

JOURNAL OF THE HELLENIC DIASPORA

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SEFERIS'S *TURNING POINT*: A TEXTUAL ANALYSIS

by C. CAPRI-KARKA

DOCUMENTS: THE O.S.S. AND GREEK-AMERICANS

by ELIAS VLANTON

IN THE DIALECT OF THE DESERT:
SELECTED POEMS OF YANNIS KONDOS

A DIVIDED LAND:
GREECE IN THE NINETEEN FORTIES

by ALEXANDER KITROEFF

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ERRATUM

The following correction is for the article, "Alexandros Kotzias: *Antipoeisis Archis* and the Poetics of an Antihistorian," published in the spring 1982 (Vol. IX, no. 1) issue of the *Journal*.

Page 28, note 18. After ("Spring 1981)," it should read: "The interpretation pertains to the ending of 'The Death of Ivan Ilyich,' in which the mysticism derives from Ivan Ilyich's illumination, and that his voice is heard after he is declared dead. In *Antipoeisis Archis*, if there is no shift in narrative point of view, and the question ('and how?') is uttered by Menios, and not by the second narrator, then Menios's voice is heard after his death."

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Statement

With this issue of the *Journal*, the editorial board undergoes its first change since it was established at the time of Pella's assumption of the magazine. Dan Georgakas has resigned from the board and Alexander Kitroeff has agreed to join it. We are delighted to report, however, that we have not lost an editor but have gained a writer.

Due to a number of other—and very pressing—writing commitments, Dan Georgakas decided that he could no longer contribute the enormous amount of time required to function as an editor of the *Journal*. However, he will still be writing for us. In fact, he, and we, hope that, being freed from editorial responsibilities, he will be able to commit much more of his time to the creative writing that is not only his specific forte but greatest love. In any case, Dan's contribution to the editorial board during the last six years was always a provocative and, thus, uniquely fruitful one. As the only one of us who was also a member of the *Journal's* original editorial board, his very presence guaranteed that we would never compromise or dilute the militant consciousness—and conscience—that gave the magazine its birth. Also, Dan's singular level-headedness (a quality sorely lacking both from the left and, especially, academe) ensured an editorial project that would never succumb to elitist posturing or intellectual hermeticism. In the end, Dan's editorial intervention came down to the defense of two simple principles: don't become so "serious" that you lose your intelligence and, above all else, don't forget the moral—which is to say, political—impulse for whose reason you presumably exist.

Alexander Kitroeff is, in that precise sense, the perfect person to take over Dan Georgakas's role on our board. While he is a young scholar of extraordinary, and obvious, quality, he also possesses an ethical commitment to knowledge and the world that does not allow him to compromise with any of the structures of

domination that rule over both knowledge and the world. We believe that Alexander will add a great deal to the *Journal*. The very fact that he is our first English-based editor will, in itself, expand the *Journal's* intellectual boundaries. Much more important than that fact, however, is that Kitroeff possesses an understanding of history—which is his specific field of inquiry—that ensures a particular sensitivity to the two most basic beliefs of the *Journal*: that history is made by people as a whole and that people as a whole must have power over their history.

Finally, our second installment of the O.S.S. documents proves that point quite directly, as we see the activities of some of the people who were a part of Greek history in the Forties. It should be stressed once again, however, that what we see here is through the mediation, not of our own eyes—and minds—but of those of the "observers" of the O.S.S. That "agency" becomes especially interesting—and illuminating—when one reads the O.S.S. political evaluations of the Greek personalities of that era.

—*The Editors*



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Seferis's Turning Point: A Textual Analysis*

by C. CAPRI-KARKA

Turning Point is Seferis's first collection of poems. Even in this early work, published in 1931, one can find signs of his profound consciousness of the classical Greek tradition and at the same time of his thorough assimilation of the Greek and European poetic techniques of the time, most notably of the French Symbolists. It is all written in rhyme and, although not as fine in form as his later work, it employs the same complex imagery and symbolism encountered in the collections that followed. Some of the recurrent motifs in his work appear for the first time here, providing the basis for further variation and development in his later poetry of certain essential themes which he keeps reiterating.

The collection opens with the poem "Turning Point," which has the same title as the whole collection. It refers to the persona's change of attitude toward life, presumably as a result of a betrayal in love. This change is also implied in the epigraph of *Turning Point*,¹ and it is also referred to in the poem "Denial" of the same collection. A moment of terror comes to the protagonist, and the delightful journey of love becomes abortive, as betrayal poisons, like a snake, the heavenly garden.

In contrast to the "Turning Point," in which the protagonist acknowledges his love for the person who later betrayed him, in most of the

*This article is taken from C. Capri-Karka's recently-published book, *Love and the Symbolic Journey in the Poetry of Cavafy, Eliot and Seferis*. [Quotations of the poems of the collection *Turning Point* are from G. Seferis, *Collected Poems 1924-1955*, tr. Edmund Keeley and Philip Sherrard (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967). Unless otherwise noted, quotations of poems from other collections are from G. Seferis, *Poems*, tr. Rex Warner (Boston, Mass.: Little Brown & Co., 1960), except for quotations from the *Three Secret Poems*, tr. Walter Kaiser (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967). On some occasions, one or two words of the translation were changed because a more literal rendering better supported the interpretation proposed by the author. In these cases, the modified words were enclosed in brackets. Unless otherwise noted, translations of Seferis's prose writings and poems not included in the above collection are by the author.]

¹But everything went wrong for me and upside down,
the nature of things was reborn for me.

(*Erotokritos*)

poems that follow, "Slowly you spoke," "The Sorrowing Girl," "Automobile," "Comments," "In Memoriam," he suffers from an inability to love or he experiences an ephemeral emotion which quickly fades away, leaving him exhausted.

Turning Point

Although the poem "Turning Point" refers to a very important moment in the protagonist's life, as far as time is concerned it represents a mere "grain of sand" in the hourglass. The protagonist does not spell out exactly what the moment was. He says only that it was ominous: it reached him "like a black pigeon" and it was comparable to seeing "the Hydra/in the heavenly garden."² Although the poet alludes here to the snake in paradise, the fact that Hydra is also a constellation suggests another way in which the protagonist saw "the Hydra" in the heavenly garden. In terms of the symbolic journey, the "return to a lost paradise," as Seferis puts it,³ is frustrated.

The protagonist also tells us that this moment reached him "at the close of a last supper,"⁴ which implies the anticipation of a betrayal and a crucifixion. This same ominous moment, again referred to as a tiny "grain of sand," appears once more in a later poem, "Stratis the Sailor Describes a Man." Here again the nature of this terrible experience is not made clear but it is obvious that it was a catastrophe of some magnitude. In this poem he picks up the same idea he left off from in the "Turning Point." After the "last supper" and the implied crucifixion, in "Stratis the Sailor Describes a Man" he suggests that he does not believe in the miracle of resurrection.

Using the metaphor of the hourglass in "Turning Point," the protagonist refers to his life as a "tragic clepsydra" and he dramatizes the terrible moment as a tiny "grain of sand" which "kept the whole/tragic clepsydra dumb." Thus, he isolates the important moment but avoids any specific explanation of it. The tremendous consequences of this moment in the protagonist's life are also evident in the two lines from the seventeenth-century Greek romance *Errotokritos*, which are used as an epigraph for the collection *Turning Point*.

But everything went wrong for me and upside down,
the nature of things was reborn for me.

²Hydra was a poisonous water snake with nine heads that grew in number when severed—unless cauterized, as Hercules proved in destroying it. It is also a southern constellation, represented as a snake on maps of the heavens .

³G. Seferis, *Δοκίμεις* [*Essays*] 3rd ed., 2 vol. (Athens: Ikaros, 1974) 2:49.

⁴G. Seferis, *Μέρες* [*Days*] (Athens: Ikaros, 1973-77) A:135. Only one of the five volumes of this series of journals has been translated under the title *A Poet's Journal: Days of 1945-1951*, tr. A. Anagnostopoulos (Cambridge,

He is even more specific in his *Journals*, written at about the same time, where he says that "one grain of sand can change a whole life."⁴ This grain of sand in "Turning Point," and in the section "Man" of "Stratis the Sailor Describes a Man," is also a symbol of sterile love.

Slowly You Spoke

The abrupt disappearance of love due to an unexplained change forms the substance of the second poem of this collection. How intense this love must have been and how important to the poet we are told both directly and indirectly: the poet tells us that this woman used to be his "fate's woof," and he contrasts the sunshine, which was bright when she spoke, to the darkness which has fallen upon the world now that love has gone. He wonders with surprise what happened to the whole universe within "five moments."⁵ A metamorphosis seems to have taken place, something that appears again and again in Seferis's work. For instance, in his novel *Six Nights on the Acropolis*, his hero Stratis, alone in his room, is thinking: "And you are only watching: a coat that has become unwearable since yesterday; a wrinkle that was invisible this morning, a love that was still eternal a moment ago."⁶ In this poem, the metamorphosis "rubbed out" his love after a very brief existence. This rubbing out is similar to the situation described in another more complex poem, "Denial":

On the golden sand
we wrote her name;
but the sea-breeze blew
and the writing vanished.

The absence of love and the feeling of emptiness and sterility that goes with it is symbolized by a "dry pitcher." Seferis uses this symbol several times in similar situations, as for instance in "The King of Asine," where he even extends the image by describing the hollow sound given off by the empty pitcher:

. . . remember its sound? Hollow in the light
like a dry jar in dug earth.⁷

Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974). The Greek series will be referred to hereafter as *Journal A*, *Journal B*, etc.

⁴The more exact meaning of the word Seferis uses in the Greek text is "moments," not "seconds."

⁵George Seferis, "Ἐξή νόχτες στην Ἀκρόπολη [*Six Nights on the Acropolis*] (Athens: Hermes, 1974) 100.

⁷Keeley and Sherrard's translation is used here, because the word "sound" brings out better the point I wish to make.

Also, in poem "10" of the *Mythistorema* sequence, the lack of love is symbolized by the empty cisterns with a hollow sound:

Only some cisterns, empty; they ring and are to us
Objects of worship.
A sound stagnant, hollow like our solitude,
Like our love and like our bodies.

In the last stanza of "Slowly You Spoke," there is again the darkness that is usually associated with the absence of love. The question, "Where is the place?" is best understood by reference to a sentence that appears twice in Seferis's novel *Six Nights on the Acropolis*. There, a young woman tells the protagonist: "I am not the place where your body exists," and on another occasion the hero himself asks, "Which is the place where our body exists?"⁸ Also, in the *Three Secret Poems* the voice of Proteus is heard saying:

I am your land;
perhaps I am no one,
yet I can become what you wish.⁹

With this in mind, we realize that the question in the poem, "Where is the place?" does not mean that he cannot locate the actual place where he once was happy but that without love he feels as though his body has lost its place. Another reference very relevant to the next line, "and your nakedness to the waist," is found in the poem "Memory II":

Our life itself, yet different, just as when
Woman's nakedness is revealed and her face changes
And yet is the same face. Those who have loved
Know this. The world, in the light of other people,
Withers away. But this you must remember:
Hades and Dionysus are the same.

Love fades after its consummation and a woman's face appears less attractive after she strips naked. In "Slowly You Spoke," the poet carefully specifies that the nakedness is "to the waist"; in other words, he recalls, in his wonder and despair, the happy moments of expectation, before the illusion had vanished, when she excited his imagination. Now his tragedy is that he no longer sees a "style" in the woman's "soul," as he did before. She is now like every other woman. Love is so ephemeral ("An unwritten love rubbed out") that it is almost absurd, for the

⁸*Six Nights on the Acropolis*, 117, 111.

⁹G. Seferis, *Τρία Κρυφά Ποιήματα* [*Three Secret Poems*] tr. W. Kaiser (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969) 27. Although the word "land" appears here instead of "place," the original Greek word is again τόπος, as in the other two quotations.

bewildered protagonist who wonders "what's happened" in "Five seconds."

The Sorrowing Girl

In "The Sorrowing Girl," the poet describes the suffering of a young woman in love and he is moved by her emotional restraint.

The girl appears "On the stone of patience," but, as the images that follow indicate, this patience is actually a slow torment. The black of her eye reveals her pain, and on her lips there is a line "that's naked and trembles."

The description moves inward to her mind, where there is a "music from which the tear starts."¹⁰ Her body, on the other hand, "returns from the [edge] to the [fruit]." Fruit in Seferis has rich symbolic connotations; "to reap the fruit" usually means erotic fulfillment.¹¹ Thus, this image, although ambiguous, must imply that she is not only a romantic person but a passionate woman with sensual desires. And yet, as the last stanza indicates, her anguish is "unmoaning"; she is suffering in a discreet, restrained manner. In this stanza, Seferis brings together two very different ideas, the unmoaning anguish of the heart and the star-filled sky:

but your heart's anguish
was unmoaning, became
what a starfilled sky
gives to the world.¹²

The star-filled sky gives to the world a feeling of harmony and balance, and this is also what the restraint of the sorrowing girl inspires.

Looking at the poem as a whole, we can see that the poet values her restraint very highly. He is touched by the dignity she shows in her un-

¹⁰Keeley and Sherrard translate this phrase as "the motive/that starts tears." The word *αἰτιότις* used here usually means "purpose" or "motive," but often refers also to a musical line or tune. In my view, the latter meaning is what the poet had in mind here.

¹¹See, for instance, the words of Logomanos in *Six Nights on the Acropolis*: "The time will come when I'll initiate her, and we'll reap together the gentle fruit" (124).

¹²The word order has been changed here, because as it stands in the published translation the impression is created that the star-filled sky is given to the world, which is not what the Greek original says. A word-by-word translation would be: "became the meaning given to the world by a star-filled sky." Seferis refers to this meaning of the star-filled sky in one of his *Journals*. Speaking about "this special element of Hellenism," which is difficult to define but can only be felt, he gives a series of persons, places or things that can help us follow its direction: "Homer, Aeschylus, Herodotus—and Bach, Shakespeare and all the other great ones—and Attica, the waves of the Aegean and the star-filled sky." "Because," he concludes, "among other things, Hellenism means humanism" (*Journal D*, 134).

happiness. It is evident that there must have been an erotic involvement between the girl and the narrator which has come to an end. He could now be indifferent or cynical. The fact that he values the girl's silent suffering as well as her capacity for love reveals something about the narrator's own problem. As in some of Seferis's other poems, such as "Comments," "Rocket," "Automobile," and "In Memoriam," the persona is unhappy because he remains detached. Of course, if one examines his poetry as a whole, the poet's attitude toward love is much more complicated than that.

Automobile

"Automobile" describes a journey, both literal and symbolic. It conveys the emptiness and the tedium following an erotic encounter. The two lovers are leaving together in a car. They feel remote and separate. It is interesting that in order to emphasize this separation, Seferis uses the image of a pair of compasses, the same image that was used by Donne for exactly the opposite effect.¹⁸ What is stressed in Donne's poem is the connection between the two feet of the compass, which makes them interdependent. Seferis, on the contrary, sees the two feet of the compass as parallel but separate; he compares them to a highway separated in the middle by a line, and he tells us, in the last stanza, that the hearts of the two lovers travel separately, one on the left side of the road and the other on the right.

The first stanza has a light tone. The idea of speed is conveyed by the two original images:

fingers of wind in the hair
and miles in the belly.

But with the first line of the second stanza the feeling of emptiness is introduced:

the two of us were leaving, empty,
whiplash for the mild gaze;
the mind make up, the blood make up
naked, naked, naked!

The protagonist feels that the beautiful illusion created by the mind before the erotic encounter is like *maquillage* covering up reality. Also, the blood's radiance was "make-up" and has worn off, leaving them "naked." The repetition of this word three times in the last line emphasizes the fact that the protagonists feel empty, stripped of any meaning.

¹⁸"A Valediction: Forbidding Mourning."

Seferis is more explicit on this point in another poem, "The *Tbrush*," where he says:

Flesh's delirium, the lovely dance
That ends in nakedness.

What he was writing in his *Journals* at about the same time is also characteristic: "This feeling of the ephemeral freezes me and paralyzes my strength. I know that this feeling was (and is now) probably my worst enemy."¹⁴

The next stanza, as emphasized by the use of italics, is a flashback to the erotic moments. The sensuous handling of this transient experience makes the contrast between this scene and the tedium that follows it more intense. The elevated feeling conveyed by the dizziness suggests a complete abandonment to the senses. The transient nature of this feeling is conveyed by the image of a fish slipping away in the sea. Both the fish and the sea are symbols very often connected with an erotic experience in Seferis's poetry. Here the protagonist is sunk into the light and transparent element of water, midway between illusion and reality.

As far as the journey is concerned, on the literal level it continues, while on the symbolic level it has reached a dead end.

Denial

"Denial" is an important poem, which deals with what Seferis has called in Greek "Καγημὸς τοῦ ἀλοθῆσιασμοῦ" (the sorrow and longing of sensuality).¹⁵ It is one of the very few poems about which the poet wrote some comments. The protagonists are Elpenors,¹⁶ a character who appears often in his poetry. In an essay, referring to another poem of this collection, the "Companions in Hades," Seferis wrote: "The unaware and the satiated who have eaten the oxen of the sun are Elpenors. The same thing I would say about the patient people of 'Denial.'"¹⁷

In the first stanza, the Elpenors appear on a "secret seashore"; they are thirsty but the water is brackish.¹⁸ The unpleasant taste of the water suggests that the erotic experience was unsatisfying; love was spoiled.

¹⁴*Journal A*, 10.

¹⁵"A Staging for 'The *Tbrush*,'" *Essays*, 2:36.

¹⁶In a later poem, "The *Tbrush*," Seferis calls this character "lustful Elpenor." As will be discussed in connection with the "Companions in Hades," Seferis borrows this character from Homer but modifies him. In Homer, Elpenor is presented as drunk, while in Seferis he is a more general symbol of the sensualist. The common characteristic, however, is a weakness, an inability to control their impulses.

¹⁷"A Staging for 'The *Tbrush*,'" *Essays*, 2:38.

¹⁸Compare the phrase in *Six Nights on the Acropolis*: "the brackish taste of uncertainty" (15).

In the next stanza, a different experience follows the first, as they write a woman's name on the sand but the sea-breeze blows and erases the writing. The implication here is that this love was ephemeral. The sand is also a symbol of barrenness. Like "a castle built on the sand," this love could not endure, as it probably would have if the protagonist had carved the name on a tree or a stone. Again, there is no fulfilment.

The last stanza is a recapitulation followed by the decision to deny passion:

With what spirit, what heart,
what desire and passion
we lived our life: a mistake!
So we changed our life.

The Elpenors realize that although these loves are superficial and ephemeral, they can become an obsession. This vulnerability to passion may be fatal. They become "patient," as Seferis tells us, and this change in direction is in line with the title of the collection *Turning Point*.

The Companions in Hades

The epigraph of this poem comes from the opening passage of the *Odyssey*:

fools, who ate the cattle of Helios Hyperion;
but he deprived them of the day of their return.¹⁹

It is of particular significance that Homer, from the very beginning, singles out this sacrilege, attributing to it the failure of Odysseus' companions to return home. In his essay, "A Staging for 'The *Tbrush*,'" Seferis writes that the "unaware and satiated" who ate the oxen of the sun in the "Companions in Hades" are Elpenors.²⁰ The Homeric Elpenor had died before his companions ate the oxen of the sun, but here Seferis refers to the more generalized character of modern Elpenor, who plays a central role in his poetry.²¹ Because of their uncontrolled sensuality, their inability to curb their animal appetites, they violated the sacred law and were deprived of access to the lost paradise.

Seferis makes a special point in his commentary about Homer's Tire-

¹⁹*The Odyssey*, I. 8-9.

²⁰*Essays*, 2:38.

²¹Edmund Keeley, in his essay "Seferis' Elpenor," discusses this subject extensively, emphasizing that "the hedonistic violation of the just order of things literally precludes the return of these modern Elpenors to a lost Paradise. The implication is that no man can aspire toward spiritual liberation until he learns to control his animal appetites, the beast in him that Homer's Circe exploited so cruelly." *The Kenyon Review* (Summer 1966) 389.

sias warning Odysseus and his companions to respect the oxen of the sun as a condition for their return. Tiresias talks to Odysseus about the light and the sun. Seferis adds:

The whole question is how one can honor the oxen of the sun, how one can honor the light of every day that God gives one. The companions did not respect them, they devoured them, the fools, and they were lost . . . Scattered, wasted, they can no longer face either the sun or man:

Lands of sun, where you cannot face the sun.
Lands of man, where you cannot face the man.²²

The meaning of Seferis's words, "how one can honor the light of every day that God gives one," becomes clear if one bears in mind that light is used by the poet as a complex symbol, meaning, among other things, love.²³ When he writes that the companions did not honor the light, did not respect the oxen of the sun,²⁴ he implies that they committed a sacrilege, they spoiled love.

In the first stanza, the modern Elpenors confess that they have eaten the cattle of the sun, not because they did not have anything else to eat—they had "some hardtack"—but out of mere "stupidity." They blame themselves for this thoughtless act.

In the second stanza, they compare each ox to a castle. In order to understand this unusual simile it is necessary to refer to a sentence in Seferis's novel *Six Nights on the Acropolis*, attributed to one of the leaders of the Greek War of Independence, Makriyannis, whom the poet considered the embodiment of the "just man": "The fortress [Acropolis] now wants to destroy those who wanted to destroy it." Makriyannis, who was defending the Acropolis—which was a fortress at that time—against the Turks, saw this act, this attempt to conquer the fortress, as an injustice that would lead to punishment.²⁵ In this sense, eating the sacred oxen is as unjust as conquering a fortress, and in both cases one becomes "a hero and a star," an ironic way of saying that one loses his life.

²²"A Staging for 'The Thrush,'" *Essays*, 2:52.

²³The identification of light with love is more explicit in a later poem, "The Thrush."

²⁴The sun, according to C.G. Jung, is considered "a fructifier and creator." *Symbols of Transformation* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967) 100.

²⁵*Six Nights*, 137. Also in the essay about Makriyannis, Seferis mentions the hubris committed by the Persian King Xerxes, who whipped the sea, as a consequence of which his fleet was destroyed and all hands perished in it. Similarly, Seferis here implies that as Aeschylus used a personification of the sea, which punishes Xerxes' hubris, Makriyannis (without knowing about Aeschylus because he was uneducated) uses the personification of the fortress which destroys those who attack it. *Essays*, 1:257.

In the third stanza, the poet returns to the story in a sort of flashback and narrates what happened:

On the earth's back we hungered,
but when we'd eaten well
we fell to these lower regions
[unaware] and [satiated].

Thus, the companions end in the underworld, with no hope of return. They fail to complete their journey.

An important element, which comes out of this description, is that these modern Elpenors committed consciously the hubris which cost their lives, just as Odysseus' companions did in Homer, ignoring Tiresias' warning. Thus, their fall from grace—to the "lower regions"—is the result of conscious defiance. The word "unaware" in the last line of the poem refers to the fact that they do not know how serious the punishment for their act will be.

There is some similarity between the "Companions in Hades" and T.S. Eliot's "Marina," although the central idea is different. Eliot's lines:

Those who sit in the sty of contentment, meaning
Death
Those who suffer the ecstasy of the animals, meaning
Death,

convey the same idea of the fatal inability to control animal appetites. However, Seferis refers to the punishment of excess, while Eliot's attitude toward sensual pleasure in general is critical.

There is also a similarity in technique between the two poems. Seferis is using here what Eliot called the "mythical method," the establishment of a continuous parallel between a myth and a contemporary situation. As Edmund Keeley comments, however, Seferis wrote the "Companions in Hades" before he became acquainted with T.S. Eliot's poetry.²⁶

Fog

The seventh poem in this collection, "Fog," is probably the first poem Seferis wrote, at least among the first that he published. The poem deals with a conflict which the protagonist solves by choosing to live a life "cold as a fish" after rejecting both alternatives presented to him: to start an affair with a woman who obviously does not inspire him, or to yield to the dangerous temptation of a paradise, offered by an "angel," which would eventually lead him to disaster. In contrast to their traditional

²⁶Edmund Keeley, "T.S. Eliot and the Poetry of George Seferis," *Comparative Literature* (Summer 1956) 216.

meaning, angels in Seferis's poetry are usually—but not always—dangerous. There is a similarity in this respect between Seferis and Rainer Maria Rilke, who also presents angels, especially in the *Duino Elegies*, as sometimes austere, aloof, and perilous²⁷ and sometimes "affirmative."²⁸

The poem opens with a fragment of an English song,²⁹ which urges a young man to confess his love to a girl.

"Say it with a ukulele . . ."
grumbles some gramophone.³⁰

The protagonist's response to the urging of the song leaves no doubt that he is absolutely incapable of loving the young woman:

Christ, tell me what to say to her
now that I am used to my loneliness?

Following the stream of consciousness, he is led from this song to some other, rather similar songs played by beggars in the streets, on their accordions, calling on the angels of a supposed paradise:

And the angels opened their wings
but below the mists condensed.

The protagonist, however, is grateful for the fog, because without it those angels who "are hell" would trap him and catch his poor soul as though it were a thrush.

The poem continues with an imaginary dialogue. "And life's cold as

²⁷If the dangerous archangel
took one step now
down toward us
from behind the stars
our heartbeats
rising like thunder
would kill us.

("The Second Elegy")

Duino Elegies, tr. David Young (New York: W.W. Norton, 1978) 27.

²⁸"Sing out jubilation and praise to affirmative angels" ("The Tenth Elegy"). *Duino Elegies*, tr. C.F. MacIntyre (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1961) 75.

²⁹In early editions, the epigraph of this poem, "Say it with a ukelele," was followed by the explanation "English Song."

³⁰In a later poem, "In the Kyrenia District," the same song appears, sung this time by a person who later dies. The motif of a dead friend whose voice returns from the past appears often in Seferis's poetry as a tyrannical memory, as for instance in the Haiku:

Is this the voice
of our dead friends
or of the gramophone?

a fish"; but the persona says flatly that he prefers it this way. To the question, "Is that how you live?" he answers, "Yes," and he justifies his way of life by pointing out that

So many are the drowned
down on the sea's bed.

They are, presumably, those who sought the paradise of the "angels" and whose promised happiness ended in disaster. Love appears as some sort of hunt, and many are caught in its trap, like thrushes—an image that appears again and again in Seferis.

The motif "Say it with a ukulele" is repeated, and this time the protagonist makes an appeal for real love instead of shallow talk:

Words for words, and more words?
Love, where's your church,
I'm tired of this hermitage.³¹

We learn here, in contrast to the fourth stanza, that the protagonist longs for a genuine love and is not made for a life as "cold as a fish," which he is now leading. The stream of consciousness brings him now to consider his whole life, wishing that it were "straight":

Ah, were life but straight
how we'd live it then!
But it's fated otherwise,
you have to turn in a small corner.

This ties in with the first poem of the collection, "Turning Point," when he saw the snake in the heavenly garden. He does not seem to know where this compulsory turn will lead him. This idea of a life which is "straight," "right," "whole," etc., is very important to Seferis. It is met again in the poem "An Old Man on the River Bank":

Not like us . . .
Caught in the gaudy nets of a life which was right and turned
to dust and sank into the sand.

What Seferis obviously has in mind when he speaks of a "straight" or "right" life is the Aeschylean idea that any excess constitutes a hubris that is to be punished.

³¹The Greek word used here, *μετόχια*, is not fully conveyed by the term "hermitage." *Μετόχι* is an outlying farm or estate run by a monastery, i.e., a place away from the center of worship. The protagonist does not complain that he is tired of living in solitude, as the word hermitage suggests, but of experiencing many ephemeral affairs, as implied by the fact that *μετόχια* is in the plural.

The poem ends in a very low mood, as the persona is searching in despair for some consolation. The same fragment of the song haunts him:

"Say it with a ukulele . . ."
I see her red nails—
how they must glow in firelight—
and I recall her coughing.³²

The protagonist does not hide his uneasy feelings toward this woman, since the only things he mentions about her are her red nails³³—suggesting a kind of sensual danger—and her unpleasant cough. The poet uses this image of coughing later in the poem "The Thrush," pointing out how changeable a love is:

The golden barrel is done
And a rag is what was the sun,
A rag on the neck of a woman in middle age
Who coughs and who never stops coughing.

The Mood of a Day

The memory of a lost paradise is conveyed by the first four lines of "The Mood of a Day," while the rest of the poem refers to an absurd present, a meaningless life from which love is absent. This life is symbolized in the last part of the poem by a ghost-ship which continues its journey while all its passengers are doomed never to reach their destination, since they are already dead.

The first stanza starts with the "mood of a day," which the protagonist lived ten years ago in a foreign country, and also with a unique moment that "took on wings and vanished like an angel of the Lord"—imagery related to a lost paradise.

Seferis presents here in quick succession the "mood of a day," "the airy spirit of a moment," "the voice of a woman" hard to forget, and "an end inconsolable, the marble setting of some September." Although one cannot be sure that the four lines are connected and refer to the same event, it seems probable that the poet is trying here to convey the feeling of a separation. He is intentionally ambiguous in this stanza, which brings to mind his admission in his *Journals*, "I write in order to postpone a confession."³⁴ The return to a lost paradise is the purpose of the journey

³²The correct translation should have the *woman* coughing in the past.

³³Even when describing a very attractive, sensual woman later in his *Journals*, a "half negress with black curled hair like a fur cap," he mentions that her nails—she was apparently wearing red nail polish—were "bloodthirsty." He then adds that she was "a kind of Salome without decapitations, a kind of castrated Semiramis." *Journal B*, 104.

³⁴*Journal A*, 76.

in Seferis's symbolism. But the return is not realized in this poem, any more than it is in most of his other poems. The lost paradise is only a source of despair, as he wrote in his *Journals* at about the same time the poem was written: "I can discern at certain times of unbelievable solitude an unexpected lost paradise that has left its traces on us only to torture us without leading us anywhere."³⁵

Seferis is not clear in this poem about whether the loss of the paradise was the result of death or of a separation or occurred for some other reason. The woman was forgotten "with such care" (the Greek word is "prudence," which usually has an unpleasant ring in Seferis), representing a contradictory mood, suggesting that the "inconsolable end" was the result of a decision rather than of death. However, Seferis has warned us in his *Journals* that one should not try to "attribute everything to a separation."³⁶ It is possible that the loss of the paradise was a consequence of seeing in it the snake that was mentioned in the first poem of this collection, "Turning Point."

Whatever the reasons may be, one can see the disastrous consequences of the loss of paradise in the description of the dreary present, which follows in the next few lines. New but strange houses, dusty clinics, coffin shops, the suffering of a sensitive pharmacist on night duty, and the disorder of the protagonist's room reflect his inner chaos. Sickness permeates the whole scene; the protagonist is fatigued and lost, unable to face reality. Life has become a disjunctive series of absurd words and empty gestures, and the persona asks:

Where is love that with one stroke cuts time in two and stuns it?

³⁵The whole passage in which this sentence appears is somewhat more revealing, because in its context the lost paradise is connected with the memory of the poet's dead friends. The first sentence of this passage appeared also, slightly modified, in a haiku:

Is this the voice
of our dead friends
or the gramophone?

The passage, dated Sunday, September 30, 1931, is as follows:

Is it the voice of our dead friends?—the gramophones insist. One of them in every room, they serve on their black trays [*δίσκος* in Greek means both "tray" and "record"—C.K.] Spanish or Negro nostalgias. I feel that I am subjected to a systematic mechanical process which brings me successively from the lower to the upper world, and I have the impression that this will continue forever. Where have our own soft, human lines gone? Now I think of the lines without the human beings. I can discern at certain times of unbelievable solitude an unexplained lost paradise that has left its traces on us only to torture us without leading us anywhere.

On the other hand, in another poem, "Stratis the Sailor Describes a Man," the lost paradise is related to the memory of a dead woman: "You know, I love a woman who's gone away perhaps/to the other world."

³⁶*Journal B*, 13.

This takes us back to the beginning of the poem, as if life had stopped ten years ago, leaving the memory of a lost happiness.

The poem ends with the image of a ghost-ship,³⁷ which continues its voyage although not a soul is alive in it—the symbol of a life that goes on while one feels dead inside.

Comments

The poem "Comments," which was omitted from the translation of Seferis's *Collected Poems*, is another expression of the same psychological climate that characterizes most of the poems in this collection.³⁸ The symbolic journey toward fulfilment is terribly frustrated because the effort at communication between the protagonist and the woman fails. Deep in their hearts a confession of love is hidden, but it remains suspended; their lips move but pronounce the wrong words. The only hope is the response of the body, which they expect as a blessing. But the miracle does not take place. The angel who would bring it about never approaches. The poet remembers such an angel from a lost paradise in his past. In contrast to "Fog," where the angels were threatening, here the angel would bring happiness. In Seferis, as mentioned before, the angels are sometimes good, sometimes evil. Here, had the angel appeared, the "quick rings," like concentric waves on the surface of the water, would have opened up and the noose would have loosened.³⁹ The communication is not realized. The woman is very attractive but remains "a stranger to [his] soul." The protagonist feels empty; he finds the evening absurd.

³⁷As the epigraph of this poem indicates, it is the ship met by Arthur Gordon Pym, the hero of Edgar Allen Poe's story *The Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym*.

³⁸The following literal translation of the poem is presented here, to help the reader follow the discussion:

Comments

Darkness had fallen upon the veranda/something flew by in a hurry/a suppressed confession/was nested in our hearts.

The voice withered, fruitless;/on our lips a flock of wrong words/and only from the depths of the body/O Lord, we expected a blessing.

Darkness hummed inside the house/and from the light of the evening star/to the magnet of your hair/remember the unapproachable angel.

With the rapid rings/fallen suddenly two fans/to the thought which we read/like a prayer from a gospel book.

Woman stranger to my soul/your surprise is what I am left with/beautiful, beloved woman/this senseless evening.

And the black rings of your eyes/and the airy horror of the night.../
Bend and get back into the sheath/Blade of my silence, chimera.

³⁹This process is described in more detail in one of the three versions of a never-published poem included in Seferis's *Journal A* (114), from about the same time that *Turning Point* was written:

In the last stanza he reverts to the darkness of loneliness. The black color of her eyes is now associated with the horror of the dark night—although the poet leaves the point a bit ambiguous since he simply places the two images in juxtaposition and does not connect them explicitly. He had hoped for some communication, which would have cut his silence like a blade, but now this hope has proved to be an illusion, a “chimera,” and the blade goes back into the sheath. A blade going into a sheath usually connotes sexual intercourse; here, however, the whole context suggests that the return of the blade into the sheath signifies the decision not to proceed with sexual intercourse. There is a certain similarity between this poem and “The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock,” although “Comments” concerns both partners. The impulse of the lovers to reach out for one another is frustrated by a psychological block at the outset. The difference, however, is that in “Comments” this block is due more to some kind of subconscious reluctance of the protagonist, who finds the evening senseless and foolish, whereas in Eliot’s poem it is due more to a lack of daring, a maimed virility.

Rocket

This poem was published in 1931, at a time when the only rockets widely known were fireworks, which travel with great speed, leaving a trail of light and culminating in a brilliant display of stars and golden lines illuminating the sky. This display lasts a very short time, as the scattered stars and bright lines are quickly extinguished.

Seferis uses the rocket as a symbol of the phantasmagoria created by an intense and ephemeral love that momentarily elevates the protagonist above the sphere of everyday life. The magic is described with such images as “the blue light on our fingers” and the “thousand antennae” that “grope giddily to find the sky.” The culmination is reached in the stanza:

there was a deer
yellow as sulphur
there was a tower
built of gold.

Seferis uses the image of a deer or antelope to describe a slender young

Set your ear and listen to the sounds
that buzz in a house full of darkness

.....
Let your sense of touch and hearing
fall on the skin of the black drum
drop them like a plumbline in the ocean and hold your breath
cling to the darkness which creates rings like the circles of a target
and loosens the tightness of the noose.

body in other poems as well, for instance in "Stratis the Sailor Describes a Man" ("a young woman whose transparent dress revealed the lines of her body, slim and full of spirit, like a gazelle's") and in an unpublished poem.⁴⁰ The bright color, "yellow as sulphur," that the poet ascribes to the deer represents the impression one gets when one walks in a wood and sees this delicate animal, while at the same time it is also related to the rocket, since sulphur is one of the inflammable chemicals used in manufacturing rockets. The critic Minas Demakis characterizes "Rocket" as "a modern erotic poem" and explains: "love is here like a rocket; it has the same transient quality—which reaches the sphere of the soul and illuminates the heavens."⁴¹ He then points out that the view of love at its prime, when it was "a tower/built of gold," lasts only for a moment and then shifts immediately to the time of decline, when "lilies whitened/ the beloved's hair."

In the fifth stanza we come to the point where the fireworks are extinguished, when the spell of love dies. Five black crows, symbols of death, quarrel and scatter in five directions after they had "counted their years," which implies aging and decay. Their black color is the color of the smoke that remains after the fireworks are extinguished.

The emphasis in this poem is on the speed of the rocket and on the abrupt disappearance of the magic. The "red carnation" (a symbol of love) is quickly replaced by the white lilies that cover the woman's hair, suggesting abrupt aging. The protagonist finds himself in the sad position of writing books about the "beautiful woman's body,"⁴² and he ends by complaining that he is tired of living "only with peacocks"—in other words, with the abstract beauty of art—and traveling "always/ in the mermaid's eyes." George Savidis feels that the sixth stanza is "one of the few direct references Seferis makes to his art; most of them are associated with a sense of futility and of doubt about the fruitfulness of the poetic act."⁴³ As for the reference to the mermaid, which appears often in Seferis's poetry, the poet has written in his novel that he considers her

⁴⁰And yet you loved the comrade whom you left
to take the dark path
As you stretch your hands
as you fix your eyes
as you don't know anything, walking along
his hands follow you
his eyes follow you
his loss follows you like a shadow
with that grace of a gazelle he had in the sun.
(*Journal C*, 34)

⁴¹Minas Demakis, "Μία αντιπροσωπευτική φωνή των χρόνων μας" ["A Representative Voice of our Times"], *Nea Hestia* 92 (1972) 1427.

⁴²The original Greek word used here, *ὀμορφη*, means "beautiful," not "beloved."

⁴³George Savidis, "Μία Περιδιάβαση" ["A Wandering"], *Γιὰ τὸν Σεφέρη* [*For Seferis*] (Athens, 1961) 386.

"half woman, half myth."⁴⁴ In another part of the *Journals* he asks "will the body of the mermaid ever come to life?"⁴⁵—a question which shows that traveling always "in the mermaid's eyes" one never reaches his destination, a fulfilment. This aimless wandering, which fascinates Cavafy, Seferis finds dreadful. As he says in the passage of his *Journals* quoted before, "the ephemeral makes me freeze";⁴⁶ and poems like "Automobile" and "Rocket" express his frustration at not being able to feel real love for these women. "At my age," he writes in his *Journals*, "I am ashamed to write it, I have nothing else besides instincts,"⁴⁷ and in another instance, "How many women promised you the same kingdom?"⁴⁸ This kingdom, this paradise, is what the protagonist has in mind: real communication. The ephemeral affair of which the "Rocket" is a symbol usually takes one out of the sphere of communication. The continuous transfers and traveling associated with Seferis's profession played a serious role in this respect, preventing him (until he was in his late thirties) from relating to people and environments. But this was not the whole problem. As he himself wrote in his *Journals* in 1931:

I don't like to delude myself or to deceive others. It would be simpler, and I think this is what all people do with a little compromise, to attribute everything to separations.⁴⁹

It is also interesting to note the context in which Seferis uses the word "rocket" in his novel *Six Nights on the Acropolis*. In it a character says:

I have been driving a streetcar for so many years now. Patissia—Ampelokipi, Ampelokipi—Patissia; a bell to start, a bell to stop; and all over again. What has my life been? A wheel! Have I known anything else? The other day my streetcar stalled and I got down. Behind us another streetcar was coming. I saw it climbing up the rails, coming up fast, how can I say it, like a rocket. Since then, I think that maybe I am also coming up fast like that . . .

"Watch out that you don't get any crazy ideas!" Visaniaris said. "I had a colleague who was, like me, making the rounds with a gramophone; one day he told me, 'I am a noble man and sympathetic too. I am not like you, like some hashish addicts, some bums who run around with the gramophones; I am a musician, I have dignity. I play at the Tuberculosis Hospital. The records that the tuberculosis patients ask for, the Traviatas, the Toscas, are in-

⁴⁴*Six Nights*, 41.

⁴⁵*Journal B*, 31.

⁴⁶*Journal A*, 10.

⁴⁷*Journal A*, 47.

⁴⁸*Journal A*, 112.

⁴⁹*Journal B*, 13.

expensive. I make good money.' In the end he caught the Traviata and passed away."⁵⁰

The gramophone player is a typical case of a man overstepping his bounds and paying the price for it. And the friend of the streetcar driver uses the incident to warn him that the excessive speed of the rocket is dangerous. Although the conversation sounds simpleminded, the Aeschylean overtones cannot be missed.

Rhyme

"Rhyme" is written in the same mood as most of the poems in the collection *Turning Point* (the "Automobile," the "Rocket," "Slowly You Spoke," the "Sorrowing Girl"), whose main theme is a love that fades away, leaving the protagonist with a feeling of emptiness.

From the beginning the protagonist remembers the lips of the beloved person as "guardians" of love, but he immediately undercuts this idea with the words "that was to fade," which suggest the futility of the effort and imply a strange tendency to escape on his part. This tendency appears more clearly in the next poem of the collection, "In Memoriam."⁵¹ The same sense of futility is conveyed by the second line of "Rhyme": "hands, bonds of my youth that was to go." Here again the hands of the beloved person that could have held him and saved him from aging fail to do so. If one recalls that Seferis wrote this poem when he was only twenty-nine, one realizes that he speaks here in symbolic terms: love, which could have prevented him from decay, is gone. In his *Journals*, the poet wrote a few lines which are very relevant in this context.

This distress appears in the form of a dim river that flows unimpeded and dominating. Et de ce fleuve de mains fugitives qui se perd dans le calme de la mer—as your friend Stratis the Sailor would say. I feel an unbearable need for love, physical love, because it holds me and takes me out of this condition. It is the only thing that can keep me out of this confusion and of this flight.⁵²

The "fugitive hands" in this case are the thousands of wild hands that are trying to carry him away and not the hands of love that could

⁵⁰*Six Nights*, 83. The novel was written at the same time as "Rocket" and revised many years later. The expression "caught the Traviata" means contracted tuberculosis, the disease that causes the death of the heroine in the opera.

⁵¹This poem was not included in the *Collected Poems*. See below, note 55, for my literal translation.

⁵²*Journal B*, 96. The phrase in French, "Et de ce fleuve . . ." is from a small poem in French, "Etude," which appeared in Seferis's *Journal B* a few months before the quoted passage (69-70).

save him. But the overall picture is the same: he is going down a river and physical love is the only thing he can hold on to. This is also the meaning of his dramatic appeal in the poem "Mycenae": "Give me your hands, give me your hands, give me your hands," and of several other references to the hands of beloved persons in his writings.

In this case, however, the hands could not save him, presumably because love faded away. This idea of the disappearance of love is reinforced by the third line, "color of a face lost in nature somewhere," while in the fourth, "trees . . . birds . . . hunting . . ." we see something very often encountered in Seferis: love presented with images of hunting or trapping. George Savidis refers to several places in the poet's work where the senses are compared to nets in which man can be trapped,⁵³ as has already been mentioned in discussing the poem "Fog."

The second stanza starts with a strong sensuous image, as the protagonist addresses his body:

Body black in the sun's heat like a grape
body, my rich ship, where are you traveling?

However, the stanza as a whole contains an antithesis because the "rich ship" is on a voyage with no direction, and this hopeless wandering conveys a sense of waste.

George Savidis suggests that the question the protagonist asks is "rhetorical" at a time when he "believed in the omnipotence of the body."⁵⁴ In my view, the poet no longer believed in the omnipotence of the body when he wrote this poem. He did believe in it at an earlier period, before the crucial moment he describes in the "Turning Point," the very first of his published poems, where he says that he saw "the Hydra/in the heavenly garden." Here there is fatigue and psychological deterioration. The persona confesses that "twilight drowns" and that he is tired searching for love in the darkness. This is an agonizing search, and there is no fulfilment in sight—hardly what one would have expected from someone believing in the omnipotence of the body. The question is not rhetorical, and it implies an aimless wandering. This rich ship is not essentially very different from the ship of the "Mood of a Day." The crew there is already dead, but here also "Our life [keeps shrinking] every day."

In Memoriam

The symbolic journey of love in this poem is an escape without a destination; an escape from a love that seemed nearly perfect for the fastidious protagonist.⁵⁵

⁵³For *Seferis*, 401-2.

⁵⁴For *Seferis*, 324.

⁵⁵This poem was also omitted from the *Collected Poems*. The following is my

Addressing the woman he loved, the persona tells her that she was "the divine silence." In Seferis's *Journals* we find some passages that help us understand the meaning this divine silence had for the poet. On February 8, 1933, he wrote:

... Like the insistent memory of this act, many years later, when a man has seen a lot, and is slowly returning from the bitter journey that is called love; when he has learned that love is not moonlight and little cries—except only for the cats—but silence, sometimes unbearable silence, and a rock exposed to the sun at high noon.⁵⁶

Earlier, on July 31, 1930, in another passage which is also interesting because of its treatment of love as a journey, he wrote :

Such was our silent fate, even before, in the good days, when a glance, an embrace, made us taste the gifts of God. We saw each other seldom, once a week, once in ten days because such was the social order. Two or three hours. And then we forgot. We forgot our troubles and with them the images and ornaments which our souls had separately gathered on the surface of the world. Do you remember how much we were afraid of words? We did not know where they would lead us. Once or twice, in the beginning, we did speak, and after we said whatever we didn't want to say—mostly that—we embraced each other. Since that time, no confession, no complaint stirred the hours that we were given to live together. We spent two or three years of a secret and silent love, and I can't really say how long the magic lasted. When I look back at those hours, our hours, I see them outside the passing of time, like a ghost-ship that would travel on the river of change, and that we had boarded and unboarded without explanation. This is how I imagine eternal life, like that journey.⁵⁷

We can see, then, that the woman he calls "divine silence" must have responded to his deepest longing; yet, the protagonist felt "the shivering for flight." And it is not an escape which brings relief, but, as he says in

literal translation of this difficult poem, which will help the reader follow the discussion:

In Memoriam

You were the divine silence/and as white as rice/but the shivering for flight/always keeps coming back.

You got into the whirlpool/centrifugal soul/that leaves us/in a remote bitterness.

When night falls, I see in the foliage/the eyes of our friends, closed.

⁵⁶ *Journal B*, 104.

⁵⁷ *Journal A*, 122.

the second stanza, addressing himself this time, it is as if he were carried away by a vortex that left him with a bitter feeling of abandonment and dejection. A similar vortex appears in a poem with the tentative title "Journey," which was published only in Seferis's *Journals* (January 18, 1931).

Aeolus' island, I returned with the winds
that your master gave me, closed in a sack.
My companions cut the silver strings
cut short my sleep, cut short the sleep of the sea
and let me loose at the root of the vortex
alone with my exhaustion and my dejection . . .⁵⁸

This vortex is also reminiscent of the whirlpool in which Phlebas was drowned in T.S. Eliot's *Waste Land*.⁵⁹

Thus, the symbolic journey in "In Memoriam" again has no end. It is the protagonist's constant tendency for escape, described later in more detail in the poem "Flight," the reason for which is implied in the title "In Memoriam" and in the last two lines of the poem:

When night falls I see in the foliage
the eyes of our friends, closed.

The same image of the eyes in the foliage was used by Seferis in another poem, "For One Available Rose," which appeared in the collection "Book of Exercises II":

What weighs heavily upon us is the thirst of the others the
altered ones
we bring them flowers in the morning fooling ourselves
what use are the flowers to them? And they breathe the cypress
trees
with those lips, and at night the eyes in the foliage . . .

In a later poem, "The Last Stop," he wrote: "Our mind is a virgin forest of murdered friends." The memory of those dead friends, together with the traumatic experience of the destruction of his hometown Smyrna, played a crucial role in the poet's inner life, although it was not the only source of his unhappiness.

Erotikos Logos

The collection *Turning Point* ends with the long poem "Erotikos

⁵⁸In Seferis's draft (*Journal A*, 134) a question mark appears after the title "Journey."

⁵⁹Seferis had not yet read the *Waste Land* when he wrote these lines.

Logos" ("Love Song"). In this poem, as in most of this collection, the symbolic journey of love does not reach Ithaca because the return is blocked by the memory of a past erotic experience. In spite of its overwhelming passion, this experience, conveyed by the allusion of two snakes making love, may have been associated with a betrayal or a violation. This impression is supported by the fact that in it the poet uses the snake imagery, as he does with the Hydra in the opening poem of this collection.

The first part of the poem starts with the protagonist expressing a complaint to the "Rose of fate" which deliberately wounded him. The rose is a symbol of love, but the addition of the words "fate" and "wound" and the whole context of the first stanza suggest that the course of this love was predetermined, as if a secret law of nature had to be followed. The woman was simply an agent delivering a "command" which originated somewhere else: "and the command you [agreed] to give us was beautiful." Her smile was like a "ready sword"—another indication that this was going to be a painful experience.

The second stanza is euphoric, describing the phantasmagoria created by the approaching love and culminating in the optimistic statement, "the world was easy: a simple pulsation." Since we already know from the first stanza what is to follow, we realize that this is a bitter irony.

In Part II, the poet uses another symbol for love, the sea. Although there is an optimistic surface again as he assures us that

The secrets of the sea are forgotten on the shores
the darkness of the depths are forgotten on the surf,

this awareness of the existence of secrets and dark depths creates a sense of vague danger. Suddenly the "purple" "corals of memory" shine bright. This must be the memory of a lost paradise. The protagonist remains motionless, hoping that the mysterious process will start again, like magic. He will touch again "the tree with the apples" and experience again the paradise of his memory, toward which a thread is guiding him. The sensuous experience, which he describes as a "dark shivering in the root and the leaves,"⁶⁰ works here as an invocation, a wish and a longing for "the forgotten dawn." The wish is expanded in the whole next stanza, which presents a picture of anticipated harmony and happiness.

May lilies blossom again on the meadow of separation
may days open mature, the embrace of the heavens,⁶¹
may those eyes alone shine in the glare
the pure soul be outlined like the song of a flute.

But this euphoria does not last long. The symbolic night falls, the

⁶⁰The word "root" is used here in the singular, because the original Greek $\rho\iota\zeta\alpha$ is in the singular. Seferis refers to the human body as if it were a plant or a tree—an imagery that he uses very often and in various contexts.

⁶¹The image is from the seventeenth-century romance *Errotokritos*.

eyes that shone bright are closed and only ashes remain. Instead of "the song of a flute" he hears a "choked hum" and a "dense fluttering," as if something he cannot see were flying away. The poet is left with the same taste of decay he described in several poems of this collection ("Turning Point," "Automobile," "Slowly You Spoke," "Comments") and in his *Journals*. Love disappears, leaving behind only ashes, just at the moment he had hoped that the "bridges" would be built and a more complete communication would be established.

Part III starts with a repetition of the line "O dark shivering in the root and the leaves" and continues with a new invocation to the woman and her sensuous beauty:

and let your desire, deep like the shade of a walnut tree, bend
and flood us with your lavish hair
from the down of the kiss to the leaves of the heart.

What he longs for is to experience again the unique sensation and return to the lost paradise. The key word here is "again"; he wants to hear the same words he heard in a similar situation from someone else in the past.

As she speaks about the way she feels, she uses words and images that remind one of a heavenly garden. The passing of time has become "soft and unworldly," "scented shrubs"⁶² are around them, "a flock of doves" descends and the stars are a human touch on her breast.⁶³ As far as she is concerned, everything seems ideal. She feels resurrected,⁶⁴ because her past was lifeless without love.

With the end of the quotation, however, we return to the disillusionment.

The broken sunset declined and was gone
and it seemed a delusion to ask for the gifts of the sky.

The dawn is replaced by the "moon's thorn" and the "mountain's shadows."

The last stanza in Part III is in italics, as if it were not a continuation of the preceding but a quotation from something else, interjected here. It is not the voice of the narrator but an inner voice.

⁶²In his essay, "A Staging for 'The Thrush,'" Seferis, referring to a similar expression in "The Thrush," writes: "the cool leaf, the leaf that respire, in the sense of fulfilment of desire," and then cites as another example the "scented shrubs" of "Erotikos Logos." *Essays*, 2:42.

⁶³As Walter Kaiser remarks in his Introduction to the *Three Secret Poems*, this kind of image "although comprehensible, achieves its full impact only for someone who has experienced the palpable closeness of stars in those Mediterranean latitudes" (xi).

⁶⁴The term "resurrected" is a more precise equivalent of the Greek *αναστηθεις*, which is used here.

*... In the mirror how our love diminishes
in sleep the dreams, school of forgetfulness
in the depths of time, how the heart contracts
and vanishes in the rocking of a foreign embrace.*

Seen in the light of this passage, the line "In the mirror how our love diminishes" becomes clear: other images and persons intervene and little by little he drifts apart from her. His dreams also teach him to forget her. As the next line indicates, those images and dreams come from "the depths of time," from his past. A "foreign embrace"—foreign in relation to the present one, most probably the love he experienced in the lost paradise—comes slowly back and makes his heart contract and the present love disappear. In other words, his subconscious, which is awake while he is asleep, suggests the idea of forgetfulness.

The next part (IV) refers, in my view, to this past experience. The poet presents two serpents, which are separated and which crawl in a dark forest in search of each other for "a secret love in hidden retreats." Their longing is so strong that they do not sleep, do not drink, do not eat.

There is some ambiguity in the choice of the snakes to represent the two lovers. There are two references to the snakes of "Erotikos Logos" in the poet's *Journals*. At one point it is suggested that the two snakes were actually one and at another that there are ten snakes.⁶⁵ The snake is a symbol of evil and betrayal, and Seferis has used it in this sense in his poetry. In the first poem of this collection, "Turning Point," the crucial moment he describes kept "the whole/tragic clepsydra dumb,/as though it had seen the Hydra [the snake]/in the heavenly garden." Although he avoided any specific explanation of it, there is no doubt that it was an ominous moment. Also, when Seferis does not use biblical symbolism but the Aeschylean idea of hubris, as in the poem "Mycenae," the snake is again connected with evil. The perpetuation of crime is evident in the following passage from "Mycenae," in which the protagonist identifies with the Atridae. There is most probably a connection here with Clytemnestra's vision in Aeschylus' *Libation Bearers*. She dreamed that she gave birth to a serpent and that she suckled it as if it had been a baby; but together with the milk the serpent drew dotted blood from her breast. The dream was an omen anticipating Clytemnestra's slaying by Orestes.

Tortured by my own garment
 Condemned by my own gods,

 I
 Who have so often followed
 The path that leads from murderer to victim
 From victim to the punishment

⁶⁵Journal B, 90.

And from the punishment up to another murder;
 Groping my way
 Over the purple welling inexhaustible
 That night of the return
 When the whistling began
 Of Furies in the scanty grass—
 I have seen snakes crossed with vipers
 Knotted about the accursed generation
 Our fate.⁶⁶

Thus, by choosing the snakes as symbols of the lovers in the lost paradise, Seferis certainly wanted to imply something—most probably that their love, in spite of its overwhelming passion and ecstasy, was related to a betrayal or a violation.

The erotic encounter of the two lovers is described in very sensuous terms:

Circling, twisting, their insatiable intent
 spins, multiplies, turns, spreads rings on the body
 which the laws of the starry dome silently govern,
 stirring its hot, irrepressible frenzy.⁶⁷

The erotic moments fall like magic drops of water in the silver cup of silence. Their echoes are like those of a chisel curving the lines of a statue. Then,

The statue suddenly dawns. But the bodies have vanished
 in the sea in the wind in the sun in the rain.

The image of the statue is rather enigmatic. Three passages from Seferis's writings throw some light on the meaning of the symbol of the statue. The poet himself has suggested⁶⁸ that the first of them is parallel to the above lines of "Erotikos Logos."

Oh it is true the fragments
 Are not the statues. You are yourself the remains
 They haunt you with their strange virginity.⁶⁹

The statues symbolize nothing else but the human bodies which

⁶⁶Cassandra, in *Agamemnon*, referring to the boldness of Clytemnestra in slaying her husband, says: "What odious monster shall I fitly call her? an amphibiaena?" (a fabulous snake which moves both backward and forward, ll. 1230-3).

⁶⁷The Greek word *ἀφορμή*, which is rendered here as "frenzy," literally translated means "primary cause," "motive" or "origin."

⁶⁸*Essays*, 2:43.

⁶⁹From "The *Tbrush*."

have been hardened by insensitivity, are bent by love or are mutilated by the waste of time.⁷⁰

Look how our gestures, our movements, our acts, our emotions, our thoughts turn instantaneously into marble as soon as they enter the past, as if they had sunk in "liquified" air. And all these remain motionless there, for ever; nothing can change their pose. We give birth to statues every passing moment. This struck me like a sudden vision three days ago. Since then I have been following this process with anxiety.⁷¹

These passages help to illuminate to a certain extent the symbolic meaning of the statues, which appear often and are very significant in Seferis's poetry. Some ambiguity, however, still remains. In the case of the two lovers of "Erotikos Logos," for instance, the question remains why instead of the dawn the protagonist was wishing for ("if it were but you who would bring the forgotten dawn") it is "the statue [that] dawns," while "the bodies have vanished." It is true that the next two lines,

So the beauties nature grants us are born
but who knows if a soul hasn't died in the world,

suggest the creation of a work of art, at the cost of the artists's soul.⁷² But this is only part of the explanation. In my view, the reason why at the end of sensual pleasure the protagonist of "Erotikos Logos" finds, not fulfilment, but the body's transformation into marble, must lie in the fact that in his imagination the two separated snakes return, as we see in the next stanza:

The parted snakes must have returned⁷³ in fantasy
(the forest glitters with birds, shoots, blossoms)
their wavy searching still remains,
like the turnings of the cycle that bring sorrow.

This is the memory of a lost paradise, as the description in parentheses above indicates. The mutual longing of the two snakes "still remains" and becomes a source of sorrow. And the poet, haunted by this memory, cannot reach fulfilment in the present.

The last part (V) starts with an insistently nostalgic tone:

⁷⁰From a letter to his French translator, Robert Levesque (*For Seferis*, 268).

⁷¹*Journal A*, 75.

⁷²See also Robert Levesque's Introduction to his French translation of Seferis's poems, *Séféris: Choix de Poèmes traduits et accompagnés du texte grec avec une préface* (Athens: Ikaros, 1945).

⁷³The Greek γύριζαν means both "circle" and "return." For my interpretation of the poem it is crucial to render it here as "return."

Where is the double-edged day that had changed everything?

he wonders, in despair, although he has just failed to revive the paradise of his youth.

In his essay, "A Staging for 'The *Thrush*,'" Seferis himself refers to some poems where this unique moment of love is described.⁷⁴

Where is love that with one stroke cuts time in two and stuns it?
(*"The Mood of a Day"*)

The night perhaps: which opened, a blue pomegranate,
Dark breasts, filling you full of stars,
Cutting down time.

(*"The Thrush"*)

Part V continues with the poet expressing himself in terms of a symbolic journey and using a direct reference to the Homeric myth.

Won't there be a navigable river for us?
Won't there be a sky to drop dew
for the soul benumbed and nourished by the lotus?

This exotic and dangerous fruit deprived some of Odysseus' companions of their day of return. By confessing here that his soul was "nourished"⁷⁵ by this fruit, the poet implies that there is no hope for him either. He is probably referring here to the time in his life when he "believed in the omnipotence of the body" and his senses had benumbed his soul. Now he is longing for "the dawn of heaven," which remains unforgettable in his memory, but he realizes that there is no return to Ithaca. The question "Won't there be a navigable river for us?" is rhetorical. Only a "miracle" could save him. He waits for the messenger⁷⁶ "On the stone of patience," but miracles do not happen often.

As the poem ends, he addresses again—as he did in the beginning—the "red rose of the wind and fate," admitting with fatigue that the only thing that remains from it in his memory is a "heavy rhythm" like an undulation of the sea.

Red rose of the wind and of fate
you remained in memory only, a heavy rhythm
rose of the night, you passed, undulating purple
undulation of the sea . . . The world is simple.

⁷⁴*Essays*, 2:42.

⁷⁵The Greek word ἀνάρρηψε, which Seferis uses here, literally translates as "reared."

⁷⁶The word used by Seferis here, ἄγγελος, means "messenger" in ancient Greek and "angel" in modern Greek. Seferis very effectively combines the two meanings here, in a manner reminiscent of the mysterious messengers in *Waiting for Godot*.

The "undulating purple" represents the reflection of the red rose on the water, and since in the beginning of the poem the rose was about to wound the protagonist, this purple, on the symbolic level, is the pain and the blood of this love.⁷⁷

The ending of the poem, "The world is simple," can only be seen as a tragic irony. The Italian critic Lucia Marcheselli, in a discussion with the poet, asked him specifically whether this statement about the simplicity of the world was indeed ironic. Seferis asserted that this was his intention by the comment: "But isn't there *καρημὸς* [deep sorrow] in sarcasm?"⁷⁸

⁷⁷Compare, for instance, Odysseus Elytis's phrase, "The blood of love has robed me in purple." *The Axion Esti*, trs. Edmund Keeley and George Savidis (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1974) 97.

⁷⁸I am indebted to Lucia Marcheselli for this information.

Documents: The O.S.S. and Greek-Americans

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GREEK TERRITORIAL ASPIRATIONS: I. CYPRUS

As the favorable development of the war encourages the United Nations to look toward the peace, the question of territorial settlements naturally engages the attention especially of the smaller nations. From nebulous praises of their heroic struggle they would like to proceed to a

A NOTE ON CLASSIFICATION

The O.S.S. employed three classification categories: SECRET, CONFIDENTIAL, and RESTRICTED.

The three-tiered classification system had been established by the War Department in 1917, and a regulation issued in September 1942 by the Office of War Information had the effect of extending this classification system to all non-military agencies.

As defined in a regulation issued in 1938, RESTRICTED, the lowest classification was to be used on a document "when the information it contains is for official use only or of such nature that its disclosure should be limited for reasons of administrative privacy, or should be denied the general public."

CONFIDENTIAL was the classification between RESTRICTED and SECRET, and it indicated the government's desire to protect a document from public scrutiny.

SECRET was the highest classification until March 15, 1944, when TOP SECRET was added to parallel more directly the British secrecy system.

Source: "The Development of Security Classification Categories for Classified Information," W.W. Harrison Jr., Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), 1958.

more concrete assurance that they will reap some of the fruits of that struggle. It is not surprising, therefore, that these nations should begin to formulate definite demands for what they consider their just due, and that the foreign nationality groups representing them in the United States should show a lively interest.

Greeks and Greek-Americans in the United States are becoming increasingly anxious about post-war adjustments. Americanized Greeks of long residence here no less than exiles whose interests remain in Greece display a passionate concern for the future status of Greece, and it is probable that their opinions reflect in the main those of Greeks in the homeland.

Like other occupied countries, Greece expects full restitution of the territories taken from her during the present war. This is so completely assumed that little is said about it except in the case of Bulgarian-held districts of Western Thrace and Eastern Macedonia. The systematic expulsion of Greeks and introduction of Bulgarians which has been practiced in that area has caused Greek-Americans acute apprehension. They fear that the Bulgarians may succeed in presenting a *fait accompli* to support their claim that these lands are indeed Bulgarian.

But in addition to concerning themselves with regaining national territory occupied by the enemy during this war, the Greek-Americans are directing their attention, both in newspapers and in general activity, toward territories which were not politically part of the Greek state before the war but which they feel belong properly to Greece by reason of historical tradition and race. Of the three regions which constitute the chief goal of their aspirations, Cyprus has long been held by a friendly power, Great Britain; the Dodecanese by an enemy, Italy; Northern Epirus (or Southern Albania) by a nominally friendly neighbor, but one actually under Italian domination. Each claim, therefore, presents a different problem, and of the three, perhaps the most delicate is that of Cyprus.

Cyprus, whose population of nearly 350,000 is approximately eighty per cent Greek and twenty per cent Moslem, has been under British control since 1878. In that year Great Britain took over its administration from Turkey in return for certain guarantees of Turkish possessions against aggression. Britain also agreed to pay an annual sum to Turkey, representing the excess of the revenue of the island over its expenditures. This sum was known as the Cyprus Tribute and was paid out of island funds. Turkey nominally retained sovereignty until the outbreak of war between Britain and Turkey in 1914, when Cyprus was formally annexed to Britain. It is now a British Crown Colony.

Although the administration of Cyprus has certainly been liberal, the Greek-speaking Cypriots have never been happy under British rule. They have been constantly agitated by a desire for union with Greece. Sometimes the agitation has been mild; sometimes, as in the uprising of 1931, it has reached a high pitch of intensity. Britain's refusal to grant the Cypriots independence has been based partly on reluctance to lose a strategic base and partly on a regard for the interests of the Moslem

minority, who would prefer to be ruled by Britain rather than by Greece. Aside from the natural desire of the large Greek majority of the population to unite with what they consider their motherland, the Greek Cypriots have several specific grievances against the British administration. Many Greek-Americans feel that redress of these grievances long ago might have done much to mollify the Cypriots and to make them willing to accept British control. They attribute to the British, however, an inability to understand the Cypriots; and they charge that a British tendency to regard the population as composed of backward "natives" has led to the rejection of many just demands, or to an acceptance so tardy that the Cypriots have lost patience and have resolved to be content with nothing short of complete independence from Britain.

In addition to informal agitation for union with Greece, which is a perpetual undercurrent in the life of Greek-Cypriots, formal requests have been made in the form of Memorials addressed by the Greek Elected Members of the Legislative Council to the British Secretary of State for the Colonies. These requests have usually been accompanied by alternative plans for giving the Cypriots a greater share in the government should the request for freedom be refused. A typical example of such a Memorial is that of 1929, addressed to Lord Passfield, then Colonial Secretary, in which the following sources of grievance were specifically mentioned:

- 1) The fact that the original agreement with Turkey was made without the knowledge of the Cypriots;
- 2) The "Cyprus Tribute" and the fact that since the annexation of the island by Britain the sum had continued to be levied and had been used to pay off the interest on the Ottoman Loan, on which Turkey had defaulted;
- 3) Britain's "imperialistic policy of administration."

The first cause has now of course become an abstract question, closely bound up with the consciousness retained by the majority of Cypriots of their Greek nationality, and no concessions other than complete freedom can satisfy it, according to Greek feeling now. The second is an issue of less importance since the British Government instituted an annual grant-in-aid for Cyprus of an amount equal to that of the Tribute, although a certain discontent remains because the Cypriots hold that some arrears are due them.

The charge of "imperialistic policy" is based, according to the Memorial, on the Cypriots' dissatisfaction with the minor role assigned them in the administration of the island. All the high officials are British; only three out of eight members of the advisory Executive Council are drawn from the resident population, and these three are not always invited to meetings of the Council. There is a Legislative Council composed of twenty-one members, of whom fifteen may be Cypriots. This is the only body in which the Cypriots have a majority, but the Governor is em-

powered to set aside any decision made by the Legislative Council. Furthermore the Legislative Council is specifically excluded from enacting laws concerning the appropriation of public revenues or the imposition of taxes. The Cypriots likewise resent the fact that the salary of an English official is vastly greater than that of a Cypriot occupying the same position; they also criticize the appointments of what they term incompetent Englishmen when competent Cypriots are available, and the preferences which they say are often shown the Moslems in an effort to gain their support for the British against the Greeks.

Although it has always turned a deaf ear to the pleas for union of Cyprus with Greece, the British Government is now showing signs of becoming increasingly aware of the necessity of according some consideration to the Cypriots' demands. The *Atlantis* of New York commented with interest (June 8) on a statement on the 1943 budget, made recently by the Governor of Cyprus, Sir Charles Woolley, which indicated that the anticipated deficit would be met with a loan from the British Government. Additional loans, according to the Governor, would be made for economic development, such as irrigation, vine culture, soil conservation, etc. The Government, he said, had adopted a policy of appointing Cypriots to positions of greater responsibility, and educational opportunities would be increased after the war. The Governor finally declared that the political representations made by the Cypriots to the Government had not been overlooked. From other sources it is learned that Britain has tested Cypriot tobacco and found it suitable for British use. It has also been reported that the production of silk cocoons in Cyprus is expanding rapidly, and that the British Government has undertaken to buy the whole of next year's crop.

But, if Greek-Americans reflect the opinion of their compatriots in Cyprus, such limited concessions will probably not satisfy the Cypriots now. The whole question of Cyprus has recently become a burning issue, both in the United States and abroad, and feelings have become intensified as a result of statements made in the House of Lords by Lord Faringdon, Lord Mersey and the Duke of Devonshire. Lord Faringdon characterized the Cypriots as "not Greek, but merely Greek-speaking," and opposed the union of Cyprus with Greece. The repercussions were immediate. In a signed editorial in the liberal Greek daily, *National Herald* of New York (April 9), Basil Vlavianos protested at length against the "violence to the truth" and the "woeful lack of respect for the sacrifices and the will of the Cypriots." The Communist *Greek-American Tribune* of April 23 invoked the Atlantic Charter and demanded a plebiscite for Cyprus. The conservative *Atlantis* (April 7) quoted the Cypriot *Eleftheria* to the effect that the statements in the House of Lords "provide a mistaken idea in regard to the level of political maturity of the people of Cyprus." Cypriots in the American Army protested in a letter to the *Greek-American Tribune*.

Finally, a group of Cypriot-Americans met in New York April 28 to consider what measures might be taken to provide pertinent information

on Cyprus to Senators, Congressmen, newspaper editors, and the American public. A temporary committee was formed under the chairmanship of Dr. Savvas Nittis. The committee was authorized to make plans for a general meeting to which all Cypriot societies in the United States would be asked to send delegates and to which about 1,000 former Cypriots would be invited individually. The Cypriot-American community is estimated to number some 6,000 or more, and there are numerous small local societies, some of which are loosely federated in the Cypriot Union or the Pan-Cyprian Brotherhood, both of New York. At the meeting of the committee it was pointed out that many teachers in the Greek Orthodox schools in the United States and also a good many priests were of Cypriot descent, and that the Cypriots had proportionately more intellectuals in this country than any other Greek group.

The statements made in the House of Lords produced a lively reaction in England also. The *Manchester Guardian* published several letters of protest from Greeks and Englishmen, and a leader of the British Labor Party, Peter Freeman, demanded at a recent meeting of the Party that Cyprus and the Dodecanese be united with Greece. The Greek-American press naturally hastened to provide full reports on this side of the Atlantic.

Former pleas of the Cypriots to be allowed to unite with Greece have met with various responses. Lord Passfield's reply to the Memorial of 1929 was simply that the subject "is definitely closed, and cannot profitably be further discussed." Much earlier, when Mr. Winston Churchill, as Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, visited Cyprus in 1907, he thought the Cypriots worthy of a more conciliatory reply. He thought it natural, he said, that the Cypriots should wish to unite with Greece. But his refusal was based on the fact that at that time Cyprus was not Britain's to give, and that it was "agreed . . . that the mission of Great Britain in the Levant should not be to impair the sovereignty of the Sultan." Possibly if Cyprus had legally belonged to Britain at that time Mr. Churchill might have based a refusal on different grounds, but the fact remains that he is on record as having recognized the reasonableness of the Cypriots' aspirations, and Greeks in America and elsewhere are not slow to point this out.

That Cyprus has profited under British rule there can be no doubt, and the unswerving loyalty of the Cypriots to the Allied cause is a tacit admission of this fact. Although Britain's interest in the island has always been strategic rather than economic, the development of its resources has not been neglected. When Britain took over the administration of Cyprus there was one road, twenty-six miles long; there are now some three thousand miles of excellent, good and passable roads. The area of cultivated land has doubled; artificial irrigation has been introduced; export of Cyprus's commodities has been developed to some extent; swamps have been drained, and some progress has been made in forest conservation and reforestation. The educational system, which under the Turks consisted merely of a few Moslem schools, was vastly extended and improved. On the other hand, many Cypriots feel that although infinitely superior to

the Turkish administration, the British has [sic] failed to take the fullest advantage of the island's natural resources; it is indeed still a comparatively poor island. For example, it is thought by some that the copper mines should have been worked to a greater extent.

In one important respect the British have earned the gratitude of the Cypriots: they have, with very few exceptions, allowed complete freedom of speech. The schools have been permitted to encourage nationalistic aims; political demonstrations have been permitted; the freedom of the press has rarely been curtailed, and the use of the Greek language has never been discouraged. A Dodecanesian Greek would be quick to realize the difference between his lot and that of the Cypriot.

Nevertheless the Greek Cypriots still harbor resentment of British rule, because, like their mainland compatriots, they believe themselves to be a civilized people capable of governing themselves. If and when they attain their independence they may find the road of self-government less easy than they had imagined it, but it is axiomatic that no nation has ever achieved self-rule without a struggle. All Greeks recognize that their interests are closely bound up with those of Britain, and according to their view, the latter would be in no danger of losing her strategic base should Cyprus be united with Greece. Greek opinion, in the United States as in Greece, holds that as long as Britain retains domination over Cyprus she will have on her hands a recalcitrant population, but that a generous gesture now would ensure her a permanently faithful ally.

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GREEK TERRITORIAL ASPIRATIONS: II. THE DODECANESE

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However sharply Greek-Americans in the United States may disagree on problems concerning the internal politics and the post-war regime of Greece, it is with an almost complete unanimity that they join their kinsmen in the homeland in confronting some of the broader national issues arising from the war. Among such questions territorial aspiration and settlements take a preeminent place. When the future of Cyprus, the Dodecanese, Northern Epirus, and the Thracio-Macedonian border is discussed, the Greek view is expressed spontaneously and in unison without a dissenting voice. All the areas mentioned are regarded as indefeasibly Hellenic, belonging to Greece by virtue of inalienable moral right estab-

lished through history, tradition, culture, and occupation. If any one of the four can be singled out and set above another, the jewel of great price is unquestionably the Dodecanese for whose union with the mother country the whole of Hellenism fervently hopes, and appeals.

Dodecanesians in the United States The strength of the appeal in the United States arises partly from the universal sympathy accorded the Dodecanesians for the fortitude with which they have endured three decades of Italian rule. The writings and speeches of several distinguished exiles who have waged an unceasing struggle for the liberation of their native islands have kept the question always to the fore. No less effective perhaps in mobilizing feeling here in support of Dodecanesian aspirations has been the steady influence of the relatively large element in the Greek-American community which traces its origin to the Twelve Islands. It is estimated that the total number of such Dodecanesian-Americans in the United States exceeds 15,000, with a widespread distribution from coast to coast and from north to south. The largest single Dodecanese colony, and one of the few compact Greek-American settlements in this country, is that at Tarpon Springs, Florida, where more than 2,500 refugees driven out by Italian restrictive measures have established themselves in their traditional occupation of sponge fishing.

The Dodecanesian element in the Greek-American community has formed numerous local societies and organizations generally federated island by island in several larger associations, and almost all affiliated under the still broader Dodecanesian National Council, of New York. An active Dodecanesian information center has been set up at 30 Rockefeller Plaza in New York City; and the energetic Dodecanesian League of America, with headquarters in the same city, is likewise an ardent champion of the Dodecanesian cause.

Twelve Isles The Dodecanese, or "Twelve Isles" (actually a baker's dozen, since there are thirteen principal islands) lie just off the southwestern coast of Asia Minor. The total land area (1,022 square miles) is somewhat less than that of the state of Rhode Island, more than half of it (564 square miles) belonging to Rhodes, the largest one of the group. Next in order of size and importance are Kos, Kalymnos, and Leros, the latter a heavily-fortified Italian naval base. According to a census of 1939, the total population was 122,402: approximately 90,000 Greeks, 10,000 Turks, 5,000 Jews, 7,000 resident Italians, and 10,000 Italian transients.

From Turkey to Italy Under Turkish rule the Dodecanese population long enjoyed a considerable prosperity and a large measure of autonomy in return for the payment of a fixed annual tribute to the Sultan. The arrangement was abrogated by the Young Turks in 1909. Before a new system could be established, however, during the Italian-Turkish War of 1911-12, the Italians seized the Islands after

defeating the Turks in a single battle at Psinthos in Rhodes. It is said that on this occasion General Ameglio and Admiral Presbitero made the following declaration to the Greek Archbishop of Rhodes:

"We assure you in the most categorical manner that, at the conclusion of this war, your islands, which are only provisionally occupied by Italy, will be granted an autonomous regime. We give you the assurance both as soldiers and as Christians, and you may regard the statement as you would regard the words of the Gospel."

Persuaded by this promise, the Rhodians assisted the Italians in the fight; a Dodecanesian assembly, convened at Patmos, proclaimed an "Autonomous State of the Aegean," with a flag of its own. By the Treaty of Lausanne (October 15, 1912) Italy pledged evacuation of the Dodecanese as soon as the Turks evacuated Libya. The Prime Minister, Giovanni Giolitti, described the occupation as a temporary one necessitated wholly by military considerations, and disclaimed all intention of retaining a territory of purely Greek nationality.

By the secret Treaty of London in 1915, the Allies, endeavoring to secure the entry of Italy into the war, extended recognition of Italian claims to sovereignty over the Islands. At the end of the war that Treaty was largely invalidated, and in 1919 Italy made concessions to Greece in a general agreement signed July 20 by Tommaso Tittoni, Minister of Foreign Affairs for Italy, and Eleutherios Venizelos, Prime Minister of Greece. Among other things the agreement provided for the cession to Greece of the smaller Islands; Rhodes was to be accorded a large measure of autonomy with the people left free to decide their future on the day when Great Britain should cede Cyprus to Greece. The agreement was denounced in 1920 by Count Carlo Sforza, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, and now prominent as an anti-Fascist refugee in the United States, in a note (July 22) to the Greek Minister in Rome and in a speech before the Italian Chamber of Deputies August 6. Under pressure of the United States, Great Britain, and France, a new agreement was signed in connection with the Treaty of Sevres August 10, 1920, reaffirming the chief provisions of the Tittoni-Venizelos understanding with reference to the Dodecanese; but it was never ratified by Italy and was formally denounced October 8, 1922. Under the Fascist Government which soon afterward came into power Italy definitely embarked on an imperialistic career and was henceforth determined to keep possession of the Dodecanese.

Fascist Rule The details of the Italian occupation are familiar to Greek-Americans, and form the foundation of their campaign to attain recognition of their cause. Repressive policies had been applied in the Islands even before the establishment of the Fascist Government, and under Fascism the regime grew steadily more severe. The Metropolitan

Archbishop of Rhodes was expelled in 1921 and was permitted to return only after three years on condition of renouncing his connection with the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Constantinople. Italian attempts at that time to establish an autocephalous Dodecanesian Orthodox Church ended in failure. The incorporation of the Islands in the Empire nevertheless proceeded. In 1925 all the inhabitants were required to assume Italian nationality. The Italian language was pressed upon the population and measures were taken to discourage and restrict the use of Greek. Local self-government, exercised for centuries by the Dodecanesians, was abolished and replaced by a Fascist form of autocracy. Political activity among the citizens was forbidden and any expression of a desire for union with Greece was severely punished by imprisonment or exile. Innumerable petty regulations and prohibitions made life almost intolerable for the Greeks, who suffered more under Italian domination than they had previously under the Turks. Thousands escaped from the Islands in one way or another, and the population declined, in some Islands by as much as 40 per cent. An acute economic depression was brought on, in large measure by the Italian imperialistic commercial policies which blocked most of the old established channels of trade.

The plight of the Dodecanesian Greeks received constant attention and publicity in the Greek and foreign press. It formed the subject of active propaganda in numerous pamphlets and books, and was often described with impassioned zeal in private and public meetings and in mass meetings held at Athens and elsewhere. In spite of some efforts on the part of Greek authorities to curb public criticism of Italian action, the issue soon became a permanent obstacle to the maintenance of cordial relations between Greece and Italy. There was much petty friction and frequent interchange of recriminatory diplomatic notes.

The Greek Claim All these matters were fully presented in the Greek-American newspapers in the United States. Each fresh complaint of the Dodecanesians against Italian oppression called forth a clamorous outburst of complaints and indignation. The arrival in the United States from time to time of refugees added fuel to the fire. Their detailed stories of persecution and mistreatment lost no emphasis in the retelling; and gradually bitter dislike and detestation of the Italians permeated the Greek-American community. The feeling of hostility was further deepened by Italo-Greek incidents in Epirus, Corfu, and elsewhere, in all of which the Greeks believed themselves wronged and unjustly humiliated.

Against such a background of resentment and discontent, the recovery of the Dodecanese has become one of the primary objectives of Greeks at home and abroad. The Dodecanesian League of America has been untiring in keeping the cause before the public eye. Departing from the purely fraternal tradition common to most Greek regional associations in the United States, it has become an active political force. Already it has achieved two successes. It obtained exemption for Dodecanesian Greeks from the cate-

gory of enemy aliens in the United States, on the ground that their Italian citizenship was involuntary. And it finally elicited from Count Sforza a statement that Italy should renounce its claim to the Dodecanese. A pamphlet entitled *Sforza vs. Sforza*, issued by the League, set forth the Count's responsibility for the failure of Italy to honor the Venizelos-Tittoni agreement ceding the Islands to Greece; it also charged that Sforza, although anti-Fascist, was nevertheless an Italian imperialist. Soon after the publication of the pamphlet Sforza issued a statement saying that in his mind the concept of Italy did not include "dominion over distant islands which have been, are, and wish to be Greek." It was generally believed that this was a direct answer to the League's challenge. (See Foreign Nationalities Number B-49, June 11, 1943.)

Champions of the Dodecanesian cause have not all been Greeks. Compton Mackenzie in a recent book, *Wind of Freedom*, supports Greece's aspirations, and he has received praise for his stand both in Great Britain and in the United States.

The Greek-American press has likewise played a very effective part in keeping the Dodecanesian question alive. Regardless of their policies on internal affairs, all papers—Royalist, Republican, Communist—have been unanimous in their insistence that the Twelve Islands should belong to Greece. Suggestions that a defeated Italy should be treated tenderly have never failed to produce an instant reaction in editorial columns. A noteworthy example was an editorial by Basil Vlavianos in the *National Herald* of May 17, 1943, commenting on an article by Walter Lippmann in which it was maintained that the reparations demanded of Italy should be of a "moral character." The editor of the *Herald* used Lippmann's article as an illustration of the dangers of Italian propaganda into which he considered the United Nations only too prone to fall.

Greek-Americans are so convinced of the rightness of their cause that they are unwilling to consider the possibility that the Dodecanese will not be awarded to Greece after the war. They have not forgotten that in 1920 the United States Senate passed a resolution which read: "It is the sense of the Senate that the Twelve Islands of the Aegean (Dodecanese) where a strong Greek population predominates should be awarded to Greece and become incorporated in the Kingdom of Greece." Their belief is further strengthened by their faith in the Atlantic Charter.

A British-Turkish Agreement? Rumors have occasionally circulated, especially after the meeting at Adana between Prime Minister Churchill and President Inonu, that a secret agreement has been reached by Britain and Turkey according to which the Islands would be ceded to Turkey. These rumors have caused momentary alarm in Greek-American circles, but fears in general have been allayed by a statement of a Turkish spokesman that Turkey does not desire any territory in which the population is not predominantly Turkish. Moreover, it is reported on good authority that assurances have been made by the British Government to a group of Dodecanesians that no such agreement exists. Greek-

Americans are disinclined to believe that Turkey would voluntarily jeopardize the cordial Turkish-Greek relations of recent years. They likewise have faith in the fairness of the British. Rumors of a British-Turkish agreement concerning the Dodecanese are therefore unlikely to be received with great credulity.

The certainty felt over the ultimate disposition of the Dodecanese is well illustrated by a resolution adopted by the Pan-Rhodian Society at its annual congress in 1942. After voting considerable sums for the purchase of war bonds, it agreed to set aside a certain sum "to buy the first Greek flag to be raised over the Castle of St. Nicholas; to pay the first expenses of the first Greek governor; and to provide for commemorative gifts to him and to all the Greek soldiers who are the first to bring sacred liberty to our beloved Rhodes."

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GREEK TERRITORIAL ASPIRATIONS: III. NORTHERN EPIRUS

The United States has become the main open forum for discussion of questions pertaining to the future of Europe. As the "beginning of the end" of the war looms into view, preoccupation with the impending difficulties of reorganization grows more and more lively. The need of securing a favorable post-war settlement of what they hold to be Greece's legitimate territorial aspirations has, in particular, aroused the ardent interests of Greek-Americans. Greek-American opinion with respect to Cyprus and the Dodecanese has been briefed in two preceding FN memoranda (Numbers 139 of 8 July 1943 and 142 of 22 July 1943). This report deals with the attitude of the Greek-American community on the one hand and the Albanian-American on the other toward the Greek-Albanian boundary dispute. A fourth and final paper will discuss Greece's Thracian-Macedonian frontier with Bulgaria.

GREECE'S aspirations for Cyprus and the Dodecanese present relatively clear-cut issues. In both instances the territories in question are under foreign domination as a result of occupation, whether peaceful or forceful, and are being held for strategic reasons. The predominance of the Greek population has never been disputed even by those most firmly resolved not to relinquish their holdings; at the outset, therefore, no problem of

nationality is raised. Moreover, island boundaries being well defined, the possibility of compromise hardly exists. The question of the district known to the Greeks as Northern Epirus, and to the Albanians as Southern Albania, on the other hand, is a highly complicated one. The national consciousness of the population is in large measure open to dispute; the nature of the terrain offers no obvious natural frontiers; and even the bare historical facts are used to advance the claims of both Greece and Albania with equal conviction, although with divergent interpretation. Greek-Americans and Albanian-Americans have taken an intense interest in the fate of the province which each group hopes may be awarded to its motherland, and they have availed themselves in the United States of the freedom of expression denied to their compatriots at home to present their views with earnest, and sometimes bitter, zeal.

Area and Population The district always called Southern Albania by Albanians and their sympathizers and just as invariably named Northern Epirus by Greeks and philhellenes is a relatively narrow strip of mountainous territory running from northeast to southwest with a length of nearly 100 miles and a width ranging from 15 to 35 or 40. It has an area of about 2,000 square miles, or approximately one-fifth of the total area of Albania as previously constituted. The southern boundary, which separates the district from Greek Southern Epirus, runs irregularly southwestward from Lake Presba to a point on the Ionian Sea just opposite the island of Corfu. The northern limit follows an even more devious course from Lake Ochrida to the coast, south of the Gulf of Valona. A rugged, mountainous region, it is broken up into a series of small valleys; since the chief mountain ranges generally extend north and south, both northern and southern boundaries cut them transversely.

Of a population of 250,000, it is estimated that 130,000 are Christians (Greek Orthodox) and the remaining 120,000 Moslems. The district is not rich in natural resources, but it includes the strategic port of Santi Quaranta (called Porto Edda by the Italian Fascist regime) and the cities of Koritza (Korca) and Argyrokastro (Gjinokastre), all in the southern half; near the northern boundary are the smaller cities of Chimara and Tepeleni.

Since 1913, when it was incorporated in the new state of Albania, the area has been a constant source of friction between the two neighbors. The fact that it has been of interest to all the chief European Powers has done nothing to lessen the friction.

1912-1920 During the First Balkan War, in 1912-13, when the Balkan states united to free themselves from Turkey, Greek armies occupied the district in question, and Greece expected to annex it. But Italy and Austria-Hungary were opposed to the growth of a rival power on the Adriatic; France and Russia, on the other hand, favored the Greek claim. A crisis was averted by British intervention, and the matter was referred to a Conference of Ambassadors held in London in December 1912. In

December of the following year, by an agreement known as the Protocol of Florence, the disputed strip was included within the borders of the newly proclaimed state of Albania.

The Greek armies unwillingly evacuated the newly-won territory, but shortly afterward the Christian Greeks initiated a successful revolt against the Albanians, and proclaimed Northern Epirus an autonomous state. It was recognized as such in the Protocol of Corfu which was signed by representatives of the European Powers in May 1914, and the new state was thereafter only nominally attached to Albania. No agreement will be found between Albanians and Greeks regarding the circumstances of the revolt. The Albanians assert that it was instigated by Greeks from across the border in deliberate defiance of the terms of the Protocol of Florence. The Greeks, on the other hand, maintain that it was the spontaneous protest of the native Epirotes against incorporation in the Albanian state.

The autonomous state was short-lived. In October 1914 the Allies, wishing to block access to the Adriatic by the Central Powers advancing through Serbia, asked Greece to reoccupy the new state, leaving its final disposition to be settled at the Peace Conference. Although the future of the district was thus left suspended, a royal decree was issued by King Constantine of Greece in March 1916, announcing that it was reunited with Greece. This action was not however accepted by the Allied Powers. Since Greece's position with respect to the Allies was at that time doubtful, the latter permitted Italy to send an army of occupation, which took over the whole region as far south as the Gulf of Ambracia. But in June 1917, soon after the occupation by Italy, King Constantine was forced by the Allies to abdicate, Venizelos returned to power as premier, and Greece officially entered the war on the side of the Allies. Since it could no longer be considered necessary to protect the eastern shores of the Adriatic against possible Greek treachery, the Greek Government demanded the evacuation of the Italian troops. The Italians withdrew from most of Southern Epirus, which lay within the old Greek boundaries of 1914, but maintained their hold in the western districts of the northern province while the French occupied Koritza.

The situation remained unchanged until July 1919, when the Tittoni-Venizelos agreement was signed. This was a general agreement of broad scope, regulating the many problems of Italo-Greek relations, and including among its terms provision for the annexation of the disputed area by Greece. Through Venizelos' influence the agreement later received the approval of the Allied Powers. Italy however delayed the withdrawal of her troops, and on July 22, 1920, the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Sforza, denounced the agreement in a letter to the Greek Minister at Rome. Two weeks later Sforza confirmed his stand in a speech before the Italian Chamber of Deputies.

Italian Influence and Occupation At the Conference of Ambassadors held in Paris in November 1921, and attended by representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan, the district was definitely awarded to Albania on the ground that "any modification of the frontiers of Albania constitutes a danger for the strategic safety of Italy." Albania was by this time becoming increasingly subject to Italian influence. The following years were marked by systematic peaceful penetration on Italy's part, culminating in the military invasion of Good Friday, 1939. Having gained complete domination of Albania, Italy was able to use the bases thus acquired in the south to launch the invasion of Greece on October 28, 1940. Greeks are therefore disinclined to view the necessity for the "strategic safety of Italy," recognized in the agreement of 1921, with enthusiasm.

Contrary to all expectations, the Greeks drove the Italians back, capturing Koritza, Argyrokastro, and other towns. But the intervention of Germany in the spring of 1941 compelled the Greeks to withdraw, and the Italians were allowed to reoccupy the territory which the Greeks had wrested from them. The fact that it was the scene of a resounding Greek triumph has intensified the desire of the Greeks to regain the disputed district, and for this desire their compatriots in the United States have the deepest sympathy.

Eden - Hull Declarations Declarations made in December 1942 by Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, implying a guarantee of Albanian independence after the war, precipitated an acrimonious controversy between Greek-Americans and Albanian-Americans, and between Greek and Albanian circles in Great Britain. Albanians both here and abroad welcomed what they interpreted as a first intimation that Albania was to be accepted as a member of the United Nations, although they would have preferred that the statements should include some assurance of what would constitute Albania. Greeks and Greek-Americans were alarmed lest Albania should regain her pre-war boundaries, including the disputed district; they derived some comfort however from Eden's statement that the boundary question would be reserved until after the war.

Although both sides had for some time been engaged in pressing their claims, the controversy took on a more official aspect when, on December 18, 1942, the Prime Minister of the Greek Government-in-Exile, Emmanuel Tsouderos, publicly noted with satisfaction Mr. Eden's reservation about the question of Albania's borders. Tsouderos's comment was published in Greek-American newspapers and immediately the territorial question once more became a burning issue between Greek and Albanian elements in America and Great Britain. Both the Greek and the Albanian press in the United States devoted long articles to the subject. The American National Pan-Epirotic League and the organization Free Albania, through their presidents, exchanged heated letters with charges and countercharges.

The Epirotes in America Greek-Americans of Epirote extraction are estimated to number about three thousand adult males, so far as may be calculated from statistics of membership in the various regional societies. Chief of these organizations are the American National Pan-Epirotic League of New York, a federation of eleven local societies claiming a membership of 1,500, and the Pan-Epirotic Federation of Worcester, Massachusetts, consisting of six chapters and 1,000 members. At a joint meeting in New York on September 5 and 6 the two federations voted to merge, in order more effectively to pursue their common aims. There are also at least eight independent Epirotic societies. The American National Pan-Epirotic League has been the most active politically. It recently (June 1943) issued a pamphlet entitled "Greek Northern Epirus" in which it advanced, not without bias, Greece's claim to this disputed area. The League has thus found itself in bitter controversy with Albanian-Americans. Both the Greek and the Albanian press in the United States have kept the issue alive, and the recent progress of the war and the surrender of Italy promise to lead to an intensification of the argument.

Feeling that the question was one of immediate importance, the Pan-Epirotic League of New York held a meeting on June 27, to which Greek-Americans not of Epirote descent were also invited. The chief business of the meeting was the discussion of Greek territorial aspirations, and a resolution was adopted, to be transmitted to the Secretary of State, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the British Foreign Office, stating the desire of the delegates for the restitution of certain territories to Greece. The extensive scope of the resolution, which covered not only Epirus, Macedonia, Thrace, Cyprus, and the Dodecanese, but even the district of Smyrna, led many Greek-Americans to express privately their disapproval of the proceedings of the Epirotes. They too desired satisfaction of Greece's claims, but they feared that to include unreasonable demands would do more harm than good to the entire cause and might, especially as regards relations with Turkey, provoke diplomatic misunderstandings. Because of the intransigent attitude of the Pan-Epirotic League, some of the more moderate minded Greek-Americans, including the leaders of the Dodecanesian National Council, refrained from attending its meeting.

The Argument The controversy rages chiefly around two points: the validity of the various agreements by which the disputed district was awarded to one side or the other, and the proportion of Greeks and Albanians in the population of that area. The Albanians cite the Protocol of Florence of 1913 and the decision of the Ambassadorial Conference of 1921, to support what they consider their incontrovertible right. The Greeks repudiate both agreements on the ground that the international commissions which fixed the boundaries did not study the situation thoroughly, and that they were intimidated by the Italians. In behalf of their own case the Greeks cite the Protocol of Corfu, by which Northern Epirus became an autonomous state whose language was recognized to be Greek; and the Tittoni-Venizelos agree-

ment by which first Italy and then the other Allies agreed that the region should belong to Greece. Greek-Americans remember with especial satisfaction and constantly point out that on May 17, 1920, the United States Senate adopted a resolution unreservedly favoring the award of Northern Epirus to Greece.

The question of the relative numbers of Greeks and Albanians in the disputed area has been argued back and forth with no conclusive results, because the criteria used to differentiate the one from the other have not been satisfactory. The usual test of language is invalid, since the nationalization of the schools in 1934 caused many of the younger generation to grow up speaking only Albanian, and the absence of Albanian schools under the Turks caused many of the older to speak only Greek. Neither can the test of religion be applied, because although few Greeks are Moslems, many Albanians are Orthodox. The assertion of some Albanians that only 30,000 of the 250,000 inhabitants of the district in question are Greeks, is probably much too low. On the other hand, the assumption that the estimated 130,000 Christians are all Greek is subscribed to by only the most ultra-nationalist Greeks. Whatever the actual numbers, it would appear that there is a very large minority of one group or the other.

The Greek Case Greece's interest in the region under dispute is centered primarily about two factors: concern for the treatment of Greeks under Albanian rule, and regard for strategic considerations. Greek-Americans of Epirote birth or descent are fiercely conscious of their culture and heritage, which they consider vastly superior to the Albanian. They point out with pride that in 1920 there were 360 Greek schools in their province, and they twit some of the most ardent Albanian nationalists with the fact that they received their education in Greek schools. The Albanians on the other hand rejoin that under the Turks they were not permitted to have schools of their own while the Greeks were allowed to have many. The Greek press in the United States recalls that after the award of the disputed territory to Albania the League of Nations demanded and obtained from the Albanian Government guarantees for the religious and educational institutions in that region, citing this fact as evidence that concern for the fate of these institutions was shared by outsiders. Subsequently, they charge, the Albanian Government violated its pledges and compelled the inhabitants to attend Albanian schools. Even Albanians have admitted the truth of this charge in the Albanian-American press, but they have dismissed it by blaming King Zog for the breach of faith.

Fears are felt also for the material welfare of the Greeks under Albanian rule. Greek-Americans are becoming increasingly alarmed by reports that under Italian domination Greeks in the disputed area were regularly being driven out of their homes and displaced by Albanians in an effort to prove that the district was ethnically Albanian. Knowing that the same method has been applied on a larger scale by the Bulgarians

in Macedonia and Thrace, they see no reason to doubt that the intentions behind the like activity of the Italians and Albanians were the same. Consequently they are not surprised by proposals made by some Albanian leaders that a plebiscite should be held in that province after the war.

Strategic Value Before April 1939, the argument that Greece needed the region as a bulwark against Italian imperialistic ambitions was treated generally with a certain skepticism. But the Italian occupation of Albania at that time gave substance to Greek fears, and the use of the southern bases from which to launch the invasion of Greece on October 28, 1940, gave the proof, but too late. This argument now provides the Greeks and their spokesmen in the United States with one of the strongest supports for their claim. It has also done nothing to improve Greek-Albanian relations, since the Greeks charge that Albania was willing to sell herself for Italian gold and thus prepared the way for the invasion of Greek territory. The Greek-American press has echoed these accusations. The Albanians, it has maintained, cannot be trusted to withstand foreign aggression; Greece must therefore be given the disputed territory to prevent a repetition of the events of October 1940. If Italy has once used Albania as a base for attacking Greece, it is argued, she will undoubtedly do so again. Nor will the overthrow of Fascism do much to alleviate Greek fears. Greek-American journalists constantly point out that Italy's career of imperialism began long before Mussolini's rise to power, and that Greece suffered from it in 1912 when Italy occupied the Dodecanese. The bombardment and temporary occupation of Corfu by the Italians in 1923, in retaliation for the assassination of General Tellini, who was alleged by the Italians to have been slain by a Greek band on the Greco-Albanian border, were not, they believe, the expression of a new policy, but of an old one which had its roots in the past. Finally, the Greek-American newspapers assert, the one-sided abrogation of the Tittoni-Venizelos agreement, which caused Greece to lose much-prized possessions, was the act of Fascism's most outspoken enemy, Count Sforza.* Greece, according to Greek-American spokesmen, will demand definite assurance that Italy has renounced not only Fascism but also imperialism before according her an honored place in Europe.

The feeling of the Greeks toward Albania, which is fully shared by the Greek-American community in this country, has never been particularly cordial. In addition to the territorial question and what is termed Albania's willingness to accept foreign domination which has alarmed her southern neighbor, other factors too have increased Greek suspicions of the Albanians. The recollection that the latter took no part in the Balkan Wars, but were willing to cast their lot with the Turks, and the fact that the

*Count Sforza has recently modified his stand on the Dodecanese question, having made a statement in the *Nazioni Unite* of June 3 which implied that he favored the cession of the islands to Greece. (See FN B-49 of 11 June 1943.) The statement contained no reference, however, to the territory involved in the Greco-Albanian dispute.

great majority of Albanians are Moslems, have been cited as added reasons for distrust. The Greeks are only slightly sympathetic to the Albanian desire for independence because they consider that the Albanians by themselves are incapable of resisting Italian domination. Some Greek-American journalists have gone so far as to suggest that Albania be put under a mandate, preferably American, to ensure the safety of Greece. The Albanians, naturally, have angrily repudiated these suggestions and have charged the Greeks with imperialistic designs.

Compromise? The possibility of compromise has not been publicly recognized by representatives of either side. Andreas Michalopoulos, former Under Secretary of Information in the Greek Government-in-Exile, advanced Greece's claim in a radio broadcast and in several articles; but it is reported that he admitted privately that "some arrangement might be made." It is believed in some quarters that Greece might be content with a new line which should include the cities of Koritza and Argyrokastro within the Greek boundaries. Albanian spokesmen have admitted in conversation with Americans that certain small areas of the disputed territory undoubtedly have a predominantly Greek population, an admission which might suggest the possibility of concessions also from the Albanian side.

Some observers are of the opinion that the official Greek attitude toward the northern claim will depend on the treatment accorded to other Greek demands, especially those for Cyprus and the Dodecanese. Should these islands be given to Greece, it is thought, the Greeks might be willing to make some compromise on the mainland for the sake of preserving peace, particularly if they can be convinced that Italy can be effectively restrained from future aggression. But no solution will be satisfactory to Greece if it leaves a large number of Greeks outside the motherland, and on the other hand no arrangement will be accepted with content by the Albanians if they believe that many of their kin are left under unsympathetic Greek domination.

A neutral observer has remarked that if the fate of the disputed territory as a whole were to be decided by a single plebiscite, Albania would surely win the day; for all the Moslems and a substantial part of the Christian population could certainly be counted on to favor the Albanian cause. That this belief is held also by many Albanian leaders is palpably demonstrated by their unhesitating alacrity to submit the question to such a popular vote held under neutral international supervision; and the corresponding unwillingness of Greek spokesmen to accept that method of determination presumably indicates on the southern side of the border a like understanding of the situation. Such a settlement of the problem as a whole, the observer continues, would undoubtedly fail to render justice to the minority which honestly desires to live under Greek sovereignty. Since this minority is to a considerable extent concentrated in two or three compact enclaves within the disputed territory, the suggestion has been heard that, if the rights of self-determination are to be

respected, the plebiscite might be held in separate areal units, district by district. Under a procedure of this kind there can be little doubt that the regions of Delvino and Drinopouli in the western part of the zone, for example, would vote for union with Greece, and some sections farther to the northeast along the border might express a similar sentiment. The possibility of reaching a compromise solution, requiring some sacrifice on the part of each side but which would not be too unjust to either, should therefore, in the opinion of the observer mentioned, not be excluded from consideration. In view of the intransigent attitude hitherto maintained by both sides it would undoubtedly be very difficult to overcome the reluctance of the rival claimants to agree to such a compromise; but should it be honestly accepted with mutual respect on both parts, it might bring about the permanent settlement of a long-standing controversy which has caused much international concern and has generated bitterness and rancor between two neighboring peoples.

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GREEK TERRITORIAL ASPIRATIONS: IV. THE MACEDONIAN-THRACIAN BORDER

Greeks and Greek-Americans are united in their conviction that the restitution to Greece of the northern provinces now under Bulgarian occupation and the strategic rectification of the frontier to provide greater security against future aggression are essential to the survival and well-being of Greece. Previous papers on Greek territorial aspirations as these are voiced in the democratic forum of the United States have dealt with Cyprus (Number 139, 8 July 1943), the Dodecanese (Number 142, 22 July 1943), and Northern Epirus (Number 150, 15 September 1943). The present memorandum, which concludes the series, surveys the historical background of the Macedonian-Thracian problem, seeking at the same time to interpret in this connection Greek and Greek-American thought and feeling.

DISCUSSION of Greece's post-war aims has nowhere been carried on with greater intensity than in the United States, and although the claims for the restitution of former Greek territory now under Bulgarian occupation might seem to require no argument, Greek-Americans are keeping

a watchful eye on the Bulgarians, fearing that by some trick the latter might succeed in cheating their neighbors of their due.

Transplantation of Greeks and Bulgarians to the United States has done little to abate the bitter hostility of these two traditional enemies. Greek-Americans retell the story of Greece's grievances against Bulgaria in the hope of assuring the recovery of their lost territory. Bulgarian-Americans, on the other hand, emboldened by what seems to them a somewhat tolerant attitude on the part of the United States Government toward the smaller Axis satellites, adopt the paradoxical stand of acclaiming every victory of the United Nations while vociferously demanding for their former homeland the privilege of keeping those territories which adherence to the Axis camp has momentarily gained for it.

The fear that a defeated Italy or Germany might somehow manage to retain a foothold in Greece naturally does not trouble even those who are most gravely concerned for the future of Greece since they know that the Germans and Italians have confined themselves to military occupation. The depredations of Greece's neighbor Bulgaria, on the other hand, are viewed with intense alarm because the Bulgarians have made a systematic effort to bring about a permanent annexation of Macedonia and Thrace which they have long coveted and have now seized with German approval. The Greek-American press has reiterated the fear that, by the seizure and settlement of these lands and by the expulsion of the Greek inhabitants, Bulgaria may succeed in imposing a claim on ethnic grounds, or at least in reopening a subject which Greeks consider to have been settled long ago.

The Land Macedonia and Thrace, it will be recalled, form a contiguous area extending from the Haliakmon River and Lake Ochrida on the west to the Hebros River (Maritza) on the east with a length of some 300 miles from east to west and a width north to south varying from about 25 to 75 miles. Four main regions are roughly marked off by river systems: Western Macedonia lying between the Haliakmon and the Vardar, Central Macedonia between the Vardar and the Struma, Eastern Macedonia between the Struma and the Nestos, and Western Thrace between the Nestos and the Maritza which formed pre-war Greece's eastern frontier with Turkey. Much of the territory is rough and mountainous. From the Vardar River eastward it comprises the lower slopes, foothills, interior valleys, and coastal plains lying to the south of the rugged, massive chain of the Rhodope Mountains, the irregular watershed of which was fixed after World War I as the boundary line between Greece and Bulgaria. This long and lofty range, traversed by only a few difficult passes, constitutes a huge natural barrier separating the broad mid-Bulgarian plain from the Aegean Sea to which relatively easy access is possible only by a circuitous detour around the eastern or the western end of the massif. Nature herself, the Greeks feel, has apparently done what she could to shut Bulgaria off from the Aegean littoral.

The western and central valleys of Macedonia are known as fertile

cereal-producing regions, while Eastern Macedonia and Thrace are noted for the superlative quality of their "Turkish" tobacco crop, a substantial part of which was formerly used in the manufacture of American cigarettes. The only good port is that of Saloniki, a harbor equipped with docks and modern installations; elsewhere, especially at Kavalla and Alexandroupolis (Dedeagatch), coasting vessels are obliged to anchor in open roadsteads and to discharge their cargoes into lighters. A single track railroad of standard gauge follows a roundabout course from Saloniki to Alexandroupolis, beyond which it connects with the main line of the Orient railway continuing on to Istanbul. Another railroad extends from Saloniki through Central and Western Macedonia to Bitolj (Monastir) in southern Yugoslavia, while the principal line coming down the Vardar Valley from Central Europe goes on southward to Athens. Macedonia and Thrace are consequently of high economic and strategic importance, and it is this fact that explains the rivalry and struggle for their possession which have long kept Greece and Bulgaria at swords' points.

The People Before the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, the whole area was inhabited by a remarkably heterogeneous and polyglot population. The three chief elements were represented by Greeks, Turks, and Macedonian-Bulgars, probably in that order numerically, although no reliable statistics were available. Furthermore, there were appreciable minorities of Macedonian Serbs in the west, Albanians, Vlachs (Wallachians), and Spanish Jews. The latter lived almost exclusively in the larger cities, mainly in Saloniki. The Vlachs were for the most part pastoral nomads, wintering in the lowlands and retreating with their flocks to the Pindos Mountains in the summer. The Albanians, though more numerous in the west, penetrated fairly widely through all the other provinces, wherever their individual enterprises called them. The Macedonian-Bulgar element comprised principally peasant farmers settled in Eastern, Central, and Western Macedonia. The Turks were also engaged primarily in agriculture, controlling especially most of the tobacco lands in Eastern Macedonia and Western Thrace. While fairly well represented in rural communities, the Greeks were essentially the businessmen, tradesmen, and professional men throughout the entire area, and Greek was the prevailing commercial language, although Turkish was often employed by tobacco buyers. Through many decades, even centuries, this heterogeneous population lived together inextricably intermingled, often in the same village, often in neighboring communities; and it was quite impossible to draw linguistic, national, or religious lines of separation.

After World War I, however, following the ratification and the implementation of treaties for the exchange of populations negotiated between Greece and Bulgaria on the one hand, and between Greece and Turkey on the other, a new pattern quickly emerged. All Moslem Turks, it will be remembered, were removed from Macedonia to be resettled in Turkey, while all Anatolian Greeks were similarly transferred from Turkey to Greece, several hundred thousands being re-established on the vacated

Macedonian Moslem lands. In the same way an exchange was effected with Bulgaria: all those dwelling within the political boundaries of Greece, as fixed by the Treaty of Neuilly, who chose to adopt Bulgarian citizenship were moved to Bulgaria and all Greeks living in Bulgaria who desired to hold Greek citizenship were obliged to cross the border into Greece. Almost 100,000 Bulgars and nearly 50,000 Greeks were thus summarily relocated. By the late 1920's the process had been virtually completed, and for the first time in history it became possible to lay out a boundary in this area based on nationality, language, and religion.

The "Prussians of the East" The Greek-American press has been assiduous in keeping the details of the Greco-Bulgarian dispute fresh in the minds of its readers, with the result that Greek-Americans long resident in the United States are hardly less familiar than their compatriots at home with the innumerable crimes charged to the "Prussians of the East." They have repeatedly heard the long and complicated story which goes back for its beginning to the Treaty of San Stefano, marking the end of the Russo-Turkish War in 1878. Imposed by Russia on defeated Turkey, this treaty provided for the inclusion within the limits of Bulgaria of all Macedonia except Saloniki and Chalcidice. It thus awarded Bulgaria a considerable piece of the northern coast of the Aegean and a large Turkish, Greek, and Serb population. The European Powers, however, were alarmed by what they considered a Russian effort to dominate southeastern Europe, since they feared that Russia would make Bulgaria a protectorate and thus move toward the creation of a large Pan-Slavic bloc. They therefore refused to recognize the Treaty of San Stefano and insisted that it be revised. The Congress of Berlin was convened three months later for this purpose, and the Treaty of Berlin, signed 13 June 1878, superseded the Treaty of San Stefano. By the terms of the new treaty Serbian and Greek Macedonia, including all the Aegean coast line, were reassigned to Turkey, and the much-reduced Bulgaria was declared an autonomous state under Turkish sovereignty. It did not include the neighboring province of Eastern Rumelia, which was likewise made autonomous and was put under a Christian governor.

Although the Bulgaria of San Stefano never materialized, it nevertheless inspired the Bulgarians with an inextinguishable desire to gain what they consider their irredenta. The fact that the Treaty was based on power politics and not on ethnic considerations has in no way altered their determination. The first step toward realizing their ambition was the sudden annexation, in 1885, of Eastern Rumelia, in contravention of the terms of the Treaty of Berlin. No other major political change occurred until 1908, when Bulgaria proclaimed itself independent, and no further territorial change was made until the Balkan Wars of 1912-13.

The Balkan Wars The intervening years, however, were marked by increasing unrest in those parts of the Balkan Penin-

sula still under Turkish rule. Greece's disastrous war against Turkey in 1897 was followed by agitation in Macedonia, first stirred up by the terrorist IMRO, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, which aroused nationalistic feeling among the Bulgarian Macedonians, and immediate counter-activity by the Greeks and Serbs. There is no agreement as to which group was guilty of the greatest atrocities, but once the spirit of nationalism was awakened peace and harmony vanished. The Macedonian rivalries were naturally viewed with equanimity by the Turkish overlords, now becoming a little uncertain of their tenure, who did nothing to allay the friction.

In spite of conflicting interests, the Balkan states were able to reach an agreement for a united effort to drive Turkey out of her remaining European possessions. In October 1912, the First Balkan War broke out. Turkey was decisively defeated by the following year and ceded to the Balkan allies all her European territory except part of Eastern Thrace, east of a line extending from Enos on the Aegean to Midia on the Black Sea.

The Balkan allies thus collectively gained Epirus, Macedonia, and Western Thrace. But the division of the spoils presented unexpected difficulties. Greece had counted on retaining both Northern and Southern Epirus, as well as Southern Macedonia, including Saloniki, while Serbia had expected to extend its boundaries westward to the Adriatic. Both these plans were frustrated by the proclamation of Albanian independence, which was supported by Austria in order to prevent the rise of Serbia as an Adriatic power. The new Albanian state included part of the territories desired by both Greece and Serbia. Deprived of an Adriatic coast line, Serbia endeavored to reach some settlement with Bulgaria in the Vardar region, in order to get access to the Aegean. Bulgaria, on the other hand, was determined to have Saloniki, as well as all of Northern Macedonia and Thrace; the Bulgarian grasp on Saloniki was forestalled, however, since the city surrendered to the Greek army which arrived there first and remained permanently established, bolstered by the presence of King George I.

Greek-Americans have always indignantly resented efforts to justify the Bulgarian claim to Greece's second city; the recent statement of an American historian that "Greece had robbed Bulgaria of Saloniki" roused a storm of protest in the Greek-American press, and convinced the Greek element in the United States anew of the insidiousness of Bulgarian propaganda.

The press has often pointed out that under the guidance of Venizelos, Greece offered to compromise with Bulgaria by ceding all the captured coastal strip east of the Struma. But Bulgaria declined to make concessions, having firmly resolved to obtain the borders laid down thirty-five years earlier at San Stefano. Observing with alarm the intransigent attitude of the Bulgarians, Greece and Serbia concluded a secret pact for mutual defense. It had barely been signed when Bulgaria, on 30 June 1913, attacked its former allies. In the course of a month Bulgaria was thoroughly defeated, while Rumania and Turkey took advantage of the situation, the

one to seize the Dobrudja and the other to reoccupy Adrianople. By the terms of the peace treaty signed at Bucharest 10 August 1913, Greece's frontiers were extended to Florina on the west, Gevgeli on the north, and the river Nestos on the east. Bulgaria received the strip of coast from the Nestos to the Maritza river, including the port of Dedeagatch, but the much more desired port of Kavalla went to Greece. Bulgaria thus acquired an outlet to the Aegean, but the resort to arms had cost the western half of the strip which might have been obtained by peaceful negotiation.

World War I In the First World War Bulgaria again saw a possibility of realizing its burning ambition to create the great Bulgaria envisaged in the Treaty of San Stefano in 1878. With that purpose Bulgaria joined the Central Powers, and in 1916 Bulgarian armies occupied most of Macedonia, where it is known that they systematically starved the people, deported many to Bulgaria as mine-workers and confined others in concentration camps; confiscated farm animals and produce; and committed untold acts of harsh aggression and terrorization. Having cast its lot with the losing side, Bulgaria was finally compelled by the Treaty of Neuilly in 1919 to relinquish all the occupied area, as well as its own remaining piece of the Aegean coast. Moreover, Bulgarian treatment of the Macedonian Greeks so embittered them and their compatriots at home and abroad that the word "Bulgarian" has become to them symbolic of the utmost treachery and cruelty.

The Between-Wars Period During the two decades between the first and second World Wars, many efforts were made by the Balkan states to settle their differences and to achieve some foundation for a lasting peace. One of the two chief sources of friction between Greece and Bulgaria was the problem of minorities; the exchange of populations between Greece and Bulgaria did little toward removing that obstacle to friendly relations, although it eliminated most of the internal friction within Greek Macedonia. The Bulgarians removed from Greece have not ceased to agitate for Macedonian independence. Established now in new homes to the north of the border, they have made Bulgaria a center for ceaseless propagandist activity, which is echoed by the native Bulgarians and viewed with fiery suspicion by Greeks everywhere, and especially in the United States.

The other main source of dispute between Greece and Bulgaria has been Bulgaria's insistent demand for access to the Aegean, on the ground of economic necessity. Greek policy has not been wholly unsympathetic to this desire, so long as it involved merely an economic outlet and not a territorial expansion. Greece repeatedly offered Bulgaria a free port at Dedeagatch or at Saloniki, but would never voluntarily give up any of the northern coast of the Aegean, which has furnished a very considerable part of Greek revenue in its tobacco crop, and has had a predominantly Greek population. Moreover, Greece regards its possession as a strategic necessity. Bulgaria has consistently refused to accept this concession, proba-

bly because of the fear that acceptance would be taken as an admission that it had relinquished all claim to the area.

Yugoslavia likewise presented a similar demand for an outlet to the Aegean and was granted a free port in Saloniki. Much patient negotiation was necessary before a settlement was made to the satisfaction of both sides in 1929, and relations between Greece and Yugoslavia were for a time strained almost to the breaking point; but the desire of both countries to preserve peace prevailed, and Greece and Yugoslavia have now no outstanding official disagreements.

World War II But Greeks and Greek-Americans can never forget what seems to them the crowning act of treachery, committed in 1941 when a third opportunity to achieve their ends seemed to present itself to the Bulgarians. Germany, it will be recalled, demanded passage through Bulgaria for the German armies on the way to attack Greece. Bulgaria granted the request and Germany was able to establish bases within easy reach of its objective. The facilities thus acquired greatly expedited the invasion, and within three weeks the German armies had overrun Greece and marched into Athens. As a reward for acquiescence, Bulgaria was permitted to send armies in the wake of the Germans, and, having suffered none of the inconveniences of a military campaign, to occupy the long-coveted territory. The defection of the Italians and the increasing demands on the Germans elsewhere in Europe have given the Bulgarians an ever widening area to police—a task which they are reported to have executed with very considerable energy and ruthlessness, thereby intensifying the already burning animosity of the Greeks.

Greeks and Greek-Americans regard the record of the past thirty years as evidence that Bulgarian policy is always dictated by opportunism. They constantly reiterate that three times in three decades Bulgaria has attacked neighbors for the sake of aggrandizement, and that Bulgaria has been the chief stumbling block in efforts to create a Balkan federation. Greek-American journalists emphasize that the Bulgarians are trying to undo by force all the good that was accomplished by the systematic exchange of populations with great sacrifice to many individuals. They publish reports indicating that during 1942 and 1943 at least 150,000 Greeks in Macedonia and Thrace have been dispossessed of their holdings and driven into exile while Bulgarians have been settled on their lands. They anticipate that Bulgaria will exploit the shift thus deliberately brought about in the balance of the population in order to base claims to Macedonia and Thrace on ethnic grounds. A painful impression was made in the United States when the Bulgarian Government decreed that all Greeks in Bulgarian-held lands would become Bulgarian citizens unless they declared to the contrary before 1 April 1943, in which case they would have to leave Bulgaria—meaning those parts of Greece under Bulgarian occupation.

Wide publicity has been given in the Greek-American press to the report of George Exindaris, a well-known Greek politician who in the

summer of 1943 reached Cairo from Greece, regarding the persecution of Greeks in Bulgarian-held districts. Although stories of mass expulsions, executions, suppression of the Greek language, closing of the schools, and enforced adoption of Bulgarian citizenship by Greeks remaining in those districts are by now familiar to Greek-Americans, the account of a recent eyewitness has aroused their anti-Bulgarian feeling to fever pitch.

On few points are Greek-Americans so unanimously agreed as on the Bulgarian question. From their vantage point in a land of free discussion they observe the trend of public opinion in Allied countries, especially in England and the United States, and they are not always satisfied with the prospect. To Greeks who have themselves suffered or whose families have suffered at the hands of the Bulgarians, the tendency to regard the Bulgarian people as distinct from their rulers seems unrealistic. They believe that if there were any such divergence the Bulgarian people would not have allowed themselves to be drawn into war with their neighbors three times in thirty years. When approving comment is made on the fact that Germany has been unable to persuade Bulgaria to send troops to fight against Russia, the Greeks rejoice that having attained its objectives in Greece and Yugoslavia without fighting, Bulgaria is naturally unwilling to shed blood on behalf of the Germans from whom it now expects to get nothing more.

The Bulgarian Case in the United States Greeks have two forces to combat in their effort to preserve the integrity of their northern boundaries—the Bulgarian nationalists and the Macedonian agitators. The former have as their ideal the realization of Bulgaria of San Stefano. The Macedonian agitators clamor for the creation of yet another independent state in the form of an autonomous Macedonia. Their plan envisages a fairly large state comprising parts of pre-war Greece, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria, extending from the Pindos Mountains to the Nestos River, and including Saloniki and all the coast line.

The feelings and opinions of Bulgarians and Bulgaro-Macedonians are echoed by their compatriots in the United States. The *Makedonska Tribuna*, organ of the Macedonian Political Organization (which has been regarded as an American offshoot of the terroristic IMRO), has repeatedly demanded an independent Macedonia which Bulgaria might join if it so desired. Although the rank and file of the membership of this organization are apparently only slightly interested in political matters, some of its leaders are said to have been sent to the United States by the IMRO in order to stir up nationalistic feeling among the Bulgarian Macedonians. The latter, constituting probably somewhat more than one half of the total Bulgarian-American community, are believed to number between 15,000 and 20,000. The Bulgarian-American nationalist newspaper *Naroden Glas* has made no effort to conceal its hope that Bulgaria may keep those parts of Macedonia and Thrace which have been taken

under military occupation. "Foreigners," it says (13 July 1943), "are trying to rob Bulgaria of one of its natural and legitimate provinces."

*Greek-American
Organization
for the Peace*

Greek-Americans are making a concerted effort to counteract the attempts of Bulgarian-Americans to enlist sympathy for their cause. Americans of Macedonian and Thracian descent are estimated to number several thousand in Greater New York alone. The Pan-Thracian Brotherhood, a Greek-American organization with a membership of several hundred, with headquarters in New York, has recently launched a campaign to unite the many Thracian societies throughout the United States in a large federation, in order to be ready to speak with one voice when the question of Thrace is brought before a peace conference. There are also many Greek-speaking Macedonian clubs in the United States, but no federation has yet been formed to serve as their united spokesman. All Greek-Americans were reassured by the official statements of the British and United States Governments that the Axis countries would not be permitted to keep any of the territories seized by them; but some misgivings are felt over attempts made recently in England to exonerate the Bulgarians, such as a letter written by Lord Noel-Buxton to the *London Times*, hinting at the possibility of territorial changes to the advantage of Bulgaria, in order to avoid "the recurrence of historic mistakes."

Greek-Americans are obsessed by an acute fear that Bulgarian propaganda may win support among Americans not conversant with the details of Balkan history; as evidence of such a tendency they see the inclination to treat Bulgaria with blandishments instead of bombs. As Bulgaria's position becomes more and more critical and all the satellite nations show signs of weakening, Greeks and Greek-Americans become the more insistent that no favored treatment should be accorded their enemy.

Should a Bulgaria finally convinced of the hopelessness of the Axis cause begin to protest friendship for the Allies, such protestations would be greeted by Greek-Americans with derision. They recall that after the First World War King Boris asserted that never again would he resort to military force, and that in violation of his promise he began secretly to rearm the country; that in an attempt to mollify Bulgaria by an act of goodwill [sic] the states of the Balkan Entente signed the Saloniki Pact of July 1938, granting Bulgaria the right to rearm. The result, however, was the opposite of what was hoped. Bulgaria more and more openly expressed revisionist aspirations until in April 1939, Prime Minister Ivan Kiosseivanov declared frankly that Bulgaria's aim was the restoration of the borders of 1913. The critics of Bulgaria's foreign policy charge that Bulgaria, seeing that chances of expansion were better under German patronage, systematically encouraged Germany's plans of aggression in Southeastern Europe. In fact, they quote former Prime Minister Nicholas Mouchanoff as declaring in the Chamber of Deputies, 14 November 1941, that Bulgaria had rendered Germany an inestimable service in bringing about the failure of every diplomatic combination likely to strengthen

the Balkan peoples' defense against the common danger. It is repeatedly asserted that Bulgaria itself did nothing to ward off that danger. Observers of events in the Balkans since 1939 point to the intensive development of airfields in Bulgaria beyond the normal needs of the country; to the rearming of the Bulgarian army with supplies from Germany; and finally to Bulgaria's ready consent to the German demand for passage through the country in the spring of 1941 in preparation for the aggressive invasion of Greece. Greeks and their fellow-countrymen everywhere say they will not soon forget that this act made it possible for Germany to turn the Greek triumph over Italy into bitter defeat. They are therefore determined to secure a northern boundary which will ensure a certain degree of safety against a similar danger in the future. According to Greek spokesmen in the United States, the interests of security demand that the frontiers of Macedonia and Thrace should be pushed farther north, especially for the protection of Greek Thrace, which is now highly vulnerable.

Competent observers believe that Greece will be ready to take up again the possibility of a Balkan federation including Bulgaria as a member only when Greek borders are securely re-established. Any encroachment now on the integrity of what the Greeks deem to be Greek territory would be interpreted not only as a breach of faith on the part of the United Nations, but as further evidence that Bulgaria could not be trusted for collaboration with its neighbors. On the other hand, repeated efforts during the past decade to form such a federation indicate that Greece is alive to the urgent necessity of evolving some plan based on mutual cooperation and trust. It is the view of Greek-Americans and other friends of Greece that, if Greece feels in the end that its part in the world struggle has been rewarded by just consideration of Greece's legitimate aspirations, then Greece may well emerge in the post-war era as a leader on the road to Balkan stability and goodwill.

CONFIDENTIAL

Number S-58

16 October 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE:
DIRECTOR OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
SECRETARY OF STATE

The attached is a translation made in this office of a letter published in the Greek *National Herald* of New York, 24 September 1943. The *Herald* is running a translation of its own in installments, and plans later to issue the text in pamphlet form. The editor of the *Herald* explains

that the document was drawn up at his special request specifically for the information of Greek-Americans by his friend and former fellow-student at the University of Athens, *Elias Tsirimokos*.

The letter deals with the continued resistance of the Greek people to the Nazi occupying forces, surveys the chief problems Greece is now facing, and sets forth the state of political feeling in the country today, especially with reference to King George. Mr. Tsirimokos, a lawyer who was a member of the Greek Chamber of Deputies, is secretary general of the "Union of Popular Democracy." Through means provided by the British he and six companions report that they succeeded in escaping from Greece, reaching Cairo 10 August 1943. Mr. Tsirimokos is chief of a delegation of four representing the EAM (National Liberation Front); the other three are representatives of other active resistance groups, the ELAS (National People's Army of Liberation), the EDES (National Democratic Committee of Coalition), and the EKKA (National Party of Social Rehabilitation).

The mission apparently went to Cairo on invitation in order to interpret to the British authorities and to the Greek Government the sentiments of the Greek people, and in order to arrange with Allied military headquarters for the intensification of guerrilla warfare in Greece.

Reporting to Premier Tsouderos and to the Government-in-Exile that an overwhelming body of public opinion in Greece demanded that King George refrain from returning to Greece upon the liberation of the country until a free plebiscite had been held to determine the form of the regime to be established, the mission is believed to have precipitated a cabinet crisis. The Government-in-Exile is said to have transmitted it to King George. It is asserted that the King consulted British and American advisers [sic] and that they urged him not to yield to the demand, but to insist on his right to return to Greece. His final answer has apparently not yet been given, but is expected from moment to moment.

The whole episode has attracted the excited attention of political-minded Greek-Americans who are already speculating eagerly on the possible consequences if the Government-in-Exile under Mr. Tsouderos should feel itself obliged to resign.

DeWitt C. Poole

Attachment

FROM THE GREEK NATIONAL HERALD

New York City, 24 September 1943

Cairo, 6 September 1943

My Dear Friend,

I give you below the general picture of Greek affairs which you asked for. It contains: 1) a report in general terms on the resistance of the Greek

people to the conquerors; 2) a memorandum on the Greek problems of today and tomorrow; 3) a report on the prerequisites for national unity and especially for the constitutional problem.

The Resistance of the Greek People to the Conquerors Sufficient publicity has been given abroad to the magnificent resistance of the Greek people to the Italian and German invaders. The victorious war effort against the Italians, which began on 28 October 1940 and lasted for many months, ending only when Greece was attacked by the German army, undoubtedly constitutes a national epic of which every Greek is proud and before which every observer stands in wonder.

It is not certain, however, that another historic page of the Greek struggle is sufficiently known, one which is equally if not more worthy of admiration than that of 1940. That is the resistance of the Greek people to the conquerors, to the implacable foreign occupation. The struggle of the people, which has been waged for two years in Greece without weakening and without hesitation, is certainly the hardest and the finest which the Greek people has ever waged.

The occupation in Greece is threefold: Italian, German, and Bulgarian. The Italians followed the low tactics of policemen. The Germans heeded the dictates of Hitlerite savagery. The Bulgarians committed indescribable acts of brutality, their old policy of the extermination of Hellenism in Macedonia and Thrace. Thus together they applied a policy of predatory economy, literally stripping the country and condemning the population to death from starvation.

One might have expected, after the war effort in Albania, in the face of a harsh occupation, and in a period when the German armies were advancing almost without resistance, inundating all Europe, that the Greek people would have been crushed under their misfortune and enslavement. Nevertheless, immediately after the invasion of the foreign armies resistance began to be organized. One month after the entrance of the Germans the most resolute elements planned and established the "National Liberation Front" (EAM), opening the way for the subsequent founding of other similar patriotic organizations, as a coalition of parties, people's organizations and citizens.

The objectives set by the EAM, objectives which have been raised up as the banner for the people's effort wherever it started, are: a) resistance to the occupation and liberation of the country from the foreign invaders; b) the assurance of popular sovereignty after liberation.

Resistance to the conqueror includes: 1) the struggle to save the people, in a word, defense against all measures which would lead to utter misery, starvation, and collapse of morale; 2) the struggle to strengthen the international war effort by organizing internal war against the invader. The first effort refers to the organization of the people and to militant demonstrations of the masses, chiefly within the cities. The second relates to the armed struggle in the open country.

Anyone who tries to compare the value of the two efforts will find him-

self in difficulties, so hard is it to determine which of the two forces has shown the greater heroism; which of the two kinds of activity has been the more arduous; whether the resistance of the masses in the cities or the armed struggle in the open country has demanded the greater self-sacrifice. This alone must be emphasized: that the same spirit of liberty and contempt of death has prevailed in the factories and the offices as well as in the mountains and the villages.

In The Cities In order to give in a few words a picture of the resistance in the cities, its composition, its organization, and how it manifested itself, I must omit any detailed description. It will suffice to say that the manifestation of the Greek people's resistance sprang from the basic, vital cry for the bread of which they were deprived. Beginning with small local gatherings and partial strikes, it culminated in the magnificent mass meetings of at least 300,000 people in the capital, combined with a general strike of private and public employees and workmen, and with the closing of all shops and offices. This demonstration had a clearly political tenor, with open anti-Axis slogans.

Thus in the first year, 1941-1942, the principal effort was devoted to the escape from total extinction by starvation. It was a period when the population lacked even the very small portion of bread that had been allotted by the rationing; while wages and salaries of private and public employees—inflation of the currency and scarcity of food were two reasons for the phenomenal rise in prices—were nothing more than wages and salaries of death and starvation.

Whatever was done at this stage—adjustment of wages and salaries and establishment of soup kitchens, *etc.*—however imperfect and inadequate, was achieved after a struggle, after popular demonstrations, strikes, *etc.*, in the organization of which an important role was played by the existence in every factory, office and trade union of groups of the EAM who moved and acted systematically and diligently.

In the course of time demonstrations of resistance took on a more impressive and massive form. Every such demonstration was a step marking the increasing strength of the spirit of resistance and the increasing power of the popular rising. At the same time these demonstrations took on an open political tenor, that is, one of overt and direct resistance to the conqueror. An example of this kind (not to mention them all, such as the annual celebrations of the 25th of March and the 28th of October, and a whole series of strikes, mass meetings, *etc.*) is the one that took place on the 5th of March 1943, occasioned by the project for civil mobilization. This demonstration is particularly memorable: a) because of the success of its organization; b) because of the great throng of participants; c) because of the extraordinary fighting spirit of the crowd; d) because of its results. a) The order for the demonstration was issued only twenty-four hours in advance, when it became known that the decree giving the occupation authorities the right to mobilize the civilian population for labor projects (an act constituting a new form of serfdom imposed

by the Germans in Greece) had been sent to the Government Printing Office. b) In spite of the short notice 250,000 people assembled at the appointed places in Athens and Peiraeus [sic]. c) The crowd that had gathered remained on the streets for many hours shouting against the mobilization, in spite of a violent attack by the Italian police, which resulted in the death and wounding of a good many persons. d) The demonstration of the 5th of March resulted in the frustration of civil mobilization. The Prime Minister, the Quisling Logothetopoulos, declared through the newspapers that the project for civil mobilization had been "slandrously" attributed to the government and to the occupation authorities, and there the question was closed. Thus the clearest evidence was given of the effectiveness of the popular struggle and of a manifest retreat of the harsh invader before the spiritual strength of a brave people.

Another demonstration worthy of note was that of the 22nd of July 1943, occasioned by the decision to extend Bulgarian occupation to the part of Macedonia which up to that time had not yet been occupied by the Bulgarians. It was known that the German authorities would take exceptional measures of violence in case of militant demonstrations, and their declaration was further reinforced by their behavior during the admirable demonstration which took place at the end of June, in protest against the unjust and vindictive execution of 106 prisoners who had not been condemned to death. Nevertheless, more than 300,000 Athenians gathered in the places appointed and marched to the designated points in the city disregarding the arms, machine guns, grenades, and tanks which the Germans used to disperse the unarmed citizens who were protesting with all the strength of their souls against the extension of the Bulgarian occupation. The demonstration in the streets lasted for many hours with stubbornness and self-sacrifice, without the slightest indications of retreat or cowardice, in spite of the fact that 300 were killed and more than a hundred wounded.

The examples which I have cited, examples of such huge and such militant demonstrations, clearly political in character, give, I think, the measure of the development of the popular rising in the cities. In this chapter a special tribute of honor must be paid to the brave workers in war factories who committed innumerable acts of sabotage at the expense of the occupation authorities and who not only caused damage to the enemy but, when they were discovered, condemned and executed, won laurels with the greatest heroes of Greek history. There are in existence some letters written by such workmen on the eve of their execution, which deserve to be taught tomorrow in the schools as sacred texts, as eternal lessons in heroism and devotion to the ideal of liberty on behalf of which the peoples of Europe are fighting today.

The Struggle in the Country In dealing with the armed struggle in the country we must follow the same method of referring in general lines to the characteristic events which make up the composite picture of what has been accomplished. The simple, gigantic

fact would suffice, that one part of Greece is today free, self-governed, and well governed. Except for the large centers and the roads leading to the frontiers no other part of Greece, from Athens to the Albanian borders, is under control of the foreign occupation. To some villages or towns where communication by automobile is possible, the occupying forces come from time to time, not as governors but as raiders to commit stupid acts of destruction and to depart immediately, returning to their bases. Free Greece is at war, it is incurring dangers, but it is free.

Free Greece governs itself. It has no contact either with the occupation authorities or with the Quisling government. Under the supervision and protection of the guerrillas and the organizations of the EAM, everything connected with the government of a place is done through freely-elected Communal Councils and through special auxiliary People's Committees for provisioning, justice, *etc.* Free Greece is not only free from foreign domination but it lives under the most liberal democratic institutions the Greek people has yet known.

This free section is likewise the best-governed part of Greece since the establishment of the Greek state. In especially mountainous districts the crime of brigandage has completely disappeared, also that of cattle stealing. Whereas at the beginning of the occupation, before the guerrilla movement was organized and began to function in an atmosphere of complete cooperation, there loomed on the horizon the danger that we might see the Greek countryside at the mercy of brigands and cattle thieves, there now prevails in the countryside a general feeling of safety the like of which Greece has seldom known.

Liberty, self-government, good government are the crowning achievement of the guerrillas. But today one should not speak of guerrilla groups. Today the whole body of the guerrillas of the EAM has been organized into a regular army, the Greek Popular Army of Liberation (ELAS) which certainly has the individual character of a popular army but which has been organized into regiments, battalions, companies, *etc.*

From the leaders down to the least guerrilla all have the feeling that they belong to an army and not to a conglomeration of guerrilla bands, to the army of Free Greece, the army of freedom.

We naturally went through many stages before reaching this splendid result. The first guerrillas had the difficult mission of eliminating the brigands and the traitors, at the same time arousing the peasants and inspiring them with faith in the work of liberation. They were few and they moved in small groups. They needed to become many, and above all they had to clear the land of brigands, of cattle thieves, of traitors and to create an atmosphere of patriotic enthusiasm indispensable for the success of the aims of the popular rising. In spite of these difficulties the guerrillas arrived at today's achievements.

Although the details of the military and political activity which permitted this development are perhaps not without value, it is impossible to include them within the limits of this memorandum. Generally speaking, the Italians not only failed to suppress the guerrilla movement; little

by little they abandoned to its sovereignty all the territory which today constitutes Free Greece. Moreover, they provided arms for the guerrillas. In each skirmish, always occurring against the will of the Italians, the guerrillas gained a quantity of arms and ammunition. Furthermore, groups of guerrillas raided cities and towns where there were stores of munitions, and after they had invariably routed the strong Italian garrisons, they supplied themselves with arms. Thus it can be said that apart from the rifles furnished by the peasants to the guerrillas—arms carefully hidden in spite of the orders of the invaders to the contrary—a great part of the armament of the guerrillas is Italian and German!

A battle of the guerrillas against the Italians and Germans always means a heroic encounter of a small band against incomparably greater forces of the enemy army, and a victory owed to the wonderful morale and the indescribable heroism of the guerrillas. A series of destructive actions against means of communication, carried out with the help of the officers of the British mission, called forth the warm congratulations of the Allied High Command of the Middle East, with which the ELAS is today associated by agreement, as a section of the Allied Army under the orders of the Commander in Chief.

It must be noted that in addition to the principal guerrilla bodies, there is organized in each village a reserve force of the ELAS consisting of fighting groups of peasants who remain in their villages and who are called on where necessity arises to help the guerrillas. Such fighting groups, in addition to the other services which they have performed, have taken part in many clashes, displaying a spirit of self-sacrifice equal to that of the guerrillas.

The contribution of the population of the country to the work of liberation must be especially praised. It is not only their cooperation with the fighting groups that has been valuable, but their general participation in the struggle. Indeed, districts which are especially poor have given what they had and did not have, for the sake of the success of the enterprise. The guerrillas had to live. They had—as a real rising of the people—started out without resources. The contributions made by the Greeks in spite of their terrible sufferings, were the only resources for the movement, not only in the cities but also in the country. In behalf of the cause the peasants gave their produce, their animals, even their personal labor, uncomplainingly and with the simplicity of true patriotism. And they continued to do this with the same enthusiasm, with even more persistence when the invaders, ostensibly to strike a blow at the movement of liberation but actually to give vent to a feeling of sadistic vengeance, began to burn and to destroy villages. The Greek countryside more than at any other time proved worthy of the motherland.

(Note: I have spoken above more particularly about the work of the ELAS because it is bound up with the general organization of Free Greece and plays the greatest part in the armed struggle. By this I intend in no way to minimize the significance of the work

of the other guerrilla bodies, such as the EDES, whose militant activity is worthy of the same praise and the same admiration.)

The general conclusion of this chapter must be that the entire Greek people, disregarding the triple Italian-German-Bulgarian terrorism and contending against famine, has been able to plunge into an astounding struggle of resistance against the invaders, a struggle the accurate evaluation of which is difficult, so incredible is it in extent, in stubbornness, in self-sacrifice.

Problems of Today and Tomorrow Certainly Greece's needs of today depend on the duration of the war and of the occupation; nevertheless they must be enumerated independently of the foreseen duration, although that may change the situation in some degree.

A. Needs of the Army of Liberation (aside from specific organization):

It is known that the numerical growth of the guerrillas is today remarkable. We referred above to the manner in which the guerrillas have until today been provided with food and arms—naturally without forgetting the reinforcement which has recently been afforded by the High Command of the Middle East. It must be emphasized that the increase of the popular army can be unlimited in so far as and up to the measure permitted by its supply. Consequently, the question of the supply of the Greek guerrillas is vital for the development of the movement.

Independently of the problem of the development of the guerrilla movement, however, the army already existing is far from being fully equipped. Its needs are so great that they can be stated only in kind and not in quantity. They consist in general terms: first, of a supply of munitions of all kinds; second, of equipment in footwear (from the lack of which our guerrillas have suffered much), of clothing, and of medical supplies; third, of the complete organization of means of communication; fourth, of reinforcement of the guerrillas with food supplies of all kinds. Such reinforcement would at the same time greatly relieve the civil population, because one portion of its production would no longer have to be put at the disposal of the needs of the army. This question is bound up with the problem examined in the following paragraph.

B. The Greek People's Need of Food Supplies:

On this subject a special memorandum has been submitted by the representatives of the EAM to the Greek Government.

I summarize here the views expressed in that memorandum. If by any chance the occupation should continue through next winter that will be more severe on the Greek people than the winter of 1941-42 during which

deaths from starvation and diseases caused by lack of vitamins rose to a tragic figure. What are the reasons for this? 1) This year's production is considerably lower than that of last year. 2) The portion of the production retained for the needs of the army of occupation has been increased. 3) Because of local military events communications are almost non-existent.

It must be observed that the astonishing increase in currency circulation has brought about an immense increase in prices, which has naturally not been followed by a corresponding increase in salaries and wages. Furthermore, the less well-to-do families in the cities have exhausted all their possessions which they sold in order to maintain themselves during the past two years, such as jewels, rugs, *etc.* Finally, it must not be forgotten that the whole population has passed through two years of constant undernourishment as a result of which the coming winter will find them with their constitutions exhausted.

The general conclusion is that an effort must be made to multiply the quantities of food hitherto sent by the Red Cross, an undertaking which today cannot meet the slightest obstacle in considerations of a military nature, in view of the decisively favorable situation today. If the fortune of arms should lead to the liberation of the country before winter, everyone concerned must bear in mind that Greece is utterly exhausted in every way, has nothing left, and that the immediate and unlimited revictualment of the country must be the watchword for the services in charge of such work.

*Immediate Post-War
Necessities*

The preceding paragraph leads us to a brief summary of the chief needs which the Greek people will face immediately upon liberation and directly following the end of the war.

Certainly a discussion in support of the national claims of the Greeks cannot form a chapter of this memorandum. Greece has claims which are based so firmly on the Atlantic Charter that she looks with equanimity to the Peace Conference. Her fight today coming after many long national struggles in the past gives her the right to believe that no way, no cause, no reason, no pretext, can bring her unjust treatment now.

But let us turn to a survey of post-war needs. The first one has already been touched upon above, namely immediate reinforcement in food supplies and, directly after liberation, in supplies of clothing, medicine, *etc.*, of every kind.

After the damage suffered during the war against Italy, the invasion by the German, Italian, and Bulgarian armies meant not merely the beginning of military occupation, but the complete devastation of the country. Innumerable villages were burned, innumerable families lost their menfolk, innumerable were those deprived of everything they possessed, from their tools to their very clothing. The immediate reestablishment of this part of the population is a preliminary requisite for entering upon the task of rehabilitating Greece.

The problem is more general. Greece was poor. Today she is utterly destroyed. Paragraph Five of the Atlantic Charter about the standard of work, economic progress, and social security of nations, can mean for Greece only generous economic aid in order to create the elementary prerequisites for economic activity. I do not propose to discuss here the kind and the terms of such aid, but I must note that its form will have to go beyond the traditional narrow form of foreign loans, before which our national powers are dreadfully strained and entirely disproportionate in comparison with the real needs of the country.

THE PROBLEM OF NATIONAL UNITY AND THE NORMAL DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL LIFE

This problem was left to be treated in a separate chapter, although on many sides it is connected with all that has been dealt with in the preceding part of the report. It is true that the unity of the people, which today, confronting the occupying forces, is unbreakable, may be dangerously disturbed at the moment of liberation. Hence it is possible, on the one hand, that harm may result to the further prosecution of the war, and on the other, that there may be a hindrance to the arduous work of rehabilitation, the successful accomplishment of which will be more difficult in an atmosphere of sharp internal quarrels. Furthermore, a separate discussion of this problem is necessary, not only on account of its great importance and its particular solution, but also because of the fact that it is not an expression of needs of today alone, but is a survival from the past.

It is in fact a question of the regime. We shall examine 1) What is its historical source? and 2) What is its status today?

For many decades Greece lived under a monarchy of different types before it finally reached the form of the Constitution of 1931. Otto, King of Greece for many decades, was exiled because of the demand of the Greeks for a truly parliamentary constitution.

His successor, George I, ruled for fifty years. He was succeeded on the throne by King Constantine, a truly popular king. In his day, however, arose the greatest political crisis that modern Greece had ever known, ending with the schism which caused so much harm to the Greek people. The insistence of Constantine on acting against the expressed wish of the people and on following a policy of his own, opposed to that of the leader of the majority, Eleutherios Venizelos, was the primary cause of the break. In the course of events Constantine became leader of the second political party-group, a fact which inevitably led to his enthronement and subsequently to the dethronement of his successor George II, who is King today.

Greece lived under a republican constitution from 1924 to 1935, when, because of the bitter feeling caused by the attempted assassination of Venizelos and the revolt which followed it in 1935, the old anti-Venizelist

political parties judged it advisable to bring about the return of King George to Greece. In spite of a manipulated plebiscite and of recollection of the past, the King on his return was tolerated, since he issued a declaration that he would be the guardian and protector of the liberal parliamentary regime, a fact which he demonstrated by proclaiming parliamentary elections for January 1936.

A few months later, however, under entirely unfounded and childish pretexts he dissolved the Chamber of Deputies, abolished the essential provisions of the constitution and delivered Greece over to the uncontrolled dictatorial government of Metaxas. For four years that government terrorized, persecuted, and misbehaved in a manner so novel in modern Greek history that the phrase "Fourth of August" now rouses indignation and disgust, since it is synonymous with tyranny and arrogance. The sole support of the Fourth of August regime was the authority of the King over the armed forces, assisted by the police organization of the Minister of Security, Maniades.

The King was kept informed of all that was being done. Many citizens, including some of the most important ones, wrote him letters and memoranda, the only result of which was the immediate banishment of the writers to the islands. Thither were sent, and kept for the whole duration of the Fourth of August regime, in addition to thousands of others, the political leaders Michalakopoulos, Kaphandaris, Papandreou, Kanellopoulos, Mylonas, *etc.* So strong a solidarity with the Fourth of August regime was felt by the King that when Metaxas died the King addressed a proclamation to the people in which he not only expressed his full agreement with the whole of Metaxas' policy, but even declared that that policy would be continued!

This is the most fundamental reason for the opposition of the Greek people to the King: namely, that in violation of his word and his oath to respect the constitution he became the leader of the Greek Fascist dictatorship. The other reasons are the following:

1) The wretched moral and material preparation for the war.

The elaborate four-year propaganda of the Fascist government tried to inspire admiration and fear of the work and the power of Mussolini's and Hitler's regimes. When the Greeks hear it said that the King and Metaxas, inspiring them with the breath of high patriotism, were their leaders in the war and the victory against Italy, they grind their teeth in indignation because they know full well that in going to war they did so in spite of the Fascist vaccination they had suffered, and in spite of the real spirit of the government, because they were impelled by love of liberty; for in the war the people sought to defend themselves against enslavement, to defeat Fascism and to win internal liberation. With regard to material preparations it is an open secret that the heavy taxes, and the unceasing fund-collecting drives, which were made ostensibly in behalf of the rearmament of the country, were used for the expenses of the Metaxist organizations and left Greece almost unarmed.

2) The one-sided conduct of the war and the betrayal.

Neither when the war against Italy broke out, nor when Metaxas died, nor at any intermediate moment did it enter the King's mind that he ought, on the one hand, as is customary in all countries, to appeal to all the political parties to collaborate and thus establish national unity, and on the other, regardless of political sentiments, to call to arms all the reserve officers of the army who had proved their worth. And when all the political leaders solemnly declared their solidarity with the government in the war—putting aside the political question of the responsibilities for the dictatorship—and when the republican officers day after day used to climb the stairways of the ministries begging to be recalled to active service at the front, the King and his government to the very end were deaf to their appeals.

The result of such conduct was—apart from the mighty fact of the failure to achieve national unity—the assignment of vital positions in the Army to well-known pro-Germans, who as soon as the Germans invaded Greek soil issued orders disbanding the Army. The present entourage of the King pretends that it disapproves of such traitors; by a curious coincidence, however, they are the warmest supporters of the throne in Greece, communicating with Egypt, receiving reinforcements and sending officers in order to build up the royal Greek Army of the Middle East. They have done it in their own way, by teaching defeatism to an extent that evoked violent demonstrations against them in the army. On the other hand the whole liberation movement has not only been ignored and misrepresented but has actually been fought both in Greece through agents sent for that purpose, and abroad by means of slanders against the alleged subversive and anarchic views of the heroic fighters for liberty.

In view of the above, the greater part of the Greek people is horrified at the thought that at the end of the war against Fascism it is possible that the leader of Greek Fascism might return to the country as a liberator!

What is the Present

Status of the Question?

That a constitutional question exists the King himself was obliged to admit after two years of passionate denial. On the Fourth of July 1943 he issued his well-known declaration by which he promised, immediately upon liberation, the formation of a national government representing all parties, organizations and currents which should conduct elections for a constituent assembly, that is, an assembly to determine the form of the regime. Consequently we are all in agreement that a crisis exists. But the question today is: Shall the King return, or shall he not, before the people decide on the form of the government?

At first glance the declaration of the Fourth of July gives to the people the right to decide and consequently to rid itself of the Fascist King. The greater part of the Greek people knows, however, 1) that it can have no trust in the King's intentions: proof, his declaration of 1935 and his dictatorship of 1936; 2) that the percentage of Greek people who favor the King is very small, in fact which the King himself cannot fail

to know. Consequently, even if he should try to maintain good intentions, he would in such an atmosphere be obliged either to depart after ten days of freedom of the press, or to resort to violence or to some sort of machinations to falsify the clear opinion of the Greek people.

Even the more conservative, who are disposed to accept as sincere the King's liberal attitude of today, also believe that his return before the plebiscite or the meeting of the constitutional assembly would be altogether unwise, precisely because of the prevailing bitter opposition of so large a part of the Greek people. If he should come, the King would necessarily become leader of one party, the party of the men who want him in order to protect their own interests. Even without wishing to do so he would have to take part in the election campaign. The end of that campaign, whatever the result might be, would be characterized by so sharp a difference of opinion that the constitution would inevitably be unable to function; for the collaboration of the King with his opponents would henceforth be impossible to practice. On the other hand, should he remain away, he need know nothing about the details of the election campaign, and if by chance he won the victory, he could return as a third party without having been involved in the discussion, which in his absence could not be a fight for or against him personally, but a discussion regarding the form of the regime. A decision of the King not to return would permit complete national unity for the continuation of the war and for the beginning of the work of rehabilitation in a spirit of regular cooperation. At the same time, too, it would help the throne, not only because such an action would morally and politically favor the King, but also because it would keep him far from the fight, which, if he were present, could not fail to end in tearing his authority to shreds.

That such a solution would facilitate national unity is demonstrated by recent events in Cairo. On the tenth of August this year, through means kindly furnished by the British, representatives of the National Liberation Front reached Cairo together with representatives of the EDES and EKKA which are carrying on guerrilla resistance. These representatives submitted their views, which had been requested, both to the King and to the Greek Government and also to the British authorities (who showed especial interest in this matter) on the question of the return of the King before the plebiscite. An identical opinion had already been expressed by Mr. G. Exindariis, official representative of the parties of the republican coalition in Greece, that is to say, of all the parties which existed in the Chamber of 1936 (except the Communist Party which, as is well known, belongs to the EAM), specifically, the Liberal Party, the Popular Party, the Progressive Party (Kaphandaris), the National Republican Party (Theotokis), the Agrarian Party (Mylonas), the Republican Socialist Party (Papandreou).

On the 17th of August 1943 the representatives of the parties and of the organizations together with Mr. P. Kanellopoulos met and signed a joint letter to the Prime Minister of the Government, Mr. Tsouderos, in which they declared that "for the sake of national unity, which alone can

assure the success of the national struggle and the normal development of the political life of the country, it is necessary that an authoritative statement be issued that the King will not return to Greece before the people have given their decision on the form of the regime." After receipt of this letter the Council of Ministers met and unanimously agreed with the view expressed in the letter, minutes of the proceedings being duly recorded. The decision of the Council of Ministers was then made known through the proper channels to the King.

Especially praiseworthy is the very rare unanimity exhibited in this instance; if it should finally lead to the King's retirement, which is necessary for political, historical, and moral reasons, it would have a great many excellent results.

1) For Greece it would bring about national unity, indispensable not only for the continuation of the war after liberation, but also for the vindication of national claims, for the beginning of the work of reconstruction, and for the resumption of normal political life.

2) Internationally it would insure political calm which is so useful for the continuation of the operations of the Allied armies; and furthermore it would constitute to all a splendid example of the settlement by agreement of an internal problem. At this point the question now stands; and in expectation of a favorable reply from the King, and with the prospect of immediate liberation in sight, the Greek people waits impatiently, because it believes it has the right to taste without distraction the liberty for which the Greek people has so valiantly struggled.

El. I. Tsirimokos

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AMERICAN ECHOES OF GREEK CIVIL WAR

Reports reaching Greek-Americans of civil war between guerrilla bands in the homeland have reopened recriminatory arguments between republicans and monarchists. The royalists hold republicans to blame for the trouble. The republicans, basing their position on a recent report said to have come uncensored to this country, charge Great Britain with meddling in Greek affairs.

News that civil war has broken out between rival guerrilla bands in Greece comes as a terrific shock to Greek-Americans, who have hitherto

taken great pride in the unity of their homeland in its resistance to Axis occupation. In general the prevailing feeling has been that no matter how much Greeks outside Greece might quarrel, those inside the country were putting aside disagreements to devote all energy to the common struggle. Reports coming out of Cairo recently have stirred up anew the dissension which in the past has torn the Greek-American community. The question as it is discussed in America resolves itself into the old monarchist-republican debate, and takes in many of the issues stemming therefrom. These issues are now being re-examined in the light of the present situation with renewed urgency and acrimony.

Generally speaking, Greek-Americans are reluctant to believe that strife is so widespread inside Greece as the American press reports. They have refrained from commenting on the frequently expressed view that the trouble resulted from clever German propaganda which succeeded in making each party believe that the other was collaborating with Axis forces. Although ready to admit that the Germans have exploited the situation for their own ends, each faction in the United States puts the primary blame on its own political opponents here and abroad and, in some cases, on Great Britain.

The royalists, represented by the New York daily *Atlantis*, lay the responsibility at the door of the republicans, whom they have repeatedly charged with trying to sow dissension among Greeks in the Middle East and in the United States. The *Atlantis* has specifically attacked the republican New York daily, the *National Herald*, as one of the principal agents of division, and the *Herald* has answered in kind.

Royalist Arguments The *Atlantis* editorially on 18 October accused all the anti-monarchists—in Greece, in the Middle East, and in America—of an attempt to establish a “moral dictatorship” by trying to bring about the dissolution of the army in Syria, the abdication of the King, and the resignation of the Tsouderos Government. During and immediately after the German invasion, the *Atlantis* asserted, Greece was unified, thanks to the regime of King George. In the course of time, however, republican organizations—named individually in the editorial—began to make contact with trouble makers in the Middle East and America. The *Atlantis* charged that the Germans were glad to facilitate the “escape” of many republicans, knowing that they would try to undermine the authority of the King. This accusation is an interesting variation of the charge often repeated by the republicans themselves: that the Germans frequently allowed royalists to “escape.”

Republican Arguments On the same day (18 October) the *National Herald* appeared with an editorial signed with the initials of the editor, Basil I. Vlavianos, directed chiefly against the British. The substance of Vlavianos’s charge was that the British had deliberately set guerrilla groups in Greece against each other in order to make restoration of the King seem necessary to establish a stable government capable

of maintaining order. The stringent censorship exercised by the British in Cairo, about which Mr. Vlavianos has complained in the past, was responsible, he said, for the lack of information about the actual state of affairs in Greece and the Middle East; and the fact that censorship there is so rigidly maintained seems to him sinister evidence that the British have much to conceal.

In a later editorial (3 November) the *Herald* demanded that the British Government withdraw its support of King George. "A declaration on the part of Great Britain that she has no intention of interfering in Greek politics, and that the position of the British Government will be the same, no matter what decision the Greek people may take regarding its form of government, would have a salutary effect and would free England from the terrible charge weighing on her today, that she is not only interfering in Greek politics but is doing so contrary to the will of the Greek people and for the purpose of imposing a fascist regime."

The Far Left The Communist-line *Greek-American Tribune*, in its issue of 29 October, took exception to General Maitland Wilson's appeal from headquarters of the Middle East Command to the Greek guerrillas for unity; the *Tribune* asserted that the guerrilla forces were united, not only against the Germans, but also against the King. In a letter to the *New York Times*, the *Tribune's* editor, Demetrios Christophides, referred to the suspicion often expressed in the leftist press that King George was trying to build up guerrilla leader Zervas as another Mihailovich. The following week, the *Tribune* added its voice to the increasing criticism of the British for continuing to support the King.

Anti-British Feeling The critical attitude of the liberal Greek-American press with respect to British policy toward Greece appears to reflect the opinions of a great many Greek-Americans. Probably the chief cause of Greek and Greek-American dissatisfaction is their belief that the Foreign Office is committed to support of King George; exclusion of Greek forces from participation in military operations in the Aegean, interdiction of direct relations between the Government-in-Exile and the people of Greece, and British censorship in the Middle East are cited as contributing factors. Despite their resentment of official British policy, Greek-Americans believe that the British people as a whole are traditionally and genuinely philhellenic. The republican Greek press in the United States has reprinted with appreciation articles published in British newspapers of such opposite political extremes as *The Times* and the *New Statesman*, recommending that the Greeks be allowed to manage their own internal affairs. Remarking on the deep feelings of love and admiration which the Greeks have for Britain, the *National Herald* of New York declared (29 October) that "every act and every omission which tends to diminish the warmth of these feelings of the Greek people is unforgivable sabotage."

The Tsirimokos Report All liberal groups in the Greek-American community felt their views vindicated by a report written by El. I. Tsirimokos, and published in the *National Herald* on 24 September. The report tells of a mission to Cairo undertaken by leaders of the four principal underground organizations in Greece. These spokesmen, arriving in Cairo on 10 August, announced that they represented the great body of public opinion in Greece. They demanded in a note presented to the Government-in-Exile that King George make a formal declaration agreeing not to return to Greece before a plebiscite should be held to determine the form of the post-war regime. This report, presumably smuggled out of Egypt and thus eluding censorship, has aroused enormous interest in Greek-American circles, which welcomed what they regarded as an authoritative and wholly uncensored account of actual conditions in Greece. Republicans regard the Tsirimokos report as incontrovertible evidence of the Greek people's resolute opposition to the King. What the monarchists think may be deduced from the fact that although the document has received wide publicity elsewhere, it has not even been mentioned in the royalist *Atlantis*.

Unity among Republicans While the reports of civil war in Greece are generally believed in liberal Greek-American quarters here to be much exaggerated, nevertheless the realization that internecine strife has actually broken out has abruptly awakened some of the liberal leaders to the need for unity among themselves. With this in mind a group of republican editors is said to have met recently in New York to discuss the measures which ought to be taken toward this end. The newspapers represented included the *National Herald*, the *New York Free Press*, the *Greek-American Tribune*, and the *Hellas* of Chicago. There is reason to believe that some basis for future concerted activity was established, and that the discussions will be continued.

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THE GREEK-LANGUAGE PRESS IN THE UNITED STATES

Under conditions today the Greek-American press is an important forum for political debate among Greek-Americans and Greek exiles alike. Since frequent reference to the press is made in the memoranda of this Branch, the newspapers most often quoted are here characterized briefly in order to provide a ready guide to their

political character and influence. The most important papers are: Atlantis, California, Parthenon, Greek Star (conservative-royalist); National Herald, Free Press, Saloniki Greek Press, Chicago Phyx (liberal-republican); Hellas, Greek-American Tribune (leftist-Communist); Dodecanesian (regional).

THE acute political consciousness of the typical Greek is shared in full measure by his compatriots who have migrated to the United States. A stimulus to their already keen interest in international politics as well as in the affairs of their native land has been added by the presence among them of many Greek exiles. Most of the exiles regard themselves as temporary sojourners on this side of the Atlantic; some of them have played, and others hope in the post-war period to play, important roles in the government of Greece. Greeks have always been avid newspaper readers, and the waxing of political discussion in the United States, since the latter became one of the few remaining strongholds of free speech in the world, has been accompanied by a corresponding intensification of journalistic activity.

The Greek-American press is centered mainly in New York, home of the largest and probably most influential Greek-American community (53,300). Chicago comes next, both with respect to size of the community (28,000) and number and importance of newspapers. The remainder of the estimated 400,000 persons of Greek stock in the United States and their newspapers are distributed broadly throughout the country.

It is difficult to determine at any one moment the exact number of Greek-language newspapers published in the United States. Cheerful optimism has induced many an editor to start a paper with sufficient funds for only one or two issues, and frequently such experiments fail. Other papers, advertising themselves as weeklies or monthlies, linger for a long time in a moribund state, producing perhaps one or two issues a year. Thus, although there are said to be at present thirty Greek-language newspapers or periodicals in this country, those appearing with any regularity are considerably fewer. Not more than ten of these deserve consideration from the political point of view.

Politically, the Greek-American press falls into three main categories: 1) the conservative-royalist; 2) the liberal-republican; and 3) the leftist-Communist. Varying shades of opinion may be noted within each group, and the polemics in which all the politically-minded papers indulge (and which they perhaps magnify for the sake of circulation) are often directed against papers of fundamentally similar principles.

Conservative-Royalist Press The conservative-royalist group is represented by one daily, two weeklies, and a monthly.

Atlantis. The oldest Greek-language newspaper in the United States is the *Atlantis* of New York, champion of conservatism and monarchy. Founded in 1894 as a weekly, it became a daily in 1905 when Greek immigration had grown to sufficient numbers to support it. It is

now a well printed eight-page newspaper of standard size, with a registered circulation of 16,037. The *Atlantis* has been strongly royalist ever since its founding. Its anti-Venizelist policy dates from 1915, when the break between King Constantine and Prime Minister Venizelos necessitated a choice between the two. In the same year the *Atlantis's* supremacy was challenged by the appearance of another daily, the *National Herald* (*Ethnikos Keryx*). The latter having announced a firm pro-Venizelist policy, the *Atlantis* was driven even farther in the opposite direction. The antagonism between the two papers, which originated over the persons of King Constantine and Venizelos and was developed by keen business competition, has in the course of time tended to focus on the large issue of monarchy *versus* republic.

The *Atlantis's* present editor, Vladimeros Constantinides, belonging to the small but vociferous group of Cretan royalists, has consistently supported King George II in the face of determined opposition from the *National Herald* and other republican papers. Some of his opponents have charged that before the invasion of Greece, Constantinides openly approved of Nazi totalitarian methods and, if not actually pro-German, was at least convinced of German invincibility. His critics charge that he divorced himself from such views only after the German attack on Greece and more particularly, after America's entry into the war.

Certainly Constantinides has made no secret of his admiration of Metaxas and his dictatorship, and readers of the *Atlantis* are frequently reminded of Metaxas's alleged achievements in preparing Greece for war. Credit for the historic "No" with which Greece answered the Italian ultimatum 28 October 1940 [sic] is usually given by the editor to Metaxas alone.

The *Atlantis* uses the dispatches of the Associated Press, United Press, and other news services, and also maintains correspondents of its own in London and Cairo, devoting a considerable amount of its news space to events in Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean. It sometimes ignores news reports which can be considered prejudicial to the royalist cause. In spite of its strong conservatism, the *Atlantis* has been consistently appreciative of the Russian war effort and has voiced no objections to Soviet policies. The dissolution of the Comintern and the restoration of the Orthodox Church in the Soviet Union were accepted by the paper as evidence of the Soviet's good faith and guarantee of international cooperation.

Constantinides has long been an American citizen and presumably entertains no aspirations toward political activity in post-war Greece. Aside from his participation in Greek political discussion, and his ardent support of the Greek cause, his interests are firmly rooted in the United States, and these interests are reflected in the *Atlantis*, which is much more actively concerned with American politics than is its rival, the *National Herald*. The *Atlantis* has almost invariably supported Republican candidates for local offices, and has recently expressed a desire to see Governor Dewey elected President in 1944.

California. Compared with the *Atlantis*, the rest of the Greek-American royalist press is negligible. The *California*, a four-page weekly of standard size published in San Francisco since 1907, praises King George and the memory of Metaxas, but is essentially a small-town newspaper chiefly concerned with the activities of the members of the Greek American community of San Francisco. Its circulation is estimated at about 5,000.

Parthenon. A like-minded but more belligerent monthly is the *Parthenon* of Canton, Ohio, founded in 1939.

Greek Star (Hellenikos Aster). Conservative, but no longer royalist, is the *Greek Star* of Chicago. This eight-page weekly, founded in 1904, has championed the cause of all the most extreme rightist elements in Greek politics. Its editor, Peter Lambros, was an ardent admirer of Metaxas and supported King George until the more conservative elements were removed from the Government-in-Exile. Coolness toward the King, first noted in February 1942 when Aristeides Dimitratos, Minister of Labor in the Metaxas Cabinet, was dropped from the Government-in-Exile, turned to open hostility a little later when the Government indicated that Kostas Kotzias, Minister-Governor of Athens under Metaxas, was no longer the *persona grata*. Since that time the *Star* has waged an unremitting and lonely campaign to build up a following for Kotzias in the United States and fervently hopes to see him become Greece's post-war premier. On domestic issues the *Star* is staunchly republican [sic], and its critics have asserted that it follows the direction of the *Chicago Tribune*.

Liberal-Republican Press The principal liberal-republican papers are a daily, two weeklies, and a fortnightly.

National Herald (Ethnikos Keryx). As the *Atlantis* is the mainstay of the royalist cause, so is the only other Greek-language daily in the United States, the *National Herald* of New York, the bulwark of republicanism. Its early history from its founding in 1915 was sketched above in connection with the account of the *Atlantis*. Composed, like its rival, of eight well printed pages, the *Herald* has a registered circulation of 13,340. Since April 1940, it has been owned by Basil Vlavianos, an Athenian lawyer and journalist, who also acts as editor-in-chief. Married to the daughter of a wealthy shipowner, Vlavianos has been able to pursue an independent policy in the *Herald*, although his views are fundamentally in accord with those of other liberals. He is inexorably opposed to the return of King George to Greece before a plebiscite is held to determine the form of the post-war regime. His belief that the British Government is determined to support the King and restore him to his throne has led Vlavianos to adopt an increasingly anti-British attitude in his editorials.

On the question of the regime, only once has there been any semblance [sic] of unity between the *National Herald* and the *Atlantis*—during the Italo-Greek war. Having consistently denounced Metaxas and his dictatorship, the *Herald* nevertheless recognized Metaxas's military ability and, in the face of the immediate danger, gave him its support. However, after the

death of Metaxas and the defeat of Greece by Germany, when the Greek Government was safe in London, the *Herald* reopened its assault on the monarchy and the dictatorship. The Government-in-Exile at that time consisted chiefly of former members of the Metaxas cabinet, and the *Herald* made ceaseless efforts to bring about their dismissal. As the Government has become progressively more liberal, the *Herald* has concentrated its fire more and more on the King personally, whom it regards as having been responsible for the dictatorship. Although Vlavianos has campaigned for the dismissal of the fascist members of the Government, he feels that any republican who enters the cabinet without being assured that the King will not return to Greece before he is called there by a plebiscite is compromising with his principles. For this reason he broke with his friend, Sophocles Venizelos, son of the former premier and one of the three leaders of the Liberal Party, when Venizelos ceased his criticisms of the Government and accepted the post of Minister of Marine, April 1943.

Vlavianos is able, through his correspondents in London and Cairo, as well as through his personal contacts, to obtain news which does not appear in the American papers. He also uses the Associated Press and other news agencies. Unlike Constantinides, he has not become an American citizen, and his interests are obviously centered in Greek rather than in American politics. It has often been suggested that he hopes to take an active part in Greek political life after the war and that his present activities are conducted with that end in view.

Free Press (Eleftheros Typos). A newcomer in Greek-American journalism is the *Free Press* of New York, an outspokenly republican and vociferously anti-fascist weekly of the same general appearance as the *Atlantis* and *National Herald*. It was founded in July 1943. The only name to appear on the masthead is that of K. Perrakis, "executive vice president," but many articles are signed by Polymeros Moschovitis, who acts as editor, although according to his own statement, without salary.

Moschovitis was for some years connected with the liberal *Daily Herald* of Athens. He entered the United States in the summer of 1942 after experiencing some difficulty in securing a permit, and with the definite understanding that he would refrain from political activity. The question of financial backing of the *Free Press* has given rise to no little speculation, since neither Perrakis nor Moschovitis is believed to possess sufficient capital of his own. According to one rumor, the paper is financed by the industrialist, Athanasiades Bodosakis, who has also been credited with supporting the Greek guerilla organization EDES led by General Napoleon Zervas. Another story has it that Mrs. Kyriakos Venizelos, widow of the brother of Sophocles Venizelos, is the sponsor. Moschovitis has stated that the *Free Press* started with funds adequate for twenty-four issues, or six months. Doubt has been expressed in some quarters that it will long survive that period. No figures are available on its circulation.

Upholding a policy generally similar to that of the *National Herald*, the *Free Press* is written with much less restraint, obviously expressing the personal and very positive views of its editor, whose anti-British feeling

is apparent on every page. Unlike the *Herald*, the *Free Press* continues to support Sophocles Venizelos. Conducting what to his critics is a political organ rather than a newspaper, the editor of the *Free Press* approaches his task with a partisan zeal which has aroused the suspicion that he too is doubtful that the paper will continue to exist, and is making every effort to give full expression to his opinions before his journalistic venture collapses.

Saloniki Greek Press (Hellenikos Typos). As compared with the *National Herald* and the *Free Press*, the weekly *Saloniki Greek Press* of Chicago is a colorless paper. Cautiously liberal in tone, it avoids most controversial political issues. Although claiming a circulation of 8,000, the paper probably has very little political influence, and is presumably read rather for news of the local Greek community than for political opinions.

Chicago Pnyx. An English-language fortnightly for Greek-Americans, the *Chicago Pnyx* is a tabloid founded in 1939, with a circulation of about 3,000. The *Pnyx*, republican and liberal in its views, occasionally indulges in mild polemic. When accusations of fascist tendencies were directed against the leadership of the Greek Battalion in the American Army, the *Pnyx* lent an attentive ear and loudly demanded the dissolution of the unit. For the final disbanding of the Battalion in October 1943, the *Pnyx* smugly assumed full credit. Its influence is generally considered negligible.

Leftist-Communist Press Only two papers are assigned to the leftist-Communist group: one a leftist but not a Communist monthly; the other a weekly following the Communist Party line.

Hellas. More to the Left than any of the papers mentioned above but still not extreme, is the *Hellas* of Chicago, a monthly magazine founded in 1940 and devoted exclusively to politics. Its twenty pages carry almost no advertising. Reported to be in financial difficulties in the summer of 1942, it missed several issues at that time, but later apparently found a new source of support and has been appearing regularly for nearly a year.

The *Hellas* has been implacable in opposition to the King and all fascists—among whom it includes Vlavianos, the editor of the *National Herald*, and Panagiotti Kanellopoulos, former Vice Premier of the Greek Government-in-Exile. This view of both Vlavianos and Kanellopoulos is shared in the press only by the more leftist *Greek-American Tribune*. In April 1943, the *Hellas* espoused the cause of Sophocles Venizelos, just before the latter entered the Government-in-Exile, and thus roused some speculation whether Venizelos had subsidized the *Hellas*. Recently, however, the *Hellas* has been rather critical of Venizelos, although not to such an extent as the *Herald*. The *Hellas* is generally regarded as a somewhat irresponsible and sensational publication.

Greek-American Tribune. At the extreme Left of the Greek-American press is the weekly *Greek-American Tribune* of New York, a twenty-page tabloid founded in April 1941 as the successor to a series of newspapers of socialist, and later Communist, leanings. On matters not directly per-

taining to Greece the *Tribune* follows the Communist Party line and echoes all the sentiments of the *Daily Worker*. Much space is devoted to the newly organized Greek-American Section of the IWO, of which the *Tribune* is the official organ. With regard to Greek affairs it takes a strongly anti-monarchist and leftist attitude, but could hardly be described as Marxist-proletarian. Somewhat belligerent in tone, it is frankly critical of the liberal press, including the *National Herald*, of whose democratic principles the *Tribune's* editor, Demetrios Christophorides, entertains the gravest doubts. His views of the *Atlantis* go beyond mere criticism.

The *Tribune* has long felt that the National Liberation Front (EAM), as the largest underground organization in Greece, deserves more publicity than it has received in the Greek-American press, and has conducted a campaign to obtain recognition for the movement's work. The fact that some of the leaders of the EAM were known to be Communists led the less radical press at first to adopt a cautious attitude toward the organization, but since it has come to be believed that the rank and file represent all political opinions, the liberal press as a whole has changed its views and is now supporting the EAM, recognizing it as the principal factor in Greece's continued and effective resistance to the Axis.

Local and Regional In addition to the principal political newspapers, the Greek-American press includes numerous small local papers, religious journals, one or two satiric reviews, and publications of regional societies.

Dodecanesian. In the regional category, one of the two currently being published is the *Dodecanesian*, recently revived journal of the Dodecanesian League of America. The other is the *Krete*, monthly organ of the Pan-Cretan Union of America, which has not been politically significant.

The Dodecanesian League, with headquarters in New York, is the most important of the local Dodecanesian societies, for which the Dodecanesian National Council serves as a roof organization. Its journal, which is evidently intended to appear every month, is devoted exclusively to a campaign for the liberation of the Dodecanesian Islands and their union with Greece. Published partly in English and partly in Greek, it is characterized by the moderation and restraint which have been noted in previous publications of the Dodecanesian League.

On issues of internal Greek politics the Greek-American press is certainly far from united. On all international questions affecting Greece and her post-war rehabilitation, however, there is remarkable unanimity of opinion. Even the *Greek-American Tribune*, which usually adopts a somewhat less nationalistic stand, is in fundamental agreement on the main problems involved. All papers are increasingly preoccupied with the subject of Greece's territorial aspirations: the Dodecanese, Cyprus, Northern Epirus, and an expanded Macedonian-Thracian border are to all Greek-Americans essential cornerstones in the rebuilding of their liberated homeland. Their fear that Greece might be neglected in the post-war settlement was sharpened by the decision of the Allies to recognize Italy as a

co-belligerent. The announcement of that decision evoked a loud outcry from the Greek-American press. Since the Italian aggression of 28 October 1940, Greek-American papers have never ceased to express their abhorrence of fascist brutality and aggression and their distrust of Italy. Greece's other archenemy, Bulgaria, is likewise the object of constant attack in the entire Greek-language press, which is horrified at the mere thought that similar mild treatment may be extended by the Allies to the Bulgars, whom the Greeks and Yugoslavs alike detest.

CONFIDENTIAL

15 December 1943

GREEK POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES

I. GENERAL

The Greek-American Community [sic] in the United States is divided into three political groups—the Royalists, the Republicans, and the Communists.

The first two groups, although united in their desire to liberate Greece, are bitterly opposed on the question of the post-war government of that country, the cause for friction on this issue being the former political struggle between the Monarchists and the Venizelists in Greece itself.

The Republicans claim that the monarchy was in league with the Metaxas dictatorship, and that the present government-in-exile is merely a hangover from that unsavory period. The Royalists, although holding no brief for any dictatorship of the Metaxas brand, are firm in their belief in monarchy as an institution and on the whole favor the government-in-exile. The Republicans demand that the question of the postwar regime be settled by a plebiscite of the Greek people. The Royalists advocate the return of the government-in-exile headed by King George when the country is freed.

On the sidelines of this controversy is the Greek element of the Communist Party, represented by the Greek-American Branch of the INTERNATIONAL WORKERS ORDER, the SPARTACUS CLUB of New York, and the GREEK SEAMEN'S CLUB. It is a small group compared with the other two, but well organized. As in all cases of Communist nationality groups, the allegiance of the Greek Communists is to Russia first and to their native land second. They are against the return of the monarchy.

Greek-American organizations in the United States may be divided into two groups, neither of which are inimical to the United States:

1. Those concerned primarily with the relief and rehabilitation of Greece—GREEK WAR RELIEF, the AMERICAN HELLENIC EDUCATIONAL PROGRESSIVE ASSOCIATION (AHEPA), the AMERICAN PAN-HELLENIC FEDERATION, the NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR THE RESTORATION OF GREECE, the GREEK-AMERICAN PROGRESSIVE ASSOCIATION.

2. The various fraternal leagues, unions, and brotherhoods incorporating the name of their province of origin—the PAN-CRETAN, PAN-CYPRIAN, PAN-THRACEAN, PAN-EPIROTIC, PAN-ARCADIAN SOCIETIES, the LACONIAN LEAGUE, and the DODECANESE NATIONAL COUNCIL. All the above are reported to seek the inclusion of their particular locale in any future Greek state.

II. GREEK PUBLICATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

1. "*Athens*."—Non-partisan in politics.

2. "*Atlantis*."—The leading royalist paper; founded in 1894; of conservative views; strong supporter of King George II and the Government-in-exile. 16,000 circulation.

3. "*California*."—Royalist paper; supported the Metaxas regime.

4. "*Chicago Pnyx*."—Liberal church paper.

5. "*Greek Star*."—Royalist; supported the Metaxas dictatorship.

6. "*Greek-American Tribune*," (Formerly "Empross").—Published by the Greek-American Section of the International Workers Order under the auspices of the SPARTACUS CLUB; follows the Communist Party Line throughout; 5,000 circulation; circulated in England and Canada as well as in the United States; directly controlled by Communist Party advisors; Alexander Hadgis of New York City and Alexander Karanikas; Editor, Demetrius George Christopher; publication's policies greatly influenced by Pendas Harisiades, leading Greek Communist in the United States.

7. "*Hellas*."—Liberal, and anti-Royalist, anti-government-in-exile; 3,000 circulation; committee of three composed of F. Constantopoulos, Demetrios Nacopoulos, and Nestor Papachriston, publisher and distributor of the magazine; official organ of Democratic Party of Greece.

8. "*National Herald*."—Republican paper; founded in 1915; bitterly opposed to King George II and the government-in-exile; 13,000 circulation.

9. "*New Generation*."—Non-partisan paper, but essentially conservative.

10. "*Saloniki Greek Press*."—Non-partisan, but at times cautiously liberal; 8,000 circulation.

III. PROMINENT FIGURES IN GREEK POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES

1. *ADRIANOPOULOS, ANDRE*.—In Greek Intelligence Service; has tentatively accepted a position in the Greek Government-in-Exile preparatory to expected occupation of Greece by Allied Armies with consequent restoration of that country's government to Greek control. Acceptance of this position would necessitate Adrianopoulos' leaving the United States. His local Selective Service Board at Rochester, New York, has intimated that he may soon be drafted as Private in the Army of the United States; however, he has been endeavoring to secure a commission in the Army because of his proficiency as doctor and surgeon, but since he has no license to practice medicine in this country, the commission has been denied. Adrianopoulos has stated that in his opinion, King George does not command respect of Greek people and is accused of being pro-Fascist; and that 90 per cent of the people would prefer a democratic form of government to the King's rule.

2. *ALFANGE, DEAN*.—Member of the Board of Directors of the GREEK WAR RELIEF ASSOCIATION, New York City; American Labor Party candidate for Governor of New York, 1942.

3. *APOSTOLIDES*.—Former Finance Minister; member of the Hotel St. Moritz Greek Colony; is said to be venal, self-centered, and a man with a huge money-hunger. He is believed to be shot through with complexes, feeling resentment against the United States for not giving him a better reception and a place in the sun. It is reported that he may have a slight inferiority complex as a result of his present personal insecurity. He has connections; it is believed he had saved some of his fortune (which, according to one source, came from looting the Greek treasury while he was finance minister) and reliable information indicates that he has the support of enterprising young Andrew Maris Embiricos. This combination may make him dangerous; German flattery, German promises of power, and German money could easily convert him to the Axis in the considered belief of observers. He is said, by an unquestionably reliable source to be "ripe for the picking."

4. *ATHANASSIADES, BODOSAKIS (JEAN BODOSAKIS)*.—Waldorf Astoria, New York City; reliably reported to be a thoroughly disreputable character and is considered by some to be one of the most dangerous Greeks in this country. He is considered pro-Nazi by Greek Army Intelligence. He was a powerful industrialist in Greece, formerly head of Greek Power and Cartridge Company; called a "small-scale Sir Basil Zaharoff" by an American observer in Greece. His munitions deals over a period of years affecting Turkey, Greece, Spain, and the French Army of the Orient were fabulously bad. His firm in Greece is now operated by the Germans and, although reported to have adopted a pro-United Nations front, he is still considered a suspect. He may try to open a munitions plant in Connecticut.

5. *ATHENAGORAS, ARCHBISHOP*.—Greek Church leader in

North and South America; Episcopate in New York City; National Chairman of the GREEK WAR RELIEF, New York City.

6. *BAIRAKLIOTIS, ATHANASSIOS*.—Since 1933, owner of the Greek-language "Patris," published in South America; thoroughly irresponsible; although once a member of the VENIZELIST Group in Buenos Aires, he joined a reactionary group of businessmen who attempted to get control of Greek affairs in Buenos Aires and Montevideo. The "Patris" has taken to task the Greek Government-in-Exile each time personalities connected with the Metaxas Fourth of August Regime have been removed from office; he openly supports Maniadakis.

7. *BOORHAS, HARRIS J.*—Formerly Supreme President of the AMERICAN HELLENIC EDUCATIONAL PROGRESSIVE ASSOCIATION, practices law in Boston; supposed to have associated with Kotzias in an unsuccessful effort to raise \$25,000,000 in the United States to be given to the Greeks at the end of the war; no derogatory information; believed loyal to the United States.

8. *CAZOULIS, M.*—Member of COMMITTEE OF DODECANESIANS (See Zervos).

9. *CHEBITHES, VASILIOS*.—Formerly Supreme President of the AMERICAN HELLENIC EDUCATIONAL PROGRESSIVE ASSOCIATION; associated with Kotzias in attempt to raise \$25,000,000 for Greeks at the end of the war (Note Boorhas above); no derogatory information; believed loyal to the United States; resides at 1223 Vermont Avenue, Washington, D.C.

10. *CHRISTOFORATOS* (alias NEOPHYTOS, GEORGE)—Secretary to Nellos Kanellopoulos and resides with him at the Hotel St. Moritz, New York City.

11. *CHRISTOPHORIDES, DEMETRIOS*.—Editor of Communist "Greek American Tribune"; accuses King George of trying to build up guerrilla leader Zervos to another Mihailovich.

12. *CHRISTOPOULOS, LOUIS*.—Member of Board of Directors, GREEK WAR RELIEF, New York City.

13. *CONSTANTINIDES, VLADIMEROS*.—Editor of Greek daily, "Atlantis," New York City; pro-Metaxas. "Atlantis," while not opposing the United Nations, consistently has refused to take an anti-Nazi attitude; rated "suspicious to dangerous, [sic] and some advices are [sic] of the opinion that he is personally sympathetic to the Germans.

14. *CONSTANTOPOULOS, FLEFTERIES*.—One of committee of three who publish and distribute "Hellas."

15. *DANDOLO, DEMETRIOS*.—Formerly Greek Honorary Consul in Buenos Aires; a crony of Dendramis, Greek Minister to the Argentine, who will support the Greek Government-in-Exile only as long as it suits his personal policy.

16. *DAVIS, HOMER W.*—Vice-President of GREEK WAR RELIEF; President of the American College in Athens; respected by American Greeks of all factions except outright Fascists.

17. *DEMETER, GEORGE*.—Editor and Publisher of the English-

language "Hellenic World"; associated with Kotzias in his unsuccessful venture to raise \$25,000,000 for Greeks at end of war; believed loyal to the United States.

18. *DEMETRIADES, E.*—Greek engineer attached to German legation in Buenos Aires; studied and worked in Germany; belonged to Nazi Party; working with Maniadakis, supposedly under orders from King George II, according to Left Liberal "Hellas" in Chicago.

19. *DENDRAMIS.*—Greek Minister to Brazil; Greek Minister to Buenos Aires; his mouthpiece is "Hellas," published by Logothetos; will support Greek Government-in-Exile only as long as it suits his personal policy.

20. *DIAKOS, JOHN, (DIACOS, DIAKAKIS).*—Hotel Lexington, New York City; suspected of being a Fascist; formerly newspaper publisher in Greece and in favor of John Metaxas; as director of Political Bureau, became engineer of Metaxas dictatorship; instrumental in forming the Metaxas "Government of August Fourth"; a thoroughly dangerous character now "lying low" in New York City and believed waiting a propitious moment to inaugurate a new venture.

21. *DIAMANTOPOULOS, KIMON.*—Greek Minister to the United States; sponsors NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR THE RESTORATION OF GREECE in New York City and the PAN-HELLENIC FEDERATION, Chicago; allegedly a relic of the Metaxas regime.

22. *DIMITRATOS, ARISTIDES (DEMETRATOS).*—Was Minister of Labor in Metaxas Government; was once alleged Communist, later reported to be Fascist, but now may again be Communist. His record in the Greek Labor Ministry was said to be phenomenally bad. He assumed that most Greek workers hate him, but he apparently had turned his talents to the aid of Greek Communism in America and is trying to get control of the GREEK SEAMEN'S UNION, New York City; however, this report is not satisfactorily verified. He will do anything for revenge against Greek Government-in-Exile which ousted him as Labor Minister, which, taken in connection with his unscrupulous nature, indicates that he might join the Axis forces. It is reported that he now appears to be sympathetic with the workers he formerly exploited, which might indicate that he is using his waterfront activities as a screen; and if he is working with Greek seamen, he might be passing along shipping information to the Axis. Dimitratos is on good terms with John Diakos, claims to be the elected leader of the TRADE UNIONS ORGANIZATION OF GREECE with a membership of 1,578,000, and of the SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC organizations, in which capacity he participated as a member of the INDEPENDENT LABOR in various cabinets and succeeded in the realization of the program of radical Socialist reforms of the Labor Conference in Salonika in 1926; General Secretary of the GREEK LABOR PARTY and NATIONAL FEDERATION OF GREEK LABOR, New York City.

23. *EMBRICOS, ANDREW MARIS.*—Board of Directors, GREEK WAR RELIEF; has many friends in Paris who reportedly are notoriously

pro-German; has expressed admiration for "the German way of running things"; attempted to establish Apostolides in an authoritative position in the United States.

24. *GAVARIS, GEORGE P., DR.*—President of the GREEK-AMERICAN PROGRESSIVE ASSOCIATION, American-Greek fraternal order; member of the Board of Directors of the GREEK WAR RELIEF.

25. *GIANAKIS, CONSTANTINE.*—Member of Board of Directors, GREEK WAR RELIEF.

26. *HADGIS, ALEXANDER.*—Advisor to "Greek-American Tribune" Communist influenced Greek publication.

27. *HANIOTIS, GEORGE.*—One of [sic] editors of "Elevtheron Vema"; democratic and anti-Metaxas. Now in charge of radio propaganda from Cairo to Greece; Director of Office of Greek Information, Washington, D.C.

28. *HARISIADES, PANDOS.*—Leading Greek Communist in the United States; influences policies of "Greek American Tribune."

29. *HAROOCOPO, M. H.*—Connected with the Office of the Rubber Director; believed from wealthy Greek family; knows Greece and Italy well.

30. *KANELLOPOULOS, NELLOS.*—Greek leader in the United States; suspected of being Fascist agent; political background has been with rightist or conservative groups; reputed to be a monarchist while in Greece, but since coming to the United States has sniped at King George's Government-in-Exile; may be aiming at Premier Tsouderos, who is alleged to be trying to weed out left-over Fascists, or may be trying to blow up entire Government-in-Exile; only Greek allowed to leave Greece after German occupation; his father was leading industrialist in Greece prior to war and is said to be now directing Greek industrial production for Germans. Kanellopoulos is reported to be a German agent. He is married to the daughter of Constantine Stephanos of Philadelphia, tobacco manufacturer with whom he and several other Greeks (Col. Stelios Pistolakis, Col. Venizelos, and Basil Vlavionos [sic]) formed a clique and tried to render ineffective the recent visit of King George to this country.

31. *KAPOGIANNIS, PANOS.*—Board of Directors, GREEK WAR RELIEF.

32. *KARANIKAS, ALEXANDER.*—Advisor to "Greek American Tribune."

33. *KLAINOS, PANAYOTIS (MAJOR).*—Commander of "Greek Battalion," 122nd Infantry of the Army of the United States, composed entirely of men of Greek descent from all parts of the United States, and recently organized at Camp Carson, Colorado; originally from Kryoneri in Lakonia; first Greek to graduate from West Point, which he did in 1933; later appointed as instructor at Army School, Fort Benning, Georgia; has seen service in Panama; was at Dutch Harbor in the Aleutians during Japanese campaign there. An article in the "Chicago Pnyx" entitled, "Is Major Klainos a Despot," contained statements re Klainos which Elias L. Janetis, Managing Editor of the "National Herald," Greek daily in New

York City, branded as untrue. Janetis has followed training of the Greek Battalion and has written a series of articles about it.

34. *KONIALIDES, NIKOLASO*.—Chief of group of pro-Fascist Greeks in South America; working with Maniadakis, cousin of Onassis, with whom he controls Greek Consulates in Buenos Aires and Montevideo.

35. *KOTZIAS, KOSTAS (CONSTANTINE)*.—"The Greek Star," Chicago Fascist paper, has publicized Kotzias as the white hope of Greece; described by American and Greek liberals as definitely Fascist; former Mayor of Athens and Governor of Attica; made anti-Nazi statements in Thrace and Macedonia prior to German invasion, which statements may have been made to satisfy anti-German Greek population; when Germans invaded, went to previously mentioned Ankara, where his first call was upon the German Ambassador Von Papen; headed committee to raise \$25,000,000 for Greeks at end of war. Greek-Americans apparently thought most of the money would stick to the palm of Kotzias and the campaign failed.

36. *LEONDOPOULOS, STEVEN*.—President Greek Local 70, International Union Fur and Leather Workers.

37. *LIANOPOULOS, GEORGE*.—Royal Hellenic Navy; left Greece two days prior to German occupation; from there went to England in November 1942, and to Miami, Florida in April 1943; in May 1943, was attending United States Navy Sub-Chaser Training School, Miami.

38. *LIATIS, ALEXIS*.—Consul of Greece, Boston, Massachusetts; political opportunist, as far as internal politics go; ready to serve any government that may employ him; at present, a liberal Democrat; is definitely known to be anti-Communist and pro-United Nations; his wife is the daughter of Maris, a former Minister of Finance belonging to Venizelist Party. It is believed Liatis will do anything to help the war effort, without injury to himself.

39. *LOGOTHETES, D. G.*—Owner and publisher of Greek "Hellas" in Buenos Aires; mouthpiece of Greek Legation in that city as well as of Dandolo, former Greek Honorary Consul.

40. *MANIADAKIS (fnu)*.—Minister of Public Security under Metaxas; under Himmler's tutelage, set up a miniature Gestapo in Athens; gathered considerable information which would be valuable for political blackmail purposes; from Greece, fled to Buenos Aires; would like to come to the United States but Government agencies are prepared to block his entry.

41. *MAROUSIS, NICHOLAS*.—Member of Board of Directors, GREEK WAR RELIEF.

42. *MANTA, JOHN L.*—Member of Board of Directors, GREEK WAR RELIEF.

43. *MERMINGAS, JOHN*.—Believed to be the business agent of Maniadakis in New York City.

44. *MOAZZO JOHN (JEAN)*.—Friend and political adherent of General Plastiras, old time Republican revolutionist, anti-Royalist, now in exile in Nice.

45. *MOSCHOVITIS, POLYMEROS P. (MAJOR)*.—Personal friend of VENIZELOS; editor and war correspondent on Albanian front from date of Italian declaration of war on Albania, 28 October 1940 to 16 April 1941; 23 April 1941, left Athens and went to the United States where he resided in New York City for more than a year; in 1936-39, he contributed without signature to "New Greece," "New World," and "Ethnos." He has friends at the Greek Embassy in Washington, D.C.; namely, Admiral Sakellariou and Naval Attache Captain Leontopoulos.

46. *NAKOPAULOS, DEMETRIOS*.—One of committee of three which publishes and distributes "Hellas" in Chicago.

47. *NILONIS, STAVROS, (LT., JG)*.—Royal Hellenic Navy; escaped from Greece two days prior to German invasion; went to England in November 1942 and to Miami, Florida, in April 1943. As of May 1943, was enrolled at United States Navy Sub-Chaser Training School, Miami.

48. *ONASSIS, ARISTOTELES*.—Wealthy Greek ship owner in South America: Fascist sympathizer; spends most of his time in New York City; South American business interests left to cousin, Konialides; controls Greek Consulates in Buenos Aires and Montevideo.

49. *PAPADAKIS, HARRY*.—Ordinary seaman, Royal Hellenic Navy. Left Greece with Commander Zepos in May 1943; now attending United States Navy Sub-Chaser Training School, Miami.

50. *PAPACHRISTOS, NESTOR*.—One of committee of three which publishes and distributes "Hellas" Chicago.

51. *PISTOLAKIS, STELIOS (COL.)*.—Suspected of being Fascist; with Kanellopoulos, formed clique which tried to render ineffective visit of King George to the United States; married to one of the daughters of Constantine Stephanos (See Kanellopoulos); was reportedly loyal democrat and once imprisoned in Greece for his beliefs, which is very likely because he is nephew of famous Greek Republican leader and statesman, Venizelos; came to the United States as volunteer exile in 1936; because of Greek background and relation with the older Venizelos, is potential power in Greek politics in the United States.

52. *PAPAVASSILIOU (LT. COL.)*.—Formerly with the GREEK ARMY PURCHASING COMMISSION sub-committee in New York City, which was liquidating supplies bought but undelivered; called to active duty in November 1941 when committee had finished its task, but refused; termed Free French "British mercenaries" and condemned efforts of Free Greeks; maintained defeatist attitude toward Italo-Greek war.

53. *PAPPAS, DEMETRIOS*.—Pappas and his associate Kourbelis of the Greek Maritime Commission at 15 Moore Street, New York City, are reported by fairly reliable sources to have Fascist tendencies.

54. *PIOYOS, DIMITRIOS*.—Ordinary Seaman, Royal Hellenic Navy; left Greece prior to German invasion with Commander Zepos; went to England in November 1942 and came to Miami in April 1943; as of May 1943, was enrolled at United States Navy Sub-Chaser Training School, Miami.

55. *POLYZOIDES, ADAMANTIOS*.—Former editor of "Atlantis"

and President of New Generation Publishing Company; now lecturer in international relations and editor of the "World Affairs Interpreter" at the University of Southern California; royalist.

56. *SKOURAS, SPYROS*.—President of GREEK WAR RELIEF. Movie magnate.

57. *STEPHANOS, CONSTANTINE*.—Tobacco manufacturer of Philadelphia; suspected Fascist; associated with Kanellopoulos in attempt to render ineffective recent visit of King George to this country.

58. *STRATACOS, ANTONIOS*.—In 1937 was associated with one Pappadakis in the latter's attempt to organize the Greek fascist youth movement, the EON, in this country, it is alleged. The movement was abortive and no traces are left of it, it is said. Stratacos is now being belabored by the liberal Greek press, according to reports, for being a "worthless royalist who is drawing a salary of \$450 per month for doing nothing. His sentiments are undoubtedly conservative-royalist if not fascist," the informant declares. He is said to be a good friend of Prince Paul, King George's brother.

59. *TAYLOR, S. GREGORY*.—Board of Directors, GREEK WAR RELIEF; operator of Hotel St. Moritz, New York City, which is frequented by many prominent Greeks and other foreigners.

60. *TSOUDEROS, JOHN (CPL.)*.—Son of Emanuel Tsouderos, Prime Minister; in the special Greek Battalion, Camp Carson, Colorado; receives uncensored diplomatic mail from his father.

61. *VARVARESSOS, KYRIAKOS*.—Former Governor of the Bank of Greece under Metaxas, whose place as Finance Minister was taken over by Tsouderos; now Minister to Great Britain and the United States; will retain his post as Director of Bank of Greece.

62. *VERGHIS, VASOS (MAJOR)*.—Hotel Empire, New York City; trying to organize a Greek Legion to fight on the side of the United Nations.

63. *VASSILIOU*.—Greek in South America; aide to Maniadakis.

64. *VENIZELOS, S. (COL.)*.—Former Military Attache of the Free Greek Government in Washington; widely reported to be the indolent, amusement-loving son of Eleutherius Venizelos. The Colonel has lent his name to the opportunist Kanellopoulos and Vlavianos and has on occasion himself lifted his voice against the Free Greeks, informants declare. An informant adds that, though he may be socially inclined, Venizelos is no fool. He may try to bring to the United States General Plastiras who would become the counterpart of General DeGaulle.

65. *VLAVIANOS, BASIL*.—Editor of Greek daily of New York, the "National Herald"; has accused the British of deliberately setting guerrilla groups in Greece against each other in order to make the restoration of the King seem necessary to establish a stable government.

66. *VOURNAS, GEORGE*.—President of the American Hellenic Educational Progressive Association; member of Board of Directors, GREEK WAR RELIEF; now Captain in the Army of the United States, (Office of Strategic Services).

67. ZERVOS, SKEVOS (DR).—Member of Committee of Dodecanesians advocating that all connections between the islands and Italy should be severed and that the legal status of the Dodecanesians be that of a part of the Greek State.

RESTRICTED

Number B-151

26 January 1944

GREEK-AMERICAN PRESS NOTES

Relations between the Greek guerrillas and the Government-in-Exile, and the ever-present Bulgarian problem are two subjects now receiving constant attention in the Greek-American press.

The Government-in-Exile and the Guerrillas

PREMIER Tsouderos's broadcasts to the Greek people on 21 and 31 December 1943, appealing for unity among the warring guerrilla factions, have evoked a flood of comment, some favorable, more adverse, in the Greek-American press. The alignment has run true to form: conservative-royalist, with the Government-in-Exile; liberal and left-wing, against.

The New York daily *Atlantis*, speaking for the conservatives, accepted Tsouderos's estimate that the trouble in Greece was widespread, and quoted (22 December) a London dispatch to the effect that the Germans had been able to reduce their forces in Greece by one division as a result. It praised the speech, while regretting that it was necessitated by conditions inside Greece. On the other side, the two liberal papers in New York, the daily *National Herald* and the weekly *Free Press*, and the pro-Communist *Greek-American Tribune*, also in New York, accused Tsouderos of slandering the Greek people by deliberate exaggeration of reports of disturbances in order to promote his own ends and those of King George. Greek-American republicans have long maintained that the only discordant element among Greeks is a small clique centered around the King and the Government. The charge of "dividing the Greek people" has been bandied back and forth between the two groups, the royalists claiming to be the only stabilizing influence, and the republicans asserting that they themselves represent all of fighting Greece.

The Hull-Eden Messages The anti-monarchist press took particular exception to messages read by Tsouderos from Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden,

welcoming the "initiative of the Greek Government in appealing for reconciliation between all Greek resistance bands." The messages, and the conspicuous way in which they were featured in the *New York Times* of 1 January, were taken by groups opposing the Government-in-Exile as an indication that their worst fears were justified and that a campaign was under way to discredit the resistance bodies in Greece.

The *National Herald* (3 January) called the *Times* article "the worst propaganda against Greece, which is represented as divided and as neglecting its fight against the enemy." Both the *Herald* and the *Greek-American Tribune* take the view that the quarrels among the guerrillas are on a small scale and not of great importance. The King and the prime minister are charged, if not with actual provocation of the quarrels, at least with exploiting them so that the King's return to Greece might appear necessary to preserve order. The *Herald* said it was not surprised that Mr. Eden should accept the views of the Government-in-Exile, but it was deeply pained that "the Secretary of State of the United States should take part in this campaign of vilification against the Greek people."

Communism in Greece Discussion of Tsouderos's broadcasts inevitably led to the much debated issue of the extent of Communist influence in Greece, particularly in the National Liberation Front, usually called by its Greek initials, EAM. Although Tsouderos had not charged directly that Communists were responsible for the troubles, the *Atlantis*, the *National Herald* and the *Greek-American Tribune* all felt that such a charge had been implied and reacted accordingly.

The *Atlantis* of 3 January remarked: "Even if we do not accept the reports about the situation in the interior of Greece as showing that the Communists under Saraphis and Klaras have begun a civil war, they are undoubtedly sowing the seed of a civil strife." The paper then plunged into an attack on the EAM and especially on its army the ELAS. Ever since the mission to Cairo of representatives of the underground organizations under the leadership of Elias Tsirimokos, the *Atlantis* continued, Mr. Tsouderos and his colleagues had been convinced that "the attempt to create an armed party for future political activity had become more important to Klaras's and Saraphis's organization even than resistance to the Germans." The *Atlantis*, although it welcomes every Russian victory on the battlefield, has become increasingly suspicious of Soviet foreign policy during recent months. It is alarmed by rumors of growing Russian influence and receptive to every report of Communist domination of the EAM, which it sees as a counterpart of the Yugoslav Partisans, equally disruptive and dangerous.

The *Free Press*, on the other hand, although as uncompromisingly anti-Soviet as the *Atlantis*, has professed to see a lessening of Russian interest in Greece since the Teheran conference. The *Press* recently carried a series of articles on the origins and growth of the EAM, the burden of which was that the EAM started as a democratic, non-Communist organization, but gradually came under Communist domination. On 8 January

the same paper published an article expressing the view that the Communist influence was being neutralized and that the EAM was returning to its original democratic principles. The *Free Press* has consistently supported General Napoleon Zervas's organization, the EDES, as "truly democratic."

The *National Herald*, although no friend of Communism, has always advocated cordial relations between Russia and the other Allies. It has deprecated charges that Communist influence in Greece is a danger, regarding such charges as a weapon forged by the King and his prime minister to drive public and official opinion into their own camp; the *Herald* recalls that it was to avert a "Communist menace" that Metaxas established his dictatorship in 1936. At first lukewarm toward the EAM, the *Herald* has recently accorded it wholehearted support as the largest and most effective fighting force in Greece. Its view of the situation may be summed up in a paragraph from an editorial in the issue of 6 January:

It is necessary that this question of communism be put once for all in its place. Above all things it must be emphasized that even if the largest organization of Greek irregulars were directed by Communists it would be absolutely stupid and harmful to libel it in foreign parts. Inasmuch as the issue concerns an organization derived from the people, libeling it means libeling the Greek people, fighting it means fighting the Greek people, hindering its activity means hindering the battle of the people against the Germans and the Bulgarians. No one has maintained that the EAM has not contended successfully with all its might against the enemy; no one has charged that any quislings have ever come from its ranks; the only charge against it is that it is directed by Communists. But whoever says this attributes to the Communists the greatest glory. He compels everyone of good faith to praise the Communists for the exceptional patriotic deeds which they have done and are doing, and the obligation is forced on all of us who are opposed to Communism to do greater works than the Communists, to make greater sacrifices, to have a more felicitous policy here and in Cairo and in Greece and everywhere.

Long before any attention was paid to the EAM in the rest of the press the *Greek-American Tribune* clamored for its recognition on the ground that it constituted 80 per cent of the guerrilla forces in Greece. The *Tribune* has avoided the issue of Communism, reiterating rather that the EAM is a democratic, anti-royalist organization, pledged to the principle that the Greek people shall be allowed to choose its own form of government. Like the *National Herald*, the *Tribune* was incensed by Tsouderos's broadcasts. An editorial in English, 7 January, gave its interpretation of the motive:

The most probable reason why Tsouderos and his King are of

late so frantic in their efforts to smear the EAM as communistic and revengeful and what not, seems to be that perhaps they have information about an impending Allied invasion of Greece, and that the EAM being the only serious armed force within Greece for the Allies to cooperate with, its recognition on the part of the latter would be inevitable. This is exactly what Tsouderos and the King want to prevent.

The Russian Message The papers under discussion had made their comment on Tsouderos's speeches, and on Mr. Hull's and Mr. Eden's messages, before it became known here that the Soviet Government, through a note to the Greek Ambassador to Moscow, had issued a similar appeal for unity. The editors were therefore confronted with a dilemma, since those who had traditionally favored the Greek Government-in-Exile and the British Foreign Office had been uncompromisingly opposed to Soviet policy, and *vice versa*. Only the *Free Press*, anti-Tsouderos, critical of the Kremlin's policy, and distrustful of Britain, was unembarrassed, since it saw no incongruity in attributing the same villainy to all. The *Greek-American Tribune*, apparently completely discomfited, printed only a brief factual account of the Soviet message (14 January) and called attention to the fact that the text of the appeal had not been published. The *Atlantis* (13 January) and *Free Press* (8 January) interpreted the statement from Moscow as serving notice on the Greek Communists that they need no longer look to Russia for support.

The *National Herald*, on record as disapproving thoroughly of the British and American appeals, was nevertheless unwilling to criticize the Russian. Assuming that the Soviet officials had previously refused to make any statement, the *Herald* (14 January) attributed their final acquiescence to a desire to avoid creating the impression that they were fostering quarrels among the guerrillas with the purpose of establishing a Communist regime in Greece. The paper expressed the belief that the reason the text was not published was that it contained nothing which the King and the Government-in-Exile might find advantageous to their cause.

Reports that the guerrillas had composed their differences were given some publicity in the Greek-American press, but the inter-newspaper quarrels which they engendered continue with unabated bitterness. The Communist-line *Greek-American Tribune* regularly attacks the liberal republican *Free Press* and the conservative-royalist *Atlantis* as two faces of the same coin; the *Atlantis* for its part has been particularly virulent in assailing the *Herald*.

Bulgaria

RUMORS that Bulgaria may detach itself from the Axis have induced an intensification of long-standing anti-Bulgarian feeling in the Greek-American newspapers. All would naturally welcome Bulgaria's demise as

an Axis partner, but they are also unanimous in demanding that that end be achieved by force rather than bribery. The *National Herald*, whose attitude on the subject is representative of the Greek-American press as a whole, has recently devoted three long leading articles to the Bulgarian situation.

The main points recurring in this press campaign against Bulgaria are: 1) skepticism regarding the contention that the Bulgarian people as a whole is imbued with a love for Russia and must be differentiated from its pro-German leaders; 2) recollection of Bulgaria's part in the Balkan disaster of 1941 and of savage behavior on the part of the Bulgarian armies in occupied territories; 3) strong disapproval of any project involving a union of South Slavs to the exclusion of other Balkan nations.

Dimitroff's Appeal Censured

The attention of the Greek-American press was further attracted to Bulgaria on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Reichstag fire trial because of the part played in the trial by George Dimitroff, Bulgarian-born Communist leader and General Secretary of the Comintern from 1935 to 1943. An appeal by Dimitroff to Bulgaria to get out of the war, reprinted in the *Daily Worker*, 30 December 1943, from *Pravda*, and a meeting in his honor held in Carnegie Hall on 22 December, added fuel to the already brightly burning flame of anti-Bulgarian feeling in the Greek-language press. In a long editorial in the *National Herald* (29 December) signed with the initials of its editor, Basil Vlavianos, vigorous exception was taken to Dimitroff's warning that if Bulgaria did not hasten to change her policy "she will be held fully responsible for her share in Hitler's war and its crimes." Vlavianos maintained that Bulgaria had already incurred this responsibility. He saw in Dimitroff's statement an implication that by changing policy now, Bulgaria would be assured of Allied support; but the actions of the Bulgarians up to the present time, Vlavianos asserted, excluded them from any such possibility. The killing and dispossession of many thousands of Greeks and Yugoslavs were crimes for which the Bulgarian people, and not only their leaders, were accountable, and no sudden change of policy could relieve them of the onus. Bulgaria, Vlavianos concluded, instead of being bribed with promises of aid from the Allies, should be warned that the already serious consequences of its collaboration with Germany would become increasingly heavy the longer Bulgaria delayed surrender.

Atlantis, 23 December, writing of the meeting at Carnegie Hall, referred to Dimitroff as a "notorious Bulgar" and accused him of aiming to unite the Slavs in the Balkans in a small Soviet Socialist Union with himself at its head. "Whatever may be the degree of redness of Comrade Dimitroff, he remains always a Bulgarian, or rather a Bulgar-Macedonian . . . attempting on the one hand to save Bulgaria from all punishment or sanctions, and on the other to keep as Bulgarian that part of Northern Greece which has been seized by the Bulgarian army."

The *Greek-American Tribune* (7 January) was the only Greek-Amer-

ican paper to speak sympathetically of Dimitroff's appeal and to draw a distinction between the Bulgarian people and their leaders. The paper expressed the hope that a Pan-Balkan People's Movement might lay the foundation for a post-war Balkan Federation.

An unconfirmed rumor of a *coup d'etat* in Bulgaria prompted the *Atlantis* (4 January) to comment that ever since the war turned in favor of the Allies Bulgaria had been trying to find a way to wriggle out of the alliance with Germany. Luckily, the *Atlantis* remarked, we have the example of Badoglio, who "put an anti-Fascist mask on his Fascist face, but did not succeed in changing the mind of the Italian people, or in deceiving the Allies. The Bulgarians, less clever than the Italians, will fail more miserably in their disgraceful game."

*Means of Balkan
Cooperation
Described*

The *National Herald* considered larger aspects of the Bulgarian question in an editorial entitled "The Future of the Balkans" (27 December). Starting from the premise that the Bulgarians must be rendered incapable of making further attacks on their neighbors, the paper expressed great skepticism about the possible success of any union of South Slavs, on the ground that admission of Bulgaria to such a group would inspire fear in all the surrounding peoples. Any Balkan union limited to Slavic peoples, the *Herald* continued, "would be a source of new and more acute racial antagonisms, whose first result would be the necessity for the neighboring peoples to seek their safety in the formation of a counteractive federation, which would inevitably come into conflict with the first."

The editorial concluded that the only possible road to peace in the Balkans was through close cooperation of all countries, including Turkey. Greece, Yugoslavia, and Turkey had already shown their ability to lay the foundations for a solid structure; the addition of Rumania and Hungary would be desirable. Only at the very last, and after she had been brought to a proper frame of mind, could Bulgaria be used as building material to complete the Balkan edifice.

RESTRICTED

Number M-143

2 February 1944

Event: GREEK-AMERICAN MASS MEETING
Sponsor: *National Herald*, liberal Greek daily of New York
Place: Manhattan Center, New York City
Date: 30 January 1944

- Attendance:* About 3,000
- Speakers:* Basil Vlavianos, editor of the *National Herald*
Johannes Steel, Leigh White, radio commentators
Stoyan Gavrilovich, formerly with Royal Yugoslav
Information Center in New York
Professor T. Leslie Shear of Princeton University
Spyros Galanopoulos, executive secretary of Greek-American
Labor Committee
Djermal Koun, president of Turkish Educational Society
of New York
Newbold Morris, president of New York City Council
Representative John M. Coffee of Washington

About 3,000 Greek-Americans and Americans assembled at Manhattan Center in New York, 30 January, to protest against Axis oppression in Greece and to urge an early invasion of the Balkans.

Although the advance notices stated that there would be no political discussion, the conservative-royalist *Atlantis* in several editorials condemned the whole project, prophesying that it would be exploited to arouse the sentiment of Greek-Americans not only against King George and the Government-in-Exile but also against British and American policy toward Greece. However, not a word was uttered on internal Greek political questions, no controversial issues were raised, and the audience was exceptionally orderly and attentive.

No representative of the Greek Government-in-Exile was present, nor was Archbishop Athenagoras. Father Basil Efthymiou of the Greek Orthodox Cathedral attended as representative of the Church communities of Greater New York, and offered the invocation.

The meeting was presided over by Stephen Skopas, a lawyer of New York. After the singing of the American and Greek national anthems, the latter by Nicholas Moschonas, basso of the Metropolitan Opera Company, the chairman made a brief statement of the purpose of the meeting. The burden of the speeches, all of which were enthusiastically received, was sympathy for Greece, indignation against the oppressors, and determination that Greece's sacrifices should not be forgotten.

A long resolution was adopted: to assure the Greek people, the guerrilla forces and the Greek Army, Navy and Air Force, of American sympathy and admiration; to make sure that German, Italian, and Bulgarian crimes in Greece shall be duly punished and that Greece shall receive a full hearing after the war; to urge the earliest possible invasion of the Balkans and to increase the aid sent to Greek resistance groups; to express gratitude to the United States Government and the Governments of the United Nations for help given the Greek people thus far; and to support the war effort of the United States and President Roosevelt in his prosecution of the war and in the execution of the decisions of the Teheran Conference.

It was further resolved to send copies of the resolution to the Presi-

dent of the United States, to the Governments of Great Britain, the Soviet Union and China, and to the Greek Government-in-Exile, with the specific request that it be made known to the people in full text.

CONFIDENTIAL

Number B-162

2 March 1944

GREEK-AMERICAN REACTIONS TO CHURCHILL'S SPEECH

The passage in Prime Minister Churchill's recent speech in Parliament deploring civil strife in Greece aroused widespread resentment in the Greek-American community and press. Only one paper, the royalist *Atlantis*, failed to protest Mr. Churchill's emphasis. The praise for Italian cooperation was greeted with particular indignation.

PRIME MINISTER Churchill's speech of 22 February in the House of Commons was received with much disappointment and some resentment in Greek-American circles. It was felt that he had magnified reports of civil strife in Greece, minimized the Greek contribution to the war, and dealt unfairly with the Greeks as compared with the Yugoslavs and the Italians. It was felt also that whereas the Yugoslav Partisans were extolled at length, the brief passages devoted to Greece stressed only the less creditable aspects of Greek affairs.

Italian co-belligerency has stuck in the throats of Greek-Americans as well as Greeks from the beginning. They are convinced that misplaced Allied trust in the Italian garrisons was responsible for the loss of Cos, Leros, and Samos; and naturally they retain a vivid recollection of the Italian aggression on Greece in 1940, and of the widespread suffering of the Greek people under Italian rule during the occupation. Mr. Churchill's words of praise for Italian cooperation therefore stirred up anew the suspicions often voiced in the Greek-American press that Italian crimes against Greece would be forgotten by the Allies. Churchill's statement that the Allies were supporting King Victor Emmanuel and Badoglio because "this is not a time for ideological preferences" was contrasted unfavorably by the *National Herald* (24 February) with a declaration made by the Prime Minister early in the war, that this is "a war of peoples and ideologies."

The Greek-American press and the Greek-American community in general were almost unanimous in declining to accept Mr. Churchill's dark picture of continuing strife in Greece. Such a picture, they asserted,

was wholly at variance with the most recent reports indicating that the guerrillas had composed their differences. The *Free Press* (26 February) demanded clarification from the British and Greek Governments, pointing out that an encouraging account of conciliation achieved had been sent out by the British High Command itself and had been passed by British censorship. Moreover, nearly all Greek-Americans remain firm in the belief that civil warfare in Greece has never been waged on so wide a scale as Mr. Churchill's words would indicate, and has always been incidental to the main business of resisting the Germans. Why, asked the *Greek-American Tribune* (25 February), did Churchill lay such stress on alleged disorders in Greece, while ignoring similar strife in Yugoslavia?

Only the royalist *Atlantis* showed any disposition to accept Mr. Churchill's evaluation of the situation in Greece, using it to support the thesis which the paper has long maintained: that Communists are stirring up trouble in Greece in order to establish a post-war dictatorship of their own.

Perhaps the most painful impression of all was caused by Mr. Churchill's reference to the "murder" of a British officer by Greek guerrillas. Basil Vlavianos, in a signed editorial in the *National Herald* of 24 February, charged the British Prime Minister with lack of tact for calling attention to this episode while failing to mention the fact that Greeks have been constantly risking and sacrificing their lives in their efforts to save British soldiers who were left behind in Greece at the time of the Allied evacuation in 1941.

The Greek Office of Information in Washington has received so many questions on this subject that a statement was issued, signed by the director, G. Haniotis. The statement explained that because of the strict British censorship which has prevented any direct communication between the Greeks inside Greece and those outside (including the Government-in-Exile), the Office knew nothing of the circumstances of the incident, although it had seen the episode reported in some English newspapers several months ago. Such an episode, the statement continued, should not be allowed to cloud Greco-British relations, nor to obliterate from British minds the memory of the many invaluable services rendered to Britain by Greece especially in the period when the British stood otherwise alone against the Axis.

Private individuals in the Greek-American community were even more outspoken in their criticism of what they regarded as an ungenerous attitude on Mr. Churchill's part.

One small ray of hope shone for Mr. Churchill's discouraged Greek-American listeners. This was the publicly expressed sympathy of some British philhellenes. One of these, the Earl of Huntingdon, was quoted by the *National Herald* as saying, in an earlier condemnation of the British Government's attitude toward Greece: "What could possibly make us follow such a policy toward this brave people?" History, the *Herald* concludes, will certainly ask this same question.

[To Be Continued in the Fall Issue]

In the Dialect of the Desert: Selected Poems of Yannis Kondos

Yannis Kondos was born in Aegion in 1943. He studied law, but discontinued his studies and opened a bookstore during the early Seventies in Athens. In 1976, he sold his bookstore and started working for the Kedros Publishing House. He is presently preparing a new book of poems to be published in October of 1982.

In The Dialect Of The Desert was first published in 1980 by Kedros, one of the most distinguished publishers in Greece. His book is currently in its third edition. It made an impact equal to his five previous books: *Perimetrics* (1970), *The Chronometer* (1972), *The Unforeseen* (1975), *Photocopies* (1977), and *Mercurial Time* (1978, also available in English). By many of his colleagues and critics, he is considered to be the spokesman of his generation, the "Generation of the Seventies."

The iconography of these poems is dense and rich. Yet the language is matter-of-fact, idiomatic, and playful. At times, the poetry borders on pure surrealism, while, on other occasions, it expresses statements of fact that point to the truth of another reality.

In a recent interview (February 1982) given to the periodical *Diavazo*, Kondos said: "Many times writing poetry is like walking on water or swimming on dry land. You realize of course that 'normal' logic cannot allow such things to happen, while the 'other' logic convinces you that these occurrences are perfectly natural."

—James Stone

ΠΕΡΣΙΚΟ ΑΠΟΓΕΥΜΑ

Πνίγομαι στόν ύπνο. Χθесινά κύματα
μέ πετᾶνε στά βράχια. Γίνομαι κομμάτια.

Στόν ἴδιο ύπνο συναρμολογοῦμαι
καί τρέχω κάτω στή θάλασσα.
Βγαίνω σέ μιὰ χώρα ἤσυχη,
τυλιγμένη στό μπαμπάκι. Κανείς
δέ μιλάει, μόνο τά δέντρα μεγαλώνουν.
—Πιάνω τά στήθη σου καί ὄλα τά μῆλα πέφτουν—

Κοιτᾶς, μυρίζεις, εἶσαι στόν τόπο σου.
Ἐδῶ καί τά φυτά εἶναι σαρκοβόρα.

(Τό φῶς βγάζει ἀγάθια καί ὄλα
θά περάσουν ἀπό τά μάτια σου.
Θά τρελαθεῖς στούς ἀντικατοπτρισμούς).

Η ΛΥΠΗ ΤΟΥ ΕΡΩΤΑ

Σ' ἀκούω μέ ὄλους τούς πόρους μου
νά τρέχεις σέ ξένες πόλεις, μέ ρούχα
χάρτινα κάνοντας ἕνα θόρυβο
πού προμηνύει μεγάλη θάλασσα.

Ἐπιστρέφω στό κλειστό κύκλωμα
τῆς ζωῆς μου. Στό κανάλι σιωπῆς.

Ταριχευμένες κινήσεις:
μιὰ καρέκλα μετακινεῖται χωρίς λόγο,
ἕνα κρεβάτι κυλάει στό δρόμο.
Στόν τοῖχο προβάλλεται ἡ ἴδια
μαγική εἰκόνα—δέν μπορῶ
νά ξεχωρίσω τόν κυνηγό—

Κοιμᾶσαι μέ στόμα γεμάτο
μυστικά καί βροχές.

PERSIAN AFTERNOON

I am drowning in sleep. Yesterday's waves
toss me against the rocks, ripping me to shreds.

In this same sleep I reassemble myself
and run down to the sea.
I arrive in a quiet land
that is wrapped in cotton. No one
speaks, only the trees continue to grow.
—I grab your breasts and all the apples fall—

You look around and sniff; you belong here.
Even the plants are flesh-eaters in this country.

(The light grows thorns and everything
will penetrate your eyes.
These mirages* will drive you insane.)

*In Greek, the word "άντικατοπτρισμός," also connotes the Fata Morgana, a particularly strong mirage seen in the strait of Messina.

THE SADNESS OF LOVE

With all my pores I can hear you
in your paper clothes, running
through foreign cities making a noise
that warns of the great sea.

I return to the closed circle
of my life. To the canal of silence.

Embalmed movements:
a chair changes position for no reason,
a bed sticks to the street.
On the wall the same magical image
is projected—I cannot
make out the hunter—

You are sleeping with your mouth full
of secrets and rain.

Η ΔΥΝΑΜΗ ΤΟΥ ΠΕΠΡΩΜΕΝΟΥ

Φλοῦδες ὀνειρών, πεταμένες ἐφημερίδες καὶ Φεβρουάριος.
Κοπέλες μεταξωτές ξετυλίγονται μπροστά μου.

Καὶ ὁμως, καὶ ὁμως ἡ κόρη τοῦ νεκροῦ
βαδίζει στὰ νερά καὶ γίνεται σπόρος.

ΤΕΧΝΙΚΗ ΤΗΣ ΠΛΙΝΘΟΥ

Ἔχω φύγει. Τὰ μαλλιά μου ἔγιναν ἀεράκι.
Δέν ἀφήνω πιά σημάδια, οὔτε ἴσκιους.
Αὐτές οἱ ἠλεκτρονικές μέρες δέν μέ ἀφοροῦν πιά.
Δέ μέ ζεσταίνουν. Σᾶς τραγουδάω, μέ σφιγμένα δόντια:

Ἔνα πουλί λαλεῖ
ἔνα σκυλί λαλεῖ
καὶ τό φεγγάρι, χαλίκι
στό στόμα τοῦ σκοτωμένου.

Γεμάτος σκέψεις-ψεῖρες φεύγω.
Πετάω τὰ λόγια μου στό δρόμο
καὶ τό κατά κεφαλὴν εἰσόδημα τῶν ποιητῶν ἀνεδαίνει.
Φτάνει στόν ὑψηλότερο δείκτη ἀποδόσεως—στό θάνατο.
Τὰ στόματα μένουν ἀνοιχτά.
Πέφτουν στάχτες
ἀποκαΐδια
θρисиές.

Πρὶν ἀπό ἔλα αὐτά ὁ ὦμος σου
τινάζει μετάξι στό στόμα μου
καὶ σωπαίνω καὶ κοιμᾶμαι.
Τότε τό κορμί τελειώνει καὶ κυλᾷ
ὀδοντόπαστα στό νεροχύτη.

THE STRENGTH OF DESTINY

Peelings of dreams, discarded newspapers, and February.
Silk girls unravel before me.

And yet, and yet the daughter of the dead man
is stepping in the water turning to seed.

TECHNIQUE OF THE BRICK*

I have gone. My hairs have turned to air.
I no longer leave signs or shadows.
These electronic days mean nothing anymore.
They do not keep me warm. With clenched teeth I sing to you.

One bird makes melodies
one dog sings
and the moon, a pebble
in the mouth of the murdered.

Full of thoughts—fleas—I'm leaving.
I throw my words to the street
and the wages of poets increase.
They climb to the highest index of return—death.
Mouths are wide open;
ashes, embers,
curses, descending.

Before all this, your shoulder
explodes silk into my mouth
and I hold my tongue and sleep.
Then the body is finished
and toothpaste sticks to the sink.

*Practice of the ascetics during the second century A.D. in Egypt: "They took a brick, stood on it, and prayed until their tears and sweat melted it away."

Ο ΑΝΘΡΑΚΩΡΥΧΟΣ

Τό τοπίο ξεκολλάει από πάνω μου
 ματωμένος επίδεσμος.
 Έχω ξεθάψει πολλά πρόσωπα.
 Τά μόνα πού θυμάμαι:
 λίγους θορύβους
 τό άσπρο νά χάνεται στό στόμα σου
 τή θάλασσα νά γέρνει
 τίς πολυκατοικίες νά κυματίζουν.

Όλα γυρίζουν τόσο γρήγορα:
 πολιτικές
 ποτάμια
 πανικός
 Όλα πολτός
 —καί μιλάνε για μόνιμη κατοικία—

Πώς πετάνε τά όρυκτά μου λόγια.
 Πόσο μεγαλώνουν τά νύχια μου
 μέσα στό χώμα σκάθοντας.

Η ΜΑΡΙΑ ΜΟΥ ΛΕΕΙ: «Όλο για καταστροφές μιλάς»

Οί φλέβες κυλοῦν στό ξύλινο σεντόνι.
 Σέ μετράω τσιγάρο τό τσιγάρο
 καί δέ θρίσκω άκρη.
 Δοκιμάζω τά χρώματα
 καί θγαίνουν όλα στό μαύρο.
 Οί μεμβράνες τών όνείρων
 έμποδίζουν τίς κινήσεις.
 Τό τρανζίστορ τρέχει πάνω-κάτω
 στό σπίτι, ούρλιάζοντας τραγούδια.

Σέ δίχτυ ό κόσμος.
 Καί έγώ πού νομίζω
 ότι είμαι άπέξω,
 σε πιά σκληρό δίχτυ
 για νά κρατάει
 καί τό άλλο μέσα του.

THE COALMINER

Like the blooded gauze of a wound
the landscape loosens from my body.
I've unearthed so many faces.
The only ones I remember:
a few sounds,
the white vanishing in your mouth,
the tilting of the sea,
tenement buildings undulating.

Everything spinning about so fast:
 politics
 rivers
 panic
Everything turns to pulp
—And they talk about permanent residence—

How my mineral words fly.
How my nails grow
digging into the ground.

MARIA SAYS: "All You Ever Talk About Is Destruction"

The veins stick to the wooden sheet.
I measure you cigarette by cigarette
and cannot find a way out.
I dabble with colors
but everything comes out black.
The membranes of dreams
block our movements.
The transistor runs up
and down the house, screaming songs.

The world is in a net.
And I, thinking
I'm on the outside,
am in a tighter net
that holds
the other one within.

ΡΕΠΟΡΤΑΖ

Τά σκοτάδια κρέμονται
 από τόν ούρανό.
 Οί άνθρωποι πέφτουν
 από τή γῆ στόν ούρανό.
 Δέ γίνονται βέβαια ἄγγελοι
 ἀλλά νερό, τό πίνουμε
 καί τούς θυμόμαστε.

«Μυρμήγκια μπαίνουν στ' αὐτιά της.
 Ἡ γλώσσα παγωμένη, ἔξω ἀπό τό στόμα.
 Ἡ τελευταία ἀναπνοή ἕνα κομμάτι σίδηρο.
 Τό σῶμα πεταμένο στό δρόμο.
 Περνάνε διάφοροι ἄνθρωποι μέ ἀδιάδροχα,
 χωρίς ἀδιάδροχα. Γύρω χτίρια.
 Γύρω ἡ πόλη. Στή μέση τό πτώμα».

Τά βλέπω όλα αὐτά καί ἄλλα.
 Μιά ἀπό τό θάθος τοῦ πηγαδιοῦ—
 μιὰ ἀπό ψηλά

REPORTAGE

Layers of darkness
hover in the sky.
People fall
from earth to the sky.
Of course they don't become angels
but water; we drink it
and remember them.

"Ants are crawling in her ears.
A frozen tongue juts out of the mouth.
The final breath, a chunk of steel.
The body is heaved out onto the street.
Various people with and without raincoats
walk by. Surrounded by buildings.
Surrounded by the city. In the center, the corpse."

I see all this and other things.
Sometimes from the pit of the well—
other times from above

Η ΠΟΜΠΗΙΑ ΣΤΗΝ ΑΘΗΝΑ

Κοιτάζω τά πόδια μου
πού περπάτησαν πολύ στό δωμάτιο.
Ἀνέβηκαν στίς χαράδρες τῶν τοίχων
γλιστρήσανε στά χιόνια τοῦ παρκέ
τασκίστηκαν στά ἄραχια τοῦ νεροχύτη.

Κάθεσαι στήν κορυφή τοῦ κρεβατιοῦ
σπασμένο φῶς καί χλόη
καί πετάγονται οἱ στάχτες τῆς ὀμιλίας σου
καί μέ σκεπάζουν.

ΣΤΗΝ ΑΠΕΝΑΝΤΙ ΠΟΛΥΚΑΤΟΙΚΙΑ ΚΛΑΙΕΙ ΜΙΑ ΓΥΝΑΙΚΑ

Καλοκαίρι μέ τζίν, μέ λεμόνι.
Χωρίς προοπτικές αὐτός ὁ μήνας.
Κοιτάζω τά τηλεφωνικά καλώδια
πού διακλαδίζονται παντοῦ, τυλιγμένα
μέ τά μονωτικά λόγια τῶν ἀνθρώπων.
Καλώδια γεμάτα ὀξέα, αἷμα καί ἄγρια βλάστηση.

Αὐτή κλαίει μᾶλλον γιά τόν ἠλεκτρισμό
ἢ γιά ἓνα φρούτο.
Τό πιθανότερο ὅμως εἶναι
ὅτι δέν θυμᾶται πού εἶναι τώρα.
Ἔχει μπερδέψει τούς χρόνους καί λυπᾶται.

Ξαφνικά κτυπᾶνε ὅλα τά τηλέφωνα μαζί.
Τρέχουν ὄλοι καί ξερνᾶνε τά μυστικά τους.

POMPEII IN ATHENS

I look at my feet that have paced
so many times through this room.
They've climbed the cracks in the walls
slipped in the snow of the parquet floors
and torn themselves on the rocky sink.

You are seated at the head of the bed
in broken light and green pallor;
the ashes of your speech rise
and cover me.

IN THE ADJACENT APARTMENT BUILDING
A WOMAN IS CRYING

Summer with gin and lemon.
This summer without prospects.
I look at telephone wires
that branch out everywhere, twisted
with the monotone words of men.
Wires full of acids, blood, and wild vegetation.

She's probably crying about the electricity
or a piece of fruit;
though most likely she cannot recall
where she is now.
She has confused the years and is sad.

Suddenly all the telephones ring.
Everyone runs outside throwing up their secrets.

ΤΟ ΤΕΛΟΣ ΜΙΑΣ ΜΕΡΑΣ

Όταν σμίγουμε ξεχνιέσαι.
 Μετά σκύβεις στόν καθρέφτη:
 βλέπεις ανθρώπους παλιούς
 ανθρώπους του Όμηρου νά θγαίνουν
 διψασμένοι από τόν κάτω κόσμο.
 Δέν γνωρίζεις κανένα.
 Ζητᾶνε φωτογραφίες γιά παρέα.
 Ζητᾶνε φαγητό, ἐφημερίδα, ραδιόφωνο.
 Γεμίζουν τό σπίτι. Κρέμονται ἀπό τά παράθυρα.
 Κλείνουν τό δρόμο. Γεμίζουν τήν πόλη.
 Σταματᾶνε ἄλα. Ἀλλάζουν οἱ ὥρες.
 Στερεύει τό νερό. Τώρα διψᾶμε ἐμεῖς
 —οἱ ἀπέξω—καί ἀρχίζει ὁ πανικός.
 Σειρήνες—φῶτα—ἐκτακτα μέτρα.

(Στόν ἑαυτό σου γίνεται
 πατεῖς με - πατῶ σε
 δέν ὑπάρχει χῶρος γιά σένα).

Βάρκες γεμάτες κόσμο
 πᾶνε πρὸς τά βουνά.
 Όλοι συνεννοοῦνται μέ συνηρημένα ρήματα
 καί ὁμοιοκαταληξίες.

Ἡ πόλη ἄδειασε.

Μόνο ἓνα ἄλογο ἀλαφιασμένο
 πετιέται ἀχνίζοντας ἀπό τά μάτια σου.

THE END OF A DAY

When we embrace you are forgotten.
Afterwards leaning into the mirror
you see people from the past
thirsty crowds out of Homer
emerging from the underworld.
You can't recognize anyone.
They ask for photographs to keep them company,
and food, newspapers, a radio.
They fill the house, hang out the windows,
block the road, crowd the city.
Everything stops. The hours change.
No more water. Now it is we who are thirsty—
We from the outside—panic takes root—
Sirens—lights—state of emergency.

(Within you
everyone stepping all over each other
no room for you.)

Boats packed with people
move toward the mountains.
Everyone's communicating with contracted verbs
and rhymes.

The city is empty.

Only a panting horse
flies off steaming from your eyes.

—translated by James Stone

A Divided Land: Greece in the Nineteen Forties

(Review Essay)

by ALEXANDER KITROEFF

Introduction

There can be no argument over the importance of the events of the 1940's to our understanding of post-1922 Greek history. The reasons for this are set out in John O. Iatrides's introduction to *Greece in the 1940's: A Nation in Crisis*. The editor of this volume points out that these events have been "poorly documented and vaguely analyzed" until now, and, because the period consists of "emotion-filled issues," it is with difficulty that political views do not impose themselves on academic research. Nevertheless, because research has progressed, even if in incomplete and uneven ways, the Modern Greek Studies Association (an academic organization promoting modern Greek studies and based in the United States) organized a conference, which took place in Washington, D.C., in 1978, on the history and literature of Greece during the 1940's. The first of the two books under review, which has already been mentioned, consists of twenty historical papers presented at the conference, bound together with three introductory texts by Iatrides. The second book is a bibliographic companion to the study of Greece in the 1940's, with two separate bibliographies by Hagen Fleischer and Steven Bowman.

Since Iatrides mentions the great obstacles which obstruct a scholarly assessment of this decade in his introduction, one should bear in mind the prevailing climate after 1974. Almost all of the essays in this volume were formulated after the restoration of democracy in Greece in 1974. Until that time, there had been no meaningful debate on the implications of the 1940's in Greece. The victors of the Civil War imposed their own official and heavily biased interpretation, formulated through the spectacles of what Tsoucalas called the post-1949 Greek "apartheid state." Professional historians and other scholars prudently avoided any subject connected with this period. The collapse of the dictatorship, the restoration of democracy, the legalization of the Communist Party, and the availability of wartime British and American state archives all operated as catalysts. A large section of the Greek public, the younger generation in particular, interpreted the 1967-1974 military dictatorship

and its effects as a result of connivance between the extreme right and foreign factors, and drew a corresponding analogy with the events of the 1940's. The dictatorship was seen as the ultimate discrediting of a process which began with the end of the Civil War, and its condemnation also aroused considerable interest in the other side of the story of the 1940's. The left-wing press was quick to cash in on this interest by publishing a spate of interviews, memoirs, and personal accounts by veteran resistance fighters, many of which also appeared in book form.

Historians busied themselves with keeping abreast of this flood of new material and processing archival evidence. A small number of them involved themselves in publishing large segments of archival material in serialized form in various daily newspapers, but, fortunately, most serious scholars devoted themselves to producing analytical syntheses based on a variety of sources. In trying to restore a balance to the interpretation of the events of the 1940's, a historian might be tempted to lean the other way by countering official versions with similar arguments leading to opposite conclusions. It is to the credit of all the contributors to *Greece in the 1940's: A Nation in Crisis* that their essays navigate through both extremes and present a scholarly account of their subjects. This volume will remain a "textbook" on the history of the period for a long time, reflecting, as it does, the high standard of modern Greek historiography.

However, as Fernand Braudel has remarked, the concerns of the historian are the concerns of his time, and that is certainly the case here. Many historians share the prevailing conventional wisdom that the most important explanatory key to the developments of that decade lies in the assessment of the foreign factor. Characteristically, the widespread publication of wartime British and American documents relating to Greece, in the press and in book form, has become an end in itself, the texts being considered self-explanatory and revelatory. This prevailing atmosphere has compounded the problems of historians, the less experienced in particular. Having directed their attention to the foreign factor, and with an enormous amount of documentary material at hand, they have embarked on the narrative form, sometimes at the expense of an analytical framework. Perhaps it is too soon to expect a move away from traditional history and the "headlong, dramatic, breathless rush of its narrative," to use another of Braudel's expressions, in the writing of such recent Greek history. But, in this book, the essay by Nicolas Svoronos, who opened the conference with his contribution, does exactly that.

Svoronos casts a critical eye on the way historians have thought about Greece in the 1940's. His essay, "Greek History, 1940-1950: The Main Problems," seeks to redefine the priorities of historical inquiry into this period by suggesting that there should be more work on the evolution of Greek society's internal structures since 1922. Svoronos believes that the initial approaches to the 1940's, examining foreign

intervention and the response of Greek political forces to it, were a justified starting point in view of the enormous importance of this intervention. But, he adds, a historian undertaking such a task should be "fully aware that he is merely describing certain epiphenomena whose causes are to be found, on different levels, in the very structures of Greek society" (p. 2). Many studies along these lines have committed the error of ascribing "to these epiphenomena, with the pretension of offering interpretive keys, the character of principal and autonomous historical factors" (p. 2), and they conclude with value judgments, justifying or condemning the policy either of one of the foreign powers or one of the political organizations involved.

In the light of this unsatisfactory state of affairs, Svoronos offers a redefinition, indeed a reversal, of priorities in order to explain, not the reasons for a foreign policy toward Greece and how it was received domestically, but why such a policy failed or succeeded because of the way Greek society was constituted. He begins his outline by identifying the main aspects of Greek society in the interwar period. The first is the economic situation, where new trends included a rise in industrial agrarian reform, and capital investment, all of which gradually led to the beginnings of an industrial economy. The second aspect is the country's social structure, which was mainly agrarian, land reform having created a majority of smallholders, while industrialization brought with it the emergence of a working class. This class was important in terms of the third aspect examined by Svoronos: the country's political structures in the context of which the agrarian population was largely ineffective. This lack of correspondence between social structures and political influence leads him to suggest, as a working hypothesis, that influence did not depend on the size but on the "dynamics" of each class. The most "dynamic" class was, until 1940, the Greek bourgeoisie, and hence, an essentially agrarian country "displayed political structures corresponding to those that evolved in modern and advanced countries in Europe."

Two problems come to mind in relation to this working hypothesis. One is simply the definition of "dynamism" as applied to social classes. The other is the degree of homogeneity of the bourgeoisie. Svoronos believes that "dynamism" is a product of the totality of the bourgeois social strata, which he thinks of as "organically inter-related, whether living inside or outside the boundaries of the Greek state" (p. 7). But previously he had noted that this class was "heterogeneous," and that the lack of cohesion among its various groups could not be over-emphasized (p. 6) and that it led to "malfunctions" of the political system. Can this notion of "totality" therefore be used to account for both the "dynamism" and the "malfunctions"? Perhaps it can. But before this issue can be examined, the homogeneity of the bourgeoisie must be measured in more detail. There certainly seems to be a rupture with the bourgeoisie abroad after 1922, for instance. The second wealthiest community abroad, the Greeks in Egypt, do not appear to participate

in economic and political developments in Athens after this date.

When Svoronos comes to examine the events following Greece's occupation by the Axis forces, he looks for the social developments which led to the ability of the National Liberation Front (EAM), formed by the small and decimated Communist Party of Greece (KKE), to gain the support of such a large section of the population. Pointing to the lack of any work on EAM's social basis, Svoronos suggests another working hypothesis: EAM appealed "to the demands of a large segment of the popular and petit-bourgeois groups that were becoming more and more socially aware and radicalized" (p. 11). This meant that the bourgeois political leadership, opposed to a principal axis of EAM's program—a postwar democratic form of government and a progressive social regime—also dissociated itself from the other axis: militant resistance to the invader. The bourgeois political leadership which did not collaborate with the enemy discovered that its only hope for survival was to attach itself unconditionally to the policy of British intervention in Greece.

This second working hypothesis, when it is empirically verified, can lead to an important methodological and theoretical departure from the ways in which most historians have dealt with events until now. It seems to be the safest course away from conspiratorial theories, value judgments, and the tiresome cataloguing of events, and it provides a meaningful analytical framework.

The remaining nineteen essays are far less ambitious in scope, concentrating on various aspects of the decade and backing up their conclusions with documentary evidence. These essays are arranged chronologically in the book by Iatrides, but, in this review, they are divided by subject, without, however, ignoring the time factor. The reviewer must apologize for dealing at greater length with some subjects than others. However, this is due to the fact that the last four essays in the book lie outside his immediate area of competence.

British Intervention

Five essays are concerned with the different ways Britain went about influencing the course of wartime Greek affairs in order to preserve its strategic interests in the eastern Mediterranean area. As British troops evacuated Crete, the Foreign Office (FO) could be reassured that contact with internal affairs would not be totally lost since its agents (both British and Greek) remained under cover in occupied Athens. The Greek people were, on the whole, Anglophile, as witnessed by the cheers which greeted the truckloads of British prisoners transported by the Germans through the Greek capital. Britain had emerged relatively unscathed from its close association with the unpopular, prewar Metaxas regime, and its role in the war further enhanced its standing in Greece.

Notwithstanding this favorable background, the British government was faced with an enormously difficult task in monitoring events in Greece, especially because of the emergence of a resistance movement in remote mountain areas. The forms of British penetration into this unknown environment and the formulation of the early stages of the FO's policy are the subject of two contributions by the well-known English historians Christopher Woodhouse and Richard Clogg. In his essay, "The Special Operations Executive in Greece," Clogg deals with the Greek Section of this extraordinary organization, which was formed in London in 1940, with the object of coordinating and fomenting acts of sabotage and resistance in occupied Europe. The organization operated autonomously, and it was soon caught in the "crossfire between the Foreign Office, with its predominantly political concerns, and the military authorities who were concerned with maximizing the war effort without undue regard for political considerations" (p. 106). When the history of these events came to be written, relying primarily on FO documents because those of the Special Operations Executive (SOE) remained classified, the FO criticisms of the SOE were reflected in most accounts. Clogg's main concern is to offer a more balanced view of the SOE, in spite of the unavailability of many of its documents.

Clogg begins with the social background of SOE's members in Greece before going on to describe its activities from 1940 to 1943, when it was finally brought under FO control. Like the membership of its antecedent organizations operating in Athens, which consisted of businessmen ("the second-in-command being a former Oxford history scholar and bantamweight boxing blue," p. 110), the SOE agents were recruited on an "old school tie" basis. They were bankers, businessmen, lawyers and even academics, such as the classicist C. M. Woodhouse, all originating from the "hermetic world of the British establishment" (p. 107), and, if not right-wing in their politics, they were certainly hostile to communism (p. 108). But this hostility, according to Clogg, did not blind them to the futility of the FO's policy toward Greece in trying to "sell" the king to the Greek people. Its often-expressed criticisms caused the SOE to lose its autonomy from the military and the FO, but, until it did so, Clogg concludes, it was able to "mitigate the harmful consequences of this policy."

Woodhouse, once a protagonist and now a historian of this period, examines British policy toward Greece up to mid-1943, taking into account the problem of the SOE. His purpose is to show that the FO did not perceive that the major threat to its plans in Greece was EAM. The author explains that, until February 1943, the FO did not have a clear picture of what was happening in Greece and was more concerned about Greeks abroad; the republican EDES resistance organization was perceived as a greater danger and, finally, suspicion of the SOE obscured a better understanding of internal developments. On the basis of a report on Greek communists dated May 1943, originating from SOE and the MIS security service, Woodhouse believes that the

real EAM threat was finally perceived in its true dimensions (pp. 98-99). This report appeared as a response to the disturbances in the Greek armed forces in the Middle East, which were attributed to EAM agents who supposedly had been sent over from Greece. We know now that this was not true. In any case, according to Woodhouse, this report was a watershed in British attitudes toward Greece, and, after it, the FO "moved towards its definite position: reluctant support for Zervas and determined opposition to EAM" (p. 101).

These two essays provide a well-documented, clear picture of the early stages of British policy toward Greece. Nevertheless, the reader is left wondering about the precise significance of the FO-SOE rift and whether this was "healed" at the expense of the SOE solely because of the disturbances in the army in the Middle East. There is certainly a connection between the FO's ultimate dominance and the emergence of anti-EAM political considerations. It seems to me that, in spite of the difference in outlook of these two British agencies, both shared a fundamental common assumption that the SOE had been formed to assist the British war effort by planning "patriotic revolts in the enemy's rear in coordination with British raids against continental Europe" (Clogg, p. 105).

But what happened in Greece and elsewhere was that the people who answered the call to arms gave a broader context to their role. The resistance movement in Greece, which sprang up independently of British aid or instigation, also had an important political motivation. The antifascists of EAM/ELAS were not prepared to sacrifice their lives merely to see a foreign oppressive regime replaced by a similar domestic one. The development of resistance, the liberation of mountain areas, and the establishment of rudimentary forms of popular administration strengthened the political dimensions of the movement. It is not surprising, therefore, that, as soon as this trend became apparent, the FO was the first to realize its implications and make an attempt to thwart what it saw as a threat to postwar British interests.

A major success in the FO's endeavors occurred in 1944, when the Greek all-party "Lebanon Conference" took place. Procopis Papastratis, in his essay, "The Papandreou Government and the Lebanon Conference," describes how British Ambassador Reginald Leeper stage-managed the proceedings and guided Prime Minister George Papandreou in bringing about a crucial political defeat of EAM. After giving a rather long account of Britain's control over the Greek government-in-exile during the months preceding the conference, Papastratis underlines Leeper's role in encouraging Papandreou and the other bourgeois politicians to isolate the EAM delegates. The purpose of the conference, he writes, was the "formation of . . . a political front against EAM [which] could then easily be transformed into a national government which, in its turn, would expose EAM to a dilemma: either enter the government as a minority party or remain isolated and face

the accusation of preventing national unity" (p. 130). This essay shows clearly that the primary British objective was to halt EAM's ascendancy and that, for this purpose, the other Greek political groupings allowed themselves to be manipulated by the FO. Therefore, from the British point of view, one can conclude that the result was an important success for the FO.

According to Papastratis, the disaster came for EAM because of the timidity of its leaders, who either "doubted that they had the power to fulfill their policies or, more probably, they had not clarified their own ideological conceptions vis-à-vis the existing political situation" (p. 128). Therefore, they decided to participate, and their delegates did not carry out the leadership's instructions, striving instead to reach an agreement. Several Greek left-wing sources have tried to imply that the final agreement, which was disastrous for EAM, was the fault of the delegates. But Papastratis rightly ignores these unproven suggestions and instead blames the leadership's approach to the conference. In fact, it could be claimed that the outcome was the fault of the EAM leadership, not because of its "timidity," but because of its blind adherence to the primary EAM objective of "national unity," which had obviously become unattainable by May 1944.

The government eventually produced by the Lebanon Conference fitted the pattern of governments produced by Britain's post-1944 decolonization policy under which direct or "India-style" administrations were replaced by governments composed of pro-British "moderates." These were intended to prevent nationalist governments, or, in the case of Greece, a pro-communist government, from taking power. This system worked in countries such as Egypt, for instance, where it did not collapse until 1952, after the empire had been lost and Britain was powerless to maintain it. In Greece, it collapsed barely six months after the Lebanon Conference, in December 1944, when Britain could and did intervene. Intervention took the form of military action, with the clashes that took place in Athens during that month. They came immediately after a controversy over the demobilization of the Third Mountain Brigade, examined in George Alexander's essay, "The Demobilization Crisis of November 1944." George Papandreou's government was faced with the problem of three army units, the left-wing ELAS, the right-wing EDES, and the Mountain Brigade, which was composed exclusively of right-wing elements and was the most effective strike force for the FO and the government. Alexander succeeds in illuminating certain facts on how this problem was resolved by tracing what is indeed a "twisted path." He reveals that the KKE's decision to change its policy and abandon negotiations was not prompted by Yugoslav influence but by the fact that Papandreou, on his own initiative, altered the text of an agreement he had signed with the Communist Party's representatives (p. 165). By altering the text, Papandreou reverted to a policy of maintaining all three units, which meant a 2:1 ratio against ELAS. EAM had been particularly hostile

to the Mountain Brigade and wanted it disbanded rather than confined to barracks. According to Alexander, the objectives of EAM's leadership were not national unity but, in his own words: "the supremacy of EAM/ELAS and the swift consolidation of a dictatorship of the KKE were most likely the communists' aims up to the moment of liberation. This quest for power, dictated by their ideology and reinforced by fear, prompted them to demand the disarmament of their rivals" (pp. 160-161).

But if the first part of this statement is true, why did EAM/ELAS not gain control of Athens before the arrival of British troops, as they did in the Peloponnese? Lars Baerentzen describes how they did this in his essay, "The Liberation of the Peloponnese, September 1944." The object of his contribution is to ascertain the reasons why Britain did so little to intervene in the fighting between ELAS and the German-sponsored Security Battalions. These were composed mainly of fascists, or merely anticommunists, who aligned themselves with the occupying forces in the name of the "fight against communism." They were particularly strong in the Peloponnese, a traditionally conservative area. Baerentzen produces documentary evidence showing the British government's concern that enemy weapons should not fall into the hands of ELAS when the Germans started evacuating the Peloponnese. This concern, according to the author, "is the most important single factor for understanding what the British authorities did—or failed to do—during the liberation of the Peloponnese" (p. 132). British policymakers preferred that the Germans should carry out an orderly retreat rather than surrender to ELAS. The Security Battalions, too, were instructed by British liaison officers not to surrender to ELAS (pp. 135-136). Thus, ELAS was to be deprived of weapons and the Battalions were to be preserved for future use. Nevertheless, ELAS harassed the Germans and engaged in pitched battles with the Security Battalions. Only the arrival of British forces, with new orders to confine the Battalions to barracks, saved these units from annihilation. These orders were issued because "it became apparent that ELAS was both willing to attack and capable of winning" (p. 140). The reason why ELAS did not do the same in Athens, writes Baerentzen, is that the Caserta Agreement (the military sequel to the Lebanon Agreement) had been signed in the meanwhile, placing ELAS under a British general. Thus, this agreement was part of EAM/ELAS's quest for national unity rather than a tactical move for the "swift consolidation of a dictatorship" that Alexander believes he sees. In fact, it was Britain's attitude which had hardened unilaterally.

The Greek Political Forces

The above statement agrees with the conclusions of John Hondros's essay, "The Greek Resistance, 1941-1944." The first point he makes

is that resistance to the invaders began quite spontaneously in different parts of Greece. The only available documentary evidence on this, the German records, show that, while communists were active, they were not the only people engaged in minor resistance activities which developed into a large-scale, organized movement dominated by EAM/ELAS. The author believes that this development occurred because of the do-nothing attitude of the Greek political forces, the failure of the FO and SOE to coordinate their policy, and, finally, because of the KKE'S "skilfull mobilization of the urban and rural population" (p. 39). He goes on to elaborate on this point by explaining that EAM/ELAS achieved its ends "by making appeals to patriotism and economic needs" (p. 39), organizing strikes in the urban areas, and being careful not to jeopardize their popularity by acts of sabotage that could cause reprisals against villages. In contrast to other, smaller groups, it "encompassed the whole country and included all classes in its organization" (p. 42). Another point Hondros makes is about the effectiveness of EAM/ELAS's military operations against the occupation forces, as evidenced by the German records. His final point is that EAM was not preparing to seize power by means of a coup in December 1944, but had the limited goal of bringing down George Papandreou's government.

By combining British and German records in his essey, Hondros does indeed produce a balanced and clear picture of EAM's policies. One ought to add, however, that the information contained in these archives, being non-Greek in outlook, sheds little light on further questions that historians might now ask. For instance, what was the connection, if any, between brigandage in the mountains and the early formation of guerrilla groups? What were the social developments underlying the support for EAM? What was the psychological and political value of resistance to the enemy and why was ELAS unprepared in December 1944? Hondros's essay clears the way for further progress on these queries.

One political grouping which has received little attention so far is the so-called "old political world" consisting of the two main parties of the interwar period: the Liberals (Venizelists) and the Populists (monarchists). John Petropulos, in his essay, "The Traditional Political Parties of Greece During the Axis Occupation" proves that these parties played a much more important role than has generally been asumed. According to Petropulos, their activities on the constitutional problem had broad repercussions, their attitude toward the king and the British was not one of intransigence, and their hostility toward EAM was mainly due to the fear of a popular mobilization they would be unable to control. In this essay, the traditional parties, or, to be more accurate, the personalities who made them up, are considered as one unit since the new political alignments had rendered the Venizelist-monarchist controversy obsolete. The two sides joined toger to fight "for their political lives" by adopting a policy of procrastina-

tion in their relations with other political groups. Petropulos believes they were successful in their dealings with the government-in-exile by forcing it to act on the constitutional question. The author is not sure whether the two parties had an alliance in mind when they parleyed with EAM or whether they were just trying to achieve a better bargaining position with the government-in-exile. But he does state that "by mid-1943 they might have gone either way" (p. 34). Their final choice was to abandon their anti-monarchical position and side with the government and Britain, fearing isolation by a possible agreement between the government and EAM.

A great deal of light is shed on the role of the traditional parties in this essay, which examines both their objectives and political behavior. At the same time, the reader is presented with a well-organized analytical framework in which events are processed and interpreted. This is a welcome departure from the usual forms of political historiography: a chronology of events ending with a few conclusions. One might mention here that there are other ways of approaching the study of political parties leading to different, although equally valid conclusions. For instance, an inquiry based on Duvergerian or Marxist methods would lay greater emphasis on ideological factors. Thus, where Petropulos concludes that the traditional bourgeois parties were judged unable to lead any resistance movement because they reflected "the characteristic caution of parties in the presence of a crisis" (p. 28), or because "wherever their agents went they encountered an already established EAM infrastructure" (p. 33), one might also add that they would be afraid of upsetting the status quo with a popular, political, and militant struggle, and would naturally side with Britain in response to the interests of the class they represented.

Hagen Fleischer's paper, "Contacts between German Occupation Authorities and the Major Greek Resistance Organizations," draws on a variety of sources, Greek, British, and German. He examines in considerable detail the contacts of each resistance group with the Germans. Not surprisingly, the rightist groups appear to have collaborated with the enemy, and we are given evidence of collaboration between certain EDES leaders and the Germans. Fleischer dismisses volumes of false evidence, produced after the end of the Civil War, and concocted to prove that EAM/ELAS cooperated with the Germans. However, he does indicate there were some instances when the communists were in contact with the Germans. These contacts seem to have been merely tactical moves and not part of any cooperation. As Aris Velouchiotis, the "*Kapetanios*" of ELAS commented after such a contact by one of his men: "Only pharmacists, notaries and milkmen never make truces, since they never make war" (p. 57).

The collaboration of certain rightists and a small number of EDES guerrillas came about because they considered their communist countrymen to be a greater danger than the invaders. Can EAM/ELAS be blamed for pushing these groups closer to the Germans? Fleischer be-

lieves it can, even indirectly, because of its "aggressive behavior" toward them. But if there was no ideological, fascist motivation for collaboration (and this cannot be said with full confidence), there does seem to have been political motivation arising from the anticommunism these groups shared with the enemy. Apart from EDES, it is not at all clear whether these groups formed to fight the Germans or to counter ELAS. But, whatever their plans may have been for postwar Greece, their collaboration with the enemy did nothing for the Greek cause they thought they were serving, and it made ELAS's behavior toward them an effect rather than a cause of their collaboration.

The Civil War and its Origins

The clashes which took place in Athens in December 1944, between ELAS on the one hand and British troops and Greek government army units on the other, signaled the collapse of the process begun at Lebanon and Caserta, which was intended to lead to some form of national unity. ELAS's defeat in December produced another agreement which was signed at Varkiza, just outside Athens. The weakness and subsequent disintegration of this agreement, too, led to new clashes which soon blossomed into a full-scale civil war that lasted until 1949.

Heinz Richter's essay, "The Varkiza Agreement and the Origins of the Civil War," is designed to "refute one of the most tenacious myths of Greece's contemporary history": that the KKE began planning the civil war after the new agreement had been signed. Its object had been to put a formal end to the hostilities of December and create the necessary conditions for the country's peaceful development. Of the nine articles of the agreement, Richter states, two contained obligations for the left which were fulfilled; the other seven contained government obligations which were not carried out. These are listed by Richter, and they were: the establishment of civil and trade union liberties, amnesty for various crimes, the creation of a new national army, a purge of military and security forces, and trials for collaborators. The author explains how none of these requirements were implemented and how this encouraged a climate of internecine strife. He considers the government's failure to abide by the Varkiza Agreement to have been prompted by its anticommunist attitude and executive weakness, added to which were the growth and uncontrolled activities of the state-within-a-state of the extreme right-wing terrorist groups; Britain's policy of intervening in or keeping out of Greek affairs according to the former's own interests; the Communist Party's lack of initiative, which allowed the state-within-a-state to entrench itself even more; and, last but not least, the appalling economic situation.

The author is right in not singling out one factor, and he may also be right in his choice of these four. But two of them are not fully explained in the text, and they leave some gray areas in

the author's thesis. It is not clear how the economic crisis functioned in this context. How was the "old economic and financial oligarchy that was closely connected with the oligarchy" "restored," and who actually composed these oligarchies? Also, how, exactly, did the task of reconstruction move from the "grass roots" to the economic oligarchy, and why did the "majority of the population [become] indifferent and apathetic" (p. 176)? In connection with the British factor, there can be no dispute over its importance. But the notion that Britain withdrew from Greece to the detriment of the country's democratic development leads to a conclusion which does not support the author's case.

The course toward civil war was accelerated by the events analyzed by George Mavrogordatos in his essay, "The 1946 Election and Plebiscite," where he makes the case that these events were a "critical turning-point." The author describes the political context in which they occurred and the "white terror" of the right-wingers, and he suggests that "the election, and especially the plebiscite, constituted the final, most emphatic and, above all, irreversible violation of the commitments made in Lebanon and again in Varkiza" (p. 186). As for the foreign (Anglo-American) supervisory missions, they were nothing more than "elaborate charades" (p. 187). Mavrogordatos discusses at great length the respective responsibilities of the British, Greek, and U.S. governments, and he claims that the preference shown toward the Greek right by Anglo-American policymakers and their hostility toward the center and left were caused by "misperception and biases." This could be regarded as an understatement, although the way it is presented in the text (p. 193) seems to imply that Anglo-American intervention could, all things considered, have been a little more fair.

The fact that only one essay deals with the Civil War is a measure of the complicated problems involved in trying to analyze it. John Iatrides's essay, "Civil War, 1945-1949: National and International Aspects," is, in fact, one of the first treatments of this subject, and undoubtedly the most scholarly and illuminating. As his subtitle suggests, the author presents the domestic and external forces which interacted prior to, and during, the conflict. He has divided this process into three phases: "Unplanned Insurrection" from February 1945 to February 1946; a transitory period, lasting until September 1947; and, finally, "Planned Insurrection," which ended in August 1949. Iatrides explains the reason why the word "insurrection" should be synonymous with "civil war" in this case since the insurgents (the left) "were able to field a sizable army which operated under a government and because they were in frequent communication with foreign states" (p. 196). Nevertheless, this is almost an opprobrious term for the left, which was battling against what Iatrides calls a government "in the hands of ever-changing groupings of men without a mandate or national vision" (p. 197). The author goes on to show that the defiance of the Varkiza Agreement by about 5,000 ELAS veterans and 6,000 Slavo-Macedonians created a sizable force in the mountains. They were

soon joined by another 10,000 former ELAS guerrillas, who fled to the mountains to avoid the consequences of the "white terror." This force could only harass secondary army forces in remote areas and "its military significance should not be exaggerated" (p. 205). There is ample evidence to show that the communist leadership meanwhile was unsure of its ultimate plans (p. 202-204).

The transition period saw further indecision by the communist leadership, which placed more emphasis on agitation rather than on guerrilla activity. The Party waited until tens of thousands of its sympathizers resisted the draft and were sent to prison camps by the government. Only then did it begin to organize safe passage to the mountains for its supporters. The guerrillas formed the "Democratic Army," which totalled 23,000 regulars and reserves by the end of 1947, according to Iatrides. Then, the number of volunteers began to dwindle "because of government security measures and increasingly hostile public sentiment" (p. 207).

"Planned Insurrection" came when the communist leadership decided to establish a "Free Greece" starting with the northern mountain areas. For this purpose, the "Democratic Army" was converted into a regular army. The reasons Iatrides gives for the failure of the insurgency are the weakness of this army, its lack of support from abroad after the break between Tito and Stalin, and lack of commitment by the communist leadership, and the improved military strength and morale of the government forces, created by vital American support.

Iatrides's account is primarily concerned with the mechanics of the conflict, and we are provided with valuable insights into the political and military make-up of both sides, the social composition of the "Democratic Army," and the precise role of foreign countries in terms of direct involvement or aid provided. In short, it is an excellent account. However, although an approach of this type succeeds in illuminating certain aspects, it does so at the expense of others. For instance, one gets the impression at times that one is reading about the relative tactical and strategic moves of two armies which are isolated from their broader social context. We are told in passing that the Sophoulis government enjoyed "a significant measure of popular support" (p. 210), while the communists suffered from "increasingly hostile public sentiment" (p. 207), without any further elaboration. What was happening among the rest of the population? Why were mountain villages forcibly evacuated by the government? Was there a pro-Macedonian dimension to the Slavo-Macedonian fight against the government? These are some of the questions that should be pursued following this authoritative study on the Civil War.

American Intervention

Four papers in this volume deal specifically with the role of the

United States from 1944 onwards, and particularly from 1947, when Britain passed on its "responsibility" for Greece to the U.S. Lawrence Wittner, in "American Policy Towards Greece, 1944-1949," seeks to demonstrate the continuity of the goals of American policy in spite of the "constantly shifting balance of forces in Greece." Until the time of the United States takeover in 1947, there seem to have been no fundamental divergences in British and American thinking about Greece, and even the British Labour Party showed hostility toward the Greek Left. The Labour Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, "fell into line with the American position" on holding elections before the plebiscite (p. 231). Both sides cooperated to hold an election in which "a massive boycott... threw the government into the clutches of the Right" (p. 231). The American attitude at the time is identical to American post-World II foreign policy: faced with a real or, more than often, imaginary communist, Soviet-backed threat, the United States supported the right-wing political forces, however fascist or oligarchic they may have been, and condoned liberals and other centrists. When the Liberal Sophoulis actually became premier, he did so only after he had proclaimed himself to be "wildly anti-communist." Even then, Wittner writes, "he would never be more than a government figure-head" (p. 235). Having initially supported the extreme right, and done so consistently, US policymakers found themselves in a position of having to justify mass executions and the suppression of civil liberties and, according to Wittner, "facilitated the dominance in Greece of conservative, reactionary and even fascist elements" (p. 237).

A. A. Fatouros examines the same subject, over a shorter time-span and from a different angle. His essay, "Building Formal Structures of Penetration: The United States in Greece, 1947-1948," opens with the statement that US involvement "was remarkable, nearly unique among non-colonial situations, not only because of its extent, since it covered all policy areas and occurred at both high and middle levels of the government machinery, but also because it was largely founded on formal legal bases" (pp. 239-240). When the US took over from Britain in 1947, Fatouros writes, the unilateral dimension of the US-Greek relationship was already formed, with the Greek government reduced to a "sham role" (p. 243). The author proceeds to examine the institutionalized forms of US penetration in Greece and the way aid was organized to suit political purposes. Accordingly, the chief of the American Mission for Aid to Greece (AMAG) overshadowed the ambassador, who was eventually moved elsewhere (p. 249). Apparently, the AMAG chief's brusque manner with the Greeks was more in line with his government's attitude than the ambassador's more refined and orthodox diplomatic approach. Fatouros also looks at how the Greek government enacted laws by which it surrendered its sovereign rights to the US Civil Service in what he aptly names "self-inflicted penetration." The explanation for all this, which the author offers in his conclusions, is that US officials considered Greece as being no different from the

smaller Latin American and Caribbean countries they had been dealing with until then. The Cold War meant that the fight against communism was an effective reason for persuading Congress to allocate foreign aid and, finally, American policymakers' awareness of the incompetence of the regime they were backing led them to assume a direct role. But this awareness, according to Fatouros, did not cause US officials to act on the logical conclusion to be drawn: that a government which mistrusts the population cannot rule it effectively (pp. 255-256). The explanation offered for the attitude of the Greek regime is that it was unable to understand US intentions and that civil war seemed the only alternative to a compromise with the left.

Several of the essays conclude by maintaining the existence of "misperceptions" and "misunderstandings" on both sides of Greco-foreign contacts, especially in the case of the US and Greece. There is no doubt that they existed, but how decisive were they? Need we pursue our inquiries by trying to impose a retrospective rationale upon these muddled events? Wittner's essay in this respect has the advantage of conveying the message that Fatouros also accepts: that civil war seemed the only way out for both the government and the US and, one might add, for the communists, too, after a certain point. But Fatouros's approach does seem a more interesting one with regard to Greco-US relations because the study of the institutionalized forms of US penetration can tell us much more than the usual cataloguing of diplomatic telegrams and minutes, which is so common in studies of Greco-British relations during this decade. However, this fruitful examination of structures seems to raise further questions. One would be interested in knowing the practical effects of US-directed economic policy in Greece. Knowing that an American was in charge of such and such an aid program is as important as knowing the results of the program itself.

Adamantia Pollis, in her essay, "U.S. Intervention in Greek Trade Unions, 1947-1950," examines one specific area of American involvement. She describes how US policy was faced with a serious dilemma: "On the one hand its stated objectives were the establishment of a labor movement in Greece, free of government intervention and the materialization of Greek labor law and of the trade union movement; on the other, it sought to thwart the actual or potential communist control of the movement and the 'prevention of communist infiltration'" (p. 269). The solution to the dilemma was along the lines of the familiar pattern: support for unrepresentative right-wing unionists with administrative measures against the communist unions. Pollis notes that the "American perception of Greek reality in the sphere of labor, as in other areas, was one of polarization between right and left. This attitude explains the failure, or rather the refusal, to recognize a non-communist progressive labor movement. On the contrary, the U.S. supported the Greek government's anti-democratic regulations regarding

trade unions and defended its repression of dissidents, including non-communists" (p. 272).

The essay is not only very informative on American policy toward Greece but also sheds light on how the postwar, anti-democratic labor institutions were formed. Labor history is still very poorly documented in Greece, and the US records show how the government unionists saw their role. US policy might be more fairly judged after we have more information on communist union policy, and the US's attitudes on democratic participation or on the emergence of a small but independent socialist trade union organization. At the same time, a fuller picture of the trade union movement might cause one to refute Pollis's suggestion that Greek union politics remained "clientelist" and "personalized." This certainly applied to the right-wingers who were subordinate to the US officials but not necessarily to the movement as a whole.

Finally, the international implications of the civil war are examined in Van Coufoudakis's essay, "The United States, United Nations and the Greek Question, 1946-1952." This is a detailed and complex documentation of how the situation in Greece was debated in the UN, with special reference to the US tactics on this issue. The civil war itself was considered as a domestic problem in which the UN (or other countries through the UN) could not intervene in accordance with the UN Charter. But the effects the conflict could have, potentially, on the Balkans allowed the US and the USSR to express their preferences. This, in turn, caused each of the warring Greek sides to identify itself with one of the superpowers. Consequently, because the US position commanded a majority in the UN, the Greek government assumed a greater degree of apparent legitimacy. But the successes of American policy in this sphere, traced so carefully by the author, do not suggest, so obviously, that the international dimension actually restrained the US in Greece. Could the United Nations have intervened in such a sharp conflict with any hope of success? After all, the conclusion one draws from all the essays dealing with US policy toward Greece is that the US's goals were pursued with single-mindedness and vigor, and that American intervention was successful—not only because of this but because, in Fatouros's words, of the "structures of American penetration." But what the essay shows very clearly is that US policy in Greece was part of the broader conflict of the Cold War.

Economic, Legal, and Ideological Aspects

There are four important essays in this volume which examine aspects other than the political ones. Economic and social affairs in wartime Greece are dealt with by Stavros Thomadakis in his study, "Black Markets, Inflation and Force in the Economy of Occupied Greece." The

author assesses the connection and interaction between economic production and consumption, official and unofficial means of distribution, and the resistance movement, with particular reference to urban centers. He explains the conditions under which the "black markets" appeared and their consequences. The black market, he writes, "was a mechanism of concentration of tangible property in the hands of the procurers" and was kept going through "collaborationist incomes arising from German payments for services and procurements" and "the liquidation of tangible wealth . . . its effective transfer from buyers to sellers of food" (p. 73). The two alternative forms of distribution were rationing, at first, and then the resistance movement. The quisling government, writes Thomadakis, was useless in protecting a rationing system against the black marketeers. After all, "the quisling government was simply the administrative support for collaborationism and could not be expected to oppose the profiteers who constituted the economic facet of collaborationism" (p. 76), and the quisling government, according to the author, was much to blame for the complete collapse of the rationing system during the first winter of the occupation. Thomadakis goes on to show how the void created by the quisling government's inertia was filled energetically by the EAM resistance organizations. This had important repercussions: at precisely the time of intensified EAM attacks on food hoards, the quisling government also responded with measures against black marketeers. The author concludes his excellent essay by saying that the resistance movement functioned in the sphere of the process of economic production and distribution as an alternative to the state, and he adds that further research is needed in this sphere. One can only hope that the results of such research are presented as well as they are in this essay.

Another essay which deals with economic and social aspects is Kostas Vergopoulos's "The Emergence of the New Bourgeoisie, 1944-1952." The author puts forward the view that domestic economic processes which began in the early forties, together with US economic policies toward Greece, combined to produce a new, "industrial" bourgeoisie. This is a very interesting thesis, and Vergopoulos attempts to present a case for it which is broadly supported by facts and theory. This case suffers a bit, however, from the facts being too unreliable and the theory too vague. We are told, for instance, that the Statistical Year Book for Greece states that, between 1941 and 1945, 1,592 new industrial enterprises were formed, compared with 1,803 for the decade ending in 1940[!]. But no figures exist on size, capital, or anything else concerning these enterprises. To understand the theoretical framework, the reader must be familiar with terms such as "state bourgeoisie," "peripheral bourgeoisie," "new peripheral bourgeoisie." He must be able to understand what is meant by "a bourgeois social network rather than a bourgeois class in the classical sense" (p. 313) and "the military-bureaucratic state totalitarianism of the Third-world type" (p. 317). In spite of these weaknesses, the case for the emergence of a bourgeoisie

connected with the country's industrialization does seem a plausible one. More complicated and more difficult to understand is the author's concluding suggestion, which is presumably connected with the above: "It is evident that just as the state is the limiting factor to the growth of civil society, so civil society is the limiting factor to the development of total statism" (p. 318).

In a short but comprehensive essay entitled "The 'Emergency Regime' and Civil Liberties, 1946-1949," Nicos Alivizatos examines the legal superstructure set up by the Greek state to show that, "while no open dictatorship was established during the civil war, the communist revolt was not suppressed by liberal constitutional methods" (p. 220). He describes how the abstention of the KKE from the elections ushered in a new situation, from the toleration of the "para-state" (state-within-a-state) to short-term anticommunist legislation and, later, as the revolt occurred, to more long-term measures. He points out the peculiarities of the practical implementation of these measures, the "penalization" of "intentions" rather than of the actual offense, "collective responsibility" applied to whole families or kin. Alivizatos, who is a keen lawyer, also has a keen eye for the more general implications of these legal measures and suggests several ideological principles underlying this legislation. Accordingly, he goes on to explain that these measures lasted until 1974, since the underlying ideology remained unaltered throughout the Civil War, the post-Civil War years, and the colonels' dictatorship.

The final essay in this volume, "The Ideological Impact of the Civil War," by Constantine Tsoucalas, develops the theme of what Alivizatos calls "dual constitutionalism." Tsoucalas sets out "to indicate some of the ideological results of the deeply original phenomenon of an authoritarian regime, during and after the civil war, built under the auspices of a democratically-organized parliamentary state" (p. 320).

The preliminary points he makes are, first, about the transformation of the structure of the ruling class, where "the dominant liberalism of the pre-war ruling class is gradually being transformed into an all-purpose, short-term comprador adaptiveness" (p. 321-322) and, secondly, about the growing role of the state. For the "new" ruling class, the ruined petit-bourgeoisie, the urban unemployed, and the displaced peasants, "the state appeared as the pivotal agency for the pursuit of their most vital interests. Despite its disorganization, its disarticulation, and its internal incoherence—or even because of them—the state apparatus, which controlled the mechanisms allocating the huge resources flowing from abroad, was in a position to affect the class situation of the vast majority of citizens" (p. 323). The author insists on the paramount importance of the Greek state in neutralizing "the ghost of EAM" and restoring the petit-bourgeoisie. It was "through the state, and largely within the state and its dependencies, that a rapid reconstruction of a malleable petit-bourgeoisie was possible. The backbone of the new nation was in the making" (p. 328). One could

go on and on, picking out the author's lively and accurate observations on the other aspects he deals with: ideological discourse, the role of intellectuals, and the situation in education. All three of these aspects are known to be of special interest to Tsoucalas; his ability to deal with them is obvious, and the excellent case he makes for the post-Civil War intellectual and cultural regression is irrefutable.

Tsoucalas's approach may not appeal to traditional historians, who might find it too ambitious in its conclusions and insufficiently backed up by empirical evidence. But, from a social historian's point of view, the precise nature of the subjects he deals with cannot be measured and quantified exclusively through the use of documents or statistics. Nevertheless, we shall have to await further research into post-Civil War society from traditional and non-traditional historians—not so much to verify Tsoucalas's conclusions about the state and intellectual regression, which appear to be correct, but to measure their importance alongside other developments which were taking place in Greek society. A tentative point the author concludes with is the responsibility of the left. He states that "it is my contention that the building up of political and ideological 'apartheid' was greatly facilitated by the intransigence of the communists" (p. 339). This was particularly so in the cultural sphere, and it led to a situation in which, "characteristically, surrealism was, for the communists, 'the expansion of bourgeois decadence,' while for the nationalists, it was 'alien, anti-Greek and communist'" (p. 341). But, as Tsoucalas notes, it will take some time for scholars to look closely at the responsibilities of the left during the post-Civil War era. When they do so, they will do well to bear in mind that post-1949 Stalinism existed before EAM and may not have been fully submerged during the 1940's.

Future researchers are presented with both a challenge and a source of inspiration by the wealth of material in *Greece in the 1940's*. They will be greatly assisted by the bibliographic companion. Hagen Fleischer has done an admirable job in classifying a series of different sources in a way which is of practical use to the reader. The bibliography on the Jews in wartime Greece by Steven Bowman reminds us that work can be done on the history of other religious minorities, such as the Muslims, and on ethnic minorities as well, during this decade. But, above all, one hopes that future researchers will turn their attention to developments within Greek society in the 1940's.