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SPECIAL ISSUE

Aspects of the Greek Resistance

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Statement

The *Journal* has systematically encouraged and promoted the scholarly discussion of the period of the German occupation of Greece, the resistance to this occupation, and the civil war which followed. This is evidenced by the relevant contributions which have appeared in the *Journal* since Pella began publishing it, and which are separately indexed elsewhere in this issue. In fact, a special issue (vol. V, no. 3, fall 1978) was devoted to "Greece: 1940-1950."

Two facts about the study of the decade of the forties were stressed by the editors in an introductory statement to that special issue: firstly, that such a study is critical to any understanding of contemporary Greek society; and, secondly, that to study the forties is to study a unique example in the suppression of history. It was, indeed, only after the election of 1981 that Greece became the last European country to officially "recognize" its left-led Resistance against the German occupation.

Our active interest in this period of Greek history continues in this issue by offering our readers seven papers presented at the international conference entitled, "Greece, 1936-1944: Dictatorship, Occupation, Resistance," which was held in April 1984 in Athens under the auspices of the Ministry of Culture and Sciences and the Greek National Research Foundation. The proceedings of the conference will be published in Greek, while an English translation will be published by Pella. We wish to express our gratitude for permission to publish these essays to the authors, as well as the editors of the forthcoming proceedings, Professor Nikos Svoronos and Dr. Hagen Fleischer.

The Athens conference brought together over forty speakers from universities and research centers throughout the world. The attention of the *Journal's* readers has already been directed to three other relevant conferences: one which was held in London in 1978 (see vol. VIII, no. 4, winter 1981); a second one in Wash-

ington in 1978 (vol. IX, no. 2, summer 1982); and a third one, on the civil war, which was held in Copenhagen in 1984, after the Athens conference (vol. XI, no. 2, summer 1984).

As reported by participants, the Athens conference, in relation to earlier ones, advanced scholarly division of the period along three main directions. The first was the formulation of the international context of the Greek Resistance and of the previous "Metaxist" period. A number of speakers examined the Greek case from the point of view of European countries other than Britain, and thus contributed to a more balanced picture than the one already provided by "Anglo-Greek" studies of this period. The second direction along which the conference advanced involved the coverage of Greek internal factors. As already signaled at the Washington conference, it is necessary to consider Greek social conditions as the template upon which external intervention was applied. Finally, the third direction involved methodological issues. There was evidence of richer approaches beyond, for example, the confines of diplomatic history, in the examination of several aspects of the period.

We have become aware of three criticisms of the conference. These relate to, firstly, the absence of resistance fighters and political parties from the conference; secondly, the particular period selected for consideration; and, thirdly, the presumed lack of theory in the historical reconstruction of the period. Although it is the responsibility of the organizers of the conference to specifically respond to criticism, we briefly join this discussion because it provides an opportunity to raise issues of general interest. Before recording our view, we also wish to report that as we have been informed, political parties and personalities were invited to the conference but declined to make an official presence.

The information just reported removes the basis of the first criticism. Nevertheless, the more general issue which is relevant is the following: that conferences and related scholarly activities which focus on this period of Greek history have the augmented responsibility of assisting in making possible the presence of participants in the historical event being examined. Among other things, it is time that the approaches of social and oral history be systematically utilized while participants are, in fact, still alive. However, by the same token, no reports or interpretations by wit-

nesses and direct participants can be considered as necessarily more (or less) authentic. Claims of privileged access to events, as well as claims of enhanced objectivity must equally be scrutinized by the historical method.

We understand the criticism of the period which was selected to refer to 1944 as a "cutoff" date. Similar concerns have, in fact, been expressed in relation to earlier conferences as well. It is no accident that the first conference on the Greek Civil War was held in Copenhagen. We do not, however, wish to be excessively "realistic" in our evaluation of political conditions and problems in Athens which obstruct the scholarly examination of the Civil War and impose politically contingent periodizations. Excessive "realism" leads to self-censorship, which is the most insidious form of suppression of history. At the same time, particularly as we are well aware of the current Anglo-American academic climate, we feel that certain apparently "principled" objections sometimes slide into the comfort of self-excluding denial of practical responsibility. We have chosen these stark terms to go to the heart of the matter because we consider that its explicit discussion is always urgent.

As to the third complaint we have mentioned, i.e., the criticism about "facts without theory," it should be clear that we do not embrace the dominantly Anglo-Saxon empiricist tradition of inquiry. Although the *Journal* never seeks to impose any orthodoxy on the variety of views of its contributors, we are in fact very critical of that implicit theoretical standpoint which masquerades as "not theory, but facts." To put it differently, our view is that empiricism, whether consistent or creeping, is not so much the "lack" of theory as it is bad theory. This is only half the story, however. We are equally concerned with an obverse problem which seems to afflict at least some scholars in modern Greek studies. We do not wish to pose this problem in terms of the salvation of the rational kernel of Anglo-American empiricism, as against the excesses of a mainly Francophone methodologism, although such a cleavage may appear persuasive in relation to Greek scholars, given differences in their graduate training. What concerns us is an influential, though by no means dominant, and implicit transposition, which comes to equate the empiricist with the empirical. In other words, some anti-empiricist campaigns,

rather than encouraging a richer theoretical appropriation of empirical material, instead degenerate into arbitrary and empty "theories without facts" or, to speak properly, attitudes and insights which try to pass as analysis and interpretation.

We remain committed to the discussion of both the general issues we have raised and the particular theories explored in this or other issues of the *Journal*. This should be understood as an invitation to join in debates on interpretation and efforts to procure and evaluate relevant documents and, in general, participate in the historical reconstruction of a period which to a large extent has and continues to determine subsequent developments in Greek society. We consider the Athens conference to have set a new standard to be surpassed and we look forward to publishing additional articles on this period of Greek history from the conference and from other sources.

— *The Editors*

The Memoirs and Reports of The British Liaison Officers in Greece, 1942-1944: Problems of Source Value

by OLE L. SMITH*

The memoirs and reports of the British liaison officers (BLOs) with the Greek resistance, 1942-1944, are generally regarded as among the best sources for Greek history during the German occupation. The material has been used extensively but, as far as I am aware, singularly little has been done so far forward a critical evaluation of the material, either as a definite body of sources in itself, or in comparison with other similar groups of material.¹ In the present paper, I intend to examine certain types of prejudices and sources of errors in the BLO material in order to ascertain the existence and effects of distortions in the material and the degree to which such distortions may have changed the general perspectives of the accounts. The present discussion will show, I hope, that there is a serious need for reevaluation of our sources.

I do not think anyone would deny that there are, and must be, some elementary distorting factors in the BLO material. For instance, lack of experience or lack of proper briefing are examples of what I propose to call *objective* distorting factors. Much more difficult to handle are the *subjective* factors, e.g., the indisputable anticommunist attitude and the memoirs' retrospectivity.

The material selected for discussion should represent the basic types and categories of sources. The five memoirs used here differ very much in reliability from the outset. In the case of E. C. W. Myers, we know that his account is based on his very full diary.² On the other hand, as I

*I wish to thank my friends and colleagues, Hagen Fleischer and Lars Baerentzen, for their helpful discussions of various points. They must not be held responsible for any views expressed in this paper. I also owe them a great debt for their willing assistance in procuring documentary evidence.

¹There are good remarks on most of the memoirs in the bibliography of Hagen Fleischer (companion volume to J. O. Iatrides [ed.], *Greece in the 1940s: A Nation in Crisis*, Hanover & London, 1981, enlarged Greek ed. Athens, 1984).

²E. C. W. Myers, *Greek Entanglement*, London, 1955. It appears both from the book and from his paper in Ph. Auty-R. Clogg (*British Policy Towards Wartime Resistance in Yugoslavia and Greece*, London, 1975, pp. 147ff) that he kept a very full diary.

will prove later, there can be no doubt that he suppresses evidence and adjusts his account in order to argue his personal case. William Jordan is reticent, as far as I can see, on his sources. There is a certain similarity between some passages in his book and the report he wrote after his departure from Greece, but it is improbable that he had much written material at his disposal when writing the book.³ It seems to have been written from his admittedly prodigious memory, which does not, however, prevent him from making obvious mistakes⁴ and some not so obvious ones of a very remarkable nature.⁵ According to his preface, Arthur Edmonds "filled out gaps by research in reliable quarters" and, since he wrote his account in 1954, this can only mean C. M. Woodhouse's *Apple of Discord*; apart from that, his book seems to be based on his memory.⁶ The same goes for N. G. L. Hammond, who says that he wrote his memoirs while

³William Jordan, *Conquest without Victory*, London & Auckland, 1969. For an interesting quote from his report of April 22, 1944, see J. L. Hondros, *Occupation and Resistance: The Greek Agony 1941-44*, New York, 1983, p. 295, n. 80.

⁴On p. 102, for instance, he says that Theodoriana is located three hours walk from Ioannina. This might be a plain error or a more serious confusion about Greek geography.

⁵I have a very uneasy feeling that Jordan's account (104f) of a meeting between Myers and Sheppard which Jordan claims to have witnessed is doubtful. It is clearly implied by Jordan that the meeting described by him was the first meeting between Myers and Sheppard. Otherwise it makes no sense. Now, from Myers (199f) it appears that he did not see Sheppard until June 14 at Abdela in Western Macedonia. Before that time, he had tried to convince Sheppard about the nature of EAM/ELAS by sending Woodhouse to see him in the beginning of May. But in June, Jordan was clearly not with Myers anymore. He was with an EDES group in Epirus (115ff). Apart from that, Myers says explicitly that he went north with Woodhouse, Gikopoulos, and his two wireless operators. Since Jordan had been Myers's operator then, it is out of the question that he went with Myers to see Sheppard. But to complicate things, Jordan definitely was with Myers and Sheppard at the beginning of July, when Jordan had gone to protest to Myers (Jordan, 130). However, at this occasion, Myers could not very well say the things Jordan claims that he heard since Myers already had had occasion to put Sheppard straight. There is a chance that Jordan confuses an episode which he describes elsewhere (p. 127) about Woodhouse arguing with Sheppard with him being together with Myers and Sheppard at Kastania, but I cannot exclude the possibility that the meeting is "invented" to blacken Sheppard, whose enthusiasm for ELAS was definitely not shared by Jordan. No doubt Myers said something like what Jordan represents him as saying, but Jordan cannot have been present at their first meeting.

⁶Arthur Edmonds, *With Greek Guerillas*, Preface. I owe a special debt to Hagen Fleischer, who lent me his copy of Edmonds's manuscript. Edmonds does not always say how much he actually saw himself, and in some cases this can be dangerous. His description of the Plaka Conference, where he was not present, is given as if he were (pp. 170-173), and includes among other inaccuracies the statement that ELAS said against Othonaios as Commander-in-Chief of the resistance forces "that he was ill and would be unable to accept" (172). It is not clear where this comes from since Woodhouse does not have the details given by Edmonds.

in the hospital for a few months after his return from Greece in August 1944.⁷ He has read Woodhouse's book, and Myers figures in his notes, so some facts have been controled by these sources. This is not all, however. Hammond has added a few indisputably later remarks, and, as the book reads now, no one can see the extent of rewriting or addition (cf. below p. 18). Finally, in this group we have C. M. Woodhouse, whose first book I have included because of the author's importance as an eye-witness and the book's status as a scholarly work.⁸ The reports included here are in the main those published by Lars Baerentzen in the series, "Documents on Modern Greek History."⁹ I have also used Myers's short precis, *Our Attitude to EAM: Post Mortem*, the report by Bathgate, the report on SOE Activities (cf. below n. 77), and a few other miscellaneous documents. It will be seen that though there are, and must be, differences, the reports show the same basic characteristic attitudes. Further, the reports can be used to check the memoirs; it will be seen, especially in the case of Myers, that there are things which he does not say in his book.

Objective Factors

The first objective factor to be discussed is the lack of adequate briefing. It may be thought that this factor is of little importance since, once they were on the spot, the BLOs would be able to form an opinion and perhaps a better one than they would have been able to acquire in Cairo. True as this might be, and apart from the fact that what they lacked most of all was information about British political objectives—which they could not get in Greece—we must be aware that difficulties arose from the very moment the BLOs arrived in Greece. It is of course impossible to know whether a better briefing about conditions in Greece would have made much difference; the main point, however, is that the BLOs were sent to Greece without the slightest information about the country, the resistance movements, or the political situation, not to mention British policy alternatives or aims. They had to acquire that knowledge themselves, but when they got it—or rather, thought they had—it was too late and problems became intertwined in an almost insoluble way. For example, the split between EDES and ELAS occurred when Myers and Woodhouse

⁷Nicholas Hammond, *Venture into Greece*, London, 1983.

⁸C. M. Woodhouse, *Apple of Discord*, London, 1948. Hammond, Preface, calls Woodhouse's book "the classical book on the period. . . ." I have also used Woodhouse's later works, *The Struggle for Greece 1941-1949*, London, 1976, and *Something Ventured*, London, 1982.

⁹*British Reports on Greece 1943-1944*, Copenhagen, 1982 (quoted in the following as BR). This book contains the reports by John Stevens, C. M. Woodhouse, and an edited version of the two Wallace reports from 1944. I expressly point out that some of the passages omitted in Wallace's reports are important for our view of the BLO attitude to Greeks. As the informed reader will know, the omissions were made in order not to provoke libel actions under British law.

realized the "political" nature of EAM/ELAS, and when their choice of staying with EDES made EAM extremely sceptical about the intentions of the British. So I would maintain that this factor is important both for the Harling mission, as well as for the officers who came later, because they were given, if anything, already distorted information from the BLOs in Greece (e.g., about the Myers-Sheppard controversy, which John Stevens tried to clear up [cf. below p. 6]).

The whole problem of the briefing of the Harling party has been the subject of much discussion, and it will help to put some basic facts straight at the outset. It is well-known that Woodhouse, who was the only BLO to stay in Greece after the Gorgopotamos operation, was not briefed at all.¹⁰ Though some SOE officials and the minister of state in Cairo had at their disposal a certain amount of knowledge about EAM and conditions in Greece, Woodhouse was not told anything except the names of Zervas and Seferiadis, both of whom were mentioned in the operational orders as leaders of guerilla bands.¹¹ The explanation offered for this failure is that SOE Cairo had been reorganized and that the resulting confusion, together with excessive secrecy among officials, created difficulties.¹² There are objections to this argument. First, Woodhouse has emphasized that he insisted on seeing Kanellopoulos expressly for the sake of a briefing, and that Kanellopoulos did not say anything about EAM.¹³ This is remarkable for, in April 1942, Kanellopoulos reported to SOE Cairo about the so-called Popular Front, and yet he said nothing in September.¹⁴ Second, as it appears from Kanellopoulos's diary (p. 143), Ian Pirie, who was in charge of the Greek desk at SOE Cairo, took part in the meeting and he knew in detail about existing organizations.¹⁵ Third, SOE Cairo, as we shall see below, was probably at this time not happy about Zervas, whom they regarded with suspicion. Further, in December 1942, when Bill Jordan was going to Greece, he was informed about the existence of Zervas's band, as well as of another band "under Communist control." This information must have been with SOE all the time because the Harling party had not yet been able to get into contact

¹⁰Woodhouse stated as much already in *Apple*, 99. The briefing of the Harling officers has been discussed by Clogg in *Brit. Pol.*, 170ff, and in *Greece in the 1940s*, 116. Cf. also Woodhouse, *Brit. Pol.*, 264, and his paper, *Balkan Studies*, XII, 1977, 350ff.; *Greece in the 1940s*, 82. Finally, see *Something Ventured*, 24ff.

¹¹For the SOE information, see the report compiled by SOE after the war, *SOE Activities in Greece and Islands of the Aegean Sea*, 51ff, and Clogg, *Brit. Pol.*, 170ff. In the *Balkan Studies* article quoted above, n. 10, Woodhouse published the operational order.

¹²Cf. Clogg, *op. cit.* 112ff.

¹³In *Something Ventured* (30), Woodhouse said that he could have learned much from Kanellopoulos "if I had known which questions to ask."

¹⁴Cf. *SOE Activities*, 52.

¹⁵Π. Κανελλόπουλος, *Ἡμερολόγιο*, Ἀθήνα, 1977. Woodhouse, *Something Ventured* (28), said that he never met the experts in SOE who were well informed about EAM/ELAS. But Pirie was one of them.

with Cairo and, at least, could not have given the wildly exaggerated information about ELAS being 30,000 strong (Jordan, 29).

In his introduction written in 1981, Hammond (p. 15) says that he and Sheppard were given next to no information when they were briefed, presumably only a few weeks later. However, there are several problems in Hammond's account. He says that he and Sheppard were sent into northwest Greece "in order to establish contact with this mysterious ELAS, which had failed to live up to the fine achievements which were still being reported through the wireless set in Athens." It is quite uncertain which reports Hammond is referring to, since there seems to be no references to ELAS before January 12, 1943, at least in the FO papers,¹⁶ and the briefing of Hammond and Sheppard took place before Sheppard went off on January 23-24. I am convinced that this is another case of Hammond being retrospectively critical of ELAS; for he says that Myers and Woodhouse "had been told through the wireless set in Athens to expect the assistance of the local ELAS forces and their commander Ares." This is not true, as we know from Myers (p. 58); the "Prometheus" in Athens only told them about Zervas and where he could be found.¹⁷

The evidence does not present any logical picture, which may be indicative of the actual situation. Zervas was put in the field by SOE in July 1942 (SOE Act. 53) and in September he was the only leader mentioned in the operational order for the Harling mission. All along, some officials at SOE Cairo knew about EAM, and still Woodhouse, Hammond, and Sheppard (but perhaps Jordan) were not told anything, although Woodhouse tried to obtain information. For obvious reasons, Woodhouse has argued that SOE was more preoccupied with Zervas's republicanism and connections with Plastiras,¹⁸ and although there is evidence that SOE had certain objections to Zervas's reliability, this does not appear openly until Myers's telegrams began reaching Cairo in January 1943 and became a major factor in March. I submit that before Zervas's connections with Plastiras became known from Myers's telegrams,¹⁹ the SOE may have been more interested in building up EDES. This could be an explanation for the one-sided briefing, but we should be aware that we are probably looking for consistency where none is to be expected.

Another aspect of inadequate briefing is the lack of knowledge among the BLOs about Greek history, and social and political conditions. In the Harling party, Woodhouse was the only one who had relevant experience in Greece. It is difficult to be certain about what Woodhouse knew at the

¹⁶See also Woodhouse, *Greece in the 1940s*, 89.

¹⁷Hammond, 15. In the presence of Hammond, Myers emphasized in 1978 that he and Woodhouse were not told anything about EAM/ELAS at all; cf. M. Sarafis, *Greece: From Resistance to Civil War*, London, 1980, 120. Edmonds (4) says that Aris was mentioned by the "Prometheus," but this cannot be true; cf. Myers, 62.

¹⁸This is the thesis in Woodhouse's paper, *Greece in the 1940s*, 81ff.

¹⁹The earliest reference I know of concerning Zervas's connections with Plastiras is Warner's letter to Dixon, November 2, 1942, possibly based on information from Bakirtzis.

time in late 1942, for his later accounts may not represent his level of information or his opinions at that time. Though perhaps colored by later experience, Myers, in his book (p. 100ff), gives a good picture of the information available to him—possibly from Woodhouse. Although Myers is somewhat inclined to ascribe the Greek hatred for Metaxas to the need to find a scapegoat, he is relatively well-informed about the nature of the regime in Greece before the war. However, Woodhouse in 1948 gives a completely different picture. Whereas Myers openly condemns the Metaxas regime as fascist, Woodhouse takes a much more positive view, regarding Metaxas's dictatorship as a serious and necessary attempt at healing the ills of Greek society and at bringing it into the twentieth century, and he refrains from judging Metaxas at all.²⁰ In view of what we shall later find in Myers, I think that, in his book, he formed his own picture in retrospect, and that he may have toned down the more pro-Metaxas opinions of Woodhouse. There is a tiny bit of evidence that Woodhouse in 1943 had the same opinions about Metaxas as five years later. John Stevens says in his report (BR 27f) that the dislike of Metaxas in the case of the average villager seems based on Metaxas's law abolishing goats. Where did Stevens get this from, if not from Woodhouse, who wrote in 1948 (p. 57) that the Greek peasants' "only objection to Metaxas was based on a law restricting goats in the interests of reafforestation"?

Hammond had extensive experience in Greece before the war, and yet he says next to nothing about the Metaxas regime in his memoirs proper. He does so, however, in the retrospect, where he says quite straightforwardly that "the dictatorship of Metaxas left a terrible legacy in the division of Greek society" and that "the great mass of the people hated the regime."²¹ I have argued elsewhere that this can only be later "hindsight." There is no indication at all that Hammond cared about the character of the regime during his stay in Greece, much less that he thought it was important for understanding the resistance.²²

²⁰Woodhouse, 13ff. There is nothing similar in his later publications. The sharp difference between Myers's and Woodhouse's views can also be seen from the fact that Woodhouse (16) says that "The term 'Fascism' in connection with Metaxas is idle abuse," while Myers (105) condemns Metaxas as using Nazi methods and differing very little from Nazism.

²¹Hammond, 184f. It is interesting to see that this never dawned upon the Foreign Office, as Clogg has observed (*Brit. Pol.*, 201, n. 4), quoting Leeper's remark that "it would be a mistake to imagine that the Metaxas regime aroused anything like the fierce hostility throughout the country that Greek politicians would have you think" (*When Greek Meets Greek*, London, 1950, 10). But Clogg could just as well have quoted Woodhouse, and there is a good chance that Leeper's remark may have been based on Woodhouse's book.

²²See my paper, quoted below, n. 90. Hammond's indifference can also be seen on p. 147f where he says that many ELAS officers in Roumeli "were . . . embittered regular officers who had been retired as a result of a political coup d'état at one time or another." Are we to suppose that Hammond knew nothing about the fate of democratic officers after 1935 and in the Greek-Italian war? I have no doubt that Hammond knew very well about Metaxas and the character of the

The effects of this inadequate briefing appear very clearly in Myers's account (p. 100f), where it is stated quite openly that his own and Woodhouse's information about EAM/ELAS came from Zervas, and that this information was sent on to Cairo before Woodhouse had been to Athens to contact the EAM central committee. The main points in Myers's telegram were that he feared a "free plebiscite may be frustrated by EAM" and that "the controlling party (of EAM) is extremely left wing with HQ Athens radiating strict control." Both statements rested on no better evidence than Zervas's testimony.²³ From the very beginning of the British presence in Greece, the BLOs, through lack of proper briefing, had been influenced by a source which they obviously did not take as partisan. In his book (p. 102), Myers clearly says that Zervas had postwar objectives in mind. Why did the BLOs then take his account on face value? It also goes without saying that the awareness of the split in the Greek population caused by the Metaxas regime would have put Zervas's information in the proper perspective.

A good example of the effects of lack of experience and information is John Stevens's mission to Greece in 1943. Stevens was in charge of the Greek desk at SOE Cairo at the time, and he went into Greece to investigate the truth behind the very different reports coming to Cairo from Myers-Woodhouse and Sheppard. While Myers and Woodhouse were extremely critical of ELAS due to their commitment to Zervas and his views, Sheppard from the start sent very enthusiastic reports.²⁴ Worse

regime. It is impossible to believe that an educated person should have been unaware of it, although it is possible that one could choose to ignore it, just as many intellectuals ignored the regimes in Italy and Germany until the war broke out. Hammond's attitude is revealed in the Foreword, where he embarrassingly states that he did not know about the importance of the period 1941-1944 until 1978, when he took part in the London conference (Sarafis, above, n. 17).

²³SOE Records, 37, Harling to Cairo, January 13, 1943. Cf. also Myers, 101f, for his information from Zervas.

²⁴What is known of Sheppard's telegrams and from other officers shows him to be very favorable toward ELAS. The other BLOs regarded him with contempt for his gullibility (see, e.g., Hammond, 34, 36; Woodhouse, *Brit. Pol.*, 141; Jordan, 104f). In a telegram to Cairo on May 4, Myers deplored the fact that Sheppard and his mission "are becoming E.A.M. yes-men not troubling to investigate deeper than the E.A.M. desire." SOE defended Sheppard (cf. the report, *Political Developments in the Greek Resistance Movement*, Week Ending May 15th, and Clogg, *Brit. Pol.*, 181). On the other hand, Sheppard seems to have had a similar low opinion of Myers, and there is evidence that SOE at one time thought Myers and Woodhouse too much pro-Zervas (if not under duress) and too critical toward EAM because of Sheppard's telegrams (Woodhouse, *Brit. Pol.*, 120; *Greece in the 1940s*, 93, though Jordan has nothing about secret code phrases to indicate whether or not the Harling mission was under duress). To "solve" the problem, Myers demanded that Sheppard be put under his orders, and he sent Woodhouse to convince Sheppard of his errors. This had no effect, it seems. Although Sarafis ('Ο ΕΛΑΣ, 'Αθήνα, 1980, 118) had a high opinion of Sheppard, other ELAS officers took him to be an agent, not a regular officer (Α. Ε. Μπαλής, 'Ο ΕΛΑΣ στη Θεσσαλία, 'Αθήνα, 1981, 153c).

than that, the two missions had started slandering each other. John Stevens recollected in 1973 that before he went to Greece, "telegrams were coming from British officers . . . saying this man is now letting down the E.L.A.S. cause or that man has gone over to the communists."²⁵ In order to clear up this confused picture, Stevens, who by his own admission was "green about Greece," went in to form an independent opinion.²⁶ The result is the very disillusioned and partly self-contradictory report he wrote in Turkey after having left Greece in June 1943. His experiences in Greece very clearly show the difficulties inherent in such attempts at forming "independent" views. Stevens began his journey in the Pindus area, from where he went to southern Thessaly after having been arrested by Aris.²⁷ From there, he sent a telegram in which we can already find many of his negative judgments on EAM/ELAS.²⁸ Edmonds, who met him there, confirms that Stevens at the time had a low opinion of EAM/ELAS, and by the time he came to Myers HQ he openly criticized the British support of ELAS.²⁹ Afterwards, he went to Sheppard, where a metamorphosis must have taken place, for the next we hear is from Hammond, who tried in vain to convince Stevens of the folly of supporting EAM/ELAS.³⁰ Hammond does not seem to have realized that Stevens had changed his mind in Thessaly with Sheppard. According to Kikitsas, Hammond and Stevens disagreed openly.³¹ Finally, Stevens seems to have had some unpleasant experience with ELAS in Chalkidiki, for he came back to Hammond in Macedonia in a rage, with a very different and wholly negative view of ELAS.³² There can be no doubt that these abrupt changes were due to inexperience. It stands to reason that Stevens was not the ideal person to form independent and reliable opinions. His views of EAM/ELAS were somewhat self-contradictory,³³ but the most spectacular features

²⁵*Brit. Pol.*, 217.

²⁶*Ibid.* Cf. also Baerentzen, 160.

²⁷Edmonds, 219. According to him, Aris arrested Stevens because the latter had found it a good idea to say something pleasant about ELAS, whereupon Aris concluded that Stevens was not a British officer but a spy.

²⁸Extracts in the SOE report quoted above, n. 24. The telegram is dated April 28, 1943. Some of the basic points recurring in his final report are EAM's terrorism, more partisan than patriotic. A few important points are not in the final version, e.g., "EDES profess . . . a crusade against communism." And while Stevens in April thought that both EDES and EAM wanted "to tip any election in their own favour," in the final report he just said that Zervas had his political future to consider (BR 24).

²⁹Myers, 165. He arrived at Myers HQ on May 6, 1943.

³⁰Hammond, 59. It also appears from Sarafis, 118f, that Stevens at that time was very positive toward ELAS.

³¹Γ. Κικίτσας, *Χη Μεραρχία του ΕΛΑΣ*, Ἀθήνα, 1978, 157.

³²It is not clear what happened to Stevens. Afterwards, he was guided by ELAS to the coast at Pelion, from where he went by caique to Turkey; see Μπαλής, 155.

³³Stevens (BR 41) emphasizes that EAM is "the most efficient organization for fighting the Axis in Greece to-day" and that "The twin organization EAM/ELAS

were his belief that EAM's power rested on terrorism³⁴ and that the leadership had personal motives, only furthering their own careers.³⁵ Stories of ELAS terrorism can be found in most British sources and Stevens was here probably only using information from BLOs.³⁶ The point that the leaders were deceiving the rank-and-file in order to further their personal careers is not met with elsewhere and is in any case a strange misjudgment that can only be ascribed to Stevens's personal understanding.

In contrast to Stevens, David Wallace could not be described as green about Greece.³⁷ And yet there are unmistakable signs that his judgment was just as unstable as Stevens's. Wallace was sent to Greece as the personal representative of Anthony Eden, who did not trust SOE's reports on the Greek situation.³⁸ During his stay in Greece from the end of June until August 9, 1943, he came, at least according to Myers and Woodhouse, to take a view of the political situation which was more or less the same as theirs, and this is confirmed by Reginald Leeper's first reports on his talks with Wallace in Cairo after Wallace had returned. Later, however, as Clogg has shown convincingly, Wallace must have changed his mind, due to Leeper's evidence for this change of mind; Wallace's final report is withheld in the F.O.³⁹ There can be no doubt that it would really be strange if Wallace was prevailed upon by a man who had never been to Greece, but it cannot be excluded. Although Wallace had considerable experience in Greece, he was inexperienced politically, as the Foreign Office admitted; second, we have evidence from people who worked with Wallace that he was "very young, very uncertain of himself, very easily influenced."⁴⁰

We do not know very much about Wallace's first stay in Greece would be no mean achievement anywhere and for Greece is something quite outstanding" (BR 18). On the other hand, he also says (BR 17) that "Antartes are vain, boastful soldiers who are too grand to study war as a science and too stupid to learn from experience" and the "EAM has never been anything but an autocratic movement in which the leaders have ruled dictatorially" (BR 12) and "the unanimity has been achieved by force, not by persuasion" (BR 22).

³⁴Instances may be found, BR 8, 14, 18, etc.

³⁵BR 23 is very interesting in this respect: "The EAM seems much more a movement for furthering the political careers of some dozen men, who happen to be communists, than the expression of the activities of the Greek Communist Party." See further, BR 19, 22, 39.

³⁶See below, p. 12. Information and prejudices from fellow officers may also account for some of the high-handed judgments found in Stevens's report, as, e.g., "the Greek character and incapability of uniting" (BR 14), "the danger inherent in all Greeks when idle that they will turn their attention to politics" (BR 43), "the Greeks are a very fickle and easily swayed race" (BR 45). I intend to discuss British views on the psychology of the Greeks in a later paper.

³⁷See Baerentzen, xxxi.

³⁸See Clogg, *Brit. Pol.*, 179ff, and Baerentzen, *loc. cit.*

³⁹Clogg, *loc. cit.*, and Discussion, 270ff.

⁴⁰Minute by Sargent quoted in Baerentzen, xxxii; Mrs. Pamela Pawson in *Brit. Pol.*, 272.

during July-August 1943. Myers (p. 216f) says that Wallace was with EDES for the first two weeks (this must have been the first two weeks of July) and then with ELAS for two weeks, when he was shocked to see the influence of EAM/ELAS on the population, and the extreme left-wing views of the organizations. He had a favorable impression of EDES. Hammond met him at the BLO conference in July at Pertouli and had a long talk with him. It also appears that Wallace had read Hammond's reports.⁴¹ It is not clear to me where Wallace had had experience with ELAS, but two things are tolerably certain. First, that his view of the situation was based on an exceedingly small amount of first-hand experience, and second, that much of his information must have been gained at the BLO conference. It was after the conference that he began sending telegrams.⁴² Thus I do not regard it as impossible that Wallace himself can have been aware of the shortcomings of his own views when he returned to Cairo, and that Leeper, with political arguments, could very well have made him see that Myers had been wrong in supporting ELAS, to the detriment of British interests.⁴³ While I think that there is a case in what we know of Wallace's earlier reports for a certain tendency to be easily influenced, his later reports from July and August 1944 show much more clearly his shortcomings as an independent observer. His two reports from 1944 deal with EDES, and they are very different.

In the middle of July 1944, Wallace went back to Greece as a member of Leeper's staff. On July 31, that is, two weeks after his arrival, he sent a very optimistic report on the possibilities and strength of EDES. Two weeks later, on August 15, he submitted what must surely be the most pessimistic and outrageous report ever from a responsible British official in Greece. In his first report, Wallace considers Zervas "an asset" and "capable of being a major factor in any general policy we wish to pursue in Greece" (BR 121). Wallace praises the morale of EDES, the organization of Zervas's area, and the great possibilities for extension of it. Zervas offers "opportunities for development" (BR 120f). However, all this seems to have been written at Zervas's HQ; in the next two weeks, Wallace went on a tour of EDES's Third Division and the result was

⁴¹Hammond, 76. It appears that Hammond talked to Wallace about the communist influence in EAM and aired his political objections to the British support.

⁴²Clogg, *Brit. Pol.*, 189.

⁴³As Clogg has pointed out (*Brit. Pol.*, 204, n. 83), one of the recommendations in Wallace's report may have been that Myers should not return to Greece after the Cairo conference, since he was too committed to EAM. This was not mentioned in Wallace's telegrams, and may also explain why Myers felt that Wallace in Cairo was embarrassed in his company (*Brit. Pol.*, 270f). On the other hand, it is very difficult to believe that Leeper was able to convince Wallace that the efficiency of the guerillas was grossly overrated by SOE. In a telegram to the Foreign Office, August 24, 1943, Leeper said on the basis of Wallace's oral report that the *andartes* "are, in fact, untrained and ill-disciplined; they are regarded with contempt by most of the British Liaison Officers. . . . In the recent series of operations . . . it is admitted that the guerillas were 95% cowardly, unwilling or inefficient. . . ."

complete hopelessness. In this later report, he was aware of the difference, and wrote that his new findings did not "raise the question of looking for something else to lean on but of whether it is worth having a Greek policy at all" (BR 152). Two weeks were all that was needed to convince him that "the Greeks are a useless people," "not capable of being saved from themselves nor themselves worth it," and what is more astonishing, "this is also the opinion of all British liaison officers who have been long in the country" (BR 151). I cannot see how it is possible to doubt for one moment that Wallace's judgment cannot be relied upon. It is therefore somewhat embarrassing to see that D. S. Laskey in his comments only noticed that "the optimistic remarks . . . are somewhat toned down by the second report," and that Laskey and other Foreign Office officials found the reports "worth printing in extracts."⁴⁴

To illustrate further the extent to which Wallace's reports are biased and at the mercy of momentary influences, we may point to his conviction (partly derived from Hammond) that ELAS was "massacring their political opponents wherever they could lay hands on them" (BR 122). He quotes the ELAS attack on Amphilochia as an example, although another BLO who was present (Wallace was not) corrected part of the reports on the attack, and although he later derided the proclivity of Greeks to spread alarm and despondency without the slightest reason (BR 131, 156f). He was also aware that "in Kalarytes none of the ugly EDES prophecies of ELAS atrocities were fulfilled" (BR 156). Another example: in Wallace's first report from July 31, he wrote that Lt. Col. Papathanasiou was "a windbag capable of preventing even Pyromaglou from opening his mouth on end." One is a little taken aback when Wallace in his later report on the second day described the same man as "a regular officer . . . exceedingly friendly, helpful and talkative." Eight days later, the poor Lieutenant Colonel again was "a windbag remarkable even among Greeks . . . obviously a muddler with little more effective control over his command than over his tongue."⁴⁵ Possibly, Wallace went on his tour with the best intentions, but he became totally frustrated at the end. Finally, Wallace's optimistic description of Zervas contrasts sharply with the later report's emphasis that the EDES officers "feather their own nests" instead of fighting the Germans and that "the andartes have so far failed to do anything and the Mission is more than usually sick with them" (BR 153, 174).

It is difficult today to get a clear picture of how much in the British sources is loose talk and rumors among the BLOs; in some cases, it is comparatively easy to see that information obtained on second hand was given somewhat uncritically. The rumors about Aris which sometimes were presented as facts by the British seem to have been derived from gossip. And as we have seen, Myers and Woodhouse were perfectly willing to

⁴⁴BR 116 and Baerentzen, 194. Cf. also Leeper's covering letter to Eden, BR 118.

⁴⁵BR 143 and 148. The description of Papathanasiou in the first report has been omitted in the edition, cf. Baerentzen, 128, and n. 9 above.

believe Zervas's talk about the sinister intentions of EAM. In the case of Stevens, we can also see that much of his information and views came from other BLOs. For instance, Stevens's view that the formation of ELAS into a regular army "may be a sop to national pride" is strangely reminiscent of Woodhouse's view that it "is a question of national pride."⁴⁶

Wallace, in his report, showed very clearly that as far as EAM/ELAS were concerned, Hammond was his source. The views of Wallace were therefore very like Hammond's.⁴⁷ In his long paragraph XVII in the July report, he gives without any personal comments only Hammond's views. As far as I can see, this can only mean that Wallace acknowledged that he had not been able to form a personal opinion himself, since he had only been in Zervas's territory. It is therefore quite interesting to see that Hammond in his book (p. 160) claimed that when he met Wallace in July 1944 with Zervas, he "only had a short talk with him, but it was clear that he had realized what the aims of ELAS and KKE were." It is impossible to know what Hammond means when he says a short talk; this is not important, though a few minutes would not account for the long paragraph and other information from Hammond. It is much more serious that Hammond implies that Wallace knew what he was talking about, whereas it is obvious that Wallace could hardly know anything about ELAS and KKE, having been in Greece only for about a week, and only with Zervas. What Wallace did, as we can see from his report, was to accept *in toto* and without question Hammond's view of the situation.

Last but not least is the language problem. Very few of the BLOs knew modern Greek sufficiently well to do without an interpreter. Among the officers dealt with here only Woodhouse, Hammond, and Wallace were fluent Greek speakers. The resulting difficulties in obtaining information hardly needs elaborating, but I should like to stress that linguistic knowledge is no guarantee of understanding Greeks, nor does insight into social and political realities follow automatically. As a result of this deficiency, most BLOs could only communicate with Greeks from higher social strata, and with the occasional former immigrant to the USA.

Subjective Factors

There seems not to have been any attempt by British authorities to select the SOE officers who went to Greece with political or ideological criteria. They seem to have been a mixed lot, with mostly liberal and conservative outlooks and very few of leftist opinion. Most of them shared the common view, as Richard Clogg has well put it, that communism was "a bad thing." It is further very probable, as Clogg also suggested, that this was one of the reasons why such young officers "could be sent on highly sensitive missions into remote areas of the Balkans . . . and . . .

⁴⁶BR 23 and 75. For another instance, see above, p. [5].

⁴⁷The passage BR 121-122 on EAM, though very much like Hammond, may also be based on rumors in the Zervas area.

retain a more or less instinctive appreciation of the line that their superiors would expect them to follow."⁴⁸ At least it was never doubted by the BLOs that a Greece dominated by EAM would be contrary to British interests.

Of the officers mentioned in this paper, Bill Jordan was a good example of what we may call initial prejudice. In his case, we know that he was prejudiced from the day he set his foot on Greek soil. His anti-communism was not a result of Greek experience or Cold War perspectives. Perhaps this is why his book is the most blatantly anticommunist of them all. In the case of the other BLOs, it is very difficult to know whether they were prejudiced from the start. In Jordan's case, it is certain that from his very first meeting with Aris and ELAS he hated them intensely. This is not only apparent in his own account, but also confirmed by Edmonds, who describes his first meeting with Jordan.⁴⁹

From the start, the BLOs were meant to have military functions only. They were not expected to mix in politics, and the only officer sent in during the early days with orders to deal with political questions was Rufus Sheppard, although it is not clear what exactly he was expected to do, probably only to collect political information.⁵⁰ Even so, from the beginning, the officers not only became aware of the political problems in the resistance but also began reporting to Cairo on such problems. Without having been asked by SOE, Myers and Woodhouse reported in January 1943 on EAM/ELAS in their first telegrams on no better evidence than Zervas's talk. From Myers's account, it is very easy to see what prompted them; for their conversations with Zervas had led them to understand that EDES distrusted the intentions of EAM, and they could not bring the two organizations together in such circumstances. The British fear, however, was concerned solely with EAM. Myers says in his telegram that "the controlling party (of EAM) is extremely left wing" and he fears that a "free plebiscite may be frustrated by EAM."⁵¹ The problems were real, but Myers and Woodhouse immediately plumped for Zervas's view. Military facts forced Myers to use ELAS since there were no targets in Zervas's area, but it will be seen that the BLOs were aware that British policy preferred Zervas.

Hammond (p. 24ff) also began almost immediately to inquire into the political background of ELAS although he did not report on this before he was expressly asked. Even so, he was clearly anxious to find out what ELAS stood for politically. When SOE began asking Hammond for information about EAM/ELAS, they did it because the different views of Sheppard and Myers-Woodhouse showed that the military problems

⁴⁸Clogg, *Greece in the 1940s*, 108ff. Woodhouse, *Apple*, 99, will have us believe that most BLOs, if they had any political views at all, were mostly sympathetic to the left. It should be pointed out that though Greek sources often assume that the BLOs were selected, there is really no evidence at all. It was not necessary.

⁴⁹Cf. Jordan, 50ff and Edmonds, 58.

⁵⁰See Hammond, 25.

⁵¹Myers, 108, Harling to Cairo, January 13, 1943.

and the political ones could not be separated. Thus, from the very beginning of the British presence in Greece, the conflict between military short-term objectives and long-term political interests came up. The BLOs were caught in it since they themselves had brought it into view. The more acute the conflict between short- and long-term objectives became, the more we can see how the negative view of EAM/ELAS grew, to end in an obsession.

In his telegram to Cairo of March 10, Myers put forward the view that the only way of solving the conflict between political and military goals was to give full support to EDES in an attempt to force ELAS out. When SOE told him to investigate the matter of Sarafis's disarming and invoked Zervas's past in order to make it clear that Britain could not concentrate support on him, Myers stated that he believed EAM to be more interested in postwar aims than in fighting the common enemy.⁵² In the meantime, Woodhouse had been to Athens and had found out, as he believed, that EAM was completely dominated by the KKE. The conflict with Sarafis therefore strengthened their prejudice, already strong after Zervas convinced them that EAM was in the hands of communists and wanted to monopolize the resistance. While Myers was prepared to regard Zervas's message to the king sincere, he found that EAM's behavior was calculated.⁵³ Still, Myers tried to find a compromise due to military realities. If Britain would guarantee free elections, both civil war and the establishment of communism could be prevented, he thought.⁵⁴ On June 10, Cairo sent a message which stated that in its opinion, both Zervas and EAM had ulterior motives, and the BLOs could not prevent EAM/ELAS from working for their own ends. Civil war was certain, but to SOE the main thing was "to ensure maximum resistance to the enemy until Allied occupation."⁵⁵ Basically, the matter rested there.

The firm belief that EAM was out solely for its own ends, and that these ends were detrimental to British interests, had the effect on the

⁵²Harling to Cairo, January 13, 1943; Cairo to Harling, March 11, 1943; Harling to Cairo, March 12, 1943. On Myers's proposals, see below, p. 17f. The BLOs commonly believed that the primary aim of EAM was the jockeying for political power, cf. Stevens, BR 40, Woodhouse, BR 72f.

⁵³Harling to Cairo, March 12, 1943. On the question of EAM's monopoly of the resistance, Woodhouse (*Brit. Pol.*, 118; *Something Ventured*, 54) tried to argue much later that the KKE at the Second Panhellenic Conference in December 1942 had laid such plans. Woodhouse never quotes the documents, and his source is obviously Kousoulas, for he reiterates Kousoulas's strange blunder that the conference took place in Thessaly.

⁵⁴Telegram to Cairo, April 4, 1943.

⁵⁵Telegram from Cairo, June 10, 1943. While it is not very astonishing that SOE thought Zervas to have postwar aims, it is rather seldom that we find similar opinions among the BLOs. Myers once reveals that he thought so (102) and Stevens also in his report (BR 24). Wallace was fooled; in July 1944 (BR 123), he said that it would not surprise him if Zervas was content to rest on his laurels at the end of the battle. And in the final SOE report (*SOE Act.* 63), Zervas is said to have no political ambitions.

BLOs of making them begin to distrust everything connected with EAM. In his report, Stevens put it very clearly (BR 44): "What is quite certain is that we do not want the EAM leaders in power after the war. They are avowedly anti-Royalist as well as being anything but democratic."⁵⁶

One of the BLOs' basic proofs of EAM's political character was their opinion that EAM's power was based on terror of the people. Stevens says so throughout his report, and there are many examples in Edmonds and Jordan, in particular, of Aris's treatment of supposed traitors. It is not relevant whether these stories are true, as my point is that they characterized EAM in the eyes of the BLOs. Edmonds seems at first to have thought ELAS's harshness a necessity in guerilla life, but later he finds no excuse.⁵⁷ Hammond is difficult to look through because he is extremely retrospective, but the impression we get is that he viewed ELAS with distrust from the start, and he soon found reason to have his suspicion confirmed.⁵⁸ Later reports do not substantially qualify this view; both Bathgate and Wallace confirm that EAM/ELAS are terrorist organizations and that the communists will murder their opponents in the towns when Greece is liberated.⁵⁹ Traitors and collaborators were useful labels to cover political opposition. The BLOs became so convinced about the sinister character of EAM/ELAS that they were able to believe anything. Hammond (p. 165) seriously thought that ELAS had secret contacts with the Germans, although the evidence he gives is ridiculous. Both Woodhouse and Hammond say that the liberal members of the PEEA were threatened with reprisals against their families in Athens.⁶⁰ The most outrageous example perhaps is Jordan's insinuation (p. 97) that Woodhouse was denounced to the Gestapo by the communists in the central committee of EAM in January 1943. It is clear from Myers and Edmonds that on his return from Athens, Woodhouse told them that he had been saved by EAM.⁶¹ Jordan also heard this story, we must suppose, but for reasons of his

⁵⁶From April 1943 on, the British support of the king and the Greek government was stated in unmistakable terms.

⁵⁷For Stevens's view, see BR 8, 14, 18, 22; Edmonds, 40, 65; Woodhouse, *Apple*, 61, goes so far as to say that the communists ascribed to "the belief in violence not only as a justifiable means to an end, but as welcome for its own sake." With very few exceptions, the BLOs saw nothing but communist brutality and treachery in the treatment of people who left ELAS (cf. Edmonds, 76, Hammond, 102). It does not seem to have been realized that you cannot have people coming and going in a guerilla movement.

⁵⁸See, e.g., the account of "Clearchus," p. 21, whom I have not been able to identify. There were no Athenians in the early groups, at least according to our best sources for this area. Cf. also pp. 45, 48.

⁵⁹P. Bathgate, "The Andarte Movement in Epirus," March 30, 1944; Wallace, BR 140.

⁶⁰Hammond, 145; Woodhouse, *Apple*, 70; cf. also Wallace's report of his talk with Hammond, BR 139.

⁶¹Myers (118) and Edmonds (63) are quite explicit on EAM's role, and Myers (145) also mentions Tzimas's part in the affair, which Woodhouse has emphasized several times, e.g., *Something Ventured*, 56ff.

own he does not mention it. It does not only prove Jordan's bad faith—to say no more—but also Woodhouse's, who in the foreword to Jordan's book calls it "a healthily frank and utterly authentic account."⁶²

As we shall see later, the BLOs were convinced that the communist leaders deceived the rank-and-file by not admitting openly that they were communists. It is therefore not surprising that the British officers uniformly regarded EAM leaders very negatively. It is well-known that no BLO had anything positive to say about Aris; at most, they accepted that he was a good leader of men. Few of them had actually seen him perform the atrocities that were ascribed to him, and still fewer knew anything about him.⁶³ The ground was ripe for rumors and it was commonly believed that he had been to Russia, had volunteered in the Spanish Civil War, and had been convicted of homosexual crimes, which was purportedly why he had to leave his job as a schoolteacher. Needless to say, none of this was anything but gossip, but according to Edmonds some of this information was given to Woodhouse by Aris himself. Jordan asserts that he once saw a police file on Aris, from which it appeared that he had been in jail for political activity, forgery, and fraud.⁶⁴ To Hammond, Aris was "the traditional Turkish type of bully in Greek legend, a man for whom I had an instantaneous and very deep dislike." Bathgate considered him a murderer and nothing more.⁶⁵

Nor were the British able to understand Sarafis. Woodhouse, who should have known better, still believed in 1948 that Sarafis had been converted at the point of a pistol,⁶⁶ and Myers could not see why Sarafis did not feel grateful to him for having saved his life. Jordan and Hammond have of course nothing positive to say, since they believed the rumors; Jordan is of the opinion that Myers saved a worthless life, and Hammond regarded Sarafis as a figurehead and puppet, "pitiful but in no way likeable." Although embarrassed, Myers believed that Sarafis was motivated by the conviction that the best thing he could do for his country in the prevailing conditions was to accept the offer to become Com-

⁶²The worst in Woodhouse seems to come up in his forewords; an excellent specimen is his preface to D. G. Kousoulas's *Revolution and Defeat*. There are too many things in Jordan's book that Woodhouse must have known to be incorrect, to say no more.

⁶³Jordan, 52, gives a story heard from his subordinate, Len Phillips, which is clearly not true since it is a concoction of the two stories told by Nat Barker to Edmonds (40 and 65f), with a sprinkling of gruesome details (invented by Phillips or Jordan?) and with a false reason for the execution. Barker may have been a witness, Phillips certainly not, although Jordan says so.

⁶⁴Edmonds, 35; Jordan, 52; *SOE Act*. 60 nicely sums up these rumors. Characteristically, Myers only gives his personal impression of Aris.

⁶⁵Hammond, 126; Bathgate also says that Aris "probably has tucked away many British sovereigns against the day when Greece will be too hot for him." This is as good an example as any to show the fundamental gap between the BLOs and the national resistance.

⁶⁶Woodhouse, *Apple*, 69f. It is perhaps understandable that he believed the rumor in 1944 (BR 73); see now *Struggle*, 34.

mander-in-Chief. This again puts Myers in different category from his colleagues.⁶⁷

Siantos was a different proposition. The portrait which Hammond gives of him is illuminating, for he believed Siantos to be "ambitious for personal power and ruthless in his treatment of others; a fanatic, but true to his convictions."⁶⁸ Most people who knew Siantos will have great difficulty in recognizing the γέρος τοῦ ἀγώνα here. And the reason why Hammond has this opinion is that he believed Siantos to have been trained in Moscow for the specific purpose of seizing power. This was a mistake which we find also in other BLOs. Woodhouse, for example, says that the whole Politburo had been educated in Moscow, and Edmonds also refers to Mr. George Siantos's studies under the communists in Russia.⁶⁹ Also, both Woodhouse and Hammond found in this connection between Greece and Moscow the most sinister implications. What emerges from their belief about Siantos is that they were at least singularly badly informed, and that they found it an incriminating circumstance to have been educated in the Soviet Union.

Kostas Despotopoulos was also looked upon with abhorrence. Hammond says that the BLOs called him "the slimy Despot," which is confirmed by Edmonds.⁷⁰ Bakirtzis was believed by Hammond to have signed the death-warrant of Psarros, and Mrs. Svolos was described as "a small and acid woman who was a keen communist. She addressed meetings of the village women, dilating upon women's rights and the need for female suffrage." The implications of these dark activities will not be lost on the reader.⁷¹ Finally, Hammond nicely sums up by calling the ELAS GHQ a "gang of ruffians" (p. 126).

The British prejudice is quite characteristic. They did not like Makridis; the only thing they have to say about him was that he fought on the Turkish side against the British in World War I. None of them says why, and Edmonds insinuates that Makridis bore a grudge against the British on that score.⁷² It is quite obvious from such passages as Edmond's, description of the staff of ELAS' Ninth Division that the only ELAS's officers that were accepted by the British were people who did not

⁶⁷Myers, 148f; Hammond, 124; Jordan, 49f, is another case of an extremely biased account.

⁶⁸Woodhouse, *Struggle*, 14, also calls Siantos ambitious and ruthless. Of course, this description is somewhat general, but it could either reflect a common opinion among the BLOs (for a similar case, see Myers and Edmonds on the leadership qualities of Sarafis) or worse, reflect Hammond's reading of Woodhouse's book.

⁶⁹Hammond, 123f; Woodhouse, *Apple*, 115; Edmonds, 207. According to Woodhouse (*Struggle*, 14), Siantos *escaped* to Moscow in 1931(!). Hondros, 111, also says without any references that Siantos was in the Soviet Union until 1934.

⁷⁰Hammond, 124; Edmonds, 160.

⁷¹Hammond, 136 and 145.

⁷²Hammond, 149; Edmonds, 208. Woodhouse, *Greece in the 1940s*, 92, falsely believes Makridis to have been the officer accompanying Sarafis in February 1943 and he accuses Makridis of having denounced Sarafis to the KKE.

hide their dislike of ELAS. Kostas Kifissas, chief-of-staff, was "co-operative" and "valuable for his military ability"; the reason clearly was that Edmonds had found out that Kifissas hated EAM. The military commander Karayannis is described as a "likeable" man; when one reads on, the reason is seen to be that "he did give the impression that were it not for his EAM bosses he would have been most co-operative." Another reason why some ELAS officers became accepted was their occasional European quality; for instance, an officer is described positively because of his "rare sense of humor."⁷³ We can observe the same tendency in Hammond. Kalambalikis, head of the Tenth Division, is described as an "honest man with a mind uninfluenced by Communist ideas." It is interesting to notice that Hammond quite frankly explains how he tried to make this honest man a British agent (p. 120f). It comes therefore as a surprise to learn that Hammond thought very highly of Kikitsas as "a man after my own heart," but the reason is evident when Hammond later discloses that he thought that Kikitsas was "executed by EAM" during the Civil War.⁷⁴

The only Greek communist that seems to have been respected by all BLOs is Andreas Tzimas. The reason is obvious; they found that Tzimas had "a thoroughly Western mentality" (Woodhouse), and that he was "sensible and more honest than most Greeks" (Myers). Hammond comments also upon his European qualities—"he was a well-educated lawyer and he had charm of manner and a sense of humor."⁷⁵ Of course, they also believed that Tzimas had a restraining influence on EAM; they found him moderate, in other words apparently open to British arguments.⁷⁶ The BLOs judged Greeks according to British political objectives.

The anticommunist prejudice was strengthened by the British inability to understand why the communists would not readily admit that they were communists and that they had great influence in EAM. Obviously, the British could not believe that EAM was a patriotic organization, and they tried to find proofs of communist control over and communist propaganda in EAM/ELAS.⁷⁷ Myers recounts that when he met Karayorgis, the

⁷³Edmonds, 174f. This also seems to have been the only reason why Jordan liked Zaroyannis (whom he calls Cavalla), cf. Jordan, 125.

⁷⁴Hammond 43, 119; his information about Kikitsas's later career is of course ridiculous and shows his level of information. Apart from the fact that EAM could not very well execute anybody during the Civil War, it should be said that Kikitsas died a natural death in Athens in 1982.

⁷⁵Woodhouse, *Brit. Pol.*, 131; Myers, *Inside Greece* (report dated 8.25.1943), 28; Hammond, 108. See also Edmonds, 81 and Stevens, BR 19.

⁷⁶Cf. also Edmonds's impression of Karayorgis from Myers: "he had found him moderate in his methods and saw that he had the wholehearted support of the majority of the people in his area." This is interesting, for Myers (140) does not say so. Hammond found Karayorgis "an amiable and charming diplomat." Later he calls him a "sleek lawyer" (30, 37). For some reason the BLOs did not know his real profession; cf. also Myers, 140.

⁷⁷See, e.g., Hammond, 24f; Woodhouse, *Apple*, 61 (some of his evidence is quite funny); Stevens, BR 14, is more reluctant.

latter emphatically denied that the EAM central committee was controlled by the KKE, and said that it had nothing to do with him, even if true. According to Edmonds, Tasos Lefterias "hotly denied EAM had anything to do with communists"; Karayorgis also reacted sharply at Hammond's suggestion that Kissavos made propaganda for the KKE.⁷⁸ The British belief that EAM/ELAS were secretly communist organizations had important consequences for their attitude. First of all, they became convinced that the leaders deceived the rank-and-file; secondly, they thought it possible to "wean" the mass of non-communists from the "extremist" leaders in various ways. Therefore, we find in almost all reports speculations as to the actual strength of the communist element in EAM/ELAS. SOE estimated in its final report on activities in Greece that eighty percent of the guerillas were not communists, although eighty percent of the leaders were (SOE, Act. 69). Stevens guessed that fifteen to twenty percent of EAM were communists. The commander of Force 133, Brigadier Barker-Benfield, gave in April 1944 the figure sixty percent pro-British (roughly identical to non-communist) in ELAS and eighty percent of the EAM rank-and-file as pro-British. A few weeks later, he ventured the opinion that the followers of EAM were about three to four hundred thousand.⁷⁹ In August 1944, Hammond (197) considered that more than sixty percent of ELAS was eager to leave, and a few weeks earlier he had told Wallace that "at least fifty percent of the actual andartes were not communists" and would be sensitive to an appeal to return to their villages when fighting against the Germans was over (BR 140). The total failure of these calculations can be seen in Woodhouse's attempt to explain why the influence of the KKE grew even after December 1944.⁸⁰

One of the areas where British long-term policy clashed very sharply with Greek interests was the growth and development of ELAS. While the BLOs wanted small units for sabotage purposes, ELAS wanted maximum growth in order to keep the Axis forces away from the free areas. In the patriotic demand for weapons to fight the invaders, the BLOs saw nothing but EAM propaganda;⁸¹ they were convinced that ELAS only wanted to increase its numerical strength in order to secure absolute political and military control. The account in Edmonds of the preparations for "Noah's Ark" is very revealing of the British attitude. Edmonds

⁷⁸Myers, 140; Edmonds, 80; Hammond, 31. Myers, 144, does not mention the conversation with Tasos Lefterias recorded by Edmonds; there is, however, no reason to doubt it. On the question of "communist" propaganda in ELAS, it should be realized that at the time propaganda against the king, Metaxist officers, and the establishment would naturally be called communist. Of this, the BLOs had no idea, due to their lack of information.

⁷⁹BR 14; see Barker-Benfield's report from April 22, 1944, and Baerentzen's paper in *Μνημύων*, 9, 1984, 172.

⁸⁰Woodhouse, *Apple*, 66ff. For the British and German estimates, see also Hondros, 119f.

⁸¹The demand for weapons is dismissed contemptuously by Edmonds, 84; cf. also Jordan, 57 and Woodhouse, BR 74ff.

wanted to cut the strength of the Ninth Division by fifty percent, and when the ELAS leaders asked what the rest were supposed to do, Edmonds told them "that the best use they could be put to economically was to produce food at their homes."⁸² Woodhouse is also very revealing when, in his May 1944 report (BR 77), he says that "*intelligent* ELAS officers see that the most valuable and least expensive successes have been achieved with very small forces under the direct guidance of ALO's" (my emphasis).

Personal Apology and Retrospectivity

After the war, the BLOs were heavily criticized for giving weapons and support to EAM/ELAS. Myers's book, for instance, can be read very sensibly as an attempt to justify his "submissive" policy toward the resistance and to argue why it was necessary to arrive at a compromise by giving concessions to EAM.⁸³ A very characteristic example of this apologetic tendency is his recommendation for a total break with EAM in March 1943 and his silence on this point in his book. Some years ago, Woodhouse showed that the telegrams sent from Myers in early 1943 could be read in Cairo as urging support for Zervas in an anticommunist crusade. Woodhouse, however, omits some important details for obvious reasons.⁸⁴

The crisis began with the disarming of Sarafis on March 4. When Myers learned what had happened, he sent a telegram on March 8 in which he said that he considered civil war imminent. He said that Zervas, "if EAM refuses to come to heel is prepared with your full help and publicity to try to take over military forces" (SOE rec. 262, Myers 126f). Then in a telegram on March 10, Myers went further: "Am convinced our interests both military effort shortly as well as eventual political interests [of] Greece to resort if necessary to sternest measures forthwith. On further consideration do not think our military programme will be materially affected even if we have to break of all repeat all relations with ELAS. But must be done now or never. In this latter case Zervas must be given ME and HMG full backing and publicity forthwith to ensure success" (SOE rec. 267). In his book, however, Myers omits the paragraph about the consequences for the military effort (126). And the next day, March 11, he sent a further telegram which he does not mention in his book at all. Nor does Woodhouse, for a central passage reads: "Consider Zervas strong enough to beat both EAM and the Italians,

⁸²Edmonds, 177.

⁸³See also Woodhouse, *Apple*, 137ff. The whole chapter reads as a defense of BLO policy. Still, in his 1981 Retrospect, Hammond defends BLO policy in the same way. During the war especially Myers was already under heavy fire, but it is not certain that he knew about such criticism until the Foreign Office archives were opened. Churchill in a minute of February 24, 1944, held Myers to be "the chief man who reared the cockatrice brute of E.A.M."; cf. Clogg, *Brit. Pol.*, 180.

⁸⁴The telegrams quoted in the following are from the collection at King's College, London. Woodhouse's paper is in *Greece in the 1940s*, 81ff.

but he will not declare open conflict [with] former without your full backing" (SOE rec. 275). It is clear why Myers omits this telegram, for in his book (p. 126) he said that a conflict would have destroyed military plans of the resistance, and Myers and Woodhouse have always denied, for obvious reasons, that Zervas could have fought both ELAS and the Italians successfully. In 1973, Woodhouse said that Zervas "claimed that if he had sufficient support from the British he could not only survive, but destroy ELAS. But in the judgment of Myers and myself, he certainly could not have succeeded."⁸⁵ In 1978, he referred to the question, saying that it had once been thought that there was a possibility of eliminating ELAS, but he only mentions the March 8 telegram and omits any reference to the much more telling March 11 one.⁸⁶ Myers conceals in his book that he once thought that Zervas was strong enough to wipe out ELAS and fight the Italians, and that the civil war would not affect military plans. The reason why Myers is reticent is of course not only that he changed his opinion.⁸⁷ In 1955, he would have laid himself open to the charge that he and Woodhouse could have eliminated ELAS at an early stage. (Cf. the insistence that Woodhouse shows in *Apple of Discord* that Britain had no options but to come to terms with EAM.) It is interesting that in his memorandum, "Our Attitude to EAM: Post Mortem" from December 1943, Myers held the British authorities responsible for not having "resorted to sternest measures forthwith."

This amalgam of retrospective postwar views and personal apology is also very marked in Hammond's book. The problem here is much more difficult. The basic part of the book is purported to have been written in 1944-1945, to which Hammond in 1981 added Introduction, Retrospect, and Appendices. However, in many places in the memoirs he refers to events much later than the writing down of the text.⁸⁸ What is worse, I think that there are unmistakable traces of his 1981 view of events in the memoirs. To illustrate the difficulties I will take a closer look at a central passage. It must be held in mind that in his 1981 retrospect Hammond ascribes to a dogmatic Cold War assessment. The KKE seized the opportunity during the occupation to gain power. The KKE leaders, Siantos in particular, had been trained in Moscow for the purpose of converting Greece to a Stalinist form of communism, as was the case with Tito and Hoxha. I have some difficulty in believing that this could be the perspective of a BLO officer writing in 1944.

At the beginning of his memoirs, Hammond explains why he was interested in finding out who controlled EAM/ELAS. In the course of his argument, he refers to Churchill's "The Second World War," a work that appeared between 1948 and 1952 (p. 26):

⁸⁵*Brit. Pol.*, 119.

⁸⁶*Greece in the 1940s*, 100.

⁸⁷Zervas continued to believe that he also later could have finished with EAM/ELAS, cf. Wallace, BR 119.

⁸⁸For instance, the story of Nikos Beis (Hammond, 147) most probably comes from Woodhouse's *Apple*, 58.

The days when the Russian system of Communism had been regarded as a paradise of egalitarian liberty had passed long since and the majority of us shared the view which was expressed by Churchill in his *Second World War* II 117: "Hitler and Stalin had much in common as totalitarians, and their systems of government were akin." In short ELAS could not serve two masters. If its loyalty was to Russia, the sooner we became aware of it the better.

Hammond is anxious to argue why he went against his strictly military orders—the political questions were Sheppard's job—but his arguments simply cannot be of 1944-1945 vintage: They are much later, and I do not think the quote from Churchill is an isolated addition. In Stevens's report, there is much about communists and their unhealthy influence, but not a word about the Soviet Union or foreign political implications.

The same Cold War perspective is also to be seen in Hammond's arguments about Siantos, Tito, and Hoxha having been educated in Moscow for subversive purposes and his insistence on concerted action by the Yugoslav, Albanian, and Greek communist parties to create an independent Macedonian state, which goal Hammond claims to be in complete line with Soviet policy (pp. 50, 74, and 108). All this looks much more like a post-1950 concoction. The reason for this becomes clear when Hammond in his retrospect says that "the first proof of the coordination of the communist parties of Albania, Greece and Yugoslavia and of their armed forces was sent by me to SOE Cairo in May 1943." Hammond does not say what this proof was in his memoirs except the story about Yugoslav partisans appearing near Florina (p. 74). But Hammond clearly feels like a Cassandra whose warning were not heeded. Instead of following his hard line toward EAM/ELAS, his superior, Brigadier Barker-Benfield, thought that Hammond and Woodhouse were responsible for the deadlock in the relations with EAM/ELAS. Hammond was more or less forced to resign, and his bitterness comes very much into the open in his account of Barker-Benfield's visit to Greece in August 1944. Hammond in retrospect thinks that the British authorities ought to have known from his reports that there was danger in the air (p. 186), and his final sentences in the memoirs—clearly a later addition—show what he tried to warn against: "The coup d'état [the December events] came within an inch of a success which Yugoslavia and Albania would then have been eager to support. The bloodshed and the suffering which ensued for several years fell once again upon the unfortunate villagers in the mountains of Northern Greece."

As we can see from Wallace's full report on Hammond's views in July 1944, there is no doubt that Hammond was obsessed with the idea that ELAS would take power in Athens and Thessaloniki in order to eliminate its political opponents. However, the Balkan conspiracy theory is nowhere mentioned, nor any complications with the Soviet Union. I conclude that this theory is a postwar idea invoked to support Hammond's

point that the danger should and could have been averted. Since these arguments pervade his book, it is almost impossible—in view of his frequent factual errors—to use it as a historical source, although he will save the facts from the veneer of partisan writing in the Foreword. For a book written by a professional scholar and historian, this is somewhat disappointing.⁸⁹

There is no need to go into Jordan's reliability as regards partisan views, apology, or retrospective accounts. It should be mentioned, however, that anyone interested in studying how effectively history can be falsified may take a closer look at Jordan's Chapter 10 for a sample.

Finally, I should like to present a case where we have to choose between two different accounts. Both Myers and Edmonds describe in detail the meeting with Aris after the disbanding of Psarros.⁹⁰ In Edmonds, the conversion ends in this way:

Well, until the matter is settled to my satisfaction, all supplies to you will be stopped, said the Brigadier. That is very unfair, stormed Aris, becoming florid and indignant—but without making any attempt to explain why it was unfair.

When we turn to Myers, we find that he threatens Aris with no supplies as long as he keeps Psarros's weapons, but Aris then answers: "That is your business, he replied, I am carrying out my orders. You must carry out your own." We have already had occasion to see that Myers has a tendency to be more fair and objective toward EAM/ELAS. The brave stand Aris takes in Myers's account could be the pure truth, but it could also be Myers's attempt to refrain from personal comments such as we find in Edmonds. This will not explain everything, but since Myers can be proven to be more than fair to Aris and ELAS in comparison with his colleagues, one might be tempted to believe Edmonds. I do, however, think that Myers, in spite of his tendency, is nearer the truth here, for there is also proof of open distortion in Edmonds. In the account of the meeting between Tzimas, Myers, and Edmonds, when Myers presented the draft of the National Bands agreement, Myers points out that Tzimas expressed his personal agreement—apart from the envisaged role of the

⁸⁹I have given some examples of his confusion and partisan views in 'Επισημοτική σκέψη, 18, 1984. At the time of writing that paper, I had not been able to solve the mystery concerning an officer called Yanni Lamiotis mentioned by Hammond (53), who seemed to be the same man referred to a few pages earlier (p. 42) as Yannakis. It now seems to be certain that the officer in question is Stelios Katsoyannis, on whom, see Kikitsas, 179. There are still a good many problems of this sort in Hammond. For instance, who is the man called Demos (p. 31) who was a brother of one of Hammond's friends in Yannina and purported to be EAM secretary in Thessaly? The Rogas mentioned on p. 145 is of course Vasilis Rotas; this error is also in Woodhouse, *Apple*, 67—where it probably came from. And so on.

⁹⁰Myers, 173; Edmonds, 96.

BLOs—but that he had to take it to Athens for discussion. In Edmonds, Tzimas is said to have also given the approval of EAM to the draft. The reason is that Edmonds later intends to arm an EDES band with reference to EAM's agreement. We know here that Myers is correct.⁹¹

The difficulties in Myers can also be illustrated from his different accounts of the Gorgopotamos operation—this time the other way round, for an evident reason. In Appendix V (C) to the *SOE Activities* report, Myers has given a somewhat different appraisal of the roles of Zervas and Aris than in his published book version. Three points should be mentioned. First, Myers here gives credit to Aris's insistence that the operation should start at 11 P.M., while Zervas wanted to begin at 10 P.M., which would have made it impossible to get the troops into position. Second, Myers emphasized that "During the action Aris was far the cooler of the two. Zervas became frightfully depressed when things went wrong, in typical Greek Army fashion. Aris remained much less ruffled." Third, Myers is quite clear on the point that ELAS fought better than Zervas's men; their discipline was better. The first of these points is mentioned in a more noncommittal way in the book, but the other two are not. In his book, Myers has tried to cover Zervas. In any case, Myers's description makes nonsense of Woodhouse's later remark that Zervas was "the victor of the Gorgopotamos operation."⁹² Even from Myers's book, it appears that Woodhouse had to keep Zervas from ordering retreat before the operation was finished (p. 77).

Conclusion

I hope to have shown the basic dangers in the BLO material, and also how they can be obviated by analysis. It is obvious that I have only touched the surface, not only of the reliability of the material, but also of the broader effects of the distorting factors. Further, it should be pointed out that there are interesting dimensions not touched upon here. What were the effects, if any, of the distortions for formulation of British policy and decisions? But it should also be said here that the view of EAM/ELAS given in the BLO material has been accepted to a great extent by public opinion, not least of all in Greece, where the evidence of the British officers against EAM/ELAS has been used for political reasons. This evidence has been a valuable help for the post-Civil War governments until October 1981 in their falsification of Greek history. Now, we can hope to put events in their proper perspective.

⁹¹Myers, 146f; Edmonds, 81ff.

⁹²*Brit. Pol.*, 118; *Struggle*, 49.

The Resistance in Evros

by ANGELIKI E. LAIOU

This short paper discusses certain aspects of the resistance movement in the region of Evros, in the period 1943-1944.¹ The Resistance in this area, and in other peripheral regions of Greece, has not yet been the object of detailed study.² Yet such a study would be interesting, not only because of the special significance of the area, which is strategically important since it borders on both Bulgaria and Turkey, but for other reasons as well. First, because the very location of Evros gave added complexity and weight to the role of foreign powers, including the British, the Americans, the Turks, and the Bulgarians. Secondly, the Resistance here developed in a specific way. During the Occupation, the Evros region was cut off from the rest of Greece, since communication had to take place either by sea or through Bulgarian-occupied Thrace and eastern Macedonia—a very dangerous route. As a result, the resistance movement remained isolated from the central leadership until February 1944; it may, therefore, be seen as a spontaneous movement, which retained its spontaneous aspect longer than did those of more central parts of Greece. A third distinguishing trait is that, whereas in the rest of Greece the resistance movement came into contact with the Allies mostly through the British, in Evros it was the American mission that was particularly evident and dynamic. All of these characteristics make the case of Evros an interesting one. In any case, it is my view that the history of the Resistance must be studied through an examination of local movements, which will show both general trends and specificities, and will thus give us a deeper and more complete picture of the movement than is possible through general studies alone.

¹This is substantially a translation of a paper read at a conference which took place in Athens, in April 1984. A much longer version of this paper, treating important topics which have not been touched here, will be published in a volume edited by H. Fleischer.

²References to the Resistance in Evros may be found in general studies. See A. Kédros, *La résistance grecque (1940-1944)*, Paris, 1966, 361-365; and C. M. Woodhouse, *Apple of Discord*, 90-92, 207 ff. There are also very useful memoirs and reports by Participants in the Resistance. See K. Konstantaras, "Τὸ ἀντάρτικο στὸν Ἑβρο," and "Τὸ ἀντάρτικο στὴ Βόρεια Ἑλλάδα," in Ἀρχεῖον Ἐθνικῆς Ἀντιστάσεως. See also Vangelis Kasapis (Kritonas), *Στὸν κόρφο τῆς Γκόμπρενας (χρονικὸ τῆς ἐθνικῆς ἀντίστασης στὸν Ἑβρο)*, 2 vols., Athens, 1977. I thank John O. Iatrides, who was kind enough to send me this book.

This study does not cover the entire story of the resistance in Evros. My purpose is to examine a few critical topics, using as my main source the reports of the Greek-American officer, Alekos Georgiadis. A few words about the source are therefore in order. Alekos Georgiadis was one of the relatively numerous Greek-Americans who arrived in Greece in 1943-1944 with the task of collecting information and organizing sabotage activities as part of operation "Noah's Ark," which began in April 1943.³ He arrived in Adrianople on August 4, 1943, and his initial orders were to gather military information from German-occupied Evros, from Bulgarian-occupied Thrace and eastern Macedonia, and, if possible, from Bulgaria itself.⁴ He was also to lay the groundwork for an operation (named Peoria II) which the American secret services (OSS) had been studying since September 1943, involving the demolition of the railroad bridges of Dikaia and Loutro (near Adrianople and Svilengrad), and which was carried out in late May 1944 by James Kellis, a group of saboteurs, and a large number of guerrillas.

It was obvious to Georgiadis that the success of his mission depended on close cooperation with the guerrillas active in the area. He had some problems in establishing contact with them, but eventually he was able to overcome the difficulties and to cooperate closely with them throughout the period in question despite some sporadic interruptions. He was soon persuaded that his task included the provisioning of the guerrillas in food and arms, a position which brought him into conflict both with the British agents and with the consulate of the Greek government-in-exile, which was established in Adrianople. His contacts with the guerrillas eventually led to his involvement in the internal affairs of the local armed bands, which subsequently became the Eighty-First Brigade of ELAS.

As my main source, I have taken Georgiadis's reports and letters to his superiors. These are supplemented by letters he wrote later to Pavlos Soulis, a resistance fighter from Evros, who was, at the time, a political exile, and by letters to John Iatrides, and by his responses to Iatrides's questionnaire.⁵ As a source, Georgiadis's reports leave much to be desired, partly because they are not always consistent and partly because of the truncated form in which OSS material is made available. However, they have the great advantage of being contemporary with the events they describe and therefore of not being influenced by the subsequent dramatic turns of Greek history, which necessarily color the memoirs written by

³On these matters, see Anthony Cave Brown, *The Last Hero: Wild Bill Donovan*, New York, 1982, 426ff, 349ff; cf. *idem*, *The Secret War Report of the OSS*, New York, 1976, 256-270. Notes will here be kept to a minimum. Full documentation may be found in the longer version of this article, entitled "Andartes and Allied Missions in German-Occupied Europe: The Testimony of Alekos Georgiadis."

⁴See Georgiadis's letter to Rodney Young, 8.10.43, and 29.5.44, and his final report (30.10.45).

⁵I am grateful to John Iatrides for having placed these documents at my disposal.

participants after the events. They provide valuable information both with regard to internal developments in the Evros region and with regard to the policies of the Greek government-in-exile, and the British and American secret services. It goes without saying that, wherever possible, I have tried to check his information with other sources.

Economic and Social Conditions in Evros

The German-occupied Evros region was inhabited by a primarily agrarian population. During the Occupation, the population had to face the added economic burden of provisioning (a) the occupation forces, which were small but had disproportionately high demands, (b) the resistance fighters who at first were few, numbering about 200, but later increased significantly in number, and (c) the refugees from Bulgarian-occupied territories, numbering about 10,000 people. The guerrilla fighters made repeated requests to the Allies for food for the population, and especially for the refugees, a fact which argues either that agricultural production had declined or, at least, that it did not suffice. Just after liberation, the ELAS of the Evros region wrote to Middle East Headquarters about the exploitation of the rural population by the occupation forces.⁶ They also stated that the Germans had destroyed whatever they could before retreating and that, at that time, the population was in immediate need of food, milk, and medical supplies.

The population, bereft of medical supplies and doctors, suffered from various diseases. A smallpox epidemic is mentioned in Orestias and Didymoteichon; the Germans vaccinated part of the population, but only after 450 deaths had occurred.⁷ Malaria had been endemic before the war, but became an epidemic because of lack of quinine. According to one report, there were 800 deaths a year due to malaria during the Occupation, deaths which would have been prevented if quinine had been available.

In these circumstances, the resistance movement took measures similar to those which were developed in other parts of Greece. The local EAM organization and the guerrillas organized an alternative system of distribution of goods. To the inevitable black market, they opposed a system in which prices of essential goods were determined by political action. According to Georgiadis, who claims to be an eyewitness, in December 1943, the EAM organization had posted a price list on the doors and walls of various shops. Black marketeers were faced with a death sentence, and many had in fact already been executed. Later, he reported that the population reacted very positively to these measures; indeed, according to him, the population's support for the guerrillas was to some degree the result of these measures.

⁶Letter dated Sept. 6, 1944, in Georgiadis file.

⁷Report dated 25.5.44; cf. telegram dated 8 $\frac{1}{2}$.9.43.

Of course, the creation of a controlled market, and the effort to impose it through political action, was not a phenomenon exclusive to the Evros region. On the contrary, this was one of EAM's basic economic measures throughout Greece.⁸ The specific case of Evros is of interest primarily because of the fact that the local organization was cut off from the central leadership of EAM and of the Communist Party; the only connection was the written materials which local EAM leaders were able to get in Kavala. Therefore, the behavior of the guerrillas in economic matters must be attributed not to specific orders which they received from the national leadership, but rather to their own interpretation and application of the general EAM directives concerning the physical survival of the people. It is also interesting that these directives were put into practice by Odysseas, the leader of the *andartes*, a man who was clearly very capable, but also very much of a hard-liner. However, his economic policy was continued after his execution; indeed, it seems to have progressed to a more advanced stage, which involved an alternative method of the organization of production. This last piece of information comes from a later period, and its credibility is perhaps less compelling than that of contemporary sources.⁹ It is also interesting to note that these economic measures provoked the negative reaction of the Greek consulate at Adrianople, which reported the matter to Cairo. It is evident that all interested parties were aware of the political impact these economic measures were having.

As for provisioning Evros from the outside, it was relatively easy to transport food and medical supplies from Turkish Thrace. Both the Resistance and Georgiadis sent frequent requests to the consulate of Adrianople for food, especially for the refugees. However, the attitude of the consulate was negative from beginning to end. In this respect, there is no reason to suspect the trustworthiness of our sources. They are confirmed by the report of a Greek agent, recruited by Georgiadis, who had a less friendly attitude toward the *andartes*. He says that in the beginning of 1944, a large number of woman and children from Feres tried to escape from the Germans and found refuge in the mountains. When he asked the consulate for food for them, he received a negative reply, whose tenor was that the consul had no desire to help the "Communist *andartes*."

In conclusion, we find that in this area the population was in poor economic straits. The official Greek government and the British were indifferent to this condition. The *andartes* organized a system of price controls, and therefore of redistribution of essential goods. This, however, could not be an adequate solution, since the productive capacity of the region had been reduced, and since part of the production was appro-

⁸On this, see S. B. Thomadakis, "Black Markets, Inflation, and Force in the Economy of Occupied Greece," in J. O. Iatrides, ed., *Greece in the 1940's: A Nation in Crisis*, Hanover and London, 1981, 61-80.

⁹Kasapis, *op. cit.*, II, 170ff.

riated by the German occupation forces. It should be noted that the information contained in the Georgiadis file on economic matters is the only such information we have for this region.

Political Forces and Developments

The most useful information of the Georgiadis file on political developments concerns two major topics. The first is the internal processes which resulted in a violent change of leadership in the local EAM and the guerrillas, in early 1944, after they had reestablished connections with the central leadership.¹⁰ This is a most interesting development which, however, will not be discussed here except very briefly and in connection with the second topic, that is, the relations between the resistance organizations, the English and American secret services, and the representatives of the Cairo government. For this second topic, Georgiadis is a very good source, for he was giving first-hand information to people who already had a broad knowledge of the matters involved. The information he provides creates a picture which has internal coherence and consistency, and which is confirmed by other sources.

As soon as he arrived in Adrianople, Georgiadis tried to establish contact with the *andartes* of Evros. The only *andarte* organization was a group of about 200 men (strength in the fall of 1943) under EAM leaders. There were, at that point, no right-wing armed groups. However, shortly before Georgiadis's arrival, the British and the Greek consulate at Adrianople organized an "allied" network, ostensibly for gathering information. Its head was a Major Dipson, with headquarters at Istanbul. According to both Georgiadis and Kriton, who was one of the major leaders of the resistance in Evros, the real purpose of the network was to set up anti-EAM organizations and armed groups where none had existed, with the ultimate aim of "counteracting and destroying" the EAM group and its armed section. In mid-July 1943, one of the members of this network was captured by the Germans, and the group started slowly to disintegrate. During the summer of 1943, the *andartes* themselves began a series of small-scale operations against the British-organized group. About 25 persons were arrested; among them was a Major Stathatos, a man of democratic leanings who had become entangled in the network without realizing its ultimate purpose. He was condemned to death by the *andartes*, but was subsequently freed, and contributed successfully to the political work of the local EAM. Odysseas, the leader of the *andartes*, wrote, on September 10, 1943, that some of the people working for the Greek consulate had been betraying the *andartes* to the Germans, and had been executed.

When Georgiadis first arrived in Evros, he did not know the details

¹⁰For a full discussion of this complex and difficult affair, see Laiou, "Andartes and Allied Missions."

concerning the British-Greek network, and tried to cooperate with its remnants. He found some difficulties in this; he soon also became aware of the fact that people at the consulate were trying to impede his contact with the *andartes* because they considered its leadership communist. He had problems both with the consulate and with the British throughout his stay in northern Greece. He finally established contact with the *andartes* in late September. He assured them that his only mission was to collect military information, and that he would not engage in political activities. He also tried to get food, medical supplies, a radio, and printing supplies from Cairo. By the end of October, and through his contact with the *andartes*, he was in a position to send to Cairo information from the Evros region and from the Bulgarian-occupied territories.

On October 28, 1943, Georgiadis's superior, Rodney Young, informed him of the future arrival of James Kellis, in charge of operation Peoria II. The success of Kellis's mission depended absolutely on the cooperation of the *andartes*. However, in late 1943, a serious crisis erupted within the EAM and *andarte* groups in the area. The immediate cause may have been a new effort for the creation of anti-EAM armed groups, an effort in which one of Georgiadis's agents was, perhaps, involved. In any case, the leader of the *andartes*, a communist who had lost all contact with the leadership since the war, launched an attack against persons whom he considered suspicious; his slogan was "death to the Anglophiles." The crisis which ensued will not be discussed here. In the end, in early February 1944, contact with EAM leadership was established, and Odysseas was replaced by Athinodoros Katsaounidis. Odysseas was tried by an *andarte* court and was executed. A few days after the trial, Georgiadis went to the *andarte* headquarters, in Leukimi, and began negotiations with the new leadership. He was to claim later that he had played a primary role in the change of leadership, but in all likelihood his contribution was less decisive than he suggested.¹¹

In its negotiations with Georgiadis and Kellis, the new *andarte* leadership stated that it was eager to cooperate with all democratic Greeks, not just with the leftists, and that it desired closer relations with Middle East Headquarters. The Georgiadis file includes a questionnaire which he gave to the new leadership and the answers he received (March 10, 1944).¹² Athinodoros and the others said that they would "welcome anyone who is willing to cooperate with us in the struggle against the common enemies," except for fascists and informers. They stressed that they considered themselves to be part of the Allied struggle, and demanded direct contact with HQ in Cairo. They requested help in terms of money and arms for equipping the 500 *andartes* then active. At that time, Georgiadis and the *andartes* signed an agreement, according to which the *andartes* became

¹¹The main sources are three reports by Georgiadis, dated 1.3.44, 10.1.44 (the date is wrong; it must be corrected to late March), 10.3.44, and his final report. Two of these reports are published in the Appendix to Laiou, "Andartes and Allied Missions." See also Kasapis, *op. cit.*, II, 118-134.

¹²Published in the Appendix, Laiou, *ibid.*

part of the American army; they would receive orders from ME HQ, which would also provide them with arms. This agreement was not fully implemented; ME HQ was slow to recognize the reorganization of the resistance fighters as part of ELAS, and was very lax about sending arms and ammunition. On the other hand, Georgiadis, Kellis, and the Evros ELAS cooperated at the local level, and were able to carry out the demolition of the two Evros bridges. The Greek consulate at Adrianople remained hostile. It considered Georgiadis's presence to be inflammatory, in the sense that it made the *andartes* "wild"; he was also accused of encouraging the resistance to cooperate with the Bulgarians.¹³ Apparently, the consulate considered his work to be against the national interest, arguing that the Greek people received the false impression that the Greek consular authorities were cooperating with the communists.

The information provided by the Georgiadis file helps to clarify the political conditions prevailing in the period and influencing the actions of individuals and groups. It suggests that the representative of the Greek government-in-exile as well as the British behaved in a negative fashion, having as their first priority not a contribution to the war effort, but rather an active opposition to EAM-ELAS. In the last analysis, their actions were contributing to the development of conditions of civil war, precisely at the time when negotiations were taking place in Lebanon. Georgiadis was absolutely convinced that this was the case, and said so both in his reports from the field and in his later statements.¹⁴

It is also interesting to note Georgiadis's attitude toward the events he witnessed, or in which he participated. While his mission had a military purpose, it quickly acquired a political aspect, under the pressure of circumstances. He himself developed great respect for the *andartes*, and it is significant that this remained unshaken even after the dramatic leadership crisis of early 1944. In his later writings, he stated that he considered EAM-ELAS to have been the most important resistance movement in Europe, both in terms of organizing the life of the population and in terms of anti-German activities and operations.

Georgiadis is exactly the type of Greek-American agent who C. M. Woodhouse has characterized as "innocent channels of KKE propaganda," because they differentiated their position from that of the British. Georgiadis's own view of the British generally and Woodhouse specifically was less patronizing and more severe: he considered them responsible for the political misfortunes that followed the war in Greece. In his own words, "the root of most of the trouble in Greece was the British and their allies among the Greek political leaders."¹⁵ His opinion carries weight, for it was formed out of his personal experiences in Evros during the last war years, and in Athens in December 1944.

¹³For a discussion of the relations between Georgiadis, the *andartes* and Bulgarian resistance groups, see Laiou, "Andartes and Allied Missions."

¹⁴Response to John O. Iatrides's questionnaire, July 1973.

¹⁵Woodhouse, *Apple of Discord*, 102-105; Georgiadis, response to Iatrides's questionnaire.

Germany, Bulgaria, Greece: Their Relations and Bulgarian Policy In Occupied Greece

by HANS-JOACHIM HOPPE

Introduction

This presentation will deal mainly with the Bulgarian occupation policy toward Greece, but at first, a short survey will be given about the relations between Germany, Bulgaria, and Greece, as the very harsh occupation policy of Bulgaria, which stood in contrast to its cautious foreign and internal policy, cannot be understood without reflecting the mutual relationship between the three countries. The rapprochement between Germany and Bulgaria¹ in the late thirties culminated in the Bulgarian entry in the Tripartite Pact on March 1, 1941, and the transit of German troops through Bulgaria for the campaign against Greece. The Bulgarian readiness was rewarded by territorial promises at the expense of Greece. German-Bulgarian relations have to be seen in the context of the German-Greek relationship:² the inclusion of both Bulgaria and Greece in the national-socialist concept of Southeastern Europe and Hitler's decision to support the unsuccessful Italian troops and expel the British from Greek territory to secure it for the Axis hemisphere.

The Bulgarian-Greek relationship,³ with its short periods of friendship and longer ones of hostility, also has to be considered. As a result of the events of the Second Balkan War and the First World War, Greek-Bulgarian relations were determined by Bulgaria's wish to regain its lost territories. It was a tragedy for the fate of Southeastern Europe that the two countries did not succeed in reaching an understanding because of the lack of readiness to compromise on both sides. The un-

¹On German-Bulgarian relations, see Hans-Joachim Hoppe, *Bulgarien-Hitlers eigenwilliger Verbündeter*, Stuttgart, 1979, and Marshall Lee Miller, *Bulgaria During the Second World War*, Stanford University Press, 1975.

²Ehregard Schramm von Thadden, *Griechenland und die Grossmächte im Zweiten Weltkrieg*, Wiesbaden, 1955.

³See Gunnar Henning's essay about Greek policy from 1923 to 1974 published in Theodor Schieder (ed.), *Handbuch der europäischen Geschichte*, vol. 7, Stuttgart, 1979, pp. 1313-1338.

bridgeable contrasts between the two countries facilitated the influence of the Axis in the Balkan region. The Bulgarian policy in the Occupied-Aegean-Macedonia-Thrace zone will be shown in the context of the German policy in this area. Special consideration will be given to the anti-Jewish measures in the occupied territories.

The Relations Between Germany, Bulgaria, and Greece

Greece and Bulgaria were included in the mid-thirties in Germany's "informal empire" in Southeast Europe.⁴ By growing economic penetration, Germany by 1939 occupied first place in the trade of all Balkan states. The German share in trade with Bulgaria was by far the highest—67.8% of exports, 65.5% of imports—while that with Greece was the lowest—29.9% of exports, 31.9% of imports.⁵ Increasing German power in Central Europe also effected more or less, a political orientation of the Balkan states toward Germany, which was combined from the Munich Agreement onward, in the case of Bulgaria (and Hungary), with the hope of territorial revision, and in the case of the First World War winners such as Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Greece, with anxiety about maintaining their possessions. To secure its economic and political interests in that region, however, Germany urged the opposing states into a *modus vivendi* between winners and losers on the basis of the status quo. Whereas Bulgaria pursued a cautious policy of neutrality (with a pro-German accent) and of peaceful revision (recalling the unlucky event of the First World War), Greece was driven by tensions with Bulgaria—and even more with Italy, which controlled the Greek border through its satellite, Albania—to its traditional orientation to Great Britain. One cause of tension between Bulgaria and Greece was the unsolved Thracian Question: with the Treaty of Neuilly (1919) and Lausanne (1923), Bulgaria had lost its access to the Aegean Sea. Although both countries agreed upon a voluntary exchange of population in Thrace and Macedonia, Greek authorities exerted pressure to diminish the proportion of Slavs in this region, and they settled Greek refugees from Asia Minor there. Nevertheless, Sofia demanded some outlet to the Aegean Sea, but Athens was only willing to concede a trade deposit. Bulgaria refused this in order not to jeopardize its future claims. A war with Bulgaria was almost caused by General Theodoros Pangalos, who, after a serious border incident in October 1925, ordered Greek troops to invade the Bulgarian border district and to bombard

⁴See Hans-Joachim Hoppe, "Die Balkanstaaten Rumänien, Jugoslawien, Bulgarien: Nationale Gegensätze und NS-Grossraumpolitik," in: Erhard Forndran et al (ed.), *Innen-und Aussenpolitik unter nation sozialistischer Bedrohung*, Opladen, 1977, pp. 161-175.

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 161.

the town of Petrich.⁶ Because of the unsolved question of revision, Bulgaria did not join a Balkan Entente, but remained isolated when, in February 1934, Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia, and Rumania concluded the Balkan Pact, which aimed directly against Bulgarian revisionist claims. But even in the following years, Bulgaria did not imitate Hitler's policy of unilateral and arbitrary revision, wanting instead to avoid risks and waiting for a favorable situation to realize its demands. Very late at the end of July 1938, Prime Minister Metaxas and his Bulgarian colleague Kioseivanov signed an agreement in Salonika, which freed Bulgaria from armament restrictions and allowed Bulgarian troops to enter the hitherto demilitarized southern border districts. Kioseivanov and Metaxas, in the name of the Balkan Pact members, confirmed their mutual wish to renounce violence.⁷

In June 1938, Bulgaria was called upon for the first time to incline more clearly to the Axis powers. King Boris refused. But the Munich decisions and the German and Hungarian successes in their territorial claims awakened in Bulgaria a wave of nationalism which the government could not neglect. In October 1938, there were talks with Belgrade about joint endeavors to obtain access to the Aegean Sea. In December, the Bulgarian envoy to Berlin explained the Bulgarian claims on Greece; the officials of the German foreign ministry were evasive, but nourished the Bulgarian wishes in the hope the country would enter into closer political connections with Germany. They wanted Bulgaria to take part in a contest for German favor between revisionist and anti-revisionist states in the Balkans. After the Italian occupation of Albania (April 7, 1939), Britain and France guaranteed their support to Rumania and Greece, but they failed to bring Bulgaria into an anti-Axis position. Considering, too, the Turkish change of policy toward Britain and France (declaration in May/June 1939), Hitler, for the first time (in July), supported Bulgarian aspirations toward the Aegean Sea, "that on one of the most important straits not only Turkey, but also a friendly country (to the Axis) maintains its influence."⁸

After the outbreak of the Second World War, the Bulgarian government emphasized its policy of nonalignment. In autumn 1940, it also turned down plans for a combined Italian-Bulgarian attack against Greece. And when Italy alone invaded Greece, Bulgaria facilitated Greek resistance by its own passivity. When Germany called on Bulgaria to enter the Tripartite Pact and make its territory available as a base for a German attack on Greece, the Bulgarian leadership succeeded in retarding the talks. At the same time, the Soviet Union, as a Balkan rival to Germany, tried to entice Bulgaria into concluding a pact of

⁶For details, see J. Barros, *The League of Nations and the Great Powers: The Greek-Bulgarian Incident, 1925, 1970.*

⁷See Georgi Markov, *Bulgaro-germanskite otnosebii 1931-1939*, Sofia, 1984, p. 169.

⁸Hoppe, *Bulgarien*, p. 65.

mutual assistance by offering the whole of western and eastern Thrace at the expense of both Turkey and Greece.⁹ Instead of this, in March 1941, Bulgaria joined the alliance with Germany for territorial promises. It took this step, as the action seemed to be inevitable.¹⁰

German and Bulgarian Decisions on Thrace and Macedonia

At the solemn ceremony of joining the Pact in the Belvedere Palace in Vienna, the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ribbentrop, confirmed in a special note "that Bulgaria shall obtain by a new regulation of borders in the Balkans an access to the Aegean Sea approximately from the mouth of the Struma in the West to the mouth of the Maritsa in the East."¹¹ On April 6, 1941, German troops simultaneously invaded Yugoslavia and Greece. Even during the campaign, the Bulgarians pressed for realization of the territorial promises to them. On April 17, Berlin allowed them to occupy Greek Thrace and Serbian Macedonia. But the final border regulations were not to be made before the conclusion of a peace treaty. On April 24, the Bulgarians occupied Thrace, except for a small corner at the Turkish border, the region of Salonika—which remained under German occupation—and a small part of western Thrace, which was given to the Italians.

Although Bulgaria annexed the "new territories" on May 14, 1941, by a formal act, which Berlin tolerated, the regulations remained provisional. Thus it was to the Bulgarians to secure possession of the new regions by creating harsh facts. But actually, they only had full sovereignty in the region by virtue of Germany, which showed the remaining German influence in economic, political, and military affairs. Thus the Bulgarians had to concede to Germany numerous mining and railway claims. The agreement, signed on April 24/27 by Carl Clodius and Bulgarian Foreign Minister Ivan Popov, stipulated, among other decisions:¹² "In the territory . . . occupied by Bulgaria, Germany can continue without restrictions the exploitation of industrial raw materials, above all minerals. This does not only concern the grants already made, but also projects which will be started now or later. . . ." Other points concerned the expenses for German military areas and the presence of German troops, questions of enemy property, and the recruitment of workers for Germany.

Not only the authority, but also the border regulations in occupied territories remained unsecured. So the Salonika district remained occupied by German troops temporarily for strategic reasons; in the long term, the Bulgarians could hope to obtain this region as well, when

⁹*Ibid.*, p. 104, see also ADAP, ser. D, vol. XI, doc. 403.

¹⁰Hoppe, *Bulgarien*, pp. 108-118.

¹¹See ADAP, ser. D, vol. XII, doc. 114.

¹²Hoppe, *Bulgarien*, p. 123. The text of the "Clodius Agreement" has been found in the Bundesarchiv Militärarchiv in Freiburg.

German troops were needed more urgently on other fronts. But officially Salonika's fate had not been determined, and rumors circulated that the town was to be returned to the Greeks as a reward for obedience. So the Germans effected discontent on both sides and a race between the competitors for favor. The area of Florina and Edessa, which was disputed between the Bulgarians and Italians, was temporarily incorporated into the Salonika zone; one reason was to put the strategically important road and railway line between Salonika and Bitolja under German control. To secure the supply transit Edirne-Salonika, and as a friendly gesture to Turkey, the Germans also retained the Edirne salient under their rule; but when the hitherto Greek section of the railway line was given to Turkish administration (in connection with the conclusion of the German-Turkish treaty of friendship on June 18, 1941), the Bulgarians regarded this act as prejudicial to a future border regulation.¹³ The German decisions about administrative borders in the South Balkans caused permanent conflicts between its partners and disquiet in the population of the occupied areas; the regulations in no way led to the necessary pacification of the Balkans or a reduction of German forces, which were needed urgently on the Eastern front.¹⁴

*The Bulgarian Occupation Policy in Thrace and Macedonia*¹⁵

In April 1941, the Bulgarians received from Greece an area of 14,430 square kilometers, with 590,000 inhabitants. The Bulgarian occupation in Aegean Thrace was considerably harsher than in Vardar Macedonia, where the population was largely Slavic. Whereas the Bulgarian policy was to win the loyalty of the Slav inhabitants, the policy in the Aegean littoral was to Bulgarize forcibly as many Greeks as possible and to expel or kill the rest. Bulgarian colonists were encouraged to settle on land expropriated from Greeks in the hope that a Bulgarian majority in the region would ensure permanent Bulgarian control.

During the first few months of the Aegean occupation, the Bulgarians made an effort to gain the support of the local inhabitants. They conducted an extensive propaganda campaign, established Bulgarian schools, and distributed food and milk to Greek children. It quickly became apparent, however, that this approach had little chance of success. The occupation authorities therefore resorted to more drastic measures. The Bulgarians closed Greek schools and expelled the teachers, replaced Greek clergymen with priests from Bulgaria, and sharply repressed the

¹³Hoppe, *op. cit.*, p. 123; see also Lothar Kreckler, *Deutschland und die Türkei im Zweiten Weltkrieg*, Frankfurt/M., 1964, pp. 149-151.

¹⁴See Klaus Olshausen, "Die deutsche Balkanpolitik 1940-1941," in: Manfred Funke (ed.), *Hitler, Deutschland und die Mächte*, Düsseldorf, 1976, pp. 707-727.

¹⁵See Hoppe, *Bulgarien*, pp. 124-127, and Miller, *Bulgaria*, pp. 122-130.

Greek language: even gravestones bearing Greek inscriptions were defaced. Bulgarian families were encouraged to settle in Thrace and Macedonia by government credits and incentives, including houses and land confiscated from the natives. The authorities also confiscated business property and gave it to Bulgarian colonists. In the town of Kavala, for example, over seven hundred shops and other enterprises were expropriated. Large numbers of Greeks were expelled, and others were deprived of the right to work by a license system that banned the practice of a trade or profession without the express permission of the occupation government.¹⁶

Even by a German report,¹⁷ the Bulgarian occupation has been described as "a regime of terror which can only be described as Balkan"—a regime with expulsions, displacement of refugees, social misery, and shortages of essential goods. But considering this harsh policy, one should not forget that to a large extent this continued the practice which was applied by the Greek government after 1919 to diminish the Slav population in the same former Bulgarian region.

The unclearness of the situation, the change of troops and occupiers, and the provisional character of borders caused the Bulgarian wish to create facts and incited the Greeks to resist the Bulgarian plans. The Greeks were also able to derive a profit from the controversies between German, Bulgarian, and Italian occupiers. The lack of clarity in the situation was realized by the Bulgarian King Boris during a tour of inspection of the occupied territories in spring 1941. He reported "that in some places, for example, in Dedeagach, there is a rather good cooperation between Bulgarian military authorities and Greek authorities and the population. In general among the German authorities there is to be seen ignorance about the future of Thrace and frequently the opinion that the Bulgarians have no right to be there; this view of course is supported by the Greeks."¹⁸

To avoid such dissension and to improve contacts with German forces, the Bulgarian government recommended the nomination of a mediator, whereas the German ambassador in Sofia, Richthofen, demanded the opening of a German consulate in Kavala, in order to secure the influence of the German foreign ministry and German economic interests in that region. Besides that, he advised:¹⁹

that the administration of the region, so long as German troops are in Thrace and we [the Germans] are able to exert an equalizing influence, will be passed over to Bulgarian hands gradually . . . a sudden transfer of the administration might have

¹⁶Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 127.

¹⁷Hoppe, *Bulgarien*, p. 126. The secret report about the situation in occupied Greece, dated October 5, 1941, has been found in the Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv.

¹⁸Hoppe, *op. cit.*, p. 125

¹⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 125/126.

serious difficulties as a consequence. As the [Bulgarian] Foreign Minister told me, even German generals had to admit, that still about 10,000 (ten thousand) infantry guns are hidden, also prisoners move freely, especially in the towns numbers of Greek officers are to be seen.

Because of such stocks of weapons, combined with the growing unrest of the population, the situation grew to be very "explosive." Already a few months after the Bulgarian takeover, hatred mounted in the population, manifesting itself in several terrorist acts and finally in insurrection. The revolt broke out in the city of Drama on the morning of September 28, 1941, and quickly spread throughout Greek Thrace and Macedonia. In Drama, a crowd attacked the city hall and killed four Bulgarian policemen; in Doxato, the entire Bulgarian police force of twenty men was massacred; in Choristi, armed Greeks seized the town and called on other towns to join them; and in many other villages there were clashes between Greeks and Bulgarian authorities. The rebellion was short-lived. On September 29, Bulgarian troops moved into Drama and the other rebellious cities and seized all men between the ages of 18 and 45. Over three thousand people were reportedly executed in Drama alone; in the countryside, entire villages were machine-gunned and looted. An estimated fifteen thousand Greeks were killed during the next few weeks.²⁰ About the same uprising, the Bulgarian prime minister, Filov, told the German ambassador, Adolf-Heinz Beckerle, the following on October 6:²¹

On September 28 the insurrection broke out. It had encroached on about 30 villages south, west and north of Drama. About 2,000 insurgents had taken part. The starting-point was the village of Doxato. There the police guard was attacked. The rebels were excellently armed. Besides guns they also possessed machine-guns. The policemen had barricaded themselves in the police office and contacted the police chief of Drama. He had come to help them with 12 other policemen. But this reinforcement could not effect anything, either, and had to retreat into the police building as well. During the night, after two policemen had been killed by shots of the rebels, the building was set on fire by them. The policemen then tried to escape. One group of them numbering 6 men was killed. Apparently the plan was, by means of the insurrection in the surrounding villages to withdraw the police and army forces from Drama. But this did not work. Drama was then virtually encircled by the insurgents and cut off from the outside world. For 48 hours no contact with there was possible. The rebels had also blown up a railway bridge near

²⁰Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 127.

²¹Hoppe, *op. cit.*, pp. 126/127.

Angista. The situation was cleared up by action of Bulgarian troops and air force. On the Bulgarian side the losses sustained were about 20-30 dead police and army personnel. After this the rebels retreated into the mountains of Bostagh. They took with them some deputy village mayors as hostages. During the attack of (our) groups the rebels were annihilated. The hostages succeeded in escaping. Since yesterday it has been relatively peaceful, apart from occasional raids. Important is, that it has evidently been a communist uprising. A large number of leaflets have been found which were apparently printed in Salonika and which clearly showed the communist tendency... A further important point is that the leaders of the insurgents had come over from the Greek area from Salonika... Also the rations they carried with them did not originate from Bulgaria. So biscuits of English origin were captured from them. The news lead to the conclusion that the rebel movement was only a first attempt, and that the rebels had expected and had been told that similar uprisings would be attempted in other parts of Bulgaria at the same time.

The German ambassador also presumed that the revolt had been plotted by the Anglo-American side and was connected with the simultaneous dropping of Soviet parachutist agents near the Bulgarian harbor of Burgas. Another version had it that the entire rebellion had been instigated by Bulgarian *agents provocateurs*. Whatever its origins, the revolt allowed the authorities to justify the subsequent atrocities by claiming "military necessity." The massacres precipitated a mass exodus of Greeks from the zone of Bulgarian control into the German-occupied region. Bulgarian "reprisals" continued after the September revolt, adding to the torrent of refugees. Villages were destroyed for sheltering "partisans," who were in fact only the survivors of villages previously destroyed. There were some Greek partisans in Macedonia, but they were of little significance.²²

The terror and famine became so severe in the region that the Athens government considered plans for evacuating the entire population of Aegean Macedonia to German-occupied Greece. The exodus of many Greeks and the settlement of Bulgarian families in "Belomorie" altered the ethnic composition of the region in favor of the Bulgarians. But the disturbances in the Aegean zone by no means suited the Germans because it seemed to require the intervention of German troops, which were more necessary in other war areas, and it disturbed relations with the Athens government and German economic interests (especially the production of tobacco) in that region.

New unrest was evoked by the Bulgarian citizenship law of June 10, 1942, which penalized those who did not take Bulgarian citizenship

²²Miller, p. 128.

with loss of property and expulsion.²³ The Greek politicians Louvaris and General Liotis protested against it in an aide-memoire directed to the German plenipotentiary for Greece, Günther Altenburg, in Athens on August 24, 1942.²⁴ The German ambassador several times applied to the Bulgarian government for changes in this law because of the severe consequences. The commander southeast and the plenipotentiary for Greece reported to the German High Command (OKW) their objections to the Bulgarian act. In their reports to OKW and the foreign ministry, they referred to the provisional nature of boundaries in the Greek regions and disputed the Bulgarian right to make such laws in their occupation zone. Apart from that, they thought that the Greeks should not be aroused; on the contrary, because of German defeats in North Africa, Greece ought to be kept quiet, perhaps by the prospect of revision of boundaries.

The German authorities often had to intervene in Bulgarian occupation policy because so many measures aggravated the German position in Greece. Thus it was not well-received when Bulgaria, desiring Salonika, Florina-Edessa, and western Macedonia, established propaganda centers to secure the allegiance of the approximately 80,000 Slavs in these regions. And the German government repeatedly had to urge Bulgaria to make an adequate contribution to supply Greece, which was threatened by increasing prices and famine.

But because of the critical development of the war, Germany needed more and more to rely on the Bulgarians to control the Balkan region. Thus it had to tolerate Bulgarian measures. The heavy losses on the Eastern front, the collapse of Italy, and the growing partisan movement in Yugoslavia, forced Germany in 1943 to thin out its forces in the southern Balkans. Germany had first requested Bulgarian participation in Balkan occupation duties in late 1942, but Bulgarian assistance now became a necessity. Hitler raised the problem at a meeting with King Boris in August 1943, urging the Bulgarians to occupy northeast Serbia and an additional section of Greek Macedonia. The king agreed in principle but postponed a decision pending "consultations," during which he vacillated between territorial avarice and the fear of further involvement in the war (especially in partisan-infested areas to which Bulgaria had little valid claim). His death left to his successors the task of expanding the Bulgarian occupation zone.

In the summer of 1943, the Germans ceded to the Bulgarians a new zone of occupation west of the river Struma. The Bulgarian occupation in Greece was further expanded in February 1944 by the addition of three additional provinces in western Macedonia. But it was an illusion to believe that the region would be pacified thus, because Bulgarian policy increased the hatred Greeks felt toward their occupiers. And the

²³*Ibid.*, p. 125.

²⁴Hoppe, *op. cit.*, p. 127.

Greeks blamed the Germans for inflicting the Bulgarians on them. Bitterness was also caused by the policy toward Thracian Jews.

The Policy Toward Jews in Bulgarian-Occupied Thrace and Macedonia

How much Bulgarian occupation policy differed from the otherwise moderate home policy of the government can be seen especially in its policy toward the Jews in the occupied territories.²⁵ In the summer of 1940, the Bulgarian government introduced measures against Jews, which proved unpopular with the Bulgarian population "because of its lack of understanding for racism." Under German pressure, the Bulgarian minister of internal affairs presented the Council of Ministers with a "Law for the Defense of the Nation" on October 7, 1940, which imposed several restrictions on Jews, but in contrast to German laws, it applied religious criteria rather than racial ones, which gave some Jews the chance to avoid prosecution by a quick conversion to Christianity. Parliament and the king were in no hurry to pass the unpopular law, the latter waiting with his signature until the end of January 1941, when Bulgaria's accession to the Tripartite Pact became inevitable. And even after this, the Bulgarian authorities were not zealous in applying it. In October 1941, there followed certain professional restrictions, which prohibited Jewish activities in trade and industry. These and other restrictions were extended to the Jews in the "new territories" from summer 1941 onward.

After the ill-famed "Wannsee Conference" of January 20, 1942, with its talk of "the final solution of the Jewish question," Bulgaria enacted sterner legislation against Jews, involving high taxation, the need to wear a Star of David, the dissolution of Jewish organizations, the evacuation of Jews from several towns to the country. On August 26, 1942, a "Commissariat for Jewish Affairs" (KEV) was set up in Sofia, with Alexander Belev as its head, which was to prepare "the transfer of Jews into the province or outside the Kingdom." On January 21, 1943, Theodor Dannecker, an SS-Hauptsturmführer and a colleague of Adolf Eichmann, came to Sofia for talks with Belev. On February 22, they concluded an agreement "for the deportation of the first 20,000 Jews from the new Bulgarian lands Thrace and Macedonia into the German eastern regions."²⁶ It seemed that the Jews of Macedonia and Thrace had to be sacrificed in favor of Bulgarian Jews.

The Bulgarian government succeeded in postponing the eventual

²⁵See Hoppe, *op. cit.*, pp. 93-96, 138-141; also the monographs of Wolf Oschlies, *Bulgarien—Land ohne Antisemitismus*, Erlangen, 1976, and Frederick B. Chary, *The Bulgarian Jews and the Final Solution, 1940-1944*, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1972.

²⁶Text of the Dannecker-Belev Agreement is published (in English translation) by Chary, *op. cit.*, p. 208-210.

deportation of Jews from Bulgaria by arguing that its "own" Jews were needed in Bulgaria for public works, especially for road construction. Jews were temporarily settled in the provinces and assembled in labor camps. But in the critical weeks of March 1943, because of massive opposition (by prominent persons, deputies, church representatives) and also later because of the German defeats, the Bulgarian government did not agree to the deportation of its own Jews to the extermination camps in Poland. In August 1944, Bulgaria was already preparing to change sides, contacting the Western allies. The commissariat for Jewish affairs was dissolved; the Jewish community obtained its old rights. Full rehabilitation was conferred by the "Patriotic Front" government in September. Thus nearly all 51,000 Bulgarian Jews survived the war.²⁷

A different fate was in store for the Jews in the occupied territories. The decree of June 1942, which prevented them from obtaining Bulgarian citizenship, had already led to the expectation of deportations, which in fact began in March 1943. Nearly at the same time, deportations began from Vardar-Macedonia and formerly Greek Thrace. On March 11, 1943, the Jews of Macedonia, most from Skopje, Bitola, and Shtip, were transported in goods trains to the Skopje camp and, at the end of March, in three trains from there to the Treblinka concentration camp in Poland. A total of 7,144 Jews were deported, and none of them returned.²⁸

The deportation of the Thracian Jews began on March 4, 1943,²⁹ even before Bulgarian deputies had drafted their protest. In all the cities of Eastern Thrace with major Jewish populations—Giunirudzhina, Dede Agach, Kavala, Drama, Xanthi, and Seres—the commissariat representatives proceeded in a similar manner: for the duration of the action, the police placed the cities under blockade and curfew, beginning sometime after midnight until seven or eight in the morning. Shortly before the action began at 4:00 a.m., policemen in groups of three received their instructions, including the lists of Jewish families to be assembled and the necessary equipment for sealing Jewish homes. The police informed the Jews that the government was sending them into the interior of Bulgaria and that they would return to their homes shortly. They were then marched through the main streets of the cities, their numbers swelling at each intersection until they reached their destinations—the tobacco warehouses which served as temporary camps. The Jews remained in the camps for one or two days, then they were sent to the major departure centers at Dupnitsa and Gorna Dzhumaia. The German general consulate in Kavala reported the following to the German embassy in Sofia:³⁰

²⁷Oschlies, *op. cit.*, Chary, *op. cit.*

²⁸Chary, pp. 122-125.

²⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 101-114, 117-122.

³⁰Oschlies, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

The evacuation of the Jews from the Belomorje-region has been . . . largely finished. Some of the Jews are on the way to the Gorna Dzhumaia assembly camp with their luggage, others have already arrived there and been interned. According to reports received so far, a total of about 4,500 Jews in the Belomorje district have been registered. As far as I could establish, their deportation is proceeding without particular difficulties or incidents. The only remarkable thing was the evident sympathy of the Greek population, which in Kavala and Drama, for example, offered the departing Jews presents and disgustingly hearty farewell ovations. As reported by reliable German sources, some Bulgarians, evidently communist influenced, have also taken part in this unpleasant spectacle in Drama. The Jews themselves are said to have taken the evacuation at least outwardly with indifference.

According to the reports of commissariat representatives, they accomplished the Thracian operation very efficiently.⁸¹ It did, in fact, proceed as planned, without any significant deviations. However, the official reports do not show the tragedies and hardships that occurred along the way. The Jews were evicted from their homes without adequate warning, placed in camps without sufficient food, water, toilet facilities, and medical services, and subjected to delousing operations and humiliating searches, which caused loss and damage to the little property the police allowed them to bring with them. The long journey in open cars through Thrace was difficult. Many fell ill, and a few died. Some women gave birth. Observers reported unbelievable misery: cries of fear and despair among the expellees, including the lame and sick, children, the aged, and pregnant women, as well as harsh and sometimes brutal treatment, both physical and psychological, by the guards and officials. On the other hand, occasionally an official pressed into service against his will, perhaps feeling the unfairness himself, treated the Jews decently.

At Demir-Hisar and Simitli, where the track gauge changed, the Jews had to transfer to different trains. The first stations on the Thracian Jews' journey to Poland were the departure centers in southwest Bulgaria—Gorna Dzhumaia and Dupnitsa. In all, over 2,500 Jews actually went to the former camp and fewer than 1,500 to the latter. Apparently only the Giurmiurdzhina and Xanthi Jews went to Dupnitsa and the entire remainder to Gorna Dzhumaia. At the departure centers, the authorities revised the story of resettlement in the interior of Bulgaria. Now they said rather that the government had made arrangements with the British to send the Jews to Palestine and that they were to leave the camps for ports on the Adriatic and Black Seas. But the Jews did not believe it.

Responsibility for the transfer of the Jews from the departure centers

⁸¹Chary, *op. cit.*, pp. 108-109.

to areas under German authority belonged primarily to the Bulgarian State Railway and the Commissariat (KEV). The transport of the Thracian Jews to the Danubian town of Lom required two trains. From Lom, the Jews traveled through Vienna to Katowicz in Poland under the responsibility of Dannecker. The Bulgarian police served as guards on the trains, not only through Bulgaria (in conjunction with the Germans) but also up to Katowicz. Guard groups on the trains consisted of a police chief, two senior officers, and forty ordinary officers. To accompany the barges in Lom, the Commissariat arranged for guard groups of fourteen to thirty-two—altogether eighty-six men.

On the March 18 train from Gorna Dzhumaia, there were actually 1,985 Jews; the trains on March 19 carried 692 Jews from Gorna Dzhumaia, 1,380 from Dupnitsa, and 158 from Pirof. The Thracian group leaving the departure centers, not considering those on the Pirof train, had 4,057 Jews. During their fortnight's journey from Thrace, some late arrivals and a few newborn children were added to the original group, but a number of them had already died. The trains arrived in Lom on March 19 and 20, after having stopped at Sofia for an hour and a half, and the barges left on March 20 and 21. Four ships left Lom, each had 875 to 1,100 passengers, and in all 4,219 Jews left. As arranged, a Bulgarian guard went along; and Bulgarian doctors traveled with the Jews as well (they left the convoy at Vienna). Although most of the security force was Bulgarian, German guards supervised the operation. The journey to Vienna lasted about five to ten days. From Vienna, the Jews traveled on to Katowicz and then Treblinka, where they were killed a few days later. Nevertheless, among the German authorities there remained an undercurrent of dissatisfaction, because the March deportations from the Bulgarian-occupied territories were only 56 percent successful: under 11,500 of a planned 20,000. And the 51,000 Jews still present in Bulgaria behind German lines disturbed the RSHA.³²

Final Remarks

The Bulgarian occupation authority was restricted in the new territories by the provisional nature of the boundary regulations and the decisive amount of German economic and political influence (see Clodius Agreement of April 24, 1941). The Germans tried to use the boundary question to secure the obedience of competing partners—Bulgarians, Greeks, and Italians—but in fact they created more unrest instead of the order and peace which were needed to concentrate all German forces on the main fronts.

Because of the lack of clarity, the Bulgarian occupation policy was guided by the wish to create "facts." So the Bulgarians applied harsh

³²*Ibid.*, p. 141.

measures to diminish the Greek population and to increase the Bulgarian one. Their brutal government in the new territories stood in contrast to the very cautious internal and foreign policy the Bulgarian leadership otherwise applied, especially in their relations to Germany. The contradiction between the general political line of Bulgaria and the occupation policy becomes tragically clear in measures against Jews: whereas the Bulgarian leadership, in view of pressure from the public and respect for foreign opinion, was anxious to save the Jews of "Old Bulgaria," they "sacrificed" those of the occupied territories and assisted the Germans to transport them to extermination camps.

In the first days of September 1944, Bulgarian troops and administrative authorities left the occupied territories, including Greek Thrace and Macedonia. The following year, the Bulgarian authorities responsible were put on trial before "People's Courts" for their actions during the war. Thousands of them were sentenced, many (about 2,000) to death.



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EEAM: The Workers' Resistance

by ANGELOS AVGOUSTIDIS

The EEAM (*Ergatiko Ethniko Apeleftherotiko Metopo* or Workers' National Liberation Front) is not very well-known, although it was the most important organization of the EAM in the large cities. The EEAM is remembered mostly for the strikes it organized on February 24 and March 5 of 1943 in Athens and Piraeus against the civil mobilization the Germans attempted to impose upon Greece at that time. The strike of March 5, which was accompanied by an imposing people's demonstration in the center of the Greek capital, was particularly successful. The evening of the same day the Germans were obliged to declare officially through the archbishop of Athens, Monsignor Damaskinos, that the mobilization was canceled.¹

This, however, was not EEAM's only contribution to the Resistance. During 1943 and 1944, the EEAM organized a great number of isolated and/or general strikes throughout the entire country. An indication of this activity can be obtained from the examples of the two enormous demonstrations which took place in Athens on June 25 and again on July 22, 1943. The first was a reaction against the terrorization of the Greek people by the occupying armies (the immediate cause of this reaction was the execution, some days before, of 128 communists, among them a large number of top party leaders). The second demonstration was aimed against the annexation of Greek Macedonia by Bulgaria. During both demonstrations, the same tactics were applied as those used during the manifestations against the civil mobilization. The demonstrations were accompanied by general strikes which paralyzed Athens and Piraeus and which set the necessary preconditions for the

¹Concerning the strikes against the civil mobilization, see: Vasilis Bartziotas, *Ethniki antistasi ke Dekemvrios 1944*, Athens, 1980,² pp. 116-118; Petros Rousos, *I megali pentaetia*, Part I, Athens, 1976, pp. 277-282; Thanassis Hadzis, *I nikifora epanastasi pou chatbike (1941-1945)*, Part I, Athens, 1977, pp. 345-355. John Hondros, whose work is based on German reports written at that time, is less enthusiastic than the Greek eyewitnesses. He does, however, speak of a "mass demonstration" on March 5. See John L. Hondros, "The Greek Resistance, 1941-1944," in John O. Iatrides (ed.), *Greece in the 1940s: A Nation in Crisis*, London, 1981, p. 40. EEAM's contribution to the cancellation of the civil mobilization is also accepted by the English liaison officer in Greece, Chris Woodhouse. See C. M. Woodhouse, *The Apple of Discord* (orig. London, 1948), Greek edition Athens, 1976, p. 60. See also *Rizospastis*, May 6, 1943.

success of the protest. The EEAM not only organized the strikes but also succeeded in activating and mobilizing workers to form the organized core of the demonstration.²

To get an idea of the isolated strikes it will suffice to examine the month of May 1943, which was not an unusually turbulent one. In the two illegal EEAM newspaper editions which were available for the present study,³ mention is made of ten strikes in the Athens-Piraeus area. Among them were strikes in the railways, the waterworks (Ulen), the telephone company, and the munitions factory. This list does not include numbers of other protests, petitions, and May Day strikes. It also does not include two big strikes which took place at the end of May. One, at the fertilizer company (the largest glass producer in Greece), lasted for two days and was joined by approximately 5,000 employees. The other, at the Bank of Athens, started on May 26 and turned into a general strike of bank employees on May 31.⁴ This situation continued throughout Greece during the entire occupation, with the exception of a lull in the Athens-Piraeus area during the winter of 1943-1944. EEAM's active role in the Resistance contributed to a general appearance of continuous upheaval in the Greek cities at this time. The sudden lull in the wave of strikes in the capital in the winter of 1943-1944 was due almost exclusively to the enormous increase in terror practiced by the Security Battalions (and other so-called "national" organizations armed by the Germans) and lasted until both EAM and EEAM could adapt themselves to the new situation.⁵

The activities of the EEAM were not limited to strikes and protests

²Concerning the events of June 25, *Rizospastis*, June 28, 1943, speaks of 150,000 demonstrators. According to an internal circular of the KOA (Communist Organization of Athens), July 16, 1943, 45,000 workers, 25,000 government employees and 5,000 shopowners took part in the strike. See General State Archives (GAK), Occupation Archive, Athens. Hondros states that the German military commander of southern Greece concluded that ninety percent of the population opposed the Axis and that the situation verged on a general insurrection. See Hondros, *op. cit.*, p. 40. For an extensive description of the events of July 22, see Bartziotas, *op. cit.*, pp. 118-127. For a more concise version, see *S' armata! S' armata! Chroniki tis etbnikis antistasis, 1940-1945*, Athens, 1967,² pp. 185-186. See also the decision of the city committee of the KOA, July 27, 1943 in *Rizospastis*, July 30, 1943.

³*Ergatiko Vima* (official newspaper of the central committee of the EEAM), May 5, 1943 and *Ergatikos Agonas*, May 25, 1943.

⁴*Rizospastis*, June 10, 1943.

⁵*Rizospastis* makes no mention of strikes from September 1943 until the end of that year. Hadzis, too, states that the massive people's movement in the Athens-Piraeus area became dormant during this period and only reawakened in the beginning of 1944. See Hadzis, *op. cit.*, Part II, p. 341. Concerning the new German policy during the second half of 1943, the increase in intimidation and terror and the "hellenization" of the struggle against EAM, see Hadzis, *op. cit.*, Part II, pp. 213-214, and Heinz Richter, *Griechenland zwischen Revolution und Konterrevolution (1936-1946)*, Frankfurt am Main, 1973, pp. 384-391.

by the working people alone. The teams of the EEAM did what they could to impede or sabotage production, gather information concerning the movements and intentions of the enemy, assist the movements—and even prison escapes—of EAM members and, in the end, take up arms to protect their factories against German destruction. In other words, the contribution of the EEAM to the Resistance was enormous. It is also worth noting that one of the most important achievements of the EEAM was that it brought together the several different trade union organizations into one united and respected organization which kept its influence within the working class after the Liberation until roughly the summer of 1947.

The Workers' National Liberation Front (EEAM) was founded on July 17, 1941, two months before EAM itself, by the trade union groups of the so-called reformists (the right-wing of Greek trade unionism), the communists, and socialists. According to some sources of information, the socialist group joined EEAM after some delay.⁶ The most important leaders of the EEAM were G. Kalomiris of the reformists, D. Stratis of the socialists, and K. Theos of the communists. The first representative of the Greek Communist Party (KKE) in the EEAM was L. Apostolou, who had also taken the initiative in the formative meetings of the EEAM.⁷ In October 1941, when Apostolou was arrested by the Italians, he was replaced by K. Lasaridis, tobacco worker and trade union KKE cadre member of long standing. After Lasaridis's arrest at the end of 1942, his position was taken by K. Theos, also a tobacco worker and a well-known trade union cadre member of the KKE, who had escaped from the Akronafplia prison together with Yiannis Ioannidis.

It was not a matter of chance that the EEAM was founded before the EAM. For the Greek Communist Party, which was the force behind the Resistance and which had taken the initiative for the founding of the EEAM, it was extremely important to have a solidly organized resistance movement in the cities based on the working class. For the Greek communists, the working class was, without a doubt, the most consequential, the most conscious, and, politically, the most developed part of society. It is therefore not surprising that the KKE could not imagine an organized and successful liberation struggle without the decisive collaboration of the workers. Henceforth, the KKE

⁶The delayed participation of the socialists in EEAM is mentioned by both Rousos (*op. cit.*, Part I, p. 126) and Hadzis (*op. cit.*, Part I, p. 91). Mastroiannakos, present as a trade unionist at the founding of the EEAM, denies that the socialist entry, in the person of Stratis, was delayed; he states, rather, that Stratis voiced a number of objections during EEAM's formative discussions. *Interview with Stamatis Mastroiannakos* on January 13, 1982. L. Apostolou, one of the EEAM founders, in reply to a questionnaire published by *Anti* (December 11, 1982, p. 36), mentions neither a tardy entrance nor objections on the part of Stratis.

⁷*Anti*, *op. cit.*, Mastroiannakos confirms Apostolou's role.

did everything it could to organize the workers' struggle. The position of the Greek Communist Party on this matter is clearly demonstrated in Point 7 of the decision taken by the Seventh Plenum of the KKE in September 1941:

The working class, as the most conscious revolutionary class, shall play a very important role in our national liberation struggle. For the Greek proletariat, the struggle for the liberation of the country from every foreign exploitation is a part of the many-sided struggle which it was and is fighting for the final liberation of our people from every economic and political exploitation. An absolute necessity for the working class today, in order to accomplish its great end, is its unification and the destruction of every fascist attempt to divide it. The Communists must march at the head of this struggle for the class unity of the Greek proletariat. Our syndicalist work of today is one of the most important parts of our task, because this shall bring us in contact with the broad masses of workers and shall secure the extension of our influence over the workers.

Furthermore, the necessity for the workers to regain control over the trade unions was underlined by the Seventh Plenum in their advocacy of the expulsion of government-appointed leaders from these unions.⁸

The aforementioned necessity for "class unity" leads us to another aspect, namely, the necessity for a well-disciplined organization. The EEAM appeared to offer the ideal solution: it could organize, within the liberation movement, the most dynamic and class-conscious workers, who, after the liberation, would become the carriers of the new struggle for social and political change. At the same time, however, the EEAM had to become a mass organization which would gather around it the great majority of the working people and take over the official unions. Only in this way could the working class play its "historic role" after the war.

A practical, though less ideological, reason that made the development of a strong trade union movement necessary was the importance of the cities in defining and imposing governmental power in Greece. Although Greece was at that time an agricultural nation, power was centered in the cities and exercised from them, especially from Athens, the hub of the wheel of Greek centralization. Even though the countryside gained its identity during the growth of the resistance movement, the idea that "he who has Athens has Greece" still prevailed. Or, to use the words of Ioannidis, "the matter would be decided in Athens."⁹ Therefore, organizing the cities, and especially Athens, was not only important for challenging the power of the Germans (which was also

⁸KKE: *Episima Keimena*, Part V, Athens, 1921, p. 50.

⁹Yiannis Ioannidis, *Anamniseis*, Athens, 1979, pp. 173-174.

based in the cities) but for securing governmental power after the Liberation. The EEAM, by organizing the working class struggle, at the same time contributed to the "EAMization" of Athens and the other large cities.

The importance given by the communists to the organization of the struggle in the cities does not automatically imply that the KKE, simply through dogmatic narrow-mindedness, hindered the development of the struggle in the countryside. This point of view has become a matter of dispute among historians. According to this interpretation, the leadership of the KKE, influenced by its political ideology, considered only the cities, and especially the workers in the cities, as the revolutionary potential which could, by means of a general revolt at the proper time, bring the party to power. Following this theory, the leadership of the KKE, influenced by Marxist thought, underestimated and neglected the countryside, as well as doing irreparable harm to the revolt there.¹⁰

Reality, however, is not that simple. If the development of the Resistance in the countryside was somewhat retarded, this was not intentional. It was, rather, the result of the situation and the inability of the EAM leadership to adapt itself quickly to it. It must not be forgotten that, at the beginning of the Occupation, the Communist Party was not even in existence. With the arrests, repression, and infiltration of the party by the state security under the dictatorship of Metaxas, the party had almost disintegrated. There was, of course, a reorganizational effort which culminated in the Sixth and Seventh Plenums (July and September of 1941). However, at the foundation of EAM on September 28, 1941, the KKE had not even solved the problem of its leadership. One aspect of this problem was that the KKE (and, with it, the EAM) did not have enough cadre members at the beginning to organize an armed resistance. Another aspect was that neither the KKE nor its allies were experienced in armed combat. It is for this reason that the EAM, in its first official public announcement, called upon army officers to assist in creating what it called "national units."¹¹ It is not surprising that EAM circles were originally characterized by a certain attitude of reserve and a reluctance to embark upon an improvised course of armed action which could later prove to be irresponsible. This reservation was, without a doubt, strengthened by the tragic events in the province of Drama, where an early revolt in September of 1941 ended in the slaughter of thousands of unarmed civilians by the Bulgarian Occupation Army. This is the reason for the communist preference for their own "traditional meth-

¹⁰Dominique Eudes proves himself a strong proponent of this standpoint in his book, *Les Kapetanios* (Paris, 1970). This point of view, however, has its origins in the old accusation made by the Yugoslav Vukmanovic (nicknamed "Tempo") against the KKE. See "Na giati echase o ELAS ton polemo" in *Ta Nea*, January 19, 1976.

¹¹*Keimena tis ethniki antistasis*, Part I, Athens, 1981, p. 19. Concerning the attempts, but also the difficulties in attracting officers, see Hadzis, *op. cit.*, Part I, pp. 155-156, 161-162.

odology," a slow and well-organized evolution "from the small struggles to the larger ones."¹²

What was more appropriate, in that case, than to start with the struggles in the cities? There, the communists were in their own element. There, they had experience with the people and the environment, and they knew how to organize demonstrations and strikes. Furthermore, with the terrible hunger which plagued the Greek cities during the winter of 1941-1942, it was one of the primary tasks of the Resistance to organize the struggle for the survival of the urban population. Simultaneously, this situation offered the unique possibility of attaining the national unity so strongly desired by EAM through a massive economic struggle. The decision taken by the Eighth Plenum of the KKE in January of 1944 is quite clear on this point:

... At this precise moment the key to the organizational growth of the Party and of the people's organizations lies in drawing out the organized people's movement, broadening the massive economic struggles and elevating these to higher forms of mass struggle.¹³

This strategy, in which the EEAM played a leading role, helped the EAM acquire a solid base in the cities. But this is not to say that this urban activity excluded or hindered other forms of combat: that in the mountainous countryside, for instance. For the EAM was waging a total war for liberation; where and when the possibility to strike at the enemy (occupying) forces presented itself, the EAM, without hesitation, took advantage of the situation and did so.¹⁴

The most important body of the EEAM was its central committee.¹⁵ There, the line was discussed and decisions were taken. In the summer of 1943, the secretariat was established, formed by the three leaders Kalomiris, Stratis, and Theos. The secretariat, which assumed some of the duties of the central committee, was formed in order to expedite decisionmaking. It had, however, to account to the central committee for

¹²Concerning the KKE organizational philosophy, see Hadzis, *op. cit.*, Part I, p. 109.

¹³KKE, *Episima Keimena*, *op. cit.*, pp. 67, 71.

¹⁴Interview with Thanassis Hadzis on January 14, 1982. An interesting analysis of the "mountain versus city" theme is presented by John Loulis, who claims that the KKE from the start made use of any and all available means, including armed struggle, to gain power. See J. C. Loulis, *The Greek Communist Party, 1940-1944*, London, 1982, pp. 60-65. See also Hadzis, *op. cit.*, Part I, pp. 258-268.

¹⁵This description of the EEAM organization is based mainly on two documents: "To Programma tou EEAM" (The Program of the EEAM), written on July 16, 1943, and the "Apofasi tis Protis Panelladikis Syndiaskepsis tou EEAM" (Decision of the First Panhellenic Conference of the EEAM), held in February 1944. See *Keimena tis ethnikis antistasis*, *op. cit.*, pp. 176-177, respectively, 179-189.

its decisions. The EEAM was permanently represented in the central committee of the EAM by a member of its own central committee. The city committees resided under the central committee of the EEAM; they were formed by local trade unionists and had to follow the leadership of the central committee. It seems that, due to communication difficulties, the provincial city committees had a certain independence. The city committees organized the struggle in their area and guided the work of the several local workers' organizations, which originally were divided between trade organizations and organizations of the unemployed. Every local organization was headed by a committee which had to be elected from representatives of the members. Those elections took place everywhere where the conditions were safe enough to allow them. The trade committees were actually the leaders of illegal local trade unions. The ordinary members of every organization were divided into teams and organized according to their workplace, while the unemployed were organized according to their neighborhood. The teams, which formed the basis of EEAM, consisted of five to ten persons and were governed by an elected leadership called a bureau. The leadership of the teams kept in contact with the committee to which the team belonged.

This, in general, was the structure of EEAM, at least as it was meant to be organized according to the instructions of its leaders. In reality, however, an absolute organizational uniformity at the base level was impossible. The structure of the Greek economy at the time, with its plethora of small enterprises, and the illegality and special conditions of the Occupation, demanded a great deal of improvisation and adaptation.

The organizational structure of EEAM is interesting because it presents a similarity to the organizational structure of the official GSEE (*Geniki Synomospondia Ergaton Ellados* or General Confederation of Greek Workers).¹⁶ Its central committee had the same place in EEAM as the leadership of the GSEE in the official trade union organization. The city committees were, in effect, the illegal labor centers (city confederations of local trade unions). The trade committees were the leaders of the illegal trade unions. Little by little, the EEAM began to form its own national trade federations like the Federations of Electrical, Metallurgical, and Tobacco Workers. By its organizational structure alone, we see that the EEAM tried to become a complete national Greek trade union organization, which it succeeded in doing. The EEAM became the second (illegal) GSEE, acting independently and according to its own judgment alongside the official GSEE of the pro-German

¹⁶The official name of the GSEE during the occupation was "Ethniki Synomospondia Ergaton Ellados" (ESEE), as the confederation was renamed by Metaxas's Labor Minister, A. Dimitratos. For the present paper, the term "GSEE" has been chosen due to the fact that all old trade unionists ignore the name "ESEE" and speak only of the "GSEE," adding the adjectives "collaborationist" or "official" or "occupation."

state. The difference between the EEAM and the GSEE was that the EEAM grew stronger and became the real confederation of Greek workers, while the GSEE constantly lost the little authority it managed to maintain. The GSEE even lost the official unions, which, one after the other, fell into the hands of trade union members of EEAM. In this manner, the official GSEE became, by the end of the Occupation, a head without a body.¹⁷ It was characteristic of the situation that in the city of Thessaloniki, the general headquarters of the EEAM were housed in the same building as the official labor center.¹⁸

Another reason why the structure of the EEAM is interesting is that the influence of the KKE in the EEAM is clear in the structure of the base. The base teams of employed and unemployed were, at the outset, a copy of communist cells. When the communists, through the organizational restructuring initiated by Ioannidis and Bartziotas in 1943, moved on to a massive recruitment of members and changed their small base cells to large KOB's (*Kommatikes Organosis Basis* or Party Base Organizations), their example was followed by EEAM. The organizational changes at the base of EEAM which began in 1943, and were confirmed by the First Panhellenic Conference of the organization in February 1944, were the result of a special effort on the part of the KKE to make the EEAM a mass organization. This matter was introduced for the first time in a decision taken by the presidium of the central committee of the KKE which was published in Rizospastis on April 20, 1943. The decision states, among other things, that "... The combatant strike movement is being greatly delayed among the working class and especially in the important branches of industry and transport. The continuation of this delay forms a special danger for the whole national liberation struggle..." The presidium of the KKE requested a radical change in the organization of the EEAM which would turn it into a mass trade union organization that would include all Greeks, unemployed as well as employed. The decision closed with the following remark: "We must elevate the struggles of the working class as soon as possible to the level of the real vanguard of the whole national liberation people's struggle..."¹⁹

After this decision, the "shortcomings of the EEAM" began to be a subject of broad discussion. For instance, *KOMEPE* asked why 90% of the workers sympathized with EEAM but only 10% became mem-

¹⁷The role of the official GSEE and its relationship with the EEAM is an interesting subject, which, unfortunately, cannot be discussed within the scope of the present limited paper. It is, however, included in the forthcoming more extensive study of the Greek trade unions by the author.

¹⁸Interview with Stavros Pitianoudis on April 14, 1983. Pitianoudis, on behalf of the KKE, was a member of the city committee of the EEAM of Thessaloniki. During the occupation, he was the official representative of the printer's union in the Labor Center of Thessaloniki.

¹⁹The most important part of this decision taken by the presidium of the KKE is quoted by Bartziotas, *op. cit.*, p. 112.

bers?²⁰ The problem of why EEAM did not have as many members as it could have was considered to be primary, but other deficiencies were also discussed, for example, the relatively small influence of EEAM on the occupier's important economic sectors and the poor co-ordination of the struggle between several sectors.²¹ Thus, a significant attempt was made to make the EEAM a mass combatant organization. Among other things, a great number of capable cadres of the KKE was transferred to trade union work.²² But in order to attract thousands of sympathizers, there were also some radical changes necessary in the organization. It was for this reason that the following plan was pushed to the forefront: base teams were enlarged from between five to ten persons to between thirty to fifty (or even one hundred) and, simultaneously, the discipline and obligations of the ordinary members of the EEAM were loosened. The logic of this plan was that a mass organization could not demand from its ordinary members that they meet once a week and show the same discipline and activity which was normally expected only from active cadres. At the head of this new big team was a bureau, which was composed of the best and most experienced cadres. This implied, in fact, that the old, small teams of the disciplined and already experienced members were automatically transformed into the leading bureaus of the new, large teams composed mainly of ordinary members. For the ordinary members, it was no longer necessary to attend the general meetings of the team.²³

This plan, which was especially supported by *KOMEPE* in July 1943, was adopted by the EEAM of Athens in the same month. Precisely when this plan was adopted by the central committee of the EEAM, and precisely when this reorganization began, is difficult to ascertain, however. Only the decision of the First Panhellenic Conference of the EEAM in February 1944 is clear on this point, when it states that the basic organizational unit should be large and concentrated around factories. (This means that the basic units not only were to become bigger, but that the emphasis was to be laid on factory units and not, as it was previously, on trade units.) The decision also states that only the leaders of the teams (that is, the basic units) had to confer regularly, and not the ordinary members.²⁴ In other words, the EEAM accepted definitely the organizational changes first initiated by the KKE.

²⁰*KOMEPE*, number 14, June 1943.

²¹For a discussion of the shortcomings of the EEAM, see: "Schedio Apofasis tou EEAM tis Athinas" (Decision Plan of the EEAM of Athens), July 1943. See also "Apofasis tis KE tou EEAM pano stis teleftaies apergies" (Decision of the Central Committee of the EEAM on the latest strikes), undated, but pertaining to the strikes of June 1943. Both documents in the General State Archives (GAK), Occupation Archive, Athens. See also *KOMEPE*, numbers 13 and 14, May and June 1943.

²²Bartziotas, *op. cit.*, p. 112.

²³For propositions of organizational change, see note 21.

²⁴See *Keimena tis ethnikiis antistasis*, *op. cit.*, pp. 179-189.

In order to facilitate the foundation, but also the smooth functioning, of the EEAM, the allied trade union groups agreed to divide the seats in the central committee in a permanent fashion; thus each group was allocated a certain fixed number of seats. It is known that from the summer of 1943, the three allies were represented in the central committee by an equal number of representatives. Even the secretariat, which was founded then, was composed of the three leaders Kalomiris, Stratis, and Theos. According to the so-called "Program of the EEAM," the city committees were to follow suit.²⁵ It is, however, not certain that this equal representation existed from the beginning. According to an official English record dated October 10, 1943, and written by the well-known Chris Woodhouse, the central committee was originally composed of eight representatives: one from Kalomiris, four from the KKE, and two aligned with Stratis.²⁶ Mastroyannakos claims, however, that the first committee of the EEAM was composed of two members of the Kalomiris faction, two of the "uncolored," two of the KKE, and two of Stratis.²⁷ If we add the two "uncolored" to the two of Kalomiris, the proportion of representation of the three groups was 4-2-2. It was not possible to find more information on this subject. It seems, however, that the relations between the allies in the central committee were good and that a sincere will for cooperation on the basis of equality existed, and that it lasted until the end. Mastroyannakos, who was a permanent member of the central committee, leaves no doubt on this point.

The same effort for equal representation was also made in the city committees. Only in those situations where a group didn't have enough or appropriate cadres were the seats filled by cadres from another group.²⁸ In the summer of 1943, it was decided that the city committees should also form secretariats, composed of three members, as in the central committee.²⁹ In the larger cities, and especially in Athens, Piraeus, and Thessaloniki, it doesn't seem that there were any great difficulties in representation by the parties.³⁰ But there were also exceptions. In Kavala, for instance, when the EEAM was finally founded at the end of the Occupation, the city committee was composed exclusively of communists. This occurred because the trade union movement in Kavala

²⁵*Ibid.*, p. 177, "To Programma tou EEAM," point 4.

²⁶"Draft Report on the Greek Trade Unions," National Archives, Washington, RG 59, 868.5045/10-2045, No. 1723 from Rankin.

²⁷*Interview with Mastroyannakos.* Mastroyannakos insists that there was also a fourth group, the "uncolored," of which he was a member. This faction, however, is not mentioned in any of the preserved texts. Mastroyannakos was considered, during the occupation as well as after the liberation, to be a Kalomiris man. This partnership is also confirmed by Mastroyannakos.

²⁸*Ibid.*

²⁹See note 25.

³⁰*Interviews with Mastroyannakos and Pitianoudis.*

had always been in the hands of the communists, and there simply was no competition for them.³¹

If, however, an equal representation of the three parties at the head of the organization was feasible, at the base the KKE was dominant. There was no place for a triple leadership there. There, only the most capable and daring rose to positions of leadership. Even before the war, the Greek communist trade union branch had brought forth many men and women with a nearly religious spirit of self-sacrifice and courage. Especially in the big industrial branches (and namely in the tobacco industry), the communists predominated absolutely. During the Occupation, their influence steadily expanded. The KKE acquired a kind of aura which attracted and influenced the young militant trade unionists. Many of them became members of the party. Others accepted the line of the party as something self-evident. In this way, a situation was created in which most of the lower cadres of the EEAM were organized communists or sympathizers. All old trade union members, communists and non-communists alike, agree as to the enormous predominance of the KKE in the base structure of EEAM.³² This predominance was repeatedly confirmed after the Liberation during the trade union elections of 1944, 1945, and 1946.³³

It should be noted here that, in comparison to the EAM, which represented only a tiny part of the established Greek political world, the EEAM represented all three important trade union groups which existed in Greece before the war. The allies of the communists in the EEAM had not only a longstanding authority and experience, but also an organizational structure within the trade union movement, but in spite of that, they were completely overshadowed by the communists, whose power constantly grew. Besides the EAM organizations, the KKE maintained its own party organization which, during the entire duration of the Occupation, continuously improved. The other parties of the EAM were small and had neither cadres nor an organization which could in any way be likened to that of the powerful Communist Party. It is precisely for this reason that the reformist and socialist trade unions found themselves in an inferior position: though they had a longstanding authority and experience, they lacked the support of a

³¹Interview with G. Peyos on April 13, 1983. Peyos was an important trade union member of the Communist Party in Kavala.

³²For instance: Mastrogiannakos, Karageorgopoulos, Pouskoulelis, Pitianoudis. Interview with Karageorgopoulos (of the socialist branch of the EEAM of Thessaloniki) on January 10, 1982. Interview with Pouskoulelis (railway union communist in Thessaloniki) on April 21, 1982.

³³The Eighth Congress of the GSEE in March 1946 was a triumph for the KKE and its trade union organization, the ERGAS. For a concise review of this congress, see A. Avgoustidis, "Zwischen Links und Rechts; Entscheidung ohne Zwiespalt; Griechenland" in H. Lademacher (Hrsg), *Gewerkschaften im Ost-West-Konflikt; Die Politik der American Federation of Labor nach dem II. Weltkrieg*, Melsungen, 1982, pp. 201-202.

well-organized party, something their communist colleagues could count on. The communists, due to their experience in underground work, organizational structure, and number and quality of their cadres, grew much stronger than their allies and became the driving motor of the people's struggle. It was clear that, without the KKE, neither the EAM nor the EEAM could have existed. It was this simple fact which gave the communists tremendous superiority and authority over their allies. It was because of this same simple fact that their views always prevailed in the organization. They didn't need to have a majority in the central committee or the city committees to achieve their goals.³⁴ Besides, the socialist and reformist trade unions, because of their lack of experience in underground work, eagerly accepted the organizational experience of their communist colleagues. But this, of course, contributed to a greater dependency of the alliance as a whole on the KKE. The enlargement of the basic teams especially offered the possibility to a relatively small number of experienced active cadres (mainly communists or sympathizers) to place themselves at the head of the great mass of EEAM members and in this way to lead and control the movement.

Although the superiority of the KKE sometimes provoked jealousy and dissatisfaction within the EEAM, it seems that there were no important disagreements or quarrels which endangered the alliance. The EEAM didn't need to take political decisions from which important problems could arise. The organization occupied itself almost exclusively with everyday urban tasks, in which the constant repression, great dangers, and even hunger strengthened its solidarity. A characteristic case occurred when the leadership of the Socialist Party of Greece (SKE or *Sosialistiko Komma Ellados*) began to react to what it termed the "tutelage of the KKE" inside EAM. The trade union branch of the SKE, with Stratis at its head, then declared itself in favor of a continuing collaboration with the KKE. As a result of Stratis's strong position, the rebels were degraded from the leadership of the SKE and expelled from EAM.³⁵

Some disagreements and friction (which, especially in Thessaloniki, increased as the liberation approached³⁶) were isolated incidents to be expected from every alliance, but which nevertheless could not destroy the harmonious atmosphere. Besides, nobody would have benefited from or have dared to leave the alliance. During the entire duration of the Occupation, the password in the lines of EEAM was "unity."

In search of the aims of the EEAM, we discover that its official documents³⁷ contain three important parts:

³⁴In answer to the question posed by the author, "What was the program of the EEAM?" Pitianoudis answered: "It was the program of the KKE . . . of course."

³⁵See Hadzis, *op. cit.*, Part I, pp. 287-289.

³⁶*Interviews with Pitianoudis and Karageorgopoulos.*

³⁷The three basic documents are: "Idrytiko tou EEAM" (The Founding Act of the EEAM), "To Programma tou EEAM," and "Apofasi tis Protis Panelladikis

- (a) the purely trade union part (economic claims and trade union rights);
- (b) the part concerning the Resistance (struggle against the occupiers to the end);
- (c) the political part (an attempt to create a left-wing party which would govern Greece after the war for the benefit of the workers).

During the Occupation, the EEAM limited itself to the first two parts, namely, pure trade unionism and the Resistance. It seems that the third part, the political, was taken care of by EAM and its program. This is due to the fact that EAM presented itself more and more, not only as a resistance organization but also, and especially, as a political organization which claimed postwar governmental power. That's why EEAM ceded the right to formulate the future postwar aims of the working class to the political leadership of EAM. The EEAM never formulated a complete political and economic program for postwar Greece, as other resistance trade union organizations did in foreign countries (for instance, in France, Belgium, and Italy). Problems such as nationalization, socialization, and workers' participation in management or in the general reconstruction of the economy didn't seem to concern either Greek workers or their leaders during the war itself.³⁸ In two official texts, we see that socialism is cited as the ultimate goal of the organization.³⁹ But what kind of socialism would this have been? This is not clearly specified in the texts. My conclusion is that this lack of clarity was due to the completely differing views on socialism of every one of the three allies. But this, like many other problems inside the alliance, was put aside for later, for after the Liberation.

Syndiaskepsis tou EEAM." See *Keimena tis etbnikis antistasis*, *op. cit.*, pp. 174, 176-177 and 179-189.

³⁸In the preserved texts on the EEAM, no mention is made of such matters. This is also confirmed in the interviews with EEAM trade unionists, all of whom declared that they did not concern themselves with such problems.

³⁹See "To Programma tou EEAM" and "Apofasi tis Protis Panelladikis Syndiaskepsis tou EEAM" (note 15).

The Role of the Greek Officer Corps in The Resistance

by ANDRE GEROLYMATOS

The aim of this paper is to provide an analysis of the activities of the Greek officer corps during the 1941-1944 period. The term "officer corps" in this instance is employed to describe the professional element of active officers, including those who were purged from the armed forces before the war. It should be noted that collectively these two broad divisions did not represent a monolithic body but defined the officer corps in a technical sense. The permanent officers of the armed forces formed a distinct group which identified with the established order, or did not subscribe to any political philosophy. The professional officers who were purged from the armed forces opposed the Metaxas regime and the monarchy, and as such they maintained a separate identity. An important consideration, however, is that it is not possible to account for the activities of every single officer during the occupation. At best, we can only surmise about the conduct of the organized element of each group, which to some degree might have represented the sentiments and activities of the majority of the military.

Before the war, the Greek armed forces suffered repeated unrest caused by the forced retirement of officers who had participated in the unsuccessful coups of the 1930's. These upheavals in the military were preceded by several coups and countercoups from 1909 to 1923. An interesting characteristic of these two periods is that, from 1909 to 1923, the coups paved the way for purges and counter-purges which resulted in the temporary displacement of officers. The first period of unrest was marked by a constant disruption in the chain of command and the destabilization of the officer corps.¹ In contrast, the purges of the 1930's resulted only in the permanent removal of republican officers from the armed forces. With the absence of the republicans, the per-

¹For a detailed account of the role of the military during this period and their involvement in the corps up to 1936, see Th. Veremis, *Οι επεμβάσεις του στρατού στην ελληνική πολιτική 1916-1936*, Athens, 1983. One result of this was the replacement of experienced officers in command of the Greek army in Asia Minor with less experienced royalist officers, after the fall of Venizelos and the return of King Constantine. This, according to L. Spāis (*Πενήντα χρόνια στρατιώτης*, Athens, 1970, pp. 144-145) was a contributing factor to the defeat of the Greek army.

manent body of active officers by 1940 represented a cohesive group loyal to the monarchy, or neutral in political outlook.²

In April of 1940, the number of permanent active officers reached approximately 4,980.³ To this number were added 300 cadets from the military academy and 50 warrant-officers who were advanced to the rank of second lieutenant, which extended the total number of officers to 5,180.⁴ The attrition caused by the war reduced this number by approximately 313 killed and 476 severely wounded, so that by the beginning of the occupation there were approximately 4,391 permanent officers. To a great extent, these officers suffered the highest percentage of casualties, which, according to established figures, reached 6.9% dead and 9% wounded. In contrast, the rate among reserve officers was 1.7% dead, while for the professional reserve officers recalled into active service the rate was 1.1% dead and 1.8% wounded.⁵ The lower casualty

²Despite the extensive purges after the 1935 coup attempt and the establishment of the Metaxas regime in 1936, some of the active officers continued to be hostile to the monarchy and formed cells of opposition. In March 1938, E. Tsellos formed the MEO (Μυστική Έπαναστατική Οργάνωσις). This was a secret organization committed to removing the dictatorship by force. The military element of MEO was formed by lower ranking officers in active service but it also included some συνταγματάρχες, αντισυνταγματάρχες, and two generals: Αντιστράτηγος Άχιλ. Πρωτοσύγκελλος and Ύποστράτηγος Πλατής, διαρχηγός του ΓΕΣ (see G. Dafnis, 'Η Ελλάδα μεταξύ δύο πολέμων 1923-1940, vol. 2, Athens, 1955, p. 454; T. Vournas, 'Ιστορία της σύγχρονης Ελλάδας, vol. 2, Athens, 1977, pp. 496-497. According to A. G. Elefantis, 'Η έπαγγελματία της άδύνατης έπανάστασης, Athens, 1976, p. 245, an earlier organization, formed in 1933, represented a group of slightly lower ranking officers (λοχαγών, δπολοχαγών κτλ.) as well as Ταγματάρχες Μοθστεράκης and Δ. Φαρρός. This organization remained dormant during 1933-1940, but some of its members played an active role in the resistance and in the formation of ELAS. Both organizations kept close contacts with the KKE, yet failed to achieve any success in the opposition to the Metaxas regime (Vournas, *Ibid.*, p. 497; J. V. Kofas, *Authoritarianism in Greece*, N.Y., 1983, p. 140; Elefantis, *Ibid.*, p. 245).

³According to S. Grigoriadis, *Συνοπτική Ιστορία της έθνικής αντίστασης 1941-1945*, Athens, 1981, p. 116, 1,500 former professional officers on the inactive list were not employed during the war (1936-1941) because the Metaxas regime regarded them as fanatics and dangerous republicans. L. Spaïs, *op. cit.*, p. 232, adds that the majority of these officers were graduates of Σχολής Πολέμου with a great deal of combat experience and ability.

⁴As of April 2, 1940, the order of battle of the permanent Greek officers was as follows: 3,413 combat officers; 1,567 non-combat officers; 300 officer cadets—50 άνωτακτιστές advanced to the rank of άνωτακτολοχαγός (minus 150 officers about to retire, left a total of 200 new officers); 10,000 reserve officers; 1,150 διαξίωματικοί (Field Marshal A. Papagos, 'Ο έλληνικός στρατός και ή προς πόλεμον προπαρασκευή του, Athens, 1945, p. 412; 'Αρχηγείο Στρατού Διεύθυνσις 'Ιστορίας Στρατού, 'Η προς πόλεμον προπαρασκευή του έλληνικού στρατού 1923-1940, Athens, 1969, *Passim*).

⁵ΔΙΕ/ΓΕΣ, 'Η υγειονομική δηηρεία του στρατού κατά τον πόλεμο 1940-1941, pp. 188-189. These figures are in sharp contrast to those offered by S. Grigoriadis

rate among this group was due to the reluctance of the Metaxas regime to place them in command of combat forces.⁶

Numerically, however, the ranks of those who had been purged from the armed forces represented a substantial group. By 1940, approximately 4,500 permanent officers were forced to retire and were placed in the category of *ἐφεδρoὶ ἐκ μoυλμων*.⁷ During the war, 3,000 from this category were recalled into active service but approximately 1,500, most of whom were of higher rank, were kept out of the armed forces.⁸ As a group, consequently, the *ἐφεδρoὶ ἐκ μoυλμων* suffered minimum disruption and were thus in a better position to prepare for resistance. Before the war, many of these officers belonged to organizations opposed to the dictatorship and they had learned to conduct their activities underground. Accordingly, such tactics as printing illegal newspapers, use of codes, and pseudonyms were reinstated during the occupation.⁹ In addition, in 1940, some of these officers were in contact with agents of the SOE, who, unknown to the Metaxas government, had begun to establish embryonic clandestine networks in Greece.¹⁰ Colonel Bakirdzis, for example, at the beginning of the occupation was already employed as a British agent and possessed one of the few wireless transmitters left in Greece. This enabled Bakirdzis to act as a link between the SOE in Cairo and republican officers who were organizing resistance groups.¹¹ In turn, the republicans acquired an independent

(*op. cit.*, pp. 115-116), who places the percentage of dead at 18%, and of dead and wounded at 40%.

⁶*Ibid.* ΔΙΕ/ΓΕΣ and Grigoriadis, pp. 115-116. The complete breakdown of casualties was as follows:

	DEAD	WOUNDED
Permanent Active Officers:	313	476
Permanent Retired Officers:	34	53
Reserve Officers:	342	955

⁷The 1933 coup attempt resulted in the removal of 45 officers; during the aftermath of the 1935 coup attempt, another 1,500 officers were retired (Veremis, *op. cit.*, p. 219), while according to I. Koliopoulos ('Ιστορία τοῦ ἑλληνικοῦ ἔθνoυς, τόμος ΙΕ, 1978, p. 365), the figure was approximately 1,800.

⁸S. Grigoriadis, *op. cit.*, pp. 115-116; L. Spañs, *op. cit.*, p. 145.

⁹See note 2. MEO, for example, printed (between July 15, 1938, to September 27, 1939) 12 issues. See Dafnis, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 453-454.

¹⁰According to I. Koliopoulos, *op. cit.*, 396, the agents of SOE made contact with the opponents of the dictatorship in order to keep the British government informed of the situation and to prepare in case Greece suffered defeat and occupation. R. Clogg, "SOE in Greece," *Greece in the 1940's*, 1981, p. 111, further adds that by agreeing to work for the SOE, republican officers, who were not employed by the Metaxas regime, could feel that they were contributing to the war effort.

¹¹Bakirdzis was not employed for long by the British and escaped to Cairo a year later. His political sympathies shifted and he joined ELAS (C. M. Woodhouse, *The Apple of Discord*, 1948, p. 36; *The Struggle for Greece 1941-1949*, 1976, p. 28; *Something Ventured*, 1982, p. 95). Bakirdzis was replaced in Athens by Koutsogiannopoulos, another republican officer who had the code

means of communication with the British and the Greek government-in-exile. In effect, the royalist and republican groups established parallel contact with Cairo and approached the problem of occupation and resistance from different perspectives.

For the republican officers, the occupation simply replaced one repressive regime for another and ultimately transformed the republican underground into a patriotic resistance. It elevated republican officers opposed to the Metaxas regime from conspirators into partisan leaders and linked them with the revolutionaries of 1821. Equally important, recognition of the resistance groups by the British, and implicitly by the Greek government-in-exile, gave the republican officers in the opposition legitimacy and the possibility of reinstatement in a postwar Greek army.¹²

In the beginning of the occupation, these ambitions were in the distant future. The stark reality of the moment was that a German victory was more than probable. On the other hand, this possibility did not necessarily affect the attitude of the republican officers, but it placed the royalist officers in a far more complicated position. For the republican officers, an allied defeat would have left them professionally in the same position outside the armed forces. Excluding the personal risks they took in opposing the axis forces, professionally they had nothing to lose and everything to gain by joining the resistance.

The permanent officers, who were in active service and had remained in Greece, faced a different situation. As a group, they suffered greater disruption caused by the campaigns in 1940-1941 and needed a longer period of time to recover from the effects of the war. An important distinction between the republicans and the permanent active officers was that the latter, many of whom were royalists, represented and identified with the government of King George II. As such, they were obliged to conduct their activities in concert with the policy of the Greek government-in-exile. That policy did not encourage officers to organize partisan warfare. As far as it can be determined, the Greek government or the high command of the army had not formulated any plans for armed resistance against the occupation forces.¹³ Instead, officers were advised to escape from Greece and join the Greek armed forces in the Middle East. Those who remained behind had to contend with the ramifications of a German victory. If such an event had occurred, a record of armed resistance would have placed Greece in a dis-

name, Prometheus II (Woodhouse, *Apple of Discord, op. cit.*, p. 36). In contrast, Major I. Tsigantes, another victim of the 1935 abortive coup, was reinstated in the army formed in the M.E. (Woodhouse, *Apple of Discord, op. cit.*, p. 37; *Ta Nea*, February 15, 1984).

¹²On this point, see N. A. Stavrou, *Allied Politics and Military Interventions*, 1970, pp. 24-25.

¹³According to the Γενικό Έπιτελείο Στρατού: Διεύθυνση Ίστορίας Στρατού (ΔΙΣ), 5ο Γραφείο/ 1, there are no records of any plans for partisan warfare from the 1940-1941 period.

advantageous position with the German leadership. This notion was used as a justification by the officers led by Tsolakoglou to collaborate with the enemy in the belief that a German victory was inevitable and their actions would benefit Greece.¹⁴ The majority of the permanent officers, however, adopted a passive role, while the younger ones found the solution to the occupation by leaving for the Middle East. By 1943, approximately 2,500 officers were serving with the army outside of Greece. Unfortunately, statistics are not available concerning their political affiliation, and their activities in the Middle East are beyond the scope of this paper.¹⁵

Initially, both groups were concerned with the political implications caused by the uncertainty of the war and the occupation. Later, however, as the resistance grew and the war turned in favor of the allies, the royalist faction of the permanent officers found itself in a greater dilemma. The resistance was developing into a force outside the control of the established order, and the royalists had lost their monopoly over the government-in-exile.¹⁶ Yet the growth of the resistance movement in Greece ultimately worked against the republicans and royalists and in the long run both factions were forced to cooperate in order to survive.

During the first year of the occupation, a faction of the permanent officers maintained clandestine contact with Cairo and accommodated the British and the Greek government-in-exile by providing them with intelligence.¹⁷ The other groups, such as the communists and republicans,

¹⁴Th. Bakopoulos, *Ἡ δὴμηρία τῶν πέντε ἀντιστρατήγων*, 1948, p. 19; an extensive discussion of this subject can be found in the memoirs of the first puppet prime minister, George Tsolakoglou, *Ἀπομνημονεύματα*, 1959.

¹⁵In the summer of 1941, the breakdown of the Greek armed forces in the Middle East was as follows:

Army: 250 combat officers
5,500 soldiers. This included 1,000 officers and men from the Evros brigade and one battalion of Egyptian Greek volunteers.

Air Force: Initially negligible

Navy: 210 officers
493 non-commissioned officers
1,180 sailors

(See: E. I. Tsouderos, *Ἑλληνικὲς ἀνωμαλίες στὴ Μέση Ἀνατολή*, Athens, 1945, p. 5; S. Grigoriadis, *op. cit.*, p. 59; A. Sakellarios, *Ἐνας ναύαρχος θυμᾶται*, Athens, 1971, p. 351.)

¹⁶G. M. Alexander, *The Prelude to the Truman Doctrine*, Oxford, 1982, p. 9; P. Kanellopoulos, *Ἡμερολόγιο*, Athens, 1977, pp. 35-39; E. I. Tsouderos, *op. cit.*, pp. 15-20. This process of broadening the Greek government-in-exile received the active encouragement of the British foreign office (L. Woodhouse, *British Foreign Policy in the Second World War*, vol. 3, London, 1971, pp. 385-386), but it was not popular with the royalist faction (L. MacVeagh, *Ambassador MacVeagh Reports*, Princeton, 1980, pp. 390-391).

¹⁷Contact with Cairo was maintained by a committee of six colonels and

equally refrained from active opposition and confined their efforts to establishing a political infrastructure for a resistance movement.¹⁸ Yet when the resistance began, the permanent officers did not join any of the established organizations, but preferred to remain on the sidelines. The few officers who did get involved with the resistance were those who had been members of a secret military group opposed to the Metaxas regime. By 1941, approximately 12 from this group, out of the original 80, were left in Greece, and in May they made contact with the KKE.¹⁹ Later, after the establishment of EAM, this group of officers expanded to 40 and attempted to recruit professional officers for ELAS.²⁰ Initially, ELAS was only able to attract a few reserve officers and even fewer professional officers. This, however, changed dramatically when Sarafis was appointed military commander of ELAS. The presence of Sarafis in ELAS, as well as other well-known officers such as Bakirdzis, Mandakas, and Othonaios, ultimately attracted many officers from the regular army and a large number of retired republican officers.²¹ By the end of 1943, ELAS included approximately 600 permanent officers and 1,250 former permanent officers, as well as approximately 2,000 lower ranking reserve officers. In all, these represented approximately

further facilitated by the use of couriers. By these means, the government-in-exile and the British could pass on instructions to the permanent officers, as well as employ them to collect intelligence. Unfortunately, this aspect of the history of the resistance has received little attention since the bulk of the material concerning these activities is still classified. The historian, consequently, is forced to deal with this subject by relying on popular accounts and brief comments in the primary sources. (See C. M. Woodhouse, *The Apple of Discord*, p. 30, *The Struggle for Greece*, p. 28 and p. 51; K. Th. Bakopoulos, *op. cit.*, pp. 23-28, R. D. Rigopoulos, *Ο μυστικός πόλεμος*, Athens, 1973; G. B. Ioannidis, *Έλληνες και ξένοι κατάσκοποι στην Ελλάδα*, Athens, 1951.)

¹⁸Just as in the case of permanent officers, the republicans were also discouraged from participating in the resistance (S. Sarafis, *ELAS: Greek Resistance Army*, London, 1980, p. 53). According to Choutas (*Η εθνική αντίσταση των Έλλήνων*, Athens, 1961, pp. 159-163), in February 1943 a document came into the possession of Zervas which cautioned officers loyal to the king's government not to become politically identified with EDES or ELAS but to use their participation in these organizations to the benefit of the government. This warning demonstrated that the government-in-exile had as many misgivings concerning EDES as it did over ELAS, but it also provides a clue to the subtle change of policy concerning the role of officers in the resistance.

¹⁹F. N. Grigoriadis, *Γερμανοί, Κατοχή, Αντίσταση*, vol. 5, 1973, pp. 279-301; Th. Chatzis, *Η νικηφόρα επανάσταση που χάθηκε*, Athens, 1982, p. 83 and p. 268, see note 2.

²⁰Early efforts met with little success, and it was not until after the spring of 1943 that a large number of officers joined ELAS (S. Sarafis, *op. cit.*, pp. 168-170; Th. Chatzis, *op. cit.*, pp. 266-273).

²¹C. M. Woodhouse, *The Apple of Discord*, *op. cit.*, p. 67; S. Sarafis, *op. cit.*, pp. 168-170; D. M. Condit, *Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II*, Washington, 1961, p. 153.

31% of the officers available in Greece and 21% of the entire officer corps.²²

Originally, the other resistance groups were equally unsuccessful in attracting professional officers. Partly because they represented republican or left-wing organizations, they could not interest officers loyal to the monarchy, who preferred to leave Greece or remain inactive. Another difficulty faced by these groups was that they failed to maintain a united front during the course of the occupation and developed at different intervals. The establishment of partisan groups by organizations such as EKKA in 1943 diverted potential recruits from EDES, which had initiated operations at the same time as ELAS. Later, when these smaller groups were dispersed by ELAS or the Germans, only some of their officers sought refuge with EDES, the others left the resistance or joined ELAS. By the fall of 1943, EDES included approximately 900 officers, of whom the majority were victims of the 1930's purges despite the fact that Zervas had accepted the monarchy.²³

²²Accurate figures concerning both the number of andartes and officers present a difficult problem and it is only possible to provide rough statistics. According to D. M. Condit, *op. cit.*, p. 67, the number of regular officers in ELAS was approximately 800 and 1,500 from the group of purged republican officers. The study by Condit, however, bases its figures on Woodhouse (*The Apple of Discord*, *op. cit.*, p. 67) and S. Sarafis (the 1951 English edition, p. 52, 176), who do not provide any statistics.

F. N. Grigoriadis, *op. cit.*, vol. 6, p. 692, suggests that the 800 permanent officers included those that had retired. A good source for the number of permanent officers in ELAS, as well as their status, is provided for in the journal *Ἀντίσταση*, vol. 28 (August 1981), "Ἡ συμμετοχὴ μονίμων ἀξιωματικῶν στὸν ἐθνικοαπελευθερωτικὸ ἀγῶνα 1941-1944," pp. 58-67. According to this article, the professional officers in ELAS were in the following categories:

Army

Active Permanent (combat) officers	366
Retired Permanent (combat) officers:	53
Active Permanent (non-combat) officers:	14
Retired Permanent (non-combat) officers:	1

Navy

3 active and one retired officer

Air Force

2 retired and 19 active officers

Military Academy Cadets

10

Also included are one active and 3 retired generals, as well as a list of 112 officers whose status in the armed forces is not indicated, 7 officers whose rank is not provided, 16 active officers and 2 retired officers in the *Χοροφυλακή*, for a total of 610 officers.

Along with the permanent officers, approximately 1,250 officers, who had been purged during the 1930's, also served with ELAS, of whom approximately 1,000 had been excluded from the armed forces during 1940-1941 (L. Spais, *op. cit.*, p. 233). The number of 1,250 is based by averaging out the figures provided by Condit and Spais.

²³This figure too is only a rough estimate. According to S. Grigoriadis, *op.*

EDES not only failed to create a more popular movement but up to the summer of 1943 was still identified with the republican cause. At first, the news of the reconciliation of Zervas with the monarchy was kept secret and only became public knowledge later. As such, up until this point, ELAS by virtue of its size and strength presented to many permanent officers a better alternative than EDES.

In the spring of 1943, the royalist faction of the officer corps made an attempt to create an organization to represent and maintain the unity of the permanent officers. This group was founded by six generals under the auspices of General Papagos on May 20, 1943, and was appropriately named the Military Hierarchy. Within a short space of time, the Military Hierarchy was able to extend its influence among the permanent officers in Athens and through them made contact with officers who resided in the prewar regions of the Greek army divisions.²⁴ Their program included support for those fighting the occupation forces and emphasized the desire of these officers to preserve the established social order by maintaining control of Athens when the Germans evacuated the city.²⁵ Shortly after, the six generals were arrested and deported to a concentration camp. Before their arrest, however, they attempted to activate their proposals but failed to solicit any interest from the resistance and the British. In effect, the Military Hierarchy had come too late to have any chance of influencing the course of the resistance. Indeed, the attempt to establish a military organization destined to assume the leadership of the resistance indicated a change of policy on the part of the representatives of the professional officers: this demonstrated that they were now prepared to sanction the struggle against the occupation forces. Their motives were open for discussion, but their change of policy now encouraged many permanent officers to join the resistance.²⁶ In addition,

cit., p. 387, the number was 829, but according to an OSS intelligence report of July 6, 1944, the number of officers serving with EDES in the fall of 1943 was 1,200 (National Archives, RG 226, L40764).

²⁴K. Th. Bakopoulos, *op. cit.*, p. 34-38; S. Grigoriadis, *op. cit.*, p. 234-237; N. A. Stavrou, *op. cit.*, pp. 36-41; F. N. Grigoriadis, *op. cit.*, vol. 6, pp. 625-633.

²⁵K. Th. Bakopoulos, *op. cit.*, pp. 34-38.

²⁶Taken out of context, the appearance of the Military Hierarchy in May 1943 seems like a futile gesture on the part of Papagos, but if it is considered within a broader spectrum of events which followed in the winter and spring of 1943, the organization of the generals may have had an effect on the attitude of the permanent officers toward the resistance. By January 1943, the destruction of the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad was complete. This, as well as the earlier German defeat at El Alamein, pointed to an ultimate allied victory. In early 1943, Zervas became reconciled with the monarchy, and later in the year was reinstated in the Greek army. In April 1943, Sarafis joined ELAS and shortly after began to organize ELAS along military lines. Thus, it is at the tail end of these events that the Military Hierarchy was created. Equally evident is that during this period the permanent officers started to make their way to the resistance in the mountains, as earlier attempts to attract professional officers had met with little success (see note 20). As ELAS and EDES expanded, other groups such as EKKA,

the reconciliation of Zervas with the monarchy, the dispersal of smaller resistance groups by ELAS, and the establishment of the security battalions, altered the composition of the professional officers within the resistance movement.

The reconciliation of Zervas with the king made EDES acceptable to officers loyal to the monarchy.²⁷ The armed clashes between EDES and ELAS ultimately affected the proportion of republican and royalist officers within EDES. During the course of these conflicts, EDES was brought to the brink of destruction several times but managed to survive by recruiting officers and men regardless of their political affiliation. For example, after the first major clash with ELAS in the fall of 1943, Zervas was left with approximately 150 men, but with British support, EDES was soon able to reach a strength of approximately 2,000. By early 1944, EDES was down again to approximately 800 *andartes*, but in the early spring of 1944 Zervas was able to increase his force to approximately 5,000 men.²⁸ During these fluctuations, a number of republican officers forced to leave EDES were replaced, to some extent, by permanent officers loyal to the monarchy. At the same time, some of the republican officers who had belonged to EDES, EKKA, and to some of the smaller organizations dispersed by ELAS, sought refuge or revenge by enlisting in the security battalions.²⁹ Established in the summer of 1943, these units were created by the puppet government of

PAO, EOA, and ES, also acquired support from professional officers and attempted to put forces in the field. The question we must ask is, whether any connection existed between these activities and the formation of the Military Hierarchy or were the generals simply following the course of events? The first point to consider is that Papagos exercised some influence over the permanent officers and represented, at least unofficially, the king and his government, which had initially discouraged officers from joining the resistance in the mountains. At the same time, both the government-in-exile and Papagos had the means of communicating with each other and with the ranks of permanent officers (see note 17). By the spring of 1943, the war had turned in favor of the allies, and the earlier inhibitions the generals had concerning opposition against a possibly victorious Germany no longer applied. As such, the development of a resistance hostile to the established order required a change of policy by the unofficial representatives of the government-in-exile. This meant the establishment of contacts with the resistance and ultimately control of it by officers loyal to the government. Although the Military Hierarchy failed to take direct control of the resistance, it did encourage officers who subscribed to its principles to join the partisan groups in the mountains. The presence of a large number of officers with the resistance would have given the Military Hierarchy the means by which they could have established implicit control over partisan organizations. Yet, despite the arrest of the generals, the number of officers in the resistance increased rapidly by the spring of 1943, and this change of attitude has to be considered not so much in conjunction with any one event, but rather must be seen as the cumulative result of a series of events.

²⁷C. M. Woodhouse, *The Apple of Discord*, *op. cit.*, p. 75 and see note 26.

²⁸National Archives, RG 228, LA0764.

²⁹Woodhouse, *The Apple of Discord*, *op. cit.*, p. 85, 87; S. Grigoriadis,

Ioannis Rallis ostensibly for the purpose of combating communism and, to a lesser extent, to oppose the return of the king. During the course of their existence, the security battalions attracted approximately 1,000 professional officers, most of whom were adherents to the republican cause while others were simply opportunists or criminals.³⁰

Consequently, by 1944, the membership of EDES no longer represented the anti-monarchist faction but had come to reflect a broad spectrum of right-wing forces opposed just as much to ELAS as to the Germans. Furthermore, by this time, the rapid development of EAM-ELAS threatened the social order espoused by the republicans and royalists. In the case of ELAS, the large number of permanent officers compounded its military strength and added a degree of legitimacy which enhanced the respectability of ELAS in the eyes of the population. In effect, by the end of the occupation, both ELAS and EDES included a large number of permanent officers who did not belong to the republican faction. Their presence in these organizations, however, was not so much determined by political considerations but by a personal and, for many of these officers, recent commitment to the concept of resistance. This is reflected by the fact that very few of the professional officers in ELAS followed the communist uprising in 1946, while those in EDES accepted demobilization without regret.³¹

The resistance, consequently, obscured the political identity of the professional officers, since the principal organizations which formed the opposition in the mountains at the end of the occupation did not serve as the focal points of the republican-royalist schism. The political debate in Greece had shifted to another level, which was beyond the *raison d'être* of the old factions.³² Thus when the rank-and-file of permanent officers decided to join the resistance, they did so as individuals and

op. cit., p. 322; F. N. Grigoriadis, *op. cit.*, vol. 6, pp. 819-830; National Archives, RG 226, 83476.

³⁰The appeal to anti-royalist officers was made in several ways. The purpose of the battalions was to fight against communism and it was implied that they could oppose the return of the king. At the same time, all officers purged from the armed forces since 1927 were made eligible for employment with their former rank or in some cases with a higher rank. This, plus the association of some prominent officers with the leadership of the battalions, gave many of them the incentive to join. The majority of the royalist officers in the battalions came from organizations dispersed by ELAS and it is ironic that the representatives of the schism found themselves in these forces (see, National Archives, RG 226 83476; L. Spaïs, *op. cit.*, pp. 263-264; Woodhouse, *The Apple of Discord*, *op. cit.*, pp. 96-97; F. N. Grigoriadis, *op. cit.*, vol. 7, pp. 256-261; Sarafis, *op. cit.*, pp. 223-224, 285, 286-287; P. Roussos, *Η μεγάλη πενταετία*, Athens, 1976, p. 514. H. Fleischer, "Νέα στοιχεία για τη σχέση Γερμανικών αρχών κατοχής και Ταγμάτων Ασφαλείας," *Μνήμων*, Athens, 1980, p. 191).

³¹F. N. Grigoriadis, *op. cit.*, vol. 6, p. 693.

³²On this subject, see J. A. Petropoulos, "The Traditional Political Parties of Greece During the Axis Occupation," *Greece in the 1940's: A Nation In Crisis*, Hanover and London, 1981, pp. 27-36.

not as representatives of any particular political group. The republican officers who had preceded them earlier in the resistance had, by 1944, lost their cohesion as a group and now served with the royalists in the same organizations. In this sense, the officer corps survived the occupation and the majority of its members reentered the armed forces in the postwar period. From approximately 8,786 professional officers available at the beginning of the occupation, approximately 6,286 remained in Greece, and 47% of these served with the major resistance groups.³³ In the final analysis, the role of the officer corps in the resistance was determined by the contribution of its members to all the partisan forces in the mountains and was characterized by their professional capacity in these organizations.

³³This is based on approximately: 1,860 officers in ELAS
1,000 officers in EDES
80 officers in EKKA.

The Roots of British, American, and Yugoslav Policy Toward Greece in 1944

by JOZE PIRJEVEC

The events of the last dramatic months before the collapse of the German Occupation in Greece has been reported many times both by contemporary actors and historians. The main lines of its international dimension are, thanks to those works, fairly well-known: (a) the British conflicting short-term and long-term policies dictated by the need to support the EAM/ELAS guerrillas in the fight against the Axis and to have a friendly government, possibly a constitutional monarchy, installed in postwar Greece; (b) the Yugoslav ambition to lead the Greek partisans on revolutionary paths in combination with the Yugoslav interest in Greek Macedonia; (c) the ambiguous American attitude to the events in the Balkans, marked by the sympathetic stand which President Roosevelt took on the British entanglement in Greek affairs and the distrust shown by the Secretary of State; (d) the cool Soviet thinking and acting in terms of power in Eastern Europe during the last year of the war. All this has been explained in many memoirs and has been the object of scholarly research. Nevertheless, some new publications, especially the correspondence between Tito and Churchill, and some new documents from the British archives can help us to add a few details to these events.

The British concept of the postwar political order in the Mediterranean was based on the vision of a chain of constitutional monarchies in Italy, Yugoslavia, Albania, and Greece. This idea was dear to Churchill, not only because of his dynastic sympathies but also because of his conviction—as the Italian historian, Gaetano Salvemini, says—that monarchy in these countries would be an instrument of British domination.¹ What better means to secure the “imperial lifeline” in the Mediterranean and to affirm the vitality of the British empire? This concept was challenged, however, by the resistance movements, which took place in the countries concerned and had quite different ideas about the future of their respective nations after the Liberation.

British diplomats had few illusions about those plans. As early as December 1943, Ralph Stevenson, British ambassador to the Yugoslav

¹Wanda De Nunzio Schilardi, Carteggio Salvemini-Petraglione, *Prospettive settanta*, Rivista trimestrale diretta da Giuseppe Galasso, nuova serie, a.V, n. 2-3, 1983, p. 292.

royal government-in-exile informed the Foreign Office: "There is no doubt whatever that the partisans are in touch with E.A.M. in Greece as they are with L.N.C. in Albania but I should not think that the attitude of E.A.M. towards the King of Greece has influenced Tito. I should say rather that the attitude of these movements towards their respective monarchies are evidence of a common republican policy pursued with the knowledge, and possibly the approval of Soviet Russia."²

American diplomatic circles took quite a fatalistic stand to such a perspective. As Isaiah Berlin, an official at the British embassy in the U.S. wrote to the Foreign Office on January 23, 1944, there was talk in Washington that "if this represents a 'hand off' warning by Russia... with regard to South Eastern Europe generally... there is little that can be done to prevent it."³ Clearly enough, Churchill was not prepared to accept such a trend of events without fighting. In the following months, he initiated a complex diplomatic activity in order to save his political vision of the Mediterranean area. It is interesting to note that his public utterances at this time were quite different from his more private thoughts and actions. In a major speech, on February 22, at the Commons, he proclaimed in fact: "Here, in these islands, we are attached to the monarchical principle, and we have experienced the many blessings of constitutional monarchy, but we have no intention of obtruding our ideas upon the people of any country. Greece, Yugoslavia, Italy—all will be perfectly free to settle what form their governments shall take, so far as we are concerned, once the will of the people can be obtained under conditions of comparative tranquility."⁴

On the operative level, however, he took quite an opposite approach. His attitude to the different guerrilla movements was in any case very flexible and shaped mainly by three considerations: the strength of the particular movement, its usefulness in fighting the Germans, and the influence which Britain, in his opinion, should and could have after the war in every particular country. In regard to Italy, he had no special fears, being that the south of the peninsula was already in British and American hands, although he was not happy with the large presence of the communists in the Committee for National Liberation. In any case, he didn't forget to show his leanings toward the Badoglio-Victor Emanuel regime.⁵ The situation in the Balkans was different, of course, as the three guerrilla movements in Yugoslavia, Albania, and Greece were considered a serious threat to British interests in the area. The most powerful of them was a partisan army led by Marshal Tito, with whom Churchill thought he could make a political deal: he wanted to convince Tito, in exchange for British aid, to col-

²Dusan Biber (ed.) *Tito-Churchill, strogo tajno*, Globus, Zagreb, 1981, p. 67.

³H. G. Nicholas (ed.), *Washington Dispatches 1941-1945*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1981, p. 310.

⁴D. Biber, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

⁵H. G. Nicholas, *op. cit.*, pp. 327, 332.

laborate with the Yugoslav royal government-in-exile, in order to save King Peter's throne and British influence in the country. Churchill's attitude toward EAM/ELAS was not biased by the romantic sympathy he felt for the Yugoslav guerrillas. "There is no comparison," he wrote to Eden on February 24, "between them [EAM/ELAS] and the bands of Tito." He didn't consider them (at least at this time) as a force useful to "kill Germans"—to put it in his own crude words—but only as "base and treacherous people" out solely for their own ends, and therefore he decided to break his links with them as soon and whenever advisable.⁶ As for the Albanian guerrillas, finally, the British didn't lend them any great attention. They decided that they would give military aid to LNC only after a reconciliation between the former and the Zogist party.⁷

In March 1944, the Soviet Union made a series of political moves which caused widespread anxiety in the West. The recognition of Badoglio came as a complete surprise in the middle of the month and was interpreted as an attempt to strengthen Soviet influence in Italy. In the United States, many commentators agreed that the Soviets were scoring off Britain and America not only in Eastern but in Western Europe.⁸ This impression was emphasized by the approving attitude of the Soviet government toward the pro-EAM mutiny in the Greek army in Egypt the following month. Churchill, who had taken charge of the Foreign Office since Eden had gone on holiday, reacted in a swift way: he addressed a sharp warning to Vjaseslav Molotov, the Soviet commissar for foreign affairs, but concluded his message with a reference to Rumania, stating that Great Britain regarded the Soviet Union as the "predominating power" in that country.⁹ This first offer to divide the Balkans into spheres of influence was acknowledged by the Soviets only a month later, a delay which caused many a headache in British political circles. "Evidently," Eden commented on May 4, "we are approaching a showdown with the Russians about their Communist intrigues in Italy, Yugoslavia and Greece. I think that their attitude becomes more difficult every day."¹⁰

In fact, the news coming from the Balkans was not encouraging. It was more and more evident that the resistance forces in the peninsula were collaborating very closely. In a memorandum written in May, Churchill asserted that Tito was probably aiming at the creation of a soviet Yugoslav state, and that his contacts with Greek and Bulgarian

⁶Richard Clogg, "Pearls Before Swine: The FO papers, S.O.E. and the Greek Resistance," in *British Policy Towards Wartime Resistance in Yugoslavia and Greece*, ed. by Phyllis Auty and Richard Clogg, Macmillan, 1975, p. 199.

⁷PRO, CAB 79/77, COS (44), 205th Meeting, 22.6.1944.

⁸H. G. Nicholas, *op. cit.*, p. 331.

⁹George M. Alexander, *The Prelude to the Truman Doctrine, British Policy in Greece 1944-1947*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1982, p. 17.

¹⁰Walter R. Roberts, *Tito, Mibailovic and the Allies, 1941-1945*, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1973, pp. 240, 241.

partisans suggested even more ambitious plans.¹¹ This suspicion had been hardly formulated when it was confirmed by Tito himself, who said to the American major, Richard Weil, that it was highly possible that after the war Albania, Greece, Bulgaria, and even Rumania would form with Yugoslavia a strong federal entity with a central federal government.¹²

However, at the end of May, the wind began seemingly to blow into British sails. First of all, the Soviets indicated that they were willing to do business in the Balkans.¹³ On May 25, the German forces attacked Tito's stronghold in Bosnia and compelled him to transfer his headquarters to the island of Vis, under British protection. Some days later, on June 12, Roosevelt, without informing the State Department, gave his blessing to Churchill's Balkan plans.¹⁴ At the end of June came an urgent and secret telegram for the prime minister from the head of the British military mission in Yugoslavia, Brigadier Maclean, who informed Churchill that Tito's collaboration with the Greek partisans was deteriorating badly.¹⁵ At the same time, the military operations in Italy were successful and Churchill believed that General Alexander could reach Bologna by mid-August and capture Trieste by the middle of September.¹⁶ The stage was set for a more incisive policy in Southeast Europe, a policy which was seen to manifest itself in a double action: first of all, the occupation of Greece, this "corner stone of the British influence in the Balkans"¹⁷ and, at the same time, an advance of General Alexander's armies northeastward through the Ljubljana Gap, in order—to say it with Churchill—to "threaten the whole of the enemy's position in the Balkans and to approach the advancing Russians."¹⁸

This ambitious plan was heavily clouded at the end of July when a Soviet military mission was sent to the headquarters of ELAS in Greece. The fact that Colonel Popov and his officers had been dropped by parachute from a Soviet aircraft based at Bari, which was allowed to operate from there and communicate only with the Yugoslav partisans, was very strongly resented by the British authorities. In the papers regarding the meetings of the chiefs of staff, one can follow a long discussion about retaliation measures against the Soviets for this act of deception.¹⁹ The political consequences of this event was even more far-reaching since it was considered by Churchill as final proof of Rus-

¹¹D. Biber, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

¹²*Ibid.*, p. 166.

¹³David Carlton, "Great Power Spheres-of-Influence in the Balkans: 1944 and After," in David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf (ed.), *South-Eastern Europe after Tito, A Powder-Keg for the 1980s*, Macmillan, London, 1983, p. 54.

¹⁴Lawrence S. Wittner, *American Intervention in Greece*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1982, p. 17.

¹⁵D. Biber, *op. cit.*, p. 206.

¹⁶PRO, CAB, 79/77, COS (44), 225th Meeting, 6.7.44.

¹⁷PRO, J.P. (44), 155 (Final), 30.6.44.

¹⁸PRO, CAB 65/47 (44) 88th C.A., 7.7.44.

¹⁹PRO, CAB, 79/78, COS (44), 259th Meeting, 4.8.44.

sian bad faith and as a clear sign that his policy in Southeast Europe should be implemented as soon as possible. The fact that the Americans began to show reluctance in regard to this policy, in order, as Eden and Churchill suspected, "not to be involved in the Balkans"²⁰ was a nuisance which, however, could not stop the British prime minister. He was haunted by the brilliant Soviet military successes in Eastern Europe and by the impression that the Red Army was spreading across the continent like a tide.²¹ At the very beginning of August, he flew to Italy to meet General Alexander and to see both Tito and the Greek prime minister, George Papandreou. The meetings with the Balkan politicians were characterized by half-truths and open lies. Tito, whose position at the time was not very strong, tried to please Churchill, and assured him that he was not thinking of imposing communism on Yugoslavia. Asked about the Balkan federation, he answered that the only federation he had in mind was the Yugoslav one, since the Balkan peoples were not prepared—in his view—to live together.²² In spite of these assurances, the British prime minister was somewhat disenchanted by him and began to think that he was not to be trusted.²³ Papandreou, on the other hand, was eager to ask for what Churchill wanted: the intervention of British troops in Greece. As is well-known, this intervention had been already decided, but Churchill, for reasons of security, deliberately preferred to make no promises.²⁴

In short, the journey to Italy convinced the British prime minister that his policy in the Balkans should be decided on a different level in direct contact with the superpowers. At the beginning of September, Churchill went to Quebec in order to meet Roosevelt and press him to take a more militant policy in the peninsula. The result of the conference was largely disappointing: Roosevelt, in the close of an election year, was not prepared to back the British in that area openly, since the avowed American policy was to liberate the occupied countries and let people choose their own governments.²⁵ However, Churchill didn't abandon hope to realize, with American help, his cherished idea of an Allied landing on the Istrian peninsula, which, as he stressed again and again in Quebec, "had not only a military value but also a political value in view of the Russian advances in the Balkans."²⁶

The second major move by Churchill at this time was his well-known journey to Moscow in October 1944. He went to the meeting with Stalin oppressed by the clear consciousness of his dramatically weak posi-

²⁰Anthony Eden, *Memoirs: The Reckoning*, London, Cassell, 1965, p. 468.

²¹Bruce R. Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1980, p. 104.

²²D. Biber, *op. cit.*, pp. 277, 281.

²³A. Eden, *op. cit.*, p. 470.

²⁴G. M. Alexander, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

²⁵David Carlton, *Anthony Eden, A Biography*, Penguin Books, London, 1981, p. 242.

²⁶PRO, CAB 80/88, CCS, 172nd Meeting, 12.9.44.

tion. By the end of August, the Soviet forces controlled Rumania. In September, they entered Bulgaria, and on the eighteenth of the same month Tito secretly abandoned the island of Vis and flew to Moscow to seek Soviet aid for the final struggle in Yugoslavia.²⁷ As the resident minister for the central Mediterranean, Harold Macmillan, put it: "We cannot hide from ourselves that our military strategy by concentrating all our efforts on the west of Europe has deprived us of effective power in Roumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece and hardly gives us sufficient strength to finish the Italian campaign. We must certainly do all we can by bluff but it is no good using bluff so transparently that it is easily called."²⁸

Churchill's famous deal with Stalin about the spheres of influence in the Balkans and in the Danube valley was such a bluff, since he offered Stalin what the Red Army had already conquered and asked for himself what the British troops did not have. Stalin accepted the deal without obviously renouncing his own plans. His opinion of Churchill was already firmly set. As he told Milovan Djilas some months earlier: "Churchill was a man capable—if you are not on your guard—to take a kopek out of your pocket."²⁹ It is interesting that the most important Soviet historian of the diplomacy of the Second World War, Israeljan, in the Russian version of his book on the anti-Hitler coalition, hotly denies any significance to the so-called "naughty document" presented by Churchill to Stalin, with the list of Balkan countries and of the Great Powers' proportion of interest in them. In the English version of the book, he even omits every reference to this famous episode.³⁰ It was actually an episode which didn't leave much of a trace even in British diplomatic circles, since, only four years later, nobody in the Foreign Office was able to remember it.³¹ The development of events took a direction which was quite different from the bargain concluded by Churchill and Stalin in Moscow. The English prime minister realized this quickly and adapted his policy to the harsh reality of the day. Already some months later, he wrote to Stalin "that the way things have worked out in Yugoslavia certainly does not give me the feeling of a fifty-fifty interest and influence as between our two countries. . . ." But, he added, "I do not complain. . . ."³² And on another paper he minuted

²⁷Elisabeth Barker, *British Policy in South-East Europe in the Second World War*, Macmillan, London, 1976, p. 125.

²⁸D. Biber, *op. cit.*, p. 333.

²⁹Milovan Djilas, *Der Krieg der Partisanen, Jugoslawien 1941-1945*, Molder, Wien, 1977, p. 501.

³⁰V. L. Israeljan, *Diplomateskaja Istorija Velikoj Otecestvennoj Vojny, 1941-1945*, gg., Moskva, 1959, Izd. Instituta mezhdunarodnyh otnosenii, pp. 260-263; V. Issraeljan, *The Anti-Hitler Coalition*, Moscow, Progress Publishers 1971, p. 318.

³¹PRO, FO 371 88344, RY 1673/1.

³²Truman Library, Independence, Naval Aid-Communications, Churchill to Truman, 29.4.1945.

at the same time: "Nothing will wrest Yugoslavia from the Russian grip. In this particular theatre the policy is 'disengage.' On the contrary in Greece it is 'hold fast.'"³³

³³D. Biber, *op. cit.*, p. 504.

Alexander, Berthold, and Claus Graf Stauffenberg, The Stefan George Circle, and Greece: Background to the Plot Against Hitler

by PETER HOFFMAN

The Stauffenberg brothers were youths with a radiance. Rainer Maria Rilke said of them, when he corresponded with their mother, that they were "lads of the future in many facets."¹ Their father came from a long line of South German service nobility: he was an officer, a Lord Chamberlain at the royal court of Württemberg in Stuttgart, and a practical man. The mother, née Countess Uxkull-Gyllenband, was a descendant of a Swedish family, and of Count von Gneisenau.² The elder twins, Alexander and Berthold, were born in March 1905, the younger twins in November 1907; Claus's twin died on the day after his birth.³

The brothers were precocious intellectually, read difficult works at an early age, and played musical instruments. They were raised in a religious Catholic environment; Alexander became emancipated from this only gradually, Berthold gave signs of agnosticism at the age of two-and-a-half and remained a skeptic, Claus kept his faith; all three of them began to write poems before they were ten years old.⁴

The mother's attachment to literary figures of the time was more than fleeting and, although marginal, it was serious rather than modish. Rilke's physician from August 1914 was a relative, Dr. Wilhelm Freiherr von Stauffenberg, in Munich; the contact had been established

¹Rainer Maria Rilke, *Briefe aus den Jahren 1914 bis 1921*, Leipzig, 1937, No. 97, pp. 230-231.

²Gerd Wunder, *Die Schenken von Stauffenberg: Eine Familiengeschichte*, Stuttgart, 1972, p. 479; *Gothaisches Genealogisches Taschenbuch der Gräflichen Häuser*, Teil A, 109, Jahrgang 1936, Gotha [1935], pp. 590-591.

³Wunder, pp. 479-480.

⁴Theodor Pfizer, *Im Schatten der Zeit 1904-1948*, Stuttgart, 1979, pp. 55-60; Klaus Mchnert, *Ein Deutscher in der Welt: Erinnerungen 1906-1981*, Stuttgart, 1981, pp. 62-64; Caroline Gräfin von Stauffenberg, mss. notes, author's archive.

through him (he died in 1918). Rilke, on the other hand, was attracted by nobility.⁵

The contact with Stefan George and his friends was less direct, but George was a constant static hum in the atmosphere. Born in 1868 as the son of a Rhineland wine merchant, he became a friend of Symbolists including Mallarmé, and the leader of a "cosmic" group of poets in Munich, a rejuvenator of poetic writing, who had great influence upon German patriotic lyricism. He died in 1933.⁶

Woldemar and Bernhard Count von Uxkull were uncles of the Stauffenberg brothers, but they were only a few years older and closer to the role of cousins.⁷ They had been introduced to George by Dr. Ernst Morwitz, a judge in the Berlin Kammergericht, when they had been eight and nine years old, before the First World War.⁸ George sought to surround himself with young friends of beauty, fine education, and poetic ability, and he was especially pleased when he found these qualities in young noblemen. He regretted that they were difficult to contact and declared himself gratified when this changed after the war.⁹ There were other roads still leading the brothers into George's circle, preparing them for what became a most profound influence in their lives.

In the king's residence in Stuttgart, good schools were readily available. The *Gymnasium illustre*, a secondary school emphasizing classical studies that had been founded in 1686 by one of the predecessors of King Wilhelm II of Württemberg, taught the unusually bright boys Latin and Greek; they read *The Iliad* and *The Odyssey*, Plato's dialogues and Pindar's victory odes.¹⁰ Schoolboys might not be likely to penetrate the mysteries of ancient Greek literature through mind-tiring memorization of vocabularies and difficult grammatical constructions, but there were other media: Hölderlin, George, and a pervasive affinity to Greek studies in German culture.

Hölderlin (1770-1843), educated for the ministry in Tübingen (Württemberg) with Hegel,¹¹ had an aura and a fascination which was lacking in the other established giants of German *Geist* in the poetic

⁵Wunder, pp. 484, 492.

⁶H.-J. Seekamp, R. C. C. Cockenden, M. Keilson, *Stefan George: Leben und Werk. Eine Zeittafel*, Amsterdam [1972], passim; Pfizer, Schatten, pp. 55-60; Mehnert, pp. 62-64; Theodor Pfizer, "Die Brüder Stauffenberg" in Robert Boehringer: *Eine Freundesgabe*, Tübingen, 1957, pp. 487-502.

⁷*Gothaisches Genealogisches Taschenbuch der Gräflichen Häuser 1919*, 92. Jg., Gotha [1918], pp. 1013-1014; Bernhard Victor Graf Uxkull-Gyllenband, *Gedichte*, Düsseldorf & Munich, 1964, pp. 7-8.

⁸Seekamp, p. 185.

⁹Edith Landmann, *Gespräche mit Stefan George*, Düsseldorf, Munich, 1963, p. 162.

¹⁰Pfizer, Schatten, pp. 64-67; Pfizer, "Brüder," pp. 489-497.

¹¹Adolf Beck and Paul Raabe, Hrsg., *Hölderlin: Eine Chronik in Text und Bild*, Frankfurt/M., 1970, pp. 19-51.

field—Goethe, Schiller, and Kleist—and also in the more contemporary Symbolists and Expressionists. Hölderlin personified the image of the ποιητής as maker and creator, as high priest of a vocation with the most dangerous of instruments—language—who suffered Ikaros' and Phaekon's fate, achieving supreme flights of enthusiastic vision and the catastrophic, destructive fall into the darkness of the mind.

Hölderlin had not been well-known in the nineteenth century but he had about him an air of protest, of rejection of established norms, and there were political currents in his poetry that were dangerous and progressive in his time. One may not wish to follow Pierre Bertaux the whole distance and find Hölderlin a Jacobin, but Hölderlin's concept of the future of Germany¹² and of the education and destiny of man was as radical as those of Nietzsche and Lenin. He was rediscovered around 1900, and his emphasis on Greek models and translations of Greek poetry had a decisive impact, making him totally suitable for assimilation by others who identified classical Greece with poetry and a way of life.

Norbert von Hellingrath (who was killed at Verdun in December 1916) wrote a dissertation on Hölderlin's Pindar translations which he submitted in 1910.¹³ In 1909, he had been introduced to Stefan George by Karl Wolfskehl;¹⁴ in 1910, Volume IX of the *Blätter für die Kunst*, George's own serial, contained twenty-four pages of Hölderlin's Pindar translations edited by Hellingrath.¹⁵ In 1897, George had written in *Blätter für die Kunst* of a new direction of German thought and intellectual culture which could be seen in the fact that "a ray of Hellas fell upon us, our youth views life not in base but in glowing terms, they seek the measures of beauty in the corporeal, in the intellectual and spiritual, they have liberated themselves from infatuation with shallow general order and eudemonism (εὐδαιμονισμός, *Beglückung*), as well as from out-dated mercenary barbarism, and they desire to stride through life with their heads held high, and with beauty."¹⁶ Similarly, in January 1929 at Berlin, George said: "The existence of the poetic element is rare. That it became dominant, that happened only once, in Greece."¹⁷

George considered himself the direct heir of Hölderlin, of whom Hellingrath had said that "never since the days of the Greeks had the poetic appeared with burning purity and extreme force" as it did in his work.¹⁸ After the First World War, one of George's friends wrote,

¹²Pierre Bertaux, *Hölderlin und die Französische Revolution*, Frankfurt/M., 1969; Pierre Bertaux, *Friedrich Hölderlin*, Frankfurt/M., 1978.

¹³Friedrich Norbert von Hellingrath, *Pindarübertragungen von Hölderlin*, Leipzig, 1910.

¹⁴Seekamp, p. 204.

¹⁵Seekamp, pp. 204-209; *Blätter für die Kunst IX. Folge*, Berlin, 1910.

¹⁶*Blätter für die Kunst Vierte Folge*, I-II. Band [Berlin, 1897], p. 4.

¹⁷Seekamp, p. 361.

¹⁸Hölderlin: *Sämtliche Werke*. Historisch-kritische Ausgabe unter Mitarbeit

with his agreement, that both Hölderlin and George had desired in the Germans "the rebirth of those heroic powers that had rested in recuperative slumber during the long night of Christianity"; Hölderlin had prophesied, and George had founded, a spiritual-intellectual kingdom, and the German people had in common with the Greeks their intellectual origins—as no other people did.¹⁹

Hölderlin had written a dramatic fragment, *Empedokles*.²⁰ Berthold Stauffenberg chose it for his graduation-year essay from the Gymnasium, and while he worked on it he wrote to an aunt: "Hölderlin and George are the heroes of my veneration."²¹ He was attracted by Hölderlin because the poet was in a deeply Greek sense "political," as he said in *Empedokles*: the poets of our time cannot come to the forefront because, since the time of the Greeks, we have begun again to sing in a patriotic way, naturally, and truly originally.²² The more Hölderlin embraced Greek thought and poetry, the more patriotic he became, wrote Berthold Stauffenberg.²³ In the dramatic, and equally in the historic, figure of Empedocles he found a harmony of polytheism and pantheism, a unity of love and combat which attracted him, the creation of the world through the force of love. But Empedocles, having helped the common people come to power, and having been forced into exile, wandering and healing in Sicily, followed by disciples, had won power over nature through his extreme love, had crossed the line between man and god, and, despairing of his own *hybris*, finally gave his life to pay, through self-sacrifice, for the vision and knowledge he had obtained. Through the sacrifice of his life, Empedocles became the precursor of a new time-making life possible in some mysterious way.

If Berthold Stauffenberg saw the parallel with Jesus of Nazareth, he did not care for it: the end of the closest friendship of his youth demonstrates that.²⁴ Together, the friends had read Plato's *Symposion* and *Phaidon*, Hölderlin's *Hyperion*, Goethe's *Epaminondas*; but when Berthold's friend began to study theology in 1922, "while Berthold was becoming ever more Hellenic," the relationship broke. The friend explained that theology, his calling, was tolerable to him also because

von Friedrich Seebass besorgt durch Norbert v. Hellgrath, Erster Band, Munich, Leipzig, 1913, p. VII; Friedrich Wolters, *Stefan George und die Blätter für die Kunst: Deutsche Geistesgeschichte seit 1890*, Berlin, 1930, pp. 418-419.

¹⁹Wolters, p.426.

²⁰Hölderlin, *Sämtliche Werke (Kleine Stuttgart Ausgabe)*, 4th Band, Stuttgart, 1962.

²¹Berthold Graf von Stauffenberg to his Aunt, Olga Gräfin von Uxkull-Gyllenband [1922], author's archive.

²²Hölderlin, *Sämtliche Werke (Kleine Stuttgarter Ausgabe)*, 6th Band, Stuttgart, 1959, No. 240, pp. 463-464.

²³[Berthold Graf von Stauffenberg], *Des Empedokles Gestalt in Geschichte und Drama*, typescript carbon copy, no date [1922], Theodor Püzer's papers, also for the following.

²⁴For this and the remainder of the paragraph, R. Obermüller to the author, Oct. 28, 1978 and Aug. 15, 1981.

it included Greek studies. But Berthold told his friend that he could not combine Hellas and Jerusalem, and that there was no compromise between Hellas and Christianity. The friend had developed his view of the harmony between Greek philosophy and Christian thought in Plato's *Gorgias* dialogue, in a graduation speech in April 1922, and he ended by saying that Hölderlin's spirit and the genius of a friend had guided him in examining the pedagogic ethics of Plato's *Gorgias*: Δεῖ ἔπεσθαι τῷ κοινῷ (Ἡράκλ.).

In April 1923, after graduation from the Gymnasium, the elder twins moved to Heidelberg to begin studies in law at the university.²⁵ The concept of public service was traditional and natural in the Stauffenberg family. For Alexander, Berthold, and Claus, it received a new and deeper dimension—a deeper historical, even mythological dimension—through their association with Stefan George. It came to mean service for the spiritual and political renewal of the German nation and its imperial tradition.

In April and May, respectively, the elder twins and Claus were introduced to George by two classicists, the historian Woldemar Graf Uxkull, and the philologist Albrecht von Blumenthal.²⁶ They also met Ernst Kantorowicz, who had begun a biography of the Hohenstaufen emperor, Frederick II. For the three brothers, the association with George became discipleship. They formed a profound attachment to the poet, whom they called *Meister*, and were faithful to his ideas beyond his death—and to their own deaths—their lives being governed by whatever George ruled, or would have ruled. They had in fact become part of the Master's Secret Germany, an intellectual underground para-government.²⁷ George had always sought political effectiveness in terms of artistic, poetic, and intellectual education. Based on his conception of the poet as creator, he had worked to place his disciples in the arts, in university positions, and he sought now to infiltrate more immediately political positions such as the Foreign Office and the Reichswehr.²⁸ He spoke frequently of the necessity of taking an active part in political leadership. His exalted estimate of his own stature was equally manifest in the rejection of political attempts to exploit his prestige, and the open repudiation of the perversion of the German historical and national tradition by the Nazis: George refused the offer of a position in the new Literary Academy in May 1933, and he wrote that far from being aloof or uninterested in the political process, he considered the relationship between the intellectual and the political as very complicated, and in any case he had administered German literature and intellect (*dichtung und geist*) for nearly half a century with-

²⁵Seekamp, p. 326.

²⁶Seekamp, p. 326.

²⁷Stefan George, *Gesamt-Ausgabe der Werke*, Endgültige Fassung, Bd. IX, Berlin [1928], pp. 59-65.

²⁸Edgar Salin, *Um Stefan George: Erinnerung und Zeugnis*, Munich, Düsseldorf, 1954, pp. 143-144, 158.

out any academy, and would probably have done so in opposition to an academy had there been one.²⁹

In the winter term of 1923-1924, Berthold continued his study of law at Berlin, while Alexander transferred to the University of Tübingen, abandoned law, and took up ancient history.³⁰ In the spring of 1924, the elder twins and a number of other friends of George, including Kantorowicz, Blumenthal, and the archeologist Erich Boehringer, traveled in Italy, and most of them visited the cathedral in Palermo and the sarcophagus of Frederick II, where a wreath was placed with an inscription signed, "The Secret Germany."³¹

After the conclusion of his studies, Berthold hoped to join the Foreign Service (as another friend of George had done before him), but was not accepted and instead joined the *Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale*, and later the German *Institut für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht in Berlin*; in the war, he served in the international law section of the Naval High Command in the rank of *Marineoberstabsrichter*.³² He negotiated passage through the zones of naval operations for grain shipments to Greece in 1943 and 1944, traveling between Stockholm, Berne, and Geneva, where another friend and Greek scholar (images of Homer and Plato, 1935) procured the grain. He was Dr. Robert Boehringer, founder and chairman of the *Commission Mixte de Secour, Comité de la Croix Rouge Internationale*.³³

Too little is known at this time about direct contacts between the Greek and German resistance movements to permit anything more than the most tenuous speculation. Hagen Fleischer has uncovered many important details of contacts between Greek resistance organizations and German occupation authorities,³⁴ but contacts with the German

²⁹Seekamp, pp. 385-386.

³⁰Pfizer, "Brüder," p. 500; Alexander Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg, *Macht und Geist: Vorträge und Abhandlungen zur Alten Geschichte*, Munich [1972], p. 433.

³¹Seekamp, p. 332; Ernst Kantorowicz, *Kaiser Friedrich der Zweite*, Berlin, 1927, p. 7.

³²A. N. Makarov, "Vorkämpfer der Völkerverständigung und Völkerrechtsgelehrter als Opfer des Nationalsozialismus: 8. Berthold Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg (1905-1944)," *Die Friedens-Warte* 47 (1947), pp. 360-364; Michael Salewski, *Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung 1935-1945*, Band II, Munich, 1975, p. 434.

³³"Biographisches und Bibliographisches," Robert Boehringer, p. 760; Conrad Roediger, "Die internationale Hilfsaktion für die Bevölkerung Griechenlands im Zweiten Weltkrieg," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 11 (1963), pp. 49-71; Robert Boehringer, "Die Brüder Stauffenberg," in Peter Hoffmann, "Claus Graf Stauffenberg und Stefan George: Der Weg zur Tat," *Jahrbuch der Deutschen Schillergesellschaft* XII (1968), pp. 541-542.

³⁴Hagen Fleischer, "Contacts Between German Occupation Authorities and the Major Greek Resistance Organizations: Sound Tactics or Collaboration?" in *Greece in the 1940s: A Nation in Crisis*, ed. John O. Iatrides, Hanover and London, 1981, pp. 48-103; Lars Baerentzen, "Anglo-German Negotiations during

anti-Hitler resistance movement are quite a different matter, and research has not yet reached an advanced stage. Claus Stauffenberg, then a major in the *Organisationsabteilung* in OKH, came to Athens in 1941,³⁵ and sought to divert to Greece some of the Cretan olive oil that was being sold to Turkey by German authorities. Approaches were made, involving considerable danger to Claus and his friend in Athens, but Colonel Hermann Foertsch, Chief of the General Staff, 12th Army (from May 12, 1941), and WB Südost in Thessaloniki, blocked this.³⁶

There was, however, in 1944, at least a sympathetic attitude on the part of General Hubert Lanz, Commander of XXII *Gebirgs-Korps*. In February 1943, he had conspired with the German resistance to have Hitler arrested in Walki near Poltava, and everything had been prepared with the help of Colonel Dr. Hans Speidel (later Rommel's Chief of Staff), when Hitler suddenly decided not to fly to Walki near Poltava, but instead visited Field Marshal von Weichs in Headquarters Army Group B, in Saporoshe.³⁷

Alexander continued his studies in Jena and Würzburg, and wrote a dissertation on Roman imperial history in Malalas (1930), and a *Habilitationsschrift* on King Hieron II of Syracuse (1933).³⁸ His last great work dealt with Sicilian Greece, Trinakria.³⁹ In addition, he translated Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*, and Pindar's Olympic Odes I-III and Pythian Odes I-III and VI-VII.⁴⁰ He became a professor at the University of Würzburg in 1931, and at Strasbourg in 1942; he was wounded twice at the front.⁴¹ In 1944, he was in Athens in the staff of Generalmajor Kurt Schuster-Woldan, through the mediation of a friend and co-conspirator, Professor Rudolf Fahrner, who had taught German literature in the *Deutsches Wissenschaftliches Institut* in Athens since 1937.⁴² Alexander lectured on Themistocles in Fahrner's institute, and, in the spring of 1944, also in Athens, on "Tragedy and State in Early Athens" ("Tragödie und Staat im werdenden Athen").⁴³ This was fraught with critical references to the present conflagration and to the

the German Retreat from Greece in 1944" in *Scandinavian Studies in Modern Greek* 4 (1980), pp. 23-62.

³⁵Eberhard Zeller, *Geist der Freiheit: Der Zwanzigste Juli*, Munich, 1965, pp. 235-236, 244.

³⁶Rudolf Fahrner to the author, April 1984.

³⁷Peter Hoffman, *Widerstand, Staatsstreich, Attentat: Der Kampf der Opposition gegen Hitler*, Munich, 1979, pp. 347-350; Ulrich Bürker, "Einsatz in Griechenland 1944," in *Furchilos und treu. Zum fünfundsiebzigsten Geburtstag von General der Gebirgstruppe a.D. Hubert Lanz*, ed. Charles B. Burdick, Cologne, 1971, pp. 59-70.

³⁸Stauffenberg, p. 434.

³⁹Alexander Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg, *Trinakria: Sizilien und Grossgriechenland in archaischer und frühklassischer Zeit*, Munich, 1963.

⁴⁰Stauffenberg, *Macht*, p. 434.

⁴¹Stauffenberg, *Macht*, p. 433; Fahrner, April 1984.

⁴²Fahrner, April 1984.

⁴³Stauffenberg, *Macht*, pp. 122-139, 41-61; Fahrner, April 1984.

senseless brutality of the Nazi regime. Alexander was engaged passionately in Fahrner's efforts to change the German authorities' policies and to persuade them to show understanding for the history of *modern Greece*.⁴⁴ Research undoubtedly will bring to light many connections established by Alexander.

Claus had met George at the same time as his brothers, in 1923, but he had to go back to Stuttgart and attend the Gymnasium. He had been his brothers' constant companion, and now he was "alone" while they moved in the great world of learning, poetry, and elegance. His health, always tender, began to fail; he stayed home for long periods, but kept up with studies on his own. He sought his brothers' company when he could, as in the winter of 1924-1925 in Berlin where Berthold was a student, where Alexander visited frequently, and where the Master lived. Claus was tutored by Albrecht von Blumenthal, the specialist in Greek philology. In March 1926, he graduated with good marks.⁴⁵

Claus had had an affinity with the heroic from early childhood. In the poems he wrote as a youth of sixteen years of age, he liked to refer to the beauty of Achilles and the glory of Alexander, to Caesar's power and Plato's wisdom:

Denn war Alexander herrlich Cäsar mächtig
Platon weise und Achilles schön
Wo blieb macht dann weisheit herrlichkeit
Ruhm und Schönheit wenn nicht wir sie hätten
Des Staufers und Ottonen blonde erben.⁴⁶

He claimed descent in at least an intellectual sense from Greek and Roman heroes, and from the greatest of medieval emperors. He had also a tendency to pursue points of view opposite to his own or others' true convictions, as a method of testing and questioning them. Thus he thought of becoming a professional musician, then he pursued a serious interest in architecture. Claus finally decided to join the army, enlisting in a cavalry regiment in Bamberg.⁴⁷

In 1936 and 1937, he attended the War Academy and was assigned subsequently to the General Staff.⁴⁸ During the war, he served in divisional staff positions, and from 1940 to the end of 1942 in the Army High Command.⁴⁹ In April 1943, he was wounded in Africa, lost an eye, a hand, and a kneecap, recovered, and was assigned to the staff of the Home Army and Replacement Army Command in

⁴⁴Fahrner, April 1984.

⁴⁵Joachim Kramarz, *Claus Graf Stauffenberg. 15. November 1907-20. Juli 1944. Das Leben eines Offiziers*, Frankfurt/M., 1965, p. 32; Seekamp, pp. 326, 336.

⁴⁶Hoffman, "Stauffenberg," p. 523.

⁴⁷Kramarz, pp. 32-33.

⁴⁸Kramarz, pp. 51-58.

⁴⁹Kramarz, pp. 58-128.

Berlin, where he became the linchpin in the conspiracy against Hitler. He and an older member of the conspiracy, Generalmajor von Tresckow, conceived of the plan to use the Home Army to take over power in Germany, but Hitler had to be killed so that subordinate commanding officers would obey orders from the staff of the Home Army.⁵⁰ This was the problem that led the plot to failure: Stauffenberg found ultimately that nothing could be done unless he both killed the tyrant in east Prussia, five hundred kilometers from Berlin, and led the coup d'état in the capital.⁵¹

Down to the last days of their lives, Claus and his elder brothers were concerned with Greek studies. Claus revised Fahrner's translation of the *Dialogue* of Dionysios Solomos, and he discussed with Berthold translations from the Seventh Canto of *The Iliad*.⁵² The *Dialogue*, of course, was published in Munich in 1943, with an introduction on the Greek struggle for liberation against the Turks.⁵³ Christos Karousos (later director of the National Museum in Athens) and Linos Politis (later professor of modern Greek philology at the University of Thessaloniki) gave valuable assistance.⁵⁴ Claus Stauffenberg wrote in 1943, from his hospital bed, that the *Dialogue* had "occidental importance."⁵⁵ Before the two brothers' sacrificial deaths, Pindar's Victory Odes were on their minds.

⁵⁰Kramarz, pp. 129-154.

⁵¹Kramarz, pp. 188-189.

⁵²Author's archive.

⁵³*Neugriechisches Gespräch: Der Dialog des Dionysios Solomos*, übertragen von Rudolf Fahrner, Munich, 1943.

⁵⁴Fahrner, April 1984.

⁵⁵Author's archive.

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Procopis Papastratis, "Studying Greek History Abroad"
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no. 2, summer 1984.
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- Aphrodite Mavroede, "Makronisos Journal," translated by Eleni Fourtouni,
vol. V, no. 3, fall 1978 (special issue).
- "Yannis Ritsos: A Selection from the Forties," translated by Athan
Anagnostopoulos, vol. VI, no. 3, fall 1978 (special issue).
- Vasilis Vasilikos, "Anatomy Lesson," translated by Athan Anagnostopoulos,
vol. VI, no. 1, spring 1979.

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Letters

To the Editors:

What a pleasure it was to read Kevin Andrews's review of *Eleni*. After all the encomiums, including Woodhouse's enthusiastic praise, here at last was a review which said all the things I had wanted to say and a few things I would have said if I'd thought of them. Not only does Andrews point out the lack of background and balance in Gage's book, faults which are perhaps forgivable in a writer nurtured on hatred for all those associated with the death of his mother, but he reminds us of its unpleasantly narcissistic tone and the shallow sensationalism of its style.

Recently, I was asked to give several seminars on the Greek Resistance as part of a history course on resistance at Cornell. I found myself carrying *Eleni* and Woodhouse's books into the classroom in order to attack the distorted picture they present of the Second World War and Civil War in Greece. Of course, there are biases on the other side, but what is distressing is the bias of the English language press in favor of Gage and Woodhouse. Gage's credentials are that he is his mother's son. They seem to have persuaded reviewers that he has nursed an admirable hatred all his life and that the grotesque caricatures he sets out to kill are representative of the communist leaders of the Resistance.

Even those who point out that there were atrocities on both sides make it sound like an even contest in which the better men won. Woodhouse's credentials are superficially more impressive but no less suspect than Gage's. He was, after all, fighting for the rightwing resistance against the leftwing resistance, and so was in no sense an impartial observer, and yet his own books have been treated with reverence by reviewers as if his dry style made his opinions reliable. As Andrews so eloquently points out, "there is a certain kind of tight-lipped British writing that can be as hysterically partisan as any of the propaganda put out by the side it so passionately opposes." As an example of Woodhouse's partisan inaccuracy, I enjoy quoting my old friend, Colonel Sheppard, who continues to use the title the British army deprived him of after he had been parachuted into Greece to assist Zervas's forces and had the intelligence to realize that the real strength of the resistance lay with Aris and ELAS. In *The Apple of Discord*, Woodhouse had Sheppard killed off by the communists who'd misled him. "I wrote to Woodhouse to tell him I was still alive and well," says Sheppard, but in his revised account, Woodhouse credits the colonel with no suggestion of intelligence. Sheppard, he says, "was quickly taken in hand by

Karagiorgis . . . (and) . . . became an enthusiastic mouthpiece for ELAS, and hence unwittingly for EAM."

It is time Woodhouse and Gage were exposed to serious criticism, and I am grateful to Kevin Andrews for his forthright review. It

is a pity that the writings of this serious and sensitive writer on modern Greece are not better known.

Your sincerely,

Gail Holst Warhaft
Ithaca



To the Editors:

May I congratulate the *Journal* for having published by far the most discerning review of Gage's *Eleni* that I have seen as yet (Kevin Andrews in vol. XI, no. 1.)? Frankly, until I saw this excellent piece, I had given up hope that somebody might dare to say what at least some informed people must have known, but no one, apparently, has been willing to say in public.

I feel, however, that Andrews missed the opportunity to bring out a serious part of the scandal by not looking a bit more closely into Gage's historical details and their quality. Gage proudly announces his intimate knowledge of the Civil War, yet anyone who has read Dominique Eudes's book, *The Kapetanios* (as we all have, I suppose), will know the provenance of Gage's learning, which is sometimes betrayed by his inability to copy out correctly from Eudes. It is also comparatively easy to see how his "childhood reminiscences" have been formed out of later evidence—e.g., his description of Koliyannis has been taken from a mid-sixties photograph—or how he invents details out of the blue. One of these, his description of how he

found out where Anagnostakis lived, just the day after the poor man had died, has already been exposed in the Greek press. Other examples of the same kind can be found. To a serious observer, these things cannot but cast doubt on the *whole* story. Yet historians accept Gage as a source. I do not refer to a writer like C. M. Woodhouse, whom I, like Andrews, would not regard as a historian, but it is a bit disquieting to find that historians have accepted Gage as the pure truth and that, e.g., Richard Clogg, whose expertise and seriousness as a researcher no one would doubt, has referred to Gage's trite melodrama as if it were a historical source, in his *Times Literary Supplement* (April 13, 1984—p. 401) review of former Premier Rallis's books.

My remarks are not intended to belittle Andrews's otherwise uncompromising and outspoken review, but I think that historians should have been told to take care of their reputations. At least Gage's disrespect for Greek history, which is well brought out by Andrews, and Gage's scrupulous reticence about his central sources (e.g., Drapetis), ought to have made scholarly read-

ers skeptical. It is clear why Gage has chosen to write his story as a novel. As a documented report, *Eleni* would not have made the sales now realized, and the gaps would have been too obvious to carry conviction, even with an uninformed reader.

Sincerely,

Ole L. Smith
Copenhagen

ACADEMIC CALENDAR 1985

August — "WOMEN IN CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY," a multilingual conference at Urbino. Details from Paola Bernardini, Istituto di Filologia Classica, Università di Urbino, Piano S. Lucia 6, 61029 Urbino, Italy.

September 26-27 — "SEVENTH NAVAL HISTORY SYMPOSIUM," US Naval Academy, Annapolis. Contact K. J. Hagan, History Dept. US Naval Academy, Annapolis, MD 21402.

September — "INTERNATIONALISM IN THE LABOR MOVEMENT BEFORE 1940," a conference in Amsterdam organized by the International Institute of Social History. Inquiries from Dr. J. R. van de Leeuw at the Institute, Kabelweg 51, 1014 Amsterdam, Holland.