A Gricean Analysis of Tom Stoppard's "Arcadia": Extending Pragmatics to Literature

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"For the linguist, integrating literature into the general schema of discourse theory means taking into his purview a body of data he has often been more than content to ignore. But that body of data is also one that can provide him with important insights into areas and aspects of nonliterary discourse that have been problematic or invisible to him in the past." -Mary Louise Pratt, Toward a Speech Act Theory of Literary Discourse, p. viii

Introduction

The quotation above proposes a line of inquiry which, although it may be a challenge, may also offer tremendous rewards for the field of pragmatics and discourse analysis*. In this paper, I will take Pratt up on her challenge to examine literature with a linguist’s eye, hoping by doing so to make headway toward the "important insights" which she writes of.

More specifically, I will examine data from Tom Stoppard's 1993 play Arcadia, and will analyze it with respect to Grice's theory of conversational implicature as written in his 1967 paper "Logic and Conversation". I will show that an application of Grice’s theory yields an analysis of this data which is correct but incomplete; I will then propose an expanded analysis.

Structurally, this paper will proceed as follows. First, I will provide the reader with background information about Grice, about Arcadia, and about some general points. Second, I will present my data: several sample passages from Arcadia and the implicatures they create, which a theory should account for. As will be seen, some quotations lend themselves to a simple, straightforward analysis; others, however, are more complicated. I will then propose an analysis, based in Grice's, which accounts for this data. Finally, I will speculate on the relevance of this inquiry to other related endeavors.

Background: Grice

Grice’s paper “Logic and Conversation” proposes that formal rules govern conversational

*I would like to thank Dana Bidetti, Sara Coe, Ted Fernald, and Kari Swingle for their help and valuable insights.
utterances. Grice begins with the principle that conversations, which he refers to as “talk exchanges” (Grice 1967; 66) are inherently cooperative. Speakers and listeners involved in talk exchanges, he writes, share “a common purpose or set of purposes, or at least a mutually accepted direction” (Grice 1967; 66). To this end, talk exchange participants are expected to follow what Grice calls the Cooperative Principle:

(1) Cooperative Principle

Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.

(Grice 1967; 67)

Grice then outlines four maxims, which he calls Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Manner, that conversation participants use to fulfill this Cooperative Principle. These are:

(2) Grice's Maxims

Quantity: Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange), and do not make your contribution more informative than is required

Quality: Do not say what you believe to be false

Relation: Be relevant

Manner: Avoid obscurity of expression, avoid ambiguity, be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity), be orderly

(Grice 1967; 67)

He furthermore proposes that when a speaker intentionally violates a maxim (an act he calls flouting) a particular effect is achieved. When a speaker flouts a maxim, the corresponding (assumed to be rational) hearer is able to calculate what Grice calls an implicature; that is, a rational
hearer can deduce what the speaker *meant* based on the fact that what he *said* did not appear to obey the Cooperative Principle.

Grice provides several examples to illustrate this concept. One of these examples involves the following scenario:

Suppose that A and B are talking about a mutual friend C, who is now working in a bank. A asks B how C is getting on in his job, and B replies, "Oh quite well, I think; he likes his colleagues, and he hasn't been to prison yet".

(Grice 1967; 65)

Later in his paper, Grice works out the steps which A might reason through to arrive at the conclusion that B's answer implied that C is "the sort of person likely to yield to the temptation provided by his occupation" (Grice 1967; 69). Although Grice's formulation of these steps is more verbal than formulaic, I abstract from it the following form1:

(3) **Calculating implicatures**

a. P asserts q2 to R in Context O.

b. assertion of q in Context O violates some maxim

c. nevertheless R assumes P is being cooperative

d. therefore R reasons that P must mean something other than Q when he asserts q

In the example above, this formulation applies as follows:

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1I am indebted to Kari Swingle for this formulation.

2Technically, what is asserted is a *statement*, while pragmatics concerns itself with *propositions*. This distinction is not relevant to this paper, however, so for this purpose I collapse this distinction.
(4) Implicature Calculation - Grice example

a. B asserts the statement that C has not yet been to prison to A in answer to a question regarding C's job.
b. Assertion of this statement in this context violates the maxim of Relation
c. Nevertheless A assumes that B is being cooperative.
d. Therefore A reasons that B must mean something other than C's lack of having been to prison when he asserts that C has not yet been to prison.

(based on Grice 1967; 69)

Background: General Points

Under this heading, I would like to clarify some reasoning, and also discuss some potentially-problematic features, before I actually present my data. The first point which I feel deserves attention concerns why examining a play through Gricean analysis is a productive and interesting endeavor.

In his paper "Dramatic Discourse", Hess-Luttich (1985) writes that "literary texts may serve as examples or paradigms for rules of everyday communication"; he argues that conversations within works of literature are "analytically pure in comparison with everyday discourse" (Hess-Luttich 1985; 203). That is, such conversations usually lack the syntactic, phonetic, and turn-taking deviances which often occur in everyday speech. These conversations, in his opinion, serve as convenient models for the sort of conversation that discourse theory in general is concerned with.

Although I partially agree with this viewpoint, I also feel that it may not be an appropriate one to take. I do not hold that literary conversations form better material for Gricean analysis than regular one-on-one conversations do; contrary to the view of Hess-Luttich, I think that Grice intended his theory to explain real conversations rather than artificial analogs of them. I do, however, feel that a Gricean analysis of literature can be rewarding and interesting in its own right. Perhaps such analyses can indeed assist in the understanding of real conversations; I will speculate
further on this point later in this paper.

For explaining why a play in particular should provide interesting data to work with, I draw on both Ohmann 1972 and my own ideas. In what has been described as "the earliest published attempt to apply speech act theory\(^3\) to literature" (Coulthard 1985; 180), Ohmann writes that plays provide particularly clear vehicles for doing the above (Ohmann 1972; 54); he does not, however, elaborate on this statement.

Filling in my own elaboration, I add that in a play, unlike in poems/novels/short stories, all of the language used is in the form of a dialogue; other factors, such as narration and description, are not present to interfere. Additionally, a performance of a play in which real people speak real words is closer in form to an actual conversation than are written words on the pages of a book.

As mentioned above, some issues present themselves as problematic to the work I undertake in the rest of this paper. A major issue lies at the very core of Grice's analysis. Grice bases his maxims, the violation of which creates implicatures, on the idea that conversations are cooperative (see (1) above). As mentioned above, I will be claiming that implicatures can be calculated in the play *Arcadia*; however, is it really possible to say that a work of literature is "cooperative"? I believe that this is a question for literature theory, not linguistics. Therefore, for now, I will acknowledge the issue presented by this condition, and will assume it resolved for the time being.

**Background: Arcadia**

I have already established why I feel that working with a play, as opposed to any other type of literature, may be particularly productive. In this section, I will explain why Tom Stoppard's *Arcadia* in particular is a appropriate choice; additionally, I will provide the background information of literature, may be particularly productive. In this section, I will explain why Tom Stoppard's *Arcadia* in particular is a appropriate choice; additionally, I will provide the background information about the play which is necessary to understand the data I draw from it.

*Arcadia* provides a good example to work with for several reasons. First, *Arcadia*’s unique

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\(^3\) Speech act theory is the branch of pragmatics which asserts that certain types of statements have certain effects in the extra-linguistic world. Grice (1967) is considered an important paper in speech act theory.
structure, which alternates between a past and a present time period, makes it a good candidate for the type of analysis I want to work on. Although in nearly all plays, there are situations in which the audience knows more than the characters (a crucial point for this analysis, as will be seen), the time-alternation in this play makes such a characteristic especially evident. Additionally, it is a work which I am very familiar with; this familiarity has lead me to a high degree of understanding of, and interest in, this play. Finally, the literature on the subject supports my choice; Hess-Luttich (1985) recommends works by Tom Stoppard for this sort of analysis, writing that Stoppard is a playwright "who supplies very rewarding source texts for conversational analysis" (Hess-Luttich 1985; 202).

Because I am analyzing a work which may be unfamiliar to my readers, I will take a moment here to explain the basic structure, plot, and characters of the play. As mentioned above, one of the unique characteristics of Arcadia involves its alternation between a modern-day (1993) setting and an 1809 one. The main 1809 characters are Thomasina, a 13-year-old girl; Augustus, her brother; Septimus, her tutor; Lady Croom, Thomasina's mother and mistress of the prestigious estate Sidley Park; and Richard Noakes, landscape gardener at that estate. The principle 1993 characters are Hannah, an author staying at Sidley Park while working on her second book; Bernard, a visiting Byron scholar; and Valentine, son of the household. Much of the action of the 1993 scenes involve the characters' search to discover what happened at Sidley Park in 1809; the 1809 action reveals what really took place. As mentioned above, action alternates between these two time periods; Scene 1 takes place in 1809, Scene 2 in 1993, and so on.

Data

Data

In this section, I will present three passages from Arcadia which I claim involve a Gricean implicature. For each passage, I will explain why there is evidence for an implicature, who calculates it, and how they do so.

My first example comes from a conversation between Bernard and Valentine. Bernard has
just conjectured that Lord Byron was once a guest at Sidley Park. Valentine asks for confirmation about the identity of this supposed visitor, and the following exchange ensues:

(5a) Valentine: Are you talking about Lord Byron, the poet?
Bernard: No...I'm talking about Lord Byron the chartered accountant.
Valentine: Oh, he was here, all right.

(Stoppard 1993; 50)

The evidence for an implicature in this passage comes from Valentine's response. Applying the formulation from (3) above, Valentine could reason as follows:

(5b) Implicature Calculation - Lord Byron

a. Bernard asserts that he is talking about Lord Byron the chartered accountant to Valentine in the context of a world in which Lord Byron is a well-known nineteenth-century poet.

b. Assertion of this statement in the context of such a world violates the maxim of Quality (since Valentine, based on his general knowledge of the world, can guess that Bernard is not actually asking after a man named Lord Byron who was a chartered accountant).

c. Nevertheless Valentine assumes Bernard is being cooperative.

d. Therefore Valentine reasons that Bernard must mean something other than "Lord Byron the chartered accountant" when he asserts that he is asking after such a man.

d. Therefore Valentine reasons that Bernard must mean something other than "Lord Byron the chartered accountant" when he asserts that he is asking after such a man (specifically, that he means to emphasize the unique and unmistakable identity of Lord Byron the poet).

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4I assume throughout this paper that although characters in Arcadia (and other literary works) are fictional, that they are as capable of thought/reason as real people are.
An implicature seems to be calculated in this passage just as in a conversation between two people; the fact that this conversation is part of a play is not essential to this implicature. However, since this conversation is part of a play, the audience of the play hears Bernard's comment just as Valentine does; the main difference is that the audience is only able to listen, not respond.

Another equally straightforward example comes from later in the play. Here, Bernard accuses Hannah of mistakenly identifying a nineteenth century painting, chosen as the cover art of her book, as a portrait of Lord Byron; he tells her, "you...had the wrong bloke on the dust-jacket" (Stoppard 1993; 60). She does not have the opportunity to respond to this statement, however, since the conversation shifts to another topic, namely the results of Valentine's method of comparing book reviews to determine their authorship. The following exchange ensues:

(6a) Valentine: The Piccadilly [a nineteenth-century periodical] reviews aren't a very good fit with Byron's other reviews, you see.

Hannah: What do you mean, the wrong bloke?

(Stoppard 1993; 60)

Here, Hannah's remark seems irrelevant; Valentine is speaking of book reviews but she asks about the portrait on her book's dust-jacket. Again, an implicature can be calculated if this exchange is regarded as a conversation between real people, not necessarily characters in a play. Bernard is regarded as a conversation between real people, not necessarily characters in a play. Bernard

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5 It is interesting to note that the implicature here is dependant on the fact that the conversation topic has shifted since Bernard's accusation. If Hannah had asked her question immediately after Bernard's accusation, no implicature would be present.
and Valentine, listeners to Hannah's remark\textsuperscript{6}, could reason as follows:

(6b) Implicature Calculation - Wrong bloke

a. Hannah asks what Bernard means by "the wrong bloke" to Valentine and Bernard in the context of a discussion on the book reviews in a particular periodical.

b. Asking this question in the context of a conversation about book reviews seems at first to violate the maxim of Relation.

c. Nevertheless Valentine and Bernard assume Hannah is being cooperative.

d. Therefore they reason that Hannah must be referring back to an earlier part of the conversation, a part in which in her utterance would have been relevant; that is, she is interested in clarifying what Bernard meant by his remark about "the wrong bloke".

As before, an implicature seems to be calculated in this passage just as in a conversation between two people; the fact that this conversation is part of a play is not essential to this implicature. Also as before, the audience of the play hears Bernard's comment just as Hannah does, but unlike Hannah can only hear and not respond.

In the above examples, Grice's analysis proceeds smoothly and without complication. However, next I will present a more complicated example. Although the exchanges above reveal an implicature if understood as simple conversations between two people, the following exchange does not. There are still implicatures being calculated, but at a different level.

Consider the following example. During Scene 1, which takes place in 1809, a hunting not. There are still implicatures being calculated, but at a different level.

\textsuperscript{6}For dealing with multiple hearers here, I assume Clark and Carlson (1982)'s 'Principle of Responsibility': "Each [participant in a conversation] is responsible at all times for keeping track of what is said, and for enabling everyone else to keep track of what is being said. Each party keeps a cumulative record that becomes part of everyone's common ground...Imagine Ann, Barbara, and Charles in a conversation. When Ann asks Barbara a question, Charles is expected to keep track of that question, even though he is not being addressed" (Clark and Carlson 1982; 334)
expedition takes place; during it, a hare which was actually shot by Augustus is mistakenly recorded as having been shot by the visiting Lord Byron. *The 1993* characters have read this hunting record and believe that the hare was indeed shot by Byron. During Scene 7, Bernard remarks about how sure he (Bernard) is that Lord Byron wrote a particular unattributed poem:

(7a) Bernard: ...he [Byron] wrote those lines as sure as he shot that hare.  

(Stoppard 1993; 89)

Before moving on to discuss implicatures, the logical form of this statement deserves some explanation. I interpret the phrase "as sure as" above as a connective which asserts that the two propositions which it connects have equivalent truth values. That is, in this statement Bernard is asserting that Byron "wrote those lines" (a proposition I will call p) if and only if he also "shot that hare" (which I will call q). The entire sentence can then be represented in standard logical notation as (p iff q).

If this exchange were analyzed, like the previous examples, as simply a conversation between two people, no implicatures would be calculated here. Bernard is speaking to Hannah; both of these characters believe that Byron did indeed shoot the hare. Because she believes that the second part of Bernard's statement is true, she can conclude that the first part is also true. That is, Bernard has made a statement which his conversation partner regards as true, relevant, and not lacking in information or giving too much information; following the standard rules of logic, she can make the following logical inference about Bernard's reasoning based on his assertion and her previous knowledge:

(8) **Bernard reasoning - Unattributed poem**

Bernard thinks that (p iff q)  
Bernard thinks that (q)  

(from Bernard's statement)  
(from Hannah's previous knowledge)
Bernard thinks that (p) (conclusion - Bernard thinks that Byron wrote the lines)

Furthermore, Hannah's own previous experience agrees with Bernard's; she too believes that (q) is true. Following the reasoning that Bernard intends her to follow, she can work out the following steps:

(9) Hannah reasoning - Unattributed poem

\[
p \iff q \quad \text{(assuming truth of Bernard's statement)}
\]

\[
q \quad \text{(from Hannah's previous knowledge)}
\]

\[
p \quad \text{(conclusion - Byron wrote the lines)}
\]

However, analyzing this exchange on an even more complex level yields a more interesting analysis. Audience members of the play can also work out (8) above, concluding that Bernard believes that Byron wrote the unattributed poem. However, they do not agree with Hannah in reasoning along the lines of (9); they know that the hare was really shot by Augustus rather than Byron. The audience's premises are therefore:

(10) Audience reasoning - Unattributed poem

Bernard believes that (p iff q) (from Bernard's statement)

Bernard believes that (p iff q) (from Bernard's statement)

\[
\neg q \quad \text{(from audience previous knowledge)}
\]

The audience cannot draw the conclusion (\neg p) from these premises, however, since the statement (p iff q) is embedded in the statement "Bernard believes that...". However, the audience
has other reason to believe that (¬p). (This is due to the content of the poem, which concerns how a particular book, *The Couch of Eros*, is soporific. Since Septimus had commented earlier in the play about how reading this book makes him sleepy, the audience has reason to believe that Septimus, not Byron, wrote the poem.) Therefore, the conclusion that the audience is likely to draw is that Bernard's statement is incorrect; that is, Bernard does not know what he is talking about. The audience is likely to find such ignorance humorous, since Bernard asserts his line with a great deal of (misplaced, from the audience's pointed view) confidence.

Here the situation becomes even more complex. From the audience's perspective, Bernard seems to be leading his intra-play listeners to an incorrect conclusion. However, he is relying on only the information he himself possesses; as demonstrated above, from his perspective he is not violating any maxims. However, Bernard is not the only speaker here; he is, after all, a character in a play. He must speak the lines which the playwright gives him, leaving the audience to wonder why this playwright chose to give Bernard a line which would cause the other characters to draw a different (and incorrect) conclusion. Again, the model from (3) above can be applied, this time with some modifications:

(7b) **Implicature Calculation - Unattributed poem**

a. Tom Stoppard has given Bernard a line which causes his intra-play listeners to reach a different conclusion than that reached by the audience of the play.

b. Giving Bernard such a line violates the maxim of Quality (since Bernard's line suggests a false conclusion)

c. Nevertheless the audience assumes Stoppard is being cooperative.

d. Therefore the audience reasons that Stoppard must mean something other than the fact that the truth values of two particular propositions are equivalent when he gives Bernard this line. (Specifically, Stoppard is providing a humorous line to entertain his audience. He is also commenting on Bernard's lack of knowledge of
past events, and possibly a more general comment about peoples' general inabilities to reconstruct history.)

To summarize, the examples above fall into two categories, a rough description of which is given below.

(11) Categories of data

Case 1: Conversation in which a character and an audience member calculate an implicature based on what a second character says

Case 2: Conversation in which an audience member, but not a character, calculates an implicature based on what the playwright gives a character to say

In the section below, I will refine these descriptions and present an analysis which I argue accounts for the above data.

Analysis

This section will have four parts. I will begin with a general overview of my analysis; I will then state the analysis, discuss its distinguishing features, and explain the reasoning behind these features. Next, I will explain my choice of terminology. Finally, I will describe how my analysis accounts for the data given above.

The basic idea of my analysis is as follows. I claim that multiple levels of discourse are involved in the calculation of the Arcadia implicatures presented above. One level fits the familiar Gricean discourse model; implicatures are calculated by an intra-play listener based on what an intra-play speaker has said, just like in the simple Gricean example (see (4) above). The second of these levels is the one I wish to emphasize; at this level, a speaker unbeknownst to the intra-play participants is communicating with a hearer who is also unbeknownst to them.
My analysis, which I will call the literary-discourse analysis, can be represented by the picture below.

In this picture, each of the circles represents a 'level' of discourse. The inner circle represents the level of discourse within the play, while the outer circle represents an external level of discourse. The words within each circle name the participants who are present in that level.

Two main characteristics of this analysis deserve discussion. The first of these involves the fact that the analysis provides four discourse roles instead of Grice's two. From the examples which fall under Case 2 above (see (11)), it is clear that, as Goffman (1981) writes, "our initial two party paradigm is inadequate" (Goffman 1981; 132). In the data presented, four roles are evident: the playwright, an audience member, and the two characters. My analysis captures this fact; the playwright receives the label of "communicator" and the audience is the "communicatee"; the character speaking is the "talker" and the character listening is the "hearer".

Another feature involves the two distinct levels present in this analysis. The rationale for a two-level analysis is inspired both by the data and by the writings of Goffman (1981) and Hess-Luttich (1985). The fact that the data fall into two cases seems to suggest that two different constructs of some sort are required to describe it.

7Goffman makes this statement with regard to bystanders to an ordinary conversation, who he argues are participants although they are not the speaker or direct listener. I will discuss the issue of bystanders in non-literary conversations later in this paper.
Further developing this notion, there are situations in which the audience knows more than the characters do. This seems to suggest that concentric circles may be a good model here. The question then arises, however, whether or not there can be situations in which the characters know more than the audience does, and can consequently calculate an implicature when the audience cannot. The answer to this question will be explored later in this section.

Literature in the field also suggests this analysis. Regarding drama, Goffman writes that:

the words addressed by one character in a play to another (at least in Western dramaturgy) are eternally sealed off from the audience, belonging to an entirely self-enclosed, make-believe realm.

(Goffman 1981; 139)

Hess-Luttich (1985), however, writes that a character in a play, while "addressing his partner in the dialogue, at the same time...addresses a hypothetical receiver of the message outside" the world of the play (Hess-Luttich 1985; 200). Both of these quotations support my notion of two levels; the inner level is Goffman's "entirely self-enclosed...realm" while the outer one provides Hess-Luttich (1985)'s "outside" addressee.

The terminology I have chosen for these participants is worth noting. For the inner level, I have borrowed Grice's terminology of "talker"/"hearer" (Grice 1967; 67-68) to reflect the fact that, at this level, my analysis is essentially Grice's. For the role in the outer level which corresponds to the inner-level 'talker', I borrow Elin Fredsted's term "communicator" (Fredsted 1998; 536). I like this term because it implies one who communicates, although not necessarily through direct speech; the inner-level 'talker', I borrow Elin Fredsted's term "communicator" (Fredsted 1998; 536). I like this term because it implies one who communicates, although not necessarily through direct speech; this description applies to the playwright from my data. Finally, to match this third term, I have chosen the term "communicatee" for the role in the outer level which corresponds to the inner-level

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8This term comes from Fredsted's 1998 article "On semantic and pragmatic ambiguity" as part of his discussion of Grice's maxims: "A communicator can observe the maxims but he can also violate or exploit them..."
I am now ready to explain how my proposed analysis accounts for the data from *Arcadia*. Consider again (5a-b) and (6a-b) above. These are examples of Case 1, in which a character calculates an implicature based on what another character has said. In my model, these exchanges involve most essentially the inner, intra-play level of conversation. The fact that an additional outer level exists is not necessary for the calculation of an implicature here. In this outer level, though, the communicatee is likely to calculate the same implicature as the character being spoken to.

This scenario is pictorially represented below. In this picture and the ones that follow, three types of notation are used and need to be explained. First, underlining the name of a participant indicates that this participant has the necessary information to calculate an implicature in the situation being represented. The second notational device, a regular arrow, has two parts. The blunt end of the arrow indicates the participant who is directly responsible for the statement being made; that is, the participant who utters such a statement. The pointed end of the arrow indicates the participant(s) who calculate an implicature based on the statement. Finally, the third notational device employed is a dotted-line arrow. The blunt end of this arrow indicates the participant who is originally responsible for the statement under discussion (that is, the communicator); the pointed end connects this participant to the one who actually utters such a statement (the talker).

Next, consider example (7a-b), which fall under Case 2. This is an example in which an audience member calculates an implicature based on what the playwright gives a character to say.
In my model, such exchanges involve both the inner, intra-play and the outer, extra-play, levels of conversation. The communicator gives the talker a particular line to say; the communicatee calculates an implicature based on it. Again, a pictorial representation is shown below.

Examining the differences in these two pictures helps illuminate the differences between Case 1 and Case 2. In Case 1 (13), all participants have the necessary information to calculate an implicature; both the hearer in the inner level and the communicatee in the outer level do so. However, in Case 2 (14), only the outer level participants have this information. Consequently, the hearer does not calculate an implicature in such cases.

As can be seen, the relationship between the communicator and talker remains the same in both cases. This relationship, however, seems more important for Case 2 implicatures than Case 1 implicatures. This is because, as discussed earlier in this paper (see Data section), Case 1 implicatures can be viewed as simple two-party conversations. That is, in Case 1 (13), the talker has all of the necessary information to create an implicature and therefore can be thought of as initiating the exchange themselves; the fact that an external force (the communicator) is ultimately responsible for the exchange does not matter for the implicature. In Case 2 (14), however, this initiating the exchange themselves; the fact that an external force (the communicator) is ultimately responsible for the exchange does not matter for the implicature. In Case 2 (14), however, this ultimate responsibility is essential to the calculation of an implicature (also as mentioned in Data section above). The talker here does not possess full information; only the communicator is in the position to create an implicature.

Earlier in this section, an issue was raised concerning the possibility of characters
calculating an implicature which audience members do not. Following the conventions established above, such a scenario would be represented as follows:

(15)

As mentioned above, there is a question of whether or not such a scenario is possible. I would like to argue that such a scenario is indeed possible, although it occurs less often than those represented in (13) and (14) above. In support of such a claim, I present yet another example from Arcadia; there is no implicature calculated here, but the example is nonetheless illustrative.

Early in Scene 1, Thomasina reports to Septimus the following secret which she has just overheard, and Septimus reacts to it immediately:

(16) Thomasina: I heard Jellaby [the butler] telling cook that Mrs.Chater [a houseguest] was discovered in carnal embrace in the gazebo.

Septimus: Really? With whom, did Jellaby happen to say?

(Stoppard 1993; 2)

Later in the scene, the audience will find out that Septimus was the other member of this illicit couple; Septimus, of course, knows it at the time. Although no implicature is calculated here, this is an example of a situation in which a character knows more than the audience does, and thus a situation in which the implicature pattern in (15) is potentially possible. (Such implicatures, if they occur at all, seem likely to occur at the beginning of a play, before the audience has had the chance
to find out much information about the characters or their world. These patterns later in a play would be likely to confuse an audience and make them feel as though they were missing important information.

To summarize, I feel that this analysis accounts for the data given above. As discussed, provision of multiple levels of discourse and more than two discourse roles are the essential features of this analysis.

Extensions

The purpose of this section is to speculate on why the analysis formulated above is an interesting result. That is, how is this result a useful one for the field of pragmatics? Can this analysis be applied to other data besides the ones given here? Here, I will argue that the literary-discourse analysis can be a useful tool for analyzing conversational implicatures in other works of literature and in certain types of real-life conversations. Independent of these extensions, however, I also claim that the analysis is interesting in its own right.

I have argued above that this analysis captures the patterns of implicature calculation which occur in this play; it would be interesting to investigate how, and whether, this analysis applies to other works of literature as well. Since the analysis deals with levels of discourse and implicature patterns rather than any characteristics specific to Arcadia, this seems likely. For example, consider the following passage from Lewis Carroll's Alice's Adventures in Wonderland. This passage involves a conversation between three characters (Alice, the March Hare, and the Mad Hatter) at a tea party:

(17a) "Take some more tea," the March Hare said to Alice, very earnestly.

"I've had nothing yet," Alice replied in an offended tone: "so I can't take more."

"You mean you can't take less," said the [Mad] Hatter: "it's very easy to take more than nothing."
Passages like this occur throughout this novel, especially in parts involving characters such as the Hatter who are acknowledged to be mad. Like the *Arcadia* data, this quotation seems to lead to an implicature, again in the pattern of (3). (This type of implicature is slightly different from the type present in the *Arcadia* data; the question of types of implicatures will be discussed in the next section.)

(17b) **Implicature calculation - Carroll extension**

a. Carroll gives the March Hare a line about having more tea in the context of a tea party at which she has not yet had any tea.

b. An offer of more tea made in the context above violates the maxim of Manner (it seems unorderly for the Hare to ask Alice if she would like more tea when she has not had any at all).

c. Nevertheless the reader assumes Carroll is being cooperative

d. Therefore the reader reasons that Carroll must mean something other than simply having the Hare offer Alice "more tea" (specifically, he may be playing on the fact that the word "more" is usually used only in contexts when "some" has already occurred.)

The literary-discourse analysis can account for this implicature in the following way. As was the case in *Arcadia*, the communicator (the author) intends an implicature to be calculated by the communicatee (her reader, in this case). This is not a direct exchange, though; the communicator's message is passed indirectly to the communicatee via a talker, the Mad Hatter. The fact that this analysis can explain implicature calculation in this work, as well as in *Arcadia*, suggests that it may be a useful tool for analyzing conversational implicatures in other works of literature.
In addition to accounting for other literary implicatures, this analysis may be a helpful tool in the study of certain types of real-life conversations. These are conversations in which a speaker intends their utterance to be understood more by a secondary hearer than by the person to whom they are ostensibly speaking. Clark and Carlson (1982) give the following example of this sort of utterance:

(18) *Mother, to three-month-old, in front of father:* Don't you think your father should change your diapers?

(Clark and Carlson 1982; 337)

This utterance can be compared to the utterances from the *Arcadia* data. Like the playwright, the mother in this exchange is directing her utterance more to an 'outside' hearer than to the more ostensibly addressed hearer. Like another character in the play, the three-month-old in this situation has a very limited understanding of the statement being made (maybe she only understands that her mother is vocalizing something). Finally, like the audience of *Arcadia*, the father understands a more complete meaning of the mother's utterance.

Using the literary-discourse analysis, an analysis of (18) above would proceed as follows. The communicator in this situation (the mother) makes a statement which both the hearer (the three-month-old) and the communicatee (the father) are privy to. The hearer, enclosed in her own level of discourse, is not aware that the utterance is directed to anyone besides herself (in this, she is similar to the characters in *Arcadia* who are not aware of the existence of an audience). She, like a character in *Arcadia*, draws an incomplete conclusion based on her limited knowledge base. The to the characters in *Arcadia* who are not aware of the existence of an audience). She, like a character in *Arcadia*, draws an incomplete conclusion based on her limited knowledge base. The communicatee, however, is able to draw an implicature based on what the communicator has said (he most likely concludes that she is tired of changing diapers and wants him to take over for her in this task). An illustration of this scenario, along the lines of (13) and (14) above, would be as follows:
Here, the communicator and communicatee are the only participants who possess enough information to create or calculate an implicature; an arrow connects these two participants. However, the issue of the role of the talker is problematic here. Since the mother is uttering her own words rather than putting them in the mouth of another participant, it would seem that there is no talker here. The dotted arrow which connects the communicator (mother) to herself captures the fact that this participant is both the originator and actual utterer of this statement. This major difference between (19) and (13) and (14) above casts doubt on whether or not the literary-discourse model is really a good model for conversations such as (18); this issue will be discussed more in the next section.

Evaluation/Further Questions

In this section, I will speculate on what sorts of questions might lead to further work in the direction of this paper. These include a technical point of my analysis, applications of the analysis, and a further point concerning actors' implicature calculations in a play.

Role exchange is a problematic technical point of this analysis. Within a Gricean discourse, the speaker and listener can readily exchange roles. However, within the framework of an author-audience situation, the communicator and communicatee cannot similarly exchange roles. As was the case with the issue of cooperation discussed in Background: General Points above, this may be an issue for disciplines other than linguistics to answer. Perhaps it could be argued that readers really do communicate back to the authors whose work they read or view; letters to these authors is
one such method for this communication. This explanation, however, is not fully satisfying; further work on this issue may be rewarding.

Besides this technical point, the question of the applications of the literary-discourse analysis is worth revisiting. In the paragraphs which follow, I will discuss two sources of further questions which fall into this category. The first point, related to the Carroll example above, concerns types of possible literary implicatures and what sorts of works may lead to them. The second point speculates on whether an analysis formulated for a play is truly a good model for describing overhearer-related situations.

The implicature in (7b) above involved a message about lack of character knowledge, accomplished via a violation of Grice's maxims of Quality/Manner. However, as the example passage from Carroll indicates (see (17b) above), this is not the only type of literary implicature possible. Another sort of implicature is found in Ernest Hemingway's short stories "Big Two-Hearted River: Parts I and II". In these stories, a character's small actions (making breakfast, fishing, etc) are described in minute detail, violating Quantity; the reader is led to conclude that this character must be focusing on these small tasks as a way of avoiding thinking about the burnt city he has just left. The question of what types of literary implicatures are possible - what maxims can be violated to achieve what effects - is, in my opinion, an interesting one worth pursuing in more depth.

Another interesting question, also related to literary implicatures, concerns what characteristics a play (or other literary work) must possess to create implicatures to which the literary-discourse analysis would be applicable. For example, the extent to which a communicator can lead a communicatee to calculate implicatures depends on the skill of the communicator literary-discourse analysis would be applicable. For example, the extent to which a communicator can lead a communicatee to calculate implicatures depends on the skill of the communicator (author) and also on the extent to which their work is intended to imitate reality. Determining the factors which are essential to the application of this analysis is another interesting direction for

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9This example comes from Kari Swingle's Ling 40: Semantics course taught during the Spring 1998 semester at Swarthmore College.
further work.

A third question under this heading concerns what differences between plays and other literary works are relevant for this analysis. Earlier in this paper (see Background: General Points above), two such differences were discussed (plays are made up mostly of dialogue and are closer in form to real conversations than other forms of literature are). A more thorough investigation of these differences may prove illuminating.

Additionally, the extendibility of this analysis to non-literary discourses is an issue worth pursuing. As discussed above, the literary-discourse analysis at first seems a good model for discourses involving overhearers; however, technical problems arise since in such situations there is no distinct "talker" role. Whether this lack should be viewed as a variation on the analysis or a reason to choose a different model for these discourses remains to be investigated.

Finally, a not-yet-mentioned added dimension of the Arcadia data may prove an interesting source of further questioning. I claim that the analysis formulated above accounts for the points of view of the (fictional) characters and the (real) playwright and audience. An additional group of people are involved in this (and any) play, however: the actors who portray these characters. These actors, having studied the script prior to their performance, are even more informed than the audience; at a given moment in the play, they are aware not only of all the scenes which have already occurred but also of all scenes yet to occur. The first time that they read the play, they are akin to the communicatee in my framework; they calculate implicatures based on what lines the playwright gives their (and other) characters to say. However, how should they be incorporated into this framework once they have memorized the script? Is it even necessary to include them in such a framework at all? These questions provide an intriguing direction which further work may wish to pursue.

Conclusion

In this paper, I have attempted to formulate an analysis which accounts for conversational
implicatures in Tom Stoppard's 1993 play *Arcadia*. I began this paper by presenting several different passages from *Arcadia* and explaining how they lead to implicatures for various participants. Next, after organizing the essential features of these data, I proposed an analysis to account for them. Finally, I evaluated this analysis and speculated on its extendibility and directions for further work. It is my hope that this paper will indeed lead to more work on this interesting line of inquiry.
Bibliography:


Linguistics 40 class notes. 2/26/98. Class taught by Kari Swingle, Swarthmore College.

