SLEEPING WITH THE ENEMY:

JAPANESE WAR BRIDES AND THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

BY ELIZABETH DOUGLAS

SUBMITTED TO PROFESSORS PAUL SMITH AND JOHN CHENG
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF HISTORY 400: SENIOR THESIS SEMINAR

APRIL 26TH, 2013
ABSTRACT

One of the last new colonial projects in the twentieth century began on September 2, 1945. The American forces arrived in Japan ready to subdue a conquered nation, full of putatively deceitful Asian barbarians. In 1952, the Americans left Japan, their new ally in the region and bulwark against the spread of communism. During the American Occupation of Japan, the military authorities rehabilitated the defeated enemy. A key element of this reconstruction was the depiction of Japan as a feminine, junior ally to the masculine United States. Central to this reimagining of Japan’s relationship with the United States was the construction of a narrative around war brides, Japanese women who married American servicemen. Although the American authorities had initially attempted to ban all forms of fraternization between Americans and Japanese, this policy proved ineffective. In response, the United States military decided to allow American journalists to portray fraternization in a positive light as part of its broader campaign to rehabilitate Japan. This process continued haphazardly, even after the official occupation ended, and contributed significantly to the triumphal history the Americans wrote about their involvement in Japan after the Second World War.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank the many people who made this project possible. First, I must thank all the members of the Haverford History Department who have nurtured my love of history throughout my college career and constantly pushed me to further develop my writing and analysis. The idea for my thesis emerged from Professor Andrew Friedman’s research seminar, and I am thankful to both Professor Friedman and my classmates for providing the genesis of this project. Thank you to Professor Lisa Jane Graham and Professor Bethel Saler for generously dispensing their advice and encouragement throughout this process. I am grateful to Professor John Cheng for his invaluable advice on my draft. Thank you to the team of librarians in Magill who helped me to find my sources, renewed them when they where overdue, and waived some of my library fines. I am thankful to Professor Paul Smith for his advice, hot chocolate, and good humor as I worked on this project.

Additionally, I would like to thank all of my fellow majors for making this process enjoyable (at least most of the time). Matt Walker, my thesis meeting buddy, deserves a special mention for reading and commenting on my draft sections. Thank you to my friends for keeping me sane and listening to my many rants about my thesis. Finally, and most importantly, thank you mum and dad for everything.
# Table of Contents

**Timeline of Fraternization in Occupied Japan**  
4

**Introduction**  
8

- Historiography of War Brides  
9
- Primary Sources  
13
- Untangling Interpretations of Fraternization  
18

**I. An Exercise in the White Man’s Burden**  
20

- Life Under the Occupation  
20
- A Moment of Social Change  
25
- Guarding Racial Frontiers  
28

**II. Everyday Encounters**  
31

- Meeting the Enemy  
31
- Initial Portrayals of Fraternization  
35
- Official Response  
38
- A Change in Course  
42

**III. Packages Home**  
47

- Cold War Rehabilitation  
47
- Writing a Love Story  
55
- Change in Attitudes  
59

**IV. Writing the Triumph of the Occupation**  
66

- Creating a Victorious History  
67
- Flaws in the Narrative  
68

**Conclusion**  
80

**Bibliography**  
90
TIMELINE OF FRATERNIZATION IN OCCUPIED JAPAN

Prior to the Occupation

The Army issues a pamphlet to the forces headed to Japan. It says that Japanese women “have been taught to hate you. They do as their men tell them, and many of them have been told to kill you. Sex is one of the oldest and most effective weapons in history. The Geisha girl knows how to wield it charmingly. She may entice you only to poison you. She may slit your throat. Stay away from the women of Japan—all of them.” Clearly, the military was concerned about the dangers posed by potentially innocent-looking civilians to American troops.1

The Japanese media publishes a variety of articles warning people to remain calm and also encouraging women to avoid a “licentious appearance.” Many women and children flee to the countryside after the surrender, but before the American forces arrive, fearful of rape and pillage.2

The Japanese government orders local officials to organize “comfort” stations in all prefectures to try and protect Japanese women from American soldiers. The largest brothel system, the Recreation and Amusement Association, is set up in Tokyo. This organized system was based on the infamous brothels used by the Imperial Japanese army during WWII.3

September 2, 1945

Japan formally surrenders; the Occupation of Japan begins.4 The Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) now governs the country.

SCAP maintains an official non-fraternization policy (which lasts four years). These rules were unevenly enforced, however, and although they forbade soldiers from soliciting prostitutes, they did not ban public dates between Japanese women (who were not prostitutes) and GIs. They did, however, make marriage between Japanese and Americans next to impossible.5

September 3, 1945

A day after the formal surrender and beginning of the Occupation, Time magazine publishes an article about the debate over the non-fraternization policy. It voices concerns that the policy will not work.

---

because “biology” might win out, as it did in Germany. Already, then, fraternization is a contested issue.\(^6\)

**December 2, 1945** SCAP issues an announcement to troops highlighting the fact that the Immigration Act of 1924 restricted entrance of Japanese into the United States. Thus, if GIs wanted to bring their Japanese wives home to America, or their mixed-race children, they were not able. It is interesting how early on in the occupation this announcement was made: already the ban on fraternization must have lost its rigidity (if it was ever not porous) in order to prompt such an announcement.\(^7\)

**March 25, 1946** Due to prostitution, venereal disease rates among Occupation forces soar: by March, one in four GIs was suffering from some form of sexually transmitted disease. In response, SCAP declares all “entertainment” facilities off-limits (including any brothels, restaurants, beer halls, and RAA facilities that offered sex for money). This blanket ban only serves to increase the number of streetwalkers, and SCAP ineffectively tries to enforce the non-fraternization ban.\(^8\)

**May 31, 1946** SCAP announces that GIs could not marry Japanese women at the American consulate (the only location in which the marriage registration would be legally recognized by the United States). Those who wanted to marry could have an unrecognized religious ceremony.\(^9\)

**June 1946** There are now around 19,000 women who work as “special maids” for American soldiers: most of these women encounter the soldiers through their jobs with SCAP. Soldiers (mainly officers) could avoid anti-prostitution regulations by setting up one woman as a mistress or “only-san.” Lower-ranking soldiers could not always afford a kept woman, and would enter into verbal agreements with “butterflies:” women who slept with multiple GIs at once (i.e. a “shared” concubine).\(^10\)

**March 1947** Attitudes towards fraternization began to shift towards acceptance. Representations of Japanese women in the media began to be more positive; increasingly, the press portrays Japanese women as stereotypical “girls-next-door.” The fraternization between American GIs and Japanese women also begins to be painted as normal.

---


\(^8\) Tanaka, *Japan's Comfort Women*, 162-63.


heterosexual relationships, made unusual only because of the unique circumstances of the Occupation.\textsuperscript{11}

**June 28, 1947** President Truman signs Public Law No. 126, which “allowed racially ineligible alien brides to enter the United States and join their husbands.” Couples had a thirty-day amnesty period in which they could officially marry. A total of 823 couples managed to get married in this period, and immigrate to the United States outside of the racial quota system.\textsuperscript{12} This was one of several “special acts of Congress that established temporary windows of opportunity through which American soldiers could bring home their Asian wives.”\textsuperscript{13}

**January 1949** Interactions between American servicemen and Japanese women are facilitated by the large number of Japanese civilians SCAP employed: “By 1949, out of a total population of over eighty million, more than four million Japanese males and over 500,000 Japanese females worked in some capacity for the occupation forces.”\textsuperscript{14}

**August 10, 1949** The Diplomatic Section of SCAP issues the memorandum “Marriage of American Citizens in Japan.” In it, SCAP strongly discourages couples from marrying because it warns that immigration laws prevent Japanese from entering the United States.\textsuperscript{15}

**September 20, 1949** SCAP issues a “pro-fraternization” edict. The new rules supersede the old non-fraternization rules and encourage friendly interactions between Japanese civilians and American military personnel. Growing Cold War tensions and the desire to cultivate Japan as an ally in East Asia motivated SCAP to change its original stance towards fraternization.\textsuperscript{16}

**April 28, 1952** The San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty go into effect, officially ending the Occupation of Japan.\textsuperscript{17}

**June 27, 1952** The Senate passes the McCarran-Walter bill, overriding President Truman’s veto, which replaces the Immigration Act of 1924. The 1924 immigration law had excluded Japanese as a racial category; the McCarran-Walter bill had instead national quotas. Japanese nationals

\textsuperscript{11} Regina F. Lark, “They Challenged Two Nations: Marriages between Japanese Women and American GIs, 1945 to the Present” (University of Southern California, 1999), 179.
\textsuperscript{12} Koshiro, Trans-Pacific Racisms and the U.S. Occupation of Japan, 157.
\textsuperscript{14} Lark, "They Challenged Two Nations", 148.
\textsuperscript{15} Koshiro, Trans-Pacific Racisms and the U.S. Occupation of Japan, 157.
\textsuperscript{16} Shibusawa, America’s Geisha Ally, 40-41.
\textsuperscript{17} Takemae, Inside GHQ, 506.
were now allowed in the United States, albeit in very limited numbers.\textsuperscript{18}

1958 Prostitution criminalized in Japan, six years after the end of the Occupation.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{18} Koshiro, \textit{Trans-Pacific Racisms and the U.S. Occupation of Japan}, 148.

\textsuperscript{19} Mark McLelland, \textit{Love, Sex, and Democracy in Japan During the American Occupation}, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 20.
INTRODUCTION

Hisa Tanaka met the love of her life in a bank. Robert Feragen had come to exchange some money and he invited her to a dance party where his band would be playing. Their relationship rapidly evolved and he stopped by her work everyday to say hello. Robert then began to have dinner with Hisa and her family regularly and he soon became a familiar sight in her neighborhood.

This was Japan in 1946. Robert Feragen was a sergeant in the American military, which had been occupying the country for over a year. Neither Robert nor Hisa spoke each other’s language, but Hisa said, in her imperfect English, that this was not a problem: “When you love someone, you don’t have to speak perfect language. Somehow you go through.”20 Robert and Hisa continued dating until 1950, when Robert had to return to America. Hisa knew that this was the last time she would ever see him. “Once American soldiers go, they never come back to Japanese women,” she said.21 Robert proved Hisa wrong, however; he returned to Japan and they got married. After immigrating to the United States with her new husband, Hisa and Robert remained married until his death in 2001.22

Hisa Feragen is one of approximately 50,000 Japanese women who entered the United States as war brides from 1947 to 1965. In total, there may be as many as 100,000 Japanese women who married American servicemen after World War II.23 In addition to the women who married American GIs, many Japanese women fraternized with the Occupation forces as

---

22 Japanese War Brides in America, 25.
23 Different scholars calculate the number of Japanese women who married American GIs differently; this explains the variance in the estimates of actually how many war brides there were. For example, 48,912 “Japanese nationals classified as ‘Wives of Citizens’” immigrated to America during 1947-1965. This number, however, does not include Japanese women who immigrated to the U.S., but whose religious marriages had yet to be registered, or those couples who stayed on American military bases abroad and did not return to the U.S. until after 1965. Japanese War Brides in America, xix.
prostitutes and mistresses. Initially, such relationships were met with revulsion from both the American authorities within Japan and the American public. Still inoculated with extreme racial hatred from wartime propaganda, the majority of Americans could not conceive of engaging with the former enemy beyond the forced interactions the Occupation required. This revulsion, however, soon changed, and stories of fraternization were redeemed as love stories in which the American GI and Japanese woman’s love represented the new alliance between America and Japan. Participants in the public discourse about these relationships made them into a story of how love conquers all.

The construction of a romanticized narrative about fraternization demonstrates the significance of relationships like that of Robert and Hisa Feragen. War brides could have been viewed as a subversive group: enemy women ensnaring innocent American soldiers and continuing Japan’s aggression towards Americans after the country’s military surrender. Indeed, some observers framed these relationships as exactly that.24 Yet, ultimately, a narrative of love and redemption became dominant, and war brides and their American husbands were subsumed into the larger project of rehabilitating Japan as an ally in the Cold War. This outcome was not inevitable. Instead, it was a product of a complex series of factors: most importantly, the American government’s desire to utilize the intimate sphere to reinforce its power in the political sphere.

Historiography of War Brides

The American Occupation of Japan could also be known as the American colonization of Japan. Spanning from September 1945 until April 1952, the American military governed Japan through a system of indirect rule. The Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) controlled all of the U.S. forces in Japan; SCAP referred to both the person in charge of the

24 For example, the article "Jobs for an Emperor."
occupation, initially General Douglas MacArthur, and, more generally, to the office he ran. Although it was officially an Allied Occupation, the overwhelming presence of American forces and their day-to-day leadership of the Occupation meant that essentially the United States alone controlled Japan; indeed, most Japanese remember it specifically as an American Occupation. SCAP ran Japan through the pre-existing Japanese bureaucracy by issuing countless American directives to Japanese civil servants. Initially, SCAP policy was based on three overarching goals: demilitarization, decentralization, and democratization. The American attempt to democratize a country it was occupying militarily created a paradoxical situation in which the Japanese were, in Ann Laura Stoler’s words, “coerced to be free.” In his extensive history of Occupied Japan, Embracing Defeat, John Dower argues that the Americans’ time in Japan represents “the last immodest exercise in the colonial conceit known as ‘the white man’s burden.’” The Occupation’s colonial context created a difficult tension that SCAP had to negotiate: it needed to rehabilitate Japan from a conquered country into an ally without threatening America’s position as the dominant power.

A central part of Japan’s reconstruction into an ally against communism was reimagining the relationship between Japan and the United States in gendered terms; this mechanism enabled America to remain the superior partner in the new alliance. In America’s Geisha Ally, Naoko Shibusawa argues that the American government framed the dynamics of Japan’s rehabilitation in terms of “natural” hierarchies; the United States was the dominant male partner in the

25 McLelland, Love, Sex, and Democracy in Japan During the American Occupation, 53.
27 McClain, Japan, 534.
relationship, whereas Japan was the subordinate female partner. Shibusawa claims that this gendered geopolitical discourse was buttressed by the actual fraternization between American men and Japanese women. She argues that the image of an American GI loving his Japanese wife made America’s newfound alliance with its former enemy more palatable to the American public because it provided a “natural” hierarchical relationship, that of a husband’s loving control over his wife, which explained the new geopolitical relationship. In her monograph, Shibusawa traces how the convergence of war brides’ individual stories and public narratives about these women led to “a shift in perception” of Japan and acceptance of its new relationship to the United States. Thus, Shibusawa’s work clearly indicates that fraternization, located firmly within the intimate sphere, or the space in which men and women met and formed romantic relationships, was inextricably linked to the political sphere during the Occupation of Japan.

Other historical studies of war brides frame the significance of these relationships in terms of their interracial aspects. In Entangling Alliances, Susan Zeiger focuses on the connection between the post-war emergence of the civil rights movement in the United States and the interracial aspect of Japanese-American relationships. Similarly, Elfrieda Shukert and Barbara Scibetta, in War Brides of World War II, frame such relationships within the greater context of racism against Asians at the time. Such approaches, which emphasize the racial aspect of fraternization, complement John Dower’s work on racist propaganda during the Second

---

30 Shibusawa argues that this process of framing the alliance in gendered terms was probably not a conscious move on behalf of the actors involved. Although the participants in the reconstruction were conscious of their role in changing the American public’s attitudes towards the Japanese, Shibusawa claims that they unconsciously utilized common tropes about the hierarchy of genders. Shibusawa, America’s Geisha Ally, 10.

31 America’s Geisha Ally, 4-5.

32 America’s Geisha Ally, 53.


World War in *War Without Mercy*. Dower argues that the intense racial hatred between Americans and Japanese that characterized World War II transformed, almost seamlessly, into relative levels of cooperation during the Occupation.\(^{35}\) Central to this transition was the shift in attitudes towards fraternization between the American occupying forces and Japanese women. Despite the utility of Zeiger, Shukert, and Scibetta’s race-based approaches, their limited scope means that these works do not address broader issues, such as the relationship between Japanese war brides and the larger transformation of Japan’s relationship with America.\(^{36}\) Rather than focusing specifically on race relations, I will look at the processes behind the construction of a larger political narrative about Japan and America’s new, post-war relationship, which incorporated the relationships between American men and Japanese women.

Studying fraternization requires negotiating between history and biography; individual stories need to be placed within the broader narrative arc of history, but their specific valences should not be lost. Regina Lark’s dissertation, “They Challenged Two Nations,” relies primarily on interviews she conducted with Japanese war brides to construct a narrative about their marriages and immigration to the United States.\(^{37}\) Her work, which balances sources ranging from oral histories to official SCAP directives, provides the model for the analysis in this thesis.

---


\(^{36}\) A recent monograph by Mark McLelland, focusing on the change in Japanese sexual customs during the Occupation, approaches relationships between American GIs and Japanese women from a different angle. McLelland frames his analysis in terms of the sudden sexual openness in post-war Japan and the constantly evolving discourse about heterosexual relationships. Since McLelland’s main focus is tangential to my project, I use his argument to inform my opinion about fraternization and its larger context. McLelland, *Love, Sex, and Democracy in Japan During the American Occupation*.

\(^{37}\) Lark argues that the marriages between American GIs and Japanese women represent the “perfect” example of domestic containment—a topic explored in detail by Elaine Tyler May in *Homeward Bound*. May claims that the Occupation of Japan, despite its rhetoric of democratization and liberation, was an exercise in domestic containment: viewing the nuclear family as the last line of defense against the spread of communism. War brides are the physical embodiment of this policy. Lark, “They Challenged Two Nations”, 227-28; Elaine Tyler May, *Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era*, 2nd ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2008).
The history of fraternization in Occupied Japan is not a side note to the history of the Occupation as a whole. Rather, fraternization and the intimate sphere more broadly are central to our understanding of the American project to reconstruct Japan as a “junior ally” in the Cold War. In *Haunted by Empire*, Ann Laura Stoler argues that the intimate is a nexus of power. Colonial states’ consolidation of power required them to manage the sexual relationships between the colonizers and colonized within the intimate sphere. Stoler claims, furthermore, that the way a colonial state handled fraternization affected its policy in all other spheres of colonial life. Thus, in the case of the Occupation, which John Dower categorically defines as an exercise in colonialism, understanding the relationships between American servicemen and Japanese women is critical to understanding the Occupation itself. The intimate sphere is central to the Occupation project.

*Primary Sources*

Newspaper articles, memoirs, films, and other cultural products created during, and in the years immediately following, the Occupation of Japan paint a cohesive story about the United States’ involvement in the country and how the Americans rehabilitated Japan from a defeated Axis power into a democratic ally in the Cold War. The process of reimagining America and Japan’s new, post-war relationship, which incorporated personal romances between American men and Japanese women into this larger political discourse, produced these primary sources and the story they tell. In this thesis, I will utilize sources including official SCAP documents, newspaper articles, memoirs, novels, and movies to discuss SCAP’s changing attitudes towards the intimate sphere and how various actors, including the American authorities and journalists,

---


created a gendered narrative about America and Japan’s relationship following the Second World War. This narrative selectively represented America’s involvement in Japan and created a triumphal history of the Occupation.

Oral histories, gathered years after the end of the American Occupation, challenge this positive history and reveal how the gendered narrative about America and Japan’s new, post-war relationship provides a very limited view of the actual project of Occupation. In this thesis, I will mainly utilize the oral histories gathered by Miki Crawford, Katie Hayashi, and Shizuko Suenaga, in their 2010 collection of interviews with Japanese women who married American GIs, *Japanese War Brides in America*, to examine how the story created about the Americans in Japan concealed certain elements of the Occupation.40 As a source, oral histories are valuable because they offer a different perspective from the highly polished interpretations of war brides as a general phenomenon during the Occupation of Japan. The women featured in Crawford, Hayashi, and Shizuko’s book reflect back on their own lives and the decisions they made. They also seek to position themselves within the already known narrative of war brides by drawing distinctions and making comparisons between their own stories and assumptions made by others. Oral histories should not be viewed as factual accounts of events, but rather as interpretations of an experience. Scientific research has shown that human memory is malleable and that memories are constantly reconfigured in response to outside stimuli.41 The oral histories of war brides, therefore, should be used as a foil to the constructed narrative created by the press and SCAP. Neither fully represents the factual truth, but by comparing the two we can see how they differ in

their interpretation of the role of war brides in Occupation Japan and why. Thus, the use of biography can illuminate the intimate sphere and reveal its larger significance.

I will juxtapose Crawford, Hayashi, and Suenaga’s oral history collection with other primary sources that describe the Occupation, reveal SCAP’s changing policies towards the intimate sphere, and demonstrate how these policy changes helped create the gendered framework around Japan and the United States’ post-war relationship. Utilizing SCAP documents and the history its bureaucrats wrote about themselves, I will examine the official interpretation of SCAP’s objectives in Japan.\textsuperscript{42} Collected by SCAP’s Statistics and Reports Section between September 1945 and July 1951, these materials include much data about the Occupation—for example, malnutrition rates in Tokyo—that paint a quantitative picture of Occupied Japan.\textsuperscript{43} Additionally, I will employ memoirs of the Occupation written by a variety of authors, from an American Red Cross Worker to a Naval language officer to a Japanese teacher, that provide illuminating pictures of individuals’ experience in Japan at that time. These memoirs’ accounts converge and diverge from the official narrative about the Occupation and provide an alternative source of information about the period.

The last cluster of sources, novels, films, and newspaper reports, are central to this project because they constitute the actual mechanism that helped create a discourse around fraternization and war brides. Romance novels, usually written by those who had served in the Occupation, abound, and I use a few famous examples to illustrate the common tropes and plot

\textsuperscript{42} Although official copies of SCAP documents are housed in the National Archives, many facsimiles of SCAP materials are available on microfilm. Unfortunately, the microfilm is poorly numerated. For example, in his annotated bibliography of materials relating to the Occupation, Mathew Augustine explains the byzantine system of organization in SCAP’s “History of the Non-Military Activities of the Occupation of Japan:” “It appears that SCAP arbitrarily assigned numbers 1 through 55 to the entries, according to a particular subject. As a result, many monographs indicate a volume and part, but many others do not. When used, volume numbers are often confusing and inconsistent, thus making it extremely difficult to comprehend the internal ordering of subseries.” Mathew R. Augustine, "A Guide to Research on the Allied Occupation of Japan," accessed 5 Dec, 2012, http://www.columbia.edu/~hds2/BIB95/02occupation_augustine.htm.

\textsuperscript{43} Augustine, "A Guide to Research on the Allied Occupation of Japan."
arcs found in the “war bride genre.” Additionally, both during and after the Occupation, Hollywood produced films, some based on previously published books and memoirs, about fraternization in Occupied Japan. Although most of these movies are no longer readily available, they played an important role in constructing a narrative about fraternization for the American public. Finally, newspaper and magazine articles, as well as cartoon strips, from both the military newspapers published for American servicemen and from American media outlets are a significant body of sources because the journalists who wrote them played a very active role in shaping public perception about fraternization and the Occupation, more generally.44

SCAP’s censorship policies, both official and unofficial, shaped the primary sources with which I worked, and enabled SCAP to maintain varying degrees of control over their content. Throughout the Occupation, SCAP enforced an official censorship code for Japanese authors and publishers, as well as foreign material translated into Japanese. Although SCAP publically celebrated its implementation of a free press in Japan and liberation of Japanese authors from the constricting wartime censors, SCAP privately set up its own censorship department, the Civil Censorship Detachment (CCD), which forced Japanese authors to seek prepublication approval of all written materials.45 In order to maintain the impression of a free press, SCAP censors eliminated any reference to American censorship.46 SCAP initially imposed stringent regulations on both radio and print media because they did not trust Japanese journalists and authors; later, SCAP continued to enforce its censorship policies in order to prevent the spread of communist

44 The vast majority of these newspapers and magazines (e.g. The New York Times, Time Magazine, etc.) is easily accessible either online or in print. The military newspaper, Pacific Stars & Stripes, is only digitized from 1948 onwards and copies from earlier years are harder to obtain.
45 Dower, Embracing Defeat, 407.
ideas through the radio or printed materials. Subjects included in the CCD’s “categories of deletions and suppressions” included: “criticism of SCAP,” “Fraternization [specifically interactions between American servicemen and Japanese women],” “Overplaying Starvation” and “Criticism of Occupation Forces.” The heavy hand of SCAP’s censors on Japanese authors means that almost no Japanese voices during the Occupation contributed to the creation of the narrative about fraternization.

In contrast to SCAP’s official censorship policies for Japanese material, English material produced in Japan either for dissemination there or in America did not have to be preapproved before publication. SCAP informally censored journalists, however, by refusing writers access to various SCAP officials and meetings if they wrote something on a topic displeasing to SCAP. Despite this pressure, journalists still published some criticisms of SCAP, although it is hard to determine whether these authors would have published harsher critiques if SCAP’s informal pressure on them had not existed. Ultimately, the existence of censorship had two main effects that are important to this study. First, the CCD’s vigorous use of a blue pencil to erase Japanese opinions about fraternization means that essentially only American authors contributed to the narrative around relationships between Japanese women and American men available to the American public. Second, SCAP’s ability to control journalists’ access in Occupied Japan meant

---

49 There is evidence that Japanese authors did try to write about fraternization because the censored copies of their work still exist. For example, an article submitted to the CCD on April 25th, 1947 had a reference to GIs’ interactions with Japanese prostitutes censored. McLelland, *Love, Sex, and Democracy in Japan During the American Occupation*, 63.
51 For example, journalist Hargis Westerfield argued that the military had poorly trained the American GIs stationed in Japan because the soldiers could not speak the language and, according to Westerfield, spent most of their time drunk or whoring or both. Hargis Westerfield, "Failures in G.I. Orientation: The Japanese Story," *Free World*, April 1946, 62-63.
that it exerted a hidden control over the stories these authors’ produced during the Occupation, and this allowed it to nudge the direction of media coverage in whatever way it saw fit.

Untangling Interpretations of Fraternization

Utilizing the range of different types of primary sources described above, my thesis will examine the centrality of intimacy to the Occupation by discussing several key questions. Firstly, what is the relationship between the state –represented by SCAP – and the intimate sphere in the Occupation? Secondly, how and why do SCAP’s attitudes towards fraternization change? Thirdly, how do the new, positive discourses surrounding Japanese war brides both reveal and conceal different elements of the Occupation? In answering these questions, I will examine both the discursive figure of the Japanese woman who fraternized with American men, created by the amalgamation of different cultural products depicting these women, and stories of real, individual Japanese women. The narrative about fraternization between Japanese and Americans condensed the wide diversity of interactions into two single characters: a white, American male and a Japanese female. Although this reduction in the races and sexualities of the people involved in fraternization does represent the majority of marriages –approximately 75% of American GIs who married Japanese women were white –many relationships existed between individuals who did not fit this mold (e.g. African-American men dating Japanese women, homosexual relationships between an American man and a Japanese man, etc.).

My thesis, however, will focus solely on the archetypal white American male and his Japanese lover because these were the two characters utilized in the dominant narrative about fraternization.

---

52 Zeiger, Entangling Alliances, 181-82.
I will divide my thesis into four sections. First, I will discuss the context of the Occupation and argue that the structure of American control, with its dependence on a clear hierarchy between Americans and Japanese, meant that SCAP needed to regulate interactions between the two groups within the intimate sphere in order to consolidate and maintain its power. Second, I will examine the initial impressions the Japanese and Americans had of one another and look at different reactions to fraternization between American men and Japanese women. Third, I will discuss the overall shift in attitudes towards fraternization that mirrored, although did not necessarily chronologically coincide with, a policy shift in reaction to the beginning of the Cold War, and how this shift produced a romanticized narrative about fraternization. Finally, I will argue that this love story, which made fraternization between former enemies more palatable, enabled SCAP to control the intimate sphere and that this discourse worked to reveal and conceal different elements of the Occupation.
I. AN EXERCISE IN THE WHITE MAN’S BURDEN

The context of the Occupation profoundly affected the development of relationships between American GIs and Japanese women. Occupied Japan was a country sharply divided between the white victors and the non-white losers of World War II; this division meant that Japanese women and American servicemen never met on equal terms. Americans may have lived in Japan, but, as the occupying force, their lived experience was quite different from that of the subjugated locals. Japanese citizens suffered from housing and food shortages, as well as an economy beset with massive inflation and an influx of labor as former Japanese soldiers and colonists were repatriated.\(^\text{54}\) In contrast, the Occupation personnel had enough to eat and were billeted in houses and hotels requisitioned by the American military from the Japanese. Furthermore, interactions between Americans and Japanese occurred within a country with rapidly changing social conditions. The effect of wartime mobilization and SCAP’s social engineering policies radically altered Japanese women’s roles in society and affected how they interacted with the occupying forces. On top of this unstable social system, divided between victor and defeated and in flux because of the rapid social changes, SCAP asserted its control over the entire populace. In order to do so, SCAP employed racial segregation policies similar to those utilized by European colonial governments across their empires prior to the Second World War.

Life Under the Occupation

Food shortages were a major problem during the first years of the Occupation. SCAP devoted much attention to the problem and, in May 1946, it issued a press release summarizing its report on Japan’s “Food Situation.” In its memo, SCAP outlined the various causes

\(^{54}\) The Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) carefully documented all of these issues, and it is from their reports that I draw most of my information.
contributing to the food shortages. It argued that the “food deficit” was primarily due to the loss of crops during particularly severe typhoons and floods in September 1945 and the lack of chemical fertilizer throughout the last five years due to the war. Six other factors, according to SCAP’s report, further aggravated the situation: first, rampant inflation meant that farmers were either waiting to sell their crops until the prices inevitably rose or diverting their produce to the black market; second, the abrupt end after the surrender of the Japanese government’s strict wartime quotas for agricultural production; third, “absence of consumer goods as an incentive for farmers to market their crops;” fourth, general uncertainty about the Japanese economy; fifth, wartime destruction of the transportation network; and, sixth, the sudden growth in population from repatriation of Japanese soldiers and civilians from its former overseas holdings.55

This convergence of problems meant that the average Japanese’s diet was devoid of many key nutrients. For example, due to the scarcity of meat and milk, people lacked crucial amino acids. According to a nutritional survey conducted by the Ministry of Welfare in May 1946, 28.2% of Tokyo’s population was underweight; roughly the same percentage of people were suffering from symptoms of nutritional deficiency, such as anemia and chronic diarrhea.56 SCAP’s May 1946 press release warned that without further emergency imports of food “mass starvation would be inevitable,” potentially leading to civil unrest directed against the occupying forces.57 Other sources corroborated SCAP’s dire reports: in June 1946 the New York Times reported that 1,291 people had died from starvation between November 1945 and June 1946 in Tokyo alone.58

The Japanese who lived through these food shortages remember how rich the Americans’ diet seemed. In her English-language memoir of the war and subsequent Occupation, Japanese schoolteacher Michi Kawai writes: “In contrast with our poor diet, these American K-rations for soldiers seemed to us like the royal food of the dragon palace in one of our fairy tales. We had been reduced to eating sweet potato leaves, squash stems after the prickly skin was pulled off, and certain weeds.” Kawai considered herself lucky to receive American soldiers’ rations; educated at Bryn Mawr College prior to the war, she knew some members of SCAP who supplied her with food during the Occupation. Most Japanese did not have such connections and were forced to scrounge for food. Miwako Cleve recalls her parents sending her along with other children to gather candy that the American GIs famously handed out; these treats, such as chewing gum, popcorn, and chocolate, sufficed to sustain families when they could not afford basic foodstuffs. Everyone was so hungry, Cleve told the oral historian who interviewed her, that people ate the chewing gum because the idea of chewing food without swallowing it seemed illogical. Another war bride, Fumi Ward, recalls a similar experience: she once took home a chocolate bar and her mother divided it among the ten members of her family to eat. Ward says this was the first time they had eaten candy since before the war.

To make matters worse, many Japanese citizens also lacked shelter. Shortly after arriving in the country, the journalist Julius Adler described the incredible physical damage American bombs had done: “Vast sections of this city [Yokohama] are completely leveled from fire bombs and only twisted wreckage marks the places where hundreds of thousands of people used to live.” American officials estimated that, at the beginning of the Occupation, 4.5 million homes

---

needed to be built (or re-built) to shelter those made homeless by the war. Unfortunately, new
construction was slow; in July 1950, Japan still needed 3.4 million homes. According to SCAP’s
analysis of the situation, many of the same factors that caused Japan’s food shortage also caused
its housing deficit. The country lacked basic construction materials, a transportation network to
move any materials it did have, a shortage of skilled labor, and a lack of capital to invest in new
building projects. Additionally, the increasing population meant that the housing situation only
grew worse.63 The large numbers of homeless people, especially in Japan’s cities, shocked
Americans. Margery Brown, an American colonel’s wife, describes the terrible conditions of the
homeless in Tokyo in her 1951 memoir about the Occupation, Over a Bamboo Fence. She
writes, “[there are] thousands of ragged diseased skeletons and verminous war orphans who pick
pockets and pimp for a living. At night they sleep in underground approaches of Ueno Station or
under the damp rat-infested bridges that span the Sumida. The filth is indescribable.”64 This
scene was repeated in cities across the devastated country.

These dire living conditions greatly impacted the lives of Japan’s citizens. In their
memoir about their experiences in Occupied Japan, Star-Spangled Mikado, the journalists Frank
Kelley and Cornelius Ryan write, “Japan looked like a nation that had suffered a sudden and
devastating paralytic stroke. Physically and mentally, the place was at a standstill.”65 The
Japanese population soon began to describe their despair after the war as a specific condition:
kyodatsu, or the “distraction” and “dejection” of the entire Japanese population.66 In an
interview, war bride Katsu Hall recalled how the war effort consumed the country: “The war

---

64 Margery Brown, Over a Bamboo Fence; an American Looks at Japan (New York: Morrow, 1951), 22.
65 Kelley and Ryan, Star-Spangled Mikado, 15.
66 The word “kyodatsu” was used prior to the Second World War as a clinical term for “physical or emotional
prostration in individual patients;” its use as a term for a general malaise among the population was popularized
during the Occupation. Dower, Embracing Defeat, 89.
takes all the riches from your country and that means from your citizens. So, I didn’t, but I know many adults donated gold teeth. Like metal things, anything metal we donated, so they can be used for parts of the war equipment. And of course, food was scarce because of the bombing.\textsuperscript{67}

Hall’s experience of sacrifice and deprivation during the war is not unique: the physical destruction of the country left many living at subsistence level. Nobuko Howard described the conditions her family faced to the oral historian Miki Crawford: “They had a good living before the war and the atomic bomb: then they had nothing to eat. They obtained water by placing buckets on the mountainside in the morning to catch the drips and then retrieved these buckets at night. This was all they had to drink.”\textsuperscript{68} Howard’s experiences illuminate the impact the war’s devastation had on families. Low employment and high inflation compounded the dire living conditions after the war and made everyday survival for the Japanese incredibly difficult.\textsuperscript{69}

Both the occupied and the occupiers noticed the prosperity of the Americans in Japan, in contrast to that of the Japanese. In her memoir, Margery Brown comments on the discrepancy between “the bombed wasteland” of most of Japan and the “comfort of ‘Little America’” in which she lived.\textsuperscript{70} She describes how the homeless “claw through the garbage pails behind American hotels and billets” in order to find food.\textsuperscript{71} The vast difference in living conditions between the occupiers and the occupied meant that Japan was effectively divided into two worlds. The Japanese lived at the periphery of “Little America,” supplementing their diet with food scraps from Americans’ garbage and candy handed out by GIs.

\textsuperscript{67} Katsu Hall quoted in Crawford, Hayashi, and Suenaga, \textit{Japanese War Brides in America}, 43.
\textsuperscript{68} \textit{Japanese War Brides in America}, 54.
\textsuperscript{69} In August 1945, the exchange rate was 13.6 yen to the dollar; a month later the rate was 67 yen to the dollar. Although SCAP tried to limit inflation in the spring of 1946 by ordering the Japanese government to reduce the circulation of currency from 62 billion yen to 15 billion yen, inflation remained a problem throughout the Occupation. For example, the exchange rate in March 1948 was 231 yen to the dollar and it rose to 324 yen to the dollar by December 1948. Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, "History of the Nonmilitary Activities of the Occupation of Japan," ix (Index); McClain, \textit{Japan}, 530-31.
\textsuperscript{70} Brown, \textit{Over a Bamboo Fence}, 25.
\textsuperscript{71} \textit{Over a Bamboo Fence}, 22.
Although numerous observers commented on the disparity between the Americans and Japanese, reactions to the division varied. Some Americans did not feel uncomfortable with this discrepancy and almost reveled in the superior position that they held over the Japanese. Lucy Crockett, an American Red Cross worker, viewed the Occupation as America’s “first big chance to play God before a conquered nation.”\textsuperscript{72} Certainly, not every American was comfortable with the colonial practices imbuing the Occupation. Margery Brown said she felt that SCAP’s policies “produced a heavy colonial atmosphere” that did not coincide with the Americans’ consistent emphasis on democracy.\textsuperscript{73} The very evident differences between the living conditions of the American occupying forces and the Japanese citizens only consolidated the power dynamics that existed between the Americans and Japanese; this hierarchy could never be ignored.

\textit{A Moment of Social Change}

In addition to the disparate living conditions within the country, the Occupation was also a time of great social change in Japan, particularly for Japanese women; this change was partly instituted by SCAP and partly a result of the war. For example, in October 1945, SCAP ordered the Japanese government to extend the franchise to women.\textsuperscript{74} Indeed, SCAP consistently promoted women’s rights as part of their larger goal to dismantle “feudalistic customs” that they thought limited Japanese society.\textsuperscript{75} In a speech to the female representatives in the Japanese Diet on June 21, 1946, General MacArthur outlined his support for the changes in women’s position in society and framed women’s suffrage as part of a broader trend of progress and modernization. He told his audience that Japanese women:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{72} Lucy Herndon Crockett, \textit{Popcorn on the Ginza: An Informal Portrait of Postwar Japan} (New York: W. Sloane Associates, 1949), xi.
\item \textsuperscript{73} Brown, \textit{Over a Bamboo Fence}, 54.
\item \textsuperscript{74} Dower, \textit{Embracing Defeat}, 81.
\item \textsuperscript{75} McLelland, \textit{Love, Sex, and Democracy in Japan During the American Occupation}, 54.
\end{itemize}
are displaying an increasing interest in political, social, and economic affairs which exceeds the most hopeful anticipation of political observers. It attests to the powerful appeal of the democratic idea and to the enthusiasm with which Japanese women are discarding the age-old bonds of convention, which have so long denied them the fundamental democratic right to participate in communal affairs beyond the home.\(^{76}\)

Although American women had only won the right to vote 26 years before, SCAP argued that Japanese women’s lack of suffrage was feudalistic and undermined democracy. Under MacArthur, SCAP promoted women’s rights as part of their broader scheme to modernize Japan, and frequently pointed to the changes they made on behalf of Japanese women as evidence of the benefits of the American occupation.

SCAP’s official policy coincided with changes brought about by World War II. During the war, nearly four million women joined the workforce because the country needed more manpower.\(^{77}\) Young women often left rural areas and moved to cities in order to send home money to support their families. War casualties also created hundreds of thousands of families headed by women.\(^{78}\) Katsu Hall remembers the different role she was forced to take on after the war effort took the male members of her family: “I was errand girl for the family because no male around to carry out the business [sic], except for my father who was constantly working in the shipyard, like twenty-four hours sometimes…So, all the males were taken for war. My three older brothers were in the war…. So women had to take over.”\(^{79}\) After the war, many women continued to support their families. Harumi Williams worked at an American base in order to support her mother and siblings, and told her interviewer that most of the women she met who

\(^{76}\) Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, "Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 to September 1948," 752.
\(^{78}\) *Japanese War Brides in America*, xv.
\(^{79}\) Katsu Hall quoted in *Japanese War Brides in America*, 44.
worked for the Americans faced the same situation. The war effort meant that many young Japanese women no longer lived with their parents until they married, but instead worked to support their family. This new independence, driven by necessity and compounded by the SCAP-instituted social changes, meant that young women during the Occupation did not follow the same restrictions that their mothers had.

Young women’s newfound independence radically altered Japanese marriage conventions. Prior to World War II, most Japanese considered marriages a family affair and not the prerogative of the bride; parents typically found spouses for their children. After shifting their energies from unpaid domestic labor to waged work during the war, however, young working women began to resist their families’ attempt to limit their newfound independence through arranged marriages. Legal changes in Japanese family law enacted by SCAP also altered the traditional requirement for parental consent even after the couple had reached the age of majority. In an interview with the American journalist James Michener, a young Japanese woman, Ryuko Ozawa, describes the changes the war had brought to her life:

In those days [before the war] when a girl reached twenty her papa would meet with other men and decide upon a good husband for her. That was how my mama married. And in those days my husband –if he were good like Papa –would have been kind to me but I would rarely leave the house. I would never argue back. And if I had girl babies I would have expected my husband to instruct them how they must always obey the wishes of their men. But my pattern of life was broken by the war...like my older brother and sister I chose the man I wanted to marry. Papa’s pride was badly hurt that I didn’t ask him to find me a husband, but he can’t say anything because he knows he couldn’t have done any better than I’ve done.

Ozawa recognized that war changed how she expected her life to be before the outbreak of hostilities, but she did not regret the changes that had happened. Ozawa’s experience was typical;

---

81 *Japanese War Brides in America*, 82.
young Japanese women’s shifting views about marriage and relationships meant that more of them found it acceptable to date and marry a man not of their parents’ choice, like an American GI. Thus, Japan’s society was in a state of flux just as SCAP needed to impose a rigid power structure upon it. SCAP attempted to use this transitional moment to insert its own agenda and then fix Japanese society in a formation that best suited American goals at the time.

Guarding Racial Frontiers

From September 1945 to April 1952, SCAP governed Japan through a system of indirect rule. For each pre-existing department in the Japanese government, SCAP established a parallel department staffed by Occupation personnel. Those within SCAP then ran the defeated country by issuing countless American directives to their counterpart Japanese civil servants. The parallel governmental structure this system created was often cumbersome and, sometimes, humorous in its inefficiencies. For example, in a 1946 New Yorker article, the journalist Helen Mears describes a typical scene repeated across busy road junctions throughout Japan:

In an effort to teach the Japanese how to handle the augmented traffic [created by the American presence], the Army has instituted a two-man traffic-control setup in the middle of one of Tokyo’s most important intersections. A tall M.P. [military policeman] and a short Japanese policeman stand a few feet from each other. They both have whistles and they make the same gestures with their arms and hands, but the movements of the Japanese policeman always lag a fraction of a section behind those of the M.P.

Mears’ description of the relationship between the two traffic policemen mirrors the governmental setup at every level during the Occupation. This complicated administrative machine contained approximately 5000 American bureaucrats, including both civilian and military personnel, who controlled every aspect of Japanese life. SCAP, working through the Japanese puppet government, sought to remake Japan into the image of the United States.

---

83 McClain, Japan, 524-25.
SCAP had to protect the distinctions between occupiers and occupied in order to maintain its control. In *Trans-Pacific Racisms*, Yukiko Koshiro argues that many Americans felt that they needed to assert a racial hierarchy in Japan, which recognized “the white man’s prestige” as the most civilized and advanced race, so that they were able to maintain control of the Japanese.85 The notion of racial inferiority, however, did not work with SCAP’s message of democratization. Thus, SCAP enforced racial policies that buttressed “the power and prestige of the conqueror,” but did not openly acknowledge that these actions reinforced notions of white superiority and Japanese inferiority. For example, official racial segregation lasted in Japan from 1945 to 1949, but any mention of race in the Japanese press was censored.86 SCAP’s desire to protect white prestige by maintaining the distinction between white Americans and the non-white locals was a policy that numerous European colonial governments adopted as well. Ann Laura Stoler argues that colonial powers’ drive to maintain racial distinctions was based on the racial prejudice of the colonists, as well as their fear that the colonized people would confront them with violence.87

In order to guard the Occupation’s internal racial “frontiers” SCAP enforced a non-fraternization policy. Between September 2, 1945 and September 20, 1949, military regulations forbade American personnel from cultivating friendships with Japanese citizens or interacting with them beyond the duties required by their Occupation position.88 Despite these rules, both members of SCAP and outside observers soon realized that preventing encounters and personal interactions between the Japanese population and the large number of mostly male Americans within Japan (nearly 5000 bureaucrats working for SCAP and between 60,000 to 500,000

86 *Trans-Pacific Racisms and the U.S. Occupation of Japan*, 21-22.
military personnel) was a herculean task.\textsuperscript{89} Very quickly, the ban on fraternization proved porous; sexual relationships soon formed between American GIs and Japanese women.\textsuperscript{90} SCAP’s reaction to Occupation personnel and Japanese women fraternizing was also similar to that of other colonial authorities. SCAP decided that the “intimate sphere,” the space in which men and women met and formed romantic relationships, needed to be controlled in order to maintain white prestige. Fraternization threatened the racial frontier between the occupiers and occupied and thus threatened SCAP’s power over its defeated enemy. Although its specific policies changed over time, SCAP, like its colonial predecessors, relied on sexual control to maintain the racial boundaries that buttressed the entire Occupation apparatus. White domination only existed if it was clear who was white and who was non-white and thus who had power and who did not have power. SCAP could not allow the intimate sphere to operate beyond its realm of control.\textsuperscript{91}

\textsuperscript{89} McLelland, \textit{Love, Sex, and Democracy in Japan During the American Occupation}, 100; Crawford, Hayashi, and Suenaga, \textit{Japanese War Brides in America}, xvi; McClain, \textit{Japan}, 525.

\textsuperscript{90} Koshiro, \textit{Trans-Pacific Racisms and the U.S. Occupation of Japan}, 157.

\textsuperscript{91} My discussion about SCAP’s need to maintain a distance between Americans and Japanese draws on arguments in Ann Laura Stoler, \textit{Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 64, 83; Stoler, "Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power," 88.
II. EVERYDAY ENCOUNTERS

On August 23, 1945, the Japanese newspaper *Yomiuri Hochi* published an article entitled “Restrain Women from Walking Alone. Let’s be Careful Not to Have a Licentious Appearance.” The article warned its female readers to avoid the imminently arriving American troops and not to walk around, even in daylight, alone. A similar caution had appeared in the *Asahi Shimbun* a few days before.92 Because of their previous experiences with their own military occupations, the Japanese believed the Americans would perpetrate a campaign of terror upon landing. Rumors spread among the civilian population that once the Americans arrived, all the men would be killed and all the women raped. The national Japanese press gave credence to these rumors as they warned the populace to be prepared for the violence the occupying army would commit. When the American forces actually landed on the main Japanese islands in late August 1945, however, none of the feared mass violence occurred.93 Indeed, as the Occupation progressed, people stopped worrying about the potential violence between the Americans and Japanese, but rather the unanticipated friendliness between members of the two groups.

*Meeting the Enemy*

Prior to the Occupation’s onset, there was deep mistrust, fear, and hatred between most Americans and Japanese. The war in the Pacific had been a race war. John Dower, in *War Without Mercy*, argues that rage, hatred, and racial prejudice spurred on the fighting.94 After the Japanese surrendered, the Americans arrived in Japan still wary of their defeated enemy. Unsure of the reception they would receive, many Americans wanted to ban any form of friendly conduct, or fraternization, between the American forces and Japanese civilians. As it did in defeated Germany, experience quickly proved that a full fraternization ban was almost

impossible to maintain. SCAP policy gradually changed to allow certain types of fraternization whilst limiting others. The continuous debate over the acceptability of fraternization, and of what fraternization constituted, reveals the deep anxiety American authorities in Japan felt about their relationship with the Japanese and the boundary between the two peoples during America’s military occupation of the country.

The *Pocket Guide to Japan*, a booklet the American military gave to all of its forces before the Occupation began, clearly demonstrates the prevailing attitudes towards Japan in the summer of 1945. The guide’s introduction frames the Occupation as a chance to make the Japanese regret their actions during the war. The first paragraph states, “the late President of the United States said that Japan will be occupied, whether she surrenders before we land on her soil or not…The Japs cannot escape occupation the way most of Germany did in the last war. They are going to be taught a lesson they will never forget.” The guide suggests that the Allies’ policy towards Germany after World War I had not been harsh enough and they were now going to rectify that error by occupying the defeated Axis powers in order to prevent them militarizing again. The anonymous government authors of the *Pocket Guide* are very clear that “we are not going to make the same mistake again” and allow the Axis powers to be a threat to America.96

In numerous places, the *Pocket Guide to Japan* warns its readers not to fraternize with the Japanese because Americans should still consider the Japanese to be their enemies. The guide says very explicitly, “You must not fraternize with the Japanese. Do not make friends. You will not associate with Japs on friendly or intimate terms, either in public or in private.” The authors of the guide justify this strict ban on fraternization by reminding their readers that the Japanese

---

“are the people who slaughtered the American soldiers you grew up with, trained with, and fought with…. They are not your friends. Do not kid yourself. They are your enemies and they hate everything about you.”98 The guide claims that everyone in Japan is America’s enemy, “almost to the last man, woman, or child.”99 The guide’s authors appear to be especially concerned that American troops would forget that even Japanese women were considered to be the enemy. Later in the guide, they reemphasize their earlier point that women are the enemy as well as the men: “Don’t ever forget this. Jap women are just as treacherous as the men. They will plot and scheme too. They will be reckless with their lives. Don’t trust them any more than you do the men. They will act as decoys. You are not to associate with Jap women.”100 The Pocket Guide to Japan’s strong message about Japan’s culpability for the war and the need to treat its entire people as defeated enemies represents a well-accepted attitude towards the Japanese at the time.

The propaganda of both sides during World War II emphasized the uniquely terrible behavior of the enemy, and ignored or downplayed any commonalities between the Japanese and Americans.101 The effect of this propaganda meant that many observers assumed fraternization would not occur between Japanese and Americans because of the vast cultural differences between the two groups. A day after the Japanese formally surrendered, the American journalist Ray Coll reported from Yokosuka:

    The strict order against fraternization will not be hard to keep, it would seem to me at this writing. The vast difference in language and custom is so great that it affords a natural barrier and there seems to be no common meeting ground. And since word has been quickly passed around about the treatment accorded [American] prisoners [by the Japanese], as related by those already freed, there

---

98 A Pocket Guide to Japan, 405.
99 A Pocket Guide to Japan, 8.
100 Emphasis in original text. A Pocket Guide to Japan, 65.
101 Dower, War without Mercy, 12.
can be no friendliness, much less love, wasted on these people. It should not be difficult for the naturally warm-hearted Americans to maintain a stern front.\(^{102}\)

Like the *Pocket Guide to Japan*, Coll emphasizes the behavior of the Japanese during the war as a reason why the Americans in Japan cannot be friendly with the local populace. Although Coll states that Americans are “naturally warm-hearted,” he believed that maintaining distance between the occupiers and the occupied through a fraternization ban was appropriate.

The Japanese government, before the Americans arrived and they ceased to function as an independent body, also forbade its citizens from fraternizing with the American occupation forces.\(^{103}\) During the war, Japanese propaganda had created and perpetuated a fear of Americans among the Japanese population. For example, war bride Nobuko Howard recalls, for example, her first encounter with Americans: “We never see blond hair, blue eyes. We see nothing but black hair, brown eyes. Oh, I get so nervous and everything –scared you know.”\(^{104}\) The Japanese government used the fear of Americans it had inspired in its people to justify its own fraternization ban. Thus, before the Occupation began, both sides felt that the interaction between the two peoples would and should be very limited.

Many members of the American forces agreed with the complete ban on fraternization before the Occupation began; support, however, was not unanimous. On August 25, 1945, the *New York Times* reported that there were “divided feelings as to whether there should be fraternization.”\(^{105}\) In the article, journalist Clinton Green writes that some GIs felt that there should be no friendly contact between them and their newly defeated enemy: “…Corp. John W. Medmon of Texarkana, Ark., an Air Force cook with fourteen months overseas, pointed out he had lost a brother on Okinawa and ‘personally, I’m not going to have a thing to do with them. I

---


\(^{103}\) "The Occupation: Fraternization Equation."


think we should show them that we mean business.”  

Despite the vengeful feelings among many GIs, others wondered whether a “no-fraternization order [would] serve only to bolster earlier Japanese propaganda, which long had been insisting to the people that we were not their ‘friends.’”  

In addition, Green quotes Lieutenant Colonel O. G. Grotenfend who argued that the idealistic goal of unifying nations under peace would not happen if Americans did not fraternize with their former enemies. Prior to the Occupation, those who were unsure about the validity of a fraternization ban based their concerns on the potential long-term impact of personal hostility between Americans and Japanese.

*Initial Portrayals of Fraternization*

Despite the clear message about fraternization the American military gave its troops prior to the Occupation, once the Japanese had formally surrendered and SCAP took control of Japan in the beginning of September 1945, the American’s stance on fraternization became murkier, especially as the word “fraternization” began to take on multiple meanings. On September 3, 1945, *Time* magazine reported that the fraternization ban had been “squelched.”  

The magazine claimed that the military had realized that the ban would not work for the same reasons it had failed in Germany: “G.I.s might not want to fraternize with Japanese men, but it was a foregone conclusion that they would find Jap children cute; as for Japanese women, they have appealed strongly to most westerners who have lived in the country.”  

The article argues that “biology” made it hard to enforce a military policy of fraternization; the servicemen had just left “miserable, womanless mid-Pacific ‘rocks’” and had arrived in a country full of appealing

---

106 Green, “GI’s in Pacific Split on Fraternization,” 3.
107 “GI’s in Pacific Split on Fraternization,” 3.
women.\textsuperscript{110} \textit{Time} magazine argued that, from a pragmatic point of view, military commanders could not stop their men from fraternizing with Japanese civilians and thus should not even try.

Less than twenty days later, however, the \textit{New York Times} ran an article titled “GI’s in Japan Obey Fraternizing Ban.”\textsuperscript{111} According to the newspaper correspondent, Frank Kluckhorn, SCAP did have a ban on fraternization and American personnel were following it. He wrote, “There is no ‘fraternization’ in Japan. The American Army is being as frigid on the GI level here as the Japanese are being reserved….”\textsuperscript{112} Furthermore, Kluckhorn argued, there specifically was no fraternization between American men and Japanese women:

\begin{quote}
Children –and heaven knows there is a superabundance of them in Japan –and women everywhere appealed to GI Joe. There are plenty of petite and beautiful women in Japan. But apparently they have no charm for these youngsters, and no more, it appears, than these tall, lithe, wise-cracking Americans have charm for the feminine element of Japan.\textsuperscript{113}
\end{quote}

Clearly, Kluckhorn has a very different perspective about interactions between Americans and Japanese than that of the \textit{Time} magazine correspondent whose article was published only eighteen days before. Part of the reason for this dissonance between the two reports is the multiple uses of the word “fraternization.”

Throughout the Occupation, the press employed the word “fraternization” to mean having friendly relationships with the former enemy and, euphemistically, to refer to sexual relationships between American men and Japanese women.\textsuperscript{114} This double meaning, often within the same article, was not usually openly acknowledged. Thus, when the \textit{Time} magazine article mentions fraternization with Japanese children, it is referring to the dictionary definition of the

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{110} The Occupation: Fraternization Equation,” 27.
\textsuperscript{112} Kluckhorn, “GI’s in Japan Obey Fraternizing Ban,” 3.
\textsuperscript{113} “GI’s in Japan Obey Fraternizing Ban,” 3.
\textsuperscript{114} The euphemistic type of fraternization also refers to relationships that outsiders perceived as having a sexual component. In other words, the distinction between these types of relationships is not one of platonic friends versus sexual partners, but of platonic friends versus people who others think are having or may possibly have sexual relations. In this case, perception is more salient than actual reality.
\end{flushleft}
word; when it talks about fraternization with Japanese women because of a biological imperative, it is using the word euphemistically. Kluckhorn’s report that there was absolutely no fraternization, of any kind, may reflect his hope rather than the reality of the situation. Quickly, it became apparent that fraternization, in both of its meanings, occurred. The difference was the official American response: SCAP did not attempt to stop friendly relations between American occupation personnel and Japanese civilians, whereas it devoted much energy to controlling sexual relationships, or relationships that might potentially lead to sexual intercourse, such as dating, between the occupiers and the occupied.

As the autumn of 1945 progressed, evidence of fraternization between Americans and Japanese was readily apparent. Major American newspapers, including the New York Times, informed the American public about the ubiquity of sexual fraternization. For example, on November 9, 1945, the New York Times ran an article by Clinton Green entitled “GI’s are Popular with Kyoto Girls.” Green reports that, in Kyoto, he saw “American soldiers walking arm in arm with kimono-clad Japanese girls…During a ride through the city at night I saw at least fifty couples walking through Murayama Park, sitting on benches under lights with English-Japanese phrase books or going through the semi-dark streets toward tea houses or the dance hall.” Green writes that the frequent interaction between American GIs and Japanese women meant “it is considered unusual if a soldier who really wants to ‘date’ a Japanese girl is unable to do so.” Green’s use of quotation marks around the word “date” suggests that he recognizes, and wants his readers to infer, that these encounters may be more sexual in nature than romantic. The journalist also cites GIs defending their actions by saying that female companionship is

---

115 Crawford, Hayashi, and Suenaga, Japanese War Brides in America, 246.
117 Green, “GI’s Are Popular with Kyoto Girls,” 4.
118 "GI’s Are Popular with Kyoto Girls," 4.
necessary for “relaxation and distraction from their tasks.” The openness and apparent acceptability of sexual fraternization between Japanese and Americans created consternation among the American public and many were critical of the Occupation’s blasé attitude toward such behavior. Compelled by American public opinion, SCAP attempted to control such relationships.

**Official Response**

SCAP’s initial reaction to sexual relationships between American men and Japanese women was to ban them. On March 3, 1946, General MacArthur announced that American servicemen should not have relationships with Japanese women. A month later, the *New York Times* reported that MacArthur had asked military chaplains “to help end the ‘promiscuous relationships’ between United States occupation troops and Japanese women.” The article quotes MacArthur’s letter to the chaplains at length:

[I have received letters] from American homes expressing grave concern and deep distress over published reports suggestive of existing widespread promiscuous relationships between members of the occupying forces and Japanese women of immoral character. Unfortunately…there has been a growing tendency to misconstrue the word fraternization and misinterpret the relationship between members of the American occupation forces and the Japanese people.

MacArthur clearly indicates that the American public’s critical response to reports of “promiscuous relationships” motivated his request to the chaplains. His letter also highlights the slippage between the two uses of the word “fraternization;” MacArthur argues that people assume that all fraternization is of the euphemistic kind, whereas he contends that much of the fraternization in Japan is of the friendly, non-sexual kind. MacArthur also feels the need to

---

119 “GI’s Are Popular with Kyoto Girls,” 4.  
121 *Japanese War Brides in America*, 246.  
123 “Chaplains' Aid Asked to End Fraternizing,” 14.
defend SCAP’s response to sexual fraternization. In his letter, he writes, “Every effort is being
made to increase the opportunities for education advancement, and interesting, healthy recreation
for soldiers off duty, but these measures are not sufficient to cope with a problem which has
confronted armies of occupation throughout military history.” Essentially, MacArthur claims
SCAP was fighting a historical inevitability by trying to prevent its men from having sex with
local women. MacArthur, however, did not justify inaction with the excuse of historic precedent.
Instead, SCAP invested much energy into preventing relationships between American men and
Japanese women because of two key reasons: venereal disease and loss of discipline. The
military’s fear over the loss of able-bodied men due to sexually transmitted diseases and the loss
of military discipline due sexual fraternization compelled it to take action.

The venereal disease (VD) rate among American servicemen soared once the Occupation
began. Previously, the average yearly infection rate of the Eighth Army (the troops who were
stationed in Japan) was 13.4 percent. In February 1946, 27 percent of the entire army had
contracted some form of VD. By June 1946, approximately half of American troops had a VD,
typically gonorrhea. The spread of sexually transmitted diseases to nearly half of servicemen
was a public health disaster for the military and significantly reduced the number of able-bodied
American soldiers in Japan. Regardless of its policies on fraternization, SCAP had to act to
control the VD rate among American GIs. On October 16, 1945, SCAP issued a directive to the
Japanese government about controlling VD. It ordered the Japanese to report all cases and keep
track of the individuals who were infected. Furthermore, it instructed the government to examine
and treat “all individuals whose occupations or activities subject them to serious hazard of

124 “Chaplains’ Aid Asked to End Fraternizing,” 14.
125 Tanaka, Japan’s Comfort Women, 155.
126 Shukert and Scibetta, War Brides of World War II, 190.
venereal disease transmission.”¹²⁷ SCAP’s directive ultimately led to “round-ups” of those suspected of being prostitutes. These women were then forcibly examined for infection and then treated if they were found to have a VD. The experience was humiliating for the women, especially for those who had the misfortune to be passing by neighborhoods known as frequent sites of solicitation and simply get caught up in a roundup.¹²⁸ With VD rates still high, SCAP ordered the end of licensed prostitution in January 1946. In its directive, SCAP declared “the maintenance of licensed prostitution in Japan is in contravention of the ideals of democracy and inconsistent with the development of individual freedom throughout the nation.”¹²⁹ Prior to this point, the Japanese government had allowed licensed brothels to operate, some of which had purposefully been created for the Occupation troops.¹³⁰ Although the abolition of licensed brothels did not end prostitution –instead, prostitutes solicited clients on the streets –SCAP’s attempts to limit servicemen’s access to prostitutes in order to prevent the spread of VDs appeared to work, though this may have also been in part because of increased treatment availability. In July 1946, General Eichelbeger, the commander of the Eighth Army, reported that the infection rate for VD among occupation troops had been halved.¹³¹

As well as its concern about the health of its troops, SCAP was also worried that sexual fraternization led to loss of discipline and order. Particularly important to SCAP was the appearance of decorum among its troops. On March 23, 1946, the military banned all public

¹²⁸ Tanaka, Japan’s Comfort Women, 163.
¹³⁰ I will discuss these government-sponsored brothels in more detail later in this section.
¹³¹ Shukert and Scibetta, War Brides of World War II, 190.
displays of affection between American servicemen and Japanese women. General Eichelberger, quoted in the military newspaper *Pacific Stars & Stripes*, said that:

…public displays of affection by men in uniform toward the women of any nation are in poor taste. Particularly is this so in Japan among those who were so recently our enemies and where the people have never been accustomed to such demonstrations. The sight of our soldiers walking along the streets with their arms around Japanese girls [sic] is equally repugnant to Americans…as well as most Japanese. Such action in public is prejudicial to good order and military discipline and will be treated as disorderly conduct.

In his order to American troops, General Eichelberger appears to be most concerned about public perceptions about sexual fraternization. Although he was also worried about the physical ramifications of these relationships – the spread of VDs – in this statement, Eichelberger is trying to prevent a breakdown of order by hiding these relationships from the public eye. For the general, it is specifically the open displays of affection towards Japanese women that disturbs the “good order.” It appears that General Eichelberger believed that public displays of affection between American men and Japanese women blurred the dividing line between occupier and occupied; this was unacceptable. In addition to a ban on public displays of affection, SCAP also issued numerous orders regulating other behaviors between Japanese women and Americans men. An infographic published in *Life Magazine* in December 1946 depicted several examples of such rules. Couples were subject to regulations that included rules such as: Japanese women could not ride on the handlebars of a bike ridden by an American; GIs could not eat Japanese food given to him by his date; and Americans were not to give Japanese cigarettes (although the *Life* article admitted this rule was broken frequently). Such policies were designed to clearly...

---

134 The magazine also conscientiously reported that the models in the photographs accompanying the banned behavior received special permission from SCAP to engage in such activities for the purpose of the magazine article.
demarcate the lines between the occupiers and occupied. As discussed in the last section, SCAP’s control relied on maintaining this clear boundary; public fraternization threatened this.

Despite the copious number of SCAP regulations limiting contact between American men and Japanese women, journalists frequently reported that GIs managed to evade these regulations. In a tongue-in-cheek article in the *New York Times*, Burton Crane describes a hypothetical date between an American GI and a Japanese woman: “If a GI wished to take an outing with a Japanese girl, he would be severely limited. He could not transport her in an Army vehicle…He could not feed her with Army food…He would not be allowed to buy Japanese [food]…The only legal course, apparently, would be to take her for a brief walk near the barracks, then send her home as soon as she got thirsty or hungry.”136 Crane concludes, “The fact that none of this [all of these regulations] makes any difference is a tribute to GI ingenuity.”137 Crane’s article demonstrates that, despite SCAP’s attempts to limit sexual fraternization between American men and Japanese women, American troops either found loopholes in the regulations or simply ignored them and continued to interact with the local women.

*A Change in Course*

Perhaps realizing that it was losing its battle to end completely sexual fraternization between troops –admitting defeat against “a problem which has confronted armies of occupation throughout military history,” as MacArthur described it –SCAP began to distinguish between more and less acceptable types of fraternization as early as the latter-half of 1946. The military considered prostitution to fall towards the unacceptable end of the spectrum; on the other hand, concubinage was considered more acceptable. SCAP’s position towards different kinds of relationships mirrors official attitudes towards fraternization in other colonial settings. Ann

---

Laura Stoler argues that the interactions between Europeans and prostitutes were problematic for all colonial architects because prostitution helped spread VD, which lowered the number of able-bodied Europeans: a problem clearly experienced by the Americans in Japan. Thus, colonial authorities preferred concubinage to prostitution because concubinage “was considered to stabilize order and colonial health.”\textsuperscript{138} SCAP, like its colonial forbearers, realized that longer-term relationships between Japanese women and American soldiers were preferable to liaisons with prostitutes, as they reduced the transmission rate of VD, so it began to relax its policy against such relationships. SCAP limited itself to just banning certain types of behavior between soldiers and Japanese women. Despite the official regulations regarding fraternization, however, primary sources illustrate the high propensity of both accepted and forbidden relationships between American men and Japanese women.

Numerous accounts of Occupied Japan describe American soldiers’ frequent solicitation of prostitutes, despite bans against paid sexual relationships. During the Occupation, approximately 70,000 women worked as prostitutes catering specifically to GIs. Known as \textit{pan pan} girls, these women brought in more than 200 million dollars of foreign money into the Japanese economy.\textsuperscript{139} Initially, \textit{pan pan} girls worked in licensed brothels, including the government-sponsored Recreation and Amusement Associations (RAA), which were set up by the Japanese government prior to the Occupation in order to protect “innocent” Japanese women from the predatory attentions of the incoming American troops by conveniently providing already “fallen” women.\textsuperscript{140} In accordance with the Japanese government’s plan, the RAAs proved popular with the Occupation personnel. In their memoir about Occupied Japan, the journalists Frank Kelly and Cornelius Ryan describe the scene outside one of these brothels:

\textsuperscript{138} Stoler, \textit{Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power}, 48.
\textsuperscript{139} McLelland, \textit{Love, Sex, and Democracy in Japan During the American Occupation}, 72.
\textsuperscript{140} Tanaka, \textit{Japan’s Comfort Women}, 141-42.
“After standing in the queue for several hours, the G.I. would enter the house, and when he left very shortly afterward he was supposed to visit the prophylactic station [set up by the American militarily conveniently nearby]. However, many drunken G.I.’s would stagger out and never reach the station. These lads would regret it several days later.” As mentioned above, SCAP ordered the Japanese government to disband such brothels after the VD rate among its troops soared. Although this action reduced the infection rate among U.S. troops to more acceptable levels, it did not end the solicitation of prostitution by American forces, as most of the workers in these brothels then became streetwalkers specifically catering to American troops.

Prostitution on the streets of Occupied Japan was pervasive, despite SCAP’s anti-fraternization policies. In his collection of vignettes about the Occupation, the American Martin Brofenbrenner remembers the ubiquity of streetwalkers. Pan pan girls would walk by the base, “[passing] in groups of two or half a dozen, to laugh and chatter at anything or nothing, to show off their kimonos (before trading them, perhaps, for food)” in order to catch the eye of an American soldier. Behind the prostitutes, Brofenbrenner writes, came “a few slimy characters with photograph albums and printed cards. They would slide up to one or another of us and ask how we would like to have this girl or that….” Although Brofenbrenner found the openness of such sexual encounters distasteful, it is clear that Americans were perfectly willing to solicit prostitutes, as prostitution remained a problem. Throughout the Occupation, SCAP attempted to control prostitution (and thus the spread of VD), both through harsh measures against streetwalkers and tacit approval of more long-term relationships between American GIs and Japanese women.

141 Kelley and Ryan, Star-Spangled Mikado, 150.
142 Star-Spangled Mikado, 153.
143 Martin Bronfenbrenner, Tomioka Stories from the Japanese Occupation (Hicksville, NY: Exposition Press, 1975), 133.
144 Bronfenbrenner, Tomioka Stories from the Japanese Occupation, 133.
During the Occupation, nearly 40 percent of American military forces participated in these longer-term relationships.\textsuperscript{145} Officers generally set up a Japanese woman as a concubine, known as an “only-san,” because the woman slept with only one American man. Lower-ranking soldiers could not always afford a kept woman and would enter into verbal agreements with “butterflies:” women who slept with multiple GIs at once (i.e. a “shared” concubine), but were not streetwalkers.\textsuperscript{146} Bill Hume’s popular, semi-pornographic, weekly cartoon series “Babysan,” which ran in a military newspaper, depicts this kind of fraternization. Hume was a Naval Reservist who served in World War II and was then recalled to active service in Japan in 1951. The \textit{Navy Times} originally printed the cartoons and Hume later collected them into three books and published them in the early 1950s.\textsuperscript{147} The comic follows the temporary relationships between American soldiers and a stereotypical Japanese woman called “Babysan.”\textsuperscript{148} Babysan is a beautiful Japanese woman whom Hume both infantilizes and sexualizes in his cartoons. Her lovers (for she has many, although she consistently denies that she is a “butterfly”) are always young, white servicemen. The relationships between Babysan and the Americans are based on a type of reciprocity: the men give Babysan gifts, money, and food, and she has sex with them and strokes their ego by praising their masculinity. In his cartoons, Hume makes clear that the relationships between Babysan and the American servicemen are only temporary: they end when the American’s tour of duty is over. The temporariness of these concubinal relationships was crucial; SCAP tacitly allowed servicemen to use loopholes in its fraternization rules to set up mistresses, but they drew the line at letting such relationships become permanent.

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{145}{McLelland, \textit{Love, Sex, and Democracy in Japan During the American Occupation}, 100.}
\footnote{146}{Tanaka, \textit{Japan’s Comfort Women}, 164-65.}
\footnote{148}{Bill Hume and John Annarino, \textit{Babysan: A Private Look at the Japanese Occupation} (Colombia, MO: American Press, 1953).}
\end{footnotes}
Although SCAP initially attempted to make these relationships as temporary as possible, hoping they would begin and end with the Occupation, those within SCAP soon realized that it could not prevent fraternization from extending beyond the boundaries of Occupied Japan. American men and Japanese women began to develop relationships beyond that of simple sexual fraternization; they began to fall in love and eventually some wanted to marry. If these interracial couples married and returned to the United States, the critical boundary between occupier and occupied would break down. Although SCAP initially decided to completely resist all marriages between Americans and Japanese, they ultimately had to reevaluate their tactics. SCAP had to choose between fruitlessly resisting marriages between American personnel and Japanese women and attempting to control the “packaging” of such relationships to the American public.
III. PACKAGES HOME

In an unedited film clip shot by the United States’ Army in Fort Sam Houston in San Antonio, Texas, a young GI walks into a well-furnished living room. He sits next to his wife, offering her a cup of tea. The man asks her about her day and the woman turns to the camera and begins to speak, in Japanese, about her experiences in America. The unidentified woman discusses how astonished she was when she first came to the United States by the vast number of cars, the wide roads, and the large buildings. She says she is happy in America and is learning English at a local night school.149 The ultimate purpose of the film clip is unknown, but it represents a remarkable shift in the American military’s attitudes toward marriages between Japanese women and American men. Produced circa 1954, this scene of domestic tranquility and a happy marriage is far different from the images of Japanese-American couples created by the American military a few years earlier. Instead of banning these “repugnant” relationships, the U.S. army was now producing positive films of these relationships on an army base in Texas. This transformation in both military and public attitudes towards fraternization between Japanese women and American GIs, especially the gradual acceptance of marriages between the two and the couples’ eventual immigration to the United States, is striking because of SCAP’s initial strong resistance to fraternization of any kind.

Cold War Rehabilitation

The American authorities’ shift in attitude towards fraternization from a complete ban to grudging acceptance was due, in part, to the emergence of China as a communist country, the deployment of American forces to Korea, and the American press’ unchoreographed decision to condone and even actively support relationships between American men and Japanese women.

As discussed in the previous section, SCAP quickly realized that a blanket ban on fraternization was ineffective and impractical to continue. In response, SCAP changed how it controlled the intimate sphere. Rather than banning sexual fraternization, it decided to subsume images of Japanese women and American men’s relationships into a broader narrative about American policy in Japan, which framed the dynamics of Japan’s rehabilitation in terms of “natural” hierarchies; the United States was the dominant male partner in the relationship, whereas Japan was the subordinate female partner.150 In order to do so, SCAP allowed the American correspondents in Occupied Japan to openly cover relationships between Americans and Japanese.

SCAP intended for the American media to portray these couples positively and use them as a symbol of the new political relationship between the United States and Japan; SCAP did not, however, intend to condone interracial marriage between these couples.151 Nonetheless, the American press soon began to portray both fraternization and marriage positively. The effect this had on American public opinion towards these relationships meant that SCAP had to liberalize its stance once again. These changes in attitude, among both officials and journalists, were not part of a conscious or deliberate move to reframe fraternization.152 Rather, the numerous different actors engaged in a mutually reinforcing process in which each actor’s change in opinion amplified the greater movement towards acceptance of these relationships. This positive feedback loop between the various actors was not strictly bounded by time or space; it occurred both in Japan and the United States and continued to function throughout the 1950s, even after the Occupation officially ended in 1952.

150 Lark, “They Challenged Two Nations ”, 153; Shibusawa, America’s Geisha Ally, 10.
151 Caroline Sue Simpson, “American Orientalisms: The Gender and Cultural Politics of America’s Postwar Relationship with Japan” (The University of Texas at Austin, 1994), 159-60.
152 Shibusawa, America’s Geisha Ally, 10.
With the intensification of Cold War tensions, China’s “fall” to communism in 1949, and the beginning of the Korean War the next year, American policy towards Japan shifted as it began to rehabilitate its former enemy into its ally in the region against communism. Between 1945 and 1947, SCAP’s policies in Occupied Japan were defined by the three overarching goals of demilitarization, democratization, and decentralization; the United States wanted to ensure that Japan would never again be a military threat. By the end of the 1940s, however, America was growing increasingly alarmed at the spread of communism, both in Europe and Asia. The United States started to view Japan more as a potential ally against communism than as a defeated enemy. To that end, SCAP changed its policy in order to promote a stable Japan to act as a bulwark against communism. Thus, from 1948 onwards, SCAP focused on reconstruction of the economy, restraint of labor groups, rehabilitation of formerly purged individuals, rearmament of the country, and realignment with the West.¹⁵³ This change in policy coincided with changes in SCAP’s attitudes towards the regulation of the intimate sphere.

In the eyes of policymakers and journalists, Japan had great potential to support America’s efforts to stop the spread of communism, but it would also severely hinder American foreign policy if SCAP allowed Japan to become too liberal and drift towards communist ideas. In September 1947, the journalist Noel Busch wrote an article entitled “The Occupation of Japan” in which he describes commonly held beliefs about Japan’s potential value in America’s Cold War strategy. Busch argues “[Japan] may enable us to give western capitalism a seat in the Orient from which it might eventually work back through China and Russia and India towards Europe again, establishing a vast progressive spiral which would set a pattern for the centuries to come.”¹⁵⁴ Although, according to Busch, Japan had the potential to support the spread of

¹⁵³ McClain, Japan, 550.
capitalism and the containment of communism, the Japanese could easily “fall” to communism if Americans were not careful. Busch writes:

Japanese social behaviour, and the childhood condition which determines it, are perhaps even more amenable to reform along Communist, than along democratic, lines; and while avidity for learning may enable the Japanese eventually to adopt American patterns, the same avidity would enable them even more readily to adopt Russian ones, which more closely resemble their own pre-war regime.\textsuperscript{155}

Despite the more dubious psychoanalytic claims Busch makes in his article about the Japanese psyche, his argument that Japan could be a powerful ally in the Cold War was one that had great resonance both in the American capital and American headquarters in Tokyo.\textsuperscript{156} SCAP deliberately reversed its policies of greater political liberalization and disarmament from 1948 onwards in favor of promoting political conservatism and rearmament of Japan in the face of growing Cold War tensions.

This Cold War context greatly influenced SCAP’s attitudes towards fraternization because, in the first half of the Occupation, it viewed the Japanese as citizens of a defeated enemy whereas, in the second half of the Occupation, the Japanese were seen as citizens of a vital Cold War ally. Two sources that are a clear example of this change are the different editions of the official SCAP \textit{Pocket Guide} given to Occupation personnel. The 1945 edition of the \textit{Pocket Guide}, cited in the previous section, describes the Japanese as the “enemy” and warns troops that they are “a treacherous people.”\textsuperscript{157} It concludes by reminding its readers that the prohibitions contained within the guide exist for a reason: “This booklet includes many don’ts.

There are two main reasons for this: In the first place, you are in enemy country and in personal

\textsuperscript{155} Busch, “Occupation of Japan,” 179.

\textsuperscript{156} Busch also makes a very astute observation about the nature of the American democratization process in Japan. Like Magarey Brown, in \textit{Over the Bamboo Fence}, (mentioned in the first section of this thesis) Busch worried that the imposition of democracy by a foreign military power occupying a country was not really democracy at all, but, in fact, it might be “precisely the reverse of democracy.”

\textsuperscript{157} Army Information Branch, \textit{A Pocket Guide to Japan}, 5, 25.
danger...Secondly, the price your country has paid in suffering, in dead and wounded, in time, in every way, for the defeat of the Axis, is one of the greatest prices ever been paid in history.” In contrast, the 1950 edition of the same Pocket Guide has a remarkably different tone. This later edition of the guide concludes by reminding soldiers of some Occupation “do’s.”

It might be a good idea to remember these Occupation Tips:
[1] Act normally, always remembering that you are doing an important job.
[2] Treat people with respect, and not as though they belonged to an inferior race or group.
[5] Put all your effort and ability into your work so that other people will see that when men are free they are also efficient.

In short, BE AN AMERICAN! These “Occupation Tips” reveal how, later in the Occupation, the Pocket Guide’s military authors wanted American personnel to treat Japanese citizens. Rather than perceive the Japanese as racially inferior enemies, the Pocket Guide argues, American servicemen should respect the Japanese, their new allies in the Cold War. Additionally, although the Japanese might be “strange,” the military authors exhort their readers to remember the “important job” America was doing in Japan. Changing geopolitical attitudes towards Japan altered the way SCAP instructed its personnel to interact with the local residents.

The politics of the Cold War, combined with changing public attitudes towards gender, significantly affected images of Japan and its people after the Second World War. During the Cold War, American policymakers believed “containment,” a policy articulated in the Truman Doctrine, would help protect America from the spread of communism. Containment was applied to both subversive individuals and states; domestically, those who were suspected communists

---

158 A Pocket Guide to Japan, 77-88.
160 Shibusawa, America's Geisha Ally, 7.
needed to be separated from the general population and, internationally, communist states had to be isolated from capitalist ones. In January 1949, the Secretary of the Army, Kenneth Royall, specifically applied the ideas of containment to Japan when he said that Japan’s “free government” and “sound and self-supporting economy” would “serve as a deterrent against any other totalitarian war threats.” Elaine Tyler May argues, in her book *Homeward Bound*, that containment also pertained to the home. May claims that the American government encouraged people to follow traditional gender roles, in which the men worked in the public sphere and the women remained in the domestic sphere, in order to protect the traditional nuclear family, which people thought was a bastion against the spread of communism.

This official promotion of strict gender roles also occurred in Occupied Japan. For example, the American Red Cross (ARC), with SCAP’s permission, began to hold classes for Japanese war brides to teach them how to be “proper wives” to their new American husbands. Beginning in 1951, nearly 8000 Japanese war brides graduated from these “brides’ schools” within the first year of their operation. The first school, located in Yokohama, offered “a two month-course, three days a week, to cover American government and history; homemaking; child care and training; charm and English.” The brides’ schools soon spread throughout Japan and the ARC developed an “eight-point program” for teaching the Japanese women. The schools emphasized their instruction in housekeeping as the most important. In an August 1951 *Pacific Stars & Stripes* article, the journalist reported that “the main points [of the course], stressed through practical demonstration, were: child care and feeding; home hygiene; clothing and good

---

161 May, *Homeward Bound*, 16.
grooming, and cooking.”¹⁶⁶ The brides’ schools reinforced an American concept of gender roles. The ARC instructors taught their Japanese students “home hygiene,” for example, under the assumption that whatever housecleaning they practiced in their own, Japanese, homes was not acceptable for an American household. The ARC brides’ schools introduced Japanese war brides to the role they were expected to undertake as a member of an American nuclear family. Officials, with their strong belief in the power of nuclear families to stop the spread of communism, actively promoted brides’ schools as they enabled Japanese women to better assimilate into their roles as wives of American men and mothers of American children.

Ideas of domestic containment infiltrated political discourse about the containment of communism in general, and political policy was frequently framed in terms of the home and domestic relations.¹⁶⁷ Both American politicians and journalists applied this domesticated language to their descriptions of the country’s relationship with Occupied Japan. Americans began to view their alliance with their former enemy in terms of a domestic relationship: the United States was the strong, masculine power and Japan was the subservient, feminine power.¹⁶⁸ In America’s Geisha Ally, Naoko Shibusawa argues that this feminization of Japan allowed Americans to view the Japanese as human again, rather than the inhuman enemy of World War II, and consider them an “American responsibility.”¹⁶⁹ Two factors contributed to the notion that Japan was a “feminine” country. First, the idea of Japan as feminine predated the Occupation; in the nineteenth century, the West had often described Japan as a childlike, feminine place. Second, World War II propaganda had focused on depicting Japanese men as the aggressors. After the war, on the other hand, the American press mainly photographed Japanese

¹⁶⁷ May, Homeward Bound, 16.
¹⁶⁸ Shibusawa, America’s Geisha Ally, 7.
¹⁶⁹ America’s Geisha Ally, 5.
women and children.\textsuperscript{170} Since the numerous images of Japan that the American public received showed them a land full of women, it was not hard for Americans to perceive Japan as a feminine country. Part of the process by which numerous actors, both official and non-official, constructed a narrative about Japan’s new relationship with the United States was the constant, oftentimes unconscious, movement back and forth between the political and the personal.

Depictions of the relationship between Japan and the United States as that of a relationship between husband and wife easily slipped into the opposite image: both SCAP and the American media used relationships between Japanese women and American men as metaphors for the geopolitical relationship between the two countries. In a front-page article in the \textit{Pacific Stars & Stripes}, a military journalist wrote approvingly about the first officially condoned marriage between a “kimonoed U.S. Marine” and an “unblushing Japanese bride.” General MacArthur, although he had initially publically condemned fraternization, argued that such marriages promoted SCAP’s goals in Japan on a personal level; the American GI was democratizing and modernizing Japanese women, one at a time.\textsuperscript{171} The journalists Frank Kelley and Cornelius Ryan also depicted personal interactions between American men and Japanese women as both part of and a metaphor for SCAP’s policies towards Occupied Japan. In their memoir, they write, “In the tiny villages and towns he [the American GI] was also meeting the average Japanese girl and housewife, and unwittingly he was playing a major role in breaking the feudalistic bonds which had held Japanese women for centuries.”\textsuperscript{172} Kelley and Ryan describe the American GI “breaking the feudalistic bonds” for Japanese women and modernizing them

\textsuperscript{170} \textit{America’s Geisha Ally}, 15, 26.
\textsuperscript{171} I could not locate the original primary source Lark is discussing, so my analysis here relies on Lark’s interpretation of the source. Lark, "They Challenged Two Nations ", 156, 29.
\textsuperscript{172} Kelley and Ryan, \textit{Star-Spangled Mikado}, 160.
into the “white American heteronormative feminine bourgeois ideal.”\textsuperscript{173} They, and their contemporaries, equated this process with SCAP’s larger goal of transforming Japan from a defeated enemy into a model ally in the Cold War.

\textit{Writing a Love Story}

Although the change in the American public’s perception of Japan was part of the government’s ultimate objectives, they did not explicitly choreograph this shift. Rather, official statements, articles in the American press, mass-market fiction, and Hollywood movies combined and organically produced a cohesive narrative about the new geopolitical relationship between Japan and the United States. Shibusawa argues that there was a “complex interplay” between policy and popular culture regarding this narrative: public perceptions of Japan influenced policy and vice-versa.\textsuperscript{174} A positive feedback loop emerged among all of the different participants in the discourse about the relationship between Japan and the United States, which produced an easily comprehensible framework about the new alliance. Thus, despite the initial negative portrayals of relationships between GIs and Japanese women, American politicians, writers, and filmmakers soon participated in creating a love story about fraternization. The press positioned these relationships in an often-repeated narrative, in which the American man comes and “saves” a Japanese woman from her poor surroundings and her love teaches him that not all Japanese are bad people. Shibusawa argues that these portrayals of fraternization as love stories between American GIs and Japanese women made America’s newfound alliance with its former enemy more palatable to the American public because they demonstrated how such an alliance could be acceptable.\textsuperscript{175} The biography of individual couples, filtered through a constructed

\textsuperscript{173} Jodi Kim, \textit{Ends of Empire: Asian American Critique and the Cold War}, Critical American Studies Series (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 100.

\textsuperscript{174} Shibusawa, \textit{America's Geisha Ally}, 10.

\textsuperscript{175} \textit{America's Geisha Ally}, 4-5, 56.
narrative about such relationships, made the project of the Occupation understandable to the American public. Thus, the “packaging” of relationships in the intimate sphere proved crucial to the project of the Occupation.

Simultaneously, but not conjointly, American writers and filmmakers began to produce positive portrayals of love between American GIs and Japanese women. One of the earliest examples of these cultural products that domesticated the political relationship between Japan and America through a romantic story is the 1947 novel *Tokyo Romance* by Ernest Hoberecht. Hoberecht was a 29 year-old correspondent from Oklahoma stationed in Tokyo during the Occupation. His fellow journalists Kelley and Ryan remember him in their memoir of the Occupation as a “bright young reporter” who was infamous among the American press corps “as the man who put the kiss into Japanese films. The story goes that Ernie gave purely professional lessons in the American-style kiss to a young Japanese starlet; then he wrote a scenario about the romance between a G.I. and a Madame Butterfly. The starlet starred in the film, which packed them in.” Kelley and Ryan’s anecdote describes Hoberecht’s putative inspiration behind *Tokyo Romance*. Although Hoberecht wrote the book in English, it was first published in Japanese and become a bestseller; it was then later published in America in English. Most American literary critics were puzzled by the book’s success, as its literary merit is thin. The *Time* magazine reviewer commented, “Although *Tokyo Romance* by Earnest Hoberecht is possibly the worst novel of modern times, a Japanese translation is selling like hotcakes. Sales have reached 213,000 copies and, if enough paper becomes available, they may hit half a million.”

Hoberecht defended himself against the poor reviews by pointing out that *Tokyo Romance* was

---

178 Kelley and Ryan, *Star-Spangled Mikado*, 165.
“a simple story anyone can understand." Hoberecht correctly identified the success of his novel: *Tokyo Romance*, for all of its literary deficiencies, perfectly encapsulates the Occupation by framing it as a love story between an American man and a Japanese woman.

*Tokyo Romance’s* primary significance is that it marks the beginning of the trend to position fraternization as part of the greater American project in Japan by transforming fraternization from a sordid, banned affair to a tale of true love that overcomes mutual unease about dating one’s former enemy. Hoberecht’s protagonists are Kent Wood, an American correspondent, and Tamiko Hara, a Japanese actress. Wood follows the American army throughout the Pacific Islands and is shot at Okinawa. As he passes through areas that the Japanese forces have abandoned, he keeps finding pictures of a particular Japanese pin-up girl, which Japanese soldiers left behind in their hasty retreat, and he becomes fascinated with the woman in the picture. The war ends and Wood arrives in mainland Japan full of apprehension about how the Japanese will act. During his time in Tokyo, Wood encounters the woman, Tamiko Hara, who was featured in all of the pin-ups he found. He and Hara gradually fall in love, despite their mutual fear of one another and the various obstacles they encounter (including a rogue Nazi spy who murders Wood’s friend). The book ends with Wood and Hara’s honeymoon and neatly wraps up their relationship as a narrative of love overcoming all odds.

Hoberecht makes his characters incredibly self-conscious about the broader significance and political impact of their relationship. As Wood begins to contemplate marriage, Hoberecht heavy-handedly forces the reader to consider such relationships as politically significant: “In a way, Kent looked upon his romance as more than just a personal thing. He knew it would be observed by others. He knew he and other Americans who married Japanese girls would be an

---

example.¹⁸² Hoberecht frames the relationship between Wood and Hara as transformational for society. After realistically encountering SCAP’s racial segregation policies and attempts to maintain clear racial boundaries between occupier and occupied, Wood argues to himself, “‘But somebody must break down all this hatred…Somebody must promote international friendship and understanding, and have the courage to cast aside all ideas of racial superiority…’”¹⁸³ *Tokyo Romance* asserts the idea that Wood’s attempt to “break down” the racial segregation of the Occupation, through his love for Hara, actually supports SCAP’s ultimate goals in Japan. In a conversation with her friend, Hara says, “I’ve found out that Americans are all right. The Japanese militarists gave us a lot of false information about the Americans during the war. It is time you and the rest of the people get rid of these foolish ideas.”¹⁸⁴ Hoberecht’s *Tokyo Romance* is one of the first stories that began to construct an archetype that was utilized to explain both individual relationships and the broader relationship between the two countries. The book’s emphasis on an interracial couple breaking down SCAP’s carefully constructed barriers between Americans and Japanese, and positioning this action as ultimately for the better because it strengthened the alliance between the two people and countries, became the model for countless other romanticized narratives about fraternization in Occupied Japan.

Romantic portrayals of fraternization were not limited to the fictional realm; interpretations of real relationships between American men and Japanese women also followed the template of a love story. This slippage between fiction and non-fiction demonstrates how powerful the archetypal narrative about interracial romance became: writers unconsciously applied it to real life as well as stories made for the silver screen. A 1953 *New Yorker* article on a former Marine named Hugh O’Reilly exemplifies the integration of this trope into real

¹⁸³ Hoberecht, *Tokyo Romance*, 144.
¹⁸⁴ *Tokyo Romance*, 192.
individual’s biographies. The journalist, E.J. Kahn, depicts O’Reilly as both a caring father figure to Japanese orphans whom he supported financially and a devoted husband to Yuko Saito. O’Reilly’s story in the article follows a very typical narrative arc: he volunteered to fight after Pearl Harbor and he developed a “violent hatred of all Japanese;” he reluctantly went to serve in the Occupation after the war; as part of his duty, his regiment visited a Japanese orphanage at which point he had a change of heart and began to raise money for the institution; finally, he fell in love with a beautiful Japanese girl and brought her back to the United States. The love story of O’Reilly packages his affection for a former enemy into a narrative that Americans could understand and more readily accept. Kahn’s successful framing of O’Reilly’s biography into this narrative about Japanese-American relationships strengthens the narrative’s resonance. It demonstrates how this interpretation was applied to relationships at many levels: fictional relationships between characters, factual relationships between individuals, and political relationships between two countries.

/change in attitudes

The acceptance of fraternization between Americans and Japanese did not happen overnight, but occurred haphazardly over many years and continued beyond the official end of the Occupation. The difference between the novel Sayonara, published in 1953, and the movie version of the book, produced in 1957, epitomizes this gradual increase in tolerance and acceptance of these relationships. James Michener, the author of Sayonara, served in the Occupation and later married a Japanese woman himself. The development of the main character in Sayonara, Lloyd Gruver, follows the same trajectory of the real life Hugh O’Reilly as described in the New Yorker article. At the beginning of the novel, Gruver cannot understand why American troops are marrying Japanese women: “They’re all so dumpy and round-faced.

How can our men – good average guys – how can they marry these yellow girls? In ’45 I was fighting the Japs. Now my men are marrying them.”186 Gruver cannot grasp the concept of loving his former enemy; he is not alone in his prejudice. His fiancé’s mother, Mrs. Webster, similarly expresses her disgust at fraternization: “I simply can’t believe it! Yellow girls as mothers of an American home!”187 Mrs. Webster is concerned that if American men married Japanese women they will eliminate the racial barrier within the home. She argues, “It’s not that I dislike Japanese. Goodness, they’re wonderful people… But a conquering army must retain its dignity.”188 Both Mrs. Webster and Gruver represent the position held by SCAP during the early years of the Occupation: the Japanese were the former enemy and must be kept at arm’s length.

As the novel moves forward, however, Gruver, and thus the reader, begin to see the attraction of these marriages. After observing the relationship between one of his men and his new wife, Joe and Katsumi Kelly, Gruver muses: “I had never witnessed a marriage where two people loved each other on an equal basis and where the man ran his job on the outside and the woman ran her job at home and where those responsibilities were not permitted to interfere with the fundamental love that existed…. ”189 Gruver is clearly jealous of such a love match and realizes that true love can exist between former enemies, despite their differences.190 Ultimately, the protagonist himself falls in love with a beautiful Japanese actress, Hana-Ogi. Gruver’s own romance explains to him why Americans so frequently crossed the racial frontier, despite the military prohibitions against fraternization. He claims, “I now understood the answer to the second question that had perplexed me… ‘How can an American who fought the Japs actually go

187 Michener, Sayonara, 23.
188 Sayonara, 34.
189 Sayonara, 60.
190 Additionally, Gruver demonstrates the perfectness of this marriage by emphasizing the different gender roles each individual inhabits. This concern with different roles for men and women is linked to the notion domestic confinement, which is discussed earlier in this section.
to be with a Jap girl?’ The answer was so simple. Nearly a half million of our men had found the simple answer. You find a girl as lovely as Hana-ogi –and she is not Japanese and you are not American.”¹⁹¹ Despite his frequent proclamation of his love for Hana-Ogi, however, Gruver eventually decides to return to the United States and marry his white fiancé, leaving Hana-Ogi behind. In the end of the novel, disregarding the previous lessons he had learnt about “why ten thousand American soldiers had braved the fury of their commanders and their country to marry such women,” Gruver decides, “the only acceptable attitude toward strange lands and people of another color must be not love but fear.”¹⁹² Although Michener sets up Gruver to overcome his initial hatred of Japanese and realize his love transcends any racial difference, Michener ultimately has Gruver’s newly found beliefs fail him. In this particular example of a love story about fraternization, the love ultimately cannot exist beyond the confines of the Occupation.

The film adaptation of *Sayonara*, released four years after the book, demonstrates the progression of the public’s attitudes towards fraternization, which continued to evolve even after the Occupation had officially ended. Whilst the novel condones Gruver’s love for Hana-Ogi in Japan, Michener does not allow his protagonist to continue such a relationship beyond the confines of the Occupation. In contrast, the last scene in the film ends with Gruver and Hana-Ogi exiting a theatre, as both Japanese and American journalists surround them, and Hana-Ogi tells the ensemble crowd that she will marry Gruver. When a correspondent from the *Pacific Stars & Stripes* asks Gruver what he will say to his military commander, Gruver responds that he will simply say “sayonara.”¹⁹³ In contrast to the book, then, the film permits Gruver and Hana-Ogi’s interracial love to continue beyond the Occupation. Nominated for ten Oscars, the movie version

¹⁹¹ *Sayonara*, 115.
¹⁹² *Sayonara*, 147, 248.
of *Sayonara*, with its opposite ending from the book, illustrates the slow shift in attitudes towards fraternization, from condemnation to toleration to acceptance.\(^{194}\)

The positive feedback loop between the numerous actors writing about the relationships between Japanese women and American men ultimately constructed an archetypal narrative interpreting fraternization as a hopeful love story in which the couple’s love overcomes all obstacles. The changes between *Sayonara* the book and its film adaptation demonstrate the evolution of this narrative to accept such relationships as permissible beyond the confines of the Occupation. This fictionalized acceptance translated into real acceptance. As discussed in the last section, SCAP policymakers quickly realized that their complete ban on fraternization, both sexual and non-sexual, was a failure and moved towards accepting some kinds of relationships over others. SCAP’s tacit approval of concubinage as a substitute for prostitution, however, did not automatically translate into approval of marriages between Japanese women and American men.\(^{195}\) The American public, too, was initially very hesitant about American GIs bringing back their Japanese wives to the United States. Yet, despite both official roadblocks and public objections, American men continued to find ways to marry their Japanese lovers.\(^{196}\) Ultimately, both official and non-official attitudes changed, over the course of more than a decade, due to the continued persistence of real couples seeking marriage and the availability of a positive narrative about such permanent relationships.

By the early 1950s, both the American government and the American public had begun to grudgingly accept that many of these relationships were permanent. Although SCAP had initially strenuously resisted any form of fraternization, it ultimately recognized the validity of the relationships between Japanese women and American men. On December 3, 1951, the

\(^{194}\) Shibusawa, *America’s Geisha Ally*, 256.

\(^{195}\) *America’s Geisha Ally*, 261.

\(^{196}\) *America’s Geisha Ally*, 47.
Pacific Stars & Stripes reported that the Japan Logistical Command Enlisted Men’s Club in Sapporo hosted a dinner for newlyweds; the second-in-command at the local base opened the reception and wished the Japanese women well in their new lives in American.197 The fact that the American Army hosted an official dinner for these married couples illustrates how official attitudes changed towards these relationships. This one example of public military acceptance of these marriages demonstrates the connections between policy and public discourse: as the public discourse about these relationships became positive, SCAP loosened its policy on fraternization, which then, in turn, increased the acceptance of these relationships in public conversations.

The evolution of tone within articles about marriages illustrates this shift in the public’s attitudes, both during the Occupation and afterwards, towards not just fraternization, but also marriage. For example, two articles from the Saturday Evening Post, written three years apart, display a vastly different attitude towards marriages between American men and Japanese women. In 1952, Janet Smith and William Worden published a piece entitled “They’re Bringing Home Japanese Wives.” The title immediately suggests that the authors are concerned about this development and their article expresses anxiety about the impact of these relationships on America. Smith and Worden write, “the effect of these mixed marriages on American life at home is still to come –the arrival of thousands of dark-skinned, dark-eyed brides in Mississippi cotton hamlets and New Jersey factory cities, on Oregon ranches or in Kansas country towns. The thousands are on the way, and their bright-eyed children soon will be knocking on school doors in most of the forty-eight states.”198 Invoking readers’ fear of the “Yellow Peril,” the authors suggest that, whilst these relationships may have been acceptable within the confines of Occupied Japan, they pose a danger when they are transferred to mainland America. Smith and

Worden suggests, perhaps more hopefully than not, that “no more than 10 per cent of the marriages will stand the strain of American life.” In the second article “Where are those Japanese Brides?” published three years later, however, Worden claims that the vast majority of the approximately 15,000 marriages he examined still survived. Overall, the tone of this later article is far more positive and accepts the fact that these couples were both permanent fixtures in American life and not a danger to the American public.

Although the vast majority of articles, novels, and movies produced in this period about the relationships between American men and Japanese women presented a very sanitized version of the obstacles these couples had to overcome, there are moments when this narrative of love conquering all falters. For example, in the article “They’re Bringing Home Japanese Wives,” the invocation of the “Yellow Peril” suggests a far greater degree of racism existed than either Sayonara or the article “The Gentle Wolfhound” allow. Despite the fact that the majority of stories about these relationships quickly brush aside the racism faced by the couples, there are some exceptions. The 1952 movie “Japanese War Bride,” for example, utilizes the racist dislike of an American GI’s family for his new Japanese bride as a major plot device. Additionally, the narrative about these relationships does not leave space for tales of abandonment by American men of their Japanese women. Although this was a very common occurrence, only a few observers incorporated this reality into their construction of stories about these relationships. For example, Martin Brofenbrenner, in his 1952 novel Fusako and the Army, depicts a young, pregnant Japanese woman abandoned by her American lover. The power of the constructed romanticized narrative about interracial romance, however, rarely allowed its audience to

---

question whether everything about this love story was true. The next section will discuss what this narrative concealed about the Occupation and why.

SCAP’s promotion and acceptance of this narrative of love in the second half of the Occupation does not mean that SCAP lost control of its management of the intimate sphere. Although SCAP initially tried to make the boundary between occupied and occupier impermeable, it soon found that its fraternization ban was a practical impossibility. In a change of course, which roughly coincided with more general policy shifts in Occupied Japan in response to the increasing tensions of the Cold War, SCAP allowed correspondents in Japan to more freely document fraternization. These reporters, many of who later wrote the numerous novels and movies discussed here, portrayed fraternization in a positive light. Caroline Simpson, in her dissertation “American Orientalisms: The Gender and Cultural Policies of America’s Postwar Relationship with Japan,” argues that acceptance of fraternization did not erode the barrier between Americans and Japanese. Instead, I would argue that SCAP translated the categories of “occupier” and “occupied” into a different binary: one of “male” and “female.” The constructed romanticized love story, which celebrated an American man’s love for a Japanese woman despite the fact that she was a former enemy, condoned fraternization whilst still reinforcing notions of difference between Americans and Japanese. Policymakers and journalists could then use this narrative to describe the new relationship between the United States and Japan because it both maintained the power the Americans wanted to exert over Japan whilst positioning Japan as a junior ally in the Cold War.

---

IV. WRITING THE TRIUMPH OF THE OCCUPATION

The creation of an easily digestible narrative about fraternization enabled SCAP to control the intimate sphere and shape its connection to the political sphere. Additionally, such a process eased the various tensions the American public felt about its relationship to Japan. This constructed archetype about the love between an American GI and a Japanese woman both revealed and concealed different elements of the Occupation. For example, the stories about fraternization demonstrated American largesse and justice by illustrating the progress SCAP had made in terms of Japanese women’s rights. On the other hand, these love stories also hid the colonial role SCAP played in Japan, and limited American concerns about its role as conquerors and occupiers. Thus, the process of making the American presence in Japan palatable consisted of selectively representing American involvement in the country in order to write the history of the Occupation as a triumph of American power and democracy. This positive history is still historiographically dominant today (which the utilization of Japan as a successful example of democratization in many contemporary academic texts demonstrates) despite the emergence of critiques by feminist historians and oral history projects that challenge this positivity. Furthermore, John Dower, in his 2012 book *Ways of Forgetting, Ways of Remembering*, argues that contemporary politicians have misused the idea of Occupied Japan as an unmitigated success to justify current American military policy. Examples of contemporary scholars referring to the success of Occupied Japan, without qualification, include Michael Perry and William Easterly. John W. Dower, *Ways of Forgetting, Ways of Remembering: Japan in the Modern World* (New York: New Press, 2012), 256-60; Michael Perry, *The Idea of Human Rights: Four Inquiries* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 82; William Easterly, *The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good* (New York: Penguin Books, 2007), 332.
Creating a Victorious History

Both during and after the Occupation, the United States government wanted the American, as well as foreigners, to perceive the project as a success. A positive interpretation of the Occupation would justify America’s new pattern of foreign interventions after the conclusion of World War II. The Japanese government also wanted the Occupation to be a positive moment in their country’s history because it enabled the nation to replace its image as a militaristic imperial power with one of a pacifist democratic state. Even before the Occupation ended in 1952, SCAP actively sought to promote a positive historical account of the endeavor. On September 20, 1950, the Pacific Stars and Stripes ran an article entitled “MacArthur Foresees New Japan” in which the journalist, Bob Considine, explains MacArthur’s beliefs about the historical importance of the Occupation. Considine quotes General Douglas MacArthur at length:

[After their defeat] it was a time of great soul-searing [in Japan]. Into this vacuum walked the Anglo-Saxon influences of our occupation forces – a wholly new experience to a people almost wholly isolated for centuries and accustomed to complete domination of their bodies and spirits... We brought this [American idea of liberty] to the Japanese people in such a way that one thousand years from now the historian will give scant notice to the two great wars as peaks of significance in the first half of the 20th century.

MacArthur clearly believed that America’s project in Japan would have far-reaching consequences and be seen as a triumph of American values. The general claimed that Japan would be “an oasis of hope for the enslaved millions of Asiatics surrounding them.” Under American tutelage, MacArthur argued, Japan was a showcase of democratic principles and an ally of America in its Cold War struggle against Russia. Ultimately, SCAP believed that history

---

would recognize the Occupation’s vital contribution to American global power and define the project as an unmitigated success.

The narrative produced about war brides, discussed in the last section, played a significant role in constructing this victorious history. Mire Koikari argues that this process is incredibly significant because “in crucial though often unacknowledged ways, the gendered narrative of occupation has affected a cleansing of the images of two imperial nations with violent paths.”\(^{208}\) The constructed romanticized story about true love between a Japanese woman and a white American man helped paint a positive gloss over the Occupation project. This gloss conceals, however, the “nastier” side of the Occupation: the economic desperation of many of the Japanese women, the racism endured by the couples from both Japanese and American observers, and the “failed” romances that resulted in many fatherless children. Later secondary sources (often feminist critiques) and individual biographies captured in more recent oral history projects reveal this reality of fraternization, and highlight the flaws in the narrative created by the American press and government officials.

*Flaws in the Narrative*

The constructed romanticized narrative about fraternization often concealed the harsh economic disparity between Japanese and Americans, which forced many Japanese women to consider relationships with American men not solely for sentimental reasons, but also for economic motives. As discussed in the first section, many Japanese families in the postwar economy struggled to fulfill basic needs such as housing and food. In contrast, Americans in Occupied Japan had immense buying power because of the yen’s rampant inflation.\(^{209}\) The war

\(^{208}\) Koikari, *Pedagogy of Democracy*, 4-5.

\(^{209}\) During the later years of the Occupation, one dollar was worth approximately 360 yen. In contrast, today’s exchange rate is roughly one dollar for about 96 yen. Crawford, Hayashi, and Suenaga, *Japanese War Brides in America*, 88.
bride Toyoko Pier recalled how attractive she found her American boyfriend’s ability to buy her goods that she was otherwise unable to purchase.\(^{210}\) American servicemen’s purchasing power did not just serve to entice young women with small luxury items, but rather offered some women a solution to their serious economic needs. For example, Katsu Hall married Cecil Hall partially because it would enable her to eat regularly and her family would have one less hungry mouth to feed.\(^ {211}\) Another war bride, Mary Shizuka Bottomely, freely admitted to her interviewer that one of the reasons she married an American man was to escape Japan and go to America, a country that seemed to be full of plenty:

> I wanted to go the U.S. Japan in those days was like a Third World country: food was scarce and there was really nothing. Since I worked in the PX [post exchange: a military store where servicemen and their families could buy American goods] with Americans for six years, I had seen American goods and had come to know what kind of clothes and shoes American women wore. I learned that America was such a wealthy country.\(^ {212}\)

Clearly Bottomley’s reasons for marrying her husband Walter were far more complicated than a story about true love would allow; she recognized that marrying an American offered her an opportunity to escape the economic hardships of postwar Japan. The narrative constructed through the simultaneous efforts of the American press and officials presented a positive image of Occupied Japan and did not reveal the uneven economic dynamic that existed between Japanese women and American men.

In addition to women who decided to date and marry American men for economic reasons, there were countless Japanese women who worked as prostitutes in order to survive in the economically devastated country. One homeless widow described how she ended up trading sex for survival: “There were three consecutive days when I went without eating… [then a] man


\(^{211}\) *Japanese War Brides in America*, 45.

\(^{212}\) Mary Shizuka Bottomley quoted in *Japanese War Brides in America*, 175.
I did not know gave me two rice balls. I devoured them. The following night he again brought me two rice balls. He then asked me to come to the park because he wanted to talk with me. I followed him.” The young widow’s story demonstrates the darker side of Occupied Japan concealed by the positive tales of romance between Japanese women and American servicemen.

The hungry woman’s unplanned fall into prostitution was fairly common. Many of the young women hired by the officially sponsored brothels, set up by the Japanese government in the beginning of the Occupation, also did so out of desperation or, in some cases, naivety. Recruiters for the brothels told young women that they were to help “promote the mutual understanding between [the Allied occupation forces] and our people.” Soon, these women realized that this “mutual understanding” meant servicing between fifteen and sixty GIs a day. One teenaged girl, who had been a typist during the war, committed suicide only a few days into the Occupation. Although these official brothels predatorily hired desperate women to cater to Americans, there is some evidence that they may have partially helped to mitigate the number of sexual assaults perpetrated by American servicemen. The historian Yoshimi Kaneko has estimated that 40 Japanese women were sexually assaulted or raped by American GIs everyday whilst the RAA was operating; once SCAP abolished the RAA, the number of daily sexual assaults increased to 330. The fate of these sexual assault victims and prostitutes remains unaddressed or unknown by history. Whilst SCAP talked about democratizing the defeated country, providing opportunities to its citizens, and creating a new ally in the Cold War, many women were forced to make desperate choices in order to survive and coerced into providing sex

---

213 McClain, Japan, 533.
214 I talked about these official brothels, and SCAP’s reaction to them, in my second section.
215 Official statement by Tokyo RAA quoted in Dower, Embracing Defeat, 128.
216 Embracing Defeat, 129.
217 Yoshimi Kaneko cited in Embracing Defeat, 529, n16.
to American soldiers; the narrative about love and romance between American men and Japanese women hid this unpleasant aspect of the Occupation.

The love stories about these marriages also did not include the opinions of the Japanese people who surrounded the women who dated American men. Oftentimes, families of war brides disowned them and strangers looked down upon them for associating with American men. The anger from their fellow countrymen that many of the war brides experienced was due to the common attitude that they were “traitors” for marrying Japan’s former enemy. Toyoko Pier’s father, who served in the Imperial Japanese Army in Manchuria, was distraught when he heard she wanted to marry an American. “Her father said, ‘I am sorry for my comrades in Manchuria because my daughter married the former enemy.’ He cried. He felt he had to apologize to his comrades who lost their lives in the battles.”218 Some women reported that their own families rejected them after they started dating American GIs. Miwako Cleve remembers how when she told her family she wanted to marry Robert Cleve, her brother told her, “You can do whatever you want to. Go ahead [and marry Robert], but never come back to the front door!”219 Although Cleve later reconciled with her parents, the division in her family after she decided to marry an American was common. Many of the sources that contributed to the production of the narrative about these relationships diminished the connection the Japanese women in the stories had to Japanese soldiers by not mentioning whether the women’s male family members were soldiers. Individual biographies of real war brides highlight the fact that the women all had male relatives who served in the military and emphasize the controversial choice they made to marry the former enemy. Since the constructed love story about fraternization wanted to frame Japanese citizens as

---

219 Miwako Cleve quoted in *Japanese War Brides in America*, 33.
new allies of America, the narrative downplayed the fact that the couples were former enemies in very personal ways.

In addition to their friends and family’s rejection of their relationship with the former enemy, many Japanese war brides faced criticism from strangers because there was a common assumption that all women who associated with American men were prostitutes. Setusko Anburn recalls an occasion when she was walking with her American husband down a street in Sapporo and a Japanese man shouted “pan pan,” the Japanese word for a prostitute who explicitly catered to American soldiers, at her. Another war bride, Setsuko Copeland, describes a similar experience:

> In Japan, sometimes I was treated rather coldly by other Japanese just because my boyfriend was an American GI…When we go [sic] downtown in Shinsaibashi with Bill, some people called out embarrassing names to me which made me blush. There were women in many difficult situations in those days. Even though I wasn’t one of them, I was treated like them, just because I was seen with an American.

Copeland and Anburn’s experiences with being publically shamed for their relationships with Americans were common, yet the narrative the American public received glossed over this assumption most people in Japan made about these women. One of the reasons for the love story’s omission of this unpleasant fact was, as Copeland identifies, that economic circumstances forced women to prostitute themselves to Americans and this exploitation did not fit into the larger American reframing of its new relationship with Japan. This did not mean, however, that American officials in Japan did not share the same assumptions as the Japanese public about the Japanese women who dated American men. Before Japanese women were allowed to marry American GIs, they endured a rigorous background check and were forced to prove that they

\[220\] Crawford, Hayashi, and Suenaga, War Brides in America, 33.
\[221\] Japanese War Brides in America, 115.
\[222\] Setsuko Copeland quoted in Japanese War Brides in America, 185.
were not prostitutes (or communists).\(^{223}\) Thus, despite the creation of a positive narrative about fraternization, those who actually witnessed these relationships, rather than learning about them as in the press, remained deeply uneasy about their morality.

Although many of the newspaper articles, novels, and movies very briefly alluded to American authorities’ resistance to the marriages between Japanese women and American men, these sources rarely conveyed the true extent of the bureaucratic procedures designed to prevent such marriages. There were two major sets of hurdles that the couples had to overcome in order to get married. First, the American serviceman had to receive permission from his commanding officer to marry a Japanese woman. In a 1952 article in the *Pacific Stars & Stripes*, the journalist Sandy Colton reported that a GI needed to complete a dossier with 23 items in order to apply for permission to marry. These requirements included medical forms, police reports, character references, and interviews.\(^{224}\) The process often took many months, sometimes a full year. Even when the couple had submitted the appropriate paperwork, they were not guaranteed permission to marry from the American military.\(^{225}\)

Many servicemen, who ultimately successfully received this permission, felt that the whole process was designed to discourage the couple from trying to marry. The Marine Corps was notorious for using bureaucracy to prevent its members from marrying Japanese women; commanding officers commonly transferred men who were interested in marrying a local woman to a different base in order to separate them.\(^{226}\) John and Noboku Howard, after they were denied permission to marry, decided to try and force John’s commanding officer’s hand by getting

---

\(^{226}\) *Japanese War Brides in America*, 237.
pregnant: luckily for them, their “shotgun marriage” attempt was successful.227 Another serviceman, Allan Stevens, describes the application process as “deliberately long and tedious:”

That was to protect the guys who didn’t know what they were doing. I didn’t learn that until I spent almost thirty years in the Marine Corps –they were trying to protect us. Then again, it was none of their business. I was over twenty-one years old, I could marry anybody in the States, but that was the way it was –the paperwork.228

Stevens’ sympathetic interpretation of the American military’s policies suggests that it was not only because of SCAP resistance to fraternization continuing beyond the confines of the Occupation that military personnel tried to prevent these marriages, but also that officers were worried that the young men did not know the consequences of miscegenation in America at the time. Sandy Colton’s1952 Pacific Stars & Stripes article also explains this concern: “Many officials still fear prejudices, narrow mindedness and callousness among some individuals against the brides once they reach the States…As one Tokyo Air Force chaplain put it: ‘I try to prepare them for the most shocking experience possible. If it doesn’t turn out that bad, so much the better.’”229 Of course, as Stevens points out, all of these men were adults and perfectly within their rights to marry whomever they wanted.

The mainstream media, except for the military newspaper the Pacific Stars & Stripes, also did not mention the second bureaucratic hurdle: the immigration barriers faced by Japanese women. During the period of the Occupation, numerous exclusionary immigration laws applied to Japanese war brides. The Immigration Act of 1924 (also known as the Johnson-Reed Act of 1924) barred “all aliens ineligible for citizenship” under previous immigration laws, which included Japanese nationals, from immigrating to the United States and was in effect throughout

227 Crawford, Hayashi, and Suenaga, Japanese War Brides in America, 57.
228 Allan Stevens quoted in Japanese War Brides in America, 70.
the Occupation. The blanket exclusion of Japanese because of racial origin was not overturned until the Act of June 27, 1952 (popularly known as the McCarran-Walter Act), which eliminated racial barriers to naturalization and immigration – although the Act’s provision for the Asia-Pacific Triangle set Japan’s immigration quota at 100. The Act of December 28, 1945 (also known as the War Brides’ Act of 1945) was designed to facilitate the immigration of women who had married American servicemen stationed abroad by admitting these war brides with nonquota status, which meant that they were not subject to the various national origin quotas enforced by previous statutes. It did not, however, provide an exemption for Japanese women excluded under the 1924 immigration bill. In 1947, Congress passed Public Law 213, which provided a thirty-day exception, from July 22nd to August 22nd 1946, to the Immigration Act of 1924. SCAP used the first two weeks of this period to design a procedure through which servicemen could apply for the immigration exception; this left two weeks for couples to gather the appropriate paperwork and apply. Not unsurprisingly, many couples missed the deadline.

Some American GIs petitioned their congressmen to introduce Private Laws into Congress to provide individual war brides an exception from the Immigration Act of 1924. For example, Congressman Burnside of West Virginia introduced Private Law 594 to the 81st

---


Congress, which explicitly allowed Fumiko Tomita Ward and Erio Tomita Ward entrance to the United States as permanent residents despite their exclusion under existing immigration laws.235 Additionally, a Japanese-American lobby group petitioned Congress throughout the Occupation to draft new legislation to allow war brides who were “racially inadmissible” permission to enter the country.236 Their efforts only achieved success after the Occupation officially ended, with the McCarran-Walter Act, although it did enable American servicemen still stationed there to marry local women.237 This complicated array of constantly changing immigration laws that faced Japanese women and American men was not included in the constructed love story about their relationships because it diminished the romance of the narrative as well as highlighting the increasingly uncomfortable racist stance that America had against its new Cold War ally in East Asia.

The fraternization love story portrayed in the American press, and encouraged and adopted by SCAP, made individual relationships between American men and Japanese women, as well as the new alliance between the two countries, palatable. This narrative, however, did not include the possibility of such romances failing, yet approximately 100,000 Japanese women were abandoned by their American lovers and left to raise any mixed-raced children on their own.238 The Japanese press, as well as the friends and family of women who dated American men, frequently referred to the story of Madame Butterfly as a warning to young Japanese women.239 Setsuko Amburn recalls the first American man with whom she fell in love. After he returned to the United States, he never contacted her again; when she wrote to his mother in

239 *Japanese War Brides in America*, 110.
Florida, Amburn received a letter telling her that the young man had married an American girl, despite his promises to Amburn.\textsuperscript{240} Although American GIs did frequently abandon their Japanese girlfriends after they rotated back to the United States, the discourse about these relationships gradually erased this possibility.\textsuperscript{241}

Additionally, the narrative never addressed the “problem” of the mixed-race children produced by fraternization. Neither the Japanese nor the American public approved of interracial progeny because of a fear that their existence would blur racial boundaries. Due to this concern, the majority of Japanese and Americans condemned interracial marriages. In 1947, 90 percent of Japanese disapproved of miscegenation.\textsuperscript{242} Similarly, 99 percent of Americans in the South, and 92 percent in the North, disagreed with mixed-race marriages.\textsuperscript{243} SCAP took harsh measures against those who discussed interracial progeny in Japan. Ten months after the beginning of the Occupation, a radio announcer reported that the first mixed-race baby had been born; he described it as “the first Occupation present.” SCAP ordered the radio station to fire the announcer and thereafter censored any mention of these babies by the Japanese press.\textsuperscript{244}

The Americans also avoided the topic of interracial progeny themselves. The Japanese Ministry of Welfare’s Institute of Population Problems asked for SCAP’s statistics on mixed-race babies, but SCAP had not collected any. Colonel Crawford Sams, head of SCAP’s Public Health and Welfare Section, did not want to gather statistics on the products of fraternization because SCAP did not want to “probe so serious a wound.”\textsuperscript{245} Instead, Sams declared that all

\textsuperscript{240} Japanese War Brides in America, 113.
\textsuperscript{241} Although, as mentioned in the previous section, Sayonara ends with Gruver leaving Hana-Ogi the movie version changes this ending. Additionally, Hana-Ogi in the book accepts that Gruver will ultimately leave her, whereas in many cases, real Japanese women did not know that their American boyfriends were going to abandon them until they never heard from the men again.
\textsuperscript{242} Lark, “They Challenged Two Nations”, 209.
\textsuperscript{243} May, Homeward Bound, 11.
\textsuperscript{244} Koshiro, Trans-Pacific Racisms and the U.S. Occupation of Japan, 159.
\textsuperscript{245} Trans-Pacific Racisms and the U.S. Occupation of Japan, 161.
mixed-race progeny should be officially listed as Japanese.\textsuperscript{246} SCAP wanted to conceal mixed-race children both because the American and Japanese public generally disapproved of interracial mixing and because the children represented a byproduct of the unequal power dynamic between Americans and Japanese during the Occupation. Although there are no official statistics, due to SCAP’s reticence about the topic, many Japanese women abandoned their socially unacceptable mixed-raced children if the child’s father had left them.\textsuperscript{247} As Norma Fields, a mixed-race child of the Occupation, writes, “the biracial offspring of war are at once more offensive and intriguing because they bear the imprint of sex as domination.”\textsuperscript{248} The narrative about fraternization between American men and Japanese women could not include the stories of the mixed-race progeny of these relationships abandoned by their fathers because they revealed the vast inequality between the two parties.

The love story about the relationships between American men and Japanese women had a happy ending: the couple went to America lived out the rest their lives in domestic bliss. The narrative’s happy ending went unquestioned, but it conceals the reality that many of the war bride’s relationships were not picture perfect. For example, Shigeko Cubillos’ husband Genaro was controlling and demanding throughout their marriage. Cubillos recalls, “Once he made a decision, nobody challenged it.”\textsuperscript{249} Disowned by most of her family for marrying an American and isolated on an air force base in California, Cubillos was desperately unhappy. She tried to escape her marriage several times, but was scared that if she left she would never see her daughter again.\textsuperscript{250} Cubillos’ unhappy marriage to her American husband, and others like it, did

\textsuperscript{246} Trans-Pacific Racisms and the U.S. Occupation of Japan, 162.
\textsuperscript{247} Crawford, Hayashi, and Suenaga, Japanese War Brides in America, 249.
\textsuperscript{249} Crawford, Hayashi, and Suenaga, Japanese War Brides in America, 136.
\textsuperscript{250} Japanese War Brides in America, 130-38.
not fit within the positive narrative about relationships between Japanese women and American GIs and the possibility of these marriages failing, therefore, was erased.

In her analysis of colonial powers’ attempts to control the intimate sphere, Ann Laura Stoler argues, “the habits of the heart and comportment have been recruited to the service of colonial governance but never wholly subsumed by it.”251 The intersections of policy-making, public discourse, and individual relationships reveal this tension in Occupied Japan. On the one hand, SCAP’s policies and rhetoric about the Occupation are all contained within its management of the intimate. On the other hand, individual biographies of war brides, revealed by later oral history projects, resist colonial control over their intimate relationships; the constructed romanticized narrative about fraternization attempted, but did not completely succeed, in concealing the harsh reality of the Occupation. Nonetheless, the intimate sphere is clearly central to the Occupation of Japan and America’s management of the Cold War alliance with its former enemy. Thus, the Occupation of Japan was an intimate occupation as much as it was a military occupation.

251 Stoler, "Intimidations of Empire: Predicaments of the Tactile and Unseen," 8.
CONCLUSION

In 1955, *The American Mercury* published a story by Hugh O’Reilly entitled “Our East-West Marriage is Working.” O’Reilly, a Marine whose charitable work for a Japanese orphanage and marriage to a Japanese woman was featured in a *New Yorker* article two years earlier, strived to convince his readers that his interracial marriage was a success. In the piece, O’Reilly tries to normalize the marriages between American servicemen and Japanese women by emphasizing their similarities to relationships between two Americans lovers:

As to why “our boys” marry Japanese girls, my answer is: For the very same reasons that people anywhere get married! I don’t think nationality makes a lot of difference when a boy and a girl find what they’re looking for in each other’s eyes—and apparently an awful lot of other men have felt the same way. You meet a girl, talk, have a few dates and your personalities just seem to blend together in a way that promises happiness for both of you. I’ve talked with hundreds of men who, like myself, brought Japanese brides to this country and, although each of them has his own way of phrasing it, the reason they married are the same men have given since time began.

On one level, O’Reilly was completely correct that his relationship with Yuko Saito was not extraordinary. Like the majority of relationships between American men and Japanese women, love and mutual affection formed the base of their marriage. O’Reilly’s normalization of these marriages and reduction of their significance to one of simple romance, however, conceals their exceptionalism. These relationships took on a much greater meaning because of SCAP and the American press’ integration of fraternization into the larger narrative about the Occupation of Japan. Although these marriages were very personal and individual, the personal was also utilized as part of the political.

Like all colonial architects before them, SCAP needed to quickly establish a hierarchy in order to maintain control because the Americans in Occupied Japan were far outnumbered by

---

Japanese nationals. Ann Laura Stoler argues that colonial authority was founded on two ideas that were not necessarily true. The first premise was that the colonizers were “an easily identifiable and discrete biological and social entity.” The second premise was that there was a clearly distinguishable boundary between colonizer and colonized. These interrelated ideas formed “interior frontiers” between the white authorities and the non-white subjects, and demarcated who had control and power and who did not. Stoler argues that colonists’ management of sexual relations between colonizer and colonized was integral in maintaining the hierarchy of power between the two groups. She claims, “sexual control was both an instrumental image for the body politics, a salient part standing for the whole, and itself fundamental… [to] how colonial projects were carried out.”

In Occupied Japan, SCAP initially tried to maintain control by enforcing a non-fraternization policy. Within the first few months of the Occupation, however, American authorities realized that American servicemen were ignoring this ban. Just as SCAP’s policies on managing the intimate sphere replicated European colonial policy in Asia, so did the response of individuals stationed in Japan; Stoler claims that “illegitimate unions between native women and European men” were common and “were woven into the fabric of colonial governance, sometimes circumventing the strictures of governance, elsewhere defining the social distinctions that colonial policy accentuated and brought into play.” This is exactly what happened during the American Occupation of Japan. Sexual fraternization between American GIs and Japanese women was in direct contradiction to official policy, but eventually these couples’ continued resistance to this policy made SCAP reevaluate its management of the intimate sphere. Although

254 Stoler, "Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power," 52.
255 "Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power," 85.
256 "Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power," 52.
257 "Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power," 88.
258 Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power, 11.
SCAP continued to forbid Occupation personnel from fraternizing with prostitutes, due to the risk of venereal disease, it began to tacitly accept more long-term relationships between American men and Japanese women.

SCAP policy over fraternization was forced to evolve further when GIs began to advocate for the right to marry their Japanese lovers. Since it was bad publicity on the home front to deny the desires of one of America’s greatest World War II heroes, the American GI, SCAP had to delicately navigate its conflicting need to maintain sexual control and placate its own people.\textsuperscript{259} Caroline Simpson argues that this problem fortuitously arose at the same moment that SCAP and the American government in Washington decided to reframe the country’s relationship with Japan.\textsuperscript{260} As the Cold War escalated, the Americans wanted to transform Japan from a defeated Second World War enemy into a Cold War ally. As part of this process, the American government needed to convince the American public that this shift in foreign policy was not a betrayal of the American lives lost defeating Japan. Thus, the government began to portray the new relationship with its former enemy in terms of a “natural” hierarchy: male over female.\textsuperscript{261} This gendering of America’s relationship with Japan allowed fraternization between American GIs and Japanese women to become “an integral part” of the way Americans conceived of Japan.\textsuperscript{262}

The process of incorporating the interracial marriages between American servicemen and Japanese women into the larger narrative about the new Cold War relationship between the two countries was unchoreographed. Once SCAP allowed the American press in Japan to cover fraternization, journalists started to use pictures of attractive Japanese women on the arms of

\begin{minipage}{\textwidth}
\textsuperscript{260} "American Orientalisms," 176.
\textsuperscript{261} Shibusawa, \textit{America’s Geisha Ally}, 10.
\end{minipage}
American soldiers in reports about Occupied Japan and write positive articles about these relationships. These images soon became symbols of the greater American project in Japan: to democratize the country and make it a junior partner in the struggle against communism. The process of formulating a new narrative was cyclical: SCAP allowed the American press corps in Japan greater freedom in what they could cover, the American journalists altered the American public’s perceptions of Japan, public perceptions then influenced SCAP policy, and so on. Each actor in this cycle amplified the actions of the other actors. Thus, through a positive feedback loop, a narrative about both the relationships between GIs and Japanese women and the relationship between American and Japan emerged.

This narrative changed the terms for SCAP’s management of the intimate sphere, but not the underlying structure. Whereas, at the beginning of the Occupation, SCAP had focused on maintaining the internal frontier between “occupier” and “occupied” by banning all forms of fraternization, SCAP gradually allowed and even embraced fraternization, and changed the power binary into gendered terms: “male” versus “female.” Thus, despite the change in SCAP policy regarding various forms of relationships between American men and Japanese women over time, the ultimate purpose of SCAP’s actions never changed. The American authorities wanted to retain their control over Japan, whether as the victor conquering a defeated land or the global hegemon directing a junior ally.

The constructed romanticized narrative formed by this positive feedback loop concealed many of the unpleasant truths about the Occupation, such as the power inequality and economic disparity between the Americans and Japanese. This story of love conquering all selectively represented America’s involvement in Japan and denied the strong colonial overtones the

---

Occupation had developed. Later interviews with war brides reveal how the constructed narrative reduced their experiences to a simple narrative of love and romance and erased the complex motivations and factors behind their decision to marry an American man. Through oral history, Japanese war brides have gained a voice, but the dominant framework that SCAP and the American press constructed around these women’s relationships still remains and it does not allow them to be more than passive objects. Indeed, the story produced by the positive feedback loop between SCAP, American journalists, and the American public proved to be a very useful and enduring tool for maintaining the power hierarchy between America and Japan. The narrative allowed the American government to write the history of the Occupation as a story of triumph. By managing the intimate sphere, both by controlling sexual relationships between individuals and the perception of such relationships by the American public, SCAP maintained the crucial distinction between occupier and occupied and the power of Americans to determine the history of the Occupation.

Americans employed these same strategies in a variety of other countries during the later half of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century. For example, a key part of the rehabilitation of Germany as an ally involved its feminization; like in Japan, fraternization, played an important role in this gendering of Germany. American servicemen in Germany, as in Japan, were initially banned from fraternizing with local civilians.265 This ban, however, soon proved ineffective as American GIs ignored the prohibition on engaging in relationships with German women.266 As VD rates among military personnel in all zones of the Allied Occupation soared –in August 1945, some American units had infection rates as high as 89 percent –both the American and other Allied military commands ran a campaign warning

soldiers about the spread of VD.\textsuperscript{267} The historian Petra Goedde argues that German women were often motivated to sleep with American soldiers in return for economic gain, such as food and clothing, whereas American men were mainly interested in sex and the opportunity to be a benevolent provider.\textsuperscript{268} American soldiers’ eventual demands to the American authorities to allow them to marry their German lovers parallel the same demands made by American GIs in Japan. The fraternization ban officially ended in Germany in October 1945 and the military allowed U.S. servicemen to marry local women in December 1946.\textsuperscript{269}

Goedde argues that the personnel relationships between German women and American GIs contributed to the feminization of Germany in the eyes of the American public after World War II. This feminization shifted the image of Germany from a militaristic, Nazi state to one of a country full of vulnerable women who needed America’s help to prevent the spread of communism in Europe.\textsuperscript{270} The development of fraternization policies in Germany and their impact on the framing of the new geopolitical relationship between Germany and the United States after the Second World War closely parallels the situation in Occupied Japan. The crucial difference is that the Americans viewed Germans as white, whereas the Japanese were classified as non-white. Thus, the racial aspect in Occupied Japan did not exist in the same way in Occupied Japan. This explains the greater reluctance by SCAP to accept fraternization and marriage in Japan, since most Americans still disapproved of miscegenation.\textsuperscript{271} German war brides were also not subject to exclusionary American immigration laws, unlike their Japanese counterparts. The comparison between the American authorities’ reaction to fraternization in

\textsuperscript{267} Goedde, "From Villains to Victims," 9; Culbert, "It Started with a Kiss," 3.
\textsuperscript{268} Goedde, "From Villains to Victims," 8-9.
\textsuperscript{269} "From Villains to Victims," 11.
\textsuperscript{270} "From Villains to Victims," 2, 20.
\textsuperscript{271} May, Homeward Bound, 11.
Japan and in Germany illuminates the similarities in rehabilitating a former enemy by feminizing it, as well as the different nuances the issue of race adds to the situation.

Only a few years after the end of the Occupation of Germany, and whilst America was still occupying Japan, the United States’ framed its relationship with Korea, both during and after the Korean War, in gendered terms as well. Historian Ji-Yeon Yuh argues that the power dynamic between the countries was (and, in some ways, still is) gendered, “with Korea inscribed as the feminine other in need of protection and the United States playing the role of the masculine superior and guardian.”272 Similar to the situation in Occupied Japan, sexual fraternization between American soldiers and Korean women both reflected and reinforced this gendered discourse.

The circumstances surrounding sexual interactions between American servicemen and Korean women in Korea are comparable to the circumstances in Japan. For example, many American men interacted with Korean women who worked as prostitutes specifically catering to the foreign soldiers.273 Additionally, poverty and a lack of opportunities incentivized women to sleep with Americans in return for unaffordable American luxuries, such as spam and chocolate.274 Furthermore, whilst the American military officially disapproved of fraternization because of the threat of VD, many commanding officers would ignore their men’s Korean mistresses as long as the men did not try to marry these women and bring them back to the United States.275 Once men did try to bring their Korean lovers into the United States as their wives, these women, like their Japanese counterparts, faced racially exclusive immigration

---

272 Yuh, Beyond the Shadow of Camptown, 10.
273 Beyond the Shadow of Camptown, 20.
274 Beyond the Shadow of Camptown, 34.
275 Beyond the Shadow of Camptown, 14, 25.
laws. In contrast with the circumstances surrounding fraternization in Japan, however, there is a key difference with the situation in Korea: most (South) Koreans viewed the United States as “a liberator, not a colonizer,” whereas the Americans were the conquerors in Japan. This difference meant that the gendered discourse surrounding America’s relationship with Korea worked to convince the American public of the need to protect the “feminine” Korea, whereas in Japan this framework strove to explain to Americans why their country was now treating Japan as an ally, rather than an enemy. As in Japan and Germany, the American military in Korea had many of the same reactions to fraternization between its soldiers and local women, although the specific contingencies of each country created differences in both the mechanics and reception of sexual fraternization.

The American military had similar reactions to fraternization in Japan, Germany, and Korea and repeatedly employed a gendered discourse to describe its relationship with all three of these countries. These repetitions demonstrate that the utility of using easily understood hierarchies, such as male over female, to explain political relationships and the slippage in this gendered framework between the political and personal are not unique to Occupied Japan. The presence of these elements in a particular historical moment offer a entry point for exploring the dynamics of the situation and the important, but often partially concealed, connections between the intimate sphere and the political sphere, which the United States frequently capitalized upon as it emerged as a super power after World War II.

The legacy of the American Occupation of Japan continues today. The strong alliance the United States has with Japan still shapes, in part, current international politics in East Asia.

276 Beyond the Shadow of Camptown, 2.
277 Beyond the Shadow of Camptown, 35.
278 For example, the current dispute between China and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands involves the United States because the islands are covered by the defense treaty between Japan and the United States, signed at
The enduring significance of the Occupation means that it remains important for historians to study and question the triumphal narrative that continues to frame America’s involvement in the region. The relationships between American GIs and Japanese women in Occupied Japan are important because they appreciably influenced SCAP policy and the history it wrote of the Occupation. More recent oral history projects reveal the discrepancies between war brides’ biographies and the official narrative surrounding war brides and thus demonstrate how selective the history of the Occupation was. Although highly significant, the relationships between American GIs and Japanese women certainly do not tell the entire story of the Occupation, but the framework they provide to the study of the Occupation is incredibly useful. For example, the analysis in this thesis raises other key questions not answered here, such as: where are the Japanese men in this story and what resistance did individual Japanese assert against the American history of the occupation of their country? The American Occupation of Japan was an incredibly complicated moment, constructed by numerous actors, but official histories have reduced the story to a few main characters; looking at those individuals overshadowed by this history creates a more complete picture of the Occupation.

Hisa Tanaka and Robert Feragen, the couple with which this story began, were married for 51 years, until Robert passed away. Their relationship was like that of thousands of other couples who met during the Occupation: it was simultaneously both incredibly politically significant and perfectly normal, ordinary, and personal. Although Hisa and Robert were part of a transformational moment in which the United States established itself as one of two superpowers during the Cold War and began to redefine its relationship to other countries in those terms, the two lovers never defined themselves as part of this political process. The couple
lived out the rest of their lives in domestic harmony in America: Robert retired from the Army after 25 years of service and Hisa raised their two children.\textsuperscript{279} The Feragens, along with the approximately 100,000 other Japanese-American marriages formed in Occupied Japan, disappeared into the fabric of American life, as the story of their love continued on as part of the narrative surrounding the American Occupation of Japan.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources


"Clarification Due on Marriage Bill." *Pacific Stars and Stripes*, 4 Sep, 1950, 1.


"GI Brides from Orient Allowed to Enter U.S.". *Pacific Stars and Stripes*, 23 Mar, 1951.


"No More Registrations Taken for Brides School." Pacific Stars and Stripes, 2 April, 1951, 2.


Secondary Sources


Lark, Regina F. "They Challenged Two Nations: Marriages between Japanese Women and American GIs, 1945 to the Present." University of Southern California, 1999.


