“Role Learning: China’s Arab Spring Intervention Policies”

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Senior Thesis

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Introduction

What accounts for China’s humanitarian intervention policies in response to Arab Spring uprisings in Libya and Syria? China has traditionally presented a principled foreign policy stance purporting to uphold norms of non-interference and state sovereignty. Norms are defined as widely shared expectations of one’s own and others’ behavior in political relations, with global norms referring to these expectations in international relations and domestic norms referring to these expectations in a national context.¹ Non-interference (also referred to as “non-intervention”) is described in the Charter of the United Nations as the prohibition of the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.² I will define sovereignty as the principle that each state wields supreme decision-making authority over its domestic affairs, free of encroachments from other states or external actors.³

If this policy were adhered to in practice, China would consistently demonstrate its opposition to the use of coercive measures such as military force and economic sanctions to influence the actions of foreign governments.⁴ One would expect a China conforming to its professed principles to discourage foreign policy behaviors that invoke these coercive measures, with the exercise of China’s veto power as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) providing a possible method of action.

Prior to the Arab Spring, China had traditionally expressed a policy that prioritized the principles of sovereignty and non-interference over universal human rights and opposed intervention in the affairs of other states. Beijing’s voting behavior as a permanent member of the UNSC, however, reveals a greater amenability to certain approaches towards humanitarian intervention. Intervention may be defined as policies by a state, international organization, or other group of state-level actors designed to alter the behavior outcome of another state through the use of economic, political, or military pressure. Categories of intervention include economic sanctions, the placement of unarmed observers, and military intervention. While China had traditionally opposed all forms of intervention, developments in Chinese foreign policy in recent decades have revealed an increasing amenability to less intensive forms of intervention, such as economic sanctions.

The Arab Spring has exposed tensions between traditional domestic conceptions of China’s humanitarian intervention policy and global expectations for China’s humanitarian intervention policy in relation to China’s developing role as an international actor. In two acts that were hailed as indicators of an expanding Chinese humanitarian intervention policy, China voted in favor of UNSC Resolution 1970, which sought to impose sanctions on the Libyan government, and abstained from voting on UNSC Resolution 1973, which proposed the establishment of a military no-fly zone over Libya in response to the Libyan Civil War in 2011. China’s vote to apply economic pressure on the Libyan government and abstention from the no-fly zone resolution permitted the passage and subsequent implementation of both resolutions. China’s support for and acquiescence in UN intervention resolutions seeking to address the Libyan situation represented a deviation from China’s traditional Middle East policy in how
China allowed the international community to interfere in Libya through condemnation, coercive sanctions and military intervention. China’s Libyan response was received internationally as an indication of China’s new willingness to compromise its traditional hardline stance on the inviolability of the principles of sovereignty and non-interference for the sake of international peace.

In an apparent reversal of its role in facilitating a UN response to the Libyan crisis, China repeatedly opposed UNSC Resolution 1973 following its implementation. After the Libyan intervention escalated into a NATO-led bombing campaign that appeared to be designed to overthrow the Qaddafi regime, China condemned the intervention, believing it to have exceeded the mandate of Resolution 1973. China’s reaction to the Libyan intervention seemed to influence its 2011 and 2012 responses to the Syrian crisis, when China exercised its veto power to block resolutions that sought to condemn, impose sanctions on, or otherwise pressure the Syrian government during the Syrian Civil War. This behavior was also atypical for China, as China has used its UNSC veto less frequently than any other permanent members of the UNSC and has historically demonstrated reluctance in exercising its veto power, opting instead to abstain from resolutions that seem to violate its principle of non-interference.\(^5\) China voted in favor of only two resolutions, UNSC Resolution 2042 and UNSC Resolution 2043, which authorized the dispatch of unarmed observers to report on the Syrian crisis. China’s response to the Syrian crisis was interpreted as a return to China’s pre-Libya policy on humanitarian intervention and an

adoption of a new strategy for China to enact its intervention policy through the use of its UNSC veto.

The Libyan case in 2011 offers an example of China’s willingness to expand its humanitarian intervention policy by permitting economic and military interventions despite their incompatibility with the principles of sovereignty and non-interference. In 2011 and 2012, however, the Syrian case saw China return to its traditional humanitarian intervention policy with a new eagerness to exercise its UNSC veto power, vetoing all resolutions that sought to apply economic or military pressure on the Syrian government. What accounts for China’s more permissive intervention policy in the case of Libya and China’s return to a more restrictive intervention policy in the case of Syria?

I will argue that role theory provides a compelling conceptual framework that permits us to understand China’s Arab Spring intervention policy as effects of a process of role learning. At the time of the UNSC response to the Libyan Civil War, China was attempting to navigate between two conflicting sets of role expectations regarding China’s role as a global actor, with Chinese national role conceptions suggesting a foreign policy that valued the principles of sovereignty and non-interference over the pursuit of international peace and external Western role prescriptions expecting a Chinese foreign policy that strove to maintain international security, even at the expense of encroachments upon sovereignty and non-interference to varying degrees. China responded to minor and moderate role conflicts posed by UNSC intervention resolutions by voting in favor of the imposition of sanctions on the Libyan government and abstaining from a vote calling for a military no-fly zone over Libyan airspace. The implementation of the military no-fly zone resolution posed a severe role conflict for China,
leading China to maintain a strong opposition to the military intervention. Following the process of role learning China experienced during the Libyan military intervention, China increased its support for Chinese national role conceptions over Western role prescriptions and adopted an intervention policy that protected the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in international responses to mass atrocity situations. China proceeded to consistently veto UNSC resolutions calling for intervention in the Syrian Civil War that China perceived as incompatible with its humanitarian intervention policy.

**Thesis Structure**

In Chapter One, I will review the existing scholarship explaining China’s Arab Spring intervention policies. I will explore China’s Arab Spring intervention policies as they have been addressed through neorealism, classical realism, institutional liberalism, and constructivism and explain why previous approaches have failed to thoroughly untangle the puzzle.

In Chapter Two, I will present role theory as the basis of an analytical framework through which I will assess China’s Arab Spring intervention policies. I will argue that China’s Arab Spring intervention behavior can be explained through China’s interactions with two sets of conflicting role expectations regarding China’s appropriate behavior as an international actor.

In Chapter Three, I will outline the role expectations that China faces as a great power. I will offer a background on traditional domestic conceptions of China’s national responsibilities and how these traditional conceptions have helped to develop modern Chinese conceptions of China’s international role. Then, I will explain how these modern domestic role conceptions
have interacted with external role prescriptions to present different sets of role expectations for China to act as a great power.

In Chapter Four, I will explore China’s humanitarian intervention policy by tracing the development of China’s interpretation of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) norm. This will include a summary of China’s humanitarian intervention policies before, during, and after the adoption of R2P by the international community.

In Chapter Five, I will analyze China’s response to the Libyan Civil War in its capacity as a permanent member of the UNSC. I will dissect the contents of Resolution 1970 and Resolution 1973 and official Chinese statements regarding each resolution. I will then trace the development of the NATO-led military intervention in Libya and China’s reaction to various stages of the intervention. I will offer role ambiguity and role conflict over China’s appropriate behavior as an international actor as explanations for China’s willingness to consider a more permissive humanitarian intervention policy, and I will present China’s response to the Libyan intervention as an experience of role learning.

In Chapter Six, I will analyze China’s response to the Syrian Civil War following the role learning incurred through the Libyan intervention. I will analyze UNSC draft resolution S/2011/612, UNSC draft resolution S/2012/77, UNSC Resolutions 2042 and 2043, the UN Action Group for Syria Final Communiqué, UNSC draft resolution S/2012/538, UNSC Resolution 2059, and official Chinese statements addressing each document. I will present China’s response to the Syrian crisis as evidence of role learning, and I will show that China’s exercise of the UNSC veto constitutes role adaptation.
Finally, in Chapter Seven, I will summarize my findings, outline my contribution to international relations theory, and provide recommendations for further research.

China’s Arab Spring intervention policies can be better understood in the context of China’s perceptions of its great power role. Chinese policies facilitating humanitarian intervention in the Libyan Civil War demonstrate a fulfillment of Western role prescriptions that expect China, as a responsible great power, to protect global human rights. Chinese policies preventing intervention in the Syrian Civil War, on the other hand, can be interpreted as a fulfillment of Chinese role conceptions of a great power that works within the existing liberal order to protect the principles of sovereignty and non-interference. The existence of different great power role interpretations explains China’s Arab Spring intervention policies.
I. Literature Review

I intend to explore the influence of different identities, sets of behavior expectations attached to each identity, and interpretations of global norms informed by behavior expectations in determining China’s endorsement of sanctions and allowance of a military intervention in the Libyan Civil War and China’s opposition to sanctions and intervention in the Syrian Civil War. To establish that identity and role are critical factors in shaping China’s humanitarian intervention policies, I will review the roles of identity, roles, and global norms in shaping international politics from the perspectives of neorealism, classical realism, institutional liberalism, and constructivism, identifying valuable contributions of each school. I will also highlight the analytical weaknesses of each individual school and present role theory as the most promising analytical framework through which I may assess the impact of China’s competing identities upon China’s UN voting behavior.

Neorealism

Neorealists believe that the lack of a central authority in the international system necessitates a self-help system in international politics, in which each state is responsible for ensuring its own survival and well-being. Neorealism emphasizes that material capabilities are the focus of international relations; state interests are exogenously given and lie in protecting and increasing one’s material capabilities. Under realism, norms, institutions, and identities are

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important only insofar as they may serve as instruments to rationalize or justify the exercise of material power.\textsuperscript{7}

Realist perspectives believe that state behavior follows global normative expectations only when domestic or external interests align with global norms; when interests are incompatible with global normative requirements, however, interests dominate.\textsuperscript{8} This, along with the realist assumption that the most powerful states establish global norms in accordance with their own interests, claims that powerful states enjoy more freedom of strategic action regarding norms than do weaker states.\textsuperscript{9} As global norms reflect the interests of powerful states, powerful states are more inclined to consistently exhibit behavior that complies with global normative requirements.\textsuperscript{10}

From a realist perspective, Beijing permitted humanitarian intervention in Libya through sanctions and military force and vetoed attempts to intervene in Syria under the belief that these voting behaviors would best serve China’s national interests. Voting in accordance with the recommendations of regional actors such as the Arab League and African Union would best preserve China’s ability to invest in the region and profit from these investments, thus serving China’s interests in maximizing its material wealth. The Arab League and African Union supported UN intervention in Libya, and China voted in favor of a UNSC resolution to impose sanctions on the Libyan government and abstained from voting on a UNSC resolution to establish a military no-fly zone, permitting its passage. During the implementation of the Libyan

\textsuperscript{9} Foot and Walter, 332.
\textsuperscript{10} Foot and Walter, 332.
military intervention, however, regional actors and Chinese representatives condemned the intervention. China then proceeded to oppose international intervention in Syria, despite how the Arab League called upon the international community to intervene, expelled Syria from the Arab League, and imposed its own sanctions on Syria. By opposing international intervention in Syria, China acted in opposition to the recommendations of the Arab League, suggesting that China’s regional material interests were not significant in determining China’s intervention policy. Additionally, realist ideas fail to explain why China would choose to oppose great Western powers with the ability to inhibit China’s material and economic rise; indeed, China’s decision to distinguish itself from or even alienate great Western powers by voting against Syrian intervention seems to sabotage rather than facilitate China’s rise.

Alternatively, another neorealist perspective might view China as a rising power with increasing power ambitions and interpret China’s vote against intervention in Syria as a bid to challenge the Western presence in the MENA region. This argument is insufficient to explain China’s behavior, given the brief span of time that elapsed between Beijing’s Libyan abstention and its Syrian veto, during which China did not exhibit a significant increase in material capabilities. The brevity of this time period suggests that China opposed not Western material power, but Western-led changes to intervention norms that clashed with China’s understanding of intervention as informed by its role identities.

Classical Realism

An expanded conception of state power interests offers classical realism a wider analytical scope than neorealism. Classical realism allows for the possibility of state interests that
exist beyond the accumulation of material power. Interests are not exogenously given, and power is not the sole determinant of state behavior. While power can increase the ability of states to act freely, state preferences are shaped not only by international politics but also by domestic politics, history, and ideology.¹¹ In classical realism, the emergence of new great powers in the system is viewed with apprehension, not only because of increased capabilities, but also because the ambition of rising states is expected to expand along with their capabilities. Classical realists expect rising powers to seek “not just security, but also status, prestige, and even deference from others.”¹² However, this “status” and “prestige” is largely constituted by material capabilities, and the pursuit of status and prestige would be determined by military power. Classical realism is unable to conceptualize a state’s pursuit of status by non-military means.

Classical realism fails to provide a sufficient explanation for China’s UN voting behavior regarding Arab Spring interventions. While classical realism could explain that China vetoed intervention in Syria in order to establish primacy or power over Western great powers, classical realism would still expect this act of assertion to occur in a material power clash.¹³ Classical realism initially appears more promising in addressing the question than neorealism due to its acknowledgement that state interests can extend beyond the pursuit of material power; however, classical realism fails to acknowledge norms and identities, despite the critical role of norms and identities in constructing an argument of China’s UN voting behavior as a bid for status.

Institutional Liberalism

¹² Kirshner, 58.
¹³ Kirshner, 58.
Institutional liberalism asserts that a liberal world order promotes greater security within the international system. Institutional liberalists believe that multilateral institutions and organizations such as the UN can foster increased cooperation in international politics by popularizing liberal identities and norms as part of international regimes. When norms are supported by structures of power and interests, they offer models of “consistent, normatively justifiable action, even if these arrangements are not formalized in law.”\(^\text{14}\) However, the strength of multilateral institutions and the norms and identities they promote rests upon power, and “changes in power generate changes in institutions.”\(^\text{15}\)

Institutional liberalism assumes that the interests of rising powers such as China differ from the interests of “established industrialized democracies,” so it logically follows that with the rise of China and other states, “structures of power and interest have become more diverse,” and that “the institutions that link major powers have been weakened, with more contention over their proper arrangements.”\(^\text{16}\) The rise of China presents “a counter-narrative to the progressive and pacific narrative of Institutional Liberalism.”\(^\text{17}\) A divergence of interests, weighted by changes in the distribution of power, as seen in Beijing and Moscow’s votes against intervention in Syria, reflects a “decline in the coherence of international regimes.”\(^\text{18}\) From a liberal institutionalist perspective, China’s opposition to intervention in Syria can be interpreted as an attempt to resist Western dominance in the UN out of fear that Western-led UN decisions could

\(^{15}\) Keohane, 135.
\(^{16}\) Keohane, 134-135.
\(^{17}\) Keohane, 134.
\(^{18}\) Keohane, 125.
influence Chinese policies, or out of envy for Western power over the UN and a desire to assume a similar degree of power.¹⁹

Institutional liberalism demonstrates that norms, when backed by power and interests, can influence international politics. The ability of institutional liberalism to capture the interaction of power, interests, and norms and its impact on determining the impact of multilateral institutions serves to illuminate how China’s votes against UN resolutions on intervention in Syria were able to influence international politics through nonmilitary means. However, while the liberal institutionalist focus on multilateral institutions aids our understanding of the ability of China’s UN voting behavior to influence international outcomes, and institutional liberalism assumes that rising power interests differ from great power interests, institutional liberalism is unable to explore how China may have utilized its UN veto privilege as a form of status-seeking behavior, as well as how and why China’s interests may have diverged from Western interests to begin with.

*Constructivism*

To constructivists, identities and institutions are of utmost importance. State interests are not exogenously given, as realists believe, and institutions are not simply instruments to facilitate the exercise of material power; rather, constructivism posits that socially constructed, intersubjective ideas govern international relations.²⁰ Constructivists argue that observing behavior in domestic and global political environments offers insight into the process of the

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¹⁹ Keohane, 135.
construction, definition, and redefinition of interests.\textsuperscript{21} Though identities are constructed through state interaction, they are stable; once constituted, identities tend to endure as “objective social fact[s],” working to reinforce certain state behaviors while discouraging others.\textsuperscript{22} States are interested in maintaining “relatively stable role identities” and resist transformations of their identities; practices or information that appear to challenge a given role identity may induce perceptions of threat.\textsuperscript{23} Institutions wield significant influence over state behavior not by imposing external constraints on state actions but by structuring identities and interests.\textsuperscript{24} The creation of institutions helps states form new role identities that influence state behavior.\textsuperscript{25} Institutions endure and resist change just as role identities do, not merely because of the transactional costs of norm change, but because norms inform identities and interests, which states are committed to maintaining.\textsuperscript{26}

States are able to consciously influence identities and interests when at least two preconditions are satisfied: first, the state must have reason to modify its self-understanding in “novel terms,” such as in the emergence of “new social situations” that confound “preexisting self-conceptions,” and second, the potential benefits of a shift in role identity must outweigh the potential costs, namely sanctions from other states that the state in question has previously interacted with under its former role identity.\textsuperscript{27}

Reciprocity is critical for transforming state role identities. Because a state’s existing role identity is perceived as social fact to other states through established patterns of state interaction,
it is insufficient for a state to alter its role identity by modifying only its self-conception. For a state to adopt a new role identity, other states must also recognize this role identity. “Altercasting,” a state’s use of tactics of “self-presentation and stage management” to influence other states’ perceptions of its role identity, may be employed to effect reciprocal recognition of a state’s desired new role. Global norms are one vehicle which states may convey their expectations of the behavior of other states.

Global norms are interpreted as “collective standards of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity” and therefore influence state behavior. Global norms may become embedded through discourse, legislation, and collective and individual belief systems, and at the deepest level of internalization, behavior that conforms to global normative requirements assumes a “taken-for-granted quality.” Some constructivist scholars believe that consistency between state behavior and global norms is contingent on the degree of congruence between global norms and historically constructed domestic norms, while others perceive congruence as a result of a dynamic relationship between global and domestic normative requirements. Both perspectives assert that global norms are not sufficient causes of state behavior in themselves; global norms and domestic norms interact to produce interpretations of a state’s appropriate role in the global normative environment.

A constructivist would focus on the role of identities in shaping China’s interpretation of global norms such as the Responsibility to Protect. Role conflict between domestic expectations

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28 Wendt, 421.
29 Wendt, 421.
30 Foot and Walter, 333.
31 Foot and Walter, 333.
32 Foot and Walter, 333.
33 Foot and Walter, 346.
and external expectations of China’s responsibilities to protect human rights and international peace may have contributed to a change in China’s traditional humanitarian intervention policy, as evidenced by the expansion of China’s humanitarian intervention policy by permitting sanctions and military intervention to be conducted in Libya. The “new social situation” of the military intervention in Libya may have presented a threat to China’s understanding of the institution of humanitarian intervention, and this may have provided the impetus for China to begin undertaking the process of recasting its role identity, demonstrated by China’s shift to a humanitarian intervention policy more influenced by domestic expectations in the case of Syria.
II. Analytical Framework

I will apply an analytical framework based in constructivist role theory to understand China’s foreign policy behavior. China possesses certain identities that inform China’s roles as a state, and these roles in turn influence China’s humanitarian intervention policies. Role theory also provides analytical models for understanding how role change manifests in the international system. The concepts of role conflict and role ambiguity explain the structural disruptions posed by Chinese role uncertainty, and the concepts of role adaptation and role learning help to construct a framework through which we may understand China’s responses to conditions of role insecurity.

Identity, Role, and Policy

Applied in an international relations context, role theory posits that policymakers hold beliefs and ideas regarding the identity of a state. Identity can be defined as a social position, as a set of characteristics that distinguishes one state from others. States may possess multiple identities, some of which will assume greater salience in certain situations. Due to the socially constructed nature of identity, the creation of identities and the prioritization of identities by a state are subject to change. Internal debates over a state’s power, history, political system, ideology, religion, culture, and language contribute to state processes of identity formation.


Role theory posits that policymakers’ ideas of state identity shape state behavior. Whereas identity refers to the social position of a state, role refers to expected or appropriate behavior associated with an identity.\textsuperscript{36} In international politics, roles refer to patterns of attitudes, decisions, commitments, and actions states enact in accordance with their social position within the international system.\textsuperscript{37} Roles in the international system are constituted by domestic expectations for appropriate behavior and external expectations for state behavior in various contexts.\textsuperscript{38}

Roles are comprised of role conceptions and role prescriptions. \textit{Role conceptions} are defined as a state’s domestic understandings of behavior that is appropriate to its social position within the international system.\textsuperscript{39} Role conceptions involve the state’s own perceptions of the social position of the state in relation to others as well as the state’s perception of role expectations by external actors.\textsuperscript{40} The perceptions, values, and attitudes of the state (and the domestic actors that shape state identity, such as policymakers, the media, and public opinion) become critical to explaining state roles.\textsuperscript{41} National role conceptions are influenced not only by domestic understandings of state identity, but also by a state’s understanding of role prescriptions from external actors.

\textsuperscript{37} Holsti, 239 and 243.
\textsuperscript{39} Holsti, 239.
\textsuperscript{40} Harnisch, 8.
\textsuperscript{41} Holsti, 239.
Role prescriptions may be defined as norms and expectations from the external environment regarding the appropriate behavior of a state in international relations.\textsuperscript{42} Role prescriptions may be understood as external norms and expectations attached to a state’s role\textsuperscript{43}, including but not limited to the structure of the international system, global norms, treaties, less formal or implicit understandings, the expectations of other states, and world opinion.\textsuperscript{44} Roles not only prescribe state behavior within the international system, but also provide states with frameworks to understand the motivations and functions of other states, thus offering stability in a disordered world.\textsuperscript{45}

In international politics, role performance refers to state behavior—foreign policy decisions and actions that a state enacts in accordance with a role.\textsuperscript{46} A state is socially assigned one or more statuses from its national role conceptions and external role prescriptions, and a state will enact these roles through policymaking decisions. Foreign policy role performances derive from policymakers’ role conceptions, domestic demands, and critical events and trends in the external environment, as well as the expectations of other governments, customary norms, and treaties.\textsuperscript{47} When national role conceptions and external role prescriptions prove incompatible, the former is usually chosen over the latter.\textsuperscript{48}

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\textsuperscript{43} Holsti, 238.
\textsuperscript{46} Holsti, 239. 243.
\textsuperscript{47} Holsti, 243.
\textsuperscript{48} Holsti, 243.
Knowledge of a state’s roles can help illuminate the likely policy actions it will take. A state that conceives of itself as a liberal state, for instance, is likely to respond favorably to multilateral agreements that promote global human rights, while a state that views itself as a developing country might interpret a global human rights regime as an impediment to its progress. On the other hand, the latter state may perceive that other states or multilateral institutions desire that the state will vote in favor of the human rights agreement.

It is important to understand that role conceptions and role prescriptions “cannot dictate every aspect of foreign policy behavior.” Roles provide suggested, not obligatory, patterns for state behavior. When applying role theory to international politics, we must allow for a margin of error in which some foreign policy decisions will diverge from expectations by national role conceptions and external role prescriptions. Additionally, the salience of role conceptions as a shaper of foreign policy may vary according to the issue at hand; for instance, national role conceptions may provide limited to no guidance when addressing technical issue such as fishing limitations. The socially constructed nature of roles means that roles offer guidance for state behavior in the international system while still permitting room for uncertainty.

**Challenges to Role Security: Role Conflict and Role Ambiguity**

The socially constructed nature of roles presents inherent risks of role conflict and role ambiguity—two structural conditions that disrupt the stability of the international system. Role conflict is defined as the concurrent presence of two or more incompatible sets of expectations.

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49 Holsti, 298.
50 Holsti, 298.
for the behavior of a state.\textsuperscript{51} Because roles are constituted through processes of interaction between actors, the security of a state role depends on the willingness of other international actors to cooperate in maintaining the role. There is no certainty that the roles one state strives to enact will be compatible with the counter-roles that external actors project upon it. If a state’s expectations for its behavior are incompatible with the expectations imposed on the state by external actors, then the state experiences a role conflict.\textsuperscript{52} The state will be pressured to respond to conflicting pressures with a coping behavior, resulting in a disruption for the state as well as the international system.\textsuperscript{53}

One theory of role conflict resolution by van de Vliert (1979, 1981) suggests three steps by which a state may resolve a stressful role conflict. If possible, a state will first choose among roles, in the process weighing the degree to which the state considers others powerful and the degree to which the state considers the role prescriptions of others to be legitimate.\textsuperscript{54} If it is not possible to choose one role, the state will attempt to strike a compromise among its roles. If compromise is not possible, a state will try to withdraw from the situation entirely.\textsuperscript{55}

K. J. Holsti proposes a different model of role conflict resolution for states. In the event that self-defined national role conceptions and externally derived role prescriptions prove incompatible, national role conceptions usually take precedence over external role prescriptions.\textsuperscript{56} While external role prescriptions do influence role performance, role performance is first and foremost consistent with “policymakers’ conceptions of their nation’s

\textsuperscript{52} Biddle, 82.
\textsuperscript{53} Biddle, 82.
\textsuperscript{54} Biddle, 83.
\textsuperscript{55} Biddle, 83.
\textsuperscript{56} Holsti, 243.
orientations and tasks in the international system. I will analyze China’s Arab Spring intervention policies as responses to role conflict, with China attempting to compromise between its domestic role conceptions and external role prescriptions in Libya and, when this response proved to be an unsustainable solution to role conflict, China then attempting to choose one role over another in Syria.

China’s responses to UN intervention attempts in Libya and Syria may be interpreted as attempts to resolve a role conflict, in which China and Western powers held two conflicting sets of expectations for how China should behave. Whereas the United States and Western powers expected China to permit intervention in accordance with its duties as a great power, Chinese policymakers may have believed that China, as a developing country, was beholden to protect Libya and Syria from Western interference.

Another condition that may disrupt the international system is role ambiguity, defined as a condition in which a state’s role expectations are incomplete or insufficient to guide state behavior. Whereas role conflict is caused by differences between domestic role conceptions and external role prescriptions, role ambiguity emerges out of a lack of consensus by the policymakers and other domestic actors within a state with regards to the state’s appropriate role. Role conceptions that are weak, vague, or undergoing rapid change may not adequately

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57 Holsti, 245.
58 Biddle, 83.
59 Holsti, 301.
predict national attitudes and foreign policy decisions, and uncertainty over a state’s proper role can produce stress for the state and its decision makers.

The appearance of unprecedented or ambiguous circumstances in the external environment can increase the likelihood of role ambiguity affecting a state. Policymakers are tasked with adjusting rapidly to new threats and opportunities, and the definition of new national roles is difficult to achieve without domestic public support. Role ambiguity may also stem from the possession of incompatible national role conceptions by a state, contributing to difficulty in determining which roles exert the most influence on state behavior.

If role conceptions are incompatible, vague, and unstructured, if a state encounters changing circumstances in the international system or a divided domestic public opinion, or if policymakers define new role conceptions without domestic public consensus, role conceptions lose utility as a predictor of state behavior. If a set of coherent roles has not risen to dominance in shaping the behavior of a state, the state may act in ways that appear contradictory and do not reflect one clear role. The United States, for example, is influenced by both a messianic identity as a leader in the global promotion of democracy and human rights, as well as by an identity as a cooperative stakeholder within the global liberal order. The varied conceptions of American identity by policymakers, nongovernmental organizations, the media, and the American public prevent the United States from fully embracing one role over another. The tension between the American self-perception as a “city on a hill” that sets an example for the rest of the world and

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60 Holsti, 299.
61 Biddle, 83.
62 Holsti, 299-300.
63 Holsti, 301-302.
64 Holsti, 304.
the perception of the United States as one of multiple states invested in global governance contributes to the seemingly contradictory policies associated with “American exceptionalism,” in which the U.S. makes efforts to establish multilateral treaties designed to protect human rights but also seeks American exemptions from the treaties which it helps to negotiate. Role ambiguity can create uncertainty over appropriate state behavior.

Like most states, China possesses multiple identities, with two of its primary identities being that of a developing country and that of a great power. Internal uncertainty by policymakers and the Chinese public over which identity should take precedence as a determinant of Chinese foreign policy contributes to policies that appear contradictory. Beijing’s responses to the Arab Spring demonstrate the lack of a fixed role to guide its intervention policies. Illuminating China’s role ambiguity may help us better understand Chinese intervention policies.

Role Change: Role Adaptation and Role Learning

Roles and role enactments may change through adaptation and learning. Role adaptation is defined as changes of strategies and instruments that are used to perform a role, while the purpose of the role remains stable. Roles may be adapted on various levels of foreign policy change: (1) increasing or decreasing the use of certain instruments; (2) changing the way and order that certain instruments are used (tactics); and (3) changing the way the problem is

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66 Harnisch, 10.
perceived (strategy).\textsuperscript{67} Role adaptation describes shifts in state behavior while the values and goals of the state remain fixed.

\textbf{Role learning}, on the other hand, is defined as a change in a state’s beliefs or the development of new beliefs, skills, or practices following the observation and interpretation of experience.\textsuperscript{68} Unlike role adaptation, in which state beliefs and practices remain constant while the modes of policy implementation are altered, role learning involves a more profound shift in the beliefs and practices of a state and occurs only after a state has experienced a situation from which it has absorbed new information. More extreme cases of role learning involve changes that transform a state’s perception of its role, providing the opportunity for the reconfiguration of a state’s role.\textsuperscript{69}

\textsuperscript{67} Harnisch, 10.
\textsuperscript{68} Harnisch, 10.
\textsuperscript{69} Harnisch, 10-11.
III. China’s Great Power Role Expectations

Like most states, China possesses multiple role expectations that inform its behavior as an international actor. I will address two sets of role expectations that exert a powerful influence over Chinese foreign policy: domestic role conceptions of China as a responsible great power and external role prescriptions of China as a responsible great power. First, I will examine historical domestic role conceptions and the development of these role conceptions into the 20th century. Then, I will explore how Western role prescriptions of China as a great power and domestic conceptions of China as a great power, as informed by historical Chinese identities, have worked in tandem to suggest different responsibilities for China as a rising great power today. China’s domestic role conceptions and external role prescriptions interact to suggest different roles for China to enact in its foreign policies, where the latter identity demands a greater involvement in global governance than the former identity, which is more preoccupied with domestic growth. The roles of rising power and great power encourage China to adopt different policies on the issue of international military intervention.

Traditional Domestic Conceptions of China’s Responsibilities

Chinese society has historically demonstrated an understanding of the concept of responsible great power and held the state accountable for certain duties. The works of Qing scholar-officials such as Lin Zexu and Liu Kunyi, for instance, reference Chinese proverbs such as ze wu pang dai (“one should face one’s responsibilities”) and ze you you gui (“one’s
responsibility is solely one’s burden to carry”). Just as individuals are responsible for acting in accordance with the norms and values that guide a society, the state is held responsible for complying with the formal and informal rules, norms, and values that govern institutions. The concept of li (rules of propriety) that governed ancient Chinese society required its members to observe strict codes of expected behavior. Social peace and harmony in Chinese society demanded individuals to fulfill their responsibility of propriety: to assume proper roles in relation to others and abide by strict norms and practices. In practice, these expectations of responsible conduct applied less to individuals than they did to elites—to “ministers, rulers, and kings.” Responsible action was a requirement for policymakers to maintain moral authority and political legitimacy. The maintenance of a “healthy system of government” and a “well-ordered society” demanded that policymakers fulfill not only their responsibilities as individuals, but also their responsibilities as state officials: to keep watch over subjects, to cultivate members of society, and to yield to heaven’s morality.

Classical Chinese political thought conceived of responsible state behavior not only domestically, but also externally, providing a model for the relationship between Imperial China and the world. The idea of responsible behavior defined how the Chinese populace was “bound to the world beyond,” with Imperial China and other international actors expected to assume proper positions in their interactions. Chinese scholars conceived of the Chinese cultural system as superior to “uncivilized” foreign systems, believing that the Chinese cultural system should be

71 Yeophantong, 334.
72 Yeophantong, 334.
73 Yeophantong, 334.
74 Yeophantong, 334-337.
“followed by all people,” that China possessed a special global role “as the guardian of these values,” and that China must live up to its values in order to set an example for others to follow, though these values could not be imposed on others by force. These ideas persisted even as China engaged with European international society during the 1800s. Domestic ideas of responsibility during the Imperial China era included the need for policymakers to exercise power in a virtuous and mindful manner, and the need for China to behave as a morally exemplary model for the benefit of foreign civilizations. An understanding of the concept of responsible power in classical Chinese political thought permits us to understand how historical political ideas have influenced modern Chinese understandings of the responsibilities of a great power.

Traditional, indigenous Chinese political beliefs and externally-derived ideas interacted to develop Chinese views on responsible great power in the post-1911 period. China’s encounters with the West during the Opium Wars caused domestic conceptions of China’s role as a superior contributor to foreign civilization to suffer a great affront. Under the influence of Western revolutionary ideology, popular domestic sentiment believed that in the event that a ruler failed to exercise responsible power, the people wielded geming quanli, or the right of revolution. In response to the Qing dynasty’s failure to address the problems of foreign contact, European imperialism and opium addiction, as well as China’s resulting loss of national pride,

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76 Yeophantong, 338.
domestic understandings of “responsibility” expanded to include revolution.\textsuperscript{77} The contrast between the classical Chinese identity as a superior example for foreign civilizations to follow and the post-Opium Wars identity as the “Sick Man of Asia,” as a victim of Western imperialism, encouraged new conceptions of China’s responsibilities and China’s role in the international system. In a move to adapt the Chinese system to a changing international environment, interest-driven pragmatism replaced political idealism as the basis of responsible state behavior.\textsuperscript{78} The desire for China to gain recognition as a “legitimate and equal” member of international society shaped foreign policy decisions such as participating in World War I. Domestic conceptions of Chinese identity underwent drastic change, resulting in new perceptions of China as a modernizing nation-state of the world.\textsuperscript{79} Despite the influence upon Chinese role conceptions by external ideas, classical Chinese political thought persisted in shaping Chinese policies following China’s exposure to European international society. The desire to increase China’s presence in international affairs was influenced as much by traditional conceptions of China as a state capable of offering valuable contributions to the international system as it was by a desire for external recognition by Western powers. Following encounters with European international society, it became the prerogative of the state to engage in the international society to gain external recognition of China as a state equal to European powers.

Classical ideas of China as a great power and ideas resulting from China’s encounter with the Western world during the post-1911 period interacted to form new perceptions of China’s responsibilities as a state. Communist China under Mao Zedong saw the convergence of nationalist narratives that focused on “expunging national humiliation” and socialist narratives

\textsuperscript{77} Yeophantong, 338.
\textsuperscript{78} Yeophantong, 339-340.
\textsuperscript{79} Yeophantong, 340.
that focused on class-based emancipation. The responsibilities of China and its people were understood to include the generation of Communist revolutionary sentiments (domestically and abroad), the expulsion of foreign influence from China, and the rejuvenation of China, which would become a strong and self-reliant country. The Chinese Communist Party sought to again elevate China to a position in which it could shape the world order; however, in contrast to classical political thought, which perceived China’s responsibility as influencing the world through superior conduct, the Chinese Communist Party held China responsible for opposing great power hegemony and chauvinism and supporting the struggles of “oppressed people and nations” of the Third World. This period of Chinese history saw Chinese ideas of responsibility evolve to hold the people responsible for instigating a revolution in the event that a leader failed to govern responsibly. The resulting Communist China was also held responsible for improving China’s material capabilities, but conceptions of responsibility also shifted to mean promoting Communism domestically and abroad, opposing Western imperialism, and supporting the liberation struggles of Third World countries. These perceptions of China’s responsibilities as a state demonstrate a resurgence of the focus on morality and justice that permeated classical domestic role conceptions. The interaction between internally- and externally-derived ideas resulted in new perspectives on China’s roles and responsibilities in international affairs, and aspects of traditional Chinese conceptions of state responsibility continue to influence modern Chinese role conceptions.

Modern Domestic Conceptions of China’s Role

Yeophantong, 341.
Yeophantong, 341.
While China has expanded its political and economic might in recent decades and accessed a position of greater influence on the international stage, China’s lingering pre-world power identities influence its newer, rising power identity. This interaction between internally- and externally-derived ideas is evident in the development of China’s international role in recent decades. Classical ideas of China as a great power and later perceptions of China as a victim of Western imperialism interacted to shape a Chinese patriotic movement during the 1990s: a movement that aimed for China to achieve its qiangguo meng, loosely translated to “great power dream.”

China’s economic and political rise was domestically perceived not as a rise so much as a return, given the belief in China’s cultural superiority during the Imperial era. The belief in China’s centrality to the world order remained prevalent in domestic political thought throughout events of the 19th and 20th centuries; for instance, the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China states that “China’s future is the world’s future” and “both are closely linked together.”

This sentiment also reflects historical Chinese beliefs in the responsibility of the Chinese ruler to preserve order and social harmony. A belief in the central role of China on the international stage would continue to shape Chinese foreign policy views through the rise of globalization and of a system of global governance.

The domestic debate over China’s multiple identities reveals that China has neither been able to fully embrace a modern identity as a great power, nor has it wholly clung to its 20th century identity as a developing country. Some Chinese official opinions reject the notion of China as a great power and argue that China remains a “developing (socialist) country,” while

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82 Yeophantong, 340.
83 Yeophantong, 343.
84 Yeophantong, 344.
others believe that China is not a great or global power but, at best, merely a regional power. Other conceptualizations of Chinese identity focus not on China’s present material capabilities and political accomplishments, but on China’s legacy of victimization and humiliation from the West, as well as on China’s historical great-power status and its right to return to this status.

During the past decade, Chinese domestic discourse has tended to perceive that if China is not yet a great power, then it is in the process of attaining such a status. The diversity of opinions regarding China’s international role indicates that China is unable to wholeheartedly assume a great power role, nor is it able to entirely cling to its historical identity as a rising power.

Today, China is recognized as an emerging major power within the international system—as a state with relatively superior material capabilities and considerable diplomatic influence, but a state that has amassed these qualities in abundance only recently. The origin of China’s increased involvement in global governance can be traced back several decades to the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee in December 1978, when the Communist Party recommended that China begin a process of “reform and opening” (改革开放). China began to “invite the world in” (引进来) and engage internationally throughout the 1980s, mainly through educational and technology exchanges abroad. During the early 1990s, the government recommended that Chinese companies “go out” (走出去) and engage outside of China, and that Chinese organizations to “move towards the world” (走向世界) or adopt a more global approach.

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86 Shambaugh, 16.
87 Shambaugh, 5.
China’s international role as a great power is constituted through Chinese conceptions of its great power identity as well as by external prescriptions of China’s great power role. External views of China’s behavior as an international actor typically expect China to shoulder a portion of the responsibilities in managing world affairs under the global liberal order. For instance, the UN expects “active participation” from China on multilateral peacekeeping missions abroad, while international non-governmental organizations request greater transparency and accountability regarding China’s domestic human rights practices.\(^8^8\) In 2011, President Barack Obama expressed that “the United States welcomes China’s rise as a strong, prosperous and successful member of the community of nations.”\(^8^9\) Obama’s reference to the “community of nations” refers to the group of states responsible for the maintenance of the global liberal order: liberal Western democracies. As China continues to grow in economic and political influence, increasing calls have been heard from the international community (particularly from representatives of Western powers) requesting that China become a “responsible great power” (fuzeren de daguo) by filling a constructive leadership role in global governance.\(^9^0\)

The idea of “global governance” is subject to debate within domestic Chinese discourse. Some view global governance with suspicion, perceiving the liberal global agenda as a tool used by the West to pressure China into conforming to Western-dominated norms and values.\(^9^1\) China’s identity as a state that has suffered injustices at “the imposition of Western neoliberal values masquerading as international norms” and China’s perception that these norms serve to

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\(^8^8\) Yeophantong, 330.  
\(^8^9\) President Barack Obama, “Remarks at Welcoming Ceremony for President Hu Jintao,” January 19, 2011,  
\(^9^0\) Yeophantong, 330.  
\(^9^1\) Yeophantong, 345.
stifle the advancement of non-Western developing countries are used to justify the lack of
Chinese participation in the global liberal order.\textsuperscript{92}

Despite this, China has contributed to global governance, and its participation has not
been shaped primarily by the demands of external actors. Chinese scholars such as Pang
Zhongying believe that “global governance without Chinese participation is not truly ‘global
governance,’ and a world without China cannot rightfully be called a ‘globalized’ world.”\textsuperscript{93}
China has also expanded the global governance agenda by drawing international attention to its
own concerns and interests. China pushed for greater representation of developing countries on
the International Monetary Fund and asserted that “rich nations” should shoulder more
responsibility in reducing carbon emissions and offering financial assistance to developing
countries on global warming initiatives.\textsuperscript{94} China’s advancement of multilateralism may be
interpreted as an enactment of China’s lingering identity as a rising power, but it might more
accurately serve as a signal of the rise of a new, hybrid identity as a \textit{fazhan zhong da guo}, or a
“developing great power,” and as a \textit{xinxing daoguo}, or a “rising great power.”\textsuperscript{95}

China’s historical identity as a developing country obstructed by Western interests and
evolving identity as a great power have interacted to inform China’s understandings of its
responsibilities in its role as a rising great power. This identity addresses the fact that, in spite of
the international attention focused on China’s material and political rise, China remains both a
recipient and a provider of international aid and must continue to focus on domestic development

\textsuperscript{92} Yeophantong, 345.
\textsuperscript{93} Yeophantong, 343.
\textsuperscript{94} Yeophantong, 330.
\textsuperscript{95} Yeophantong, 347.
before it can truly be considered on par with Western great powers. China has participated increasingly in global governance but believes the extent of its participation to be limited by its continued status as a developing country. Beijing’s policy objectives are informed by domestic perceptions of China’s identity and limited material capabilities. Throughout China’s rise in recent decades, Chinese political leaders have emphasized that China will never strive for hegemony or attempt to dominate other states. Instead, Chinese policymakers have articulated a desire to uphold the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity and to treat other international actors with mutual respect. The “five principles” most valued by the Chinese government are “mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each others’ internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.” These perceptions of China’s responsibilities as a rising great power have translated into a Chinese reluctance to fully assume a role as a “responsible stakeholder” in the maintenance of the global liberal order, including an unwillingness to embrace Western conceptions of humanitarian intervention in international crises.

Modern Expectations of China’s Responsibilities as a Rising Great Power

Chinese role conceptions of its place in the international system are influenced by traditional Chinese identities and by external role expectations for China to assume a position in

96 Yeophantong, 347.
97 Yeophantong, 347.
98 Yeophantong, 345.
99 Yeophantong, 345.
global governance. The adaptation from China’s traditional role as a leading developing country to a modern role as a great power defines China’s foreign policy strategy.101 Despite varying interpretations of exactly what the responsibilities of great power entail, the idea that China faces an obligation to contribute to global governance in accordance with its major rising power role is widely accepted within domestic and international discourse.102 This is evident in China’s concession of its traditional role as a bystander in global governance and its adoption of a more active role in international leadership.103 The lack of consensus may be found in defining the extent to which China is expected to participate in addressing global concerns.

Two major schools of expectations regarding China’s responsibilities in global governance may be identified.104 The first school believes China must embrace its international responsibilities as a global power by participating in the maintenance of the global liberal order. Notable support for the this position may be found in the expectations of Western great powers such as the United States, and the influence from Western role prescriptions has shaped Chinese domestic discourse. Domestic voices that share this opinion believe that China carries the potential to make significant contributions to the global order and that China faces a duty to assume a level of responsibility in addressing global governance issues similar to those of other great powers.105 This school is the most supportive of humanitarianism and of active Chinese

101 Gottwald and Duggan, 2.
102 Yeophantong, 350.
103 Gottwald and Duggan, 3.
104 A third school consists of those who perceive the concept of international responsibility as an attempt by Western powers to pass their international obligations to China as a way to overburden China and threaten its national development; however, I address only the role expectations that believe China wields a degree of international responsibility as a great power.
105 Shambaugh, 41-43.
participation in multilateral institutions, hoping that China will embrace the existing global order and assume a stakeholder position in its maintenance.

The second school consists of those who believe that as a major developing country, China’s domestic obligations take precedence over its external duties. This view, which is derived more from domestic conceptions than external prescriptions, recognizes that assuming responsibility in global governance can simultaneously legitimize China’s international actions as well as limit China’s freedom of action and undermine Chinese power. These attitudes recall the classical Chinese belief that responsibility is tied to one’s appropriate place in society, that state responsibility should be proportionate to state power—not only material capabilities and international political influence, but also national conditions. As China possesses an identity as a rising great power and still requires further domestic development, some role conceptions expect China to assume a level of international responsibility lesser than that of Western great powers. A general consensus exists regarding the need for China to avoid assuming unnecessary international responsibilities that threaten to impede Chinese national development and security.

The clearest vision of how two these sets of role expectations have contributed to China’s vision of its great power responsibilities is encapsulated by Hu Jintao’s “Harmonious World” concept, first advanced in September 2005 at the UN’s High-level Plenary Meeting and then in the report of China’s 17th Party Congress. The objective of “constructing a harmonious world” through the establishment of a new international order signaled the introduction of a more

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106 Yeophantong, 350.
107 Yeophantong, 350.
108 Yeophantong, 350.
proactive Chinese foreign policy in the modern age.\textsuperscript{109} The basis for the Harmonious World vision can be traced back to classical Chinese ideas of global governance that saw China’s development as a way to serve world peace, stability, and prosperity, as well as to 20\textsuperscript{th} century values of multipolarity and more equal representation for developing countries.

The Harmonious World concept desires the establishment of a multipolar order that features multilateralism and “inclusive governance.” Each state is encouraged to construct a microcosmic “harmonious society” within its borders by advancing the “material prosperity and spiritual well-being” of its people.\textsuperscript{110} Hu encouraged developed countries, meaning Western great powers, to “shoulder greater responsibility for a universal, coordinated and balanced development in the world” and urged developing countries to “make a fuller use of their own advantages to develop themselves.”\textsuperscript{111} The values of multilateralism and sovereignty are evident in Hu’s Harmonious World vision as he encourages developing countries to take greater initiative in improving their domestic conditions. Additionally, Hu believes great powers should assume more responsibility in ensuring “balanced development in the world,” at once expressing the traditional Chinese understanding of state responsibility as proportional to state power and encouraging a more equitable balance in the global distribution of capabilities. China’s vision of a global order involves a greater degree of multipolarity than can be observed in the existing Western-led order.

The Harmonious World vision translates China’s role expectations as a rising great power into policy objectives. It captures Chinese conceptions of great power responsibilities that

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{109} Yeophantong, 357.
  \item \textsuperscript{110} Yeophantong, 358.
  \item \textsuperscript{111} Hu Jintao, Build Towards a Harmonious World of Lasting Peace and Common Prosperity (statement given at the United Nations Summit, New York, September 15, 2005).
\end{itemize}
demand domestic development in conjunction with the realization of common values across state borders. Rather than conceiving of domestic development and global governance as two separate goals, as Western expectations of great power objectives do, the Harmonious World vision requires a state to act “inwardly” responsible until it can be considered capable of shouldering external obligations.\textsuperscript{112} A state must prove able to ensure its own security and the wellbeing of its own people before it can reasonably be expected to contribute to the security and wellbeing of others.\textsuperscript{113} The elevation of domestic development from a national goal to a great power responsibility absolves China of participating in maintaining the global liberal order at the level that Western role prescriptions demand.

The Harmonious World vision highlights realms of similarity and incompatibility between Chinese and Western great power role expectations. Both conceive of the role of great power as responsible for helping to maintain international peace and stability.\textsuperscript{114} The ends that may be employed in the realization of this goal, however, differ; the two sets of great power role expectations diverge on their views of intervention. The Harmonious World concept’s emphasis on state development as a vehicle of global advancement increases responsibility by developing countries to improve their domestic conditions and deters interference by external actors in the domestic affairs of other states. Whereas Western conceptions of great power responsibilities require great powers to involve themselves in improving conditions in the developing world, such as by halting human rights abuses in crisis situations, Chinese conceptions of great power responsibilities often perceive such interventions as an abuse of global governance discourses.\textsuperscript{115}

\textsuperscript{112} Yeophantong, 357.  
\textsuperscript{113} Yeophantong, 357.  
\textsuperscript{114} Yeophantong, 360.  
\textsuperscript{115} Yeophantong, 359.
Western great powers understand the promotion of international peace and stability as their utmost calling; China, on the other hand, believes that the principles of sovereignty and non-interference cannot be compromised.

_**China’s Role Expectations as a Great Power: Role Conflict**_

Role theorists and international relations scholars perceive that China may be experiencing role conflict and role ambiguity as a result of multiple role expectations. Given China’s historical role development and the recent nature of China’s rise in economic might and political influence, domestic expectations of China’s role as a rising great power are not definitively formed. China’s developing domestic role conceptions also enter into conflict at times with Western role prescriptions for responsible great power behavior. These competing sets of expectations suggest diverse objectives for Chinese foreign policy. Sometimes Chinese foreign policy fulfills both sets of role expectations, such as when China engages in strategic dialogues or holds peace conferences. At other times, however, Chinese foreign policy appears to be at odds with Western role prescriptions, such as when China chooses to focus on its internal development or does not play as active of a role in global governance as Western great powers do. China’s abstention from the Libyan intervention resolution and votes against the Syrian intervention resolutions serves as an example of China behaving in accordance with more than one set of role expectations.

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116 Shambaugh, 14.
IV. China’s Interpretation of Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

I will offer an overview of China’s stance on humanitarian intervention before and after its global reformulation as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) norm.¹¹⁷ I will provide a background on the concept of R2P and its debate and adoption by the United Nations General Assembly. In doing so, I will focus in particular on China’s contributions to these developments and China’s interpretation of R2P in the capacity of a responsibility for China to perform as a rising great power. China has focused on the state capacity-building functions of the R2P mandate, or Pillar 1, as well as on promoting a definition of R2P that constrains the operational methods permitted in humanitarian intervention. Overall, China has sought to develop the norm to increase the focus on R2P’s preventative aspects in the hopes of decreasing the number of instances in which the principles of sovereignty and non-interference are violated.

*China’s Intervention Stance before R2P*

Between 1949 and the 1980s, the Chinese government rejected the concept of universal human rights as a bourgeois ideology and largely avoided involvement in international human rights activities. China’s first acceptance of a global responsibility to uphold human rights occurred with China’s admission to the United Nations in 1971, when China accepted this obligation as a principle of the UN Charter.¹¹⁸ Before China’s admission to the UN in 1971,

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China strongly opposed all peacekeeping operations.\textsuperscript{119} After China’s admission to the UN, China continued to reject “the entire concept of peacekeeping,” resulting in a pattern of Chinese abstentions on UNSC peacekeeping resolutions throughout the 1970s.\textsuperscript{120} China was a “vocal critic” of any form of intervention, believing any form of intervention to be an exercise of imperialism by the United States or the Soviet Union in the developing world.\textsuperscript{121} China’s anti-intervention stance on the grounds that intervention was akin to imperialism aligned with China’s national identity as a historic victim of Western imperialism, as well as with Chinese foreign policies valuing sovereignty, non-interference, and multipolarity that were informed by this traditional national identity.

The 1980s saw an increase in Chinese support for the concept of human rights through political rhetoric and increased Chinese participation in UN peacekeeping missions. In 1985, Chinese President Deng Xiaoping stated, “China must concentrate on economic development if it wants to become a modern, powerful, socialist country. Therefore we need a peaceful international environment and are striving to create or maintain one.”\textsuperscript{122} China proceeded to adopt a policy of reassuring its neighbors of its peaceful intentions, expanding its participation in UN peacekeeping operations, and increasing its avoidance of confrontation with more powerful states.\textsuperscript{123} China voted in favor of a UNSC peacekeeping resolution for the first time in 1981 by supporting UNSC Resolution 495 on Cyprus. In 1982, China became a member of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR), vowed to respect human rights, and began a

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{120} Holland, 17.
\textsuperscript{121} Holland, 17.
\textsuperscript{122} Foot and Walter, 342.
\textsuperscript{123} Foot and Walter, 342.
\end{flushright}
process of ratifying a series of human rights conventions.\footnote{Heilmann and Schmidt, 121.} China also offered its first financial contribution to peacekeeping efforts in 1982. China was then accepted as a member of the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations in 1988.\footnote{Holland, 17.} The first contribution of civilian observers from China was made to a peacekeeping mission in Namibia in 1989. In the years following, China sent peacekeeping personnel to the UN Truce Supervision Organization, the Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, the UN Mission in Mozambique, and the UN Mission in Liberia. Chinese foreign policy during the 1980s demonstrated China’s willingness to engage with UN peacekeeping operations, signaling a change from China’s previous rejection of peacekeeping and any form of intervention. Chinese participation in UN peacekeeping operations served to enact Chinese role expectations as a responsible great power by demonstrating China’s commitment to the UN and to international peace and security.\footnote{International Crisis Group, “China’s Growing Role in Peacekeeping Operations,” \textit{ICG Asia Report}, no. 166 (April 17, 2009), \url{http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/north-east-asia/china/166-chinas-growing-role-in-un-peacekeeping.aspx}.} Increased Chinese participation in UN peacekeeping efforts was interpreted as a sign of China’s willingness to renegotiate its stance on sovereignty and non-interference. While Chinese contributions to peacekeeping missions were taken to mean that China’s stance on sovereignty and non-interference had “become increasingly flexible,”\footnote{Jochen Prantl and Ryoko Nakano, “Global Norm Diffusion in East Asia: How China and Japan Implement the Responsibility to Protect,” \textit{International Relations} 25, no. 2 (Jan 2011): 10 and Holland, 23.} the traditional Chinese emphasis on sovereignty and non-interference continued to dominate as “the most important concern” in Chinese policies pertaining to peacekeeping.\footnote{Bates Gill and Chin-Hao Huang, “China’s Expanding Role in Peacekeeping,” \textit{Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Policy Paper}, no. 25 (Nov. 25, 2009): 2 and Holland, 24.}
The 1990s saw China counter Western criticisms of Chinese human rights abuses by supplying a Chinese interpretation of human rights. China argued that an independent, more discriminating position on human rights would address the Western “monopoly” on interpreting the concept of human rights.\(^{129}\) In 1993, China established the China Society for Human Rights Studies, which maintains the official website on Chinese human rights developments,\(^{130}\) hosts human rights forums, and regularly publishes a *Blue Book on Human Rights*.\(^{131}\) China’s human rights developments have focused on “collective, nonpolitical, and unenforceable human rights” such as the right to development in accordance with China’s “modernized socialist and culturalist interpretation” of its human rights position since the 1990s.

**R2P: Contents and Adoption**

In the 2000s, China appeared to have accepted the principle of universal human rights and expressed a distinct position regarding the priorities and developmental requirements involved in its pursuit. In September 2005, the largest gathering of international heads of states and heads of government in history convened at the 2005 United Nations World Summit. Every Member State formally accepted the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as an international norm. Paragraph 138 of the World Summit Outcome (WSO) Document stated that each individual state is responsible for protecting its populations from four egregious human rights crimes: genocide,

\(^{129}\) Heilmann and Schmidt, 123.
\(^{130}\) The web address is [www.chinahumanrights.org](http://www.chinahumanrights.org).
\(^{131}\) Heilmann and Schmidt, 123.
war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.\textsuperscript{132} The responsibility required individual states to prevent these crimes from occurring through “appropriate and necessary means” and instructed the international community to assist states in providing a necessary degree of protection.\textsuperscript{133} These “appropriate and necessary means” were revealed in Paragraph 139 of the WSO document to refer to “diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means” aimed to protect populations from gross human rights violations.\textsuperscript{134} In the event that a state was considered to be “manifestly failing” to fulfill its responsibility to protect its population, then the international community was permitted to take collective action through the UN Security Council, under the provisions of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, “on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate,” and only if peaceful means proved inadequate.\textsuperscript{135} Paragraph 139 also permitted the international community to adopt preemptive measures “as necessary and appropriate” to help states build capacity to protect their populations from the four crimes covered by R2P and to assist states under stress before crises and conflicts erupt.\textsuperscript{136}

The World Summit Outcome Document was brought to the UN General Assembly for consideration on September 16, 2005, and the General Assembly formally agreed that the international community has a responsibility to protect, or a duty to intervene when national


\textsuperscript{133} UN General Assembly, 2005 \textit{World Summit Outcome}: resolution 60/1 adopted by the General Assembly, October 24, 2005.

\textsuperscript{134} UN General Assembly, 2005 \textit{World Summit Outcome}: resolution 60/1 adopted by the General Assembly, October 24, 2005.

\textsuperscript{135} UN General Assembly, 2005 \textit{World Summit Outcome}: resolution 60/1 adopted by the General Assembly, October 24, 2005.

\textsuperscript{136} UN General Assembly, 2005 \textit{World Summit Outcome}: resolution 60/1 adopted by the General Assembly, October 24, 2005.
governments fail to fulfill their responsibility of protecting their citizens from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and/or crimes against humanity. Following the adoption of the 2005 World Summit Outcome by the General Assembly, UN Security Council Resolution 1674 passed unanimously on April 28, 2006, “reaffirming the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 WSO Document regarding the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity” and committing the Security Council to the protection of civilians in armed conflict. R2P is both regulative, in its prohibition of four categories of human rights crimes, and constitutive, in its assignment of roles and responsibilities to individual states and to international society and requiring members of this society to fulfill the requirement of “responsible” sovereignty.

During preliminary debates over R2P, certain requirements were added to R2P to increase the strictness of the conditions for its applicability. Only specific crimes—genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity—permit the invocation of R2P, rather than broader requirements such as “large-scale killing” that were considered at earlier stages of R2P deliberations. The just cause threshold was also elevated, requiring the “manifest failure” of a state to protect its populations from these crimes before the international community is permitted to intervene. This gave the host state a primary role in R2P and diminished the emphasis on “collective international responsibility.”

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137 UN General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome: resolution 60/1 adopted by the General Assembly, October 24, 2005.
139 Rosemary Foot, “The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and its Evolution: Beijing’s Influence on Norm Creation in Humanitarian Areas,” St Antony’s International Review 6, no. 2 (2011): 52.
140 Foot, 52.
141 Foot, 52.
authorization of the UN Security Council, further narrowing the “international” nature of responsibilities as outlined by R2P. The emphasis on Security Council authorization and the primary role of the state resulted in the passage of a UNSC resolution that is less potent than original conceptions of R2P.  

**R2P: Implementation Strategy**

In January 2009, the UN Secretary-General’s Report to the UN General Assembly “Implementing the Responsibility to Protect” was published, and the report’s recommendations were discussed by the General Assembly in July of that year. The January report proposed a three-pillar approach to implementing R2P. Pillar One holds the state responsible for protecting its population from four mass atrocity crimes: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. Pillar Two addresses international assistance in building state capacity to prevent humanitarian atrocities, holding the wider international community responsible for encouraging and assisting individual states in meeting the responsibility of Pillar One. Pillar Three focuses on the need for a “timely and decisive response” in accordance with the UN Charter in the event that a state is “manifestly failing” to protect its population from gross human rights violations. Although the report stresses that no one pillar is more important than another, it emphasizes “the value of prevention” and, in the event that prevention fails, the value

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142 Foot, 53.
144 UN General Assembly, *Implementing the responsibility to protect*: Report of the Secretary-General, January 12, 2009 and “About R2P,” *Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect* and Foot, 53.
145 UN General Assembly, *Implementing the responsibility to protect*: Report of the Secretary-General, January 12, 2009 and “About R2P,” *Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect* and Foot, 53.
of “early and flexible response tailored to the specific circumstances of each case.” Pillar 3 is the most controversial aspect of R2P due to its likelihood of coercive measures and its greater challenge state sovereignty.

Impact of R2P

The adoption of R2P signaled a change in the international understanding of sovereignty by endorsing a concept of security that focuses on the rights of individuals. Sovereignty no longer serves to protect states from foreign interference but required that states exercise “responsible sovereignty” by ensuring the security and welfare of their populations. In other words, the new understanding of sovereignty no longer permits governments to commit gross human rights violations while remaining free from external interference. Should states fail to uphold their responsibility of protecting their populations from four major categories of human rights crimes, the international community is permitted or even obligated to intervene with authorization by the UNSC. The specification of four specific types of crimes sets a high standard for the use of military force to protect populations, and the requirement of Security Council authorization to undertake intervention does not provide guidelines for action in the event that a veto from a Permanent Member of the UNSC prevents Security Council action.

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146 UN General Assembly, Implementing the responsibility to protect: Report of the Secretary-General, January 12, 2009.
149 Foot, 54.
Finally, the implementation plan of R2P focuses international attention towards the prevention of human rights abuses rather than the reaction to abuse.\textsuperscript{150}

\textit{China’s R2P Stance}

China participated in the deliberations that culminated in the 2005 WSO Document and voted in favor of UNSC Resolution 1674, which addressed the protection of civilians in armed conflict;\textsuperscript{151} however, it was not until Resolution 1674 reflected the 2005 WSO Document by limiting R2P to the four international crimes outlined in Paragraph 138 and emphasized that the host state bore primary responsibility for protecting its populations.\textsuperscript{152} In addition to contributing to the adoption of R2P in the UN and UNSC, China has also used its permanent UNSC seat to authorize international military interventions for humanitarian purposes. To understand China’s stance on R2P as an international norm and China’s position on R2P as a Security Council member, I will examine official statements and position papers by Chinese UN ambassadors that address R2P. I will analyze the development of China’s interpretation of R2P between 2005 and 2009.

China’s 2005 Position Paper on UN Reforms outlines the official Chinese position on R2P. The Paper places primary responsibility on each state to protect its own population, calls for prudence in judging a government’s ability and will to protect its citizens, and emphasizes

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{150}{Foot, 54.}
\footnote{151}{Foot, 54.}
\footnote{152}{Foot, 58-59.}
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that “reckless intervention” should not be allowed.\textsuperscript{153} China states that should a “massive humanitarian crisis” occur, the international community should concern itself in easing and diffusing the crisis.\textsuperscript{154} Any response to a crisis must “strictly conform” to the UN Charter and respect the “opinions of the country and the regional organizations concerned.”\textsuperscript{155} Additionally, the Security Council should make decisions that culminate in peaceful solutions “as far as possible,” and greater prudence should be involved whenever enforcement actions are considered.\textsuperscript{156}

China’s 2005 Position Paper demonstrates that China has accepted a definition of R2P intervention that protects state sovereignty, demands a central role by the UNSC and limits unilateral action, and discourages the use of military force. China’s position may be interpreted as a more conservative approach to the enactment of R2P—a position that does not permit perceived infringements of state sovereignty. By holding the state accountable for upholding its responsibilities to its citizens, requiring any exercise of R2P to consider the desires of relevant states and regional actors, and emphasizing the central role of the UNSC in enacting R2P, the Position Paper places great importance on state sovereignty. The invocation of the UN Charter, which explicitly requires the UNSC to respect state sovereignty, further contextualizes China’s R2P position as one that forbids R2P responses from compromising state sovereignty. By focusing on the centrality of the UNSC to the R2P response process and the need to respect the

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opinions of the host state and regional organizations, China promotes multipolarity and multilateralism within its conception of R2P. Additionally, by demanding a high degree of prudence in determining whether or not R2P should be invoked in response to a crisis situation and whether or not the response may involve military enforcement, China’s R2P vision strives to preserve the strength of state sovereignty and raise the standard for interference in state affairs by external actors. The value accorded to multipolarity, sovereignty, and non-interference renders China’s 2005 R2P interpretation consistent with the traditional conceptions of China’s responsibilities as a global actor: to uphold sovereignty and non-interference and to promote multipolarity in international relations.

At the Plenary session of the General Assembly on July 24, 2009, Chinese UN Ambassador Liu Zhenmin issued a statement revealing the development of China’s R2P stance since 2005. Liu offered four elements of China’s views on R2P. First, Liu emphasized that while the international community can provide assistance to states in protecting their citizens, ultimate responsibility lies with the government of the state concerned. Liu stated “the implementation of R2P should not contravene the principle of state sovereignty and the principle of non-interference of internal affairs.”

Second, Liu stated that R2P applies only to the four international crimes of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity and instructed states not to expand R2P beyond these crimes or to make “arbitrary interpretations.”

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Third, Liu specified that the international response to a crisis involving one of the four international human rights crimes “must strictly abide by the provisions of the UN Charter,” “respect the views of the government and regional organizations concerned,” proceed “in the framework of the UN,” that “all peaceful means must be exhausted” before further actions are taken, and that “it is necessary to prevent any state from unilaterally implementing R2P.”

Fourth, Liu emphasizes that the Security Council must also act prudently when forming decisions about crisis situations and that UNSC action under R2P must help to maintain international peace and security.

Liu’s statement at the 2009 Plenary session imposes stricter limits on the Chinese R2P approach first outlined in the 2005 Position Paper. Liu’s first point reveals that in the eyes of Chinese policymakers, sovereignty and non-interference cannot be compromised for the sake of humanitarian intervention. While the 2005 Position Paper emphasized the importance of sovereignty in China’s R2P interpretation, this section of Liu’s statement explicitly specifies China’s unwillingness to sacrifice the principles of state sovereignty and non-interference in the enactment of R2P interventions. The second point explains China’s belief in the necessity of a narrow interpretation of R2P application in order to prevent its abuse. Whereas the 2005 Position Paper did not specify situations that would permit the application of R2P, Liu’s 2009 Plenary statement limits the application of R2P to cases of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. Liu’s third point repeats the need for R2P applications to be guided by the UN Charter and the opinions of relevant regional actors, as expressed in the 2005 Position

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Paper. It confines responses permitted by R2P to UN jurisdiction, requiring UN approval to undertake an intervention and preventing individual states from implementing R2P without UN authorization, effectively discouraging unilateral action and promoting multipolarity in the exercise of R2P actions. Liu’s third point also adds that “all” peaceful, non-military methods must be “exhausted” before considering further actions. This may be interpreted as a Chinese preference to attempt non-military political and diplomatic methods prior to attempting strategies involving the use of military force. In addition to demanding prudent judgment by the UNSC, which was expressed in 2005, Liu’s fourth point also adds a new dimension to China’s R2P stance not previously outlined in the 2005 Position Paper: Liu specifies that UNSC actions taken to fulfill R2P are required to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security. This can be understood as a requirement that R2P responses should be designed to increase global peace and stability rather than obstruct it. Whether Chinese policymakers were more concerned with intended abuses of R2P or with the international community’s potential inability to resolve crisis situations through R2P cannot be ascertained.

China’s interpretation of R2P in 2009 is compatible with domestic conceptions of China’s great power responsibilities: to protect international security and welfare while promoting the principles of multipolarity, sovereignty, and non-interference. China’s position on R2P may be viewed as relatively conservative and cautious, as Liu’s 2009 statements propose a vision of R2P that rejects potential infringements of the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in the pursuit of international peace. The adoption of R2P by China and other UN Member States demonstrates that Chinese conceptions of the role of great power and Western
prescriptions of the role of great power align with regards to the need of great powers to ensure international peace; however, China’s unique interpretation of R2P suggests that Chinese role conceptions and Western role prescriptions differ in their understandings of the relationship between sovereignty, non-interference, and human rights. Whereas Western great powers believe in a more proactive application of the R2P norm, China’s prioritization of sovereignty and non-interference as norms that cannot be compromised means that China prefers a more conservative approach to R2P.
V. China and the Libyan Civil War

China’s response to UN intervention in the Libyan Civil War reveals that China was experiencing role ambiguity and role conflict as a result of incompatible sets of expectations regarding China’s responsibilities as an international actor. Chinese role conceptions and Western role prescriptions offered different suggestions for China’s policies on humanitarian intervention. China’s responses to UNSC resolutions that sought to address the crisis in Libya may be classified as responses to the role ambiguity and role conflict caused by two sets of incompatible great power role expectations. China’s reaction to the implementation of the Libyan resolutions demonstrate a process of role learning, during which one set of role expectations rose to dominate China’s understanding of its international role and its appropriate stance on intervention.

I will trace intervention policies undertaken by China in its capacity as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council during the Libyan Civil War, focusing in particular on UNSC Resolutions 1970 (2011) and 1973 (2011) and their implementation. Then, to understand the influence of Chinese national role conceptions in determining China’s intervention policies in Libya, I will conduct an examination of statements from Chinese policymakers that refer specifically to issues of humanitarian intervention during the Libyan Civil War. These statements include official responses to Resolutions 1970 and 1973 as well as statements from Chinese government officials regarding the implementation of the Libyan intervention. The selected statements reflect the foreign policy stances on intervention held by Chinese ambassadors and other government officials and can be interpreted as reflective of the views of the Chinese Communist Party.
UN Sanctions: UNSC Resolution 1970 (2011)

On February 26, 2011, the UNSC passed Resolution 1970 unanimously with 15 votes in favor. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, France, Gabon, Germany, Lebanon, Nigeria, Portugal, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States submitted the original text of the resolution. These states, along with Brazil, China, India, and Russia, cast the votes that led the resolution to pass. By adopting Resolution 1970, the UNSC referred the Libyan situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC), imposed an arms embargo on Libya, and imposed sanctions on Muammar Al-Qaddafi and other Libyan government officials. The resolution also called upon all Member States to offer humanitarian assistance to Libya and affirmed a commitment to review the actions of Libyan authorities. Resolution 1970 was the first UN response to the Libyan crisis.

Analysis of China’s Statement on Resolution 1970

China’s ambassador to the UN, Li Baodong, issued a statement addressing the adoption of Resolution 1970. Li’s statement demonstrates a position that is oriented towards both domestic Chinese conceptions of China’s responsibilities as a great power and Western prescriptions of China’s responsibilities as a great power. This reveals that China was

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161 UN Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record of the 6491st Meeting Held at Headquarters, New York, on Saturday, February 26, 2011 (S/PV.6491), http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Libya%20S%20PV%206491.pdf.
experiencing role ambiguity and role conflict caused by the concurrence of two sets of incompatible expectations of China’s international role.

Li began his statement by expressing China’s deep concern over the situation in Libya. Li emphasized China’s view that the most pressing goals were “to secure the immediate cessation of violence, avoid further bloodshed and civilian casualties, restore stability and normal order as soon as possible, and resolve the current crisis through peaceful means, such as dialogue.”164 Li also stressed the importance of assuring “the safety and interests of foreign nationals in Libya” and the value of the “concerns and views of the Arab and African countries,” which influenced the decision by the Chinese delegation to vote in favor of Resolution 1970.165

By assigning “the greatest urgency” to the goal of ending violence and bloodshed in Libya, Li shows that China is concerned with international peace and stability and interested in working to secure international peace and stability. Li’s emphasis on the value of international peace fulfills both Chinese and Western role expectations of great powers as actors that are obligated to promote international stability.

Li’s closing emphasis on the opinions of Arab and African countries, however, affirms the importance of the views of regional actors to China’s foreign policy decision-making process. The end of Li’s statement presents China as a state that values multipolarity and is receptive to the input of developing countries and especially to the opinions of relevant regional actors in matters of international politics. The stated importance of the opinions of regional actors and local states expresses a desire by China to account for these opinions in the attempt to

164 UN Security Council, *Provisional Verbatim Record of the 6491st Meeting Held at Headquarters, New York, on Saturday, February 26, 2011* (S/PV.6491).
165 UN Security Council, *Provisional Verbatim Record of the 6491st Meeting Held at Headquarters, New York, on Saturday, February 26, 2011* (S/PV.6491).
respect state sovereignty. The treatment of multipolarity in Li’s statement acknowledges domestic Chinese role conceptions of China as a state that is responsible for promoting multipolarity and sovereignty in the international system.

Acceptance of Resolution 1970 as a Response to Role Ambiguity and Role Conflict

China’s overall response to Resolution 1970 reveals that China was appealing to two differing stances on intervention and balancing two conflicting sets of great power role expectations. Resolution 1970 proposed the imposition of economic sanctions, a less invasive form of intervention than military intervention. The low intensity of economic intervention as a form of humanitarian intervention suggests that the degree of role conflict China experienced was mild, which allowed China to vote in favor of the resolution. China’s adoption of Resolution 1970 satisfies both Chinese conceptions of China’s great power responsibilities and Western prescriptions of China’s great power responsibilities, perhaps even erring more on the side of the latter.

The emphasis on international peace in Li’s statement, analyzed alongside China’s vote in favor of a resolution that imposed a travel ban and asset freeze on Libyan officials, suggests that China endorsed interference in the affairs of the Libyan government for the pursuit of international peace. By voting in favor of UN interference in the affairs of the Libyan government, China suggests a prioritization of international peace and human rights over the principles of sovereignty and non-interference, insofar as these principles were infringed upon through a mild form of humanitarian intervention. China’s response to Resolution 1970 suggests that China perceives the nature of the interference demanded by Resolution 1970—sanctions—as
an acceptable middle ground between the goal of international peace and the principles of sovereignty and non-interference. China’s response to Resolution 1970 aligns with both Western great power role prescriptions and Chinese great power role conceptions.

UN Military Intervention: Resolution 1973 (2011)

On March 17, 2011, the UNSC passed Resolution 1973 with 10 votes in favor, no votes against, and five abstentions from Brazil, China, Germany, India, and Russia. The original text of the resolution was submitted to the UNSC by France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and the resolution demanded an immediate ceasefire in Libya, including an end to attacks against civilians that the UNSC said might constitute crimes against humanity, tightened sanctions on the Qaddafi regime, and imposed a no-fly zone in Libyan airspace, banning all flights above Libya. The flight ban did not apply to flights that had “as their sole purpose” humanitarian aid, the evacuation of foreign nationals, enforcement of the flight ban, or other objectives “deemed necessary for the benefit of the Libyan people.” Additionally, UNSCR1973 authorized all Member States, acting unilaterally or through regional organizations, to “take all necessary measures to protect civilians under threat of attack in the country… while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory.”

168 UN Secretariat, Security Council Approves ‘No-Fly Zone’ over Libya, Authorizing ‘All Necessary Measures’ to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions, March 17, 2011.
169 UN Secretariat, Security Council Approves ‘No-Fly Zone’ over Libya, Authorizing ‘All Necessary Measures’ to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions, March 17, 2011.
necessary measures short of sending group troops to Libya were permitted for the protection of Libyan civilians.\footnote{\textit{Clashes renew in eastern Libya, despite no-fly zone}, \textit{Xinhua}, March 23, 2011, \url{http://en.people.cn/90001/90777/90855/7328277.html}.}

For a UNSC resolution to pass, it must receive at least nine votes in favor and zero votes against, allowing for up to six abstentions. As permanent members of the UNSC, the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China wield veto power when voting on Security Council resolutions, meaning that a vote against a resolution from any single permanent member prevents the resolution from passing. Had any one Security Council member voted against resolution 1973, it would have failed to pass.

The Arab League endorsed the no-fly zone over Libya on March 12 following a meeting on the Libyan situation.\footnote{\textit{UN Security Council no-fly zone vote explained}, \textit{People’s Daily Online}, March 18, 2011, \url{http://en.people.cn/90001/90777/90856/7324632.html}.}

\textit{Analysis of China’s Statement on Resolution 1973}

At the time of the passage of Resolution 1973, China’s ambassador to the UN, Li Baodong, was also serving as the President of the UNSC. Following the passage of resolution 1973, Li issued a statement, speaking in Chinese, in his capacity as the representative of China that explained China’s decision to abstain from the vote on Resolution 1973.\footnote{UN Security Council, \textit{Provisional Verbatim Record of the 6627th Meeting Held at Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, October 4, 2011 (S/PV.6627)}, \url{http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.6627}.} Li’s statement acknowledges both national Chinese conceptions of China’s responsibilities as a great power and Western prescriptions of China’s responsibilities as a great power, which suggests that China’s
decision to abstain from the vote on Resolution 1973 was a response to role ambiguity and role conflict caused by the existence of two sets of conflicting expectations regarding China’s role as an international actor.

Li began by expressing that China was “gravely concerned” by the worsening situation in Libya and supported the Security Council’s “adoption of appropriate and necessary action to stabilize the situation in Libya as soon as possible and to halt acts of violence against civilians.” 173 This portion of Li’s statement portrays China as a state that is concerned with international peace. By endorsing Security Council actions that sought to bring stability to Libya and end violence against civilians, Li revealed that China values the Security Council as an instrument for the promotion of human rights; however, Li qualified that Chinese support extended only to actions that Chinese policymakers perceived to be “appropriate and necessary.”

The next section of Li’s statement illuminates the Chinese understanding of what actions can be deemed “appropriate” when addressing human rights violations. Li expressed that

“China has always emphasized that the action of the Security Council should comply with the United Nations Charter and the norms governing international law, respect the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Libya and resolve the current crisis in Libya through peaceful means.” 174

173 UN Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record of the 6627th Meeting Held at Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, October 4, 2011 (S/PV.6627).
174 UN Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record of the 6627th Meeting Held at Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, October 4, 2011 (S/PV.6627).
By highlighting the historical consistency of China’s views on Security Council measures, Li portrays China as a state that is principled in its foreign policy approach. In contrast to scholars and policymakers who conceive of China as a hyper-pragmatic state that forms policy decisions based primarily on cost-benefit calculations, Li’s statement reveals the value of international norms in shaping Chinese policies. Li claims that China has “always” advocated the principles of the United Nations Charter, particularly those of sovereignty and territorial integrity. This refers to Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, which prohibits forceful intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign state unless expressly authorized by the Security Council as essential for the sake of international peace and security.\(^\text{175}\) The emphasis on “peaceful means” as China’s preferred method of addressing the Libyan crisis also reveals that China prefers the Security Council to not resort to force in its crisis resolution practices.

The next portion of Li’s statement asserts that China “always opposes the use of force in international relations,”\(^\text{176}\) that specific questions posed by China and other Council members during Security Council deliberations on Resolution 1973 failed to be clarified or answered, and that China had serious concerns with certain elements of the resolution.\(^\text{177}\) Li then emphasizes that China viewed the positions of the Arab League, African Union, and African countries regarding the establishment of a no-fly zone over Libya with “great importance.”\(^\text{178}\) Li again highlights the principled nature of Chinese foreign policy by stating that China “always opposes”


\(^{176}\) UN Security Council, *Provisional Verbatim Record of the 6627th Meeting Held at Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, October 4, 2011 (S/PV.6627).*

\(^{177}\) UN Security Council, *Provisional Verbatim Record of the 6627th Meeting Held at Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, October 4, 2011 (S/PV.6627).*

\(^{178}\) UN Security Council, *Provisional Verbatim Record of the 6627th Meeting Held at Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, October 4, 2011 (S/PV.6627).*
force in international relations. His explanation of how questions regarding resolution 1973 remained unanswered suggests that the resolution did not meet the standards that China would require to vote in its favor and also implies a degree of uncertainty regarding those Member States that did vote in favor of Resolution 1973 over either their intentions or their requirements to vote in favor of a resolution. By mentioning that other Security Council members also had questions left unaddressed, Li reminded the Security Council that China was not alone in holding reservations about Resolution 1973. By emphasizing the value China placed on the opinions of regional organizations and African countries, Li portrayed China as a state that values multilateralism and respects the opinions of regional actors.

Li’s statement explaining China’s abstention from the vote on Resolution 1973 draws attention to certain aspects of China’s interpretation of its role as an international actor. China values international stability and human rights, and China approves of UNSC action as a method to stabilize tumultuous regions and end violence. These values imply an orientation towards both Chinese conceptions and Western prescriptions of a responsible great power role, and this portion of Li’s statement suggests that China strove to align with both China’s perception of the role of a great power and the U.S.’s perception of the role of a great power.

Other features of Li’s statement, however, highlight differences between the Chinese and American perceptions of an international great power role. Li’s emphasis on sovereignty, territorial integrity, multilateralism, and opposition to the use of force in international relations align with the priorities associated with China’s identity as a rising major power but that Western powers do not devote great attention to in their policies.
The expression of the importance of principles that are uniquely valued by China and not Western great powers suggests an orientation towards a great power role conception that differs from externally-derived expectations of a great power role from Western powers. In attempting to strike a compromise between two conflicting sets of great power role expectations, China’s abstention from the vote on Resolution 1973 can be interpreted as a response to role ambiguity and role conflict.

*Abstention from Resolution 1973 as a Response to Role Ambiguity and Role Conflict*

Li’s statement reveals that China was experiencing role conflict and role ambiguity. Li alluded to two different sets of role expectations for China. By endorsing Security Council action and expressing a dedication to human rights and stability, Li acknowledged domestic and international actors who supported intervention, such as the ten states who voted in favor of Resolution 1973. By emphasizing China’s commitment to sovereignty, multilateralism, and peaceful forms of intervention, however, Li spoke on behalf of domestic and international actors who opposed intervention on the basis of these values, such as members of the Chinese populace or other developing countries. China was facing two incompatible sets of role expectations from both its domestic population and from international actors: one of China as a state that would permit intervention for the protection of human rights, and one of China as a state that would defend the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention on behalf of developing countries.
Li’s statement reveals that China was facing not only role conflict, but also role ambiguity. By expressing a position supportive of Security Council action as well as a position that sought the protection of sovereignty and non-intervention, Li reveals a lack of domestic consensus on China’s appropriate role as an international actor. Li’s statement was oriented to both Chinese conceptions of a great power role and Western prescriptions of a great power role, demonstrating that neither image of a great power role was a dominant influence in shaping China’s intervention policies.

Li’s statement also demonstrates a Chinese role conflict caused by the concurrence of two conflicting role expectations. Acknowledging expectations that China should support intervention as well as expectations that China should support non-intervention demonstrates that China was juggling its own ambiguous role conception alongside external role prescriptions. While traditional domestic role conceptions perceive China as a rising power and would expect China to oppose intervention and uphold the principles of sovereignty and non-interference, external role prescriptions, particularly those imposed by Western powers, perceive China as a great power and would expect China to protect human rights by supporting humanitarian intervention in Libya. Rather than choosing to take one position or another by supporting intervention or opposing intervention, Li’s statement expressed sentiments that resonated with two conflicting positions on intervention.

China’s abstention from the vote on Resolution 1973 can be interpreted as a response to role conflict. When faced with two incompatible expectations for China’s behavior—to permit humanitarian intervention in Libya or to protect sovereignty and non-interference by opposing intervention in Libya—China chose to strike a compromise between them. China did not vote in
favor of Resolution 1973, nor did it exercise its veto power to vote against it; rather, China chose to abstain from voting and then offered a statement that sought to satisfy its conflicting role expectations. By permitting the passage of Resolution 1973 and issuing a statement that expressed reservations with Resolution 1973, China attempted to simultaneously fulfill its domestic role conceptions as a rising power/developing country and its external role prescriptions as a responsible great power.

*Implementation of Resolution 1973*

Military intervention in Libya began on March 19, 2011 under Operation Odyssey Dawn, with the France, the United Kingdom, and the United States leading a Coalition of States\(^{179}\) in initiating military strikes in order to enforce a no-fly zone over Libya, as authorized under Resolution 1973.\(^{180}\) An additional “civilian protection mission” also began ground attacks against Qaddafi’s forces and in support of the rebels.\(^{181}\) An official statement was released from the Paris Summit expressing the participants’ determination to “take all necessary action, including military, consistent with UNSCR 1973, to ensure compliance with all its requirements” and acknowledging that Resolution 1973 did “not allow for any occupation of, or attempt to


occupy the Libyan territory.”\textsuperscript{182} NATO assumed control of the U.S.-led operation from March 31 onwards as Operation Unified Protector.

On April 4, the Special Envoy to Libya, Abdel-Elah Mohamed Al-Khatib, revealed in a report to the Security Council that violence in Libya persisted in spite of the effective implementation of a military no-fly zone over Libya and UN coalition efforts to protect civilians.\textsuperscript{183}

On April 14, American President Barack Obama, British Prime Minister David Cameron, and French President Nicolas Sarkozy published a letter expressing that the three found it “impossible to imagine a future for Libya with Qaddafi in power,” envisioning “a future without Qaddafi,” and emphasizing that NATO would maintain its operation “so long as Qaddafi is in power.”\textsuperscript{184} Obama, Cameron, and Sarkozy stated that for a transition from dictatorship to an inclusive political process to succeed, “Qaddafi must go and go for good.”\textsuperscript{185} The letter was perceived as tantamount to a declaration of regime change in Libya.\textsuperscript{186}

On April 19 and 20, Britain, France, and Italy sent military officers to Libya to help rebel forces improve their “military organizational structures, communications, and logistics” as they

\textsuperscript{186} Ian Black, “Libya regime change is west’s goal, but doubts remain over how to achieve it,” \textit{The Guardian}, April 15, 2011, \url{http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/15/libya-regime-change-analysis}. 
sought to combat Qaddafi’s forces. On May 20, NATO officials expressed a belief that NATO airstrikes targeting Qaddafi’s command compound had weakened Qaddafi’s military position and offered protection to rebel fighters. On May 31, it was reported that the NATO operation had intensified operations in Libya with repeated claims by the Libyan government of civilian casualties. A Libyan government spokesman claimed that the NATO air strikes had resulted in 718 civilian deaths and over 4,067 wounded between March 19 and May 26. The Libyan Foreign Minister, Abdulati Al-Obeidi, had asked the UN and the AU to declare a ceasefire, including an end to the NATO air strikes. On June 1, however, the mandate for the NATO-led operation in Libya was extended to late September, and days later, NATO intensified its air campaign by introducing attack helicopters and dropping bombs on Qaddafi’s compound in the Libyan capital.

France stated on June 29 that it had provided “light” weapons to Libyan rebel forces, confirming the first instance of a NATO country offering direct military assistance to rebel forces attempting to instigate a regime change. It was revealed one day later that Britain was

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192 UN Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record of the 6541st Meeting Held at Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, May 31, 2011 (S/PV.6541).
also offering “limited assistance” to anti-Qaddafi rebel forces, including protective clothing. Britain, France, and the United States were hoping to assist rebel forces through material aid and airstrikes in toppling the Qaddafi regime. On July 15, the United States extended formal recognition to the Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC), a major rebel group, as the legitimate government of Libya, thereby increasing diplomatic pressure on Qaddafi to leave office and permitting the rebel government to access $30 billion in Libyan assets held in the United States, possibly to fund a rebel offensive. Britain joined the United States and France on July 27 by also formally recognizing the Transitional National Council. Qaddafi was killed on October 20 and the Libyan people were declared liberated from his regime on October 23. The unanimous passage of UNSC Resolution 2016 on October 27 revoked the provisions outlined by Resolution 1973, bringing Operation Unified Protector to an end on October 31, 2011.

The Libyan airstrikes constituted the largest international military intervention in the Arab World since the invasion of Iraq. A report released in November 2011 by the Prosecutor

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201 “UN Security Council adopts resolution to end Libyan mandates,” Xinhua, October 28, 2011.
of the ICC revealed that NATO might have used force indiscriminately in civilian areas, while an Amnesty International report released on March 19, 2012 found that the NATO airstrikes had caused death and injury to “scores of civilians.”

The NATO ground campaign in support of Libyan rebel forces drew criticism for exceeding its UN mandate by attempting to secure regime change, or the “coercive, externally instigated removal” of a sitting government from power and its replacement with a different government. Regime change may be effected through direct military engagement, the displacement of the senior leadership of a government, or more indirectly such as by providing material and political support to third parties, such as rebel forces in Libya. The UN mandate authorized by Resolution 1976 had expressly forbidden regime change as a violation of the sovereignty of the Libyan government, but the NATO air strikes and ground operation helped facilitate the fall of the regime in practice. Some believed that NATO misused R2P to permit regime change in order to fulfill ulterior political motives rather than implemented regime change for the “stated and more limited humanitarian ends.”

The varied international responses to the adoption and implementation of Resolution 1973 reveal the lack of a truly global consensus on humanitarian intervention under the R2P norm. International consensus may be found regarding R2P as a tool to halt mass atrocities; however, while Western powers demonstrated a willingness to subsume sovereignty under the

\[203\] “The Crisis in Libya,” *International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect*.
\[205\] McMillan and Mickler, 291.
\[206\] McMillan and Mickler, 285.
\[207\] McMillan and Mickler, 286-290.
need for international peace, China expressed a belief that responses to crises under R2P should not infringe upon the principles of sovereignty and non-interference. A disparity may be observed in Chinese and Western conceptions of the limits of R2P. That the decision to intervene in the Libyan Civil War was met only with quiet opposition from China demonstrates that China sought to balance two conflicting sets of role expectations governing China’s responsibilities as a great power. In choosing to abstain from the vote on Resolution 1973 and to vote in favor of other UNSC resolutions addressing the Libyan situation, China attempted to strike a compromise between two conflicting great power role expectations. China’s response to the implementation of Resolution 1973 through military intervention in Libya, however, reveals significant development in Chinese role expectations.

Regional Responses to Implementation of Resolution 1973

As China’s abstention from the vote on Resolution 1973 and later diplomatic statements emphasized respect for the opinions of the Libyan government and the “concerns and stances of Arab Countries and the African Union,” the stances of Libya, the Arab League, and the African Union regarding Resolution 1973 and its implementation is critical to understanding China’s response. On March 19, the Libyan Foreign Ministry stated that it considered Resolution 1973 invalid after a Western coalition launched airstrikes on Libyan military forces, and that Libya
had “the right to use its civilian and military aircraft to defend itself” in response. Libya demanded “an urgent meeting of the UN Security Council after the French-American-British aggression against Libya” and stated that the airstrikes had caused civilian casualties. That same day, the African Union panel on the Libya crisis stated its opposition to any foreign military intervention in Libya. On March 20, Arab League chief Amr Moussa criticized the West’s bombing of Libya on the grounds that the military campaign was not what Arabs had anticipated when they agreed to impose a no-fly zone over Libya; the Arab League desired the protection of civilians rather than the bombing of civilians. On March 21, Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe expressed his belief that some Western countries had manipulated Resolution 1973 to “bombard Libya” without regard for civilian casualties and in hopes that Qaddafi would die. Mugabe believed that the African Union and Arab League “could not have voted for the destruction of Libyan lives” and that oil interests had motivated the West to attack Libya. On April 1, African Union Commission Chairman Jean Ping expressed his belief that the Western-led military operations in Libya had exceeded UN authorization and was likely to “cause an even greater humanitarian crisis.” AU representatives denounced the use of force, boycotted conferences in Paris and London, and accused NATO of exceeding the UN

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209 “Libya says UN resolution on no-fly zone invalid,” Xinhua, March 20, 2011.


212 “Countries slam Western air raids against Libya,” Xinhua, March 22, 2011.

213 “Countries slam Western air raids against Libya,” Xinhua, March 22, 2011.

mandate. On April 25, NATO forces bombed Qaddafi’s command complex in Tripoli, and the Libyan government accused NATO of attempting to assassinate Qaddafi on April 25. On April 26, Libya urged Russia to call an emergency UNSC meeting regarding what Libya referred to as “colonial and crusader aggression” against Libya. The African Union requested that NATO cease targeting Libyan officials via airstrike.

Chinese Response to Implementation of Resolution 1973

The response to Operation Unified Protector suggests that it was incompatible with China’s interpretation of R2P, which considers the use of force only after all peaceful solutions have been exhausted and demands great prudence when resorting to force. China believed that the NATO military airstrikes against Libyan forces on the ground exceeded the mandate authorized by Resolution 1973 to impose a no-fly zone over Libya. Chinese representatives expressed concern over reports that the military strikes had caused civilian casualties. On March 21, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Jiang Yu expressed regret over the NATO-led military strikes against Libya. Jiang referred to the strikes as an “abuse of force” and asserted that the implementation of Resolution 1973 was “meant to offer humanitarian protection, rather

than engender a greater humanitarian disaster.”221 Jiang called for an end to the strikes in response to reports that the use of armed forces was causing civilian casualties, opposing “the wanton use of armed force leading to more civilian casualties.”222 China expressed concerns that the air campaign over Libya exceeded the scope permitted by Resolution 1973 and called for an end to the campaign as soon as possible.223 On March 29, China called for an immediate ceasefire in Libya. Jiang restated that China disagreed with the use of force in international affairs and that disputes should be solved through peaceful political and diplomatic efforts.224 Additionally, on March 31, Jiang stated China’s belief that “the affairs and future of Libya should be decided by Libyans themselves.”225

Jiang’s remarks suggest that China objected to the NATO military operation believing that it harmed rather than contributed to international peace. In opposing the NATO Libya operation due to its perceived violation of international peace, China was enacting its interpretation of R2P as informed by role expectations that China, as a great power, is responsible for ensuring international peace and stability. The emphasis on the need for political and diplomatic strategies rather than military solutions supports China’s desire for R2P responses to remain peaceful for as long as absolutely necessary. Finally, the March 31 assertion that China

values the beliefs of the Libyan people corresponds to China’s support for an R2P interpretation that values the opinions of relevant local actors in accordance with the principles of sovereignty and multipolarity. Jiang’s statements illuminate China’s concerns for international peace, nonmilitary means to secure peace, sovereignty, and multipolarity in addressing the Libyan crisis, in accordance with role conceptions of China’s responsibility to promote these principles in its role as a global actor.

On March 31, Chinese President Hu Jintao stressed that “history has time and again proved the use of military force is no answer to any problem but [complicates] the problem,” and that the ultimate solution to the Libyan crisis lay in “dialogue and other peaceful means.” Hu stated that Resolution 1973 was intended to end internal violence and protect Libyan civilians and that military action resulting in a greater humanitarian crisis in Libya ran “counter to the original intention” of the resolution. Hu reiterated China’s “firm opposition to the use of force” and instead expressed support for a peaceful political strategy.

Hu highlights China’s concerns with the implementation of Resolution 1973: it resorted to the use of force before attempting peaceful diplomatic strategies, and this use of force exacerbated rather than alleviated the Libyan crisis. Hu’s response clarifies that China’s interpretation of R2P prefers nonmilitary political and diplomatic means when responding to crisis situations and perceives military force as a last-resort option. The use of force in NATO’s military operation in Libya was perceived to worsen the violence of the Libyan crisis rather than

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228 “China’s attitude on Libya: Give peace a chance,” People’s Daily Online, March 31, 2011.
contribute to the end of violence. Hu’s statement shows that China objected to the Libyan operation believing that it not only failed to secure international peace but even further obstructed the attainment of peace. As international peace is a prerogative demanded by both domestic Chinese conceptions and external prescriptions of China’s responsibilities in its role as a global actor, China’s objection to the implementation of R2P in Libya can be interpreted as an attempt to fulfill China’s great power role expectations.

On April 22, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei expressed China’s disapproval of “any act beyond the authorization of the United Nations Security Council.” These remarks were made in response to reports that Britain intended to send military officers to Libya. Hong reaffirmed China’s belief that “the UN Security Council shoulders the prime responsibility of safeguarding international peace and security.”

Hong’s statements emphasize the value of multipolarity and multilateralism in China’s humanitarian intervention policies. Hong draws attention to China’s belief that all responses to mass atrocities under R2P must be provisioned under the guidance of the Security Council and disapproves of intervention actions taken independently of UNSC authority. They also reflect China’s perceptions of its great power responsibility to promote multipolarity and to protect the principles of sovereignty and non-interference, particularly on behalf of developing countries that are more vulnerable to experiencing external interference.

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In June 2011, China intensified its efforts to promote a political solution to the Libyan crisis by encouraging the two sides of the conflict to engage in peaceful talks. The Chinese ambassador to Qatar, Zhang Zhiliang, met with senior officials of the Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC) on June 2, while Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi met with a special envoy of the Libyan government, Abdul Ati Al-Obidi, on June 8. During the meeting, Yang called again for a Libyan ceasefire on June 9 and for the crisis to be resolved through political means. Yang reaffirmed China’s prioritization of respect for the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Libya and the opinions of the Libyan people. Yang expressed that China supported the AU proposal and diplomatic mediation to resolve the Libyan conflict and that China was willing to communicate with interested parties and cooperate with the international community to begin a strategy of political resolution. Yang also met with the chairman of the Executive Board of Libya’s NTC on June 22 and called for both sides of the Libyan conflict to prioritize the interests of the country and to people and use political means to resolve the crisis.

Yang’s statements demonstrate that China objected to the Libyan intervention due to China’s preference for political over military means and desire to act in accordance with the visions of regional actors. This supports a Chinese interpretation of R2P that favors non-military solutions, namely diplomatic mediations. The use of military force in the Libyan intervention was perceived as ineffective and unnecessary compared to alternative non-military solutions. In

supporting the AU’s proposal to address the Libyan crisis through diplomatic mediation, Yang also reveals disapproval of the Libyan military campaign on the grounds that it failed to respect the opinions of the Libyan people and the AU. This demonstrates that China’s policy towards Libya and general interpretation of R2P were greatly influenced by domestic conceptions of China’s responsibility to secure peace and respect sovereignty as a great power.

On June 9, the director general of the West Asian and North African Affairs Department of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, Chen Xiaodong, stated that the “ultimate goal of China’s foreign policy is to safeguard and promote world peace,” and that as a permanent member of the UNSC, “China has an obligation to work together with other countries to resolve the Libya crisis peacefully as early as possible.”233 Chen’s elaboration on China’s foreign policy objectives reveals that China was seeking to fulfill its perceived responsibilities as a great power. The emphasis on working with other countries particularly supports China’s objective of promoting multipolarity—an objective that is primarily informed by domestic conceptions of China’s great power role as opposed to external prescriptions of China’s great power role.

In August, Chinese representatives continued to emphasize the importance of multipolarity and the role of the UN in humanitarian interventions. On August 2, Chinese assistant foreign minister Wu Hailong called for the UN to play a more significant role in easing tensions in Libya and to intensify UN mediation efforts and strengthen consultations with

regional organizations to obtain a Libyan ceasefire “as early as possible.” Jiang Yu also emphasized that the UN should play a leading role in helping to reconstruct Libya. On August 29, Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping vowed that China would support the UN’s leading role in resolving the Libyan crisis and the UN’s greater role in addressing global issues. The explicit preference for the UN to assume a more influential role in solving the Libyan conflict targeted NATO’s leadership of the Libyan military operation. The emphasis on the role of the UN, a multilateral organization, and the need to increase cooperation with regional actors both highlight the value of multipolarity in China’s intervention policy. This may be expressed as a Chinese desire to contribute to greater multilateralism in global governance in accordance with its perceived great power responsibilities.

On August 29, Chinese UN Ambassador Li Baodong presented four principles that China believed should be followed in handling the next stage of the Libyan situation: first, to bring an early end to the conflicts, second, to initiate an inclusive political process as soon as possible, third, to respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Libya and the will and choice of the Libyan people, and fourth, to embrace the “leading role of the Security Council while other countries, international mechanisms and international conferences should also play a

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236 “China backs UN’s leading role in Libya issue: vice president,” Xinhua, August 30, 2011, [http://en.people.cn/90883/7583317.html](http://en.people.cn/90883/7583317.html).
supplementary role under the guidance of the UN Charter and established principles concerning the Libyan issue.”

Li’s August 29 statement illuminates China’s preferences in addressing the Libyan crisis. His first point indicates a desire to end the violence as soon as possible and aligns with China’s stated importance of the value of international peace. This shows that China’s intervention policy in Libya aligns with both internally- and externally-derived and expectations of China’s great power responsibility to secure global peace. The second point demands an “inclusive” political process, signaling both a preference for a political rather than military response in responding to mass atrocities and a desire for diplomatic mediations that invite the contributions of regional actors and developing countries, rather than only Western great powers. The emphasis on the value of non-military means supports the need to attempt political and diplomatic solutions in China’s interpretation of R2P, while the focus on inclusive political negotiations indicates the importance of multipolarity in Chinese conceptions of R2P. Li’s second point presents China’s Libyan intervention policy as compatible with domestic role conceptions of China’s great power behavior, which instruct China to uphold multipolarity and invite the representation of developing countries. The third point highlights the role of sovereignty in shaping China’s Libyan policies; by emphasizing the need to take the desires of the Libyan people into account, Li shows that China’s interpretation of R2P views the NATO-led intervention as incompatible with the will of the Libyan people and therefore constitutes a violation of sovereignty. Thus, Li’s third point shows that China’s intervention policy is compatible with domestic conceptions of

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China’s great power responsibility to uphold respect for state sovereignty. Finally, Li’s fourth point expresses a desire for the UNSC to assume a leading role in addressing the Libyan crisis, while other countries and regional actors perform supplementary roles. This demonstrates China’s desire for greater multipolarity in intervention, and in global governance generally—for the UNSC, a multilateral organization, to exert the greatest influence in implementing humanitarian interventions, as opposed to other countries, such as the Western great powers leading the Libyan military intervention. The four points of Li’s statement present China’s intervention policy in the Libyan crisis as compatible with domestic conceptions of China’s responsibilities as a great power.

China’s response to the implementation of R2P showed that China disapproved of the operation because it did resort to the use of force before adequately attempting political and diplomatic methods, because this use of force did not help to secure international peace, and because the use of force [ignored/did not take into account] the will of regional actors, thus infringing upon sovereignty. China’s objections to the Libyan operation reveal an interpretation of R2P that is informed by China’s domestic conceptions of its great power responsibilities that demand advocacy on behalf of international peace, sovereignty, and multipolarity.

*China’s Response to Implementation of Resolution 1973 as Evidence of Role Learning*

China’s response to the implementation of Resolution 1973 may be interpreted as a case of **role learning**. Role learning is a continuous process that is fueled by experience, and the
negative consequences of the implementation of Resolution 1973 offered greater support for Chinese national conceptions of great power responsibilities and weakened support for Western expectations of great power responsibilities. China modified beliefs concerning its responsibilities as a great power following China’s interpretation of the Libyan intervention. China’s role learning during the Libyan intervention resulted in the dominance of national Chinese role conceptions over Western role prescriptions in shaping China’s responsibilities in its great power role.

The contrast between China’s response to the passage of UNSC Resolution 1970 and Resolution 1973 and China’s response to the implementation of these resolutions demonstrates that a process of Chinese role learning occurred during the Libyan operation. During deliberations over Resolution 1970 and 1973, China’s UN ambassador emphasized China’s desire for international peace and China’s respect for sovereignty, non-interference, and multipolarity in the pursuit of international peace. The Chinese delegation voted in favor of Resolution 1970 and abstained from voting on Resolution 1973, demonstrating a desire to compromise between domestic role conceptions and external role prescriptions for China’s great power role.

China’s response to the implementation of the UN Libyan intervention resolutions, however, was guided by the pursuit of international peace, sovereignty, non-interference, and multipolarity, and China’s continued objections to the Libyan intervention was consistently attributed to perceived violations of these principles. China’s increased emphasis on peace, sovereignty, non-interference, and multipolarity throughout the Libyan intervention suggest that China’s experience of the intervention transformed role conceptions of China’s responsibilities
as a great power. In contrast to China’s ambiguous intervention policies before Operation Unified Protector, as demonstrated by China’s attempt to compromise between two conflicting sets of great power role expectations in response to Resolution 1970 and Resolution 1973, China’s responses to Operation Unified Protector were consistently aligned with internally-derived understandings of China’s great power role. The increased salience and uniformity of China’s intervention policy during the Libyan operation suggest that China’s Libyan experience led to the reconfiguration of Chinese role conceptions through a process of role learning.

Review of China’s Libyan Response

China’s UNSC voting behavior was influenced by the degree of intensity of role conflict between national Chinese conceptions of its great power role and Western prescriptions of its great power role. Resolution 1970 caused China to experience a mild role conflict, which China responded to by voting in favor of the resolution. Resolution 1973 triggered a moderate role conflict for China, leading China to abstain from voting on the resolution. The implementation of Resolution 1973, however, created a severe role conflict for China regarding its expected behavior as an international actor. China responded to this high-intensity role conflict by displaying strong opposition to the military intervention in Libya. The development of UNSC attempts to intervene in the Libyan Civil War constituted a process of role learning that permitted China to increase its support for national role conceptions of China’s responsibilities as a great power.
VI. China and the Syrian Civil War

China’s response to the Syrian Civil War reveals the effects of role learning that China gained through its Libyan intervention experience and also demonstrates role adaptation. The developments in China’s conceptions of its role as a responsible great power during the Libyan Civil War resulted in a shift in China’s intervention policy, and this shift is observable in Chinese responses to UN attempts to intervene in Syria. China’s modified stance on intervention in the Syrian case demonstrates the progression of a role learning process and the resolution of role ambiguity and role conflict, while the new use of its Security Council veto power as a strategy to enact its modified role as a responsible great power demonstrates role adaptation.

I will trace Chinese responses to international attempts to intervene in Syria in China’s capacity as a permanent member of the UN Security Council during the Syrian Civil War. I will examine the contents of UNSC resolutions and draft resolutions that were brought before the UNSC for voting on October 4, 2011, February 4, 2012, and May 22, 2014 and the final vote counts for each draft resolution. Then, to understand the influence of domestic role conceptions in shaping China’s Syrian intervention policies, I will analyze statements from China’s UN ambassador and other Chinese government officials that explain China’s vote on each of these draft resolutions.

*Threat of Sanctions: UNSC Draft Resolution S/2011/612*
On October 4, 2011, draft resolution S/2011/612 was placed to a vote by the UNSC. The resolution was submitted by France, Germany, Portugal, and the United Kingdom. With 9 votes in favor, 4 abstentions, and 2 vetoes, the draft resolution was not adopted. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, France, Gabon, Germany, Nigeria, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States voted in favor of the draft resolution. Brazil, India, Lebanon, and South Africa abstained from voting on the draft resolution. China and Russia voted against the draft resolution, exercising their veto power as permanent members of the UNSC to block its passage. The draft resolution sought to condemn the “continued grave and systematic human rights violations and the use of force against civilians” by the Syrian government, demand an end to the human rights violations and use of force, call for an “inclusive Syrian-led political process” that included the contributions of the Syrian opposition and “all sections of Syrian society,” encourage the Arab League to continue efforts to end the violence and promote such a political process, and warn of further options to be considered against the Syrian government: sanctions.

Analysis of China’s Statement on Draft Resolution S/2011/612

Chinese ambassador to the UN, Li Baodong, issued a statement following the failure of draft resolution S/2011/612 to pass that explained China’s decision to exercise its veto.

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Li began by expressing China’s concern about the Syrian situation and called upon the various parties of Syria to “exercise restraint” and “avoid more bloodshed and all forms of violence.” Li also expressed China’s hope that the Syrian government would implement commitments to reform and that an inclusive, Syrian-led political process could begin as soon as possible. The beginning of Li’s statement display’s China’s concern for international peace and China’s corresponding desire for the Syrian atrocities to end. The expressed hope for Syria to begin reforms and engage in a political process reveals that China did not object to the elements of the draft resolution that encouraged an end to the Syrian government’s human rights atrocities and the start of an inclusive, Syrian-led political process.

Li introduces the next part of his statement by emphasizing the need for the international community to offer “constructive assistance” to contribute to the achievement of the objectives mentioned in the introduction of Li’s statement while paying full respect to the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Syria “in the meantime.” The demand to uphold Syria’s sovereignty is consistent with China’s R2P interpretation, but the specification of “constructive assistance” is a new development.

The next part of Li’s statement may offer clarification on the Chinese understanding of “constructive assistance.” Li states that the UNSC should only take further action in addressing the Syrian crisis if the action would “facilitate the easing of tension in Syria, help to defuse differences through political dialogue,” “contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability in the Middle East,” and comply with the UN Charter and the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states, “which has a bearing upon the security and survival of developing
countries, in particular small and medium-sized countries, as well as on world peace and stability.”

The first three elements that determine whether China supports UNSC action in Syria demand that any action taken must help ensure to peace in Syria through political dialogue. The emphasis on contributing to peace and stability may reference China’s response to the Libyan intervention that, according to the statements of Chinese government representatives, increased the violence of the Libyan crisis rather than helping to alleviate it. China’s clarification of political dialogue as the only method that China would support the UNSC in undertaking also undercuts any possibility of more coercive humanitarian measures, such as military intervention similar to the NATO-led operation conducted in Libya. While China has previously referenced the UN Charter as an important guiding document for acts of humanitarian intervention to follow, Li’s statement offers a greater degree of specificity by highlighting the principle of non-interference—a principle that is outlined not only in the UN Charter but also in China’s foreign policy objectives. Li draws greater attention to the importance of non-interference as a principle to guide intervention policy. Furthermore, when Li states that compliance with the principle of non-interference can determine the “security and survival of developing countries,” highlighting the impact on small and medium-sized countries in particular, Li draws attention to the concerns of smaller developing countries. Li is essentially advocating for greater multipolarity as the UNSC considers various strategies to address the Syrian crisis. Li’s emphasis on global peace, political rather than military means, non-interference, and multipolarity aligns with expectations

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240 UN Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record of the 6627th Meeting Held at Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, October 4, 2011 (S/PV.6627).
for China’s great power role that are strongly informed by domestic role conceptions rather than external role prescriptions.

Next, Li asserts the consistency of the Chinese position on humanitarian intervention, emphasizes China’s history of positive and constructive contribution to the draft resolutions, and states, “sanctions or the threat thereof does not help to resolve the question of Syria and, instead, may further complicate the situation.” Li characterized the draft resolution as focused “solely on exerting pressure on Syria, even threatening to impose sanctions,” rather than helping to facilitate greater peace in Syria. These words suggest Li’s definition of “constructive” assistance as actions that contribute to greater international peace, and previous sections of Li’s statement suggest a belief that greater peace can only be obtained through political and diplomatic mediation rather than through any actions that seek to pressure a government, such as military force or, as China feared as a possibility in the draft resolution, sanctions.

A marked contrast can be seen in the difference between China’s response to the October 11 draft resolution and China’s earlier responses to resolutions seeking to address the Libyan situation. China voted in favor of Resolution 1970, which imposed sanctions on the Libyan government; however, by vetoing the October 11 draft resolution, China was negating the future possibility of imposing sanctions on the Syrian government. Rather than voting in favor of

241 UN Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record of the 6627th Meeting Held at Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, October 4, 2011 (S/PV.6627).
242 UN Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record of the 6627th Meeting Held at Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, October 4, 2011 (S/PV.6627).
sanctions, as the Chinese UN delegation did in February 2011, an emphasis was placed on the inability of sanctions to help resolve the Syrian situation and that sanctions may “further complicate the situation.” China’s dramatically altered position on sanctions as a method of humanitarian intervention between February 2011 and October 2011 suggests that China experienced a process of role learning during the Libyan intervention. The change in China’s position may be attributed to China’s experience throughout the unfolding of the UNSC intervention in Libya. UNSC actions in Libya began with sanctions, which China voted in favor for, progressed to the enforcement of a military no-fly zone, which China abstained from voting on, and escalated to a military air operation, which China continuously objected to. Perhaps China feared that permitting the first step, sanctions, in the Syrian situation would lead to a similar escalation of the intensity and scale of the Syrian intervention. China’s firm stance against sanctions to address the Syrian situation demonstrates a shift in China’s humanitarian intervention policy, which may be explained by role learning.

Li concluded his statement by stressing that peace and stability in Syria is important not only for the Syrian people, but also for the international community. Li stated China’s willingness to play a “positive and constructive role in appropriately resolving” the Syrian crisis and to continue supporting “mediation efforts of the relevant countries and organizations in the region.” The end of Li’s statement presents global peace as a responsibility of the international community, recalling expectations of China’s responsible great power role. The repeated emphasis on “constructive” solutions alongside the declaration of continued Chinese support for

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UN Security Council, *Provisional Verbatim Record of the 6627th Meeting Held at Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, October 4, 2011 (S/PV.6627).*
“mediation efforts” deepens China’s stated commitment to political and diplomatic mediation as an intervention strategy as opposed to military interventions, while the specification of “relevant countries and organizations in the region” as leaders in initiating mediation efforts may be interpreted as a Chinese promotion of sovereignty and multipolarity. Li expressed a desire by China not only to respect the opinions of regional actors, as previous statements have indicated, but to support regional actors in actively shaping and undertaking mediation efforts. Li’s emphasis on non-coercive forms of intervention in which regional actors play a leading role displays the focus on sovereignty and multipolarity in China’s intervention policy.

Democratic Transition: UNSC Draft Resolution S/2012/77

On February 4, 2012, draft resolution S/2011/612 failed to pass in the UNSC. The resolution was submitted by Bahrain, Colombia, Egypt, France, Germany, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United States, constituting a more internationally representative draft resolution than the resolution brought to vote on October 4, 2011. With 13 votes in favor and 2 vetoes, the draft resolution was not adopted by the UNSC. The delegations from Azerbaijan, Colombia, France, Germany, Guatemala, India, Morocco, Pakistan, Portugal, South Africa, Togo, the United Kingdom, and the United States voted in favor of the draft resolution, while China and Russia exercising their veto power as permanent members of the UNSC to prevent its passage. The draft resolution sought to condemn the “continued widespread..."
and gross violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms” by the Syrian government, demand an end to violence from all parties in Syria in accordance with the Arab League initiative, call for an “inclusive Syrian-led political process” without a prejudged outcome, offer full support to the Arab League’s decision to “facilitate a Syrian-led political transition to a democratic, plural political system,” encourage the Arab League to continue efforts to cooperate “with all Syrian stakeholders,” and decide to consider further measures in the event of non-compliance from the Syrian government.245

Analysis of China’s Statement on Draft Resolution S/2012/77

The Chinese ambassador to the UN, Li Baodong, issued a statement that explained China’s decision to vote against the draft resolution S/2011/612.

Li began by calling upon “all parties in Syria” to cease acts of violence and especially to avoid civilian casualties. Li expressed that the quick restoration of order in Syria and respect for the Syrian people’s request for reform were “in the fundamental interest of Syria and its people.” Li also supported the efforts by the Arab League to resolve the Syrian situation and promote an “early launch” of an inclusive, Syrian-led political process involving extensive participation from all parties.246


246 UN Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record of the 6711st Meeting Held at Headquarters, New York, on Saturday, February 4, 2012 (S/PV.6711).
This portion of Li’s statement clarifies the elements of the draft resolution that were supported by the Chinese delegation. It suggests that China did not object to demanding an end to the violence in Syria, in accordance with China’s expressed interest in global peace and security. Additionally, China demonstrates support for an inclusive, Syrian-led political process, which aligns with China’s preferences for diplomatic mediation as appropriate means for humanitarian intervention and for intervention actions that take the opinions of the local government and local population into account. China also expresses support for the Arab League’s participation in facilitating such an inclusive, Syrian-led political process to “peacefully resolve differences and disputes through dialogue and negotiations,” a statement that showcases China’s preference for intervention strategies that include the opinions and cooperation of regional actors. Notably, however, Li expresses support only for the Arab League’s efforts to facilitate a political process and does not address the Arab League’s decision to enact a transition to a “democratic, plural political system” in Syria.

Next, Li expresses a need for the international community to offer “constructive assistance” to restore order in Syria while fully respecting the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Syria. Li also expressed the need for UNSC actions addressing the Syrian situation to “comply with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations” and to “help ease the tensions, help promote political dialogue and diffuse disputes, and help maintain peace and stability in the Middle East region, rather than complicate the issue.”

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247 UN Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record of the 6711st Meeting Held at Headquarters, New York, on Saturday, February 4, 2012 (S/PV.6711).
248 UN Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record of the 6711st Meeting Held at Headquarters, New York, on Saturday, February 4, 2012 (S/PV.6711).
While this portion of Li’s statement is consistent with previous expressions of China’s R2P interpretation that expressed the importance of respecting state sovereignty and the UN Charter while undertaking R2P actions, it also adds increased specificity regarding the extent to which China believes humanitarian actions should comply with the UN Charter. Rather than simply drawing attention to the UN Charter as a source of guidance for UNSC actions, Li states that the “purposes and principles” underlying the UN Charter must also be respected. This may be interpreted as a stricter interpretation of R2P compared to that expressed in previous Chinese statements, which focused on the principles of the UN Charter but not the purposes outlined in Article 1 of the UN Charter.

Li then explains China’s stance on attempts to address the Syrian situation. Li expresses that China had actively participated in the consultations for the draft resolutions and supported efforts by the Arab League to initiate a political settlement and maintain stability.249 Li then states China’s belief that placing “undue emphasis on pressuring the Syrian government for a prejudged result of the dialogue or to impose any solution” would not help to resolve the situation and instead could pose further complications.

Li’s statement illuminates the area of incompatibility between the draft resolution and China’s humanitarian intervention policies. Li shows that China’s objection to the resolution lies in China’s perception that the UNSC sought to pressure the Syrian government to reach a “prejudged result” following a process of political dialogue. This may be interpreted as an expression of China’s objection to the draft resolution’s support for a “Syrian-led political

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249 UN Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record of the 6711st Meeting Held at Headquarters, New York, on Saturday, February 4, 2012 (S/PV.6711).
transition to a democratic, plural political system.” Li suggests that China is supportive of political solutions to the Syrian situation that involve a leading role by the people of Syria, but that China’s support requires that such a political solution not be designed to achieve a predetermined result, such as a regime change. Li’s statement reveals that while China may support political dialogues as a response to mass atrocity situations, China’s support does not extend to political dialogues that are designed to achieve an externally-imposed end result. China perceived such an externally-designed result as “undue pressure” on the Syrian government, and as a pressure that was unlikely to yield results for international peace and stability. China’s opposition to political pressure as a method of resolving the Syrian situation demonstrates that China’s intervention policy constricted to prevent regime change as an option following the Libyan intervention.

Li then showed that China supported the amendments to the draft resolution proposed by Russia. Li also expressed disappointment over how the request for continued consultations over the draft resolution was not taken into account, and how the draft resolution was put to vote despite serious disagreements over the draft resolution did not help maintain “the unity and authority of the Security Council” or help to address the Syrian issue. Li explained that China voted against the draft resolution for these reasons. The amendments proposed by Russia required the Syrian opposition to distance itself from violent extremist groups, demanded that armed opposition groups cease attacks, and proposed greater “flexibility for the intermediary efforts of the League of Arab States” to increase the chances of success from an inclusive,

250 UN Security Council, 6711st Meeting, Bahrain, Colombia, Egypt, France, Germany, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution (S/2012/77), February 4, 2012.
Syrian-led political process.\textsuperscript{251} Li closed his statement by emphasizing that peace and stability in Syria would serve not only Syrian interests but also the interests of the international community.

China’s support for the Russian amendments reveals a desire to enact an intervention policy that placed less pressure on the Syrian government by demanding the cessation of violence from both armed opposition groups and Syrian forces, as well as by requiring the Arab League to facilitate a political process without pursuing a democratic regime change. Additionally, the displeasure voiced by Li regarding the UNSC’s decision to vote on the draft resolution despite the reservations of the Chinese and Russian delegations demonstrates a desire by China to contribute to a UNSC response to the Syrian crisis that aligned more with China’s intervention policy. China’s decision to veto the draft resolution reveals that placing pressure on the Syrian government to accept a regime change to a democratic political system violated China’s non-intervention policy.

\textit{Unarmed Observation Mission: UNSC Resolution 2042}

On April 12, 2012, the UNSC passed Resolution 2042 unanimously. The resolution supported the implementation of the six-point plan proposed by the Joint Special Envoy of the United Nations and the League of Arab States, Kofi Annan, called upon the Syrian government to implement its commitments to the plan, and authorized an “advance team of up to 30 unarmed military observers” to monitor the Syrian ceasefire and liaise with the involved parties.\textsuperscript{252} The

\textsuperscript{251} UN Security Council, \textit{Provisional Verbatim Record of the 6711\textsuperscript{st} Meeting Held at Headquarters, New York, on Saturday, February 4, 2012} (S/PV.6711).


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Syrian representative who attended the meeting expressed concern over the “ill intentions” of some UNSC members towards Syria “in that they deliberately do not hold armed gangs accountable for their crimes.” The representative expressed commitment to the Joint Special Envoy’s plan but also a belief that the resolution was unbalanced for not holding armed opposition groups responsible for helping to maintain the ceasefire.

The monitoring team of unarmed observers was expanded on April 21, 2012 with the unanimous adoption of UNSC Resolution 2043, which increased the number of unarmed observers from 30 to 300. The monitoring mission was suspended in June due to escalated violence in Syria.

Analysis of China’s Statement on Resolution 2042

Chinese ambassador to the UN, Li Baodong, explained China’s decision to vote in favor of Resolution 2042 following its adoption by the UNSC.

Li continued his statement in a manner consistent with previous Chinese statements regarding humanitarian intervention in the Arab Spring; by upholding the importance of maintaining the sovereignty and independence of Syria and the choice and will of the Syrian

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people. Li also expressed China’s belief that the Syrian crisis should be resolved peacefully through political dialogue. Li urged all parties, including the Syrian government and opposition groups, to honor their commitments to uphold the ceasefire and create conditions to facilitate the start of a Syrian-led inclusive political process.\textsuperscript{257} This portion of Li’s statement is consistent with previous expressions of China’s policy on humanitarian intervention in the context of the UNSC.

Next, Li expressed China’s appreciation and support for Annan’s efforts to facilitate a political solution to the Syrian crisis and encouraged all parties in Syria and the international community to cooperate with the mediation. This presents a contrast to Li’s explanation of China’s decision to veto the draft resolution on February 4, 2012, demonstrating that the political solution proposed in Resolution 2042 was compatible with China’s expectations of a proper political solution. China’s support for the political mediation efforts outlined in Resolution 2042 clarifies the nature of political responses that China finds acceptable in addressing humanitarian crises.

Li then stated that the imminent deployment of the advance team of the Syrian supervision mission would contribute to Anna’s mediation efforts and acknowledged the consent of the Syrian government in authorizing the advance team. Li said that China hoped the advance team would respect the sovereignty of Syria and act “in strict accordance with the mandate of the Security Council.” The recognition of the consent of the Syrian government and the emphasis on the importance of respecting sovereignty and the UN Charter are consistent with previous statements outlining China’s intervention policy.

\textsuperscript{257} UN Security Council, \textit{Provisional Verbatim Record of the 6751st Meeting Held at Headquarters, New York, on Saturday, April 14, 2012 (S/PV.6751).}
**Action Group for Syria Final Communiqué on June 30, 2012**

On June 30, 2012, the UN held an Action Group Conference, now referred to as the Geneva I Conference on Syria, to seek a resolution to the Syrian Civil War. The Action Group for Syria was initiated by Joint Special Envoy to Syria Kofi Annan and attended by the Action Group for Syria representatives from the UN, the Arab League, China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, Turkey, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, and the European Union.\(^\text{258}\)

The conference culminated in a final communiqué containing agreed principles and guidelines for a Syrian-led political transition. Such a transition was required to employ “peaceful dialogue and negotiation alone,” and the attendees stated a shared opposition to “any further militarization of the conflict.”\(^\text{259}\)

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On July 19, 2012, draft resolution S/2012/538 was not adopted by the UNSC due to vetoes by China and Russia. The draft resolution was submitted by France, Germany, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and it sought to endorse the June 30 Action Group Final Communiqué, demand compliance with the 6-point plan submitted by the Joint Special Envoy, renew the mandate of the United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) for 45 days, and, in the event that Syrian authorities did not fully comply with Resolutions 2042 and

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2043 within 10 days, threaten the immediate imposition of sanctions under Article 41 of the UN Charter. Azerbaijan, Colombia, France, Germany, Guatemala, India, Morocco, Portugal, Togo, the United Kingdom, and the United States voted in favor of the draft resolution. Pakistan and South Africa abstained from voting on the draft resolution. China and Russia vetoed the draft resolution and prevented its passage. This was the third exercise of a veto on draft resolutions seeking to address the Syrian crisis by both China and Russia.

The draft resolution was considered alongside text of an alternative draft resolution submitted by Russia, S/2012/547/Rev.2, and the Russian representative stated that he would not put Russia’s draft to a vote but instead work for a “depoliticized text” to permit the extension of the mandate of UNSMIS.

Analysis of China’s Statement on Draft Resolution S/2012/538

Li Baodong issued a statement explaining China’s decision to veto UNSC draft resolution S/2012/538.

Li began by stating China’s deep concern over the escalating crisis in Syria and China’s opposition to terrorism and violence. Li presented full support and cooperation for Annan’s mediation plan and promotion of the implementation of the June 30 Action Group Final Communique as top priorities for the international community. The international community was encouraged to call for an immediate ceasefire and cessation of all violence in Syria. Additionally,

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Li stated that the UNSMIS had played an important role in helping to resolve the Syrian crisis and that China supported the extension of the UNSMIS mandate. Speaking on behalf of China, Li called on the UNSC to signal its support for Annan’s mediation and promotion of a political settlement to the Syrian situation.261

The statement demonstrates China’s support for certain elements of the draft resolution. China approved of the June 30 Communiqué, which it helped shape, as well as Annan’s mediation plan and the extension of UNSMIS. This indicates that these proposed UNSC actions conform to China’s intervention policy and China’s interpretation of R2P. China believed that these actions would benefit international peace and security while respecting state sovereignty and the input of regional actors—all outcomes valued by China in its responsibilities as a global actor.

Li claimed that the draft resolution completely contradicted the aims of UNSMIS and Annan’s mediation plan. First, Li identified a flaw in the “unbalanced content” of the draft resolution, which sought to pressure only one party. Li expressed that experience had shown that placing pressure on one party would not help to resolve the Syrian crisis but would instead “derail the matter from the political track” by exacerbating the turmoil, causing the instability to spread throughout the region, undermine regional peace and stability, and harm the interests of the people of Syria and other regional countries.262

The first of China’s objections to the draft resolutions lies in the belief that it did not place equal responsibility on all parties in Syria to cease acts of violence. Instead, China felt that

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262 UN Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record of the 6810th Meeting Held at Headquarters, New York, on Thursday, July 19, 2012 (S/PV.6810).
the resolution sought to impose pressure only on the Syrian government and did not address measures to be taken by Syrian opposition groups. This may be interpreted to refer to condemnations and demands on the Syrian government included in the draft resolution, as well as (or even especially) the threat of sanctions in the event of noncompliance by the Syrian government. China did not believe that placing unequal pressure on the parties in Syria would contribute to the attainment of peace and stability in Syria. This demonstrates once more a departure from China’s stance on humanitarian intervention in February 2011, when China voted in favor of imposing sanctions on the Libyan government. In contrast, China’s objection to the unbalanced nature of the July 19 draft resolution indicates an objection to sanctions as a means of pressuring governments to work towards peace and stability.

Second, Li believed that the draft resolution “would seriously erode international trust and cooperation” regarding the Syrian crisis and perceived the draft resolution as attempting to undermine the consensus that fostered the June 30 Communiqué. Li presented the draft resolution as contradictory to the Annan’s mediation efforts, which Li portrayed as an “important and realistic” step towards a political resolution of the Syrian crisis.

While Li reiterates China’s support for the June 30 Communiqué and the mediation plan presented by Joint Special Envoy Annan, Li expresses a belief that the draft resolution was inconsistent with the aims of the June 30 Communiqué and Annan’s mediation plan. Li’s statement reveals a perception that the draft resolution sought not only to undermine the objectives of these plans, but also, in undermining the June 30 Communiqué which was borne out of multilateral consensus, to damage international cooperation aimed to address the Syrian
crisis. Li’s statement indicates that China did not believe the draft resolution to reflect the desires of the international community in seeking to resolve the Syrian situation.

Third, Li emphasizes the central role of sovereign equality and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries as “the basic norms governing inter-State relations enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations” before expressing China’s consistent belief that “the future and fate of Syria should be independently decided by the Syrian people, rather than imposed by outside forces.” Li states China’s belief in political means as the appropriate strategy to address the Syrian issue, rather than military means, which “would achieve nothing.” Li highlights China’s “consistent position on international affairs” and purposes of safeguarding the interests of the Syrian people, Arab countries, and all countries, particularly small and medium-sized countries, and protecting the authority of the UN and the UNSC and norms of international relations.

This portion of Li’s statement proves most illuminating. Li’s emphasis on the importance of sovereignty, non-interference, multipolarity, and the role of the UNSC is consistent with previous Chinese statements addressing humanitarian intervention strategies and with Chinese foreign policy views. By highlighting the need to respect sovereignty and the weight of the opinions of the Syrian people, Li makes clear that China will not support a solution that appears externally-imposed and does not involve extensive participation from the Syrian people. Previous statements by Chinese representatives have expressed desires for a solution that

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263 UN Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record of the 6810th Meeting Held at Headquarters, New York, on Thursday, July 19, 2012 (S/PV.6810).
264 UN Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record of the 6810th Meeting Held at Headquarters, New York, on Thursday, July 19, 2012 (S/PV.6810).
265 UN Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record of the 6810th Meeting Held at Headquarters, New York, on Thursday, July 19, 2012 (S/PV.6810).
involves the input and leadership of the Syrian people. The interesting part of Li’s statement, however, is the emphasis on China’s preference for political over military means. The draft resolution made no mention of the potential use of military force, with the prospect of sanctions to be imposed in the future constituting the most coercive aspect of the draft resolution. Li’s specification of China’s objection to military intervention reveals not only the limits of China’s intervention policy, but also China’s fear that attempts to address the Syrian humanitarian crisis could possibly escalate into a military intervention like Operation Unified Protector in Libya during 2011. This idea is supported by British ambassador to the UNSC, Mark Grant, who expressed a belief that objections from China and Russia were based in a fear that the draft resolution was “designed to seek military action through the back door,” though Grant also described such fears as irrational and that the resolution could not be interpreted as a precursor to military intervention in Syria.266 Li’s reference to military intervention indicates Chinese fears of another intervention in the style of the Libyan military intervention, demonstrating that China’s experience with the Libyan intervention constituted a process of role learning. China’s disapproval of the Libyan intervention caused China to reevaluate its intervention policy in the case of Syria.

Fourth, Li emphasizes that the draft resolution undermines the unity of the UNSC; as opposed to the unanimous adoptions of Resolution 2042 and Resolution 2043, the deliberations over the draft resolution on July 21 exhibited a lack of cooperation between the countries sponsoring the draft resolution and the other countries comprising the UNSC. Li expressed dissatisfaction over the belief that the sponsoring countries refused to engage in further

266 UN Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record of the 6810th Meeting Held at Headquarters, New York, on Thursday, July 19, 2012 (S/PV.6810).
consultations, as requested by China, other UNSC members, and Annan, and insisted on holding the draft resolution to a vote.

This portion of Li’s statement displays China’s concern that forcing the UNSC to vote on a contentious draft resolution damaged the perceived unity of the UNSC, potentially weakening its international influence as a multilateral institution. China appeared dissatisfied by the insistence of other UNSC members to hold a vote despite reservations by some UNSC representatives. China’s objections conform to China’s interpretation of R2P that upholds a central role of the UNSC in shaping and guiding humanitarian interventions. The focus on the UN as a multilaterally representative institution is also consistent with conceptions of the promotion of multilateralism and multipolarity as China’s great power responsibility.

Li then explains that the Chinese delegation could not vote in favor of the draft resolution for the stated reasons and defends China against “unfounded accusations” made by other UNSC representatives.267 Li asserted that these accusations were “completely mistaken” and based on ulterior motives and that China had participated in UNSC deliberations concerning Syria in a “positive, responsible, and constructive manner.”268 Li reiterated China’s intent to encourage a ceasefire and the cessation of violence in Syria and to ensure the implementation of the June 30 Communiqué, Annan’s mediation plan, and Resolutions 2042 and 2043. Li accused “a few countries” of possessing a desire to “interfere in the internal affairs of other countries, to fuel the

267 UN Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record of the 6810th Meeting Held at Headquarters, New York, on Thursday, July 19, 2012 (S/PV.6810).
268 UN Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record of the 6810th Meeting Held at Headquarters, New York, on Thursday, July 19, 2012 (S/PV.6810).
flames, and to sow discord in complete disregard of the possible consequences.”

Li accused those “few countries” of setting preconditions to obstruct the extension of the mandate of UNSMIS and threatening sanctions to undermine the consensus that resulted in the June 30 Communiqué. Li questioned the desire of those countries to resolve the Syrian crisis through a Syrian-led political settlement and urged them to “return immediately to the right road.” Li expressed a desire that the sponsoring countries would change their minds before the expiration of the UNSMIS mandate and strive to produce a political solution to the Syrian issue. Doing so would protect the interests of the people of Syria and the surrounding region and safeguard the “credibility, authority, and unity of the Security Council.”

Li explained that China vetoed the draft resolution due in part to the apparent desire by other countries to violate the sovereignty of Syria and pursue intervention strategies that would exacerbate rather than alleviate the Syrian crisis. China made evident its firm opposition to the threat of sanctions and saw the attempt to threaten sanctions as contrary to the developments achieved on June 30. In defending China against the accusations by other UNSC representatives, Li emphasizes China’s sincere interest in obtaining an effective resolution to the Syrian crisis and also reveals China’s belief that any strategy involving a greater degree of coercion than diplomatic mediation would fail to promote peace in Syria. Li’s statement defends the goodwill behind China’s intervention policy and also illuminates the limits of China’s intervention policy. Li shows that sanctions have become a hard limit of China’s humanitarian intervention policy, providing a sharp contrast between China’s July 2012 intervention stance and China’s February

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2011 intervention stance. The role learning experienced by China during the Libyan intervention may account for developments in China’s intervention policy.

*Extension of Unarmed Observation Mission: UNSC Resolution 2059*

On July 20, 2012, mere hours before the expiration of the UNSMIS mandate, the UNSC passed Resolution 2059 unanimously, extending the mandate of the observer mission by 30 days.\(^{271}\) The resolution also decreed that the mandate of UNSMIS would be renewed “only in the event” of the cessation of the use of heavy weapons and of a reduction in violence by all sides in the Syrian crisis.\(^{272}\) Azerbaijan, Colombia, China, France, Germany, Guatemala, India, Morocco, Pakistan, Portugal, Russia, South Africa, Togo, the United Kingdom, and the United States all passed the resolution without offering statements explaining their votes in its favor.

China’s vote in favor of Resolution 2059 is consistent with the statements of Chinese ambassador to the UN, Li Baodong, which expressed support for the UNSMIS and suggested that China’s objections to the July 19 draft resolutions lay with the attempt to threaten sanctions on the Syrian government.

*China’s Response to the Syrian Crisis as Evidence of Role Learning*

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Chinese humanitarian intervention policies at the beginning of the UNSC response to the Libyan Civil War demonstrate that China was amenable to infringements upon state sovereignty in the pursuit of international peace, as demonstrated by China’s willingness to impose sanctions on the Libyan government and China’s decision to abstain from voting on Resolution 1973, thereby permitting a humanitarian intervention in Libya through the establishment of a military no-fly zone. This may be interpreted as an attempt by China to strike a compromise between two conflicting sets of role expectations of its behavior as a global actor, one that stressed the paramount importance of upholding the principles of state sovereignty and non-interference at all costs and another that expected China as a global actor to accept tradeoffs of state sovereignty and non-interference in order to attain global peace and stability. These two sets of great power role expectations offered China with two sets of guidelines informing Chinese policies on humanitarian intervention. The former expected China to not permit humanitarian intervention actions that would violate the principles of sovereignty and non-interference, while the latter expected China to prioritize humanitarian intervention efforts over sovereignty and non-interference. By expressing support for Resolution 1970 and by not blocking Resolution 1973, China was attempting to compromise between its conflicting internally- and externally-derived expectations for China’s great power role.

China’s responses to the implementation of the Libyan intervention indicated that China had increased its support national role conceptions and decreased its support for Western role prescriptions. National conceptions of China’s responsibilities as a great power assumed a more influential position in guiding China’s humanitarian intervention policy. The expansion of the military no-fly zone into a military air operation against Libyan forces led to an increase in
Chinese objections to the intervention and beliefs that the mandate of UNSC Resolution 1973 had been manipulated to permit NATO forces to attempt to impose a regime change in Libya. As a result of China’s dissatisfaction with the Libyan intervention, all Chinese responses to the Libyan intervention demonstrated resistance to the intervention, marking a change from China’s more ambiguous intervention policy prior to the start of the intervention. Rather than striving to compromise between national role conceptions and external role prescriptions, as China did while considering Resolution 1970 and Resolution 1973, China clearly expressed a modified intervention policy that was predominantly shaped by its national role conceptions.

China’s response to the Syrian Civil War provides further evidence that role learning occurred following China’s experience with the Libyan military intervention. China’s Syrian intervention policy demonstrates that China’s beliefs regarding humanitarian intervention were profoundly altered following the absorption of China’s experience with the Libyan intervention. The influence by domestic role conceptions over China’s intervention policy was markedly more pronounced in China’s response to Syria than in China’s response to Libya. Rather than attempting to compromise between two incompatible sets of role expectations in response to the role conflict that they presented to China, China indicated its embrace of domestic role conceptions in enacting an intervention policy that professed a commitment to the principles of sovereignty, non-interference, and multipolarity in the pursuit of international peace. China’s intervention policy demanded political strategies and forbade any coercive efforts, including both the use of military force and sanctions. This placed China at clear odds with Western great powers, which were in favor of threatening sanctions against the Syrian government, and presented a contrast to China’s previous intervention policy regarding the Libyan crisis. The
change in China’s intervention policy provides evidence that China had experienced role learning during the Libyan intervention, resulting in a change in Chinese beliefs regarding its humanitarian intervention policies. China’s response to the Syrian crisis revealed that sanctions, military force, and other coercive policies were incompatible with China’s modified intervention policy. China’s new intervention policy demonstrated a greater prioritization of domestic role conceptions of its great power responsibilities over external role prescriptions of its great power responsibilities.

*China’s Use of Veto Power as Role Adaptation*

In addition to revealing a changed intervention policy as a result of role learning, China’s intervention policy in Syria demonstrated role adaptation through China’s new use of its UNSC veto power as a strategy to enact its modified great power role expectations. Role adaptation involves a change in the strategies and instruments used by a state to perform its role. China’s use of its veto power as a permanent member of the UNSC to block the passage of three draft resolutions pertaining to the Syrian crisis demonstrates a willingness to employ the veto as a strategy to enact China’s intervention policy in accordance with its role expectations as a responsible great power. During the Libyan Civil War, when China held reservations about certain elements of Resolution 1973, China demonstrated its objections to the resolution by abstaining from voting. During the Syrian Civil War, however, China exercised its veto to block three draft resolutions held to vote on October 4, 2011, February 4, 2012, and July 19, 2012. China’s new use of its UNSC veto power demonstrates that China had adapted its instruments of

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273 Harnisch, 10.
foreign policy behavior in an attempt to better enact its role as a responsible great power—a role that had developed to inform a more limited intervention policy. Alongside China’s role learning that resulted in a changed intervention policy was a case of role adaptation that saw China modify its foreign policy tools to enact this policy.

Review of China’s Syrian Response

China’s UNSC voting behavior in response to the Syrian Civil War may be seen as a return to China’s traditional role before the Arab Spring. Whereas China voted in favor of imposing economic sanctions on the Libyan government in response to the Libyan crisis, in the Syrian crisis, China vetoed all UNSC attempts to place pressure on the Syrian government. China’s return to a humanitarian intervention policy more influenced by national Chinese conceptions of great power responsibilities than by Western role prescriptions may be explained by the process of role learning China experienced during the Libyan intervention. The resulting role conflict pushed China to return to its pre-Arab Spring humanitarian intervention stance, as evidenced by China’s consistent opposition to UNSC resolutions attempting to intervene in the Syrian crisis.
Conclusion

China’s humanitarian intervention policies regarding the Libyan Civil War and Syrian Civil War appear, at first glance, to contradict one another. Why would China vote in favor of sanctions and permit military intervention in the Libyan Civil War, only to reverse this policy and veto all attempts to intervene in the Syrian Civil War? A realist explanation would suggest that China’s Arab Spring intervention policies support the idea that the global normative order is no more than a smoke screen used by great powers to justify the pursuit of national material interests. This explanation, however, is problematic because opposing intervention in Syria did not serve Chinese national interests. China has only “non-vital” interests in Syria, while Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, China’s largest energy supplier, had expressed desires for the Syrian regime to fall.274 A realist explanation not only fails to consider the effect of China’s opposition to Syrian intervention on Chinese material interests, but also fails to address the influence of identities and social roles on Chinese foreign policy.

Constructivist role theory offers a valuable contribution by providing a compelling analytical lens through which we may make sense of China’s Arab Spring intervention policies. The consistency of Chinese diplomatic statements regarding China’s stance on humanitarian intervention offers support for the value of identities, roles, and global norms in shaping international relations. Every one of China’s responses to the Libyan and Syrian crises prioritized the same Chinese foreign policy principles: sovereignty, non-interference, multipolarity, and international peace. A role theory perspective permits us to understand how China’s interpretation of R2P in relation to these principles evolved over the course of the Arab Spring.

Whereas realist theory would incorrectly classify China’s foreign policy actions as rational or irrational according to an exogenously given set of interests, a role theory application reveals that China’s Arab Spring intervention policies were informed by China’s role expectations as they developed through a process of role learning.

I argued that the Libyan crisis presented China with a series of role conflicts that resulted in changes in China’s perception of its responsibilities as a great power as well as changes in China’s performance of these responsibilities. By voting in favor of Resolution 1970 to impose sanctions on the Libyan government, China responded to a mild role conflict by demonstrating greater adherence to Western prescriptions of China’s great power role and responsibilities to protect endangered populations. Resolution 1973, which proposed military intervention in the form of a no-fly zone over Libya, posed a more serious role conflict to Chinese conceptions of China’s role as a global actor, causing China to abstain from voting on the resolution. The implementation of Resolution 1973 and its escalation into a military air campaign against Libya constituted a severe role conflict for China, resulting in vocal Chinese opposition to the intervention. China’s experience with the Libyan Civil War facilitated a process of role learning, during which national Chinese conceptions of China’s role as a responsible great power outweighed external prescriptions of China’s role. The development of China’s humanitarian intervention policy to a more conservative policy valuing traditional Chinese foreign policy principles of sovereignty and non-interference was evident in China’s response to the Syrian crisis, when China exercised its veto power as a permanent member of the UNSC to block three resolutions proposing less invasive forms of intervention in Syria: economic sanctions and political intervention with the intent of regime change. China’s response to the Syrian Civil War
also signaled role adaptation, with China displaying a new willingness to exercise its UNSC veto to enact its role as a global actor as informed by traditional Chinese conceptions of humanitarian intervention. I used role theory to offer a perspective that views China’s humanitarian intervention policies in Libya and Syria as rational decisions based on China’s evolving understanding of its role as a responsible great power.

The analytic value of role theory for international relations is not limited to China’s humanitarian intervention policy during the Arab Spring. A comprehensive understanding of Chinese foreign policy requires an examination not only of strategic and material interests but also of China’s perceptions of its role as a responsible great power. Applying role theory as an analytical framework can help policymakers and scholars comprehend and even predict Chinese foreign policy behaviors regarding other issues of global governance. Additionally, the continued cooperation of the United Nations Security Council demands an understanding of how UNSC members perceive their international roles. Further research on China’s understanding of its social role as an international actor would not only strengthen efforts to increase cooperation within multilateral institutions such as the United Nations Security Council, but also help global actors work to secure international peace and stability.
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Resolution 1970 (2011)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 6491st meeting, on 26 February 2011

The Security Council,

Expressing grave concern at the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and condemning the violence and use of force against civilians,

Deploring the gross and systematic violation of human rights, including the repression of peaceful demonstrators, expressing deep concern at the deaths of civilians, and rejecting unequivocally the incitement to hostility and violence against the civilian population made from the highest level of the Libyan government,

Welcoming the condemnation by the Arab League, the African Union, and the Secretary General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference of the serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law that are being committed in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

Taking note of the letter to the President of the Security Council from the Permanent Representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya dated 26 February 2011,

Welcoming the Human Rights Council resolution A/HRC/RES/15/1 of 25 February 2011, including the decision to urgently dispatch an independent international commission of inquiry to investigate all alleged violations of international human rights law in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, to establish the facts and circumstances of such violations and of the crimes perpetrated, and where possible identify those responsible,

Considering that the widespread and systematic attacks currently taking place in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya against the civilian population may amount to crimes against humanity,

Expressing concern at the plight of refugees forced to flee the violence in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

Expressing concern also at the reports of shortages of medical supplies to treat the wounded,

* Second reissue for technical reasons (10 March 2011).
Recalling the Libyan authorities' responsibility to protect its population,

Underlining the need to respect the freedoms of peaceful assembly and of expression, including freedom of the media,

Stressing the need to hold to account those responsible for attacks, including by forces under their control, on civilians,

Recalling article 16 of the Rome Statute under which no investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with by the International Criminal Court for a period of 12 months after a Security Council request to that effect,

Expressing concern for the safety of foreign nationals and their rights in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

Mindful of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security under the Charter of the United Nations,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and taking measures under its Article 41,

1. Demands an immediate end to the violence and calls for steps to fulfil the legitimate demands of the population;

2. Urges the Libyan authorities to:

   (a) Act with the utmost restraint, respect human rights and international humanitarian law, and allow immediate access for international human rights monitors;

   (b) Ensure the safety of all foreign nationals and their assets and facilitate the departure of those wishing to leave the country;

   (c) Ensure the safe passage of humanitarian and medical supplies, and humanitarian agencies and workers, into the country; and

   (d) Immediately lift restrictions on all forms of media;

3. Requests all Member States, to the extent possible, to cooperate in the evacuation of those foreign nationals wishing to leave the country;

ICC referral

4. Decides to refer the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya since 15 February 2011 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court;

5. Decides that the Libyan authorities shall cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the Court and the Prosecutor pursuant to this resolution and, while recognizing that States not party to the Rome Statute have no obligation under the Statute, urges all States and concerned regional and other international organizations to cooperate fully with the Court and the Prosecutor;

6. Decides that nationals, current or former officials or personnel from a State outside the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya which is not a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of that State for all alleged acts or omissions arising out of or related to operations in the
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya established or authorized by the Council, unless such exclusive jurisdiction has been expressly waived by the State;

7. Invites the Prosecutor to address the Security Council within two months of the adoption of this resolution and every six months thereafter on actions taken pursuant to this resolution;

8. Recognizes that none of the expenses incurred in connection with the referral, including expenses related to investigations or prosecutions in connection with that referral, shall be borne by the United Nations and that such costs shall be borne by the parties to the Rome Statute and those States that wish to contribute voluntarily.

Arms embargo

9. Decides that all Member States shall immediately take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, from or through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, and technical assistance, training, financial or other assistance, related to military activities or the provision, maintenance or use of any arms and related materiel, including the provision of armed mercenary personnel whether or not originating in their territories, and decides further that this measure shall not apply to:

(a) Supplies of non-lethal military equipment intended solely for humanitarian or protective use, and related technical assistance or training, as approved in advance by the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 24 below;

(b) Protective clothing, including flak jackets and military helmets, temporarily exported to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya by United Nations personnel, representatives of the media and humanitarian and development workers and associated personnel, for their personal use only; or

(c) Other sales or supply of arms and related materiel, or provision of assistance or personnel, as approved in advance by the Committee;

10. Decides that the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya shall cease the export of all arms and related materiel and that all Member States shall prohibit the procurement of such items from the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya by their nationals, or using their flagged vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the territory of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya;

11. Calls upon all States, in particular States neighbouring the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, to inspect, in accordance with their national authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, in particular the law of the sea and relevant international civil aviation agreements, all cargo to and from the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, in their territory, including seaports and airports, if the State concerned has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the cargo contains items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 9 or 10 of this resolution for the purpose of ensuring strict implementation of those provisions;

12. Decides to authorize all Member States to, and that all Member States shall, upon discovery of items prohibited by paragraph 9 or 10 of this resolution,
seize and dispose (such as through destruction, rendering inoperable, storage or transferring to a State other than the originating or destination States for disposal) items the supply, sale, transfer or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 9 or 10 of this resolution and decides further that all Member States shall cooperate in such efforts;

13. Requires any Member State when it undertakes an inspection pursuant to paragraph 11 above, to submit promptly an initial written report to the Committee containing, in particular, explanation of the grounds for the inspections, the results of such inspections, and whether or not cooperation was provided, and, if prohibited items for transfer are found, further requires such Member States to submit to the Committee, at a later stage, a subsequent written report containing relevant details on the inspection, seizure, and disposal, and relevant details of the transfer, including a description of the items, their origin and intended destination, if this information is not in the initial report;

14. Encourages Member States to take steps to strongly discourage their nationals from travelling to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to participate in activities on behalf of the Libyan authorities that could reasonably contribute to the violation of human rights;

Travel ban

15. Decides that all Member States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals listed in Annex I of this resolution or designated by the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 24 below, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall oblige a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory;

16. Decides that the measures imposed by paragraph 15 above shall not apply:

(a) Where the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that such travel is justified on the grounds of humanitarian need, including religious obligation;

(b) Where entry or transit is necessary for the fulfilment of a judicial process;

(c) Where the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that an exemption would further the objectives of peace and national reconciliation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and stability in the region, or

(d) Where a State determines on a case-by-case basis that such entry or transit is required to advance peace and stability in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the States subsequently notifies the Committee within forty-eight hours after making such a determination;

Asset freeze

17. Decides that all Member States shall freeze without delay all funds, other financial assets and economic resources which are on their territories, which are owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the individuals or entities listed in annex II of this resolution or designated by the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 24 below, or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them, and decides further that all
Member States shall ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources are prevented from being made available by their nationals or by any individuals or entities within their territories, to or for the benefit of the individuals or entities listed in Annex II of this resolution or individuals designated by the Committee;

18. **Expresses** its intention to ensure that assets frozen pursuant to paragraph 17 shall at a later stage be made available to and for the benefit of the people of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya;

19. **Decides** that the measures imposed by paragraph 17 above do not apply to funds, other financial assets or economic resources that have been determined by relevant Member States:

(a) To be necessary for basic expenses, including payment for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges or exclusively for payment of reasonable professional fees and reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services in accordance with national laws, or fees or service charges, in accordance with national laws, for routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds, other financial assets and economic resources, after notification by the relevant State to the Committee of the intention to authorize, where appropriate, access to such funds, other financial assets or economic resources and in the absence of a negative decision by the Committee within five working days of such notification;

(b) To be necessary for extraordinary expenses, provided that such determination has been notified by the relevant State or Member States to the Committee and has been approved by the Committee; or

(c) To be the subject of a judicial, administrative or arbitral lien or judgment, in which case the funds, other financial assets and economic resources may be used to satisfy that lien or judgment provided that the lien or judgment was entered into prior to the date of the present resolution, is not for the benefit of a person or entity designated pursuant to paragraph 17 above, and has been notified by the relevant State or Member States to the Committee;

20. **Decides** that Member States may permit the addition to the accounts frozen pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 17 above of interests or other earnings due on those accounts or payments due under contracts, agreements or obligations that arose prior to the date on which those accounts became subject to the provisions of this resolution, provided that any such interest, other earnings and payments continue to be subject to these provisions and are frozen;

21. **Decides** that the measures in paragraph 17 above shall not prevent a designated person or entity from making payment due under a contract entered into prior to the listing of such a person or entity, provided that the relevant States have determined that the payment is not directly or indirectly received by a person or entity designated pursuant to paragraph 17 above, and after notification by the relevant States to the Committee of the intention to make or receive such payments or to authorize, where appropriate, the unfreezing of funds, other financial assets or economic resources for this purpose, 10 working days prior to such authorization;
Designation criteria

22. Decides that the measures contained in paragraphs 15 and 17 shall apply to the individuals and entities designated by the Committee, pursuant to paragraph 24 (b) and (c), respectively;

(a) Involved in or complicit in ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing, the commission of serious human rights abuses against persons in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including by being involved in or complicit in planning, commanding, ordering or conducting attacks, in violation of international law, including aerial bombardments, on civilian populations and facilities; or

(b) Acting for or on behalf of or at the direction of individuals or entities identified in subparagraph (a).

23. Strongly encourages Member States to submit to the Committee names of individuals who meet the criteria set out in paragraph 22 above;

New Sanctions Committee

24. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, a Committee of the Security Council consisting of all the members of the Council (herein “the Committee”), to undertake to following tasks:

(a) To monitor implementation of the measures imposed in paragraphs 9, 10, 15, and 17;

(b) To designate those individuals subject to the measures imposed by paragraphs 15 and to consider requests for exemptions in accordance with paragraph 16 above;

(c) To designate those individuals subject to the measures imposed by paragraph 17 above and to consider requests for exemptions in accordance with paragraphs 19 and 20 above;

(d) To establish such guidelines as may be necessary to facilitate the implementation of the measures imposed above;

(e) To report within thirty days to the Security Council on its work for the first report and thereafter to report as deemed necessary by the Committee;

(f) To encourage a dialogue between the Committee and interested Member States, in particular those in the region, including by inviting representatives of such States to meet with the Committee to discuss implementation of the measures;

(g) To seek from all States whatever information it may consider useful regarding the actions taken by them to implement effectively the measures imposed above;

(h) To examine and take appropriate action on information regarding alleged violations or non-compliance with the measures contained in this resolution;

25. Calls upon all Member States to report to the Committee within 120 days of the adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken with a view to implementing effectively paragraphs 9, 10, 15 and 17 above;
Humanitarian assistance

26. Calls upon all Member States, working together and acting in cooperation with the Secretary General, to facilitate and support the return of humanitarian agencies and make available humanitarian and related assistance in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, and requests the States concerned to keep the Security Council regularly informed of the progress of actions undertaken pursuant to this paragraph, and expresses its readiness to consider taking additional appropriate measures, as necessary, to achieve this.

Commitment to review

27. Affirms that it shall keep the Libyan authorities’ actions under continuous review and that it shall be prepared to review the appropriateness of the measures contained in this resolution, including the strengthening, modification, suspension or lifting of the measures, as may be needed at any time in light of the Libyan authorities’ compliance with relevant provisions of this resolution;

28. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
Annex I

Travel ban

1. Al-Baghdadi, Dr Abdulqader Mohammed
   Passport number: B010574. Date of birth: 01/07/1950.
   Head of the Liaison Office of the Revolutionary Committees. Revolutionary Committees involved in violence against demonstrators.

2. Dibri, Abdulqader Yusuf
   Date of birth: 1946. Place of birth: Houn, Libya.
   Head of Muammar Qaddafi’s personal security. Responsibility for regime security. History of directing violence against dissidents.

3. Dorda, Abu Zayd Umar

4. Jabir, Major General Abu Bakr Yunis
   Date of birth: 1952. Place of birth: Jalo, Libya.
   Defence Minister. Overall responsibility for actions of armed forces.

5. Matuq, Matuq Mohammed
   Date of birth: 1956. Place of birth: Khoms.
   Secretary for Utilities. Senior member of regime. Involvement with Revolutionary Committees. Past history of involvement in suppression of dissent and violence.

6. Qadhafi Al-dam, Sayyid Mohammed
   Date of birth: 1948. Place of birth: Sirte, Libya.
   Cousin of Muammar Qadhafi. In the 1980s, Sayyid was involved in the dissident assassination campaign and allegedly responsible for several deaths in Europe. He is also thought to have been involved in arms procurement.

7. Qadhafi, Aisha Muammar
   Daughter of Muammar Qadhafi. Closeness of association with regime.

8. Qadhafi, Hannibal Muammar

9. Qadhafi, Khamis Muammar
   Son of Muammar Qadhafi. Closeness of association with regime. Command of military units involved in repression of demonstrations.
10. Qadhafi, Mohammed Muammar  
   Son of Muammar Qadhafi. Closeness of association with regime.

11. Qadhafi, Muhammad Mohammed Abu Minyar  
   Date of birth: 1942. Place of birth: Sirte, Libya.  
   Leader of the Revolution, Supreme Commander of Armed Forces.  
   Responsibility for ordering repression of demonstrations, human rights abuses.

12. Qadhafi, Muassim  

13. Qadhafi, Saadi  
   Commander Special Forces. Son of Muammar Qadhafi. Closeness of association with regime. Command of military units involved in repression of demonstrations.

14. Qadhafi, Saif al-Arab  
   Son of Muammar Qadhafi. Closeness of association with regime.

15. Qadhafi, Saif al-Islam  
   Director, Qadhafi Foundation. Son of Muammar Qadhafi. Closeness of association with regime. Inflammatory public statements encouraging violence against demonstrators.

16. Al-Senussi, Colonel Abdullah  
   Date of birth: 1949. Place of birth: Sudan.  
Annex II

Asset freeze

1. Qadafi, Aisha Muammar
   Daughter of Muammar Qadafi. Closeness of association with regime.

2. Qadafi, Hannibal Muammar

3. Qadafi, Khamis Muammar

4. Qadafi, Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar
   Date of birth: 1942. Place of birth: Sirte, Libya.

5. Qadafi, Mutassim

6. Qadafi, Saif al-Islam
   Director, Qadafi Foundation. Son of Muammar Qadafi. Closeness of association with regime. Inflammatory public statements encouraging violence against demonstrators.
cannot be denied. Libya's leaders will be held accountable for violating these rights and for failing to meet their most basic responsibilities to their people.

Mr. Salam (Lebanon) (spoke in Arabic): The Council of the League of Arab States held an emergency meeting on 22 February to discuss the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. At the conclusion of that meeting, the Council denounced the crimes committed against the peaceful popular protests and demonstrations taking place in several Libyan cities and in the capital, Tripoli. It also expressed its profound condemnation of the acts of violence committed against civilians, especially the use of foreign mercenaries, live ammunition, heavy weapons and other methods against the demonstrators, all of which are grave violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.

The Council also called for an immediate halt to all acts of violence, a resort to national dialogue, a response to the legitimate demands of the Libyan people and respect for their rights to demonstrate and exercise their freedom of expression, so as to prevent further bloodshed, preserve peace, the territorial integrity of Libya and civil order and ensure the safety of Libyan citizens.

When the Libyan authorities did not respond to that call, Lebanon decided — in line with the Arab consensus, the African Union statement of 23 February and the position of the Secretary General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference — to vote in favour of this resolution.

On this occasion, as we did at the headquarters of the League of Arab States, Lebanon would like to reaffirm the importance of defending Libya's territorial integrity and the unity of its people. Lebanon proudly salutes those who were martyred while exercising their freedom of expression in Libya. We also express our deep condolences for the hundreds killed and thousands injured among the Arab Libyan people.

Mr. Churkin (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): The Russian Federation supported Security Council resolution 1970 (2011) because of our serious concern over the events taking place in Libya. We sincerely regret the many lives lost among the civilian population. We condemn the use of military force against peaceful demonstrators and all other manifestations of violence and consider them absolutely unacceptable. We call for an immediate end to such actions.

We echo the Libyan authorities to comply with the demands of the international community, including the League of Arab States and the African Union, which demands have received the support of the Security Council. This is necessary in order to prevent a full-scale civil war and to preserve Libya as a united, sovereign State with territorial integrity.

All the parties involved must show restraint and observe the norms of international civil and human rights law. Reliable security must be ensured for those foreigners who remain in Libya, including Russian citizens, and conditions for their safe return home must be established.

A settlement of the situation in Libya is possible only through political means. In fact, that is the purpose of the resolution adopted by the Council, which imposes targeted, clearly expressed, restrictive measures with regard to those guilty of violence against the civilian population. However, it does not enjoin sanctions, even indirect, for forceful interference in Libya's affairs, which could make the situation worse.

Russia, in cooperation with international and regional partners, will continue actively to help the friendly people of Libya to find a peaceful way out of the current crisis.

Mr. Li Baodong (China) (spoke in Chinese): China is deeply concerned over the turbulent situation in Libya. In our view, it is of the greatest urgency to secure the immediate cessation of violence, avoid further bloodshed and civilian casualties, restore stability and normal order as soon as possible, and resolve the current crisis through peaceful means, such as dialogue. The safety and interests of foreign nationals in Libya must be assured throughout this process.

Taking into consideration the special situation in Libya at this time and the concerns and views of the Arab and African countries, the Chinese delegation voted in favour of resolution 1970 (2011), which the Council just adopted.

Mr. Osorio (Colombia) (spoke in Spanish): I would like to express to the Security Council the satisfaction of the Government of Colombia with resolution 1970 (2011), which the Council has just
Resolution 1973 (2011)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 6498th meeting, on
17 March 2011

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolution 1970 (2011) of 26 February 2011,

Deploiring the failure of the Libyan authorities to comply with resolution 1970
(2011),

Expressing grave concern at the deteriorating situation, the escalation of
violence, and the heavy civilian casualties,

Reiterating the responsibility of the Libyan authorities to protect the Libyan
population and reaffirming that parties to armed conflicts bear the primary
responsibility to take all feasible steps to ensure the protection of civilians,

Condemning the gross and systematic violation of human rights, including
arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances, torture and summary executions,

Further condemning acts of violence and intimidation committed by the
Libyan authorities against journalists, media professionals and associated personnel
and urging these authorities to comply with their obligations under international
humanitarian law as outlined in resolution 1738 (2006),

Considering that the widespread and systematic attacks currently taking place
in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya against the civilian population may amount to crimes
against humanity,

Recalling paragraph 26 of resolution 1970 (2011) in which the Council
expressed its readiness to consider taking additional appropriate measures, as
necessary, to facilitate and support the return of humanitarian agencies and make
available humanitarian and related assistance in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

Expressing its determination to ensure the protection of civilians and civilian
populated areas and the rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian assistance
and the safety of humanitarian personnel,

Recalling the condemnation by the League of Arab States, the African Union,
and the Secretary General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference of the
serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law that have been
and are being committed in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,
Taking note of the final communiqué of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference of 8 March 2011, and the communiqué of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union of 10 March 2011 which established an ad hoc High Level Committee on Libya,

Taking note also of the decision of the Council of the League of Arab States of 12 March 2011 to call for the imposition of a no-fly zone on Libyan military aviation, and to establish safe areas in places exposed to shelling as a precautionary measure that allows the protection of the Libyan people and foreign nationals residing in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

Taking note further of the Secretary-General’s call on 16 March 2011 for an immediate cease-fire,

Recalling its decision to refer the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya since 15 February 2011 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, and stressing that those responsible for or complicit in attacks targeting the civilian population, including aerial and naval attacks, must be held to account,

Reiterating its concern at the plight of refugees and foreign workers forced to flee the violence in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, welcoming the response of neighbouring States, in particular Tunisia and Egypt, to address the needs of those refugees and foreign workers, and calling on the international community to support those efforts,

Deploiring the continuing use of mercenaries by the Libyan authorities,

Considering that the establishment of a ban on all flights in the airspace of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya constitutes an important element for the protection of civilians as well as the safety of the delivery of humanitarian assistance and a decisive step for the cessation of hostilities in Libya,

Expressing concern also for the safety of foreign nationals and their rights in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

Welcoming the appointment by the Secretary General of his Special Envoy to Libya, Mr. Abdel-Elah Mohamed Al-Khatib and supporting his efforts to find a sustainable and peaceful solution to the crisis in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

Determining that the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Demands the immediate establishment of a cease-fire and a complete end to violence and all attacks against, and abuses of, civilians;

2. Stresses the need to intensify efforts to find a solution to the crisis which responds to the legitimate demands of the Libyan people and notes the decisions of the Secretary-General to send his Special Envoy to Libya and of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union to send its ad hoc High Level Committee to Libya with the aim of facilitating dialogue to lead to the political reforms necessary to find a peaceful and sustainable solution,
3. **Demand** that the Libyan authorities comply with their obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law, human rights and refugee law and take all measures to protect civilians and meet their basic needs, and to ensure the rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian assistance;

**Protection of civilians**

4. **Authorises** Member States that have notified the Secretary-General, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, and acting in cooperation with the Secretary-General, to take all necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory, and requests the Member States concerned to inform the Secretary-General immediately of the measures they take pursuant to the authorization conferred by this paragraph which shall be immediately reported to the Security Council;

5. **Recognise** the important role of the League of Arab States in matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security in the region, and bearing in mind Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, requests the Member States of the League of Arab States to cooperate with other Member States in the implementation of paragraph 4;

**No Fly Zone**

6. **Decides** to establish a ban on all flights in the airspace of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in order to help protect civilians;

7. **Decides further** that the ban imposed by paragraph 6 shall not apply to flights whose sole purpose is humanitarian, such as delivering or facilitating the delivery of assistance, including medical supplies, food, humanitarian workers and related assistance, or evacuating foreign nationals from the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, nor shall it apply to flights authorised by paragraphs 4 or 8, nor other flights which are deemed necessary by States acting under the authorisation conferred in paragraph 8 to be for the benefit of the Libyan people, and that these flights shall be coordinated with any mechanism established under paragraph 8;

8. **Authorises** Member States that have notified the Secretary-General and the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, to take all necessary measures to enforce compliance with the ban on flights imposed by paragraph 6 above, as necessary, and requests the States concerned in cooperation with the League of Arab States to coordinate closely with the Secretary General on the measures they are taking to implement this ban, including by establishing an appropriate mechanism for implementing the provisions of paragraphs 6 and 7 above,

9. **Calls upon** all Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, to provide assistance, including any necessary over-flight approvals, for the purposes of implementing paragraphs 4, 6, 7 and 8 above;

10. **Requests** the Member States concerned to coordinate closely with each other and the Secretary-General on the measures they are taking to implement
paragraphs 4, 6, 7 and 8 above, including practical measures for the monitoring and approval of authorised humanitarian or evacuation flights;

11. Decides that the Member States concerned shall inform the Secretary-General and the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States immediately of measures taken in exercise of the authority conferred by paragraph 8 above, including to supply a concept of operations;

12. Requests the Secretary-General to inform the Council immediately of any actions taken by the Member States concerned in exercise of the authority conferred by paragraph 8 above and to report to the Council within 7 days and every month thereafter on the implementation of this resolution, including information on any violations of the flight ban imposed by paragraph 6 above;

Enforcement of the arms embargo

13. Decides that paragraph 11 of resolution 1970 (2011) shall be replaced by the following paragraph: “Calls upon all Member States, in particular States of the region, acting nationally or through regional organisations or arrangements, in order to ensure strict implementation of the arms embargo established by paragraphs 9 and 10 of resolution 1970 (2011), to inspect in their territory, including seaports and airports, and on the high seas, vessels and aircraft bound to or from the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, if the State concerned has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the cargo contains items the supply, sale, transfer or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 9 or 10 of resolution 1970 (2011) as modified by this resolution, including the provision of armed mercenary personnel, calls upon all flag States of such vessels and aircraft to cooperate with such inspections and authorises Member States to use all means commensurate to the specific circumstances to carry out such inspections”;

14. Requests Member States which are taking action under paragraph 13 above on the high seas to coordinate closely with each other and the Secretary-General and further requests the States concerned to inform the Secretary-General and the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 24 of resolution 1970 (2011) (“the Committee”) immediately of measures taken in exercise of the authority conferred by paragraph 13 above;

15. Requires any Member State whether acting nationally or through regional organisations or arrangements, when it undertakes an inspection pursuant to paragraph 13 above, to submit promptly an initial written report to the Committee containing, in particular, explanation of the grounds for the inspection, the results of such inspection, and whether or not cooperation was provided, and, if prohibited items for transfer are found, further requires such Member States to submit to the Committee, at a later stage, a subsequent written report containing relevant details on the inspection, seizure, and disposal, and relevant details of the transfer, including a description of the items, their origin and intended destination, if this information is not in the initial report;

16. Deplores the continuing flows of mercenaries into the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and calls upon all Member States to comply strictly with their obligations under paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011) to prevent the provision of armed mercenary personnel to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya;
Ban on flights

17. **Decides** that all States shall deny permission to any aircraft registered in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya or owned or operated by Libyan nationals or companies to take off from, land in or overfly their territory unless the particular flight has been approved in advance by the Committee, or in the case of an emergency landing.

18. **Decides that all States shall deny** permission to any aircraft to take off from, land in or overfly their territory, if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the aircraft contains items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 9 and 10 of resolution 1970 (2011) as modified by this resolution, including the provision of armed mercenary personnel, except in the case of an emergency landing.

Asset freeze

19. **Decides** that the asset freeze imposed by paragraph 17, 19, 20 and 21 of resolution 1970 (2011) shall apply to all funds, other financial assets and economic resources which are on their territories, which are owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the Libyan authorities, as designated by the Committee, or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them, as designated by the Committee, and **decides further** that all States shall ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources are prevented from being made available by their nationals or by any individuals or entities within their territories, to or for the benefit of the Libyan authorities, as designated by the Committee, or individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned or controlled by them, as designated by the Committee, and directs the Committee to designate such Libyan authorities, individuals or entities within 30 days of the date of the adoption of this resolution and as appropriate thereafter.

20. **Affirms** its determination to ensure that assets frozen pursuant to paragraph 17 of resolution 1970 (2011) shall, at a later stage, as soon as possible be made available to and for the benefit of the people of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

21. **Decides** that all States shall require their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction and firms incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction to exercise vigilance when doing business with entities incorporated in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya or subject to its jurisdiction, and any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and entities owned or controlled by them, if the States have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such business could contribute to violence and use of force against civilians;

Designations

22. **Decides** that the individuals listed in Annex I shall be subject to the travel restrictions imposed in paragraphs 15 and 16 of resolution 1970 (2011), and **decides further** that the individuals and entities listed in Annex II shall be subject to the asset freeze imposed in paragraphs 17, 19, 20 and 21 of resolution 1970 (2011); 

23. **Decides** that the measures specified in paragraphs 15, 16, 17, 19, 20 and 21 of resolution 1970 (2011) shall apply also to individuals and entities determined by the Council or the Committee to have violated the provisions of resolution 1970.
Panel of Experts

24. Requests the Secretary-General to create for an initial period of one year, in consultation with the Committee, a group of up to eight experts ("Panel of Experts"), under the direction of the Committee to carry out the following tasks:

(a) Assist the Committee in carrying out its mandate as specified in paragraph 24 of resolution 1970 (2011) and this resolution;

(b) Gather, examine and analyse information from States, relevant United Nations bodies, regional organisations and other interested parties regarding the implementation of the measures decided in resolution 1970 (2011) and this resolution, in particular incidents of non-compliance;

(c) Make recommendations on actions the Council, or the Committee or State, may consider to improve implementation of the relevant measures;

(d) Provide to the Council an interim report on its work no later than 90 days after the Panel’s appointment, and a final report to the Council no later than 30 days prior to the termination of its mandate with its findings and recommendations;

25. Urges all States, relevant United Nations bodies and other interested parties, to cooperate fully with the Committee and the Panel of Experts, in particular by supplying any information at their disposal on the implementation of the measures decided in resolution 1970 (2011) and this resolution, in particular incidents of non-compliance;

26. Decides that the mandate of the Committee as set out in paragraph 24 of resolution 1970 (2011) shall also apply to the measures decided in this resolution;

27. Decides that all States, including the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, shall take the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the Libyan authorities, or of any person or body in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, or of any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or body, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was affected by reason of the measures taken by the Security Council in resolution 1970 (2011), this resolution and related resolutions;

28. Reaffirms its intention to keep the actions of the Libyan authorities under continuous review and underlines its readiness to review at any time the measures imposed by this resolution and resolution 1970 (2011), including by strengthening, suspending or lifting those measures, as appropriate, based on compliance by the Libyan authorities with this resolution and resolution 1970 (2011);

29. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
### Libya: UNSCR proposed designations

**Annex I: Travel Ban**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Justification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>QUREN SALIH QUREN AL QADHAFI</td>
<td>Libyan Ambassador to Chad. Has left Chad for Sabha. Involved directly in recruiting and coordinating mercenaries for the regime.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Colonel AMID HUSAIN AL KUNI</td>
<td>Governor of Ghat (South Libya). Directly involved in recruiting mercenaries.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Annex II: Asset Freeze**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Justification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Dorda, Abu Zayd Umar</td>
<td>Position: Director, External Security Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Jabir, Major General Abu Bakr Yunis</td>
<td>Position: Defence Minister <strong>Title:</strong> Major General <strong>DOB:</strong> 8/28/1952. <strong>POB:</strong> Jalo, Libya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Matuq, Matuq Mohammed</td>
<td>Position: Secretary for Utilities <strong>DOB:</strong> 8/28/1952. <strong>POB:</strong> Khoms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Qadhafi, Mohammed Muammar</td>
<td>Son of Muammar Qadhafi. Closeness of association with regime <strong>DOB:</strong> 8/28/1970. <strong>POB:</strong> Tripoli, Libya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Qadhafi, Saadi</td>
<td>Commander Special Forces. Son of Muammar Qadhafi. Closeness of association with regime. Command of military units involved in repression of demonstrations <strong>DOB:</strong> 5/25/1973. <strong>POB:</strong> Tripoli, Libya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Qadhafi, Saif al-Arab</td>
<td>Son of Muammar Qadhafi. Closeness of association with regime <strong>DOB:</strong> 8/28/1982. <strong>POB:</strong> Tripoli, Libya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Al-Senussi, Colonel Abdullah</td>
<td>Position: Director Military Intelligence <strong>Title:</strong> Colonel <strong>DOB:</strong> 8/28/1949. <strong>POB:</strong> Sudan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Entities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Justification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Central Bank of Libya</td>
<td>Under control of Muammar Qadhafi and his family, and potential source of funding for his regime.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Justification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Libyan Investment Authority</td>
<td>Under control of Muammar Qaddafi and his family, and potential source of funding for his regime.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Libyan Foreign Bank</td>
<td>Under control of Muammar Qaddafi and his family and a potential source of funding for his regime.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Libyan Africa Investment Portfolio</td>
<td>Under control of Muammar Qaddafi and his family, and potential source of funding for his regime.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Libyan National Oil Corporation</td>
<td>Under control of Muammar Qaddafi and his family, and potential source of funding for his regime.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In adopting resolution 1970 (2011), the Security Council had hoped that the Libyan authorities would act responsibly and stop committing more acts of violence against their own people. The authorities have defied that resolution and have continued to kill and discharge numerous civilians while continuing to violate their human rights. We believe that the United Nations and the Security Council could not be silent, nor be seen to be doing nothing in the face of such grave acts of violence committed against innocent civilians.

We believe that by adopting resolution 1973 (2011), which South Africa voted in favour of, the Security Council has responded appropriately to the call of the countries of the region to strengthen the implementation of resolution 1970 (2011), and has acted responsibly to protect and save the lives of defenseless civilians, who are faced with brutal acts of violence carried out by the Libyan authorities. We believe that the establishment of these additional measures, including a ceasefire and a no-fly zone, as authorized by this resolution, constitute an important element for the protection of civilians and the safety of the delivery of humanitarian assistance to those most vulnerable and those desperately in need of such assistance.

As a matter of principle, we have supported the resolution, with the necessary caveats to preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Libya and reject any foreign occupation or unilateral military intervention under the pretext of protecting civilians. It is our hope that this resolution will be implemented in full respect for both its letter and spirit. This is consistent with the African Union Peace and Security Council decision to respect the unity and territorial integrity of Libya and its rejection of any foreign military intervention, whatever its form.

In conclusion, South Africa will continue to work through the Council, the African Union and other multilateral and bilateral platforms to contribute to a speedy resolution of the Libyan crisis in a manner consistent with the aspirations of the people of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

The President (spoke in Chinese): I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of China.

China is gravely concerned by the continuing deterioration of the situation in Libya. We support the Security Council’s adoption of appropriate and necessary action to stabilize the situation in Libya as soon as possible and to halt acts of violence against civilians.

China has always emphasized that, in its relevant actions, the Security Council should follow the United Nations Charter and the norms governing international law, respect the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Libya and resolve the current crisis in Libya through peaceful means.

China is always against the use of force in international relations. In the Security Council’s consultations on resolution 1973 (2011), we and other Council members asked specific questions. However, unfortunately, many of those questions failed to be clarified or answered. China has serious difficulty with parts of the resolution.

Meanwhile, China attaches great importance to the relevant position by the 22-member Arab League on the establishment of a no-fly zone over Libya. We also attach great importance to the position of African countries and the African Union.

In view of this, and considering the special circumstances surrounding the situation in Libya, China abstained from the voting on resolution 1973 (2011). We support the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Libya, as well as the continuing efforts by the African Union and the Arab League to address the current crisis in Libya by peaceful means.

I now resume my functions as President of the Council.

There are no further speakers inscribed on my list. The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Security Council will remain seized of the matter.

The meeting rose at 7.20 p.m.
Appendix E

United Nations

Security Council

Distr.: General
4 October 2011
Original: English

France, Germany, Portugal and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Expressing grave concern at the situation in Syria,

Recalling its Presidential Statement of 3 August,

Welcoming the Secretary-General’s statements articulating continued concerns about the ongoing violence and humanitarian needs, calling on the Syrian Government to halt its violent offensive at once, calling for an independent investigation of all human rights violations during recent demonstrations, and stressing the need to hold to account those responsible for human rights violations,

Noting Human Rights Council’s report of its 17th Special session (A/HRC/8-17/1), including the decision to dispatch an independent international commission of inquiry to investigate all alleged violations of international human rights law since March 2011 in Syria,

Recalling the Syrian Government’s primary responsibility to protect its population, and the Secretary-General’s call for the Syrian Government to allow unhindered and sustained access for humanitarian aid and humanitarian organizations, welcoming OCHA’s humanitarian assessment mission and urging the Syrian authorities to cooperate comprehensively with the United Nations,

Stressing that the only solution to the current crisis in Syria is through an inclusive and Syrian-led political process with the aim of effectively addressing the legitimate aspirations and concerns of the population which will allow the full exercise of fundamental freedoms for its entire population, including of the rights of freedom of expression, assembly and peaceful protest, and further stressing that such a political process can only be advanced through an environment free from any sort of violence, fear and intimidation,

Noting the announced commitments by the Syrian authorities to reform, and regretting the lack of progress in implementation,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Syria,

Deeply concerned by the continuing deterioration of the situation in Syria and the potential for further escalation of the violence, and reaffirming the need to resolve the current crisis in Syria peacefully,
Welcoming the engagement of the Secretary-General and the League of Arab States, and all other diplomatic efforts aimed at addressing this situation, including those of Turkey, Russia, Brazil, India, South Africa, and regretting the lack of a substantive response by the Syrian authorities to these demands,

1. Strongly condemns the continued grave and systematic human rights violations and the use of force against civilians by the Syrian authorities, and expresses profound regret at the deaths of thousands of people including women and children;

2. Demands an immediate end to all violence and urges all sides to reject violence and extremism;

3. Recalls that those responsible for all violence and human rights violations should be held accountable;

4. Demands that the Syrian authorities immediately:
   (a) cease violations of human rights, comply with their obligations under applicable international law, and cooperate fully with the office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights;
   (b) allow the full exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms by its entire population, including rights of freedom of expression and peaceful assembly, release all political prisoners and detained peaceful demonstrators, and lift restrictions on all forms of media;
   (c) cease the use of force against civilians;
   (d) alleviate the humanitarian situation in crisis areas, including by allowing expeditious, unhindered and sustained access for internationally recognized human rights monitors, humanitarian agencies and workers, and restoring basic services including access to hospitals;
   (e) ensure the safe and voluntary return of those who have fled the violence to their homes;

5. Calls for an inclusive Syrian-led political process conducted in an environment free from violence, fear, intimidation, and extremism, and aimed at effectively addressing the legitimate aspirations and concerns of Syria’s population, and encourages the Syrian opposition and all sections of Syrian society to contribute to such a process;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to urge the Syrian Government to implement paragraphs 2 and 4 above, including by appointing at the appropriate time a Special Envoy in consultation with the Security Council, and encourages all States and regional organizations to contribute to this objective;

7. Encourages in this regard the League of Arab states to continue efforts aimed at ending the violence and promoting such an inclusive Syrian-led political process;

8. Strongly condemns attacks on diplomatic personnel and recalls the fundamental principle of the inviolability of diplomatic agents and the obligations on host States, including under the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, to take all appropriate steps to protect embassy premises and prevent attacks on diplomatic agents;
9. *Calls upon* all States to exercise vigilance and restraint over the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to Syria of arms and related materiel of all types, as well as technical training, financial resources or services, advice, or other services or assistance related to such arms and related materiel;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report on implementation of this resolution within 30 days of its adoption and every 30 days thereafter;

11. *Expresses* its intention to review Syria’s implementation of this resolution within 30 days and to consider its options, including measures under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations;

12. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.
Appendix F

We believe that today's message will be correctly understood by the opposition forces. There is no alternative to dialogue; there cannot be. If the opposition believes that Mr. Al-Assad's laws are imperfect, then it must take up the invitation of the Government to discuss them. We will indicate our concerns to the leaders of the Syrian opposition when they visit Moscow in the near future. Changes for a peaceful resolution are possible, and we will be supporting those prospects in coordination with all constructively inclined peace partners.

If Council colleagues agree with our approach, which is aimed at dialogue and full national reconciliation in Syria, we will continue to work on the Russian-Chinese draft so as to arrive at a balanced resolution containing the vital elements for a settlement. Our draft remains on the table.

On that basis, we are prepared to develop a genuinely collective and constructive position for the international community and not get involved with legitimizing previously adopted unilateral sanctions or attempts at violent regime change. The people of Syria deserve peaceful change, with the support of the international community.

Mr. Li Baodong (China) (spoke in Chinese): China is highly concerned about the developments in Syria. We call on the various parties in Syria to exercise restraint and to avoid more bloodshed and all forms of violence. We hope that the Syrian Government will implement commitments to reform. We also hope that a Syrian-led and inclusive political process will be launched as soon as possible, so as to facilitate the early easing of tension there.

The international community should provide constructive assistance to facilitate the achievement of the objectives I have mentioned. In the meantime, it should fully respect Syria's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. Whether the Security Council takes further action on the question of Syria should depend upon whether it would facilitate the easing of tension in Syria, help to defuse differences through political dialogue and contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability in the Middle East. Most important, it should depend upon whether it complies with the Charter of the United Nations and the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of States — which has a bearing upon the security and survival of developing countries, in particular small and medium-sized countries, as well as on world peace and stability.

The Chinese Government's position on those questions has been consistent and firm. On that basis, China has always participated positively and constructively in the consultations on the relevant draft resolutions. At the moment, the Security Council has before it two draft resolutions. One, which China supports, advocates respect for the sovereignty of Syria and resolving the crisis there through political dialogue. With regard to the other draft resolution, which the Council considered today, like quite a few other Council members, China believes that, under the current circumstances, sanctions or the threat thereof does not help to resolve the question of Syria and, instead, may further complicate the situation. Regrettably and disappointinglly, this major and legitimate concern did not receive due attention from the sponsors. As it now stands, the draft resolution focuses solely on exerting pressure on Syria, even threatening to impose sanctions. It does not help to facilitate the easing of the situation in Syria. China therefore voted against it.

Syria is an important country in the Middle East. The maintenance of peace and stability in Syria serves the common interests of the Syrian people and the international community. Along with the international community, China is willing to play a positive and constructive role in appropriately resolving the question of Syria. We will continue to support the mediation efforts of the relevant countries and organizations in the region.

Mr. Moraes Cabral (Portugal): Allow me, first of all, to congratulate you, Madame President, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council, as well as to wish you every success. I also wish to thank Ambassador Nawaf Salam and his team for the very efficient and wise way in which they conducted the Council's work during the month of September, often in very challenging conditions.

We deeply regret that the Security Council was unable to unanimously and unequivocally condemn, and demand an immediate end to, the Syrian Government's violent repression against its population, even though the situation in the country has continued to deteriorate since the adoption of the presidential statement of the Council on 3 August (S/PRST/2011/16).
Bahrain, Colombia, Egypt, France, Germany, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its presidential statement of 3 August 2011,

Recalling General Assembly resolution A/RES/66/176 of 19 December 2011, as well as Human Rights Council resolutions 8/16-1, 8/17-1 and 8/18-1,

Noting the League of Arab States' request in its decision of 22 January 2012,

Expressing grave concern at the deterioration of the situation in Syria, and profound concern at the death of thousands of people and calling for an immediate end to all violence,

Welcoming the League of Arab States' Action Plan of 2 November 2011 and its subsequent decisions, including its decision of 22 January 2012, which aims to achieve a peaceful resolution of the crisis,

Noting the deployment of the League of Arab States' observer mission, commending its efforts, regretting that, due to the escalation in violence, the observer mission was not in a position to monitor the full implementation of the League of Arab States' Action Plan of 2 November 2011, and noting the subsequent decision of the League of Arab states to suspend the mission,

Underlining the importance of ensuring the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons to their homes in safety and with dignity,

Mindful that stability in Syria is key to peace and stability in the region,

Noting the announced commitments by the Syrian authorities to reform, and regretting the lack of progress in implementation,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Syria, emphasizing its intention to resolve the current political crisis in Syria peacefully, and noting that nothing in this resolution authorizes measures under Article 42 of the Charter,
Welcoming the engagement of the Secretary-General and all diplomatic efforts aimed at addressing the situation, and noting in this regard the offer of the Russian Federation to host a meeting in Moscow, in consultation with the League of Arab States,

1. **Condemn** the continued widespread and gross violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms by the Syrian authorities, such as the use of force against civilians, arbitrary executions, killing and persecution of protestors and members of the media, arbitrary detention, enforced disappearances, interference with access to medical treatment, torture, sexual violence, and ill-treatment, including against children;

2. **Demands** that the Syrian government immediately put an end to all human rights violations and attacks against those exercising their rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and association, protect its population, fully comply with its obligations under applicable international law and fully implement Human Rights Council resolutions S-16/1, S-17/1, S-18/1 and General Assembly resolution A/RES/66/176;

3. **Condemn** all violence, irrespective of where it comes from, and in this regard **demands** that all parties in Syria, including armed groups, immediately stop all violence or reprisals, including attacks against State institutions, in accordance with the League of Arab States’ initiative;

4. **Recalls** that all those responsible for human rights violations, including acts of violence, must be held accountable;

5. **Demands** that the Syrian government, in accordance with the Plan of Action of the League of Arab States of 2 November 2011 and its decision of 22 January 2012, without delay:
   
   (a) cease all violence and protect its population;
   
   (b) release all persons detained arbitrarily due to the recent incidents;
   
   (c) withdraw all Syrian military and armed forces from cities and towns, and return them to their original home barracks;
   
   (d) guarantee the freedom of peaceful demonstrations;
   
   (e) allow full and unhindered access and movement for all relevant League of Arab States’ institutions and Arab and international media in all parts of Syria to determine the truth about the situation on the ground and monitor the incidents taking place; and
   
   (f) allow full and unhindered access to the League of Arab States’ observer mission;

6. **Calls** for an inclusive Syrian-led political process conducted in an environment free from violence, fear, intimidation and extremism, and aimed at effectively addressing the legitimate aspirations and concerns of Syria’s people, without prejudging the outcome;

7. **Fully supports** in this regard the League of Arab States’ 22 January 2012 decision to facilitate a Syrian-led political transition to a democratic, plural political system, in which citizens are equal regardless of their affiliations or ethnicities or beliefs, including through commencing a serious political dialogue between the
Syrian government and the whole spectrum of the Syrian opposition under the League of Arab States’ auspices, in accordance with the timetable set out by the League of Arab States;

8. **Encourages** the League of Arab States to continue its efforts in cooperation with all Syrian stakeholders;

9. **Calls upon** the Syrian authorities, in the event of a resumption of the observer mission, to cooperate fully with the League of Arab States’ observer mission, in accordance with the League of Arab States’ Protocol of 19 December 2011, including through granting full and unhindered access and freedom of movement to the observers, facilitating the entry of technical equipment necessary for the mission, guaranteeing the mission’s right to interview, freely or in private, any individual and guaranteeing also not to punish, harass, or retaliate against, any person who has cooperated with the mission;

10. **Stresses** the need for all to provide all necessary assistance to the mission in accordance with the League of Arab States’ Protocol of 19 December 2011 and its decision of 22 January 2012;

11. **Demands** that the Syrian authorities cooperate fully with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and with the Commission of Inquiry dispatched by the Human Rights Council, including by granting it full and unimpeded access to the country;

12. **Calls upon** the Syrian authorities to allow safe and unhindered access for humanitarian assistance in order to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid to persons in need of assistance;

13. **Welcomes** the Secretary-General’s efforts to provide support to the League of Arab States, including its observer mission, in promoting a peaceful solution to the Syrian crisis;

14. **Requests** the Secretary-General to report on the implementation of this resolution, in consultation with the League of Arab States, within 21 days after its adoption and to report every 30 days thereafter;

15. **Decides** to review implementation of this resolution within 21 days and, in the event of non-compliance, to consider further measures;

16. **Decides** to remain actively seized of the matter.
Mr. Churkin (Russian Federation): The bloodshed and violence in Syria must be immediately ended. To that end, the Russian Federation has undertaken active diplomatic efforts in contacts with the Syrians, Syria’s Arab neighbours and other members of the international community. Today, it was announced in Moscow that, on instructions from President Medvedev of the Russian Federation, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Lavrov and the Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation, Mr. Fradkov, are to visit Damascus on 7 February for a meeting with President Al-Assad of the Syrian Arab Republic.

In the Security Council, we have actively tried to reach a decision for an objective solution that would truly help to put an end to violence and start a political process in Syria. The decision of the Security Council should be just that, but from the very beginning of the Syrian crisis some influential members of the international community, including some sitting at this table, have undermined any possibility of a political settlement, calling for regime change, encouraging the opposition towards power, indulging in provocation and nurturing the armed struggle.

The work of the Security Council was not taken to its conclusion. The draft resolution put to the vote (S/2012/77) did not adequately reflect the true state of affairs in Syria and sent a biased signal to the Syrian sides. The sponsors of the draft resolution did not take into account our proposed amendments to the draft resolution to the effect that the Syrian opposition must distance itself from extremist groups that are committing acts of violence, and calling on States and all those with any relevant opportunity to use their influence to stop those groups committing acts of violence. Nor has account been taken of our proposals that along with the withdrawal of the Syrian armed forces from the cities, there should be an end to attacks by armed groups on State institutions and neighbourhoods. Nor has there been support for the proposal to show more flexibility for the intermediary efforts of the League of Arab States, which would increase the chances for the success of an inclusive Syrian political process.

Under these conditions, the Russian delegation voted against the draft resolution submitted. We greatly regret such an outcome of our joint work in the Security Council. We believe that intensive efforts by the international community will be continued, with a view to an immediate end to the violence and a successful beginning and conclusion of an inclusive Syrian political process and to withdrawal of that country from a profound crisis.

Russia, for its part, will continue to work precisely in that direction.

Mr. Li Baodong (China): The Security Council has just voted on the draft resolution on Syria (S/2012/77), and China voted against it.

China has, all along, followed closely the developments in Syria. We call on all parties in Syria to stop the violence and in particular to avoid casualties among innocent civilians, to restore order in the country as soon as possible and to respect the request of the Syrian people for reform and for the safeguarding of their own interests. This is in the fundamental interest of Syria and its people. We support the good offices efforts of the Arab League to resolve the Syrian crisis so as to promote an early launch of an inclusive political process led by the Syrian people and in which all parties extensively participate, to peacefully resolve differences and disputes through dialogue and negotiations, and to restore stability in Syria.

The international community should provide constructive assistance to help achieve these goals. At the same time, the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Syria should be fully respected. The actions of the Security Council on the Syrian issue should comply with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and help ease the tensions, help promote political dialogue and diffuse disputes, and help maintain peace and stability in the Middle East region, rather than complicate the issue.

Under these principles, China participated actively in the consultations on the draft resolution and supported the efforts of the Arab League to facilitate a political settlement of the Syrian issue and to maintain stability in the region. Like many Council members, China maintains that under the current circumstances, to put undue emphasis on pressuring the Syrian Government for a prejudged result of the dialogue or to impose any solution will not help resolve the Syrian issue. Instead, that may further complicate the situation.
China supports the amendments proposed by the Russian Federation and has noted that the Russian Foreign Minister will visit Syria next week. The request by some Council members for continued consultations on the draft resolution is reasonable. It is regrettable that these reasonable concerns were not taken into account. To put through a vote when parties are still seriously divided over the issue does not help maintain the unity and authority of the Security Council nor help to properly resolve the issue. In this context, China voted against the draft resolution.

Syria is an important country in the Middle East. Peace and stability in Syria serve the common interests of the Syrian people and the international community. China will continue to work with the international community and to play a positive and constructive role in the proper settlement of the Syrian issue.

Mr. Haroon (Pakistan): Many congratulations, Mr. President, on assuming the post of Council President, and with such an important world issue at the very start of your tenure.

The problem in Syria has assumed dimensions that are not only regrettable but condemnable. We have to understand that while we have made civilization, we have also condoned expressions like “collateral damage”, and so many others, which is not my intention to name here today. But I believe that we accept too much too easily. It reminds me of when, two thousand years ago, Pontius Pilate washed his hands and said, “I have nothing to do with this.” Two thousand years later, we still see that humanity suffers from that particular viewpoint.

Pakistan had some serious concerns, mainly against killings, the massacre of innocents. But also, on a point of principle of the Charter, we were not happy about any infringement on the sovereignty or integrity of Syria.

There was a very spirited attempt, as related by Sir Mark just now as well, to take care of issues and concerns, and we are thankful for that. I believe that it became important to be able to end killings by asking both sides — in fact, forcing both sides — to acknowledge that it is unacceptable, and based on the strong moral point that the Arab League draft introduced into this.

There was a question of amnesty. I also believe it was an accepted fact that everyone has to get involved to stop it. Do not forget that nothing succeeds anywhere in the world against a government without external help. That is a point of history that cannot be ignored.

It is easy for those of us who today voted in the majority to sit back and say, “Well, we have done our bit.” No, we have not. We cannot wash our hands of this. We must continue and seek — as the Russians and the Chinese have stated that they will continue to seek — the way forward. I believe that the best vehicle is the Arab League plan and the very substantial moves that have been accepted over the last few days.

I believe that the offer of no regime change, of plurality, and the promotion of democracy are important aspects of this situation. We have stood by that. I believe that even today our system has indeed let us down. We have been very clear, without taking political benefit out of it, that this aspect of the veto is always a heart-wrencher. It cuts both ways, benefiting one side at one moment and the other at another moment. Either everyone should have the veto, and then see how the world gets on, or perhaps we should all consider not using it whatsoever.

I also think we have arrived at a situation that demands we persevere in our efforts to strengthen the relationships among us. Today our decision, this great deal to our Arab brethren, who have been so important to us. We had to stand with them on principle because they wanted our support pretty unanimously. I raised a question a couple of days earlier, noting that I did not then see present either Tunisia, Egypt or others that are such strong proponents on this issue, and I am glad to see their presence today. That is a great plus, in my mind.

I would like to close with a few words of reminder that all this was done with good intentions on all sides. I am not going to beat anyone with a stick. I believe consensus was achieved, though there were some drop-outs from it, and I believe we can still work towards that consensus. There is a visit to Syria scheduled in the next few days. I am sure that some more points may arise.

This matter should not be allowed to die. The draft resolution should remain an active matter before this Council, and we should address it again as soon as possible, with the help of those that decided today not to vote for it. By keeping the matter active, we would give hope to those who are expecting action.
Resolution 2042 (2012)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 6751st meeting, on 14 April 2012

The Security Council,

Recalling its Presidential Statements of 3 August 2011, 21 March 2012 and 5 April 2012, and also recalling all relevant resolutions of the General Assembly,

Reaffirming its support to the Joint Special Envoy for the United Nations and the League of Arab States, Kofi Annan, and his work, following General Assembly resolution A/RES/66/253 of 16 February 2012 and relevant resolutions of the League of Arab States,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Syria, and to the purposes and principles of the Charter,

Condemning the widespread violations of human rights by the Syrian authorities, as well as any human rights abuses by armed groups, recalling that those responsible shall be held accountable, and expressing its profound regret at the death of many thousands of people in Syria,

Noting the Syrian government’s commitment on 25 March 2012 to implement the six-point proposal of the Joint Special Envoy of the United Nations and the League of Arab States, and to implement urgently and visibly its commitments, as it agreed to do in its communication to the Envoy of 1 April 2012, to (a) cease troop movements towards population centres, (b) cease all use of heavy weapons in such centres, and (c) begin pullback of military concentrations in and around population centres, and to implement these in their entirety by no later than 10 April 2012, and noting also the Syrian opposition’s expressed commitment to respect the cessation of violence, provided the government does so,

Noting the Envoy’s assessment that, as of 12 April 2012, the parties appeared to be observing a cessation of fire and that the Syrian government had started to implement its commitments, and supporting the Envoy’s call for an immediate and visible implementation by the Syrian government of all elements of the Envoy’s six-point proposal in their entirety to achieve a sustained cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties,

1. Reaffirms its full support for and calls for the urgent, comprehensive, and immediate implementation of all elements of the Envoy’s six-point proposal (annex)
aimed at bringing an immediate end to all violence and human rights violations, securing humanitarian access and facilitating a Syrian-led political transition leading to a democratic, plural political system, in which citizens are equal regardless of their affiliations, ethnicities or beliefs, including through commencing a comprehensive political dialogue between the Syrian government and the whole spectrum of the Syrian opposition;

2. **Calls upon** the Syrian government to implement visibly its commitments in their entirety, as it agreed to do in its communication to the Envoy of 1 April 2012, to (a) cease troop movements towards population centres, (b) cease all use of heavy weapons in such centres, and (c) begin pullback of military concentrations in and around population centres;

3. **Underlines** the importance attached by the Envoy to the withdrawal of all Syrian government troops and heavy weapons from population centres to their barracks to facilitate a sustained cessation of violence;

4. **Calls upon** all parties in Syria, including the opposition, immediately to cease all armed violence in all its forms;

5. **Expresses its intention**, subject to a sustained cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties, to establish immediately, after consultations between the Secretary-General and the Syrian government, a United Nations supervision mission in Syria to monitor a cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties and relevant aspects of the Envoy’s six-point proposal, on the basis of a formal proposal from the Secretary-General, which the Security Council requests to receive not later than 18 April 2012;

6. **Calls upon** the Syrian government to ensure the effective operation of the mission, including its advance team, by: facilitating the expeditious and unhindered deployment of its personnel and capabilities as required to fulfil its mandate; ensuring its full, unimpeded, and immediate freedom of movement and access as necessary to fulfil its mandate; allowing its unobstructed communications; and allowing it to freely and privately communicate with individuals throughout Syria without retaliation against any person as a result of interaction with the mission;

7. **Decides** to authorize an advance team of up to 30 unarmed military observers to liaise with the parties and to begin to report on the implementation of a full cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties, pending the deployment of the mission referred to in paragraph 5 and **calls upon** the Syrian government and all other parties to ensure that the advance team is able to carry out its functions according to the terms set forth in paragraph 6;

8. **Calls upon** the parties to guarantee the safety of the advance team without prejudice to its freedom of movement and access, and **stresses** that the primary responsibility in this regard lies with the Syrian authorities;

9. **Requests** the Secretary-General to report immediately to the Security Council any obstructions to the effective operation of the team by any party;

10. **Reiterates** its call for the Syrian authorities to allow immediate, full and unimpeded access of humanitarian personnel to all populations in need of assistance, in accordance with international law and guiding principles of humanitarian assistance and **calls upon** all parties in Syria, in particular the Syrian
authorities, to cooperate fully with the United Nations and relevant humanitarian organizations to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance;

11. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the implementation of this resolution by 19 April 2012;

12. Expresses its intention to assess the implementation of this resolution and to consider further steps as appropriate;

13. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
Annex

Six-Point Proposal of the Joint Special Envoy of the United Nations and the League of Arab States

(1) commit to work with the Envoy in an inclusive Syrian-led political process to address the legitimate aspirations and concerns of the Syrian people, and, to this end, commit to appoint an empowered interlocutor when invited to do so by the Envoy;

(2) commit to stop the fighting and achieve urgently an effective United Nations supervised cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties to protect civilians and stabilize the country;

To this end, the Syrian government should immediately cease troop movements towards, and end the use of heavy weapons in, population centres, and begin pullback of military concentrations in and around population centres;

As these actions are being taken on the ground, the Syrian government should work with the Envoy to bring about a sustained cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties with an effective United Nations supervision mechanism.

Similar commitments would be sought by the Envoy from the opposition and all relevant elements to stop the fighting and work with him to bring about a sustained cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties with an effective United Nations supervision mechanism;

(3) ensure timely provision of humanitarian assistance to all areas affected by the fighting, and to this end, as immediate steps, to accept and implement a daily two hour humanitarian pause and to coordinate exact time and modalities of the daily pause through an efficient mechanism, including at local level;

(4) intensify the pace and scale of release of arbitrarily detained persons, including especially vulnerable categories of persons, and persons involved in peaceful political activities, provide without delay through appropriate channels a list of all places in which such persons are being detained, immediately begin organizing access to such locations and through appropriate channels respond promptly to all written requests for information, access or release regarding such persons;

(5) ensure freedom of movement throughout the country for journalists and a non-discriminatory visa policy for them;

(6) respect freedom of association and the right to demonstrate peacefully as legally guaranteed.
Appendix J

The deployment of an observer mission should also not lead to a mere freezing of the situation. A United Nations mission on the ground cannot serve as a substitute for the lack of will by the parties. Close and early linkage with the political transition process as foreseen in the six-point proposal by Mr. Annan is required, not least as an eventual exit option for the observers. One more thing: accountability for the crimes committed must be a central element of the transition process. There cannot be a return to the status quo ante.

In conclusion, I would like to reiterate our full support for the laudable efforts of Joint Special Envoy Kofi Annan and his team.

Mr. Li Baodong (China) (spoken in Chinese): China consistently maintains that the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Syria and the choice and will of the Syrian people should be respected. The Syrian crisis should be resolved in a just, peaceful and proper manner through political dialogue. We urge all parties, including the Syrian Government and the opposition factions, to strictly honour their commitments to cease all acts of violence and create conditions for the launch of a Syrian-led inclusive political process.

Joint Special Envoy Kofi Annan’s mediation is the practical way out and an important channel for the political settlement of the Syrian crisis. China appreciates and supports the efforts made by Mr. Annan for a political solution of the Syrian crisis. We urge all parties in Syria to take real actions to support and cooperate with Mr. Annan in his mediation and continue the process of a political solution of the Syrian issue.

We call on the international community to continue its support for Mr. Annan’s mediation efforts. We need to guard against any attempt to create difficulties or trouble for that mediation. Any words or deeds that stand in the way of Mr. Annan’s mediation efforts are unacceptable and must be firmly opposed. What the relevant parties say and do about the Syrian issue should contribute to an easing of the tensions, a cessation of violence, the launch of a political dialogue and the maintenance of peace and stability in Syria and the Middle East, rather than the other way around.

The imminent deployment of the advance team of the supervision mission in Syria with the consent of the Syrian Government to swiftly kick off the task of supervision and the cessation of violence will help consolidate the progress made by Joint Special Envoy Annan’s mediation efforts, fully implement Mr. Annan’s six-point proposal and launch the political process at an early date. We hope that the advance team will fully respect Syria’s sovereignty, act in strict accordance with the mandate of the Security Council, carry out its mission in a neutral, objective and just manner, make good preparations for the deployment of the supervision mission and play an active and constructive role in sustaining the cessation of violence and bringing about lasting peace and stability in Syria.

We also hope that the Syrian Government and the other relevant parties will vigorously support and cooperate with the advance team. We hope that the Secretary-General will put forward his proposals on the deployment of the supervision mission as soon as possible.

In view of those remarks, China voted in favour of resolution 2042 (2012), which the Security Council just adopted.

Mr. Loulichk (Morocco) (spoken in Arabic): The Kingdom of Morocco appreciates the efforts of the Security Council and its adoption by consensus today of its first resolution on the crisis in the sisterly country of Syria (resolution 2042 (2012)). The resolution is a practical translation of the hard work and intentions of the Security Council to further the success of the good-faith efforts of Joint Special Envoy Kofi Annan on behalf of the United Nations and the League of Arab States to end the violence, achieve a political and peaceful solution to the crisis in Syria, and implement resolution 66/253, the declarations of 5 April 2012 and the relevant resolutions of the League of Arab States.

Since becoming a member of the Security Council, Morocco has worked with the other members in all efforts to enable the Council to speak with one voice, as that was the only way to influence events in Syria. We have also emphasized the positive and effective influence that all relevant parties have had on the country. We believe that today’s resolution is an important milestone. We hope that it will be a decisive basis for the Security Council to address the situation in Syria.

The League of Arab States, which, since the beginning of the crisis, has played out an effective and constructive role in order to end the bloodstream and
Resolution 2043 (2012)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 6756th meeting, on 21 April 2012

The Security Council,

Recalling its Resolution 2042 (2012), as well as its Presidential Statements of 3 August 2011, 21 March 2012 and 5 April 2012, and also recalling all relevant resolutions of the General Assembly,

Reaffirming its support to the Joint Special Envoy for the United Nations and the League of Arab States, Kofi Annan, and his work, following General Assembly resolution A/RES/66/253 of 16 February 2012 and relevant resolutions of the League of Arab States,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Syria, and to the purposes and principles of the Charter,

Condenning the widespread violations of human rights by the Syrian authorities, as well as any human rights abuses by armed groups, recalling that those responsible shall be held accountable, and expressing its profound regret at the death of many thousands of people in Syria,

Expressing its appreciation of the significant efforts that have been made by the States bordering Syria to assist Syrians who have fled across Syria’s borders as a consequence of the violence, and requesting UNHCR to provide assistance as requested by member states receiving these displaced persons,

Expressing also its appreciation of the humanitarian assistance that has been provided to Syria by other States,

Noting the Syrian government’s commitment on 25 March 2012 to implement the six-point proposal of the Joint Special Envoy of the United Nations and the League of Arab States, and to implement urgently and visibly its commitments, as it agreed to do in its communication to the Envoy of 1 April 2012, to (a) cease troop movements towards population centres, (b) cease all use of heavy weapons in such centres, and (c) begin pullback of military concentrations in and around population centres, and to implement these in their entirety by no later than 10 April 2012, and noting also the Syrian opposition’s expressed commitment to respect the cessation of violence, provided the government does so,
Expressing concern over ongoing violence and reports of casualties which have escalated again in recent days, following the Envoy’s assessment of 12 April 2012 that the parties appeared to be observing a cessation of fire and that the Syrian government had started to implement its commitments, and noting that the cessation of armed violence in all its forms is therefore clearly incomplete,

Supporting the Envoy’s call for an immediate and visible implementation by the Syrian government of all elements of the Envoy’s six-point proposal in their entirety to achieve a sustained cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties,

Taking note of the assessment by the Secretary-General that a United Nations monitoring mission deployed quickly when the conditions are conducive with a clear mandate, the requisite capacities, and the appropriate conditions of operation would greatly contribute to observing and upholding the commitment of the parties to a cessation of armed violence in all its forms and to supporting the implementation of the six-point plan,

Noting the 19 April 2012 Preliminary Understanding (S/2012/250) agreed between the Syrian Arab Republic and the United Nations which provides a basis for a protocol governing the Advance Team and, upon its deployment, the UN supervision mechanism,

Having considered the Secretary-General’s letter addressed to the President of Security Council (S/2012/238),

1. Reaffirms its full support for and calls for the urgent, comprehensive, and immediate implementation of all elements of the Envoy’s six-point proposal as annexed to resolution 2042 (2012) aimed at bringing an immediate end to all violence and human rights violations, securing humanitarian access and facilitating a Syrian-led political transition leading to a democratic, plural political system, in which citizens are equal regardless of their affiliations, ethnicities or beliefs, including through commencing a comprehensive political dialogue between the Syrian government and the whole spectrum of the Syrian opposition;

2. Calls upon the Syrian government to implement visibly its commitments in their entirety, as it agreed to do in the Preliminary Understanding and as stipulated in resolution 2042 (2012), to (a) cease troop movements towards population centres, (b) cease all use of heavy weapons in such centres, (c) complete pullback of military concentrations in and around population centres, as well as to withdraw its troops and heavy weapons from population centres to their barracks or temporary deployment places to facilitate a sustained cessation of violence;

3. Calls upon all parties in Syria, including the opposition, immediately to cease all armed violence in all its forms;

4. Calls upon the Syrian armed opposition groups and relevant elements to respect relevant provisions of the Preliminary Understanding;

5. Decides to establish for an initial period of 90 days a United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) under the command of a Chief Military Observer, comprising an initial deployment of up to 300 unarmad military observers as well as an appropriate civilian component as required by the Mission to fulfills its mandate, and decides further that the Mission shall be deployed expeditiously
subject to assessment by the Secretary-General of relevant developments on the
ground, including the consolidation of the cessation of violence;

6. Decides also that the mandate of the Mission shall be to monitor a
cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties and to monitor and support
the full implementation of the Envoy’s six-point proposal;

7. Requests that the Secretary-General and the Syrian government without
delay conclude a Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA), taking into consideration
General Assembly resolution 58/82 on the scope of legal protection under the
Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, and notes the
agreement between the Syrian government and the United Nations that, pending the
conclusion of such an agreement, the model SOFA agreement of 9 October 1990
(A/45/594) shall apply provisionally;

8. Calls upon the Syrian government to ensure the effective operation of
UNSMIS by: facilitating the expeditions and unhindered deployment of its
personnel and capabilities as required to fulfil its mandate; ensuring its full,
unimpeded, and immediate freedom of movement and access as necessary to fulfil
its mandate, underlining in this regard the need for the Syrian government and the
United Nations to agree rapidly on appropriate air transportation assets for
UNSMIS; allowing its unobstructed communications; and allowing it to freely and
privately communicate with individuals throughout Syria without retaliation against
any person as a result of interaction with UNSMIS;

9. Calls upon the parties to guarantee the safety of UNSMIS personnel
without prejudice to its freedom of movement and access, and stresses that the
primary responsibility in this regard lies with the Syrian authorities;

10. Requests the Secretary-General to report immediately to the Security
Council any obstructions to the effective operation of UNSMIS by any party;

11. Reiterates its call for the Syrian authorities to allow immediate, full and
unimpeded access of humanitarian personnel to all populations in need of
assistance, in accordance with international law and guiding principles of
humanitarian assistance and calls upon all parties in Syria, in particular the Syrian
authorities, to cooperate fully with the United Nations and relevant humanitarian
organizations to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance;

12. Invites all Member States to consider making appropriate contributions to
UNSMIS as requested by the Secretary-General;

13. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the
implementation of this resolution within 15 days of its adoption and every 15 days
thereafter, and also to submit, as necessary, to the Council proposals for possible
adjustments to the UNSMIS mandate;

14. Expresses its intention to assess the implementation of this resolution and
to consider further steps as appropriate;

15. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
Appendix L

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In view of the Secretary-General’s statement that a supervision mission will be important to sustain peace and a meaningful political process in the country, we welcome the unanimous adoption of resolution 2043 (2012) by the Council today, thereby providing for the expeditious deployment of the United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS). We urge all sides to help assure UNSMIS’s effective operation by facilitating its work and guaranteeing the safety of its personnel. Its deployment will be important for ensuring that Joint Special Envoy Kofi Annan’s six-point plan is implemented; it will also play a crucial role in efforts towards the goal of ensuring that all sides commit to a peaceful dialogue, designed to promote an all-inclusive negotiation process leading to a political outcome that responds to the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people.

Finally, it is equally important that all members of the international community give this resolution and the Annan plan the chance to succeed, and that they uphold and respect the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Syria, as well as the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

Mr. Li Baodong (China) (spoke in Chinese): China was a sponsor of resolution 2043 (2012), which we have just adopted. China has always maintained that Syria’s independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity — as well as the choice and will of the Syrian people — should be respected. We have always supported and are actively committed to promoting a just, peaceful and proper settlement of the Syrian crisis through political dialogue. The good offices of Joint Special Envoy Kofi Annan constitute a practical way out and an important channel through which to steer a political settlement of the crisis, and he has made positive and significant progress. We urge all parties, including the Syrian Government and the opposition, to cooperate fully with his efforts in order to create the conditions for launching a Syrian-led, inclusive political process.

We also call on the international community to maintain its firm support for Mr. Annan’s efforts and to help consolidate the results achieved so far. We are strongly opposed to any words or deeds that may create difficulties for Mr. Annan in his work. The immediate and full deployment of the United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) is critical to solidifying Mr. Annan’s progress and promoting the full implementation of his six-point proposal. We hope that the Supervision Mission will fully respect Syria’s sovereignty and dignity, act strictly in accordance with what the Security Council has authorized, adhere to the principles of neutrality, objectivity and impartiality, and play an active and constructive role in pushing for a sustained cessation of violence in Syria. We also call on the Syrian Government and other relevant parties to support and cooperate with UNSMIS.

Mr. Rosenthal (Guatemala) (spoke in Spanish): Exactly one week ago, Guatemala voted to adopt resolution 2042 (2012). In spite of the fact that not all the conditions laid down in that resolution have been met before the next step is taken, today we again voted to adopt the new resolution, 2043 (2012). We did so on the recommendation of the Secretary-General and of Joint Special Envoy Kofi Annan, and in order to be consistent with the position we have taken on the events in Syria since their beginning.

While we share the scepticism expressed by various members of the Council regarding the commitment of the Government of Syria to complying with all six points in the Special Envoy’s proposal — points that the Government has committed to — we believe that the best course of action is to give the Government and the members of the opposition the benefit of the doubt, and to trust that the presence of United Nations observers on the ground will make a genuine difference to the capacity of the United Nations and the League of Arab States to help find a way out of this crisis.

We should remember that while the task at hand is to put an immediate end to the violence, a lasting solution requires negotiations among every sector of Syrian society to reach a peaceful agreement characterized by inclusive democratization and a respect for human rights. That is a noble objective, and we believe that it is worth taking this chance to see it fulfilled — perhaps the last chance of avoiding far worse evils.

Mr. Hardeep Singh Puri (India): Let me begin by thanking the Russian delegation for introducing the draft resolution that the Security Council has adopted unanimously today as resolution 2043 (2012). It is a significant step in the Council’s collective support for the efforts of the Joint Special Envoy, Mr. Kofi Annan.

It is a matter for satisfaction that Mr. Annan’s efforts over the past seven weeks have resulted in an improvement in the situation in Syria. Although there
France, Germany, Portugal, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its Resolutions 2043 (2012) and 2042 (2012), and its Presidential Statements of 3 August 2011, 21 March 2012 and 5 April 2012,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Syria, and to the purposes and principles of the Charter,

Reaffirming also its support to the Joint Special Envoy for the United Nations and the League of Arab States, Kofi Annan, and his work, following General Assembly resolution A/RES/66/253 of 16 February 2012 and relevant resolutions of the League of Arab States, aimed at securing full implementation of his six-point plan in its entirety, as annexed to resolution 2042 (2012).

Condemning the Syrian authorities’ increasing use of heavy weapons, including indiscriminate shelling from tanks and helicopters, in population centres and failure to withdraw its troops and heavy weapons to their barracks contrary to paragraph 2 of resolution 2043 (2012),

Condemning the armed violence in all its forms, including by armed opposition groups, and expressing grave concern at the continued escalation of violence, and expressing its profound regret at the death of many thousands of people in Syria,

Condemning the continued widespread violations of human rights by the Syrian authorities, as well as any human rights abuses by armed opposition groups, and recalling that those responsible shall be held accountable,

Condemning the series of bombings that have made the situation more complex and deadly, some of which are indicative of the presence of well-organized terrorist groups,

Deploring the deteriorating humanitarian situation and the failure to ensure timely provision of humanitarian assistance to all areas affected by the fighting contrary to point 3 of the Envoy’s six-point plan, reiterating its call for the Syrian parties to allow immediate, full and unimpeded access of humanitarian personnel to all populations in need of assistance, in particular to civilian populations in need of evacuation, and calling upon all parties in Syria, in particular the Syrian authorities, to cooperate fully with the United Nations and relevant humanitarian organizations to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance,
Condemning the continued detention of thousands of Syrians in networks of Government-run facilities and deploring that there is no freedom of assembly contrary to points 4 and 6 of the six-point plan, and recalling the urgency of intensifying the pace and scale of release of arbitrarily detained persons, and reiterating the need for Syrians to enjoy the freedom to assemble, including to demonstrate peacefully and freedom of movement for journalists throughout the country, as part of the necessary conditions for a political transition,

Having considered the Secretary-General’s report on UNSMIS dated 6 July 2012, commending United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) personnel for their continued efforts in a dangerous and volatile environment, and deploring that, due to the failure of the parties to implement the six-point plan and to the level of violence, monitoring access restrictions and direct targeting, the Mission’s operational activities were rendered unworkable, and supporting the Secretary-General’s recommendation that a shift in Mission structure and focus should be considered,

Stressing that rapid progress on a political solution represents the best opportunity to resolve the situation in Syria peacefully, welcoming in this regard the Final Communiqué of the Envoy’s 30 June Action Group meeting, and noting that progress towards an atmosphere of safety and calm is key to enabling a credible transition,

Welcoming the Syrian Opposition Conference held under the auspices of the League of Arab States in Cairo on July 3, 2012, as part of the efforts of the League of Arab States to engage the whole spectrum of the Syrian opposition, and encouraging greater cohesion among the opposition,

Noting the Secretary-General’s 6 July 2012 call on the Security Council to provide the necessary support and ensure sustained, united and effective pressure on all concerned to ensure compliance with its decisions and create conditions for the success of a political solution envisaged by the Action Group,

Determining that the situation in Syria constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Expresses grave concern at the escalation of violence, and the failure of the parties, in particular the Syrian authorities, to implement the Envoy’s six-point plan as annexed to resolution 2042 (2012), thus not permitting the creation of a political space that would allow for meaningful political dialogue, and calls upon all parties to recommit immediately and without waiting for the actions of others to a sustained cessation of violence in all its forms and implementation of the six-point plan;

2. Endorses in full the 30 June Action Group Final Communiqué and its underlying guidelines and principles (Annex);

Enabling Transition: Immediate implementation of the Envoy’s six-point plan

3. Demands the urgent, comprehensive, and immediate implementation of all elements of the Envoy’s six-point proposal as annexed to resolution 2042 (2012) aimed at bringing an immediate end to all violence and human rights violations, securing humanitarian access and facilitating a Syrian-led political transition as
outlined in the Annex, leading to a democratic, plural political system, in which citizens are equal regardless of their affiliations, ethnicities or beliefs, including through commencing a comprehensive political dialogue between the Syrian authorities and the whole spectrum of the Syrian opposition;

4. **Decides** that the Syrian authorities shall implement visibly and verifiably their commitments in their entirety, as they agreed to do in the Preliminary Understanding and as stipulated in resolution 2042 (2012) and 2043(2012), to (a) cease troop movements towards population centres, (b) cease all use of heavy weapons in such centres, (c) complete pullback of military concentrations in and around population centres, and to withdraw its troops and heavy weapons from population centres to their barracks or temporary deployment places to facilitate a sustained cessation of violence;

5. **Demands** that all parties in Syria, including the opposition, immediately cease all armed violence in all its forms, thereby creating an atmosphere conducive to a sustained cessation of violence and a Syrian-led political transition;

6. **Expresses grave concern** at the increasing numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons as a result of the ongoing violence, and **reiterates** its appreciation of the significant efforts that have been made by the States bordering Syria to assist those who have fled across Syria's borders as a consequence of the violence, and requesting UNHCR to provide assistance as requested by member states receiving these displaced persons;

**Transition**

7. **Demands** that all Syrian parties work with the Office of the Joint Special Envoy to implement rapidly the transition plan set forth in the Final Communiqué in a way that assures the safety of all in an atmosphere of stability and calm;

**Accountability**

8. **Recalls** that all those responsible for human rights violations and abuses, including acts of violence, must be held accountable;

9. **Decides** that the Syrian Government shall provide the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic and individuals working on its behalf immediate entry and access to all areas of Syria, **decides** that the Syrian authorities shall cooperate fully with the Commission of Inquiry in the performance of its mandate;

**UNSMIS**

10. **Decides** to renew the mandate of the United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) for a period of 45 days, on the basis of the Secretary-General's recommendation to reconfigure the Mission to increase support for dialogue with and between the parties, and enhance attention to the political track and rights' issues across the six-point plan;

11. **Requests the Secretary-General** to retain the minimum military observer capacity and requisite civilian component necessary to promote forward steps on the six-point plan through facilitation of political dialogue and to conduct verification and fact-finding tasks;
12. **Condemns** all attacks against UNSMIS, **reaffirms** that perpetrators of attacks against UN personnel must be held to account, **demands** that the parties guarantee the safety of UNSMIS personnel without prejudice to its freedom of movement and access, and **stresses** that the primary responsibility in this regard lies with the Syrian authorities;

13. **Demands** that the Syrian authorities ensure the effective operation of UNSMIS by: facilitating the expeditious and unhindered deployment of its personnel and capabilities as required to fulfil its mandate; ensuring its full unimpeded, and immediate freedom of movement and access as necessary to fulfil its mandate, underlining in this regard the need for the Syrian authorities and the United Nations to come rapidly to an agreement on appropriate air transportation assets for UNSMIS; allowing its unobstructed communications; and allowing it to freely and privately communicate with individuals throughout Syria without retaliation against any person as a result of interaction with UNSMIS.

**Compliance**

14. **Decides** that, if the Syrian authorities have not fully complied with paragraph 4 above within ten days, then it shall impose immediately measures under Article 41 of the UN Charter;

**Reporting and Follow-Up**

15. **Requests** the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the implementation by all parties in Syria of this resolution within 10 days of its adoption and every 15 days thereafter;

16. **Expresses** its intention to assess the implementation of this resolution and to consider further steps as appropriate;

17. **Decides** to remain seized of the matter.

**Annex**

**Final Communiqué of the Action Group for Syria**

1. On 30 June 2012, the Secretaries-General of the United Nations and the League of Arab States, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, Turkey, Iraq (Chair of the Summit of the League of Arab States), Kuwait (Chair of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the League of Arab States) and Qatar (Chair of the Arab Follow-up Committee on Syria of the League of Arab States) and the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy met at the United Nations Office at Geneva as the Action Group for Syria, chaired by the Joint Special Envoy of the United Nations and the League of Arab States to Syria.

2. The members of the Action Group came together out of grave alarm at the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic. They strongly condemn the continued and escalating killing, destruction and human rights abuses. They are deeply concerned at the failure to protect civilians; the intensification of the violence, the potential for even deeper conflict in the country and the regional dimensions of the problem. The
 unacceptable nature and magnitude of the crisis demands a common position and joint international action.

3. The members of the Action Group are committed to the sovereignty, independence, national unity and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic. They are determined to work urgently and intensively to bring about an end to the violence and human rights abuses, and to facilitate the launch of a Syrian-led political process leading to a transition that meets the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people and enables them independently and democratically to determine their own future.

4. In order to secure these common objectives, the members of the Action Group (a) identified steps and measures by the parties to secure the full implementation of the six-point plan and Security Council resolutions 2042 (2012) and 2043 (2012), including an immediate cessation of violence in all its forms; (b) agreed on principles and guidelines for a political transition that meets the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people; and (c) agreed on actions that they would take to implement the objectives in support of the Joint Special Envoy’s efforts to facilitate a Syrian-led political process. They are convinced that this can encourage and support progress on the ground and will help to facilitate and support a Syrian-led transition.

Identified steps and measures by the parties to secure the full implementation of the six-point plan and Security Council resolutions 2042 (2012) and 2043 (2012), including an immediate cessation of violence in all its forms

5. The parties must fully implement the six-point plan and Security Council resolutions 2042 (2012) and 2043 (2012). To that end:

(a) All parties must recommit to a sustained cessation of armed violence in all its forms and to the implementation of the six-point plan immediately and without waiting for the actions of others. The Government and armed opposition groups must cooperate with the United Nations Supervision Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic (UNSMIS), with a view to furthering the implementation of the plan in accordance with the Mission’s mandate,

(b) A cessation of armed violence must be sustained, with immediate, credible and visible actions by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to implement the other items of the six-point plan, including:

(i) Intensification of the pace and scale of release of arbitrarily detained persons, including especially vulnerable categories of persons, and persons involved in peaceful political activities; the provision, without delay and through appropriate channels, of a list of all places in which such persons are being detained; the immediate organization of access to such locations; and the provision, through appropriate channels, of prompt responses to all written requests for information, access or release regarding such persons;

(ii) Ensuring freedom of movement throughout the country for journalists and a non-discriminatory visa policy for them;

(iii) Respecting freedom of association and the right to demonstrate peacefully, as legally guaranteed.
(c) In all circumstances, all parties must show full respect for the safety and security of UNSMIS and fully cooperate with and facilitate the Mission in all respects;

(d) In all circumstances, the Government must allow immediate and full humanitarian access by humanitarian organizations to all areas affected by the fighting. The Government and all parties must enable the evacuation of the wounded, and all civilians who wish to leave must be enabled to do so. All parties must firmly adhere to their obligations under international law, including in relation to the protection of civilians.

Agreed principles and guidelines for a Syrian-led transition

6. The members of the Action Group agree on the principles and guidelines for a Syrian-led transition set out below.

7. Any political settlement must deliver to the people of the Syrian Arab Republic a transition that:

(a) Offers a perspective for the future that can be shared by all in the Syrian Arab Republic;

(b) Establishes clear steps according to a firm timetable towards the realization of that perspective;

(c) Can be implemented in a climate of safety for all and of stability and calm;

(d) Is reached rapidly without further bloodshed and violence and is credible.

8. Perspective for the future. The aspirations of the people of the Syrian Arab Republic have been clearly expressed by the wide range of Syrians consulted. There is an overwhelming wish for a State that:

(a) Is genuinely democratic and pluralistic, giving space to established and newly emerging political actors to compete fairly and equally in elections. This also means that the commitment to multiparty democracy must be a lasting one, going beyond an initial round of elections;

(b) Complies with international standards on human rights, the independence of the judiciary, accountability of those in Government and the rule of law. It is not enough just to enunciate such a commitment. There must be mechanisms available to the people to ensure that these commitments are kept by those in authority;

(c) Offers equal opportunities and chances for all. There is no room for sectarianism or discrimination on ethnic, religious, linguistic or any other grounds. Numerically smaller communities must be assured that their rights will be respected.

9. Clear steps in the transition. The conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic will end only when all sides are assured that there is a peaceful way towards a common future for all in the country. It is therefore essential that any settlement provide for clear and irreversible steps in the transition according to a fixed time frame. The key steps in any transition include:

(a) The establishment of a transitional governing body that can establish a neutral environment in which the transition can take place, with the transitional governing body exercising full executive powers. It could include members of the
present Government and the opposition and other groups and shall be formed on the basis of mutual consent;

(b) It is for the Syrian people to determine the future of the country. All groups and segments of society in the Syrian Arab Republic must be enabled to participate in a national dialogue process. That process must be not only inclusive but also meaningful. In other words, its key outcomes must be implemented;

(c) On that basis, there can be a review of the constitutional order and the legal system. The result of constitutional drafting would be subject to popular approval;

(d) Upon establishment of the new constitutional order, it will be necessary to prepare for and conduct free and fair multiparty elections for the new institutions and offices that have been established;

(e) Women must be fully represented in all aspects of the transition.

10. **Safety, stability and calm.** Any transition involves change. However, it is essential to ensure that the transition can be implemented in a way that ensures the safety of all in an atmosphere of stability and calm. This requires:

(a) Consolidation of full calm and stability. All parties must cooperate with the transitional governing body to ensure the permanent cessation of violence. This includes completion of withdrawals and addressing the issue of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of armed groups;

(b) Effective steps to ensure that vulnerable groups are protected and that immediate action is taken to address humanitarian issues in areas of need. It is also necessary to ensure that the release of the detained is completed rapidly;

(c) Continuity of governmental institutions and qualified staff. Public services must be preserved or restored. This includes the military forces and security services. However, all governmental institutions, including the intelligence services, have to perform according to human rights and professional standards and operate under a leadership that inspires public confidence, under the control of the transitional governing body;

(d) Commitment to accountability and national reconciliation. Accountability for acts committed during the present conflict must be addressed. There also needs to be a comprehensive package for transitional justice, including compensation or rehabilitation for victims of the present conflict, steps towards national reconciliation and forgiveness.

11. **Rapid steps to come to a credible political agreement.** It is for the people of the Syrian Arab Republic to come to a political agreement, but time is running out. It is clear that:

(a) The sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic must be respected;

(b) The conflict must be resolved through peaceful dialogue and negotiation alone. Conditions conducive to a political settlement must now be put in place;

(c) There must be an end to the bloodshed. All parties must recommit themselves credibly to the six-point plan. This must include a cessation of armed
violence in all its forms and immediate, credible and visible actions to implement points 2 to 6 of the six-point plan;

(d) All parties must now engage genuinely with the Joint Special Envoy. The parties must be prepared to put forward effective interlocutors to work expeditiously towards a Syrian-led settlement that meets the legitimate aspirations of the people. The process must be fully inclusive in order to ensure that the views of all segments of Syrian society are heard in shaping the political settlement for the transition;

(e) The organized international community, including the members of the Action Group, stands ready to offer significant support for the implementation of an agreement reached by the parties. This may include an international assistance presence under a United Nations mandate if requested. Significant funds will be available to support reconstruction and rehabilitation.

Agreed actions

12. Agreed actions that the members of the Group will take to implement the above in support of the Joint Special Envoy’s efforts to facilitate a Syrian-led political process are as follows:

(a) Action Group members will engage as appropriate, and apply joint and sustained pressure on, the parties in the Syrian Arab Republic to take the steps and measures outlined in paragraph 5 above;

(b) Action Group members are opposed to any further militarization of the conflict;

(c) Action Group members reiterate to the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic the importance of the establishment of an effective empowered interlocutor, when requested by the Joint Special Envoy to do so, to work on the basis of the six-point plan and the present communiqué;

(d) Action Group members urge the opposition to increase cohesion and to be in a position to ensure effective representative interlocutors to work on the basis of the six-point plan and the present communiqué;

(e) Action Group members will give full support to the Joint Special Envoy and his team as they immediately engage the Government and the opposition, and will consult widely with Syrian society, as well as other international actors, to further develop the way forward;

(f) Action Group members would welcome the further convening by the Joint Special Envoy of a meeting of the Action Group, should he deem it necessary to review the concrete progress taken on all points agreed in the present communiqué and to determine what further and additional steps and actions are needed from the Action Group to address the crisis. The Joint Special Envoy will also keep the United Nations and the League of Arab States informed.
Appendix N

by re-establishing existing mechanisms, including the six-point plan that served as our main reference for such a solution. It included, of course, the United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS).

The Council and countries that contributed to UNSMIS were aware of the fact that the dispatch of observers to Syria was somewhat different from other missions. But Morocco chose to support the international effort to find a peaceful solution to the crisis, including after the acceptance of the six-point plan by all parties, whose first demand was the complete cessation of violence and the relaunching of the political process to enable the Syrian people to achieve their legitimate aspirations.

To conclude, I wish to reiterate our firm conviction of the need to continue our common, joint work on restoring unity in the Council. What unites its members is their Charter responsibility and its imperative to prevail over differences of opinion.

We are heartbroken over the suffering of the people in sisterly Syria. A credible solution that restores hope and faith to the people of Syria is necessary to ensure their understanding that the crisis will end and that their aspirations will be fulfilled with the support of the Council.

Mr. Li Baodong (China) (spoke in Chinese): China is deeply concerned over the increasingly challenging situation in Syria. We oppose terrorism and violence in all their forms and strongly condemn the recent killing of civilians and the bomb attack in Damascus on 18 July.

The top priority of the international community now is to fully support and cooperate with Joint Special Envoy Annan’s mediation, and to promote the implementation of the final communiqué of the Action Group for Syria (S/2012/523, annex), adopted at its meeting of Foreign Ministers held in Geneva, the relevant Security Council resolutions and Mr. Annan’s six-point plan. The international community should urge an immediate ceasefire and cessation of all violence and establish the necessary conditions to resolve the crisis.

To that end, the United Nations Supervision Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic (UNSMIS) has played an important and exceptional role. China therefore supports the extension of the UNSMIS mandate and endorses Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s proposal to adjust its tasks accordingly. China calls on the Security Council to send a clear signal in support of Mr. Annan’s mediation and promotion of a political settlement to the Syrian crisis. We have vigorously pushed for consensus among Security Council members through consultations. However, draft resolution S/2012/530 submitted by the United Kingdom, the United States and France completely contradicts such aims.

First, the draft resolution is seriously flawed, and its unbalanced content seeks to put pressure on only one party. Experience has shown that such a practice would not help resolve the Syrian issue, but would only derail the matter from the political track. It would not only further aggravate the turmoil, but also cause it to spread to other countries of the region, undermine regional peace and stability, and ultimately harm the interests of the people of Syria and other regional countries.

Secondly, the draft resolution would seriously erode international trust and cooperation on the issue of Syria. Mr. Annan’s mediation is an important and realistic way forward towards a political solution of the Syrian issue. It is an important tool. Not long ago, thanks to the efforts of all parties, the ministerial meeting of the Action Group for Syria, initiated by Joint Special Envoy Annan, adopted a final communiqué that forged consensus among the major parties and opened a new window of opportunity for an appropriate settlement of the Syrian crisis. At present, Mr. Annan’s efforts to implement the outcome of that meeting are at a critical juncture. However, the draft resolution essentially undermined the consensus reached at the Geneva meeting and seriously disrupted the new round of mediation efforts undertaken by Joint Special Envoy Annan.

Thirdly, sovereign equality and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries are the basic norms governing inter-State relations enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. China has no self-interest in the Syrian issue. We have consistently maintained that the future and fate of Syria should be independently decided by the Syrian people, rather than imposed by outside forces. We believe that the Syrian issue must be resolved through political means and that military means would achieve nothing.

That is China’s consistent position on international affairs. It is not targeted at any specific incident or moment. Our purpose is to safeguard the interests of the Syrian people and Arab countries, and the interests of all countries — small and medium-sized countries in particular — and to protect the role and authority of
the United Nations and the Security Council, as well as the basic standards that govern international relations.

Fourthly, the draft resolution jeopardizes the unity of the Security Council. The Council was unanimous in adopting resolutions 2042 (2012) and 2043 (2012), displaying a hard-won spirit of unity and cooperation. During consultations on today’s draft resolution, the sponsoring countries failed to show any political will or cooperativeness, adopting a rigid and arrogant approach to the reasonable basic concerns of other concerned countries and refusing to make revisions. It is even more regrettable that, in circumstances where the parties were still seriously divided and there was still time for continued consultations, the sponsoring countries refused to heed the calls for further consultation made by China, some other Council members and Joint Special Envoy Annan — until an approach acceptable to all parties could be reached — and pressed for a vote on the draft resolution. China is strongly opposed to such practices.

For the aforementioned reasons, China could not accept today’s draft resolution and voted against it. This morning, various countries made statements that confused right and wrong and made unfounded accusations against China. They are completely mistaken and are based on ulterior motives. China is firmly opposed to such behaviour. We have participated in all of the Council’s consultations on resolutions concerning Syria in a positive, responsible and constructive manner, with a view to pushing for a ceasefire and a halt to all violence in Syria, as well as for implementation of the communique from the Geneva meeting (S/2012/523, annex), of resolutions 2042 (2012) and 2043 (2012) and of the Annan six-point plan.

China has been committed to reaching a consensus, worked hard for a smooth extension of the mandate of UNSMIS and supported Mr. Annan’s mediation efforts. In contrast, a few countries have been eager to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries, to fuel the flames and to sow discord in complete disregard of the possible consequences. From the very beginning, they have shown a negative attitude to Mr. Annan’s mediation efforts and to the deployment of UNSMIS over the past few months, proclaiming the futility and failure of those efforts.

This time they have repeated their old trick of setting preconditions as obstacles to the extension of UNSMIS’s mandate and have accompanied that with an invocation of Chapter VII of the Charter and the threat of sanctions, in an attempt to change or even repudiate the hard-won consensus reached by the action group during the Geneva meeting. They have shown only arrogance, not sincerity, during the consultations. We cannot help questioning their willingness to see UNSMIS’s mandate extended and a speedy settlement of the Syrian crisis through a Syrian-led political process. We urge those countries to reflect earnestly on their policy and behaviour and to return immediately to the right road.

At present, some time still remains before the mandate of UNSMIS expires. We hope that the sponsors will change their minds and call on them to do so, in a positive response to Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and Joint Special Envoy Kofi Annan’s proposals, by supporting the extension of the UNSMIS mandate with a view to arriving at a political solution to the Syrian question and protecting the fundamental interests of the people of Syria and other countries in the region, as well as to safeguarding the credibility, authority and unity of the Security Council.

China supports Pakistan and South Africa’s proposal to adopt a draft resolution on a technical roll-over of the UNSMIS mandate, and hopes that Security Council members can reach a consensus on that proposal as soon as possible.

The President (spoke in Spanish): I shall now speak in my capacity as Permanent Representative of Colombia.

In April of last year, during Colombia’s previous presidency of the Security Council, we saw the first signs of a spiral of violent repression that has not ceased and has become more acute by the day. Thousands have died, disappeared, become refugees, been tortured or arbitrarily detained. The world stands appalled at the terrible human tragedy, unusual levels of violence and flagrant lack of respect for human rights that Syrians are enduring. It is deplorable that the Syrian Government has not taken the measures necessary to implement the Joint Special Envoy’s plan and resolutions 2042 (2012) and 2043 (2012), and that the opposition has made no contribution to this either.

Colombia voted in favour of the draft resolution (S/2012/538) submitted by the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Portugal and the United States, because we believe that its text provides the necessary support and sends a clear message to all parties in Syria on the importance of complying with the commitments and
Resolution 2059 (2012)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 6812th meeting, on 20 July 2012

The Security Council,

Commending the efforts of the United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS),

1. **Decides** to renew the mandate of UNSMIS for a final period of 30 days, taking into consideration the Secretary-General's recommendations to reconfigure the Mission, and taking into consideration the operational implications of the increasingly dangerous security situation in Syria;

2. **Calls upon** the parties to assure the safety of UNSMIS personnel without prejudice to its freedom of movement and access, and stresses that the primary responsibility in this regard lies with the Syrian authorities;

3. **Expresses its willingness** to renew the mandate of UNSMIS thereafter only in the event that the Secretary-General reports and the Security Council confirms the cessation of the use of heavy weapons and a reduction in the level of violence by all sides sufficient to allow UNSMIS to implement its mandate;

4. **Requests** the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the implementation of this resolution within 15 days;

5. **Decides** to remain seized of the matter.