Beyond the Dichotomies of History:

A reconstruction of the dynamic of modern society in

light of its apparent fragmentation

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May 1, 2015
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INTRODUCTION: THE LEFT DIVIDED

One of the major sources of discord within the contemporary Left is that between the proponents of post-colonial theory and those of traditional Western Marxism. At the heart of this antinomy lies the interface of culture and economy, of identity and structure. In the attempt to grapple with the inequalities and oppressions of modernity, each takes a fundamentally one-dimensional approach to contemporary society. Analyzing the theoretical bases of each reveals misinterpretations and misunderstandings of modern life. Post-colonial thought, can be traced back to the work of Michel Foucault, despite its subsequent rejection of much of his critique, and Western Marxism is based on the work of its namesake, Karl Marx, interpreted in light of the historical understanding of Marx’s predecessor Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Moving beyond the one-dimensional analyses of each system to one that captures the critical insights of each offers the possibility of a fuller and, ultimately, more productive account of society.

A contemporary dialogue, which highlights the issues at play, is that between Dipesh Chakrabarty and Vivek Chibber. In Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference, Chakrabarty outlines what he views as the shortcomings of traditional understandings of non-Western post-colonial societies, particularly India. Because Marxism has been one of the few Western philosophical strains to deal seriously with questions of non-European societies, it is the one most directly targeted by Chakrabarty’s critique. Chakrabarty’s critique begins with a general statement of difference. European history can no longer be considered synonymous with world history (Chakrabarty 2000:3). The aim of his project is to locate the differences in the history between postcolonial societies and those of Europe. The legacy of the European colonizers, however, is one that has shaped the language of political modernity with the categories of Enlightenment secular humanism (Chakrabarty 2000:4). For Chakrabarty, Marxist and Liberal thought are the inheritors of that tradition and therefore
both continue the covert (and often overt) discrimination latent within the Enlightenment tra-
dition (Chakrabarty 2000:4). And yet, Chakrabarty argues, the critique of colonialism itself is
impossible without making use of the principles and intellectual successors to the Enlighten-
ment (Chakrabarty 2000:4). Instead, a critique of colonialism necessitates a critical engagement
with the Enlightenment universals (Chakrabarty 2000:5). This is, in many ways a result of the
current dynamic of the social sciences, in which the Western tradition is the only one that
is still alive; no other intellectual tradition is engaged with in the contemporary academy.
Chakrabarty indicates that South Asian and South Asianist social scientists no longer engage
with ancient Indian philosophers in any way other than as historical curiosities (Chakrabarty
2000:5).

Chakrabarty’s critique of the Marxist conception of history as it applies to postcolonial so-
cieties begins from an assertion that late capitalism is never seen as having its engine in the
Third World, which is always understood as somehow lagging behind. This is the problem of
Historicism according to Chakrabarty (Chakrabarty 2000:7). Historicism posits time as a mea-
sure of cultural difference. Thus those countries that entered late into the capitalist sphere are
seen as somehow less developed. Moreover, this historicist understanding robs postcolonial
societies of any historical agency. History is understood as developing in Europe and sim-
ply spreading elsewhere with no reciprocal influence (Chakrabarty 2000:7). Non-European
societies were always seen therefore as incapable and not fully developed culturally and
politically. The narrative that develops out of this understanding is one that urges the unde-
veloped societies to wait before they can claim political emancipation. This is a narrative that
has come into conflict with the insistence on the present by those who have been told to wait
(Chakrabarty 2000:8).

Historicist Marxism, according to Chakrabarty, could only go so far in conceptualizing the
ynamics of non-European countries, making reference to terms like pre-political (Chakrabarty
2000:11). Eric Hobsbawm say peasants as both revolutionary and yet as not fully viable for sec-
ular political engagement. Understandings of the historical process were developed by various
Western Marxist in such a way that conceptualized a historical dynamic for which features
of many present societies were considered anachronistic (Chakrabarty 2000:12). Chakrabarty
makes reference to the work of Guha to indicate that the peasant movements in modern
India challenge what had been held to be political. Peasant political engagement is a real
world historical fact that cannot be relegated to the category of the pre-political (Chakrabarty
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2000:13). Guha's critique of the category of this category pluralizes the history of power and distinguishes it from universalist projects. Instead, subaltern historiography questions the assumption that capitalism necessarily brings bourgeois relations of power to a position of hegemony (Chakrabarty 2000:14). That is not to say, however, that capitalism and modernity have remained incomplete, but that which is regarded as traditional is so only in that it traces its roots to precolonial conditions, not because it is somehow backward or primitive. The non-viability of the traditional Marxist critique, according to Chakrabarty lies in the fact that there was no Indian class equivalent to the European bourgeoisie that could fabricate a hegemonic ideology that made its own interests look and feel like the interests of all (Chakrabarty 2000:15). Instead, Chakrabarty argues for an understanding that incorporates capitalist domination without bourgeois hegemonic culture (Chakrabarty 2000:15). Dipesh Chakrabarty raises a very important critique to the traditional Marxist understanding of history. By problematizing the question of cultural difference, he undermines formulaic attempts to conceptualize the history of postcolonial societies according the the same progression associated with the development of modern bourgeois European culture. His dismissal of Marxism as a viable means of critique, however, did not remain unchallenged.

One such challenge to Chakrabarty's position has come from Vivek Chibber, in his book Postcolonial Theory and the Specter of Capital. Chibber is primarily interested in a purely negative critique of postcolonial theory, in an attempt to rescue the Marxist-Enlightenment tradition from the critique that scholars like Chakrabarty have brought to bare. Chibber characterizes postcolonial thought as arguing that Western categories can't be applied to postcolonial societies; it denies the categories that emerged out of the liberal Enlightenment (Anon n.d.). Chibber agrees with postcolonial thinkers that for the categories of the Enlightenment and political economy to be applicable to postcolonial regions, capitalism must have spread to those regions as well. He disagrees with them, however, over whether this has happened. Postcolonialists, Chibber argues, demand that new categories be developed for those regions to which capitalism has not spread in its entirety. The Marxist universalist categories, they argue, are not only inapplicable, but fundamentally Eurocentric (Anon n.d.).

Chibber's attempt to rescue the applicability of the Marxist categories comes from a critique of Chakrabarty and his predecessor, Guha. Chibber's criticism of Guha stems from his understanding of the universalizing drive of capitalism. Chibber criticizes Guha for locating this capacity with the bourgeois class. Capital becomes hegemonic in the form of bourgeois ideals.
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and noncoercive domination. Because the bourgeoisie has not taken hold in the East as it has in the West, Guha argues that therefore capitalism's universalizing character is not applicable to the East and neither are traditional critiques thereof. Chibber characterizes Chakrabarty's analysis of the failure of Marxist categories as one based not in class relations but on the concept of what it means to be universalizing. He equates universalizability with an ability to fundamentally restructure all social relations. Since, however, there are traditional social relations that remain present in India, capitalism does not extend its universalizing character to postcolonial societies (Anon n.d.).

Chibber criticizes both theoretical positions from two perspectives. On the one hand he calls into question the validity of Guha's historicist argument by indicating that the history of capitalist development in the West was not brought about by the bourgeois themselves and therefore Guha's identification of capitalist modes of domination with the bourgeois class is misplaced. Instead, Chibber argues for a form of domination based exclusively in economic necessity (Anon n.d.). He argues that as long as a society is organized around the principle of surplus value it can be considered capitalist and therefore subject to analysis based on the Marxist categories (Anon n.d.). In this way he also claims to undermine Chakrabarty's claim regarding the universalizing character of capitalism. Chibber restricts his analysis purely to the realm of economics.

In order to fully understand this debate, it is necessary to investigate the theoretical traditions that serve as the conceptual bases for both Chakrabarty and Chibber, as well as those they seek to critique. In the following work I will make the claim that the notion of historical progression that Chakrabarty is criticizing is one that is fundamental to a particular kind of Marxism in which Marx's work is understood through a Hegelian lense. Chakrabarty's own argument takes Foucault's radically non-progressive conception of history as its basis and rejects any progressive-teleological understanding of history as totalizing. So, Chakrabarty directly criticizes Marxist narratives for maintaining the Hegelian conception of a developmental totality (Chakrabarty 2000:47). This is reinforced by Foucault's attempt to undermine the logical foundation of a theory of modernity based on the domination of the bourgeois class, arguing instead for a concrete, particular understanding of history that does away with abstract universals. Chibber is critical of this approach and, by returning to Marx's own theory, problematizes the account of capitalism that Chakrabarty and Guha present. He argues that it would be a mistake to understand Marx's theory of capitalism as based fundamentally on
relations of class, or as transforming the totality of social relations. His account locates the
possibility of transformation of modernity within the dynamic of capitalism itself, rather than
with an agent outside it. However, he identifies the fundamental contradiction of capitalism
as one between individual capitalists and the market, and between the authority of capital and
the workers (or to put it more abstractly, with labor) (Chibber 2013:231). This understanding
of the contradiction of capitalism I will argue, points to exactly the kind of totalizing society
that Chakrabarty warns against. It an understanding of the dynamic of capitalism that is
based upon an understanding of the role of labor in capitalist society that I shall call into
question.

I will attempt to reframe this debate as one that began with Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegels
account of history and totality as the basis of modern historical representations. This position,
I argue, is open to a number of critiques levelled against it by Michel Foucault, who coun-
terposes an emphasis on contingency and concrete particularity with regard to history. Fou-
cault, I argue, recasts the issue of history in terms of abstract systems of domination oriented
around relations of power. Finally, I will differentiate traditional Marxists understandings of
capitalism, which are equally susceptible to Foucaults critique, from one that fundamentally
reinterprets the role of labor in society. This reinterpretation, I will argue, is capable of avoid-
ing the theoretical pitfalls of traditional Marxism. Moreover, it is capable of grasping two
apparently contradictory understandings of historical development outlined by Chakrabarty,
the first in which institutions and social practices serve to reproduce the specific relations
of capital, and the second in which these social practices exist outside capitalism and resist
its universalization, as immanent to capitalism. Finally, it avoids the one-sidedness of both
Chakrabartys and Chibbers analyses and points to a possibility of structural transformation
that is more adequate to contemporary society.
HEGEL: HISTORY AS THE GROUNDS OF KNOWLEDGE

The intimate and mutually constitutive relationship between thought, society, and history, which would be so central to the thought of both Foucault and Marx, albeit in different ways, can be traced back to the epistemological and historical philosophy of Hegel. In fact, all subsequent thinkers have had to face, one way or another, the fundamental issues present in Hegel's work. Principal among these is the relationship between history, society and subjectivity, and between the abstract and the concrete. By intimately connecting history with the development of human subjectivity and social structures, Hegel made history a philosophical issue of central importance. The basis of any theory of society now had to provide a theory of history to account for that image of society. In order to understand what Hegel felt was at stake for his own philosophical program, it is necessary to have a brief understanding of the conversation to which he was contributing. Without recapitulating the entire history of western Philosophy, it is worth sketching a brief outline of the history of a particular question as it emerged at the end of the 18th century: how do we have knowledge of external reality. Hegel himself can be understood as continuing the program begun by Kant of developing a ground for claims made on the basis of reason, although Hegel does so in a radically different way than Kant.

Kant puts forward a question that would ultimately lead Hegel to make reference to the entirety of history in order to develop an adequate answer: Kant asks how it is possible to form empirically valid claims if those claims are dependent on structures of thought that cannot themselves be empirically validated. The particular form of this question derives from Kant's division of the foundation of knowledge into the a priori form knowledge takes as concepts and the a posteriori matter that is molded to that form. For Kant, we make use of concepts such as substance and cause when making claims about external reality, and any claim to knowledge must make use of these concepts. At the same time, however, following Hume,
Kant accepts that these substances and causal relations cannot be derived from experience. Instead, they are features of the mind, which determine the shape of experience. These concepts must be the conditions by which we have representations of external experience. That is, without the a priori faculty of thought, we would not have an experience of external reality at all. Kant does not give an explanation, however, how it is that these two different kinds of faculties, the a priori, on the one hand, and the a posteriori, on the other, interact. The question then becomes: how are these concepts generated in the mind and can the assumption be made that they actually correspond to empirical reality?

It is this issue that Hegel sets out to overcome in his epistemology. Hegel will take a fundamentally novel approach to these problems relative to Kant and Fichte. Hegel accepts Kants supposition that concepts are rules that we impose upon ourselves, but he goes farther than Kant in saying that we do so as part of our engagement with empirical reality. This means that concepts have a temporal dimension to them. They develop and change over time as a part of a meaningful practical life. Moreover, it means that they can develop to be increasingly adequate to a fully realized practical existence. Hegel sees the possibility of the full realization of the True, that is, of a set of concepts that is adequate to reality such that we can live full and meaningful lives within a natural order, and therefore the solution to the problems of epistemology. Because the issue with which Hegel is faced is that of dualism, he cannot solve the problem of the transcendental deduction with reference to a consciousness as subject and an independent external reality. Such a formulation would not justify the claim to empirical knowledge as there would be no way for the subject to leave its own consciousness to examine the validity of its knowledge. Instead, Hegel must justify the possibility of empirical knowledge by unifying the subject and object into a single substance that compromises all of existence.

In the preface to the Phenomenology Hegel makes the claim for such a substance, the Absolute, which he regards as synonymous with Truth. The shape of this Truth in any determinate period is the Notion, or the particular understanding of how to achieve a meaningful existence through a conscious sense of purpose that is actualized through existence (Hegel and Findlay 1977:4). The Notion changes as the understandings of how to achieve meaningful live change.

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1 Although a full and adequate account of the intellectual history of Hegels epistemology would include the influence of Fichte and Schelling on his thought, I will not do so for the sake of brevity. For a clear and concise account of the relationship between Hegel, Fichte and Schelling, as well as Kant, see Beiser, Fredrick. 2005. Hegel Routledge.
These changes, in turn, are driven by the failures of the previous understanding to achieve the goal of this kind of meaningful life. That Truth is conceptual means that Hegel is explicitly disagreeing with those philosophers who regard the form of truth as intuitive, that is as purely subjective and unreasoning. Although Hegel recognizes that there has been a turn away from the heaven directed gaze of earlier eras in favor of vulgar empiricism, he does not advocate a return to the earlier form of thought as those in favor of intuition do (Hegel and Findlay 1977:5). For Hegel this would be a return to the exact kind of Metaphysics that Kant had done away with. For Hegel, this turn would be a turn away from the Notion and Necessity as finite and therefore beneath the level of Truth. The Notion, Hegel admits, is only an immediate and undeveloped form. It is the condensation of cultural forms that are now superseded. It is this condensed form that marks this Science as incomplete. What is needed is for all those forms to redevelop in light of the new structure of Science. Because Science is as yet still undeveloped, it seems to stand apart from its past range and specificity of content, and even more the articulation of form it appears to be the possession of a select few as a singular esoteric knowledge (Hegel and Findlay 1977:7). This is a false image of Science, however, one that must be overcome. Thus Science must redevelop its former determinacy in order that it be generally understood. Thus, Hegel argues Science is at a crossroads where the old forms possess breadth of material and intelligibility, while the other promises a more developed rationality, one, which Hegel says, will be realized through the course of the argument in the rest of the book. While the new system may win out over the old, Hegel argues this is not truly a victory until the undeveloped rationality unpacks itself to possess the characteristics of breadth and simplicity (Hegel and Findlay 1977:8). The old system is capable of such breadth of material because it is a mechanistic system that fails to see difference. Hegel is here arguing against Fichtes and Schellings conception of the Absolute, which is purely formalistic and subsumes the multitude of appearances under the rigid logic of the Absolute. Hegel snidely refers to this as the night in which all the cows are black (Hegel and Findlay 1977:9). The similitude found in this system is an artificial one, a product of the purely formalistic definition of the Absolute from which it proceeds. For this reason, Hegel wants to move away from a conception of the Absolute as purely substance, but regards it equally as subject, as an organic whole composed of different distinct components that develop in the direction of self-knowledge with regard to what it is and what it ought to do (Hegel and Findlay 1977:10). The Absolute is a Subject that comes to know itself through the process through which it is
self-posed. As pure negativity this Subject creates the duality of subject and object within itself and then negates that same dualism, in so doing, realizes itself as the Absolute (Hegel and Findlay 1977:10). Unlike Fichte and Schelling, Hegel does not posit the Absolute as the whole atemporally; it is both the end of a process of negation and is simultaneously that process (Hegel and Findlay 1977:11). This is a criticism both of Schelling and of Fichte from the standpoint of the other. That is, Hegel is criticizing Schelling for positing the Absolute as an identity by indicating that it is simultaneously the process by which that identity is realized, while criticizing Fichte for maintaining the Absolute Ego as exclusively a process that can never be completed by indicating that the process itself is the constitution of a real Substance. The mediation of the Substance of Truth is accomplished by Reason, which is a purposive activity. This purposive activity in the form of a system, or Science is the only true basis for knowledge, which Hegel expresses by calling the Absolute Spirit (Hegel and Findlay 1977:12). Because Hegel equates truth with the Absolute that is Substance and Subject, it takes on a meaning fundamentally different than that of other philosophical systems. Truth is not just synonymous with objective validity. Instead, it is part of a process of development of the whole and of humanities coming to develop a self-understanding and an understanding of how to proceed that leads to a meaningful existence. This process is both the creation and realization of Truth as the dynamic of Spirit unfolds (Hegel and Findlay 1977:14). Spirit is as yet only understood as being-in-and-for-itself to us, that is it is in itself. This restricts Spirit to a state of being only Spiritual substance.

It becomes clear from this argument why Hegel's use of a term as laden as Spirit makes sense; he is arguing that at the present, the Absolute is only understood as a Spirit outside of us, in the form of God. For Spirit to become subject, it must realize that it is not only in itself, but also for itself. That is, the Absolute must recognize itself as such; we must recognize ourselves in Spirit, rather than relegating it to an external metaphysical existence. This amounts to a historical understanding of truth that is contingent on the dynamic of Spirit. That is, truth is historically specific. That is not to say that truth is arbitrary, however, but rather that it unfolds as the Spirit realizes itself in time. He is eschewing isolated individual principles in favor of the dynamic by which each principle is immanently critiqued and rectified. The subsequent principle would again return to the beginning of the dynamic. Because the Spirit is the dynamic through which it is realized, a historical dynamic for it becomes relevant for the first time. The issues regarding which mental representations correspond to reality is a
practical one. It has to do with a Scientific critique of claims of truth about reality. Mental representations are adopted so long as they adequately satisfy self-consciousness. As the dynamic of the realization of Spirit unfolds, immanent critique of claims about how we know things and how we structure life will suggest a newer revised version of what the adequate mental representation should be.

Because Hegel has made history a central issue for the foundation of epistemology, he must develop a philosophy of history. This understanding of history can be found, at least in part, in Hegel’s introduction to his lectures on history, Reason in History. Here, unlike in the sections from the preface of the Phenomenology, Hegel is dealing with history in general, as opposed to particular historical facts. There are, for Hegel, three methods of historical presentation: original, reflective, and philosophical. Original historians are those like Thucydides who record what they themselves experienced (Hegel 1985:3). They transform events into representative thought (Hegel 1985). We are at a point now, however, where there is very little original history being written, because our minds are mainly conceptual now, or, to use the language of the Phenomenology, notional (Hegel 1985:5). It seems, then, that original history depends on a kind of cognition that Hegel refers to as immediate in the Phenomenology. Reflective history, which involves a spiritual transcendence of the present, is the most varied of the three. Under the category reflective history fall universal history, pragmatic history, critical-reflective history, and fragmentary history. The third and, for Hegel, most important form of history is the philosophical. Hegel acknowledges that it might seem like a dilemma between philosophical ideas and historical facts. What philosophy brings to the study of history, and what separates philosophical history from other forms of history is the introduction of reason (Hegel 1985:10). In world history, Hegel argues, things have occurred rationally. Reason gives reality its being, not simply as an idea; phenomena only arise by reason. This argument recapitulates the relationship between the Absolute and empirical reality. The Absolute, as the rational system of all existence makes possible empirical knowledge because it is the basis for the external world as well as our knowledge of it. Philosophy has proven that reason is all that manifests itself in the world (Hegel 1985:11). This is not a presupposition of history, however, but its result (Hegel 1985:12). For Hegel, to him who looks at the world rationally, the world looks rationally back (Hegel 1985:13). This falls very much in line with the nous of Anaxagoras, which is reason as the ruler of the world. For Hegel, however, reason rules not as an individual consciousness. This would be a return to a metaphysical concep-
Hegel: History as the Grounds of Knowledge

tion of the Absolute, which, as indicated above, Hegel seeks to move away from. Instead, Hegel's claim that there is reason in nature is the same as saying there are natural laws (Hegel 1985:13).

At the same time, however, Hegel argues that the world is ruled by Providence (Hegel 1985:14). He questions the doctrine that it is impossible to know God, questioning the tenet of Faith over understanding. Instead, he argues in favor of directly getting to know God and his plan. How can one know God's plan, or, to put it another way, what is the purpose of the world? To answer this question, Hegel argues that history must be contemplated in relation to Spirit (20). In the world, there are two realms, the realm of nature and the realm of Spirit, where the realm of Spirit is everything produced by man (Hegel 1985:20). The two realms unite in one place: human nature (Hegel 1985:21). The ultimate purpose of world history then is the manifestation of God and his will: the Idea manifested as human spirit. As in the Phenomenology, Hegel is moving away from a conception of God as an external being, to God as a substance made subject through human action. Through human freedom in its purest form, thought, the Idea manifests itself (Hegel 1985:22). This Idea is not an idea of the human mind, but is rather the plan for the Spirit's development to self-knowledge. Initially, this Idea is abstract, and history consists of its concretization or realization. Spirit, whose essence is freedom, has its center in itself; it is self-contained existence. Independent and therefore free, self-consciousness is the self-contained existence of Spirit (Hegel 1985:23). World history, then, is Spirit striving to know its own nature. Freedom is the sole purpose of Spirit, Hegel argues. Freedom alone is the purpose which realizes and fulfills itself: the only truly efficient principle that pervades the whole (Hegel 1985:24). God can only will himself and therefore, his will, his Nature, the Idea, is the Idea of Freedom (Hegel 1985:25).

Freedom, though an idea internal to the Absolute, manifests itself through external occurrences, that is, the material needs of man appear as an efficient cause, although in reality, it is the Idea of Freedom that determines world history (Hegel 1985:26). In the same way, purposes and principles exist first in our thoughts. They are not yet realized. Actualization must be added for purpose to become reality. It is only through the will, through man's activity in general that a concept can be realized. Thus the individual has the right to be satisfied in its activity. That is not to say that people should do things only for themselves, but that the cause for which they work also have their interests in mind (Hegel 1985:28). In this way, when (and only when) we correctly understand our objective interests and acted effectively.
on the basis of this understanding, the abstract universal is united with the particular and subjective, this union alone constitutes truth: the universal must be actualized through the particular (Hegel 1985:35). But historically the abstract final aim of history is initially incomplete; the union is not yet fully realized. Need, passion, private interest, therefore constitute the tools by which the World Spirit realizes itself. The passions are utilized in the course of history to construct an edifice used to keep them out. This aim, however, is not conscious, but is implicit in world history (Hegel 1985:30). Certain individuals throughout history have contained within their purposes, the will of the world spirit. These people seem sufficient unto themselves and act against the existing norm, furthering the Idea, although they have no consciousness of the Idea as such (Hegel 1985:40). The occurrence of these individuals and, more abstractly, the progression of world history marks the realm of spirit as different from the realm of nature. World history is the development of Spirit in time, just as nature is the same development but in space (Hegel 1985:87). The development of Spirit in time indicates that Hegel is dealing with a dynamic of historical time. Change in nature moves by a cycle of constant repetition (Hegel 1985:68). The organic individual produces itself directly (69). Spirit, however, produces itself dialectically; it is mediated through consciousness and will, as the above indicates. These at first oppose Spirit until Spirit is able to use will for its own aim. Being mediated, however, the aim of Spirit is not clear to the will, thus Spirit is self-alienated and must overcome itself (Hegel 1985:69). This overcoming is the definite end toward which history is working. In other words, Spirit is moving to become for itself as well as in itself. It is moving towards realizing itself as Subject in human existence, rather than as substance beyond it. Having an end toward which it is developing gives history meaning. Concrete historical facts, therefore, must be regarded as external accidents. What is essential is the development of the actualized consciousness of Spirits freedom as human freedom (Hegel 1985:70).

The telos toward which history is working is the self-realization of Spirit, or the coming to be of the Idea, which is nothing other than the full development of Freedom. Freedom is nothing but the recognition and adoption of such universal substantial objects as Right and Law and the production of a reality, which is in accordance with them the State. The State, as the creation of Right and Law is the embodiment of Freedom. Only when a people have formed a state, then, can it be considered a part of world history (Hegel 1985:74). In this formation, history confronts itself; a proper state cannot exist without an interest in and
understanding of the past. History then refers both to the events of the past as well as the
telling and recording of those events (Hegel 1985:75). In thinking about Spirit, we are dealing
with the present no matter how far into the past we look. This is true furthermore, because
the present stage of Spirit contains all the past within it (Hegel 1985:95).

While this gives a general outline of the mechanisms by which Spirit realizes itself in world
history, it does not present us with an account of how Spirit has successfully achieved this
realization through the course of history. For Hegels argument to hold, he must indicate that
we are at a stage where Spirit has come to realize itself as Subject and Substance. This account
can be found in the body of the Phenomenology. First, however, it is worth briefly returning
to the preface for an introduction to Hegels historical method as it applies to the Phenomenol­
y. In order to understand Spirit, which has emerged out of the totality of human history, it
is necessary to traverse that history, because each moment has been necessary for the develop­
ment of Spirit. In fact, the full realization of Spirit is dependent on the cognitive, as opposed
to immediate understanding of all the past stages of Spirit, because they reside within Spirit
with the same immediacy as existence. Thus to achieve full understanding, this immediacy
must be overcome in the comprehension of these past stages (Hegel and Findlay 1977:2932).

For the actual stages of world-history, however, it is necessary to look in Hegels Elements of
the Philosophy of Right, where he explicitly traces the development of world history through
each of its four realms. The first realm is the Oriental realm, in which both secular society
and religion are united in the person of the ruler who is also the head priest or god. In
fact, according to Hegel, the ruler is the only personality that matters, all others are purely
accidental. Moreover, for Hegel, what develops is a system of customs that take the place
of laws, developing endlessly in tension with the rigid social hierarchy that exists stagnantly.
In the Greek realm, the unity of the Oriental is pushed back into a distant realm where it
changes to become the ideals of beauty and an ethical life. While individuality emerges at
this time, it is not fully developed, as the Greeks still rely on the external power of the oracles
to determine the will. In the Roman realm, the differentiation reaches a peak where the
personal is set against abstract universality. What is lost are all associations other than that
of private person with equal status and with formal rights. These individuals are only kept
together by and increasingly bloated bureaucracy. The untenability and ultimate collapse of
this system gives way to the possibility of the unity of self-consciousness and subjectivity, of
human and divine nature. For Hegel, this unity is the task of the Germanic realm (Hegel 1991:377380).

The account of these four realms of world history seems to be a radical departure from the argumentative language of the Phenomenology and do not seem to have the strong connection to Absolute Spirit that one might expect from Hegel. These four realms of world-history, however, are simply concrete Notions that stand in relation to the world-spirit. They are particular understandings on the means of achieving a meaningful life, as well as Spirits take on what it would mean for it to know itself. They are simply the principles made manifest by which Spirit frees itself from natural immediacy. This is not however, a progression that takes place neither out of pure happenstance nor out of the abstract and irrational necessity of a blind fate. Rather, it is a necessary development, of the different moments or modes of reason that emerge out of the concept of the freedom of Spirit as Spirit moves toward self-actualization. For Hegel, history has, and has always had a logic whereby the logical contradictions of each stage give rise to a better alternative, which stands as the solution to the problem of the preceding stage, but contains within itself a contradiction that will be its undoing. This kind of history is both abstract, inasmuch as it is based on a logical conception of history that does away with specifics, and one driven by a rational necessity, the self-realization of the Absolute. Only in this way, Hegel argues can certain knowledge truth be arrived at.
FOUCAULT: REJECTING THE DOMINATION OF TOTALITY

If Hegel's project can be understood as a coherent narrative establishing a claim to a singular truth, then Michel Foucault would stand in direct opposition both to the aims Hegel sets out to achieve and the methods he uses to fulfill those aims. Foucault's project is to undermine the unitary claim to truth of established narratives by assisting, as he puts it, the insurrection of subjugated knowledges, a kind of knowledge that stands in opposition to a functionalist standpoint (Foucault 1980b:81). Functionalist and systematic theory has hidden these forms of knowledge, which, Foucault argues, are uncovered by criticism. Not only does this kind of knowledge play a different role than those traditionally accepted, but it also comes from a different place. These knowledges are from the perspective of those cast out of positions of power within the traditional social hierarchy. By uncovering these knowledges, criticism performs its work of subverting traditional power structures (Foucault 1980:82).

One method of criticism Foucault describes is genealogy—the rediscovery of struggles throughout history from the perspective of those losers who were subjugated in the aftermath. Genealogy is neither pure abstraction, nor pure empiricism. Instead, it treats those sources of knowledge that have been brushed aside and disqualified with the same attention and care as those officially deemed worthy of recognition (Foucault 1980:83). The issue of recognition is a central one for Foucault, particularly within the context of science. Foucault argues that applying the category of science to a set of practices and facts is a means by which is acquires its stamp of validity as well as a seal of power (Foucault 1980:84). Science has become a category used to denote all those knowledges deemed acceptable. This is certainly the case with Hegel, who refers to knowledge of Spirit as Science, and, for whom, only this Science carries with it the validity associated with true knowledge. It is the hegemonic nature of this kind of theory that Foucault wants to argue against. Foucault therefore wants to question the one-dimensionality of this current unified body of thought, but, at the same
time, he warns against infusing those knowledges that had previously been subjugated with
the same hegemonic power that had been interred in the old accepted knowledges (Foucault
1980:86). Foucault takes aim at the one-dimensionality he sees governing the idealism of the
Liberal theorists and the functionalism of the orthodox Marxists. Both, according to Foucault,
see only necessity in relations of power, Power is subordinate to other processes (Foucault
1980:89). In both cases, power is understood in relation to the economy, whether as a com­
modity in the case of Classical Liberalism or as dependent on economic factors as in the case
of Marxism. Instead, Foucault puts forward a third definition of power, one that is not depen­
dent on economic definitions as he sees those of the 18th and 19th century as being. Instead,
he argues, that power is fundamentally a relation of force (Foucault 1980:89).

Foucault wants to primatize the role of power, while simultaneously staying away from a
system based on necessity. Power, for Foucault, is a relation of force that only exists in action
(Foucault 1980:89). It is the multiplicity of force relations that leads to a complex strategical
situation in a particular society (Foucault 1999:93). Foucault wants to locate power, dependent
on relations of force, as based in war. Politics, for Foucault, is therefore a continuation of war,
in a reversal of the famous remark by Clausewitz (War is Politics by other means). This
reversal has serious implications for an understanding of politics. Rather than a cessation
of war, the establishment of political institutions is, according to Foucault, merely a change
in form of a relation of forces that came into being during a period of war. Political power
maintains these relations through social institutions, language, economic inequalities, and the
control (both positive and negative) of bodies (Foucault 1980:90).

These relations are maintained via the triangle of power, right, and truth. Philosophy, as
the discourse on truth, fixes the rights of power. This is viewing the relation the wrong way
round, however. Rather, according to Foucault, the relation begins with relations of power,
which fix the system of rights that shape the discourse on truth. Power is then exercised
through the discourses of truth. In fact, we are constrained to the pursuit of truth. We are
not simply constrained to pursue the truth, however, but are coerced and compelled to do so
(Foucault 1980:93).

The traditional mode of understanding politics, understands the theory of right as fixing
the legitimacy of power. The discourse of right was meant to hide the fact of domination by
establishing the legitimacy of sovereignty and the moral obligation to obey (Foucault 1980:95).
The central issue of right, therefore, is not sovereignty, but domination. Sovereignty's role is
to serve as a blanket concept that covers the many sites of domination (Foucault 1980:96). To disrobe this cover, Foucault proposes that power should be examined at the specific site that it is exercised, rather than at the level of the theory of sovereignty, or other abstract concepts, like morality (Foucault 1980:97). Power must be understood as something, which circulates, or only exists as something in the form of a chain, not as a concrete object. Individuals, inasmuch as they are social beings, are the vehicles of power (Foucault 1980:98).

Rather than the traditional descending analyses of power, Foucault argues for an ascending analysis of power beginning with the local, the concrete, and then broadening the scope to general mechanisms of global domination. This is, in essence, a materialist view of history, but one situated around the category of power (Foucault 1980:99). Foucault wants to see how the mechanisms of power have become economically advantageous. What were useful were not the particular manifestations of power, but the mechanisms developed by power (Foucault 1980:101). Contingent mechanisms of power used at particular times by the bourgeois interests for economic and political utility in response to contingent historical situations. Foucault, stuck in the language of orthodox Marxism, sees only the interests of the bourgeoisie. Foucault is really interested in the question of the relation between abstract domination and concrete manifestations of power (Foucault 1980:102).

The 17th and 18th centuries marked the emergence of a new mechanism of power with highly specific procedural techniques incompatible with the established relations to sovereignty. These new techniques were much more dependent on bodies and permeates time and labor rather than wealth and commodities, relying on a tightly knit grid of material coercions (Foucault 1980:104). This new type of power disciplinary power is one of the great inventions of bourgeois. Foucault sets out to examine this phenomenon as the techniques of power move away from the kind of power that effused feudal monarchies and which still informs the theory of sovereignty, to a new kind of power, one which is absolutely incompatible with the relations of sovereignty, because it applies to the totality of the social body, which has taken on fundamentally new shape since the feudal system. Foucaults project, then, is to reexamine those places where power is exercised with the mad, in prisons, over sexuality using a definition of power that is no longer caught up in the language of sovereignty, but is understood as something much more dispersed and, therefore, powerful.

Rather than work through the entirety of Foucaults genealogies, it will be enough for this work to trace the similarities between the disparate subjects in order to substantiate the theo-
Retical claims Foucault is making, and then to draw out some conclusions he himself does not, or will not make. It is useful to examine Foucaults works in relation to the means by which, according to Foucault in The Subject and Power, human beings are made into subjects (Foucault 1984:208). Subject, here, refers simultaneously to the syntactic subject, that is, opposed to object, as well as to the subject of the techniques of power.

The first mode is that of the objectivizing modes of inquiry (Foucault 1984:208). By establishing systematized fields of truth, these modes of inquiry objectify the subject as the object of study. This mode of subjection is dealt with primarily in The Order of Things, which I will not examine in great detail. In his introduction to The Foucault Reader, Paul Rabinow provides a concise and illuminating summary of Foucaults argument in this book. Rabinow indicates that Foucault rejects the hypothesis of incremental improvement in the study of life, labor, and language (Foucault Reader, 9). Instead, much like Thomas Kuhn, Foucault locates several points at which these fields changed abruptly and significantly. What is most important about this work for the present argument is Foucaults emphasis on the discontinuity present in the discourses of the human sciences (Foucault 1984:9). The theme of discontinuity is central and one that will be revisited in the discussion of Foucaults theory of history as a field.

The second mode of subjection is that of the dividing practices. These practices divide the human being from him or herself and from others (Foucault 1984:208). In so doing it creates a system of binary identities that define the individual and establish a conception of normality. It is this mode that is most directly addressed in Madness and Civilization and Discipline and Punish. It should be noted, however, that all three modes are present in these works as they are fundamentally interrelated. The first instance of this kind of subjection occurs at the outset of Madness and Civilization with the image of the ship of madmen, an image that pervaded European art during the 15th century. Its ubiquity, Foucault argues marks a transitory period in European history. Madmen, those in between, were men, but without reason and therefore served as symbols of Europe (Foucault 1988:13). Madness marks the perpetual nothingness of life, not in the finality of death, but in the unreason of everyday life (Foucault 1988:16). This changed drastically with the creation of houses of confinement in the 17th century (Foucault 1988:38). The purpose of these houses of confinement becomes unclear upon first examination when the apparently disparate groups housed therein are taken into account. What Foucault illuminates is that the confinement of these groups, such as criminals,
the insane, and vagabond was a condemnation of idleness (Foucault 1988:46). To remedy this condition, work was given to those confined. In this way the poor could be absorbed during times of crisis, and cheap labor could be offered during times of plenty (Foucault 1988:51). Labor was seen as a moral category set in opposition to poverty (Foucault 1988:55). Following the implications of the condemnation of idleness, Foucault suggests that the arbitrariness of monarchial rules was being replaced by the moral category of good embodied in bourgeois ideals (Foucault 1988:61). The highest of these ideals, reason, triumphs over unreason symbolically with the confinement of the insane, who are unreason objectified (Foucault 1988:64). The confinement of the 17th century differs drastically from the public spectacle of the 15th. Confinement suggests that there can be no redemption from evil via the shame of punishment; instead, the shame must be hidden (Foucault 1988:67). In the association of humanity with reason, the insane were no longer seen as a threat because they were no longer seen as human, insanity was no longer considered a condition, but an identity. There was no longer a conception of unreason that resided within everyone (Foucault 1988:70).

In the same way that the position of the madman marked a larger shift in European society, the disappearance of torture as a public spectacle during the 18th century marked a similar transition (Foucault 1995:7). The disappearance of the public punishment was the result of two separate factors. On the one had punishment is no longer a spectacle, but became the most hidden aspect of the judicial system (Foucault 1995:8). The publicity shifts from the punishment to the trial and the condemnation of the crime becomes the public spectacle (Foucault 1995:9). The shame of the punisher intensifies as it is no longer shared with any onlookers (Foucault 1995:10). The body served as the sight of punishment, now punishment affected the rights attached to the body, it affected the soul (Foucault 1995:16). Because crime became a question not just of an adequate punishment for a given action, but the intent and the character of the criminal became involved, criminality was no longer just attached to the action but to the individual themself (Foucault 1995:19). Punishment had been tied to the crime; the act itself was punished (Foucault 1995:45). Public execution was simultaneously a political statement; the crime attacks the sovereign (Foucault 1995:47). The punishment therefore also serves to restore the power of the sovereign (Foucault 1995:48). This is also the effect of a system in which the body has little value as a source of labor power (Foucault 1995:54).
While economic considerations were of secondary importance in the 17th century during the second half of the 18th century, the target of illegality shifted away from feudal rights toward goods (Foucault 1995:84). Those who suffered from this change in the nature of crime were peasants, farmers, and artisans. The new system of production and commerce absolutely depended on the intolerance of crime involving goods (Foucault 1995:85). The economies of illegality were restricted with the development of capitalist society. The illegality of property was separated from the illegality of rights (Foucault 1995:87). In short, the purpose of penal reform was to bring to bear a new economy of punishment (Foucault 1995:89).

While the earlier form of falls into theory of contract the criminal has broken pact with society and all of society retaliates (Foucault 1995:89). This marks a shift from the vengeance of sovereign to the defense of society (Foucault 1995:90). At issue is not the suffering of the criminal, but that of the social body aligned to punish him (Foucault 1995:91). The prisoner must be seen as working for society, as a useful body. In the old system the body of the prisoner was the property of the king, now he is the property of society as a whole. The punishment serves a double purpose the labor he provides the public works and the signs he produces that remind everyone of the relationship of crime to punishment (Foucault 1995:109). Punishment is no longer dependent on fear, but on a system of visible signs (Foucault 1995:110). Disciplines became general means of domination in the 17th and 18th century, discipline produces docile bodies that mold themselves through their own actions (Foucault 1995:138).

The final mode of subjection is that by which human beings turn themselves into subjects (Foucault 1980b:208). It is this mode of subjection that features most prominently in The History of Sexuality, Part I. Against the standard narrative of discourses on sex, Foucault demonstrates that modern society does not hide sex but makes it in issue of central importance to be discussed at all available opportunities (Foucault 1990:35). A discursive explosion took focus away from the heterosexual couple and placed the importance on peripheral sexualities those regarded as unsuitable (Foucault 1990:38). This led to a transition from regarding a sexual act as taboo to investing the individual with an identity associated with that act (Foucault 1990:43).

Starting in the seventeenth century there were two forms of power that manifested in the body, the development of the body as a machine and the body of the species, the control of body as a part of a population (Foucault 1990:139). This dual understanding of the body led
to a new development of technology associated with sex (Foucault 1990:116). Power changed
to infuse the social body with the ability to generate forces that allow the social body to
grow rather than the previous configuration, which gave the sovereign the right to kill (Fou­
cault 1990:136). The society that emerged in the nineteenth century bourgeois, capitalist,
or industrial societyput into operation an entire machinery for producing true discourses of
[sex] (Foucault 1990:69). Because sex and sexuality had come to be markers of an individuals
identity, and stood at the intersection of disciplinary and bio power, the true discourses on
sex became the means by which the secret of the individual was to be revealed. This was
nowhere clearer than with psychoanalysis, which took the place of the confession. Thus in
the act of searching for the truth of sexuality, the individual reaffirmed the identity which
had been constructed by power. In The Subject and Power, Foucault states that he is inter­
ested in power and its techniques that found their most extreme expression in Stalinism and
Fascism; nowhere was the human being made more of a subject than under these systems.
These techniques, however, were not qualitatively unique to these systems, but exist in ev­
ery modern society. Moreover, these societies operated under the same system of political
rationality as the modern states, albeit with an internal madness particular to these systems
(Foucault 1984:209). Not only is Foucault interested in the techniques of power, but also the
way they relate to the issue of political rationality and rationalization. Foucault warns against
the dangers of the term rationalization, however, as it refers to an abstract whole rather than
the particular loci of rationality (Foucault 1984:210).

For this reason Foucault analyses society, not as a reified whole, but through those entities
against which society has aligned itself (Foucault 1984:211). Moreover, Foucault has aimed to
examine a series of oppositions to the system of differentiation inscribed in the dualisms of
social power (Foucault 1984:211). These oppositional movements are of interest to this work
for two reasons. First, Foucault describes them as transversal- they develop across national
boundaries. Second, their target is the specific technique of power whereby the individual
is marked with a particular identity that contains the truth of his or her person (Foucault
1984:212). It is clear that Foucault does not suggest that these methods of subjection can be
studied apart from their relation to the mechanisms of exploitation and domination, but he
does not want to portray them as merely the terminal of more fundamental mechanisms. This
is clear in his discussion of the modern state. Since the sixteenth century, the State has been
developing as a new form of political power. Foucault argues that the states power is both
individualizing and totalizing. In this way it mirrors the pastoral power of the Church (Foucault 1984:213). This pastoral power is characterized by an assurance of salvation in the next world, sacrificing itself for the sake of the flock, dependence on knowledge of peoples minds and souls, and looking after both the individual and the community (Foucault 1984:214).

Under the modern state, Foucault argues, the pastoral power takes on a number of new features. It shifts the focus from salvation in the next world to salvation in this world. Moreover, the knowledge of man develops in two opposite but complementary directions: quantitative knowledge of populations and analytic knowledge of the individual (Foucault 1984:215). In this way, when Foucault refers to the disciplining of Europe in the eighteenth century, he is not referring to the physical institutions of discipline so much as the improvement of processes of adjustment between productive activities, resources of communication and the play of power relations (Foucault 1984:129). These power relations can only be exercised over free subjects and only insofar as they are free. Slavery is not a power relationship, but a state of physical constraint. Thus freedom and power always exist in conjunction (Foucault 1984:2212).
MARX: RECOVERING THE TENSION OF MODERNITY

What emerges out of Foucault's considerations of the various forms of power and the mean by which they make human beings into subjects is a theory of history radically different from that of Hegel. Following Nietzsche, Foucault dubs his mode of historical reconstruction Genealogy (Foucault 1980a:78). Foucault outright rejects the possibility of a priori considerations, instead arguing that what lies behind empirical events is not a deeper truth or essence, but precisely a lack thereof (Foucault 1980a:80). Foucault utilizes two terms that capture the genealogical method: descent and emergence. Descent is meant to stand in opposition to the rationality of an uninterrupted continuity (Foucault 1980a:83). Rather than construct a neat progression, genealogy seeks to embrace the details and accidents of events (Foucault 1980a:81). In the same way, emergence is not to be confused with any sort of end point of historical development (Foucault 1980a:83). Foucault criticizes a form of history that takes the present as a given endpoint for reading that endpoint back into the depths of history. Instead, he argues, what is required is a reconstruction of the hazardous play of dominations which determine progressive systems of subjugation, appropriate for a given set of needs that is constantly changing in a contingent manner (Foucault 1980a:83). The historical sense, for Foucault, can be used to serve the goals of genealogy only when it does away with absolutes, that is, when all categories of universality are done away with. The picture of history that Foucault presents and which informs all of his genealogical studies is a concrete particular one that is driven by accident and contingency rather than logic or necessity.

Foucault's analysis of the development of power since the sixteenth century depends on the understanding of the State and its relationship to pastoral power outlines in the previous chapter. In fact, Foucault argues, that in contemporary society all forms of power must refer to the state (Foucault 1984:223). This is due to the fact that power relations have come more and more under state control (Foucault 1984:224). This understanding of power relation, I
would argue, is no longer appropriate in contemporary society characterized by a neo-liberal understanding of the state and economy. As the centrality of the state has decreased since the late 1970s, the need for a new referent for power relations has become clear; Foucault himself points, implicitly, to one such referent.

In The Subject and Power, Foucault, warning against drawing too strong a distinction between power relations, relationships of communication, and objective capacities, says that objective capacities depend on and are inseparable from relationships of communication such as shared work as well as to power relations (Foucault 1984:218). In the same way, relationships of communication effect finalized activities and produce effects of power. The finalized activities themselves, such as the division of labor, depend on relations of power (Foucault 1984:218). The emphasis here on shared work and the division of labor should make clear that I am suggesting an analysis of contemporary society through the lens of capital. Foucault supports this suggestion in two other ways. On the one hand, his discussion of the secularization of pastoral power closely resembles Max Webers account of the development of the Protestant Ethic into the Spirit of Capitalism. On the other hand, just as power is dependent on freedom, so too is the relation of labor that allows for the creation capital.

That is not to say, however, that what is needed is a return to the characterization of capitalism espoused by the proponents of traditional Marxism. Foucault has clearly indicated that an analysis based on the domination of the bourgeois class is insufficient to capture the dynamics of modern society (Foucault 1980b:99101). Instead, he argues, what is needed is an examination of abstract domination (Foucault 1980b:99102). This mode of domination affects the bourgeoisie as well, as Foucault indicates in The History of Sexuality. This understanding of abstract domination must also account for the relationship between power relations, relationships of communication, and objective capabilities. The analysis of capital must therefore be based on "shared work" and the "division of labor". In other words, it must take labor as subject-forming social practice particular to capitalism.

In order to understand the kind of interpretation of Marx which rescues Foucault form the pitfalls of his theory, without being subject to the critiques he formulates, it is necessary to examine first, the basic categories of Marx's mature theory and, second, the understanding of these categories in traditional Marxism, the target of Foucault's critique.

To understand the shortcomings of traditional Marxism, it is first necessary to examine the basic categories from which Marx's analysis proceeds. The first and most fundamental
category of Marxs critique, as fully developed in Capital, is the commodity. It is the first category introduced in that work, and serves to ground the entire rest of the work. The commodity is, first and foremost, an object of sensuous nature that exists outside of our person. As an object that is used it possesses a utility and therefore a use-value tied directly and inseparably from the specific properties of the object (Marx and Mandel 1992:303). The commodity, however, is not defined solely by its having a use value. As an object of exchange, the commodity also possesses an exchange-value. Because the exchange-value denotes a relation between two things, and is therefore always changing as the commodities in relation are changing, exchange-value appears, not as something intrinsic to the commodity, but precisely the opposite, as something purely accidental (Marx and Mandel 1992:304). In order for two commodities to be exchanged, however, there must be something within each that allows them to be compared. There must be an equal quantity of something in both commodities that is not tied to the purely physical form of those commodities. In order to determine what this something is it is necessary to abstract from all physical characteristics of the commodity. If then we leave out of consideration the use-value of commodities, they have only one common property left, that of being products of labor (Marx and Mandel 1992:305).

If the commodity, once abstracted from all physical traits, is left only as a product of labor, this feature must relate one commodity to another. Thus commodities can be understood not only as physical manifestations of particular utilities, but also as the condensation of human labor; this aspect of the commodity is what Marx terms value. Value never manifests itself directly, however, but appears only as exchange-value, that is as something contingent and relative (Marx and Mandel 1992:305). The value of a commodity is measured by the socially necessary labor time expended in its production. This means that as improvements are made in the technical processes of production, and the labor time needed for the production of a commodity generally decreases, so does the value of the commodity, although the amount of value produced in a given time remains the same (Marx and Mandel 1992:306). Labor, then, stands as the second foundational category for Marxs analysis. Just as the commodity is divided in its essence, so too is the labor that creates the commodity. The two aspects of labor correspond directly to the two aspects of the commodity, which it creates. The particular form of labor that creates a qualitatively distinct use-value is useful labor (Marx and Mandel 1992:308). This form of labor, however, is not responsible for the production of value. The latter is a function of abstract homogeneous labor, regardless of the qualitative specificity of
the labor involved. Hence, the amount of value that inheres within an object is determined by
the temporal quantity of human labor-power expended in the production of the commodity,
the value of a commodity represents human labour in the abstract, the expenditure of human
labour in general (Marx and Mandel 1992:310).

Because the value of a commodity can only be expressed through exchange, Marx examines
the specific mode of exchange, or of circulation, in modern society. Like the commodity,
and labor, there exist two forms of exchange. Marx identifies the exchange of a commodity
for its equivalent in money and then use of that money for another commodity or C-M-
C as the simplest form of circulation (Marx and Mandel 1992:330). The goal of this kind
of exchange is the acquisition and consumption of a specific use-value. It is a qualitative
exchange. Alongside this form of exchange, Marx also places the exchange of money for a
commodity, which is then exchanged for money again or M-C-M. This is fundamentally a
quantitative exchange. It only makes any sense if the amount of money acquired at the end of
the exchange is greater than that invested initially (Marx and Mandel 1992:332). To frame this
in other terms as Marx does, this is M-C-M where M=M+M. That is M is equal to the initial
investment plus the difference between the initial money invested and the amount of money
acquired after the exchange. This M Marx calls surplus value. When this money is reinvested,
it is called capital. As soon as this happens, however, M becomes a new M. The dynamic
of capital is such that there is a constant drive to create surplus value, which generates ever-
increasing quantities of capital (Marx and Mandel 1992:335). This is the reason why value
cannot be based on utility (in case this was a question). If value were based exclusively on
utility you could not explain surplus value or this dynamic.

Surplus value cannot be created through circulation, however, because no new value is
being created; it is only transformed from the form of one use-value to another, both of
which necessarily contain the same value (Marx and Mandel 1992:336). It must therefore
come about as a result of a specific use-value that is exchanged. This use value must be such
that its consumption produces value. Since, according to Marx, the only source of value is
human labor power, this must be the use-value that is being exchanged. This can only be the
case when the possessor of this use-value (the worker) sells this commodity on the market.
The worker and the buyer must make the exchange as equals (this cannot occur in a feudal or
ancient society). It also necessitates the existence of a labor force that has no other commodity
to sell other than their labor power.

28
The creation of capital depends on the existence of a working class, which is formed by separating large numbers of people from ownership of any means of production (Marx and Mandel 1992:337). As a commodity, this labor-power itself has a value, which is a function of the value of those products necessary for the sustenance of the worker themselves. This means not just keeping them alive but keeping them fit enough to work, and also includes training and the ability to have a family and provide new workers (Marx and Mandel 1992:337). If the worker is paid a daily wage, that is the amount necessary to sustain him for a day, then the value of his product is the value of the raw materials used in production and the value he contributes through his labor time. This is not the same as the value of his labor time. He is not paid for a full days work, which is longer than the amount equivalent to the value of his labor-power. This is how surplus value is produced. The workers labor produces more value than the value of their labor-power (Marx and Mandel 1992:357). The amount of labor time needed to create the value necessary of the sustenance and reproduction of the workers, Marx calls necessary labor time. All labor time beyond that, what Marx refers to as surplus labor time, is time during which surplus value is created. The surplus labor time does not remain constant, however, because of the dynamic of capital, of ongoing pressure to produce ever-increasing amounts of surplus value. There are two ways of achieving this increase. The first is to extend the workday past the necessary labor time, thereby creating more surplus value. Marx termed this absolute surplus value. However, it is impossible to extend surplus labor time beyond the temporal limits of the day. Moreover, beginning in the middle of the nineteenth century, a legal limit was added to the working day (Marx and Mandel 1992:361).

This gave rise to another way of increasing surplus value, what Marx calls relative surplus value. A response to the emergence of legal limits to the working day was to decrease the amount of necessary labor time, thereby increasing relative surplus labor time. How was this possible, given that the necessary labor time is determined by the value of the commodities necessary for the reproduction of the workers? The reproductive needs of the worker are based on the use-value of those objects that sustain them. Hence, decreasing the value of these objects would also decrease the value of the workers labor power. This does not necessarily mean a fall in the workers standard of living, since now the same use-values would possess less value. This can be accomplished through socially general increases in the productiveness of labor (Marx and Mandel 1992:378). Such increases decrease the value of labor power, thereby decreasing the amount of necessary labor time. The value of the individual commodi-
ties produced during the working day decreases. Surplus labor time is not increased directly as a result of increased productivity, but indirectly, because increased productivity decreases socially necessary labor time (Marx and Mandel 1992:379). The value of commodities is in inverse ratio to the productiveness of labor (Marx and Mandel 1992:382). Relative surplus value increases in direct proportion to productivity (Marx and Mandel 1992:382). However, each new increase in productivity reduces the amount of necessary labor time by an increasingly small amount. Each time necessary labor time is cut in half by a doubling of productivity, less and less time is gained as surplus labor time. This generates a tendency toward ever increasing levels of productivity in order to reduce necessary labor time. In other words, capitalism, in Marx's analysis, generates a tendency toward ongoing increases in productivity. It should be noted that increasing levels of productivity generate increasing amount of use-values produced, but not more value produced per unit time. Later we shall examine some implications of this difference for an understanding of Marx's conception of the overcoming of capitalism.

First, however, it is important to examine some of the presuppositions of traditional Marxism, the general form of Marxism against which Foucault then reacted. Traditional Marxism understands Marx as criticizing capital from the standpoint of labor, that is, it sees labor as being held hostage to a particular organization of circulation and production that oppresses the worker and shackles society. The negative implications of this interpretation can perhaps best be seen by not examining its most reductionist versions, but by looking at the most creative and productive versions of this intellectual tradition, that put forward by Georg Lukács and subsequently, the members of the Frankfurt School of Social Research including Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, and Herbert Marcuse. Although all of these theorists contributed much to the understanding of capital and modern society and culture, their understanding of the particular dynamic of capital hindered them from being able to conceive of a way to overcome the structures they so perceptively describe, and left them open to the kind of critique leveled by Foucault.

The first theorist within this tradition, Georg Lukács, wrote History and Class Consciousness only three decades after Capital Volume III was first published. He begins, like Marx in Capital with the commodity form as the basis of modern life (Lukács 1971:83). Lukács enriched the tradition by arguing that, for Marx, the commodity is not just as an economic category, but a social and cultural one as well. For Lukács, the fetish character of the commodity is the basis for various forms of subjectivity structured by that form (Lukács 1971:83). The commodity
and, by extension, the fetish form, are historically specific forms of modern society (Lukacs 1971:84). This is a point Lukacs locates directly in Marx, who argues that the commodity is not a feature of society transhistorically, but is specific to a distinct historical moment: [T]he exchange of commodities originates not within the primitive communities, but where they end where they come into contact with other communities. That is where barter begins, and from here strikes back into the interior of the community, decomposing it (Lukacs 1971:85). From here, social relations mediated by the commodity develop until the commodity becomes the fundamental category of society. It is on the basis of his analysis of the total hegemony of the commodity that Lukacs introduces the concept of reification, a concept that will be central to the subsequent critical theorists of the Frankfurt School. Reification is the process by which the social relations of the producers become objectified in the apparent relation of their products (Lukacs 1971:87). Because of his concern with consciousness, Lukacs focused on the fetish as the central element of the commodity. Yet, although Lukacs understands the commodity as a social form specific to capitalism, his understanding of its foundation, labor, is transhistorical. As a result, he has to ground reification in factors external to labor. Lukacs understanding of the relation between labor and capital becomes clear in his discussion of the possibility of capitalisms overcoming. He begins with the position of the worker in society. For Lukacs, the worker is objectively transformed into a mere object of the process of production by the methods of capitalist production. But because of the split between subjectivity and objectivity induced in man by the compulsion to objectify himself as a commodity, the situation becomes one that can be made conscious. (Lukacs 1971:168). The basis for social transformation in Lukacs analysis is the worker, who is characterized by a self-consciousness that is rooted in the split between the individual as subject and as object. The worker is objectified inasmuch as their labor-power is turned into a commodity. But, according to Lukacs, it is this state of division that allows the worker to become conscious of the real workings of capitalism. This is accomplished, he argues, via the dialectical method: the essence of the dialectical method lies in the fact that in every aspect correctly grasped by the dialectic the whole totality is comprehended (Lukacs 1971:170). Thus the proletariat is able to comprehend the totality of society due to its position, one that is characterized by a divided subjectivity that is also objective. Here Lukacs becomes increasingly Hegelian in his understanding of the development of modern society. For him, the division of the person of the proletarian makes them the identical subject-object of history. The overcoming of capital then depends on a
transformation of consciousness, the unification of the subjective and objective dimensions of the situation of the proletariat via a dialectical transformation:

Only when the consciousness of the proletariat is able to point out the road along which the dialectics of history is objectively impelled, but which it cannot travel unaided, will the consciousness of the proletariat awaken to a consciousness of the process, and only then will the proletariat become the identical subject-object of history whose praxis will change reality (Lukács 1971:197).

Operating within the Hegelian tradition, Lukács understands history as a teleological process such that it is realized in the consciousness of the proletariat and the overcoming of capitalism. This unification, like that of Spirit in the Phenomenology of Spirit brings about the realization of the totality. In Hegel this is a totality of Spirit, and in Lukács it is a totality of society. That is, society, for Lukács is a totality, the reality of which is masked by the reification of bourgeois social relations. Totality, then, for Lukács is a positive category. Capitalism is characterized by a set of social relations that conceals this reality, the removal of which will emancipate society. For Lukács, the labor of the proletariat gives rise to the totality of society. That labor and the totality must be realized as the basis of an emancipated society. Therefore, in order to achieve emancipation, the dialectical method, as a means of emancipation, should possess an aspiration towards totality, that action should serve the purpose, described above, in the totality of the process (Lukács 1971:197). The proletariat, by constituting the totality that is to be realized through its actions, is the Subject of history. The relationship of history and totality within the theoretical tradition of Western Marxism, upon which Lukács was a fundamental influence, is the subject of Martin Jay's work Marxism and Totality, in which Jay outlines, in great detail, the relationship between the Hegelian understanding of totality and the Marxism of the 20th century. The epilogue of the book entitled The Challenge of Post-Structuralism leaves the reader on uncertain footing. By presenting the challenge raised by post-structuralist thinkers to the relationship between Marxist theory and the concept of totality, Jay ends his book in a place of pessimism, or at the very least of skepticism with regard to the viability of a theory of society that points to the possibility of overcoming the domination of capitalist modernity. At the same time, however, Jay's presentation of the debate between traditional Marxism and post-structuralism, centered around the concept of totality, presents a critique of traditional Marxism that offers the possibility of a reframing and therefore a reinterpretation of Marx's own argument.
For Jay, although post-structuralists, among them Foucault, are difficult to characterize with regard to a shared set of principles, one means of doing so is their shared antipathy toward totality (Jay 1984:515). On the one hand, Foucault, like theorists in the Marxist tradition, is resistant to a purely linguistic theory of society (Jay 1984:516). On the other hand, Foucault challenges Lukács and traditional Marxisms celebration of totality. Not only do his analyses directly oppose the affirmation of totality, but they also oppose the kind of teleological historical narrative that Lukács and other Hegelian Marxists purportedly espouse. Foucault, according to Jay, deliberately challenges the possibility of conceiving history as a longitudinal totality (Jay 1984:524). Not only did Foucault oppose the type of narrative and teleology espoused by the Hegelian Marxists, but he also rejected the belief in a meta-subject who would be responsible for the emancipation of the whole (Jay 1984:513).

Unlike Hegelian Marxists, for whom power could be distinguished between that which was dominating and that which was benign, Foucault saw no power that was without coercion; his genealogies grounded that assertion in the experience of modern history (Jay 1984:524). Particularly directed against the kind of Marxism that considered labor to be the grounds for an emancipated post-capitalist society, Foucaults emphasis on the body led him to analyze the categories of labor and productivity as imposing a positive control on the body. Thus, rather than being emancipatory, labor as an ontological category, entailed domination for Foucault (Jay 1984:527). Indeed, Foucault argued, as the previous chapter indicates, that power relations characterized all spheres of life in modernity. All categories of activity that impelled the body beyond its natural state, be they physical, in the form of labor, or meta-psychological, in the form of sexuality, fed into and sustained these power relations. Although this power was not a monolithic totality, for it always gave rise to an opposition, it could not be overcome, for Foucault. Instead it could merely be resisted (528). Jay rightly points out, however, that this argument could just as easily lead to a politics of quietism as one of anarchy or nihilism. Thus the challenge of post-structuralism offered the possibility only of resistance to an otherwise monolithic sphere of power circulation. If the possibility of a politics that was transformative rather than just resistant were to be recovered, the onus would fall on the interpreters of Marx to overcome the serious challenge raised by post-structuralism, particularly that of Foucault as outlined in the previous chapter. At this point I have illustrated the difficulties both in the Marxist tradition derived from Hegel, and in Foucaults own work, leaving the possibility of any adequate theory of modernity ambiguous.
I would argue that a reinterpretation of Marx's theory, such as that presented in Moishe Postone's *Time Labor and Social Domination*, overcomes the antinomy of traditional Marxism and post-structuralism while, at the same time, avoiding the shortcomings of each. Rather than reading Marx's theory as an examination of modes of domination within society, Postone reads Marx as providing a critique of modern society as a whole (Postone 1996:4). Unlike Lukcs, however, for whom labor is the trans-historical basis of all society, Postone indicates that the category of labor in Marx's mature theory is constitutive of the social world in capitalist society alone (Postone 1996:4). The kinds of critique undertaken by traditional Marxist, including Lukcs, criticize capitalism from the standpoint of labor. This understanding presupposes a trans-historical form of labor whose realization is hindered in capitalism by the forces of the market and private property (Postone 1996:5). Instead, Marx, according to Postone, treats labor as the object of his critique; labor is equally constitutive of capitalist society as the forces of the market and private property (Postone 1996:6). This understanding sees Marx's theory as one that understands the fundamental relations of society to be the quasi-objective forms of commodity and capital. Labor then, for Marx, is constitutive of value, now considered the capitalist form of wealth, as well as of the fundamental social relations of capitalism. This leads to a critique of the form of production and not just of circulation, as in traditional Marxism (Postone 1996:6). Marx's claim that there exist a structural contradiction between social relations and forces of production has traditionally been taken to refer to a difference between market and industrial production. This view understands labor as a transhistorical category, a goal-directed social activity that mediates between man and nature (Postone 1996:8). The form of social domination under this traditional paradigm is a class based structuring of the productive process, in which another exploits the labor of one class. Overcoming this domination means the realization of labor and the constitution of a social totality (Postone 1996:9).

This mode of critique, according to Postone, could not provide a critique or account of the state centric mode of distribution predominant in the post-war era (Postone 1996:10). It is not coincidental that this form of social organization is precisely that which Foucault critically analyzes. One could argue that the shortcomings of the Marxist understanding necessitated a new interpretation of power in modern society, which is what Foucault attempted. Moreover, the traditional Marxist understanding of society as based essentially on class relations is unable to account for the growing importance of non-class-based identities (Postone 1996:12).
By the same token, however, Foucault's inability to account for the nonlinearity of modern history, for the return in recent decades to a more classical liberal form of economic life, suggests the need, in turn, for a critique of his approach.

A reinterpretation of Marx that locates labor in capitalism as historically specific recognizes exploitation in bourgeois society, but ties it to the process of production itself, rather than seeing it simply as a result of unequal distribution (Postone 1996:16). Production, under this system, is not simply a technical process but is itself molded by social relations. Those relations, however, cannot be fully understood in terms of class relations. Rather categories such as commodity and capital should be understood as forms of social relations in Marx's work. These social relations appear to be objective, rather than social. They are ultimately based on labor acting as a socially mediating activity, in Marx's work (Postone 1996:16). Lukács was correct in identifying the increasingly fragmented nature of individual existence as related to work, but he was mistaken in failing to recognize the work itself as the basis for the fragmentation and abstract domination inherent to capitalist society (Postone 1996:17). If we reconsider labor in this way, the other categories of capitalism must be reconsidered as well. Postone argues that these categories cannot simply be understood in terms of an economic function, but must also be taken as categories that structure existence and the nature of the subject, which is precisely Foucault's aim in The Subject and Power (18). Primary among these is the category of history. Marx's theory of history understands history as having a logic and a dynamic that is specific to capitalist society (Postone 1996:17). Unlike Hegel or traditional Marxists, Mark analyzes a historical logic as a unique feature of capitalism, one that indicates that people are not free historical agents. By treating historical logic in a historically specific manner, Marx's theory is not only capable of understanding the nature of history in capitalism, but is able to explain the theories of history of Hegel and Hegelian Marxists, like Lukács.

The basis of Postone's reinterpretation of Marx's argument comes from his reading of The Grundrisse, Marx's notes on what would later become Capital (Postone 1996:22). The Grundrisse, Postone argues, indicates that the mode of production and that of distribution are part of the same historical process. The mode of distribution includes the market and private property, which are relations of production but only of the distributive subspecies (Postone 1996:22). That these are only a distributive subspecies of the relations of production, Postone recognized, must mean that there is also a productive subspecies of the relations of produc-
tion. For Marx, following Fourier, the mode of production itself is to be overcome (Postone 1996:23).

This means that Marx's idea of the contradiction inherent in capitalism that points to its overcoming must be rethought. It can no longer be considered only in terms of a contradiction between labor and private ownership and the market. In order to more fully understand Marx's notion of contradiction, it is first necessary to reexamine some of the basic categories of his analysis. For this paper, a focus on his category of value will be sufficient to illustrate the ways in which Postone's interpretation of Marx resolves the apparent antinomies of Hegelian Marxism and post-structuralism. Value is central to Marx's understanding of capitalism because it represents both a form of wealth but also a form of social relations that has an objective quality. For Marx, value expresses the foundation of bourgeois production, not just of its distribution (Postone 1996:25). A central feature of value, for Marx, is that it is not only based on abstract human labor, but also contains a temporal dimension; it is based on the expenditure of labor time. That is, the form of wealth historically specific to capitalism is an essentially temporal category. This historically specific form of wealth and of social relations gives rise to a historically specific form of production (Postone 1996:25). Marx's labor theory of value, unlike Ricardo's, is not a theory of wealth in general. In fact, the whole thrust of the theory is to illustrate the growing gulf that develops in capitalism between the use values produced, what Marx terms real wealth, and value (Postone 1996:26). It is this tension that points to the possibility of overcoming capitalism.

With the development of production based on relative surplus value, levels of productivity are achieved that do not depend on the expenditure of human labor time and actually render the latter increasingly unnecessary. Yet value, and the expenditure of human labor time, remain necessary for capitalism. Because value is tied to a historically specific mode of production, abolishing value would require the abolition of that mode of production, rather than simply changing the way value is distributed (Postone 1996:27). Not only is value intrinsically related to the mode of production specific to capitalism, but it also grounds the system of domination (30). It confronts living labor as something alien and dominating (Postone 1996:30). In this way Marx, like Foucault argues for an understanding of domination constituted not by domination by other people directly, but by social structures that people constitute (Postone 1996:30). Under a system governed by value, power and knowledge are increased dramatically, but at the expense of the human being. People are dominated by that
which they produce, which expresses itself as the antinomy between the isolated individual and the totalizing society (Postone 1996:30). The process of self-generated structural domination is one that also creates a historical dynamic outside of the control of the individuals that propel it. Abolition of the socially constituted form of production would also be the abolition of the historical dynamic. It would also allow for the appropriation by people of the powers and knowledge that had been developed as part of the historical dynamic, thereby resolving the antinomy between individual and society (Postone 1996:31). This is a different understanding than that which views Marx as arguing for the subsumption of the individual under an amorphous collective. For Marx, both the isolated individual and the semi-objective collective are equally one-sided. Instead, Marx is arguing for the development of an individual who is the beneficiary of all the power and knowledge that inheres within the collective.

In this way, Marx's mature critique maintains the concept of alienation, but an alienation that develops historically as a feature of the historically specific form of society, capitalism. The overcoming of capitalism is the appropriation of this alienated object. This would, therefore, not be a return to a prior state, but the realization of a potential that only develops in the course of capitalism (Postone 1996:32).

This appropriation, however, depends on the workers removing themselves from the process of production. It would entail the self-abolition of the proletariat inasmuch as there would no longer be a producing class (Postone 1996:33). For Marx, the proletariat does not stand in opposition to capitalism. In fact, fights for wages and modified working-time are intrinsic to its development (Postone 1996:35). This abolition is not an inevitable one, nor is it a product of a linear historical dynamic. Value, despite its growing inadequacy as a measure of the material wealth produced, is not simply superseded by a new form of wealth (Postone 1996:34). It would be a mistake to understand the historical dynamic outlined by Marx as a teleological one. Since it is a dynamic specific to capitalism, it is contained entirely within it, that is, it develops into nothing but itself. That is, although a potential is developed that points beyond capitalism, all that is realized by the dynamic is the continuation of capitalism.

The analysis of Marx's theory that understands the categories of capital as constituting both social objectivity and subjectivity can point to both the possibility of changing subjectivities and consciousness but also of contradictory forms thereof (Postone 1996:37). That there are contradictory forms of consciousness expresses that capitalism possesses a contradictory nature. This approach does not say that forms of consciousness will inevitably emerge that
oppose and point to the supersession of capitalism. Rather this understanding points only to
the possibility of this occurring (Postone 1996:38).

Marxs mature critique, rather than inverting Hegels categories and rooting them in social
life in a transhistorical way, seeks to ground those concepts in a historically specific form
of social organization. Capital, for Marx, is the self-moving substance in the same fashion
as Hegels Spirit. Thus the Subject that Hegel identified with Spirit is not identified by Marx
with a reified social group, such as the proletariat, but is an abstract, impersonal structure, the
product of a particular form of social, objectifying practice (Postone 1996:75). Capital itself is
therefore not an object, a thing, but a set of social relations. Marx, therefore is able to explain
Hegels conception of Spirit historically, as based on the abstract and apparently independent
power associated with the category of capital. For Marx, this Subject consists of an objectified
set of social relations the subjective-objective categories of capitalism whose substance is
abstract human labor (Postone 1996:76). Marx, like Foucault, sees the problem of knowledge
not in terms of the individual and a passive external reality, but as determined by social
relations that constitute both social subjectivity and objectivity (Postone 1996:77). Unlike
Foucault, however, who sees the reality of modernity exclusively in terms of the concrete
aspects of power and coercion, Marx locates a dual nature in the social forms of capitalism:
the value dimension, the dimension of the abstract, and the use-value dimension, that of the
concrete. The dual nature of labor in capitalism is such that it is both a productive activity
(concrete) as well as a socially mediating activity (abstract). This dual nature generates a
dialectical dynamic. This form of labor produces increasingly large amounts of material
wealth, while always maintaining the same amount of value produced in a given period of
time (Postone 1996:287). It is given a directional dynamic by promoting new developments in
productivity, which changes the socially necessary labor time required for the production of
a given commodity. This redetermination, once it is generalized, changes the magnitude of
value of the individual commodities produced while maintaining the same amount of value
produced across all the commodities produced in a given time frame (Postone 1996:288).
This changes what counts as the social labor hour. In other words, increased productivity
(a function of use-value) redetermines socially necessary labor time (value). This new level
of productivity is then redetermined as the base level of productivity (Postone 1996:289).
Because the amount of value produced in a given social labor hour is only increased by an
increase in productivity once it is generalized, a dynamic interaction of productivity and
the redetermination of the social labor hour emerges (Postone 1996:290). Although the same amount of value is always produced in a clock hour this hour becomes increasingly dense on the level of material wealth produced (Postone 1996:292).

This cannot be measured in terms of abstract time, that is the way we normally measure hours in the day, a variable independent of events and actions; it can only be grasped in terms of concrete time, a form of time that is dependent on events. Thus the frame of abstract time is moved forward, a movement of time, which is effected by changes in productivity (Postone 1996:293). This dialectic of time constitutes, for Postone, a new form of time, which he refers to as historical time. Historical time expresses the movement of capital and captures the sense of temporal acceleration that is a feature of modernity (Postone 1996:294). While abstract time is related exclusively to the abstract human labor time expended in the process of production, historical time also expresses the knowledge and technical development that is promoted by the dynamic process of production. As productivity increases it becomes less dependent on the direct labor of the immediate producer, that is, the human being (Postone 1996:296). As this process develops, an increasing divide emerges between the value produced, which is a function of human labor time expressed in the form of abstract time, and the development of the productive powers of humanity, which is a function of use-value and therefore not dependent on human labor time alone (Postone 1996:297). What develops is a situation in which use-value production becomes less and less dependent on the skills and knowledge of those directly involved, and instead is dependent on the collective knowledge of humanity taken as a whole (Postone 1996:298). The process of production increasingly becomes the objectification of historical time in so far as historical time reflects the increasing rate of productivity and the accumulation of knowledge and technical discoveries (Postone 1996:298). However, because the abstract temporal category of value remains the foundation of capitalism, this process leads to the continual conversion of a dynamic process into a stagnant present. Increasing levels of productivity are continually reified as the basis for a static amount of value. This present is continually redetermined as increasingly dense, giving the appearance of the acceleration of time itself (Postone 1996:299). Because socially necessary labor time remains determining for the system a compulsion is exerted on producers to maintain a socially adequate level of production, presenting them with a feeling of necessity that is temporal and directed. This confrontation has the effect that it makes history appear to move necessarily in a determinate direction (Postone 1996:301).
Thus a characteristic of capitalism is the social constitution of both abstract and historical time, meaning that one of the major characteristics of a society based on value is the existence of an ongoing historical dynamic (Postone 1996:295). This sheds light on Marx's adage: Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please (Marx, Engels, and Tucker 1978:595). Moreover, unlike Lukács and Hegel who see this historical movement as having always existed and as leading to its own full realization, Marx understands the dynamic as central to and inseparable from capital, a historically specific, non-teleological dynamic that points to the emergence of the possibility that it could be abolished, while hindering that possibility from being realized. Far from leading to its realization, the dynamic of capitals points to the conditions of possibility of its abolition (Postone 1996:295).

This reading allows one to distinguish three different modes of dialectical interaction that are interrelated in Marx's thought: one is that people constitute their own nature through the process of changing their surroundings. This dialectical relationship most closely resembles that found in Hegel's account of Spirit. It is not surprising, then, that the second form of dialectical interaction is closest to that found in Foucault. This form of interaction is the dialectical constitution of structure and practice. Neither, on their own, however, necessarily entails a historical process; they do not constitute a directional dynamic (Postone 1996:304). What generates such a dynamic, one that embeds the first two dialectical forms, is the interactions of the two dimensions of the commodity form, of use-value and value. That is, the dual nature of the underlying social forms of capitalism generates a historical dynamic as outlined above, as the dialectic of abstract time and historical time (Postone 1996:305). This theory of history, dependent both on use-value and on value is therefore also one with a dimension of concrete particularity and universal abstraction. Moreover, the theory of history that emerges out of this analysis of Marx's argument in Capital, is one that views the history apart from capitalism as based in the accidents and contingencies of material life, as Foucault asserts. Nevertheless, within capitalism itself, a directional dynamic emerges that presents itself as always having existed. This explains Hegel's understanding of history, which for Marx, is not wrong in as much as misapplied. Taken together, the two offer a picture of the modern world in which the contingent and the necessary, the universal and the particular, and the concrete and abstract are united in the form of a dominating totality. The possibility of overcoming this totality lies precisely in the mutual constitution of both use-value and value. One without the other captures only a part of the picture.
5

CONCLUSION: A UNIVERSALITY OF PARTICULARS

We are now in a position to return to the debate between Dipesh Chakrabarty and Vivek Chibber. This debate, whose structure was reproduced in this work begins with a progressive and linear form of history, one which holds that non-industrial countries are not capable of emancipation but must wait until they have reached an appropriate level of development. This theory of historical development, I argue, corresponds to the kind of teleological history that develops on the basis of a determinate logic that Hegel constructs in his philosophy. This kind of history as based in reason progresses in a linear and necessary fashion toward a final state. For Chakrabarty, this is an untenable position on a number of grounds. It assumes that the shape of all world history necessarily corresponds to that of European history and that because this history is necessarily progressive, non-industrialized countries are not only economically less developed, but are ontologically less developed as well (Chakrabarty 2000:3). Because the rest of the world is seen as somehow culturally behind industrialized countries it is robbed of any agency on the level of historical development instead seen as simply reacting to the events of the industrialized world (Chakrabarty 2000:7). Chakrabartys alternative to this view is heavily influenced by Michel Foucault. Rather than a singular necessary development, Chakrabarty presents the history of non-industrialized countries as possessing two separate strands. One is that of social domination by the power structures of capitalism, which seeks to expand and conquer the whole of society. The other is compromised of those social practices that cannot be subsumed under capitalism and in fact resist its spread. It is both a critique of any historical conception of existing totality and a structure in which power can only be resisted.

Against Chakrabartys particularist, subjectivist understanding of history, Chibber argues for a theory of historical development that contains a logic that maintains cultural identity rather than reducing it to abstract homogeneity. Chibber denies Chakrabartys claim that
capitalism must reconstitute all the social relations and cultural institutions to be said to have fully developed, arguing instead that all that needs to be take place is the adoption of surplus value as the basis of economic organization. Chibbers purely economic understanding of capitalism lends itself to a position that maintains that the structures of oppression can be overcome from within the structure of capitalism itself. This is to be accomplished primarily, he argues by the working classes who will fight for their basic material needs. It is possible, I have argued, to unify these two approaches to the history and development of capitalism in contemporary society. By reanalyzing Marx's critique of capitalism as one that takes labor to be the fundamental category of the capitalist system, this theory illustrates that the form of labor creates a system of value, whose two dimensions, one abstract and universal, the other concrete and particular, generate a temporal dynamic that is unique to capitalism. Moreover, because this dynamic is dependent on both the universal and the particular, not only is it permissive of a system of cultural distinctiveness alongside a dynamic of economic necessity, but the two are, constitute two sides of the same process. Finally, this dynamic points to the possibility of capitalism's overcoming, not on the basis of freeing labor from the fetters of dominating social structures, but on the reorganization of labor itself and the cessation of the domination of this historical dynamic.
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