'ii yiildlosh jini.  
    coyote 3sgS-walking REP  
    “(I hear) that there is a coyote around here.” (Willie 1991: 117)

(b) mą'ii jooldloosh jini.  
    coyote 4sgS-walking REP:NARR  
    “Once upon a time there was this coyote walking along...” (Willie 1991: 117)

(5a) is a hearsay while (5b) is a narration. Both are marked by *jini*, so Navajo uses the same evidential to mark hearsay and narration.

4.2 Basic Person and Point of View Features in Navajo Discourse Complements
Based on her research in Slave, a northern Athabaskan language, Rice (1986: 63) asserts: “the complement of a direct discourse verb is interpreted from the point of view of the subject of this verb while the complement of an indirect discourse verb is interpreted from the point of view of the discourse speaker”. In Navajo, the speech verb *dishni* (and its inflected forms) can take both direct and indirect discourse complements. The discourse complement of *dishni* “I say” always follows the point of view of the speaker because in this case the speaker and the subject of the root clause are the same person.

The following examples show constraints on the coreference and point of view for interpretation in discourse complements of *dishni* and its inflected forms in all four persons.

### 4.2.1 Discourse Complement of *dini*

In examples (6), (7) and (8), the 2nd person singular subject prefix of *dini* “you say” refers to the hearer of the utterance.

(6)  
(a) naashnish        dini.  
     1sgS-work-IMP/3sgS-work-P  2sgS-say-NI  
Reading 1: You say I am working.  
          Reading 2: You say/said he worked/had worked.

(b) bi naashnish      dini.  
     3sg  3sgS-work-P  2sgS-say-NI  
You said he had worked.

(Irene Silentman, p.c.\(^8\), October 13, 2015 & November 6, 2015)

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\(^8\) p.c.: Personal Contact
According to my consultant, (6a) is ambiguous without further context. *Naashnish* means “work” with either the 1st person singular subject in imperfective aspect or the 3rd person singular subject in perfective aspect. It means either “the hearer said that the speaker is working” or “the hearer said another person had worked”. If we add an independent pronoun like the 3rd person singular pronoun *bi* in (6b), the sentence will no longer be ambiguous. Thus the ambiguity in (6) emerges from the different inflected forms of the verb *naashnish*. This type of ambiguity needs to be noted here, but Section 4.2 mainly concerns the type of ambiguity that emerges from different possible points of view shown in (7a):

(7) (a) Mary says to Bob: “nishishnish dini.”

\[\text{1sgS-work-P 2sgS-say-NI}\]

Reading 1: Mary says to Bob: “you said I had worked.”
Reading 2: Mary says to Bob: “you said you had worked.”

(Irene Silentman, p.c.9, October 13, 2015 & November 6, 2015 & December 2, 2015)

(b) Hahgolá 'éiyá\(^{10}\) nihaa náádíídaáál

(+ni’=now let’s see) when yet again-1sgIO.2sgS-come-IMP

dashidohnii ni’\(^{11}\)?

DSTR-1sgIO.2plS-say-NI recalled to mind

“When was it that you (plr) said for me to come to see you again?”

(Young & Morgan 1980: 394)

Example (7a) has two readings, because the 1st person pronominal prefix in the embedded verb *nishishnish* “I had worked” can refer to either the speaker or the hearer. If *nishishnish* is a direct discourse complement, then, from the point of view of the hearer, the referent of the 2nd person pronominal prefix in *dini* “you said”, the 1st person pronominal

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\(^{9}\) p.c.: Personal Contact

\(^{10}\) *haalá t’aá ‘éiyá(+verb) ni’* means “now let’s see” (Young & Morgan 1980: 427).

\(^{11}\) *ni’* by itself “connotes an action or event that is recalled to mind” (Young & Morgan 1980: 637).
prefix refers to the hearer. If *nishishnish* is an indirect discourse complement, on the other hand, the 1st person pronominal prefix refers to the speaker. Thus (7a) shows that *dini* can take both direct and indirect discourse complements.

The 1st person indirect object prefix often needs to be added to the matrix verb when the speaker of the sentence specifically talks about something that the hearer once said to him or her. In this case, the words of the hearer are reported by direct speech. In (7b), for example, the matrix verb *dashidohnii* “you (plr) said to/for me” has a 1st person indirect object prefix and a 2nd person plural subject prefix. The persons of the indirect object prefix and subject prefix in *dashidohnii* are determined from the perspective of the speaker of the whole sentence. The embedded verb *náádiidáát* “you come to me again”, on the other hand, has a 2nd person subject prefix and a 1st person indirect object prefix, and the person of these two arguments are determined from the perspective of the speaker of *náádiidáát* “you come to me again”, which is the hearer of the whole sentence.

### 4.2.2 Discourse Complement of *nį*

Speas generalizes that the Direct Discourse Complement structure in Navajo resembles the direct discourse in English because it does not have a complementizer and its certain agreement features show reference to the point of view of “the subject of the sentence”, not “the speaker of the utterance” (Speas 2000: 19). One significant difference between a reported speech and a Navajo direct discourse complement is that the person in reported speech in general is determined from an external (speaker of the sentence) point of view while that in Navajo direct discourse complement is determined from an internal (subject of the clause) point of view (2000: 29).
The phrase *chidi nahálñiī’ “I bought a car”* is the direct discourse complement within sentence (8). In English, the indirect speech should be “John says he bought a car”, in which the 3rd person singular pronoun “he” refers to John, but in Navajo, the verb *nahálñiī’ “I bought it”* incorporates a 1st person singular subject, as expected in direct speech in English.

In (9a), the English sentence has the syntactic structure John told Mary, [PRO to buy a car] in which the PRO co-indexes with Mary, while the embedded verb *nahidiilñihi* in the Navajo sentence incorporates 2nd person singular subject in its prefix. The person here is 2nd person from John’s perspective, not the speaker of the utterance’s.

In (9b), however, the 2nd person singular subject in *díinááł “you should go”* can refer to either the hearer of the discourse complement *díinááł* or the hearer of the whole sentence.
According to Speas (2000: 21), in example (10) the pronominal prefixes in *ndoolnish* and *ni* must have disjoint reference because they are both in 3rd person.

\[(11) \quad jidoogáál \ ní.\]
\[
\text{4sgS-arrive} \quad 3\text{sgS-say-NI} \\
\text{“He, said that personj will come.” (Willie 1991: 145)}
\]

When the subject prefix in the embedded verb *jidoogáál* is in 4th person and that in the matrix verb *ni* is in 3rd person, they must also have disjoint reference (1991: 145). Thus, the subject prefix in the matrix verb *ni* and that in the embedded verb can only have a coreferential reading when the embedded verb is in 1st person. The referent of the 1st person subject prefix in the embedded verb, however, remains ambiguous, because in the other reading it can refer to the speaker of the sentence (Irene Silentman, p.c., n.d.).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Person</th>
<th>Non-evidential Reading</th>
<th>Perspective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Embedded Verb</td>
<td>Matrix/Root Verb (<em>ni</em>)</td>
<td>Coreferential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.2.2 Person, Coreference and Perspective in Discourse Complement of *ni*

Table 4.2.2 provides a generalization of person, coreference and perspective in a sentence with *ni* and its discourse complement. The 1st person subject prefix in the embedded verb and the 3rd person subject prefix in the matrix verb *ni* can be coreferential from the perspective of the subject of the matrix verb *ni* and can be non-coreferential from the
perspective of the speaker. The 2nd person subject prefix in the embedded verb can refer to either the hearer of the utterance from the perspective of the speaker or the hearer of the direct discourse complement from the perspective of the subject of the matrix verb *ni*. Neither the 3rd person nor the 4th person subject prefix in an embedded verb can be coreferential with the 3rd person subject prefix in the matrix verb *ni*, and it’s hard to tell from whose perspective the person in the embedded verb is determined.

4.2.3 Discourse Complement of *jini*

This section introduces the role of *jini* in sentences. Each sentence below embeds only one discourse complement.

(12) deeshááł jini.
1sgS-arrive-F 4sgS-say-N1
“That person said that he would go.” (Willie 1991: 144)

The person of *jini* “that person said” in (12) could actually be interpreted as a 3rd person that politely refers to someone present (1991: 116) and the 1st person subject prefix in *deeshááł* “I will go” must be coreferential with the 4th person subject prefix in *jini*.

(13) (a) diínáát jini.
2sgS-arrive-F REP
“It is said that you should go.” (Willie 1991: 147)

(b) diínáát nijini.
2sgS-arrive-F 2sgIO.4sgS-say-NI
“That person said (of you) that you should go.” (Willie 1991: 147)
In (13a), \textit{jini} must be a reportative, and the only way to express the idea “that person said that the hearer should go” is to say (13b) (1991: 147). When someone says (13b), he or she might not be informed, and \textit{diin\text{"a}l} “you should go” is just the intention of the referent of the 4\textsuperscript{th} person in \textit{nijini} (1991: 147). This referent should be clear in context and the subject of \textit{diin\text{"a}l} is the hearer (1991: 147). Both (13a) and (13b) allow only a single reading.

Sometimes it is difficult to tell whether \textit{jini} is intended as a speech verb or a reportative without the context, as shown in the example below:

(14) \textit{doog\text{"a}l jini.}

\begin{tabular}{ll}
3\textsuperscript{sg}S-arrive-IMP & 4\textsuperscript{sg}S-say-NI/REP \\
Reading 1: “That person\textsubscript{i} said he\textsubscript{j} will come.” \\
Reading 2: “It is said that he\textsubscript{j} will come.” & (Willie 1991: 144)
\end{tabular}

According to Willie (1991: 145), both readings for (14) are possible, so the sentence in example (14) is ambiguous. In Reading 1, in which \textit{jini} is a speech verb, the 3\textsuperscript{rd} person subject of the embedded verb \textit{doog\text{"a}l} and the 4\textsuperscript{th} person subject of the matrix verb \textit{jini} are not coreferential.

(15) \textit{jidoog\text{"a}l jini.}

\begin{tabular}{ll}
4\textsuperscript{sg}S-arrive-F & 4\textsuperscript{sg}S-say-NI/REP \\
Reading 1: “He\textsubscript{i} said that he\textsubscript{j} would come.” \\
Reading 2: “They say that person will come.” & (Willie 1991: 145)
\end{tabular}

The sentence is also ambiguous when both the speech verb and the embedded verb are in 4\textsuperscript{th} person. As shown in (15), one can’t tell whether \textit{jini} has a specific reference or is impersonal without knowing the context.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Person</th>
<th>Non-evidential Reading</th>
<th>Perspective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Embedded</td>
<td>Matrix/Root</td>
<td>Coreferential</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Table 4.2.3 Person, Coreference and Perspective in Discourse Complement of *jini*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Verb</th>
<th>Verb (<em>jini</em>)</th>
<th>Coreferential</th>
<th>Verb</th>
<th>Coreferential</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
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</tr>
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<td>4</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>Unclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.2.3 provides a generalization of person, coreference and perspective in a sentence with *jini* and its discourse complement. Evidential readings are always interpreted from the point of view of the speaker of the whole sentence and the columns under “Perspective” show the perspectives from which non-evidential readings are obtained.

The 1st person subject prefix in the embedded verb and the 4th person subject prefix in the matrix verb *jini* must be coreferential, and this 1st person subject prefix cannot refer to the speaker. The 2nd person subject prefix in the embedded verb cannot refer to the hearer of the utterance from the perspective of the speaker unless a 2nd person indirect object prefix is added to the matrix verb. Without the indirect object prefix, *jini* is a reportative and this 2nd person subject prefix can only refer to the hearer of the direct discourse complement. Neither the 3rd person nor the 4th person subject prefix can be coreferential with the 4th person subject prefix in the matrix verb *ni*, and it’s also hard to tell from whose perspective is the person in the embedded verb determined.

### 4.2.4 the Quotative and Direct Quotation

As shown in Section 4.2.2, the inflected forms of *dishni* can take both direct and indirect discourse complements. The quoted speech between *ani* and *ni*, however, should be a direct quotation (Shorty 2012). Also, the major difference between a reportative and a
quotative is that a quotative specifies “the exact author of the quoted report” while a reportative does not (Aikhenvald 2004: 177):

(16) Asdzą ani, Albuquerquegóó woman 3sgS-say thus:Q-NI Albuquerquegóó deekai, ní. 1plS-go-IMP 3sgS-say-NI “That woman says, ‘we are going to Albuquerque, she says.” (Shorty 2012)

In (16), for example, the quotation Albuquerquegóó deekai “we are going to Albuquerque” is a direct quotation, as the 1st person plural subject in Albuquerquegóó deekai refers to the subject of the root clause and her companions. Both the first ní in ani and the second ní at the end of the sentence incorporate a 3rd person subject prefix that refers to asdzą, so the source of information is specified.

Examples in Section 4.3 show that the morpheme (-)ni in both ani and ní can be replaced by other inflected forms of dishni, so I would generalize the structure of the quotative as “a-+inflected form of dishni...inflected form of dishni”.

The monoclausal quotative construction “a-+inflected form of dishni...inflected form of dishni” might have been evolved from the merging of two clauses12.

(17) (a) Mary áni, "gohwéeh likan" ní

12 A detailed investigation of the origin of this quotative is beyond the scope of this thesis, but the deduction follows theories promoted by Harris & Campbell (1995). Harris & Campbell (1995: 171) presents the “universals of the quotation-to-quotative transition in languages with hypotactic structure”, and asserts that biclausal quotations become monoclausal quotations following these steps: “(a) The two clauses of the hypotactic quotation construction become a single clause. (b) No argument of the “say” clause becomes an argument of the output structure. (c) A quotative particle is formed from some combination of the following: (i) the verb “say”, (ii) its subject, (iii) the pronoun “it,” and (iv) the complementizer.” The quotative construction in Navajo might have formed from á-, (i) and (ii) but the function of á- “thus” is not very clear, so this is just a conjecture.
Mary says: 

Mary says: “the coffee is sweet.”

(b) *Mary áni, "gohwééh likan"

Mary says: “the coffee is sweet.”

(c) Mary "gohwééh likan" ni

Mary says: “the coffee is sweet.”

As shown in (17), both “á-+inflected form of dishni” and “the inflected form of dishni” has to be present to construct a quotation, and there is agreement in person between their inflected parts. Since ni “he says” itself can take a discourse complement and it would be ungrammatical to have only áni “he says thus” in a sentence, I argue that “á-+inflected form of dishni” is a speech verb that also serves as a quotative.

(18) (a) nwg nug kuv (has) tas koj nyob qhov-twg

“He asked me where you are staying.” (Li 1988: 3)

(b) Tuam tas nwg nkeeg-nkeeg

“Tuam said that he was very tired.” (Li 1988: 3)

In Green Hmong, for example, the quotative tas has the same form as the speech verb tas (Harris 1995: 171; Li 1988: 3). In (18a) tas is a quotative, but in (18b), tas is the speech verb “say”.

(Irene Silentman, p.c., December 6, 2015)
4.3  the Reportative *jini* and the Quotative in Complex Discourse Structures

This section provides a descriptive analysis for the pragmatic function of the reportative *jini* in sentences with multiple embedded discourse complements.

According to Rice (1986: 63), “the complement of a direct discourse verb (in Slave) is interpreted from the point of view of interpretation required by the immediately dominating verb”. I expected this to also characterize the change in person and point of view in embedded discourse complements in Navajo, but the presence of *jini* seems to enable the innermost embedded complement to be interpreted from the point of view of the speaker of the whole sentence or the subject of the root clause.

The effect of *jini* is especially versatile when it appears in the sentence with multiple embedded discourse complements. When a sentence has multiple embedded discourse complements, two reportatives *jini* are added. The multiple *jini* in examples of Sections 4.3.1-3 function as reportatives, not speech verbs, because their presence is strongly preferred but not obligatory, and they show no specific referent. More specifically, I argue that the *jini* attached at the end of a sentence, like the *jini* in 4.2.3, marks that the information the sentence conveys is secondhand information, while the *jini* attached to the first part of a quotative “á-* +inflected form of *dishni*” indicates that the speaker is not responsible for the content of other people’s speech.

Examples from other languages show that when a reportative appears within the discourse complement of a speech verb, it could mark secondhand information. In Cupeño, for example:

(19)  
\[Yax-qal=am \quad ichaa'i=ku'ut \quad \text{miyax-we}\]  
\[\text{say-PIS-MIR} \quad \text{good-REP} \quad \text{be-PRST}\]
“He says it is good news.” (Faye field notes 4-6-27 23 (267)\(^{13}\); Hill 2005: 65)

In contrast with the mirative *am*, which also marks firsthand information, *ku’ut* marks the secondhand information in the discourse complement (Hill 2005: 65). Hill also asserts that in this case *ku’ut* indicates that the speaker is not responsible for the validity of the news.

Example (19) has, however, only one discourse complement. Hence I argue that it is possible that when a sentence has multiple embedded discourse complements, the *jini* attached to the first part of a quotative “á-+inflected form of dishni” also marks thirdhand information. Secondhand hearsay should be a type of thirdhand evidence, because hearsay itself is already a type of secondhand information.

The speech verbs in both root clauses and matrix\(^{14}\) clauses of the examples in 4.3.1-3 below are in 3\(^{rd}\) person, and the embedded verbs vary in person. It is also worth noticing that in examples of Section 4.2.3, *jini* always appears at the end of the sentence, but in examples (20)-(24) it can also appear within a discourse complement in the middle of a sentence.

Based on the examples, I assert that the reportative *jini* in Navajo not only marks reported speech and secondary information like *ku’ut* in Cupéño, but also marks thirdhand information and indicates or emphasizes that the speaker who utter the sentence is not responsible for the validity of the content of other people’s speech.

4.3.1 Examples with Speech verbs in 3\(^{rd}\) Person and Embedded Verb in 1\(^{st}\) Person

\(^{13}\) A note on the source: “Where the source is from Paul-Louis Faye’s materials, collected in 1920-1921 and 1927, the sentence is labeled “Faye,” with additional identification (such as a text name), and either my own page number or line number (or both) in my photocopy of his notes and the number of the example in my Shoebox database” (Hill 2005: xvii).

\(^{14}\) In Section 4.3, the term *matrix clause* only denotes the clause that embeds the (innermost) embedded clause and is embedded in the root clause.
In example (20), the subject of őn “says” is Bob, the subject of őshîlnî “he says of me thus” and őn “says” is John and that of dishnî “I say” is šî, which refers to Mary. The indirect object of őshîlnî “he says of me” is also Mary. According to my consultant, dishnî “I say” must be added when the speaker speaks of himself or herself (Irene Silentman, p.c., November 10, 2015).

The first reportative šînî possibly marks that the information in the embedded clause šî ’aghaa’ yîilchii’ dishnî “I said I had dyed some wool red” is thirdhand and that the speaker is not responsible for what John has said. The second reportative šînî is attached to the end of this sentence, possibly indicating that the sentence is a reported speech that also provides secondhand information from Mary.

The 1st person independent pronoun šî as well as the 1st person pronominal prefix in the embedded transitive verb yîilchii’ “I have dyed...red” can only refer to Mary, the speaker of this sentence. It can refer to neither Bob, the subject of the root clause, nor John, the subject of the matrix clause.

---

12 [Context]
Mary, says: “John said that I had worked”.

(b) Mary áni 3sgS-say thus-NI John áni 3sgS-say thus:Q-NI REP 1sg 'aghaa' yiilchii' dishni ni jini.
wool 3sgO.1sgS-dye red-P 1sgS-say-NI 3sgS-say-NI jini.
REP
Mary, says: “John said that I had dyed some wool red”.

(Irene Silentman, p.c., November 10, 2015)

In example (21a) and (21b), the subject of the first áni “says” is Mary, the subject of the second áni “says” and ni “says” is John and that of dishni “I say” is shi “I”, which refers to Mary. Similar to example (20), dishni “I say” must be added because Mary, the subject of the matrix/root clause, mentions herself in a direct discourse complement.

In (21a), the first reportative jini possibly marks that the information in the embedded clause shi nishishnish dishni “I said I had worked” is thirdhand and that the speaker is not responsible for what John has said, and the second reportative jini is attached to the end of this sentence, possibly indicating that the sentence is a reported speech that also presents secondhand information from Mary.

Both the 1st person independent pronoun shi and the 1st person pronominal prefix in the embedded intransitive verb nishishnish “I have worked” refer to Mary, the subject of the root clause, not John, the subject of the embedded clause.

Example (21b) shows a similar structure, so the coreference between the subject of the embedded clause and that of the matrix or root clause is not affected by whether the embedded verb is transitive or not when the subject of the embedded verb is in 1st person.
4.3.2 Examples with Speech verbs in 3rd Person and Embedded Verb in 2nd Person

(22) (a) [I say to Mary:]“Bob ání John ání
Bob 3sgS-say thus-NI John 3sgS-say thus:Q-NI
jini ni nishinilnish ni jini.”
REP 2sg 2sgS-work-P 3sgS-say-NI REP
[I say to Mary:]“Bob says that John said YOUi had worked.”

(b) [I say to Mary:]“Bob ání John ání
Bob 3sgS-say thus-NI John 3sgS-say thus:Q-NI
jini ni aghaa’ yinitchii’ ni jini.”
REP 2sg wool 3sg0.2sgS-work-P 3sgS-say-NI REP
[I say to Mary:]“Bob says that John said YOUi had dyed some wool red.”

(Irene Silentman, p.c., November 6, 2015)

In example (22a) and (22b), the subject of the first ání “says” is Bob, the subject of the second ání “says” and ni “says” is John. In these two examples dishni “I say” does not need to be added because the speaker of the sentence is talking about the hearer of the sentence, not himself or herself.

In example (22a), the first reportative jini possibly marks the thirdhand information about the event in the embedded clause ni nishinilnish “you had worked” and indicates that the speaker is not responsible for the validity of what John has said, and the second reportative jini is attached to the end of this sentence, possibly indicating that the sentence also conveys secondhand information from Bob.

Both the 2nd person independent pronoun ni and the 2nd person pronominal prefix in the embedded intransitive verb nishinilnish “you have worked” refers to Mary, the hearer.
(22b) has a similar structure, so the coreference between the subject of the embedded clause and that of the matrix or root clause is not affected by whether the embedded verb is transitive or not when the subject of the embedded verb is in 2nd person.

4.3.3 Examples with Speech verbs in 3rd Person and Embedded Verb in 3rd Person

The meaning of the following sentences might be expressed in different ways, and these examples are some of the acceptable constructions.

(23) (a) Bob ání John ání jiní
Bob 3sgS-say thus-NI John 3sgS-say thus:Q-NI REP
bi naashnish ní jiní.
3sg 3sgS-work-P 3sgS-say-NI REP

(b) Bob ání John ání jiní
Bob 3sgS-say thus-NI John 3sgS-say thus:Q-NI REP
bi naashnish shilni jiní.
3sg 3sgS-work-P 1sgO.3sgS-say-NI REP
Bob3 says that John said he3 had worked.

(Irene Silentman, p.c., November 6, 2015)

In examples (23a) and (23b), the embedded verb is transitive. The subject of the first ání “says” is Bob, the subject of the second ání “says” and ní “says” or shilni “he says of me” is John. In these two examples dishni “I say” does not need to be added because although the subject of the root clause talks about himself, the first discourse complement is an indirect discourse complement. According to my consultant, both (23a) and (23b) are acceptable.

In example (23a), it is possible that the first reportative jini marks the thirdhand information in the embedded clause bi naashnish “he had worked” and indicates that the
speaker is not responsible for the validity of what John has said. The second reportative *jini* attached to the end of this sentence could indicate that the sentence is a reported speech that also provides secondhand information from Bob.

Both the 3rd person independent pronoun *bi* and the 3rd person pronominal prefix in the embedded intransitive verb *naashnish* “he has worked” refer to Bob, the subject of the root clause.

The only difference between (23a) and (23b) is that (23b) has the verb *shilni* “he says of me” instead of *ni* “he says”. The 1st person indirect object in verb *shilni* “he says of me” refers to Bob, which makes it coreferential with the 3rd person independent pronoun *bi* and the 3rd person pronominal prefix in the embedded intransitive verb *naashnish* “he has worked”.

(24) (a) Bob áni John áni jini
    Bob 3sgS-say thus-NI John 3sgS-say thus:Q-NI REP
    hó 'aghaa' jiilchii' ni jini.
    4sgS wool 4sgS-dye red-P 3sgS-say-NI REP
    Bob says that John said he had dyed some wool red.

(b) Bob áni John áni jini
    Bob 3sgS-say thus-NI John 3sgS-say thus:Q-NI REP
    t'áá hó 'aghaa' jiilchii' ni jini.
    just 4sgS wool 4sgS-dye red-P 3sgS-say-NI REP
    Bob says that John said he had dyed some wool red.

(Irene Silentman, p.c., November 6, 2015)

In examples (24a) and (24b), the embedded verbs are intransitive. The subject of the first *áni* “says” is Bob, the subject of the second *áni* “says” and *ni* “says” is John. In these two examples *dishni* “I say” does not need to be added because although the subject of the
root clause talks about himself, the first discourse complement is an indirect discourse complement.

In example (24a), the first reportative jini probably marks that the information in the embedded clause hó 'aghaa'jiilchii”“he, had worked” is thirdhand and that the speaker is not responsible for the validity of what John has said. The second reportative jini attached to the end of this sentence indicates that the sentence is a reported speech that also provides secondhand information.

Both the 4th person independent pronoun hó and the 4th person pronominal prefix in the embedded intransitive verb 'aghaa'jiilchii” “he has dyed some wool red” refers to Bob, the subject of the root clause.

The only difference between (24a) and (24b) is that hó, the subject of the embedded clause in (24a), refers to Bob, the subject of the root clause, while (t’áá) hó, the subject of the embedded clause in (24b), refers to John, the subject of the matrix clause.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Embedded Verb</th>
<th>Matrix</th>
<th>Root</th>
<th>Coreference (between the subjects of)</th>
<th>Perspective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Embedded and Matrix V</td>
<td>Embedded and Root V</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.3.3: Person, Coreference and Perspective in Discourse Complement of jini

As shown in Table 4.3.3, the discourse complement is interpreted from the perspective of the subject of the root verb or that of the speaker when the embedded verb is in 1st person and can only be interpreted from the perspective of the speaker when the embedded verb is in
2nd person. Also, when the reportative *jini* follows the quotative *ání*, the subject of the embedded clause cannot be coreferential with that of the matrix clause, but all except the 2nd person could be coreferential with the subject of the root clause.

5 The Mirative Enclitic *lá*

5.1 The Origin and Distribution of *lá*

The meaning of the enclitic *lá* varies according to the context, but usually it could be translated as “I find”, “I found”, or “I discovered” to show that “the idea which it modifies has just occurred to one, just been discovered, or just been brought to one’s attention” (Young & Morgan 2000: 305).

In his survey of Athabaskan languages, De Haan (2008: 79) notices that –*la* and particles containing –*la* appear in multiple languages as inferential evidentials. He deduces that –*la* possibly comes from *-*la, a morpheme that marks inference in proto-Athabaskan languages (De Haan 2008: 79). Another possible origin of –*la* might be a verb that means “to be”, because *yilà* “there was” is likely an origin of the inferential evidential in Sarcee, another Athabaskan language (Cook 1984: 35; De Haan 2008: 79).

According to De Haan (2008: 73), the particle *lá* can be interpreted as an inferential evidential with a mirative connotation in the following example from Willie (1996: 343):

(25) Ján t’áá 'añii diné nilí lá.
    John just true Navajo 3sgS-be INFR
    “John is really a Navajo.” (Willie 1996: 343)
If we interpret là as an inferential evidential, the source of information of J̲a̲a̲n t'ú̲á̲ J̲á̲a̲n i̲n̲i̲i̲ d̲in̲é̲ n̲i̲l̲í̲ "John is a Navajo" should be indirect. If là has a mirative overtone, then the speaker does not expect the fact that "John is a Navajo".

Contrary to part of De Haan's claim, I argue that là is a mirative enclitic that is often attached to the end of a statement to mark the sudden realization of a fact by the speaker or the subject of the sentence, regardless of the source of information of the statement.

In languages like Yukaghir, a mirative extension is only allowed to occur with "one semantically defined subclass of verbs" (Aikhenvald 2004: 198). My examples show that là in Navajo can occur with many different types of verbs, including various sense verbs and verbs that convey daily activities.

Aikhenvald (2004: 199) also argues that the mirative extension of evidentials in some languages can be used to mark the surprise of not only the speaker but also the hearer of a sentence. In Navajo là only marks the surprise of the speaker or the subject of the sentence, not that of the hearer. In addition, when là marks the change in personal experience, its use is to some extent arbitrary.

5.2 là and Person and Point of View

Although some languages use the mirative overtone of non-firsthand evidentials to mark the surprise of the hearer, most languages only associate this type of overtone with the speaker, or, in other words, the 1st person subject (Aikhenvald 2004: 197, 199, 220). Aikhenvald (2004: 220) claims that "if one of the participants is ‘I’, a non-firsthand or a non-visual evidential may gain a range of additional meanings...linked to overtones of new information, unprepared mind, and surprise.” The mirative overtone is developed because it is illogical for the speaker of a sentence to talk about his or her own experience using non-
firsthand evidentials (2004: 220). Since the mirative interpretation of lá is associated with either a 1st or a 3rd person subject, it is unlikely that the mirative interpretation of lá is derived from an inferential evidential as an overtone:

(26) John naashnish=igií yiiltsá lá.  
John 3sgS-work=P=the one 3sgO.1sgS-see-P MIR  
I (suddenly) saw John working.  

(Irene Silentman, p.c., November 13, 2015)

The subject of example (26) is “I”, the speaker of the sentence. The speaker suddenly noticed that John naashnish=igií “John was working”.

(27) Bob John 'aghaa' yiilyilchii=igií  
Bob John wool 3sgO.3sgS-dye-red-P=the one  
yiiltsá lá.  
3sgO.3sgS-see-P MIR  
Reading 1: Bob (suddenly) saw John dyeing some wool.  
Reading 2: (The speaker is surprised that) Bob saw John dyeing some wool.  

(Irene Silentman, p.c., November 13, 2015)

In the second reading of example (27), the subject is in 3rd person singular. The mirative lá indicates that the subject Bob suddenly noticed that John 'aghaa' yiilyilchii=igií “John was dyeing some wool”.

The mirative enclitic lá in both examples (26) and (27) can be translated as “suddenly” and it conveys the meaning of gaining new knowledge (Irene Silentman, p.c., November 13, 2015). It indicates that the speaker is surprised when the subject of the sentence is in 1st person, and that the speaker or the subject of the sentence is surprised when the subject of the
sentence is in 3rd person. Therefore, when the subject is in 3rd person, the sentence is ambiguous, but usually the context will make the intended meaning clear.

When the subject is in 2nd person, lá marks that the speaker, rather than the subject, is surprised:

(28) nishishnish=ígí yiníłtsáá lá.
1sgS-work-P=the one 3sgO.2sgS-see-P MIR
(Hey) you saw my work! (Irene Silentman, p.c., November 13, 2015)

The sentence in (28) means that the speaker is surprised to notice the fact that nishishnishígíi yiníłtsáá “you saw my work”, in which the 2nd person pronominal prefix in yiníłtsáá denotes the hearer. Thus the mirative enclitic lá cannot convey the meaning that the hearer is surprised when the subject of the sentence is in 2nd person.

When the subject is in 4th person, lá also marks that the speaker is surprised, as it does when the subject is in 1st and 2nd person:

(29) lįį bichįį bızhdįlnihgo ‘ayıoo yilzholi
horse 3-nose 3sgO.4sgS-feel-CI very 3-soft/downy
lčh (lá).
usually (MIR)
“When one feels a horse’s nose, it is usually very soft.”

The original sentence in (29) does not have lá. My consultant agreed that lá could be added if the speaker is surprised at the fact that lįį bichįį bızhdįlnihgo ‘ayıoo yilzholi “when one feels a horse’s nose, it is usually very soft” (Perkins & Fernald, 2014: 273; Irene

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16 This work does not have page numbers so the example numbers are used instead.
Silentman, p.c., November 13, 2015). The new sentence does not convey the meaning that “when one feels a horse’s nose, one is usually surprised that it is very soft”.

5.3 *lā* and Sensory Expressions

As previously mentioned (in Section 5.1), De Haan (2008: 73) argues that *lā* is an inferential evidential with a mirative overtone, but the following examples contradict part of his claim:

(30) (a) John naashnīsh=įgįį yiiltsą lā.
John 3sgS-work-P=the one 3sgO.1sgS-see-P MIR.
I (suddenly) saw John’s work.

(b) Shiiltsą lā.
1sgO.3sgS-see-P MIR
He (suddenly) saw me.

In both (30a) and (30b), *lā* could be translated as “suddenly” (Irene Silentman, p.c., November 13, 2015). The verbs yiiltsą “I saw him” in (30a) and shiiltsą “he saw me” in (30b) indicate that the subjects of (30a) and (30b) had acquired new knowledge from visual evidence.

Another example below shows that *lā* can also co-occur with auditory evidence:

(31) John Bob yáltigo yidiizts’ąq’ lā.
John Bob 3sgS-talk-IMP 3sgO.3sgS-hear-P MIR
John heard Bob talking!

(Irene Silentman, p.c., November 13, 2015)
Since auditory and visual evidence are classified as direct evidence by De Haan (2008: 76), the presence of the enclitic lá in (30) and (31) shows that lá is not exclusively used to mark indirect evidence.

In addition, it is true that the enclitic lá can be used when indirect evidence is present, but there are limitations (as discussed in 5.5). Although De Haan (2008: 76) does not classify the senses “touch”, “taste” and “feel” as direct evidence, these senses contribute to the speaker’s own experience:

(32) Bee da'dilti'igií bidinishnií ti'téé'
    electric light bulb 3sgO.1sgS-touch-P PAST
    ’ayóo sido lá.
    very 3sgS-to be hot-IMP MIR
    “I touched the light bulb and found it to be very hot.”
    (Young & Morgan 1980: 179)

In example (32), lá appears with sensory evidence obtained via bidinishnií “I touched it”, and this evidence comes from the speaker’s own action of “touching”.

(33) Díí baáah likání ’ayóo ’áhálniíh lá.
    this bread sweet delicious MIR
    “This sweet bread is delicious.”
    (Young & Morgan 1980: 38)

As shown in example (33), lá can also appear when the evidence of a statement comes from “tasting”. The sentence implies that “there is a sweet bread” and the speaker, who is also “the person to taste it”, “doesn’t know how it would taste” and then finds out that the bread is sweet after tasting it (Irene Silentman, p.c., November 10, 2015). My consultant also suggests that by adding lá, the speaker highlights new knowledge gained and the sentence can
be translated as “it is so that this bread is delicious” (Irene Silentman, p.c., November 10, 2015). Without lá, the sentence does not indicate that the speaker is surprised.

Furthermore, lá can mark the speaker’s sudden realization of a certain emotion:

(34) Shitsii’ bidíshnihgo shił nízhóni (lá).

1-hair 3sgO.1sgS-feel-CI 1-with 3-good (MIR)

“I like feeling my hair.”


The original sentence in (34) does not have lá. After lá has been added, the meaning of the sentence changes to “I became aware that I like feeling my hair” (Irene Silentman, p.c., November 13, 2015). According to my consultant, the sentence with lá makes sense although the situation it describes is a bit “strange” (Irene Silentman, p.c., November 13, 2015).

Since lá can co-occur with either direct or indirect evidence, it does not exclusively mark indirect sources of information. The subjects of examples (30)-(34) have different sources of information, but in each of these examples, lá marks a sudden discovery that contributes to the subject’s personal experience epistemically, which indicates that it is a mirative enclitic, not an inferential evidential.

5.4 lá and Negation

Like evidentials in most languages (as mentioned in Section 2.1), the mirative enclitic lá is not in the scope of negation particles. Many different negation particles can, however, appear within the scope of lá. These negation particles often appear when a speaker finds out something contrary to his or her expectations.
Whenever the previous assumption is unexpectedly proved to be incorrect and the discovery contrary to expectation is explicitly indicated, lá appears at the end of the sentence, regardless of which negation particle is used or whether the negation particle is present or not.

In example (35) above, the negation particle doo...da is used, and baa honeeni “(I) have fun with (the book)” is within its scope. In this sentence, the presence of lá indicates that the speaker is surprised by the negation of what is within the scope of the negation particle doo...da.

In example (36), the negation particle nda-ga’ negates the whole sentence except the mirative enclitic lá. Naaltsoos baa honeeni “the book is fun” is within the scope of nda-ga’ but lá is not.

When there is no negation particle present, but the contradiction is explicitly shown by both the fact and the expectation presented, lá can also be used, as in:
In example (37), the speaker does not expect *dii mási* “this cat” to be *tlizi* “a goat”, and thus uses *lā* to show the unexpectedness. The particle *nt'ée* indicates that *dii mási atée nisin* “I thought this was a cat” happens before the speaker finds out that *tlizi at'ée* “it is a goat”. It is translated as “but” because it emphasizes the contrast by marking what happened first.

In example (38) above, the two parts of the sentence, *dii naaltsoos lichii nisin* “I thought this paper was red” and *ch'il-látah hózhóón at'éé* “it is a flower” also have a time difference marked by *nt'ée*. The expectation of the color is correct and only the fact of the thing “being a flower” is unexpected, so *lā* is used to mark the sudden realization of this fact.

If the result of the new discovery is not made explicit, *lā* should not be added:
more 1sgS-accomplish-P 1sgS-think-P PAST
“I thought I had accomplished more (than any of the others, but I had not).”
(Young & Morgan 1980: 16)

In example (39a), the negation particle *hanii* is used, and *shibēeso* “money” is within its scope. Example (39b) has no negation particle. Although in (39) there is an overtone of surprise in both sentences, *lā* is not added. I argue that *lā* is not added because the new knowledge gained is not shown and the contrast is therefore not explicit. Also, *lā* should always be attached to the result of discovery, not the expectation.

This claim is supported by examples in other languages. The auxiliary *shag* that marks mirativity in Tibetan, for example, is always attached to the result of an event:

(40) (a) chags ‘dug.
broke TU’(:DIR)
“It broke/was broken (and the speaker saw it break). ”
(Kalsang et al. 2013: 530)

(b) chags shag.
broke SHAG(:INFR/MIR)
“It broke/was broken (the speaker sees the pieces but not the breaking process).”
(Kalsang et al. 2013: 530)

Kalsang et al. (2013: 530) claims that ‘*dug* can be used if the speaker has witnessed the process of breaking while *shag* ‘can (only) be used by a speaker who has witnessed a result’.

5.5 The Constraints on *lā*

(41) Awēé bimá yiťahdēč’ haa’na’ lā jini.baby 3sg-mother-POSS 3sg-with to crawl out MIR REP
“It was found that the baby had crawled out of bed with its mother (where it was sleeping with its mother).”

(Young & Morgan 1980: 434; Irene Silentman, p.c., December 6, 2015)

The mirative enclitic lá can co-occur with the reportative jini. In example (41), lá indicates that the speaker is surprised by a story or hearsay.

On the other hand, when a sentence has multiple discourse complements embedded, lá cannot be used:

(42)  (a)  John naashnish dishní ni Bob.
       John 3sgS-work-P 1sgS-say-NI 3sgS-say-NI Bob
       Bob says that I said John had worked.
       (Irene Silentman, p.c., November 13, 2015)

(42)  (b)  *John naashnish dishní ni Bob lá.
       John 3sgS-work-P 1sgS-say-NI 3sgS-say-NI Bob MIR
       (Irene Silentman, p.c., November 13, 2015)

Bob is the subject of ni “he says” and also the subject of the root clause. John is the subject of naashnish “he worked” in both sentences (42a) and (42b). According to my consultant, (42a) is grammatical but (42b) does not make sense (Irene Silentman, p.c., November 13, 2015).

Speakers of both (41) and (42a) receive information from someone else, but lá cannot be added to (42a). The major difference between (41) and (42a) is that John naashnish “John had worked” does not directly contribute to the speaker’s personal experience. The speaker of example (42a) gains new knowledge from “secondhand hearsay”, which is a kind of thirdhand information. Thirdhand information cannot be marked by lá perhaps because it is too far away from the speaker’s personal experience.
6 Possible Positions of the Evidentials and the Mirative

6.1 the Position of jini and the Quotative

When marking narration or hearsay, jini often appears at the end of the reported speech, as shown in examples (5b) and (13a):

(cf. 5b) mą'ii jooldloosh jini.
coyote 4sgS-walking REP:NARR
“Once upon a time there was this coyote walking along...” (Willie 1991: 117)

(cf. 13a) diináál jini.
2sgS-arrive-F REP
“It is said that you should go.” (Willie 1991: 147)

Although the quotative jini is attached to the end of the root clause of the sentences in Section 4.2.3, examples in Section 4.3 show that it can also be attached to embedded clauses:

(cf. 23a) Bob ání John ání jini
Bob 3sgS-say thus-NI John 3sgS-say thus:Q-NI REP
bi naashnish ni jini.
3sg 3sgS-work-P 3sgS-say-NI REP
Bob, says that John said he, had worked.
(Irene Silentman, p.c., November 6, 2015)

The first reportative jini following the quotative marks that the embedded information is thirdhand and unverified. The second jini marks that the sentence it attached to conveys also secondhand information.

Moreover, I argue that the position of the embedded jini in a sentence with multiple discourse complements is flexible, but it must follow the first particle “á-+inflected form of dishni” in the quotative “á-+inflected form of dishni...inflected form of dishni”.
Both (cf. 20a) and (cf. 20b) are acceptable. They both mean “Mary says: ‘Bob says that John said I(Mary) had dyed some wool red.’” It seems that when multiple discourse complements are embedded, the position of jini and that of the quotative “á-+inflected form of dishni...inflected form of dishni” affects each other. It is hard to determine how they interact with each other because the quotative structure is not well analyzed yet and usually we do not encounter a sentence with so many embedded discourse complements in daily conversation.

6.2 the Position of lá

Both (cf. 20a) and (cf. 20b) are acceptable. They both mean “Mary says: ‘Bob says that John said I(Mary) had dyed some wool red.’” It seems that when multiple discourse complements are embedded, the position of jini and that of the quotative “á-+inflected form of dishni...inflected form of dishni” affects each other. It is hard to determine how they interact with each other because the quotative structure is not well analyzed yet and usually we do not encounter a sentence with so many embedded discourse complements in daily conversation.

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The mirative *lā* is often attached to a sentence or a clause, as shown in (30a) above.

The position of the mirative *lā* is less flexible than that of *jini*. It does not have to appear at the end of the sentence, but it must immediately follow whatever that makes the speaker or the subject of the clause surprised.

The mirative *lā* can, for example, not only be attached to clauses but also appear in a direct discourse complement, following a constituent:

(43) Díi zhini lá dō' 'iishbeh diní.
    this summer MIR also to marry 2sgS-say-NI
    You said "Boy! This summer I'm (also) getting married!"
    (Young & Morgan 1980: 112)

6.3 Co-occurrence of *jini* and *lā*

Cinque (1999: 71) establishes an order of clausal functional heads based on Korean, which determines the arrangement of suffixes in agglutinative languages in which suffixes involve “mood, modality, tense, aspect, and voice”. Cinque (1999: 54, 71) believes that this order follows the Mirror Principle, and is cross-linguistically consistent, provided that the meanings of these suffixes are not changed. The four highest functional heads in descending order are speech act mood, evaluative mood, evidential mood and epistemic mood above the Inflectional Phrase (IP):

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Mood}_{\text{speech act}} & > \text{Mood}_{\text{evaluative}} \\
\text{Mood}_{\text{evaluative}} & > \text{Mood}_{\text{evidential}} \\
\text{Mood}_{\text{evidential}} & > \text{Mood}_{\text{epistemic}}
\end{align*}
\]

(adapt. Cinque 1999: 71)
Cinque’s model is supported and adapted by Speas (2004: 256), who further parallels the evidential hierarchies with logophoric categories in the chart below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cinque's Projection</th>
<th>Logophoric Category(^{17})</th>
<th>Evidential Category(^{18})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Speech Act Mood</td>
<td>Speech</td>
<td>Hearsay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluative Mood</td>
<td>Thought</td>
<td>Indirect Evidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidential Mood</td>
<td>Know</td>
<td>Direct Evidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epistemological Mode</td>
<td>Direct Perception</td>
<td>Personal Experience</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.1.1 (adapt. Speas 2004: 256)

(43) Ku say-ka cwuk-ess-keyss-kwun-a
That bird-NOM die-ANT-EPIS-EVAL-DECL
That bird must have died! (Sohn 1994: 354; Cinque 1999: 53)

The evaluative mood is higher than the epistemological mode in Cinque’s projection, and in example (43), the evaluative mood suffix *kwun* is further away from the verb root *cwuk* than the epistemological mood suffix *keyss*.

Since Navajo, like Korean, is also a head-final language, if Cinque’s generalization is valid, the reportative *jini* which marks hearsay should come after the mirative *lá*. The following examples prove that the order of speech act mood (paralleled with the hearsay evidential) and epistemological mood (paralleled with the mirative, which marks personal experience) in Navajo is consistent with the order generalized by Cinque (1999: 71).

(cf. 41) Awéé’ bimá yit’ahdéé’ haa’na’ lá jini.

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\(^{17}\) The hierarchy of logophoric predicates in Table 6.1.1 is adapted from Culy (1994: 1062).
\(^{18}\) The hierarchy of evidentials in Table 6.1.1 is adapted from Willett (1988: 57)
“It was found that the baby had crawled out of bed with its mother (where it was sleeping with its mother).” (Young & Morgan 1980: 434)

This is an example of hearsay. According to my consultant, the reporative jini should come after the mirative là.

(44) 'Alk'idáá' sáanii dóó hastói yeğ long ago womenfolk from 3plS-become old-P now deceased 'as'ah ndaakai 'ñít'éé' là jini. for a long time 3plS-go about PAST MIR REP “It is said that the men and womenfolk of long ago lived long lives. 'As'ahdéeg', for a long time.” (Young & Morgan 1980: 123)

As expected, the reportative jini in this example of narrative also follows the mirative là. Although the subjects are in 3rd person, là indicates that the speaker is surprised by the story. Thus, when followed by jini, là in both narrations and hearsays marks the surprise of the speaker, not that of the subject of the sentence.

7 Conclusion

In general, this paper analyzes the use of the reportative jini, the quotative “â-+inflected form of dishni...inflected form of dishni” and the mirative là in Navajo in various examples.

The 4th person singular form of dishni has the same form as the reportative jini and it is important to distinguish them. The reportative jini marks secondhand information, including hearsay, narrations, and other media like newspaper or radio. When appear in embedded discourse complements, it marks thirdhand information, affects the person and point of view
in the embedded discourse complement and indicates that the speaker is not responsible for the validity of other people’s reported speech.

The quotative “á-+inflected form of dishni...inflected form of dishni” marks direct quotation when jini is not attached to it. When jini is attached to it, the person and point of view features of the discourse complement in its scope show features of indirect discourse.

The mirative lá, unlike the two evidentials, does not indicate sources of information but marks the new knowledge gained by the speaker or the 3rd person subject. It cannot, however, be attached to thirdhand information, including secondhand hearsay. It does not appear within the scope of negation particles but negation particles can occur in its scope.

Both lá and jini can appear within the scope of the quotative. While jini affects the person and point of view of the embedded discourse complement following “á-+inflected form of dishni”, lá appears in direct quotations and does not have such effect at all.

There are several questions that I was not able to solve. For example, the quotative “á-+inflected form of dishni...inflected form of dishni” is not analyzed in detail. Also, I have not discussed the reduplicated form of jini and the difference between jini and its reduplicated form. Jini jini means “by hearsay, by word of mouth” and its position is also flexible (Young & Morgan 1980: 489). There is, therefore, much room for improvement. It would also be better if I had more chance to communicate face-to-face with the native speakers of Navajo because in that way I might be able to notice more detailed use of the evidentials.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANT:</td>
<td>anterior tense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CI:</td>
<td>continuative imperfective</td>
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<tr>
<td>DECL:</td>
<td>declarative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIR:</td>
<td>direct evidence marker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSTR:</td>
<td>distributive</td>
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<td>du:</td>
<td>dual</td>
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<td>emphatic</td>
</tr>
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<td>EPIS:</td>
<td>epistemic mood</td>
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<td>EVAL:</td>
<td>evaluative mood</td>
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<tr>
<td>F:</td>
<td>future</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMP:</td>
<td>imperfect aspect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INFR:</td>
<td>inferential (evidential)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IO:</td>
<td>indirect object</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lit:</td>
<td>literal translation</td>
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<td>LOC:</td>
<td>locative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIR:</td>
<td>mirative</td>
</tr>
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<td>NARR:</td>
<td>narrative</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEG:</td>
<td>negation particle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NI:</td>
<td>neuter imperfective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPN:</td>
<td>non-possessed noun&lt;sup&gt;19&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O:</td>
<td>direct object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P:</td>
<td>perfect aspect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAST:</td>
<td>past tense marker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIS:</td>
<td>past imperfective singular (-qal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POSS:</td>
<td>possessive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRST:</td>
<td>present stative (-we(n))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pl:</td>
<td>plural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QUOT/Q:</td>
<td>quotative evidential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REP:</td>
<td>reportative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S:</td>
<td>subject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sg:</td>
<td>singular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/2/3/4:</td>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;/2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;/3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;/4&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; person</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>19</sup> Hill (2005: 164-166) explains non-possessed nouns in detail.
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20 The original citation from Harris & Campbell (1995: 462) is used because the author of this thesis cannot
access the original document.


